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<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Robert Adler 13, professor of law at University of Utah, “Agriculture And Water Quality: A Climate-Integrated Perspective ,” Vermont Law Review, 102, pp 847-886, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564707// um-ef fulltext: 2. Aligning Multiple Interests Simply reframing the question, of course, at best only takes us in a new direction with the potential to generate more promising solutions. Moving from the reframed question to one or more solutions also requires both a mechanism to match public and private interests and successful ideas on how those interests should be aligned to achieve mutually beneficial goals. In previous work, I proposed a potential mechanism designed in part to achieve a better alignment of public and private interests in the context of the massive public expenditures that have been devoted to agricultural water pollution control in recent decades. Without suggesting that this is the only possible approach to achieve this pairing of interests—and indeed, I hope many more might be proposed—it can serve as an illustration of how this might be achieved. In Priceline for Pollution: Auctions to Allocate Public Pollution Control Dollars, 189 I critiqued our decades-old policy, under both Clean Water Act and Farm Bill programs, of throwing huge amounts of public dollars at agricultural water pollution control programs without adequate accountability or success measures. None of those funding sources, of course, are free of guiding criteria or standards, but others have critiqued them as inadequate and ineffective.190 It is possible, then, that the primary flaw in our previous approaches to agricultural pollution is not that we have chosen to subsidize private pollution control with public dollars rather than regulating farmers, but that we have subsidized in an inefficient way with little or no effective means of measuring or even requiring effective use of those funds. An alternative is to borrow a concept from the Colorado River Salinity Control Program, which also devotes significant public funding to the control of both point and nonpoint source salinity pollution in the Colorado River Basin.191 In the early years of the salinity program, following the traditional methods it had used for decades for dams and other water projects, the Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) selected salinity reduction projects using a traditional public works model.192 Later, the USDA added its traditional federal assistance approach to subsidize farmers to reduce their salinity inputs into the system.193 Both internal and external reviewers critiqued the cost-effectiveness of this strategy, and Congress adopted legislative reforms194 suggesting a “basinwide” approach to the salinity problem.195 As a result, the BoR, in cooperation with the Colorado River Basin states, shifted to a public auction approach. Program funds are now allocated to those who can demonstrate that they can reduce salt loadings to the river most cost-effectively, measured in cost per ton of salt removed from the river, regardless of the source, after accounting for any risk that the project will not be implemented effectively.196 In the roughly decade and a half since BoR adopted the auction approach, the cost-effectiveness of salinity reduction measures in the basin has improved dramatically.197 In my earlier analysis, I suggested using nutrient and sediment pollution of the Chesapeake Bay as an experimental model for using the reverse auction approach to tackle a more traditional but longstanding and intractable agricultural pollution problem.198 Rather than throwing public money at anyone who can meet generic program criteria independent of cost-effectiveness or any other measure of accountability, under this approach agency officials would solicit bids based on who can reduce more pounds of nitrogen, phosphorus, or sediment loadings at the lowest costs, again accounting for project risk.199 My intent in that analysis was not to argue that public funding is necessarily the best approach to agricultural pollution control, but if we are going to continue to spend large amounts of public funds in that effort—particularly during a time of federal fiscal crisis—we certainly should do so more effectively and with more accountability. There is some indication that interest in the public auction approach is building, as Pennsylvania is considering legislation to adopt an auction model200 as part of its implementation of the EPA’s interstate Chesapeake Bay TMDL discussed above.201 This same strategy might also help us to identify and prioritize funding for solutions to agricultural water pollution in ways that also help agricultural producers adapt to the disruptive effects of climate change. One thing seems reasonably clear in this effort: Neither farmers nor governments can solve the reframed problems laid out earlier on their own. It needs to be a partnership. And it is equally clear that, despite rhetorical claims about the independent nature of small rural farmers, agriculture has been a privatepublic partnership in the United States since at least the 1930s. The federal government has assisted farmers through direct subsidies, price supports, subsidized crop insurance, international trade policies, and otherwise. Since Congress adopted the original New Deal agricultural programs, the real question has been about the specific nature and terms of the public-private partnership, which has evolved considerably throughout its history,202 as opposed to whether it should exist at all. Although certainly not the only option, a reverse auction approach might help us to use climate change as an (admittedly counter-intuitive) opportunity to make this public-private partnership work more effectively to reduce the water quality and other adverse environmental effects of agriculture while also helping with climate change adaptation. To explore that option, we first need to consider accountability metrics equivalent to dollars per ton of salt (or nitrogen or phosphorus) that address multiple, hopefully consistent, goals. Although more difficult and more complex than programs designed to address individual pollutants like salt or nutrients, it is quite possible to conceive of metrics that might be suitable. The following examples are presented simply as preliminary possibilities to llustrate the idea. All would require considerably more refinement and are in no way intended to be exclusive. In a region facing expected reductions in precipitation and runoff, we might rank public investments based on predicted crop production per unit of water used (e.g., tons of wheat per acre-foot of water applied). In this case, the mutually aligned goals would be to increase production efficiency while preserving scarce water resources in increasingly arid areas. The accountability metric would provide incentives to develop more waterefficient production methods, while making public funds available to make the necessary investments in the most cost-effective irrigation methods, crop changes, or other innovations. Similarly, in a region facing increasing weed growth or increased risks from insects or other pests, we could rank public investments by crop production per unit of herbicide or pesticide use, perhaps weighted by the toxicity and mobility of each chemical in the environment. The mutually aligned goals would be to maintain production while reducing input costs and reducing adverse effects on water quality and human health. Producers would have incentives to innovate weed control and pest control methods that either used lower quantities of chemicals, or chemicals that were either less toxic or less likely to contaminate surface water, ground water, or other resources. Last, in a region in which crops are facing natural temperature limits, we might rank investments based on which new crops or varieties can produce best in that region with lowest water quality or other environmental impacts. The mutually aligned goals would be to promote and support crop shifts that maintain or improve production levels with lower environmental impacts, even if that means that different crops would be produced in different regions. Producers would have incentives either to develop or change to crops or crop varieties better suited to changing weather conditions, or even to change production locations. Some of those solutions could be expensive, making the partnership and public funding approach particularly desirable. One interesting advantage of using accountability metrics based on production relative to some relevant measure of environmental harm, as opposed to dollars per unit of pollution reduction, as is used for the salinity control program and proposed for the Chesapeake Bay TMDL, is that it potentially opens up a wider scope of federal funding mechanisms. As a matter of basic domestic farm policy, it may no longer be feasible from a fiscal, food supply, or environmental perspective to continue to subsidize inefficient production of large amounts of commodity crops, either for domestic consumption or for export. Rather than basing only certain targeted provisions of the Farm Bill on water quality and other resource protection goals, as well as any funding under the CWA or other federal and state environmental programs, this strategy could be used to direct all agricultural subsidies, or at least a larger percentage of them, to production changes designed simultaneously to help farmers adapt to climate change and to meet water quality and other environmental goals. A particularly challenging problem inherent in this approach, however, is that so many different accountability metrics might be relevant in determining the sustainability of agricultural production in the face of climate change, and some of those metrics might be internally inconsistent and subject to different value preferences or policy judgments. As just one example, if one measures production relative to pesticide use as a way to avoid or reduce the likelihood that farmers will adapt to increased pest risks by using more, or more toxic, pesticides, that might provide an incentive to shift to genetically modified organisms. Some may believe that to be a positive trend, while others may fear that it exposes humans, or the environment, to currently unknown or poorly understood risks. On the other hand, framing the question in this way may force us to make the choices among competing values that will be inevitable in deciding how to maintain or increase agricultural productivity in the face of climate change without aggravating already serious water quality and other environmental problems. Agricultural water pollution remains a serious problem that has not been mitigated on a nationwide scale despite four decades or more of effort. It has also been an intractable problem, in part due to the longstanding policy impasse about whether the best approach to the problem is to regulate farming practices more rigorously or to continue to encourage farmers to minimize their environmental impacts through education, public funding, and other voluntary programs. Climate change is likely to exacerbate the water quality effects of a range of agricultural practices and to increase other associated environmental problems as well. At the same time, climate change is likely to hurt U.S. agriculture itself, in ways both related to and entirely independent of environmental issues. As unsettling as those dual realizations may be, if we integrate the two issues, they provide an interesting opportunity to reframe the agricultural water pollution problem in a way that brings about an alignment of—rather than a conflict between—traditional agricultural and environmental interests. Some of the same strategies that will help farmers to withstand the production challenges presented by climate change, such as better pest management techniques, simultaneously could reduce the water pollution effects of those activities. Accordingly, reframing the agricultural water pollution issue from a climate-integrated perspective may increase our chance of finding viable solutions and overcoming the longstanding policy impasse in this area.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The plan’s public auction approach solves by requiring farms to limit water pollution, incentivizing a shift to climate-smart ag.</h4><p>Robert <strong>Adler 13</strong>, professor of law at University of Utah, “Agriculture And Water Quality: A Climate-Integrated Perspective ,” Vermont Law Review, 102, pp 847-886, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564707// um-ef</p><p>2. Aligning Multiple Interests Simply reframing the question, of course, at best only takes us in a new direction with the potential to generate more promising solutions. Moving from the reframed question to one or more <u>solution</u>s also <u>requires</u> both <u>a mechanism to match public and private interests</u> and successful ideas on how those interests should be aligned to achieve mutually beneficial goals. In previous work, I proposed a potential mechanism designed in part to achieve a better alignment of public and private interests in the context of the massive public expenditures that have been devoted to agricultural water pollution control in recent decades. Without suggesting that this is the only possible approach to achieve this pairing of interests—and indeed, I hope many more might be proposed—it can serve as an illustration of how this might be achieved. In Priceline for Pollution: Auctions to Allocate Public Pollution Control Dollars, 189 I critiqued our decades-old policy, under both Clean Water Act and Farm Bill programs, of <u>throwing huge amounts of public dollars at ag</u>ricultural <u>water pollution control programs without adequate accountability or success measures</u>. None of<u> those funding sources</u>, of course, <u>are free of guiding criteria or standards, but others have critiqued them as inadequate and ineffective</u>.190 It is possible, then, that <u>the primary flaw in our previous approaches to agricultural pollution is not that we have chosen to subsidize private pollution control with public dollars rather than regulating farmers, but that <mark>we have subsidized</mark> in an inefficient way <mark>with</mark> little or <mark>no</mark> effective means of measuring or even requiring <mark>effective use of</mark> those <mark>funds</u>. <u></mark>An <mark>alternative is</u></mark> to borrow a concept from the Colorado River Salinity Control Program, which also devotes significant <u>public funding to </u>the <u>control </u>of <u>both point and nonpoint source salinity pollution</u> in the Colorado River Basin.191 In the early years of the salinity program, following the traditional methods it had used for decades for dams and other water projects, the Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) selected salinity reduction projects using a traditional public works model.192 Later, the USDA added its traditional federal assistance approach to subsidize farmers to reduce their salinity inputs into the system.193 Both internal and external reviewers critiqued the cost-effectiveness of this strategy, and Congress adopted legislative reforms194 suggesting a “basinwide” approach to the salinity problem.195 As a result, <u>the BoR, in coop</u>eration <u>with the Colorado River Basin states, shifted to <mark>a <strong>public auction approach</u></strong></mark>. <u>Program funds are now allocated to those who can demonstrate that they can reduce salt loadings to the river most cost-effectively, measured in cost per ton of salt removed from the river</u>, regardless of the source, after accounting for any risk that the project will not be implemented effectively.196 In the roughly decade and a half since BoR adopted the auction approach, the cost-effectiveness of salinity reduction measures in the basin has improved dramatically.197 In my earlier analysis, <u>I suggest</u>ed <u>using nutrient and sediment pollution of </u>the<u> Chesapeake Bay as a</u>n experimental<u> model for using the reverse auction approach to tackle </u>a more traditional but longstanding and intractable<u> ag</u>ricultural<u> pollution </u>problem.198 Rather than throwing public money at anyone who can meet generic program criteria independent of cost-effectiveness or any other measure of accountability, <u>under this approach agency officials would solicit bids based on who can reduce more pounds of nitrogen, phosphorus, or sediment loadings at the lowest costs</u>, again accounting for project risk.199 My intent in that analysis was not to argue that public funding is necessarily the best approach to agricultural pollution control, but if we are going to continue to spend large amounts of public funds in that effort—particularly during a time of federal fiscal crisis—we certainly should do so more effectively and with more accountability. There is some indication that <u>interest in the public auction approach is building</u>, as Pennsylvania is considering legislation to adopt an auction model200 as part of its implementation of the EPA’s interstate Chesapeake Bay TMDL discussed above.201 <u>This</u> same strategy <u>might</u> also <u>help</u> us to identify and <u>prioritize funding for solutions to ag</u>ricultural<u> water pollution in ways that also help ag</u>ricultural <u>producers adapt to the disruptive effects of climate change</u>. One thing seems reasonably clear in this effort: Neither farmers nor governments can solve the reframed problems laid out earlier on their own. It needs to be a partnership. And it is equally clear that, <u>despite rhetorical claims about the independent nature of small rural farmers, agriculture has been a privatepublic partnership in the United States since at least the 1930s</u>. <u><strong><mark>The fed</strong></mark>eral government has <mark>assisted farmers through direct subsidies, price supports,</mark> subsidized <mark>crop insurance, international trade</mark> policies, <mark>and otherwise</u></mark>. Since Congress adopted the original New Deal agricultural programs, the real question has been about the specific nature and terms of the public-private partnership, which has evolved considerably throughout its history,202 as opposed to whether it should exist at all. Although certainly not the only option, <u><mark>a reverse auction</mark> approach might help </u>us to use climate change as an (admittedly counter-intuitive) opportunity <u>to <mark>make </mark>this </u>public-private<u> <mark>partnership work </mark>more effectively <mark>to reduce</mark> the <mark>water quality</mark> </u>and other adverse environmental<u> <mark>effects of ag</u></mark>riculture<u> while also helping with climate change adaptation</u>. To explore that option, we first need to consider accountability metrics equivalent to dollars per ton of salt (or nitrogen or phosphorus) that address multiple, hopefully consistent, goals. Although more difficult and more complex than programs designed to address individual pollutants like salt or nutrients, it is quite possible to conceive of metrics that might be suitable. The following examples are presented simply as preliminary possibilities to llustrate the idea. All would require considerably more refinement and are in no way intended to be exclusive. In a region facing expected reductions in precipitation and runoff, we might rank public investments based on predicted crop production per unit of water used (e.g., tons of wheat per acre-foot of water applied). In this case, the mutually aligned goals would be to increase production efficiency while preserving scarce water resources in increasingly arid areas. The accountability metric would provide incentives to develop more waterefficient production methods, while making public funds available to make the necessary investments in the most cost-effective irrigation methods, crop changes, or other innovations. Similarly, in a region facing increasing weed growth or increased risks from insects or other pests, we could rank public investments by crop production per unit of herbicide or pesticide use, perhaps weighted by the toxicity and mobility of each chemical in the environment. The mutually aligned goals would be to maintain production while reducing input costs and reducing adverse effects on water quality and human health. Producers would have incentives to innovate weed control and pest control methods that either used lower quantities of chemicals, or chemicals that were either less toxic or less likely to contaminate surface water, ground water, or other resources. Last, in a region in which crops are facing natural temperature limits, we might rank investments based on which new crops or varieties can produce best in that region with lowest water quality or other environmental impacts. The mutually aligned goals would be to promote and support crop shifts that maintain or improve production levels with lower environmental impacts, even if that means that different crops would be produced in different regions. Producers would have incentives either to develop or change to crops or crop varieties better suited to changing weather conditions, or even to change production locations. Some of those solutions could be expensive, making the partnership and public funding approach particularly desirable. One interesting advantage of using accountability metrics based on production relative to some relevant measure of environmental harm, as opposed to dollars per unit of pollution reduction, as is used for the salinity control program and proposed for the Chesapeake Bay TMDL, is that it potentially opens up a wider scope of federal funding mechanisms. <u>As a matter of basic domestic farm policy, it may no longer be feasible from a fiscal, food supply, or environmental perspective to continue to subsidize inefficient production of large amounts of commodity crops</u>, either for domestic consumption or for export. <u>Rather than basing only certain targeted provisions of the Farm Bill on water quality and </u>other <u><strong>resource protection</strong> goals, as well as any funding under the CWA or other federal </u>and state environmental<u> programs, <mark>this strategy could</mark> </u>be used to<u> <strong><mark>direct </mark>all</strong> <strong>ag</u></strong>ricultural<u><strong> subsidies</u></strong>, <u>or at least <mark>a large</mark>r <mark>percentage</mark> of them</u>, <u><strong>to production changes designed simultaneously <mark>to help farmers adapt to climate change and</mark> </u></strong>to <u><strong><mark>meet water </mark>quality </u></strong>and other environmental<u><strong> <mark>goals</u></strong></mark>. A particularly challenging problem inherent in this approach, however, is that so many different accountability metrics might be relevant in determining the sustainability of agricultural production in the face of climate change, and some of those metrics might be internally inconsistent and subject to different value preferences or policy judgments. As just one example, <u>if one measures production relative to pesticide use as a way to avoid or reduce the likelihood that farmers will adapt to increased pest risks by using more, or more toxic, pesticides, that might provide <strong>an incentive to shift to</u></strong> <u><strong>g</strong>enetically</u> <u><strong>m</strong>odified</u> <u><strong>o</strong>rganism<strong>s</u></strong>. Some may believe that to be a positive trend, while others may fear that it exposes humans, or the environment, to currently unknown or poorly understood risks. On the other hand, <u>framing the question in <mark>this way</mark> may force us to make the choices among competing values that will be inevitable </u>in deciding how <u>to maintain or <mark>increase ag</u></mark>ricultural <u><mark>productivity</mark> in the face of climate change</u> <u><strong><mark>without aggravating</u></strong></mark> already serious <u><strong><mark>water quality</mark> </u></strong>and other environmental <u><strong>problems</u></strong>. <u>Ag</u>ricultural<u> water pollution remains a serious problem</u> that has not been mitigated on a nationwide scale despite four decades or more of effort. It has also been an intractable problem, <u>in part due to the longstanding policy impasse about whether the best approach to the problem is to regulate farming practices </u>more rigorously or to continue to encourage farmers to minimize their environmental impacts through education, public funding, and other voluntary programs. Climate change is likely to exacerbate the water quality effects of a range of agricultural practices and to increase other associated environmental problems as well. At the same time, <u>climate change is likely to hurt U.S. ag</u>riculture <u>itself,</u> in ways both related to and entirely independent of environmental issues. As unsettling as those dual realizations may be, <u>if we integrate the two issues, they provide an interesting opportunity to reframe the ag</u>ricultural<u> water pollution problem in a way that brings about an alignment of—rather than a conflict between—traditional agricultural and environmental interests</u>. Some of the same strategies that will help farmers to withstand the production challenges presented by climate change, such as better pest management techniques, simultaneously could reduce the water pollution effects of those activities. Accordingly, reframing the agricultural water pollution issue from a climate-integrated perspective may increase our chance of finding viable solutions and overcoming the longstanding policy impasse in this area. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Gautam Mukunda 17, Assistant Professor in the Organizational Behavior Unit of Harvard Business School, 2/23/17, “If Democrats Want to Challenge Trump, They Need a New Strategy,” https://hbr.org/2017/02/if-democrats-want-to-challenge-trump-they-need-a-new-strategy fulltext: The loyalty Trump has earned from some of his supporters may be virtually unbreakable, resulting from appeals that Democrats cannot and should not seek to match. But to win in the 2018 midterms and the 2020 presidential election, the opposition does not need to convince everyone who voted for Trump. It does not even need to convince most of them. Democrats just need to peel away Trump’s marginal voters without losing the support of the majority of Americans who voted for other candidates. To do so, they need to understand the four reasons those marginal voters supported Trump: heightened partisanship (which led Trump to receive the support of 89% of registered Republicans); hostility to the Washington establishment; Trump’s rhetorical abandonment of the normal tropes of Republican politics; and his image as a successful businessman. The first two of these are probably nonstarters for Democrats, but the third and fourth represent vulnerabilities they could exploit. Trump took advantage of the fact that standard elements of the Republican catechism, particularly support for tax cuts on the wealthy and lower spending on almost everything except defense, had little popular appeal, even among Republican voters. Republican majorities in Congress remain at least rhetorically committed to that agenda, however, and Trump’s cabinet nominees, who for the most part are traditionally conservative Republicans, are likely to want to move it forward, despite its lack of appeal to his voters. Trump’s image as a businessman who can “get things done” and who was not captive to normal politics helped him get elected, but is fundamentally at odds with both that agenda and the chaos of his initial weeks in office. This creates an enormous opportunity for those opposed to Trump: Every time he proposes a conventional Republican policy, win or lose, Trump will be pushing ideas that his supporters mostly oppose and that seem like exactly the sort of generic Republican they rejected by electing him. Whatever type of policy he pushes, if he is seen to fail, the opposition will get a double triumph, on the issue and by showing that his aura of competence is a false one. The less Trump seems to be someone who can get things done, the less his marginal voters will believe in him. The less they believe in him, the weaker he gets. The weaker he gets, the more likely his next defeat becomes, weakening him still further and creating a vicious cycle that might lead to his political collapse. (A similar cycle, beginning with American struggles in Iraq and intensified by the effects of Hurricane Katrina and the financial crisis, is what caused George W. Bush to limp out of office, in 2008, with members of his own party keeping their distance from him.) But for this to happen, the opposition needs to understand three things: The opposition should focus on winning over the marginal Trump voter — not the fervent ones who appear at Trump rallies, but the ones who might be persuaded to switch their votes, or even to stay home on Election Day. Marginal voters are generally characterized by exceptionally low levels of knowledge about politics and pay little or no attention to policy debates and the tactics used by the two parties. This low level of knowledge about politics means that the president is often the only government official many voters can identify (in 2011 only 43% of voters could name the Speaker of the House; during the election only 40% of voters could name either candidate for vice president, with marginal voters disproportionately represented among those who could not). So voters tend to attribute all outcomes, positive or negative, to the president, regardless of what actually happened. Using the Right Approach Democrats can sort major Republican policy initiatives that will come up in the next two years in two ways: by their origin (are they specific to Trump or traditionally conservative policies) and by their popularity. This means there are four potential types of policies: Trump-specific popular policies Republican elite–supported popular policies Trump-specific unpopular policies Republican elite–supported unpopular policies To succeed, the opposition needs to treat each of these four types differently, with an eye to how they will affect Trump’s popularity by the 2018 and 2020 elections. Democrats and other opponents don’t have to win on every issue — just those that might make Trump more popular with marginal voters. Note how different this is from the two basic choices that have dominated discussions about how Trump’s opponents could best challenge him: Should the opposition treat Trump as the incarnation of the Republican Party or as an aberration? Should it cooperate on some issues in order to gain influence on policy and credit for bipartisanship? Categorizing issues this way, though, shows that those are the wrong questions. Instead, the opposition to Trump could capture the benefits of both sides of both choices because Trump’s policies, to the extent that he has articulated them thus far, are popular (at least with his voters) but hard to implement, while the conservative establishment’s policies are implementable but often unpopular. Trump-Specific Popular Policies A perfect example of this is an infrastructure bill. Democrats have been trying to pass an infrastructure bill since early in the Obama administration. If Trump proposes one, should they cooperate with him to pass it — both because they actually support the policy and because they would get credit with voters for bipartisanship? If marginal Trump supporters are the Democrats’ target, what will they think of this? Marginal voters pay little or no attention to politics, so they won’t give Democrats credit for being bipartisan. They probably won’t even know about it. Only 36% of Americans can correctly identify which party controls the House and Senate. Among registered voters, that number only increased to 41%. Marginal voters do, however, give credit to the president for all political outcomes. So if they see construction being done in their neighborhoods, or heavily broadcast on Trump-friendly media, they will give the credit to the president, regardless of whether the opposition cooperated. On the flip side, if Democrats successfully block an infrastructure bill, marginal Trump voters are not likely to blame Democrats for that opposition — they will just blame the president for failing to get things done. This central insight was what drove Mitch McConnell’s (in my opinion, the finest Senate tactician since Henry Clay) strategy of uniform opposition, which helped lead to today’s unprecedented Republican dominance of all levels of government. If Democrats want to erode Trump’s base of support, popular policies that are unique to Trump are the ones they ought to oppose most strenuously. Weak as they are, though, Democrats would have to ally with Republicans to defeat these policies. The Republican margin in both houses of Congress is small enough that Democrats don’t have to flip many Republicans to succeed. Successful opposition to any of Trump’s policies would, as long as Democrats stay unified, require joining with only one of many factions within a deeply fractured GOP (such as, in the case of an infrastructure bill, deficit hawks), and each new policy initiative opens up opportunities to ally with different factions. Trump’s own approach in the campaign means that he will have little or no ability to use party discipline to try to maintain the cohesion of the Republican caucus. He will have to rely on Republicans’ fear of being defeated in a primary by a candidate he supports, a fear that will ebb along with his popularity. Republican Elite–Supported Popular Policies These are ideas that a Republican like Paul Ryan would support and that have broad traction with voters, not just major donors. The Republican elite has diverged so far from its base (precisely the disjunction Trump exploited to seize control of the party) that it is difficult to come up with a policy that meets this description. Broad-based tax cuts and increases in defense spending are the most likely possibilities. Repealing the Obamacare mandate is another, but as that possibility has become more real and public attention has focused on the issue, the Affordable Care Act has substantially increased in popularity. The opposition probably has little ability to effect such policies one way or another, given unified Republican control of the House and Senate, so here the most fruitful target would be implementation. The Trump administration is already struggling to get things done. Any policy pushed by congressional Republicans will need to be implemented by an Executive Branch that so far has struggled with the machinery of government. The more that the actual rollout of any plan seems chaotic or failed (as was seen during the rollout of his immigration ban), the more it will tarnish Trump’s image as someone able to get things done. Trump-Specific Unpopular Policies Massive decreases in the legal immigration of skilled immigrants are one potential policy. This idea has limited broader popular support and would result in economic problems for the United States. However, it seems to be a priority for the Trump White House and has the support of some congressional Republicans. (Steve Bannon in particular has expressed his disapproval of the fact that a disproportionate number of executives in Silicon Valley are of Asian and South Asian origin.) Trump-supported unpopular policies that can be executed solely through executive orders are likely to be virtually impossible for the opposition to stop until the House or Senate changes hands (or unless those orders are so extreme or sloppily written that they fail to pass judicial review). If Trump does decide to push such measures, Democrats could respond by opposing these initiatives and trying to ally with skeptical House and Senate Republicans. In all cases, any political arguments that Democrats make should focus on what’s most likely to appeal to marginal Trump voters. Republican Elite–Supported Unpopular Policies The perfect example of such a policy is Medicare privatization, something Republicans in Congress are likely to explore despite an extraordinary level of popular opposition. It doesn’t take great strategic acumen to know that the Democrats should want to oppose any such policy. But what if Trump tries to position himself as the defender of popular programs, like Medicare, against the Republican establishment? If that happens, Democrats’ logical move would be to push Republicans together, hanging Congress’s every unpopular move around Trump’s neck like a wreath. (This will most likely increase the odds of such policies passing, but policy changes can be reversed if Democrats succeed in retaking control of Congress and the White House.) We can think of the Trump administration as roughly divided between a traditional Republican faction, led by Mike Pence and Reince Priebus (and supported by Ryan and McConnell), and an insurgent faction, led by Bannon and Jeff Sessions. Given the unpopularity of the policies advocated by the Pence-Priebus faction, the more that control over policy shifts into the hands of the Republican faction, the better chance Democrats will have in trapping Trump in a vicious cycle. If the Bannon-Sessions faction faces early policy defeats, the balance of power is more likely to move to the Pence-Priebus faction, traditional Republicans in Congress, and Trump’s cabinet, which will pursue policies that probably will result in further blows to Trump’s popularity, making him even more likely to face further defeats. Time Is Not on the Democrats’ Side By being bipartisan sometimes and partisan at other times, Democrats and other opponents of Trump could stymie the administration’s ability to pass policies they oppose, weaken his political standing, and perhaps even push him into a self-destructive spiral that would result in major gains for them in 2018 and Trump’s defeat in 2020. Trump’s approval rating has already dropped below 50% much faster than any other president in history. The challenge facing Democrats now is to prevent him from achieving victories that might deliver him enough short-term political benefits to restore his standing or arrest his fall, and to do so before Republicans in control of the national and most state governments implement policies (like voter suppression) that might make defeating him in an election more difficult. That means that, for the opposition, time is of the essence. Republicans have every conceivable structural advantage. To win, Democrats must reduce Trump’s popularity enough to render him functionally toxic to Republicans in Congress before he can act in ways that cement his hold on power. The opposition is in a race against the clock, and no one knows how much time is left on it. What is clear is this: If Democrats want to challenge Trump effectively, then every day they spend using the failed tactics of 2016 is a day wasted.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Dems will win the midterms by <u>peeling off marginal Trump voters</u> through <u>denying him wins</u> on popular policies---those voters filter <u>everything</u> through the President </h4><p>Gautam <strong>Mukunda 17</strong>, Assistant Professor in the Organizational Behavior Unit of Harvard Business School, 2/23/17, “If Democrats Want to Challenge Trump, They Need a New Strategy,” https://hbr.org/2017/02/if-democrats-want-to-challenge-trump-they-need-a-new-strategy</p><p>The loyalty Trump has earned from some of his supporters may be virtually unbreakable, resulting from appeals that Democrats cannot and should not seek to match. But <u><mark>to win</mark> in <mark>the</mark> 2018 <mark>midterms </mark>and</u> the <u>2020</u> presidential election, <u>the <mark>opposition does not need to convince <strong>everyone</strong></mark> who voted for Trump</u>. It does not even need to convince most of them. <u>Democrats <mark>just</mark> need to peel away <strong><mark>Trump’s marginal voters</u></strong></mark> without losing the support of the majority of Americans who voted for other candidates. To do so, they need to understand the four reasons those marginal voters supported Trump: heightened partisanship (which led Trump to receive the support of 89% of registered Republicans); hostility to the Washington establishment; Trump’s rhetorical abandonment of the normal tropes of Republican politics; and his image as a successful businessman. The first two of these are probably nonstarters for Democrats, but the third and fourth represent vulnerabilities they could exploit.</p><p><u>Trump took advantage of the fact that standard elements of the Republican catechism, particularly <strong>support for tax cuts on the wealthy</strong> and <strong>lower spending</u></strong> on almost everything except defense, <u>had little popular appeal, even among Republican voters</u>. <u>Republican majorities in Congress remain</u> at least rhetorically <u><strong>committed to that agenda</u></strong>, however, and Trump’s cabinet nominees, who for the most part are traditionally conservative Republicans, are likely to want to move it forward, despite its lack of appeal to his voters. <u>Trump’s image as a businessman who can “get things done” and who was not captive to normal politics</u> <u>helped him get elected, but is <strong>fundamentally at odds with</u></strong> both <u><strong>that agenda</u></strong> and the chaos of his initial weeks in office.</p><p><u>This creates an enormous opportunity for those opposed to Trump</u>: Every time he proposes a conventional Republican policy, win or lose, Trump will be pushing ideas that his supporters mostly oppose and that seem like exactly the sort of generic Republican they rejected by electing him. <u>Whatever type of policy he pushes, if he is seen to fail, the opposition will get a double triumph, on the issue and by showing that his aura of competence is a false one</u>. <u><strong><mark>The less Trump seems to</mark> be someone who can <mark>get things done, the less</mark> his <mark>marginal voters</mark> will <mark>believe in him</u></strong></mark>. <u>The less they believe in him, the weaker he gets. The weaker he gets, the more likely his next defeat becomes</u>, weakening him still further and creating a vicious cycle that might lead to his political collapse. (A similar cycle, beginning with American struggles in Iraq and intensified by the effects of Hurricane Katrina and the financial crisis, is what caused George W. Bush to limp out of office, in 2008, with members of his own party keeping their distance from him.)</p><p>But for this to happen, the opposition needs to understand three things:</p><p>The <u>opposition should focus on winning over <mark>the marginal</mark> Trump <mark>voter</u></mark> — not the fervent ones who appear at Trump rallies, but <u>the ones who <mark>might</mark> be persuaded to <strong><mark>switch</mark> their <mark>votes, or</mark> even to <mark>stay home</mark> on Election Day</u></strong>.</p><p><u><mark>Marginal voters are</u></mark> generally <u>characterized by <strong>exceptionally <mark>low</mark> levels of <mark>knowledge</mark> about politics</strong> and pay <strong>little or no attention to policy debates</u></strong> and the tactics used by the two parties.</p><p><u>This</u> low level of knowledge about politics <u>means</u> that <u><strong><mark>the president is</mark> often <mark>the only</mark> government <mark>official many</mark> voters <mark>can identify</u></strong></mark> (in 2011 only 43% of voters could name the Speaker of the House; during the election only 40% of voters could name either candidate for vice president, with marginal voters disproportionately represented among those who could not). So <u><strong>voters</u></strong> tend to <u><strong>attribute all outcomes, positive or negative, to the president, regardless of what actually happened</u></strong>.</p><p>Using the Right Approach</p><p>Democrats can sort major Republican policy initiatives that will come up in the next two years in two ways: by their origin (are they specific to Trump or traditionally conservative policies) and by their popularity. <u>This means there are four potential types of policies:</p><p>Trump-specific popular policies</p><p>Republican elite–supported popular policies</p><p>Trump-specific unpopular policies</p><p>Republican elite–supported unpopular policies</p><p></u>To succeed, the opposition needs to treat each of these four types differently, with an eye to how they will affect Trump’s popularity by the 2018 and 2020 elections. <u>Democrats</u> and other opponents <u>don’t have to win on every issue — just those that might make Trump more popular with marginal voters</u>.</p><p>Note how different this is from the two basic choices that have dominated discussions about how Trump’s opponents could best challenge him: Should the opposition treat Trump as the incarnation of the Republican Party or as an aberration? Should it cooperate on some issues in order to gain influence on policy and credit for bipartisanship? Categorizing issues this way, though, shows that those are the wrong questions. Instead, the opposition to Trump could capture the benefits of both sides of both choices because <u>Trump’s policies, to the extent that he has articulated them</u> <u>thus far</u>, <u><strong>are popular</u></strong> (at least with his voters) <u><strong>but hard to implement</strong>, while the conservative establishment’s policies are <strong>implementable but often unpopular</u></strong>.</p><p>Trump-Specific Popular Policies</p><p>A perfect example of this is an infrastructure bill. Democrats have been trying to pass an infrastructure bill since early in the Obama administration. If Trump proposes one, should they cooperate with him to pass it — both because they actually support the policy and because they would get credit with voters for bipartisanship?</p><p>If marginal Trump supporters are the Democrats’ target, what will they think of this? <u><mark>Marginal voters</mark> pay little or no attention to politics, so they <strong><mark>won’t give Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s credit for being bipartisan</strong></mark>. They probably won’t even know about it</u>. Only 36% of Americans can correctly identify which party controls the House and Senate. Among registered voters, that number only increased to 41%. <u>Marginal voters <strong>do</u></strong>, however, <u>give <strong>credit to the president for all political outcomes</u></strong>. So if they see construction being done in their neighborhoods, or heavily broadcast on Trump-friendly media, <u>they will give the credit to the president, <strong>regardless of whether the opposition cooperated</u></strong>.</p><p>On the flip side, <u>if Democrats successfully block a</u>n infrastructure <u>bill, marginal Trump voters are <strong>not likely to blame Democrats for that opposition — they will just blame the president for failing to get things done</u></strong>. This central insight was what drove Mitch McConnell’s (in my opinion, the finest Senate tactician since Henry Clay) strategy of uniform opposition, which helped lead to today’s unprecedented Republican dominance of all levels of government. <u>If Democrats want to erode Trump’s base of support, <strong>popular policies that are unique to Trump are the ones they ought to oppose most strenuously</u></strong>.</p><p>Weak as they are, though, Democrats would have to ally with Republicans to defeat these policies. The Republican margin in both houses of Congress is small enough that Democrats don’t have to flip many Republicans to succeed. Successful opposition to any of Trump’s policies would, as long as Democrats stay unified, require joining with only one of many factions within a deeply fractured GOP (such as, in the case of an infrastructure bill, deficit hawks), and each new policy initiative opens up opportunities to ally with different factions. Trump’s own approach in the campaign means that he will have little or no ability to use party discipline to try to maintain the cohesion of the Republican caucus. He will have to rely on Republicans’ fear of being defeated in a primary by a candidate he supports, a fear that will ebb along with his popularity.</p><p>Republican Elite–Supported Popular Policies</p><p>These are ideas that a Republican like Paul Ryan would support and that have broad traction with voters, not just major donors. The Republican elite has diverged so far from its base (precisely the disjunction Trump exploited to seize control of the party) that it is difficult to come up with a policy that meets this description. Broad-based tax cuts and increases in defense spending are the most likely possibilities. Repealing the Obamacare mandate is another, but as that possibility has become more real and public attention has focused on the issue, the Affordable Care Act has substantially increased in popularity.</p><p>The opposition probably has little ability to effect such policies one way or another, given unified Republican control of the House and Senate, so here the most fruitful target would be implementation. The Trump administration is already struggling to get things done. Any policy pushed by congressional Republicans will need to be implemented by an Executive Branch that so far has struggled with the machinery of government. The more that the actual rollout of any plan seems chaotic or failed (as was seen during the rollout of his immigration ban), the more it will tarnish Trump’s image as someone able to get things done.</p><p>Trump-Specific Unpopular Policies</p><p>Massive decreases in the legal immigration of skilled immigrants are one potential policy. This idea has limited broader popular support and would result in economic problems for the United States. However, it seems to be a priority for the Trump White House and has the support of some congressional Republicans. (Steve Bannon in particular has expressed his disapproval of the fact that a disproportionate number of executives in Silicon Valley are of Asian and South Asian origin.)</p><p>Trump-supported unpopular policies that can be executed solely through executive orders are likely to be virtually impossible for the opposition to stop until the House or Senate changes hands (or unless those orders are so extreme or sloppily written that they fail to pass judicial review). If Trump does decide to push such measures, Democrats could respond by opposing these initiatives and trying to ally with skeptical House and Senate Republicans. In all cases, any political arguments that Democrats make should focus on what’s most likely to appeal to marginal Trump voters.</p><p>Republican Elite–Supported Unpopular Policies</p><p>The perfect example of such a policy is Medicare privatization, something Republicans in Congress are likely to explore despite an extraordinary level of popular opposition. It doesn’t take great strategic acumen to know that the Democrats should want to oppose any such policy. But what if Trump tries to position himself as the defender of popular programs, like Medicare, against the Republican establishment? If that happens, Democrats’ logical move would be to push Republicans together, hanging Congress’s every unpopular move around Trump’s neck like a wreath. (This will most likely increase the odds of such policies passing, but policy changes can be reversed if Democrats succeed in retaking control of Congress and the White House.)</p><p>We can think of the Trump administration as roughly divided between a traditional Republican faction, led by Mike Pence and Reince Priebus (and supported by Ryan and McConnell), and an insurgent faction, led by Bannon and Jeff Sessions. Given the unpopularity of the policies advocated by the Pence-Priebus faction, the more that control over policy shifts into the hands of the Republican faction, the better chance Democrats will have in trapping Trump in a vicious cycle. If the Bannon-Sessions faction faces early policy defeats, the balance of power is more likely to move to the Pence-Priebus faction, traditional Republicans in Congress, and Trump’s cabinet, which will pursue policies that probably will result in further blows to Trump’s popularity, making him even more likely to face further defeats.</p><p>Time Is Not on the Democrats’ Side</p><p>By being bipartisan sometimes and partisan at other times, <u>Democrats</u> and other opponents of Trump <u>could</u> stymie the administration’s ability to pass policies they oppose, weaken his political standing, and perhaps even <u>push him into <mark>a self-destructive spiral</mark> that <mark>would result in <strong>major gains</mark> for them <mark>in 2018</mark> and <mark>Trump’s defeat in 2020</u></strong></mark>. Trump’s approval rating has already dropped below 50% much faster than any other president in history. <u>The challenge facing Democrats now is to prevent him from achieving victories that might deliver him enough short-term political benefits to restore his standing or arrest his fall</u>, and to do so before Republicans in control of the national and most state governments implement policies (like voter suppression) that might make defeating him in an election more difficult. That means that, for the opposition, time is of the essence. Republicans have every conceivable structural advantage. <u>To win, Democrats must reduce Trump’s popularity enough to render him functionally toxic to Republicans in Congress before he can act in ways that cement his hold on power</u>. The opposition is in a race against the clock, and no one knows how much time is left on it. What is clear is this: If Democrats want to challenge Trump effectively, then every day they spend using the failed tactics of 2016 is a day wasted.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Barnes 13 (Andrew Barnes is Chair, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science of PONARS Eurasia and is an expert in Comparative Politics, Political Economy, Oil & Gas, September 2013, “How Much Would It Hurt? Exploring Russia’s Vulnerability to a Drop in Energy Prices“, PONARS Eurasia, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/how-much-would-it-hurt-exploring-russia%E2%80%99s-vulnerability-drop-energy-prices, accessed 6-29-2019) jd fulltext: Russia’s economy is obviously energy-reliant, but how vulnerable does that make it in practical terms? What would happen if global energy prices dropped significantly? In the shadow of the shale gas and oil revolution, this memo examines how a drop in energy revenues would affect Russia in three important areas: fiscal, financial, and political. In each area, some of the effects of falling oil prices would be more or less automatic. For example, a decline in revenues would mean a rising budget deficit (keeping all other things equal). Such an effect is easy to predict: the deficit would simply be larger if the revenue loss were greater. Other implications, however, are more contingent, as they rely on choices made by individuals and groups. For instance, while observers sometimes imply or state outright that a government will be “forced” to respond to a crisis in a certain way, leaders always have some freedom to remain stubborn in the face of adversity. Likewise, there are multiple ways in which political alliances may react to stress. Those reactions are more difficult to foresee, but institutional arrangements and past patterns of behavior can guide observers’ efforts. The Nature and Performance of the Russian Economy In order to understand how the Russian economy might react to a shock, it is important to recognize not only its weaknesses, but also the fact that it has so far avoided a number of pitfalls. The economy is not a basket case teetering on the edge of disaster; in fact, it is performing quite well on a number of economic indicators. The World Bank categorizes it as “high middle income” with a GDP per capita of almost $20,000 in terms of purchasing power parity and over $12,000 in nominal terms. Economic growth quickly returned to positive levels after the crisis in 2009-10, and the budget has generally been balanced over the past decade, again with the exception of the crisis years. Life expectancy has risen for men and women, poverty rates have been declining for a number of years, and unemployment remains low. Recent inflation has been surprisingly high, but a significant portion of that rise has been caused by domestic drought and a concomitant rise in commodity prices. Russia’s external debt is far less than 50 percent of its GDP, and short-term debt is only about 12-17 percent of its total external debt. For these reasons and more, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – mainly composed of North American and European states – describes Russia as “within the range of OECD countries, not an outlier.” Certainly, Russia is dependent on oil and gas to a great degree. Fuel exports represent approximately 66 percent of total merchandise exports, up from about 61 percent in 2007. Furthermore, while the overall budget is balanced, the non-oil budget deficit stands at about 10 percent of GDP, which has been the case since the crisis in 2009. Even in that regard, however, things could be much worse. Compared to petro-states of the past, Russia has been remarkably successful since the early 2000s in dealing with the impersonal, automatic effects of high hydrocarbon revenues. It has sterilized oil revenues to counter upward pressure on the ruble, and it has stored excess funds away for when revenues decline. The Stabilization Fund reached $157 billion in 2008, when it was split into a Reserve Fund ($125 billion) and a National Welfare Fund. The former was depleted to barely $25 billion during the crisis, but both funds stand at about $85 billion today. Furthermore, even during the boom years, the country has generally resisted the policy temptation to borrow against future hydrocarbon revenues for investment. Finally, to Russia’s good fortune, its economy contains other significant sectors, such that total natural resource “rents” are only about 22 percent of GDP. In terms of its economic structure and policy choices, Russia is not Saudi Arabia or Kuwait (which are more economically vulnerable) or Venezuela (which is more politically reckless). The developments in Russia that have been most troubling during the hydrocarbon boom have really been in the country’s political and economic structures. Most broadly and obviously, the political system has grown more authoritarian. A bit more subtly, a variety of informal networks of political and economic actors have developed within the state that compete with each other and with formal authorities. Within this environment, a particularly detrimental form of corruption has continued and even expanded. Corruption is not always inimical to growth, as China has demonstrated for more than 30 years. However, the Russian version of corruption seems to be confiscatory, with each bribe-taker or surplus-extractor taking as much as he or she can, rather than “lubricative,” where bribes are a predictable cost of business that help get things done. Oil and gas money does not cause these problems, however, even if it facilitates them. Many other countries have had similar issues without high oil prices, including the USSR in the 1980s and Russia in the 1990s. The effects of a revenue decline on these structures and the elites who benefit from them are the most contingent and, therefore, the most difficult to predict. Hydrocarbons and the Budget If oil and gas revenues fall significantly, the federal budget will go into deficit. This is a simple and automatic outcome, and we have seen it happen already. Indeed, it would occur in any country that saw the price and, therefore, tax revenues of a dominant export decline. The question is what would happen next. In the short run, Russia would cover the shortfall with the excess oil revenues it has saved over the last several years. These funds were depleted by the crisis, however so they would not last long—perhaps a year or two if oil prices did not recover. In the medium term, Russia would probably be able to borrow effectively (that is, at affordable rates) on international markets. Its low external debt would make it attractive. In addition, its economy has the potential for growth, including from a rebound in hydrocarbon prices. Even its authoritarianism might be attractive to bond traders, who would expect that the state would use its power to extract resources from society in order to repay investors. Russia’s 1997 default would be a blemish on its record, but that happened under a different regime in different circumstances. In any case, lenders are not choosing from an array of enviable options at the moment. It is possible that Russia could take a different approach, quickly cutting expenditures and refusing to borrow internationally, but taking advantage of bond markets would be the path of least resistance. Simply borrowing to cover deficits, of course, would not be infinitely sustainable. There are some fiscal changes the government could make in order to fix a persistent budget imbalance, but these would be difficult and not at all automatic. One option would be to raise taxes on non-hydrocarbon economic activity in order to replace lost revenues. Those taxes, however, would likely suppress economic growth even further. Another approach would be to continue reducing expenditures on social welfare, perhaps by raising retirement ages, but that would cause widespread pain among the citizenry. Another area where savings could be found is in military expenditures, but that seems highly unlikely given both the lobbying power of the military-industrial complex and the version of nationalism the current administration has employed to develop domestic support. The best hope for addressing a long-term budget deficit, therefore, is economic growth in non-hydrocarbon sectors. Some growth is likely to occur because of a decline in the profitability of oil and gas (see below), but the system is still beset by destructive corruption, which will not be alleviated just because natural resource prices decline. If no structural changes occur over several years, Russia would eventually find itself in very difficult straits. If deficits were to remain high and debt levels continued to grow, international bond markets would finally stop lending at a manageable rate. The government would find itself in a vicious cycle of offering higher and higher interest rates in order to borrow; at some point, it would have to default. That, in turn, would produce a massive currency outflow, a collapse of the ruble, a spike in inflation, and a recession. All that is possible, but, fortunately for Russia, none of it seems very likely in the next ten years unless there is an additional shock to the world economy. The stabilization fund, the ability to borrow in the medium term, the opportunities for fiscal reform, and the possibility of growth in other sectors will all work against it. Hydrocarbons and the Ruble If the price of oil and gas fall on international markets, so will the value of the ruble. Again, this pressure is automatic: the less oil and gas cost, the fewer dollars and euros consumers will need to exchange for rubles in order to buy Russian hydrocarbons. The way that pressure plays out, however, would depend on the speed of the decline and how the government and other actors react.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Energy exports are key to sustain Russia’s economy --- the alternative is <u>budget deficits</u> and <u>recession</u>.</h4><p><strong>Barnes 13 </strong>(Andrew Barnes is Chair, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science of PONARS Eurasia and is an expert in Comparative Politics, Political Economy, Oil & Gas, September 2013, “How Much Would It Hurt? Exploring Russia’s Vulnerability to a Drop in Energy Prices“, PONARS Eurasia, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/how-much-would-it-hurt-exploring-russia%E2%80%99s-vulnerability-drop-energy-prices, accessed 6-29-2019) jd</p><p><u><mark>Russia’s economy is</mark> obviously <strong><mark>energy-reliant</strong></mark>, but how vulnerable does that make it in practical terms?</u> What would happen if global energy prices dropped significantly? In the shadow of the shale gas and oil revolution, this memo examines how a drop in energy revenues would affect Russia in three important areas: fiscal, financial, and political. In each area, some of the effects of falling oil prices would be more or less automatic. For example, <u><mark>a decline in revenues would mean a rising budget deficit</u></mark> (keeping all other things equal). Such an effect is easy to predict: the deficit would simply be larger if the revenue loss were greater. Other implications, however, are more contingent, as they rely on choices made by individuals and groups. For instance, while observers sometimes imply or state outright that a government will be “forced” to respond to a crisis in a certain way, leaders always have some freedom to remain stubborn in the face of adversity. Likewise, there are multiple ways in which political alliances may react to stress. Those reactions are more difficult to foresee, but institutional arrangements and past patterns of behavior can guide observers’ efforts. The Nature and Performance of the Russian Economy <u>In order to understand how the Russian economy might react to a shock, it is important to recognize not only its weaknesses, but also the fact that it has so far avoided a number of pitfalls. </u>The economy is not a basket case teetering on the edge of disaster; in fact, it is performing quite well on a number of economic indicators. The World Bank categorizes it as “high middle income” with a GDP per capita of almost $20,000 in terms of purchasing power parity and over $12,000 in nominal terms. Economic growth quickly returned to positive levels after the crisis in 2009-10, and the budget has generally been balanced over the past decade, again with the exception of the crisis years. Life expectancy has risen for men and women, poverty rates have been declining for a number of years, and unemployment remains low. Recent inflation has been surprisingly high, but a significant portion of that rise has been caused by domestic drought and a concomitant rise in commodity prices. Russia’s external debt is far less than 50 percent of its GDP, and short-term debt is only about 12-17 percent of its total external debt. For these reasons and more, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – mainly composed of North American and European states – describes Russia as “within the range of OECD countries, not an outlier.” <u>Certainly, <mark>Russia is dependent on oil and gas</mark> to a great degree. <mark>Fuel exports represent</mark> approximately <strong><mark>66 percent</strong> of total</mark> merchandise <mark>exports, up from</mark> about <mark>61</mark> percent in 2007.</u> Furthermore, while the overall budget is balanced, the non-oil budget deficit stands at about 10 percent of GDP, which has been the case since the crisis in 2009. Even in that regard, however, things could be much worse. Compared to petro-states of the past, Russia has been remarkably successful since the early 2000s in dealing with the impersonal, automatic effects of high hydrocarbon revenues. It has sterilized oil revenues to counter upward pressure on the ruble, and it has stored excess funds away for when revenues decline. The Stabilization Fund reached $157 billion in 2008, when it was split into a Reserve Fund ($125 billion) and a National Welfare Fund. The former was depleted to barely $25 billion during the crisis, but both funds stand at about $85 billion today. Furthermore, even during the boom years, the country has generally resisted the policy temptation to borrow against future hydrocarbon revenues for investment. Finally, to Russia’s good fortune, its economy contains other significant sectors, such that total natural resource “rents” are only about 22 percent of GDP. In terms of its economic structure and policy choices, Russia is not Saudi Arabia or Kuwait (which are more economically vulnerable) or Venezuela (which is more politically reckless). The developments in Russia that have been most troubling during the hydrocarbon boom have really been in the country’s political and economic structures. Most broadly and obviously, the political system has grown more authoritarian. A bit more subtly, a variety of informal networks of political and economic actors have developed within the state that compete with each other and with formal authorities. Within this environment, a particularly detrimental form of corruption has continued and even expanded. Corruption is not always inimical to growth, as China has demonstrated for more than 30 years. However, the Russian version of corruption seems to be confiscatory, with each bribe-taker or surplus-extractor taking as much as he or she can, rather than “lubricative,” where bribes are a predictable cost of business that help get things done. Oil and gas money does not cause these problems, however, even if it facilitates them. Many other countries have had similar issues without high oil prices, including the USSR in the 1980s and Russia in the 1990s. The effects of a revenue decline on these structures and the elites who benefit from them are the most contingent and, therefore, the most difficult to predict. Hydrocarbons and the Budget <u><mark>If oil and gas revenues fall</mark> significantly, the <mark>federal budget will go into deficit</mark>. This is a <mark>simple and automatic</mark> outcome, and we have seen it happen already.</u> Indeed, it would occur in any country that saw the price and, therefore, tax revenues of a dominant export decline. The question is what would happen next. <u>In the short run, Russia would cover the shortfall with the excess oil revenues it has saved over the last several years. These funds were depleted by the crisis, however so they would not last long</u>—perhaps a year or two if oil prices did not recover. In the medium term, Russia would probably be able to borrow effectively (that is, at affordable rates) on international markets. Its low external debt would make it attractive. In addition, its economy has the potential for growth, including from a rebound in hydrocarbon prices. Even its authoritarianism might be attractive to bond traders, who would expect that the state would use its power to extract resources from society in order to repay investors. Russia’s 1997 default would be a blemish on its record, but that happened under a different regime in different circumstances. In any case, lenders are not choosing from an array of enviable options at the moment. It is possible that Russia could take a different approach, quickly cutting expenditures and refusing to borrow internationally, but taking advantage of bond markets would be the path of least resistance. Simply borrowing to cover deficits, of course, would not be infinitely sustainable. There are some fiscal changes the government could make in order to fix a persistent budget imbalance, but these would be difficult and not at all automatic. <u>One option would be to raise taxes on non-hydrocarbon economic activity in order to replace lost revenues. Those taxes, however, would likely suppress economic growth even further.</u> Another approach would be to continue reducing expenditures on social welfare, perhaps by raising retirement ages, but that would cause widespread pain among the citizenry. Another area where savings could be found is in military expenditures, but that seems highly unlikely given both the lobbying power of the military-industrial complex and the version of nationalism the current administration has employed to develop domestic support. The best hope for addressing a long-term budget deficit, therefore, is economic growth in non-hydrocarbon sectors. Some growth is likely to occur because of a decline in the profitability of oil and gas (see below), but the system is still beset by destructive corruption, which will not be alleviated just because natural resource prices decline. If no structural changes occur over several years, Russia would eventually find itself in very difficult straits. If deficits were to remain high and debt levels continued to grow, international bond markets would finally stop lending at a manageable rate. <u>The <mark>government would find itself in a vicious cycle of offering higher and higher interest rates</mark> in order <mark>to borrow; at some point, it would</mark> have to <mark>default. That</mark>, in turn, would <mark>produce</mark> a <mark>massive currency outflow</mark>, a <mark>collapse</mark> of the ruble, a spike in <mark>inflation, and</mark> a <strong><mark>recession</strong></mark>.</u> All that is possible, but, fortunately for Russia, none of it seems very likely in the next ten years unless there is an additional shock to the world economy. The stabilization fund, the ability to borrow in the medium term, the opportunities for fiscal reform, and the possibility of growth in other sectors will all work against it. Hydrocarbons and the Ruble If the price of oil and gas fall on international markets, so will the value of the ruble. Again, this pressure is automatic: the less oil and gas cost, the fewer dollars and euros consumers will need to exchange for rubles in order to buy Russian hydrocarbons. The way that pressure plays out, however, would depend on the speed of the decline and how the government and other actors react.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Gerber ‘17 [David J. Gerber; Sept. 2017; University Distinguished Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement; “Competitive harm in global supply chains: assessing current responses and identifying potential future responses,” vol. 6, p. 5–24, https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article-pdf/6/1/5/24149036/jnx015.pdf] fulltext: VII. THE MOTOROLA-MOBILITY CASE: SHOWCASING THE OBSTACLES The 2015 Motorola-Mobility case of the Seventh Circuit highlights the obstacles.47 It is a major case that has drawn much attention in relation to the shaping of GSCs.48 This fact not only underscores the potential for constructive influence of the US private enforcement regime in the evolution of GSCs, but it also reflects many of the factors that we have identified as obstacles to realizing that potential. The US Supreme Court declined to review the case,49 and it may therefore remain an important component of US law relating to extraterritoriality, in general, and GSCs, in particular.50 The opinion The basic fact pattern is typical of global supply chains. The plaintiff, MotorolaMobility, Inc., is a large US electronics manufacturer. It incorporates LCD screens in many of its products, purchasing most in Asia through a global supply chain. In this case, a small percentage of the component sales were made directly to the US parent (ca 1 per cent), but most were made to its wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. These units then sold some of the products to the parent and others to buyers outside the United States. On discovering that some suppliers that were part of the supply chain had agreed among themselves to increase the prices they charged for such screens, Motorola filed suit in US court for compensation for the losses incurred as a result of the agreements. The appeals court upheld the lower court ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue. At issue was the harm caused to the parent company as a result of purchases it made through its overseas subsidiaries. The opinion by Judge Posner did not treat that portion of the FTAIA that specifically deals with the extraterritorial reach of the statute (the effects principle). A criminal proceeding on the same basic facts had found that the effects of the foreign conduct on US commerce were ‘direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable’ and, therefore, that the statute did apply to the conduct. Judge Posner accepted this finding. The opinion focused instead on the issue of the plaintiff’s standing to sue. It analysed the issue by reference to the statute’s ‘arising under’ language. In Judge Posner’s view, the effect of the cartel agreements on US commerce occurred outside the United States and therefore did not ‘arise under’ US law. Accordingly, the plaintiff was barred from bringing suit in the United States because the losses were suffered by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries rather than Motorola itself. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the harm was suffered by the parent, because the foreign subsidiaries were completely owned and controlled by the parent and functionally part of the parent. According the opinion, this claim was a ‘fatal flaw’ in the plaintiff’s case. Judge Posner apparently did not consider total ownership and control of the subsidiaries as a sound basis for identifying them as functionally part of the parent. He buttressed the denial of standing by referring to a US domestic antitrust law doctrine referred to as the indirect purchaser rule, which denies indirect purchasers the right to sue for harm suffered as a result of antitrust violations. This so-called ‘Illinois Brick’ rule was specifically crafted to achieve policy objectives—specifically, to increase enforcement of the antitrust laws by increasing the incentives for private actions.51 By assuring that at least the direct seller suffered sufficient harm to justify litigation, it sought to provide this incentive. The rule has been heavily criticized, and numerous states have contravened it in their own antitrust laws.52 Obstacles to a constructive role for US private enforcement The opinion reflects some of the obstacles that impede US law from performing a constructive role in shaping responses to GSC-based harms. It applies the statute in ways that provide little guidance for future cases, uses the confused case law in ways that further contribute to the confusion, and inappropriately applies domestic doctrine to a transnational context. Struggling with the statute The Court struggles to make sense of the statute. First, it turns the ‘arising under’ language into a test of standing to sue, despite the fact that the statutory language has been understood to refer to other issues and that the legislative history does not support that interpretation. Second, it uses this language to define, in effect, the extraterritorial reach of the US antitrust laws in private enforcement cases. And third, the opinion applies the statute formalistically despite the fact that it is being applied to new circumstances that call for careful analysis of the consequences of its application. In particular, it claims that the Motorola’s wholly owned subsidiaries were not functionally part of Motorola, although they were completely owned and controlled by Motorola and, therefore, functioned as part of it. Confused by the confused case law? The opinion also reflects the confusion of the case law. Judge Posner injects issues from earlier cases that have little if any relevance to the case at hand and are likely to exacerbate the uncertainty and inconsistency of the case law. For example, the opinion inserts language about ‘comity’ from earlier cases, but uses it in ways that are misleading in relation to the cases from which the language is taken and which tend to obfuscate the issues relating to GSCs. Missing the transnational: applying domestic doctrine to transborder contexts The opinion’s ‘domestic blinders’ represent a third obstacle to the development of antitrust law relating to GSCs. The Court applies domestic rules to the transnational context without accounting for the changed context in which they are being applied. The result is an outcome that directly contravenes the policy on which the domestic rules were based. Judge Posner’s application of the ‘indirect purchaser rule’ provides a particularly poignant example.53 According to this rule, only direct purchasers may sue for damages for harm caused by anticompetitive conduct. The rule was established in the Illinois Brick decision and based on ‘the longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private enforcement of antitrust laws’. According to Illinois Brick, this policy called for ‘concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers’.54 Otherwise, there was a risk that ‘those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing ... would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against them’.55 The policy behind the rule was to encourage private enforcement. In the GSC context, the application of the indirect-purchaser doctrine has precisely the opposite effect. It discourages private enforcement, because it all but precludes recovery by the victims of anticompetitive conduct. Except in unlikely cases, it virtually ensures that foreign cartels will ‘retain the fruits of their illegality’. Barring parent companies from bringing suit where they make purchases through their wholly owned foreign subsidiaries means that price-fixing within the supply chain will escape liability for such purchases, because the subsidiaries are unlikely to have a remedy under foreign antitrust laws. Judge acknowledges that ‘foreign antitrust laws rarely authorize private damages actions’, but ignores the consequences of this fact.56<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>AND Motorola is <u>negatively reshaping</u> global supply chains. </h4><p><strong>Gerber ‘17 </strong>[David J. Gerber; Sept. 2017; University Distinguished Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement; “Competitive harm in global supply chains: assessing current responses and identifying potential future responses,” vol. 6, p. 5–24, https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article-pdf/6/1/5/24149036/jnx015.pdf]</p><p>VII. THE MOTOROLA-MOBILITY CASE: SHOWCASING THE OBSTACLES</p><p>The 2015 <u><mark>Motorola-Mobility</mark> case of the Seventh Circuit <mark>highlights</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>obstacles</u></strong></mark>.47 It is a <u><mark>major case</u></mark> that has <u><mark>drawn</mark> much <mark>attention</mark> in relation <mark>to the <strong>shaping of GSCs</u></strong></mark>.48 <u><mark>This fact</u></mark> not only <u><strong><mark>underscores</u></strong></mark> the potential for constructive influence of the <u><strong>US <mark>private enforcement regime</strong></mark> in the <strong>evolution of GSCs</u></strong>, but it also reflects many of the factors that we have identified as obstacles to realizing that potential. <u>The US Supreme Court declined to review the case,</u>49 and it may therefore remain an important component of US law relating to extraterritoriality, in general, and GSCs, in particular.50 </p><p>The opinion </p><p>The basic fact pattern is typical of global supply chains. The plaintiff, <u><strong>MotorolaMobility</u></strong>, Inc., is a large US electronics manufacturer. It incorporates LCD screens in many of its products, purchasing most in Asia through a global supply chain. In this case, a small percentage of the component sales were made directly to the US parent (ca 1 per cent), but most were made to its wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. These units then sold some of the products to the parent and others to buyers outside the United States. On discovering that some suppliers that were part of the supply chain had agreed among themselves to increase the prices they charged for such screens, Motorola filed suit in US court for compensation for the losses incurred as a result of the agreements.</p><p>The appeals court upheld the lower court ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue. At issue was the harm caused to the parent company as a result of purchases it made through its overseas subsidiaries. The opinion by Judge Posner did not treat that portion of the FTAIA that specifically deals with the extraterritorial reach of the statute (the effects principle). A criminal proceeding on the same basic facts had found that the effects of the foreign conduct on US commerce were ‘direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable’ and, therefore, that the statute did apply to the conduct. Judge Posner accepted this finding.</p><p>The opinion focused instead on the issue of the plaintiff’s standing to sue. It analysed the issue by reference to the statute’s ‘arising under’ language. In Judge Posner’s view, the effect of the cartel agreements on US commerce occurred outside the United States and therefore did not ‘arise under’ US law. Accordingly, the plaintiff was barred from bringing suit in the United States because the losses were suffered by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries rather than Motorola itself.</p><p>In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the harm was suffered by the parent, because the foreign subsidiaries were completely owned and controlled by the parent and functionally part of the parent. According the opinion, this claim was a ‘fatal flaw’ in the plaintiff’s case. Judge Posner apparently did not consider total ownership and control of the subsidiaries as a sound basis for identifying them as functionally part of the parent.</p><p>He buttressed the denial of standing by referring to a US domestic antitrust law doctrine referred to as the indirect purchaser rule, which denies indirect purchasers the right to sue for harm suffered as a result of antitrust violations. This so-called ‘Illinois Brick’ rule was specifically crafted to achieve policy objectives—specifically, to increase enforcement of the antitrust laws by increasing the incentives for private actions.51 By assuring that at least the direct seller suffered sufficient harm to justify litigation, it sought to provide this incentive. The rule has been heavily criticized, and numerous states have contravened it in their own antitrust laws.52</p><p><u>Obstacles to a constructive role for US private enforcement</p><p>The opinion <mark>reflects</u></mark> some of the <u><strong><mark>obstacles</strong> that <strong>impede US law</strong></mark> from <strong>performing</strong> a <strong>constructive role</strong> in <strong>shaping responses to GSC-based harms</strong>. <mark>It</mark> applies the statute in ways that <strong><mark>provide little guidance</strong></mark> for future cases, <mark>uses</mark> the <strong><mark>confused case law</u></strong></mark> in ways that further contribute to the confusion, <u><mark>and <strong>inappropriately applies domestic doctrine</strong> to a <strong>transnational context</strong>.</mark> </p><p></u>Struggling with the statute</p><p><u>The Court <strong>struggles to make sense</strong> of the statute</u>. First, it turns the ‘arising under’ language into a test of standing to sue, despite the fact that the statutory language has been understood to refer to other issues and that the legislative history does not support that interpretation. Second, <u>it uses this language to define</u>, in effect, <u>the extraterritorial reach of the US antitrust laws in private enforcement cases.</u> And third, t<u>he opinion </u>applies the statute formalistically despite the fact that it is <u>being applied to <strong>new circumstances</strong> that <strong>call for careful analysis</strong> of the <strong>consequences</strong> of its application</u>. In particular, it claims that the Motorola’s wholly owned subsidiaries were not functionally part of Motorola, although they were completely owned and controlled by Motorola and, therefore, functioned as part of it.</p><p>Confused by the confused case law?</p><p><u>The opinion also reflects the <strong>confusion</strong> of the <strong>case law</u></strong>. Judge <u>Posner injects issues from earlier <mark>cases</mark> that have <strong>little if any relevance</strong> to the case at hand </u>and are likely to <u><strong><mark>exacerbate</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>uncertainty and inconsistency</strong></mark> of the <strong>case law</u></strong>. For example, the opinion inserts language about ‘comity’ from earlier cases, but uses it in ways that are misleading in relation to the cases from which the language is taken and which tend to obfuscate the issues relating to GSCs.</p><p>Missing the transnational: applying domestic doctrine to transborder contexts</p><p>The opinion’s ‘domestic blinders’ represent a third obstacle to the development of antitrust law relating to GSCs. The Court applies domestic rules to the transnational context without accounting for the changed context in which they are being applied. The result is an outcome that directly contravenes the policy on which the domestic rules were based.</p><p>Judge Posner’s application of the ‘indirect purchaser rule’ provides a particularly poignant example.53 According to this rule, only direct purchasers may sue for damages for harm caused by anticompetitive conduct. The rule was established in the Illinois Brick decision and based on ‘the longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private enforcement of antitrust laws’. According to Illinois Brick, this policy called for ‘concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers’.54 Otherwise, there was a risk that ‘those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing ... would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against them’.55 The policy behind the rule was to encourage private enforcement.</p><p>In the GSC context, the <u>application</u> of the indirect-purchaser doctrine has precisely the opposite effect. It <u><strong>discourages private enforcement</strong>, because it all but <strong>precludes recovery</strong> by the victims of anticompetitive conduct</u>. Except in unlikely cases, it virtually ensures that <u>foreign <mark>cartels</mark> will ‘<strong><mark>retain</strong></mark> the <mark>fruits of their illegality’</mark>. <mark>Barring parent companies from bringing</mark> suit where they make purchases</u> through their wholly owned foreign subsidiaries <u><mark>means</mark> that <strong><mark>price-fixing</strong></mark> within the supply chain will <strong><mark>escape liability</strong></mark> for such purchases, because the <mark>subsidiaries are</mark> <strong><mark>unlikely to have a remedy</strong></mark> under foreign antitrust laws.</u> Judge acknowledges that ‘<u>foreign antitrust laws <strong>rarely authorize private damages</strong> actions’</u>, but ignores the consequences of this fact.56</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Drezner, poli sci PhD, 16 – PhD Stanford, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, (Daniel W., “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy,” Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/05/future-global-political-economy-drezner/ios-drezner-web.pdf) fulltext: Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought.106 The liberal logic is straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics.108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital. Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place. Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence.112 A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008, for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2014.114 While the stock of interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial Times has suggested that the global economy has hit “peak trade.”115 If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline, thereby weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more.116 A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade across borders. Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple component parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply, transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 As 3-D printing technology improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines.119 Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward. There have been other drivers of the decades-long reduction in militarized interstate disputes. Nuclear deterrence has helped curb violent conflict among the great powers. Multilateral peacekeeping missions mitigate small country conflicts. Even if there is a decline in interdependence, it is possible that the “Long Peace” will endure. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict the degree to which either innovations or geopolitics will lessen the need for international trade. Even technological optimists acknowledge that the future diffusion of 3D printing is unclear. Advocates of networked manufacturing insist that economic openness is a prerequisite for the process to continue.122 And the degree of geopolitical revisionism among great powers might be endogenous—that is to say, preexisting levels of globalization might constrain revisionist impulses, rather than such impulses weakening the globalized economy. If great powers resort to revisionist foreign policies, however, then the global economy will start to resemble the Cold War era of economic blocs and strategic embargoes—one in which trade and investment follow the flag rather than follow the rate of return. The increased American use of targeted financial sanctions, for example, has already generated grumblings from peer competitors about finding ways to diversify away from reliance upon the dollar.123 In 2015, China introduced its own international payment and settlements system, in part, to diversify away from reliance upon the dollar.124 The correlation of economic flows with geopolitical alliances would not just have a profound effect on cross-border flows; it would likely lead to the fragmentation of global economic governance. Just as significantly, great power governments would reverse post-Cold War trends and choose to allocate more scarce resources towards their militaries.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Interdependence <u>solves</u> great power war and the impending decline <u>causes</u> it</h4><p><strong>Drezner, poli sci PhD, 16</strong> – PhD Stanford, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, (Daniel W., “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy,” Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/05/future-global-political-economy-drezner/ios-drezner-web.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Multiple scholars</strong></mark> have <mark>observed a</mark> secular <mark>decline in</mark> interstate <mark>violence</mark> in recent decades.</u>105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. <u>In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that <strong><mark>commercial interdependence</strong> is a <strong>big</strong></mark>ger <mark>driver</mark> of this phenomenon than previously thought.</u>106 The liberal logic is straightforward. <u>The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic <mark>interdependence</mark> act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics</u>. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. <u>This <mark>creates incentives</mark> for governments <mark>to preserve an open economy <strong>even during</mark> times of <mark>crisis</strong></mark>. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.</u>107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, <u><mark>the financial sector</mark> <strong>has <mark>staunchly opposed</strong></mark> initiating the use of <mark>force</mark> in world politics.</u>108 <u><strong>Even <mark>militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating</mark> global <mark>capital</strong></mark>. Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression.</u> <u><strong><mark>Interdependence can also tamp</mark> down <mark>conflicts</mark> that would otherwise be likely to break out <mark>during a</mark> great <mark>power transition</mark>.</u></strong> Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 <u>Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that <mark>the Sino-American economic relationship</mark> is so deep that it <mark>has tamped </mark>down <mark>the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom</mark> over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. <mark>Interdependence can</mark> help to <mark>reduce the likelihood of</mark> an extreme event—such as a <strong><mark>great power war</strong></mark>—from taking place.</u> Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence.112 A different counterargument is that<u> the <strong><mark>continued growth of interdependence will stall out</strong></mark>.</u> Since 2008, for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a <u>percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2014.</u>114 <u><strong><mark>While</mark> the <mark>stock</mark> of interdependence <mark>remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle</strong></mark>. The Financial Times has suggested that <mark>the global economy has hit <strong>“peak trade.”</u></strong></mark>115 <u><mark>If</mark> economic <mark>growth continues to outstrip trade</mark>, then the level of <mark>interdependence will</mark> slowly <strong><mark>decline</strong></mark>, thereby <strong><mark>weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts</mark>.</u></strong> And there are several reasons to posit why <u>interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods.</u> For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more.116 A more radical possibility is the <u>development of technologies</u> that <u>reduce the need for physical trade across borders.</u> Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple component parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply, transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 <u>As 3-D printing technology improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines.</u>119 <u>Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.</u>120 Russia and <u>China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior</u> by both countries. <u><mark>In a low-growth world</mark>, it is possible that <mark>leaders</mark> of either country <mark>would</mark> choose to <mark>prioritize</mark> their <strong><mark>nationalist ambitions over</mark> economic <mark>growth</strong></mark>. More generally, it could be that <mark>the <strong>expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels</mark> of interdependence—<mark>constrains great power bellicosity</mark>.</u></strong>121 <u><mark>If great powers expect</mark> that the future <mark>benefits of</mark> international <mark>trade</mark> and investment <mark>will wane</mark>, then commercial <mark>constraints on revisionist behavior <strong>will lessen</strong></mark>. All else equal, this <strong>increases the likelihood of great power conflict</strong> going forward. </u>There have been other drivers of the decades-long reduction in militarized interstate disputes. Nuclear deterrence has helped curb violent conflict among the great powers. Multilateral peacekeeping missions mitigate small country conflicts. Even if there is a decline in interdependence, it is possible that the “Long Peace” will endure. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict the degree to which either innovations or geopolitics will lessen the need for international trade. Even technological optimists acknowledge that the future diffusion of 3D printing is unclear. Advocates of networked manufacturing insist that economic openness is a prerequisite for the process to continue.122 And the degree of geopolitical revisionism among great powers might be endogenous—that is to say, preexisting levels of globalization might constrain revisionist impulses, rather than such impulses weakening the globalized economy. <u>If great powers resort to revisionist foreign policies, however, then <mark>the</mark> global <mark>economy will </mark>start to <mark>resemble</mark> the Cold War era of <strong><mark>economic blocs</strong> and</mark> strategic <strong><mark>embargoes</strong></mark>—one in which trade and investment follow the flag rather than follow the rate of return.</u> The increased American use of targeted financial sanctions, for example, has already generated grumblings from peer competitors about finding ways to diversify away from reliance upon the dollar.123 In 2015, China introduced its own international payment and settlements system, in part, to diversify away from reliance upon the dollar.124 <u>The correlation of economic flows with geopolitical alliances would not just have a profound effect on cross-border flows; it would likely lead to the <strong>fragmentation of global economic governance</strong>. Just as significantly, great power governments would reverse post-Cold War trends and choose to allocate more scarce resources towards their militaries.</u> </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Ravich and Fixler 19 [Samantha F. Ravich is a Senior Advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF) where she focuses on cyber-enabled economic warfare. She also serves on the CSIF Board of Advisors. Ravich served as the deputy national security advisor for Vice President Cheney and served in the White House for five and half years where she was the Vice President's representative on Asian and Middle East Affairs as well as on counterterrorism and counterproliferation. Following her time at the White House, Ravich was the Republican Co-Chair of the congressionally-mandated National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs in the United States Intelligence Community. She advises private industry and Federal and State governments on international security, financial, and political risk. Annie Fixler is the deputy director of FDD's Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, contributing to the cyber-enabled economic warfare project and the Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab. The Economic Dimension of GreatPower Competition and the Role of Cyber as a Key Strategic Weapon, https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/The-Economic-Dimension-of-Great-Power-Competition-and-the-Role-of-Cyber-as-a-Key-Strategic-Weapon.pdf, msm] fulltext: Each cyberattack, each espionage operation, each export control violation is “part of an overall economic policy of developing China at American expense” and “stealing our firepower and the fruits of our brainpower,” in the words of Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers.51 Beijing’s strategy is to weaken U.S. geopolitical and military capabilities and advance its own by using all means available including cyberattacks to undermine the defense industrial base and the broader U.S. economy from which America draws its strength. “U.S. military superiority since World War II has relied on both U.S. economic scale and technological superiority,” a January 2018 DOD study concluded.52 Washington should never send its soldiers into a fair fight. Our adversaries agree, so they are trying to defeat our weapons systems and undermine our military capabilities before we realize that we are already at war. Belatedly, the U.S. military and intelligence communities are starting to take notice. For example: l In its annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities, the Pentagon has warned that Beijing uses its cyber capabilities to “exfiltrate sensitive information from the [defense industrial base]” which in turn “threaten[s] to erode U.S. military advantages and imperil the infrastructure and prosperity on which those advantages rely.”53 l The head of FBI counterintelligence has testified similarly that China’s “economic aggression, including its relentless theft of U.S. assets” through cyber and traditional means, “is positioning China to supplant [the United States] as the world’s superpower.” l The U.S. Navy reportedly has made the economic endgame of adversaries such as China even more explicit: “The systems the U.S. relies upon to mobilize, deploy and sustain forces have been extensively targeted by potential adversaries, and compromised to such extent that their reliability is questionable.”55 Global Trade, Rule Enforcement, and China’s Civil–Military Fusion As the U.S. military considers how to fight and win wars in the 21st century when it has an adversary with an economy that is quickly advancing on its own, diagnosing how Beijing’s creeping invasion of our national security industrial base could have gone unnoticed—or, perhaps worse, been noticed but not addressed—is critical. A 2005 RAND study, for example, warned that Huawei and other ostensibly private companies are in fact merely the “public face for, sprang from, or are significantly engaged in joint research” with the Chinese military. Huawei itself “maintains deep ties with the Chinese military.”56 An even earlier 2001 report in the Far Eastern Economic Review concluded that Huawei is “financially and politically supported by the Chinese government.”57 In 2012, the House Intelligence Committee concluded that Huawei’s “assertions denying support by the Chinese government are not credible.”58 Yet Western media continue to treat Huawei’s ownership as an unanswered question,59 and the CIA is still trying to convince U.S. allies that Huawei receives state funding.60 We have known since that 2012 House Intelligence Committee investigation that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei shows a “pattern of disregard” for intellectual property rights.61 This state-backed, multibillion-dollar company is accused of stealing innovations from everyone from start-ups to multinational companies, yet the press was surprised that Huawei had a policy of providing bonuses to employees who stole trade secrets.62 Huawei’s theft of trade secrets is just one example of China’s persistent eforts to steal research and development, intellectual property, and proprietary technology. In another example, China announced in 2014 that it intended to spend $150 billion to become dominant in the semiconductor industry.63 Semiconductors are critical components of all modern technology. The Semiconductor Industry Association warned that while the United States has led previous semiconductor innovations, “overseas governments are seeking to displace U.S. leadership through huge government investments in both commercial manufacturing and scientific research.”64 Their efforts include stealing trade secrets from American companies that make the world’s most advanced semiconductors. Boise, Idaho-based Micron provides as much as a quarter of the world’s Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) integrated circuits, which are used in everything from personal computers to the U.S. military’s next-generation thermal weapon sights.65 In 2018, the U.S. government indicted Chinese state-owned Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Company for stealing Micron’s trade secrets66 and added Fujian Jinhua to its Entity List, barring the export of any U.S.-origin goods to the company.67 The theft began after Micron turned down an acquisition ofer from a Chinese company.68 Before this intellectual property theft, China did not possess DRAM technology, but instead of investing in research and development, it “conspired to circumvent Micron’s restrictions on its proprietary technology,” according to the indictment.69 Nor was this American company the only target of Chinese operations. Dutch company ASML, a global supplier to the semiconductor industry, was also the victim of commercial espionage but quickly denied any “national conspiracy.” ASML’s CEO said, “We resent any suggestion that this event should have any implication for ASML conducting business in China. Some of the individuals (involved) happened to be Chinese nationals.”70 This defensiveness is perhaps understandable given the limited recourse available to companies that are victimized by Chinese government–supported espionage. After the Department of Justice accused Chinese military hackers of cyber-enabled espionage and trade secrets theft against U.S. Steel,71 the company has tried to bring a case before the U.S. International Trade Commission against Chinese firm Baosteel for selling a high-tech steel similar to its own products, but U.S. Steel faces a problem. It is asserting that Baosteel stole proprietary technology, but the indicted hackers worked only for the Chinese military, never for Baosteel.72 The global trade system and mechanism for enforcing the rules are not set up to address China’s military–civil fusion. Additionally, the U.S. legal system is not well suited to combating China’s exploitation of the rules-based system for its geopolitical and military gain.73 For example, instead of undergoing a Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process, which likely would have resulted in a negative review,74 Chinese firm Wanxiang waited until A123 Systems went bankrupt and purchased the company’s technology for fast-charging lithium-ion batteries.75 When high-end microchip producer ATopTech went bankrupt, Chinese firm Avatar Integrated Systems used the judicial system to block U.S. competitor Synopsys from raising CFIUS concerns76 and purchased ATopTech’s technology.77 The bankruptcy process is not the only area in which China has figured out how to maneuver around the CFIUS process. The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission warned in a May 2019 report that CFIUS and export control regulations “have been unable to adequately assess and address the risks of increased technology transfers to China.” As a result, China has been able “to pursue investments in critical U.S. technologies that could jeopardize U.S. technological innovation and national security.”78 China participates in more than 10 percent of all venture capital deals in the United States and in 2015 alone invested $11.5 billion in early-stage technology deals.79 Investments in emerging technology, including artificial intelligence, augmented reality/virtual reality, robotics, and financial technology, represent about 40 percent of China’s overall investments.80 Put succinctly, because innovation occurs in the private sector, “state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed,” as the National Defense Strategy recognized.81 Meanwhile, Beijing requires foreign companies interested in selling into the Chinese market to form joint ventures with local firms and uses “the administrative licensing and approvals process to require or pressure the transfer of technology” from foreign firms to their Chinese counterparts, according to an in-depth U.S. Trade Representative study of China’s unfair trade policies.82 The American Chamber of Commerce in China has similarly warned that Chinese government authorities often demand “unnecessary disclosure” of confidential technological and other information.83 European companies report feeling similarly compelled to give away critical technology to gain access to the Chinese market.84 In short, China uses all means to acquire sensitive, national security–related technology at the expense of America’s economy and military capabilities. China uses illegal means like industrial and cyber espionage and forcible technology transfers as well as legal ones like strategic investment.85 As the United States considers how these economic battle campaigns could afect the outcome of military engagements, it is wise to consider that World War II could have ended diferently had such adversarial practices been in place at that time. General Dwight Eisenhower attributed U.S. victory to Andrew Jackson Higgins, a small-boat builder who adapted his shallow-draft boat designs to fulfill the U.S. military’s request for a small vessel that could transport both troops and vehicles from ships to the beach.86 Higgins’s story is a combination of individual ingenuity and the American military’s ability to gain an advantage over the adversary by deploying next-generation weaponry and matériel onto the battlefield.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>That <u>eviscerates</u> US <u>modernization</u> and <u>power projection</u> – espionage <u>undermines</u> military superiority and credibility<strong>.</h4><p>Ravich and Fixler 19 [</strong>Samantha F. Ravich is a Senior Advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF) where she focuses on cyber-enabled economic warfare. She also serves on the CSIF Board of Advisors. Ravich served as the deputy national security advisor for Vice President Cheney and served in the White House for five and half years where she was the Vice President's representative on Asian and Middle East Affairs as well as on counterterrorism and counterproliferation. Following her time at the White House, Ravich was the Republican Co-Chair of the congressionally-mandated National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs in the United States Intelligence Community. She advises private industry and Federal and State governments on international security, financial, and political risk. Annie Fixler is the deputy director of FDD's Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, contributing to the cyber-enabled economic warfare project and the Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab. The Economic Dimension of GreatPower Competition and the Role of Cyber as a Key Strategic Weapon, https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/The-Economic-Dimension-of-Great-Power-Competition-and-the-Role-of-Cyber-as-a-Key-Strategic-Weapon.pdf, msm]</p><p>Each cyberattack, <u>each <mark>espionage</mark> operation</u>, each export control violation <u><mark>is </mark>“part of an <strong>overall economic policy</strong> of <strong><mark>developing China at American expense</u></strong></mark>” <u>and “<strong>stealing our firepower</strong> and the fruits of our brainpower</u>,” in the words of Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers.51 <u><mark>Beijing’s strategy is to <strong>weaken</mark> U.S. geopolitical and military <mark>capabilities</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>advance its own</u></strong></mark> <u>by using all means available</u> including cyberattacks to undermine the defense industrial base and the broader U.S. economy from which America draws its strength. “<u><strong><mark>U.S</mark>. military <mark>superiority</u></strong></mark> since World War II <u>has <mark>relied on</mark> both</u> U.S. <u><strong>economic scale</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>tech</mark>nological <mark>superiority</u></strong></mark>,” a January 2018 DOD study concluded.52 Washington should never send its soldiers into a fair fight. Our <u><mark>adversaries</u></mark> agree, so they <u>are <mark>trying to <strong></mark>defeat our weapons systems</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>undermine</mark> our military <mark>capabilities</u></strong> <u>before</mark> we </u>realize that we <u>are</u> already <u>at <mark>war</u></mark>. Belatedly, the U.S. military and intelligence communities are starting to take notice. For example: l In its annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities, the <u>Pentagon</u> has <u>warned</u> that <u><mark>Beijing</u></mark> uses its <u><mark>cyber capabilities</u></mark> to “exfiltrate sensitive information from the [defense industrial base]” which in turn “<u><mark>threaten</u></mark>[s] <u><mark>to</u> <u><strong>erode</mark> U.S. <mark>military advantages</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>imperil the infrastructure and prosperity on which those advantages rely</u></strong>.”53 l The head of FBI counterintelligence has testified similarly that <u>China’s</u> “economic aggression, including its <u>relentless <mark>theft</mark> of U.S. assets</u>” <u>through cyber and traditional means</u>, “<u>is</u> <u><strong><mark>positioning China to supplant</mark> [the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates] <mark>as</mark> the world’s <mark>superpower</u></strong></mark>.” l The U.S. Navy reportedly has made the economic endgame of adversaries such as China even more explicit: “<u>The <mark>systems</mark> the <mark>U.S. relies upon</mark> to mobilize, deploy and sustain forces <mark>have been</mark> extensively targeted by potential adversaries, and <strong><mark>compromised </mark>to such extent that their <mark>reliability is questionable</u></strong></mark>.”55 Global Trade, Rule Enforcement, and China’s Civil–Military Fusion As the U.S. military considers how to fight and win wars in the 21st century when it has an adversary with an economy that is quickly advancing on its own, diagnosing how Beijing’s creeping invasion of our national security industrial base could have gone unnoticed—or, perhaps worse, been noticed but not addressed—is critical. A 2005 RAND study, for example, warned that Huawei and other ostensibly private companies are in fact merely the “public face for, sprang from, or are significantly engaged in joint research” with the Chinese military. Huawei itself “maintains deep ties with the Chinese military.”56 An even earlier 2001 report in the Far Eastern Economic Review concluded that Huawei is “financially and politically supported by the Chinese government.”57 In 2012, the House Intelligence Committee concluded that Huawei’s “assertions denying support by the Chinese government are not credible.”58 Yet Western media continue to treat Huawei’s ownership as an unanswered question,59 and the CIA is still trying to convince U.S. allies that Huawei receives state funding.60 We have known since that 2012 House Intelligence Committee investigation that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei shows a “pattern of disregard” for intellectual property rights.61 This state-backed, multibillion-dollar company is accused of stealing innovations from everyone from start-ups to multinational companies, yet the press was surprised that Huawei had a policy of providing bonuses to employees who stole trade secrets.62 Huawei’s theft of trade secrets is just one example of China’s persistent eforts to steal research and development, intellectual property, and proprietary technology. In another example, China announced in 2014 that it intended to spend $150 billion to become dominant in the semiconductor industry.63 Semiconductors are critical components of all modern technology. The <u><strong>Semiconductor Industry Association</strong> warned that while the United States has led previous semiconductor innovations, “overseas <mark>governments</mark> are <mark>seeking to displace U.S. leadership through</mark> huge government investments in both commercial manufacturing and scientific research</u>.”64 <u>Their efforts include <strong><mark>stealing trade secrets</u></strong> <u></mark>from American companies that make the world’s most advanced semiconductors. </u>Boise, Idaho-based Micron provides as much as a quarter of the world’s Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) integrated circuits, which are used in everything from personal computers to the U.S. military’s next-generation thermal weapon sights.65 In 2018, the U.S. government indicted Chinese state-owned Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Company for stealing Micron’s trade secrets66 and added Fujian Jinhua to its Entity List, barring the export of any U.S.-origin goods to the company.67 The theft began after Micron turned down an acquisition ofer from a Chinese company.68 Before this intellectual property theft, China did not possess DRAM technology, but instead of investing in research and development, it “conspired to circumvent Micron’s restrictions on its proprietary technology,” according to the indictment.69 Nor was this American company the only target of Chinese operations. Dutch company ASML, a global supplier to the semiconductor industry, was also the victim of commercial espionage but quickly denied any “national conspiracy.” ASML’s CEO said, “We resent any suggestion that this event should have any implication for ASML conducting business in China. Some of the individuals (involved) happened to be Chinese nationals.”70 This defensiveness is perhaps understandable given the limited recourse available to companies that are victimized by Chinese government–supported espionage. After the Department of Justice accused Chinese military hackers of cyber-enabled espionage and trade secrets theft against U.S. Steel,71 the company has tried to bring a case before the U.S. International Trade Commission against Chinese firm Baosteel for selling a high-tech steel similar to its own products, but U.S. Steel faces a problem. It is asserting that Baosteel stole proprietary technology, but the indicted hackers worked only for the Chinese military, never for Baosteel.72 The global trade system and mechanism for enforcing the rules are not set up to address China’s military–civil fusion. Additionally, the U.S. legal system is not well suited to combating China’s exploitation of the rules-based system for its geopolitical and military gain.73 For example, instead of undergoing a Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process, which likely would have resulted in a negative review,74 Chinese firm Wanxiang waited until A123 Systems went bankrupt and purchased the company’s technology for fast-charging lithium-ion batteries.75 When high-end microchip producer ATopTech went bankrupt, Chinese firm Avatar Integrated Systems used the judicial system to block U.S. competitor Synopsys from raising CFIUS concerns76 and purchased ATopTech’s technology.77 The bankruptcy process is not the only area in which China has figured out how to maneuver around the CFIUS process. The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission warned in a May 2019 report that CFIUS and export control regulations “have been unable to adequately assess and address the risks of increased technology transfers to China.” As a result, <u>China has been able “to pursue investments in critical U.S. technologies that <mark>could</u> <u><strong>jeopardize</mark> U.S. <mark>tech</mark>nological <mark>innovation </mark>and national security</u></strong>.”78 China participates in more than 10 percent of all venture capital deals in the United States and in 2015 alone invested $11.5 billion in early-stage technology deals.79 Investments in emerging technology, including artificial intelligence, augmented reality/virtual reality, robotics, and financial technology, represent about 40 percent of China’s overall investments.80 Put succinctly, because innovation occurs in the private sector, “state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed,” as the National Defense Strategy recognized.81 Meanwhile, Beijing requires foreign companies interested in selling into the Chinese market to form joint ventures with local firms and uses “the administrative licensing and approvals process to require or pressure the transfer of technology” from foreign firms to their Chinese counterparts, according to an in-depth U.S. Trade Representative study of China’s unfair trade policies.82 The American Chamber of Commerce in China has similarly warned that Chinese government authorities often demand “unnecessary disclosure” of confidential technological and other information.83 European companies report feeling similarly compelled to give away critical technology to gain access to the Chinese market.84 In short, <u><mark>China uses all means</mark> to acquire sensitive, national security–related technology <strong><mark>at the expense of America’s </mark>economy and military <mark>capabilities</u></strong></mark>. <u>China uses <strong>illegal <mark>means like</mark> industrial and cyber <mark>espionage</mark> and forcible technology transfers</u></strong> as well as legal ones like strategic investment.85 As the United States considers how these economic battle campaigns could afect the outcome of military engagements, it is wise to consider that <u>World War II could have ended diferently had such adversarial practices been in place at that time</u>. General Dwight Eisenhower attributed U.S. victory to Andrew Jackson Higgins, a small-boat builder who adapted his shallow-draft boat designs to fulfill the U.S. military’s request for a small vessel that could transport both troops and vehicles from ships to the beach.86 Higgins’s story is a combination of individual ingenuity and the <u><mark>American military’s</mark> ability to gain an <mark>advantage</mark> over the adversary <mark>by deploying <strong>next-gen</mark>eration <mark>weaponry</u></strong></mark> and matériel onto the battlefield.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: McMaken ’20 [Ryan; 2-7-20; bachelor's degree in economics and a master's degree in public policy and international relations from the University of Colorado; “Why Open Borders Between States in America Might Lead to Disaster,” https://mises.org/wire/why-open-borders-between-states-america-might-lead-disaster] brett fulltext: We hear far less about the issue of open borders between member states within a confederation or union of states. After all, no one thinks twice of crossing the borders between member states within the United States of America. Increasingly, one is similarly unimpressed when crossing from one EU member state to another in Europe. Often unnoticed is the way that disappearing patrolled orders between states have helped pave the way for advocates of ever greater consolidation of power in the hands of the central government.1 It's a process that has taken decades—or even centuries in some cases—but it is real. This process of centralization often proceeds in four steps: One: So long as there are internal borders unregulated by a central government, each member state can control — or not control — the flow of migrants, goods, and services locally. Thus, if one state has legalized a dangerous substance or device, neighboring states have the legal prerogative to stop those substances and devices at the member state's border. The degree to which each state does this — if at all — will vary. There is no need for a universal policy, because each member state is responsible for regulating those persons or goods it claims must be controled. Only the residents within that specific state are subject to these rules, while outsiders are free to ignore them. Two: But some activists and lawmakers recognize there are benefits to open borders.2 So, seeking greater ease in the movement of goods, capital, and workers—and in some cases seeking to transfer the cost of border enforcement to taxpayers outside its jurisdiction—member states lobby the central government to minimize or abolish state-level control of borders. Three: But this does not come without risks and externalities. Without union-wide and uniform laws, pro-regulation activists insist that "bad actors" and prohibited goods can too-easily cross from less regulated areas to more regulated ones. Four: So a solution is proposed: the central government will assume the cost of border control, transferring border control activities to the new union-wide border encompassing all member states. Within this border, lawmakers seek union-wide uniform policies. "Bad actors" are declared to be criminals in all jurisdictions and the "dangerous" substances and devices can now only legally enter by crossing international boundaries. The central government is now expected to provide enforcement to maintain this new status quo. What had once been the responsibility of the member states has been transferred to a newly empowered central government. The problem is one of increasing threats to "self-determination." As Ludwig von Mises notes in Liberalism, political "self-determination" for individuals is often best secured through a decentralized political structure where local laws are created and controlled by the local population. By removing local control of borders, self-determination is lessened. This process is now underway in Europe, where the EU government is moving closer to demanding "harmonization" of tax rates and that all states within the open-border zone adopt more stringent gun control laws. But for now, we'll stick to examples in the United States: Cross-Border Travel as an Excuse for National Gun Control In the gun control debate, it has long been argued that the lack of patrolled borders between states means a greater need for uniform nationwide gun control. In an analysis from National Public Radio, for example, the author concludes that the high homicide rates in Washington, DC, and Chicago are partly to blame on gun laws in neighboring states. According to political scientist Philip Cook, the stringent gun laws in places like Chicago are "only at best partially effective, because the borders are permeable." Were there not free movement from state to state, of course, it would be more difficult to argue that Wisconsin is to blame for Chicago's homicide rate. The argument by gun control advocates in this case follows a now familiar pattern: the presence of a relatively low amount of regulation in one member state (i.e., Indiana) is viewed as a threat to surrounding member states, who then insist that open borders between states mean that low-regulation states must change their policies to match the high-regulation states. The Federalization of Immigration Up until the late nineteenth century, immigration control had been regarded as a state matter. States heavily impacted by immigration—especially New York and Massachusetts—had imposed a variety of laws restricting the movement of immigrant paupers and requiring that bonds be paid on new immigrants to ensure that they did not become a burden on public funds. As late as the 1870s, bills aimed at federalizing immigration policy were killed by majorities in Congress. Part of the reason that there was a lack of a national consensus was that views of immigrants nationwide were hardly uniform. Some frontier states actively sought immigrants in order to increase the development of farmland and increase state populations. These ongoing regional differences are a reason President Cleveland in 1897 vetoed legislation further restricting immigration because many states and territories of the US—especially those bordering Canada, which provided migrant labor to American farmers—benefited from migrants. Cleveland noted that these parts of the country "have separate and especial interests which in many cases make an interchange of labor between their people and their alien neighbors most important." Nevertheless, it was recognized that migrants could move freely from immigrant-friendly states to immigrant-unfriendly states. So, anti-immigrant forces had increasingly lobbied for greater federal controls on the external border.1 No long after, the US Supreme Court in 1876 ruled that it was necessary to provide "a system of laws in this matter applicable to all ports and all vessels" in order to settle a long-standing "matter of contest and complaint." By the twentieth century, the autonomy once granted to states on the immigration issue was all but forgotten. Prohibition and the Drug War Regulating guns and migrants haven't been the only excuses given for expanding federal power in the name of national uniformity. Centralized control was also deemed to be necessary in order to control the transport and manufacture of alcoholic beverages. In the years leading up to the adoption of nationwide prohibition, all but sixteen states had adopted their own versions of prohibition. For the moralists, however, this wasn't enough. Those states where alcohol remained legal—mostly states with large numbers of Catholics and ethnic Germans—offered a haven to residents of "dry" states, who could easily cross over into the "wet" states. Even worse, people could illegally import alcohol into dry states from wet ones with relative ease. By imposing nationwide prohibition on everyone, however, access to alcohol could be more easily attacked. We see similar issues today as some states have begun to legalize recreational marijuana much to the dismay of officials in neighboring states. Once again, the answer is alleged to be the federalization of policy and the abolition of local prerogatives. In 2014, two marijuana prohibitionist states, Oklahoma and Nebraska, unsuccessfully sued Colorado in response to its legalization of recreational marijuana. The two states were concerned that the lack of a patrolled border between Colorado and its neighbors was an unacceptable threat to the public in prohibitionist states. Thus, the two states petitioned the court to declare state law null and void and to rule that federal law reigns supreme in matters of drug prohibition. Fortunately, on this particular issue the federal courts have not yet decided to declare federal law supreme, as they have many times before. When Erasing Borders Isn't a Problem Unfortunately, economic integration between member states in the US did not come organically or unilaterally. It was imposed from above, often with the goal that low-regulation states would not provide a haven from high-regulation states. We have seen this in political fights over alcohol, over migrants, and with guns. Experience with these political fight now strongly suggests the lowering of borders do not pose a threat to self-determination and do not enhance the power of the central state only under the following conditions: Border controls are decreased unilaterally by each member state in an ad hoc and decentralized manner. The central government is too weak (or lacks the legal authority) to impose uniform nationwide laws without widespread consensus. Member states bring to the table a significant amount of tolerance for their neighbors, and for the fact that people might do things differently in other places. In decades past, for instance, it was more often accepted that some places have stringent gun laws and other places don't. In the minds of many policymakers, this created certain risks and externalities, but these were tolerated in light of the ideological notion that not every aspect of daily life ought to be regulated from the center. It is no longer clear, however, that we live in a political environment where this sort of tolerance or decentralization is still valued. It now appears that a lack of functioning borders between member states—instead of promoting unity and cooperation—may actually be promoting conflict and further centralization. For example, were there a meaningful border between California and the rest of the United States it is unlikely that the rest of the nation would regard foreign migration as the high-stakes political issue it now is. Similarly, if it were not so easy to travel unobstructed from gun-friendly Indiana to gun prohibitionist Chicago, we wouldn't be hearing about how we need federal action on gun control. The result is something similar to what we see from political centralization in general. By ending legal and physical separations between culturally and legally diverse political jurisdictions, opposing sides end up fighting bitterly over who controls the central government. Ironically, the attempt at building unity through erasing borders has increased the stakes of who controls the central government and influences its policymakers. In the long term, this is likely to bring ever greater regional conflict.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u>Open borders</u> increases <u>disputes</u> between states and makes <u>conflict</u> more likely.</h4><p><strong>McMaken ’20</strong> [Ryan; 2-7-20; bachelor's degree in economics and a master's degree in public policy and international relations from the University of Colorado; “Why Open Borders Between States in America Might Lead to Disaster,” https://mises.org/wire/why-open-borders-between-states-america-might-lead-disaster] brett</p><p>We hear far less about the issue of <u><strong><mark>open borders</u></strong></mark> <u>between</u> member <u>states <mark>within a confederation</u></mark> or union of states.</p><p>After all, no one thinks twice of crossing the borders between member states within the United States of America. Increasingly, one is similarly unimpressed when crossing from one <u><strong>EU member state</strong> to another in Europe</u>. </p><p>Often unnoticed is the way that disappearing patrolled orders between states have helped <u><mark>pave the way for</u></mark> advocates of ever <u><strong>greater <mark>consolidation of power</u></strong></mark> in the hands of the central government.1</p><p>It's a process that has taken decades—or even centuries in some cases—but it is real.</p><p>This process of centralization often proceeds in four steps:</p><p>One: <u>So long as there are internal borders <strong>unregulated</strong> by a central government, <mark>each</mark> member <mark>state can control</mark> — or not control — the <mark>flow of <strong>migrants</mark>, goods, and services</strong> <mark>locally</u></mark>. Thus, <u><mark>if one</mark> state <mark>has</mark> legalized <mark>a dangerous substance</mark> or device, <mark>neighboring states </mark>have the legal prerogative to <mark>stop those</mark> substances and devices at the member state's border</u>. The degree to which each state does this — if at all — will vary. <u>There is no need for a universal policy, because each member state is responsible for regulating those persons or goods it claims must be controled</u>. Only the residents within that specific state are subject to these rules, while outsiders are free to ignore them.</p><p>Two: But some activists and lawmakers recognize there are benefits to open borders.2 So, seeking greater ease in the movement of goods, capital, and workers—and in some cases seeking to transfer the cost of border enforcement to taxpayers outside its jurisdiction—member states lobby the central government to minimize or abolish state-level control of borders.</p><p>Three: But this does not come without risks and externalities. <u>Without union-wide and uniform laws, pro-regulation activists insist that "bad actors" and prohibited goods can too-easily cross from less regulated areas to more regulated ones</u>. </p><p>Four: So a solution is proposed: <u>the <mark>central government</mark> will <mark>assume</mark> the cost of border control, transferring border control activities to the new union-wide border encompassing all member states. Within this border, lawmakers seek union-wide uniform <mark>policies</mark>. "Bad actors" are declared to be criminals in all jurisdictions and the "dangerous" substances and devices can now only legally enter by crossing international boundaries</u>. <u>The central government</u> <u>is now expected to provide enforcement</u> to maintain this new status quo. What had once been the responsibility of the member states has been transferred to a newly empowered central government.</p><p>The <u>problem is</u> one of <u><strong>increasing <mark>threats to "self-determination."</u></strong></mark> As Ludwig von Mises notes in Liberalism, <u>political "self-determination" for individuals is often <mark>best secured through</mark> a <strong><mark>decentralized political structure</strong></mark> where local laws are created and controlled by the local population</u>. By <u><strong><mark>removing local control</mark> of borders, self-determination is lessened</u></strong>.</p><p><u>This process <mark>is</mark> now <mark>underway in <strong>Europe</strong></mark>, where the <strong>EU government</strong> is moving closer to demanding "harmonization" of tax rates and that all states within the open-border zone adopt more stringent gun control laws</u>. But for now, we'll stick to examples in the United States:</p><p>Cross-Border Travel as an Excuse for National Gun Control</p><p>In the gun control debate, it has long been argued that the lack of patrolled borders between states means a greater need for uniform nationwide gun control. In an analysis from National Public Radio, for example, the author concludes that the high homicide rates in Washington, DC, and Chicago are partly to blame on gun laws in neighboring states. According to political scientist Philip Cook, the stringent gun laws in places like Chicago are "only at best partially effective, because the borders are permeable."</p><p>Were there not free movement from state to state, of course, it would be more difficult to argue that Wisconsin is to blame for Chicago's homicide rate.</p><p>The argument by gun control advocates in this case follows a now familiar pattern: the presence of a relatively low amount of regulation in one member state (i.e., Indiana) is viewed as a threat to surrounding member states, who then insist that open borders between states mean that low-regulation states must change their policies to match the high-regulation states.</p><p>The Federalization of Immigration</p><p>Up until the late nineteenth century, immigration control had been regarded as a state matter. States heavily impacted by immigration—especially New York and Massachusetts—had imposed a variety of laws restricting the movement of immigrant paupers and requiring that bonds be paid on new immigrants to ensure that they did not become a burden on public funds. As late as the 1870s, bills aimed at federalizing immigration policy were killed by majorities in Congress.</p><p>Part of the reason that there was a lack of a national consensus was that views of immigrants nationwide were hardly uniform. Some frontier states actively sought immigrants in order to increase the development of farmland and increase state populations. These ongoing regional differences are a reason President Cleveland in 1897 vetoed legislation further restricting immigration because many states and territories of the US—especially those bordering Canada, which provided migrant labor to American farmers—benefited from migrants. Cleveland noted that these parts of the country "have separate and especial interests which in many cases make an interchange of labor between their people and their alien neighbors most important."</p><p>Nevertheless, it was recognized that migrants could move freely from immigrant-friendly states to immigrant-unfriendly states. So, anti-immigrant forces had increasingly lobbied for greater federal controls on the external border.1 No long after, the US Supreme Court in 1876 ruled that it was necessary to provide "a system of laws in this matter applicable to all ports and all vessels" in order to settle a long-standing "matter of contest and complaint." By the twentieth century, the autonomy once granted to states on the immigration issue was all but forgotten.</p><p>Prohibition and the Drug War</p><p>Regulating guns and migrants haven't been the only excuses given for expanding federal power in the name of national uniformity. Centralized control was also deemed to be necessary in order to control the transport and manufacture of alcoholic beverages. In the years leading up to the adoption of nationwide prohibition, all but sixteen states had adopted their own versions of prohibition. For the moralists, however, this wasn't enough. Those states where alcohol remained legal—mostly states with large numbers of Catholics and ethnic Germans—offered a haven to residents of "dry" states, who could easily cross over into the "wet" states. Even worse, people could illegally import alcohol into dry states from wet ones with relative ease. By imposing nationwide prohibition on everyone, however, access to alcohol could be more easily attacked.</p><p>We see similar issues today as some states have begun to legalize recreational marijuana much to the dismay of officials in neighboring states. Once again, the answer is alleged to be the federalization of policy and the abolition of local prerogatives. In 2014, two marijuana prohibitionist states, Oklahoma and Nebraska, unsuccessfully sued Colorado in response to its legalization of recreational marijuana. The two states were concerned that the lack of a patrolled border between Colorado and its neighbors was an unacceptable threat to the public in prohibitionist states. Thus, the two states petitioned the court to declare state law null and void and to rule that federal law reigns supreme in matters of drug prohibition. Fortunately, on this particular issue the federal courts have not yet decided to declare federal law supreme, as they have many times before.</p><p>When Erasing Borders Isn't a Problem</p><p>Unfortunately, <u><strong>economic <mark>integration</u></strong></mark> between member states in the US did not come organically or unilaterally. It was <u>imposed <mark>from above</u></mark>, often <u>with the goal that low-regulation states would not provide a haven from high-regulation states</u>. We have <u>seen</u> this <u>in political fights over alcohol, over migrants, and with guns</u>.</p><p>Experience with these political fight now strongly suggests the lowering of borders do not pose a threat to self-determination and do not enhance the power of the central state only under the following conditions:</p><p> Border controls are decreased unilaterally by each member state in an ad hoc and decentralized manner.</p><p>The central government is too weak (or lacks the legal authority) to impose uniform nationwide laws without widespread consensus.</p><p>Member states bring to the table a significant amount of tolerance for their neighbors, and for the fact that people might do things differently in other places. In decades past, for instance, it was more often accepted that some places have stringent gun laws and other places don't. In the minds of many policymakers, this created certain risks and externalities, but these were tolerated in light of the ideological notion that not every aspect of daily life ought to be regulated from the center.</p><p>It is no longer clear, however, that we live in a political environment where this sort of tolerance or decentralization is still valued. It now appears that <u>a lack of functioning borders between member states—<strong>instead of promoting unity and cooperation</strong>—may actually be <strong><mark>promoting conflict</strong></mark> and <strong>further centralization</u></strong>. For example, were there a meaningful border between California and the rest of the United States it is unlikely that the rest of the nation would regard foreign migration as the high-stakes political issue it now is. Similarly, if it were not so easy to travel unobstructed from gun-friendly Indiana to gun prohibitionist Chicago, we wouldn't be hearing about how we need federal action on gun control.</p><p>The result is something similar to what we see from political centralization in general. <u>By ending legal and physical separations between culturally and legally diverse political jurisdictions</u>, <u><strong>opposing sides</u></strong> <u>end up <strong>fight</strong>ing bitterly over who controls the central government</u>. Ironically, the attempt at building unity through <u><strong><mark>erasing borders</u></strong></mark> has <u><mark>increased the stakes of</mark> who</u> controls <u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>central government</u></strong></mark> and <u>influences</u> its <u><strong>policy</strong>makers</u>. In the long term, this is <u><strong><mark>likely to bring</mark> ever <mark>greater regional conflict</u></strong></mark>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Nedal and Nexon 17 – Dani, Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University and a Smith Richardson predoctoral fellow at Yale, and Daniel, associate professor at Georgetown University specializing in international security and international-relations theory, “Trump’s ‘Madman Theory’ Isn’t Strategic Unpredictability. It’s Just Crazy,” Foreign Policy, 4/18/17, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/18/trumps-madman-theory-isnt-strategic-unpredictability-its-just-crazy///ninerz fulltext: On the campaign trail, the media loved Donald Trump’s unpredictability. What would the wacky candidate do next? It was an approach he was keen to wield not only on the political stage but the global one, calling for an “unpredictable” foreign policy. “We are totally predictable. We tell everything. We’re sending troops? We tell them. We’re sending something else? We have a news conference. We have to be unpredictable, and we have to be unpredictable starting now,” he said in an April 2016 speech. Recent weeks have seen a renewed focus on this pledge, with Trump switching positions almost by the day. Trump declared that NATO, despite his earlier claims, is “no longer obsolete.” He won’t declare China a currency manipulator. Despite months (and even years) of calling for cooperation with Syria and Russia to combat the Islamic State, and for an “America First” doctrine skeptical of the value of international norms, Trump ordered a cruise missile strike on Syria’s Shayrat air base in retaliation for the Bashar al-Assad regime’s apparent use of chemical weapons against civilians. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., now visibly disagree on whether the administration will resume Barack Obama’s policy of demanding Assad’s removal from power. Reversals and shifts are far from unprecedented. New administrations often adjust their policies to deal with the complex realities of international affairs or with changing tides in domestic politics. But few of these have openly sung the praises of unpredictability or contradicted themselves with such abandon as the Trump administration. The president and his supporters argue that having a reputation for being unpredictable will make others think twice before messing with the United States.But unpredictability isn’t a strength. For a great power such as America, it’s a recipe for instability, confusion, and self-inflicted harm to U.S. interests abroad. Some commentators link Trump’s championing of unpredictability to the so-called “madman theory” of Richard Nixon’s attempt to persuade rivals — including the North Vietnamese and the Soviet Union — that he was impulsive and unpredictable. Neither Hanoi nor Moscow was ever entirely convinced by Nixon’s stance. But the madman theory also wasn’t about Trumpian unpredictability. Nixon wanted to convince his adversaries that he was irrational, but consistent, when it came to calculating the downsides of using force. Consider nuclear brinkmanship during the Cold War. A “rational” leader would never risk nuclear oblivion over an issue of minor importance. It is, in fact, difficult to imagine any particular dispute being worth nuclear Armageddon, especially one that does not directly threaten the American homeland. That left some questioning the value of the deterrent at all.So how do you make it credible that the United States will risk a nuclear exchange over West Germany or Japan, let alone, as Nixon toyed with, Vietnam or Israel? Nixon thought that it might help create the impression that he was irrational — but in the sense of being prone to impulsive and disproportionate actions without thinking about the costs. There was nothing unpredictable about his underlying policy preferences or goals.The strategy was attractive, in large part, because some of the situations Nixon faced did not lend themselves to standard solutions. In the context of nuclear deterrence and coercion — which was central to Nixon’s calculations — the textbook approach is to make a nuclear response more or less automatic. Such policies are ways of approximating the act of “throwing the steering wheel out the window” in a game of chicken. They show your opponent that you can’t swerve out of the way — that you will, metaphorically or literally, fight to the death.There was no guarantee that the United States would go nuclear over Berlin, but the U.S. troop presence in the city made clear that Washington would be under enormous pressure to “do something” following thousands of American deaths. It left multiple pathways through which an attack on Berlin might spiral out of control. As famed nuclear theorist Thomas Schelling noted of the garrison in Berlin, “What can 7,000 American troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”The “tripwire” of an outmatched U.S. presence in Berlin therefore enhanced deterrence. By placing its troops in a place where they might be easily sacrificed, Washington showed it simply had no other option than escalating the conflict. While we might associate such behavior with a crazy person, it is the exact opposite of unpredictability. Throwing the steering wheel out the window makes the outcome of failing to swerve totally predictable.In sharp contrast, Trumpian unpredictability often undermines coercive diplomacy. What would have happened if the Trump administration had made clear that the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria would result in American military action? Or if Trump and his closest advisors hadn’t repeatedly signaled that they would rather work with Assad than against him? We will never know. But an unambiguous threat to retaliate might have deterred the use of chemical weapons in the first place.Seen from this perspective, the American strike looks like a failure of coercive diplomacy, not a success. While Trump demonstrated his willingness to use force by attacking the Shayrat air base, the only way that the attack will reduce the chances of the Assad regime using chemical weapons in the future is if it believes that Trump is predictable and that any future use will cause another strike.Similarly, leaks from the administration suggested that if Pyongyang tested a nuclear device last weekend, then the United States would launch military action against North Korea. Other members of the administration walked back those threats, creating — at least in public — significant ambiguity about possible American actions. On Monday, Vice President Mike Pence warned that North Korea should not test American resolve but that the United States is open to talks. Let’s say that Trump does, in fact, intend to retaliate if North Korea tests another nuclear device. The unpredictability of the situation likely makes Pyongyang more, not less, likely to initiate a test. After all, it cannot be sure that Trump would, in fact, use force. There are situations where this might benefit American policymakers. If Washington wants to deter an adversary, but does not actually want to use force, then leaving the threat ambiguous reduces the political costs of backing down, stopping opponents at home from accusing you of chickening out of enforcing a supposed red line. If the goal is to keep an adversary from taking any provocative steps — even those short of what you consider worth using force or imposing sanctions over — then introducing some unpredictability about what would trigger a response might be a good idea. The problem is that ambiguity might encourage the adversary to probe your resolve and test the limits of your interests while making it more difficult to clearly signal that a particular move is a step too far and will credibly invite retaliation. For example, in the absence of clear signals about what the United States is and is not willing to tolerate, and faced with mixed signals about American interests, Pyongyang might be tempted to initiate a series of low-level incidents designed to test the limits of U.S. tolerance. It is easy to imagine one of those actions, like the downing or seizure of a naval vessel or drone, crossing a line that prompts a forceful response to the perceived affront. The irony in such a scenario is that Pyongyang might steer clear of these actions if it could predict with some confidence how the United States would react.The trade-offs around strategic ambiguity are difficult, but Trumpian unpredictability seems not to take account of them at all. No rational policy calculation for the United States favors sudden policy reversals, a failure to communicate consistent interests or preferences, consistently mixed signals, or any of the other forms of “flexibility” now on the table. Trump’s unpredictability is a strategy that carries more benefits for weak states facing vastly superior foes.Indeed, Trump might make more sense if he were North Korea’s leader, not America’s. On the classic sitcom Malcolm in the Middle, the father, Hal, explains the strategy of schoolyard fights to his sons: “Crazy beats big every time.” Crazies fight harder and dirtier and care less about consequences. North Korea certainly derives some benefit from the common perception that its leaders are crazy. The United States has the ability to utterly annihilate North Korea a few times over. But the simple risk that “crazy” North Korea would be willing to risk total destruction, carrying large portions of South Korea and the U.S. garrison there with it, has contributed to deterring Washington from preventive action in the peninsula.But the United States, in this scenario, is one of the big kids on the schoolyard. With the limited exception of the other nuclear great powers, Washington can inflict far more damage — economic, diplomatic, or military — on any other state than they can impose on the United States. Some of that outsized power derives directly from America’s vast network of allies and strategic partners, which no rival comes close to matching.Thus, for the United States, unpredictability carries enormous risks. That’s true for Nixonian calculated irrationality, too, but much more so for Trumpian unpredictability. Rivals and allies can easily interpret mixed signals from different voices in the administration and frequent high-profile policy reversals as evidence that the president does not mean what he says, that he has no idea what he is doing, or that he can change his mind on a whim. Intentionally fostering uncertainty reduces the credibility of existing commitments.Unraveling the American alliance network by undermining confidence in Washington is probably the worst way to implement an America First policy. It undercuts a major source of American strength without gaining the benefits that might follow from strategic retrenchment — that is, of making deliberate decisions about what commitments are key to American security and which can be shed, while taking steps to ensure that unwinding those commitments don’t harm vital interests and alliances.Trumpian unpredictability creates more problems than solutions. Playing crazy may sometimes be an attractive strategy, especially for weaker actors that have a narrow set of minimalist goals — like survival or autonomy. But if a state has more expansive goals, and ample resources to pursue them, as does the United States, unpredictability is a poor approach to grand strategy. It is hard for others to follow your lead when they don’t know what your goals are. Partners are less likely to stand by your side if they lack confidence that you will stand by theirs. If Trump wants America to remain a dominant power, and wants others to respect American interests around the world, he needs to bolster American credibility. This requires a good measure of predictability, not the attitudes of an unpredictable rogue state.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Trumpian unpredictability invites testing by adversaries, pushes away allies, and undercuts US leadership</h4><p><strong>Nedal and Nexon 17 </strong>– Dani, Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University and a Smith Richardson predoctoral fellow at Yale, and Daniel, associate professor at Georgetown University specializing in international security and international-relations theory, “Trump’s ‘Madman Theory’ Isn’t Strategic Unpredictability. It’s Just Crazy,” Foreign Policy, 4/18/17, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/18/trumps-madman-theory-isnt-strategic-unpredictability-its-just-crazy/<u><strong>//ninerz</p><p></u></strong>On the campaign trail, the media loved Donald Trump’s unpredictability. What would the wacky candidate do next? It was an approach he was keen to wield not only on the political stage but the global one, calling for an “unpredictable” foreign policy. “We are totally predictable. We tell everything. We’re sending troops? We tell them. We’re sending something else? We have a news conference. We have to be unpredictable, and we have to be unpredictable starting now,” he said in an April 2016 speech. <u>Recent weeks have seen</u> a renewed focus on this pledge, with <u>Trump switching positions almost by the day</u>. <u>Trump declared that NATO, despite his earlier claims, is “no longer obsolete.” He won’t declare China a currency manipulator. Despite</u> months (and even <u>years</u>) <u>of calling for cooperation with Syria and Russia</u> to combat the Islamic State, and for an “America First” doctrine skeptical of the value of international norms, <u>Trump ordered a cruise missile strike</u> on Syria’s Shayrat air base in retaliation for the Bashar al-Assad regime’s apparent use of chemical weapons against civilians. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., now visibly disagree on whether the administration will resume Barack Obama’s policy of demanding Assad’s removal from power. Reversals and shifts are far from unprecedented. New administrations often adjust their policies to deal with the complex realities of international affairs or with changing tides in domestic politics. But few of these have openly sung the praises of unpredictability or contradicted themselves with such abandon as the Trump administration. <u>The president and his supporters argue that having a reputation for being unpredictable will make others think twice before messing with the United States</u>.<u><strong>But unpredictability isn’t a strength</u></strong>. <u>For a great power such as America, it’s a recipe for <strong>instability</strong>, <strong>confusion</strong>, and <strong>self-inflicted harm to U.S. interests abroad</u></strong>. <u>Some</u> commentators li<u>nk Trump’s championing of unpredictability to the </u>so-called “<u>madman theory” of</u> Richard <u>Nixon</u>’s attempt to persuade rivals — including the North Vietnamese and the Soviet Union — that he was impulsive and unpredictable<u>. Neither Hanoi nor Moscow was ever entirely convinced by Nixon’s stance</u>. <u>But the madman theory also wasn’t about Trumpian unpredictability</u>. <u>Nixon wanted to convince his adversaries that he was irrational, <strong>but consistent</strong>, </u>when it came to calculating the downsides of using force. Consider nuclear brinkmanship during the Cold War. A “rational” leader would never risk nuclear oblivion over an issue of minor importance. It is, in fact, difficult to imagine any particular dispute being worth nuclear Armageddon, especially one that does not directly threaten the American homeland. That left some questioning the value of the deterrent at all.So how do you make it credible that the United States will risk a nuclear exchange over West Germany or Japan, let alone, as Nixon toyed with, Vietnam or Israel? <u>Nixon thought that it might help create the impression that he was irrational — but in the sense of being prone to impulsive and disproportionate actions without thinking about the cost</u>s<u><strong>. There was nothing unpredictable about his underlying policy preferences or goals</u></strong>.<u>The strategy was attractive, in large part, because some of the situations Nixon faced did not lend themselves to standard solutions.</u> <u>In the context of nuclear deterrence and coercion</u> — which was central to Nixon’s calculations — the textbook approach is to make a nuclear response more or less automatic. Such policies are ways of approximating the act of “throwing the steering wheel out the window” in a game of chicken. They show your opponent that you can’t swerve out of the way — that you will, metaphorically or literally, fight to the death.There was no guarantee that the United States would go nuclear over Berlin, but the U.S. troop presence in the city made clear that Washington would be under enormous pressure to “do something” following thousands of American deaths. It left multiple pathways through which an attack on Berlin might spiral out of control. As famed nuclear theorist Thomas Schelling noted of the garrison in Berlin, “What can 7,000 American troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”The “tripwire” of an outmatched U.S. presence in Berlin therefore enhanced deterrence. By placing its troops in a place where they might be easily sacrificed, Washington showed it simply had no other option than escalating the conflict. While we might associate such behavior with a crazy person, it is the exact opposite of unpredictability. Throwing the steering wheel out the window makes the outcome of failing to swerve totally predictable.<u>In sharp contrast, <strong>Trumpian unpredictability often undermines coercive diplomacy</strong>.</u> What would have happened if the Trump administration had made clear that the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria would result in American military action? Or if Trump and his closest advisors hadn’t repeatedly signaled that they would rather work with Assad than against him? We will never know. But an unambiguous threat to retaliate might have deterred the use of chemical weapons in the first place.Seen <u>from this perspective, the American strike looks like a failure of coercive diplomacy, not a succes</u>s. <u>While Trump demonstrated his willingness to use force</u> by attacking the Shayrat air base, <u><strong>the only way that the attack will reduce the chances of the Assad regime using chemical weapons in the future is if it believes that Trump is predictable and that any future use will cause another strike</u></strong>.Similarly, <u>leaks from the administration suggested that if Pyongyang tested a nuclear device last weekend</u>, <u>then the United States would launch military action against North Korea</u>. <u>Other members of the administration walked back those threats, <strong>creating</u></strong> — at least in public — <u><strong>significant ambiguity about possible American actions</u></strong>. On Monday, Vice President Mike Pence warned that North Korea should not test American resolve but that the United States is open to talks. Let’s say that Trump does, in fact, intend to retaliate if North Korea tests another nuclear device. <u>The unpredictability of the situation likely makes Pyongyang <strong>more</strong>, not less, <strong>likely to initiate a test.</u></strong> <u>After all, <strong>it cannot be sure that Trump would</u></strong>, in fac<u>t<strong>, use force</u></strong>. There are situations where this might benefit American policymakers. If Washington wants to deter an adversary, but does not actually want to use force, then leaving the threat ambiguous reduces the political costs of backing down, stopping opponents at home from accusing you of chickening out of enforcing a supposed red line. If the goal is to keep an adversary from taking any provocative steps — even those short of what you consider worth using force or imposing sanctions over — then introducing some unpredictability about what would trigger a response might be a good idea. The problem is that <u><strong>ambiguity might encourage the adversary to probe your resolve and test the limits of your interests while making it more difficult to clearly signal that a particular move is a step too far and will credibly invite retaliation</u></strong>. <u>For example</u>, <u>in the <strong>absence of clear signals</strong> about what the United States is and is not willing to tolerate, and faced with <strong>mixed signals</strong> about American interests, Pyongyang might be tempted to <strong>initiate a series of low-level incidents</strong> designed to <strong>test the limits of U.S. tolerance</u></strong>. <u>It is easy to imagine one of those actions</u>, like the downing or seizure of a naval vessel or drone, <u><strong>crossing a line</u></strong> that prompts a forceful response to the perceived affront. <u>The irony in such a scenario is that Pyongyang might <strong>steer clear</strong> of these actions if it could <strong>predict with some confidence how the United States would react</u></strong>.The trade-offs around strategic ambiguity are difficult, but Trumpian unpredictability seems not to take account of them at all. <u><strong>No rational policy calculation for the United States favors sudden policy reversals, a failure to communicate consistent interests or preferences, consistently mixed signals, or any of the other forms of “flexibility” now on the table. </u></strong>Trump’s unpredictability is a strategy that carries more benefits for weak states facing vastly superior foes.Indeed, Trump might make more sense if he were North Korea’s leader, not America’s. On the classic sitcom Malcolm in the Middle, the father, Hal, explains the strategy of schoolyard fights to his sons: “Crazy beats big every time.” Crazies fight harder and dirtier and care less about consequences. North Korea certainly derives some benefit from the common perception that its leaders are crazy. The United States has the ability to utterly annihilate North Korea a few times over. But the simple risk that “crazy” North Korea would be willing to risk total destruction, carrying large portions of South Korea and the U.S. garrison there with it, has contributed to deterring Washington from preventive action in the peninsula.But <u>the United States</u>, in this scenario<u>, is one of the big kids</u> on the schoolyard. With the limited exception of the other nuclear great powers, <u>Washington can inflict far more damage</u> — economic, diplomatic, or military — <u>on any other state than they can impose on the United States</u>. Some of that outsized power derives directly from America’s vast network of allies and strategic partners, which no rival comes close to matching.<u>Thus, for the United States, <strong>unpredictability carries enormous risks</strong>. </u>That’s true for Nixonian calculated irrationality, too, but much more so for Trumpian unpredictability. <u>Rivals and allies can easily interpret <strong>mixed signals</strong> from different voices in the administration</u> and frequent high-profile policy reversals <u><strong>as evidence that the president does not mean what he says</u></strong>, <u><strong>that he has no idea what he is doing</u></strong>, <u>or that he can</u> <u><strong>change his mind on a whim</u></strong>. <u><strong>Intentionally fostering uncertainty reduces the credibility of existing commitments</u></strong>.<u>Unraveling the American alliance network by undermining confidence in </u>Washington is probably the worst way to implement an America First policy. It <u><strong>undercuts a major source of American strength</u></strong> without gaining the benefits that might follow from strategic retrenchment — that is, of making deliberate decisions about what commitments are key to American security and which can be shed, while taking steps to ensure that unwinding those commitments don’t harm vital interests and alliances.<u><strong>Trumpian unpredictability creates more problems than solutions.</u></strong> Playing crazy may sometimes be an attractive strategy, especially for weaker actors that have a narrow set of minimalist goals — like survival or autonomy. But if a state has more expansive goals, and ample resources to pursue them, as does the United States, unpredictability is a poor approach to grand strategy. <u>It is hard for others to follow your lead when they don’t know what your goals are. <strong>Partners are less likely to stand by your side if they lack confidence that you will stand by theirs. </strong>If Trump wants America to remain a dominant power, and wants others to respect American interests around the world, he needs to <strong>bolster American credibility</u></strong>. <u><strong>This requires a good measure of predictability, not the attitudes of an unpredictable rogue state.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Dolmans 21 (Maurits Dolmans, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, The Dominance and Monopolies Review: Editors' Preface, 6-14, https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-dominance-and-monopolies-review/editors-preface, y2k) fulltext: A third set of commentators believes that competition policy is misdirected, that the historic focus of competition law has been too narrow, and that the consumer welfare standard should be expanded to take account of social, industrial, environmental and other considerations (sometimes referred to as 'hipster antitrust'). And a fourth critique, voiced by Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, maintains that many of today's problems result from too much 'toxic' competition overall, driven by ideologues, lobbyists and privatisation, and that we need to promote a kind of 'noble competition', where rivals mutually strive for excellence. To address these challenges, a dizzying array of reports has emerged, commissioned by governments in the US, EU, UK, Germany, France, Australia and elsewhere. And from those reports, a constellation of ideas has emerged to overhaul competition law, including: reorienting the goals of antitrust policy away from the consumer welfare standard towards a broader societal welfare test; reversing the burden of proof in merger control; per se bans on certain categories of conduct in the digital sector (including prophylactic controls on vertical integration); lowering the standard of judicial review to give competition authorities more leeway; injecting political oversight into competition law enforcement; loosening the standard to impose duties to share data with rivals; introducing market study regimes; allowing authorities to impose remedies without formally establishing an infringement; and establishing mandatory codes of conduct for digital platforms. Where does this all leave busy practitioners and businesses that are trying to navigate the complex and constantly evolving rules concerning abuse of dominance? Helpfully, this ninth edition of The Dominance and Monopolies Review seeks to provide some respite, providing an accessible and easily understandable summary of global abuse of dominance rules. As with previous years, each chapter – authored by specialist local experts – summarises the abuse of dominance rules in a jurisdiction, provides a review of the regime's enforcement activity in the past year, and sets out a prediction for future developments. From those thoughtful contributions, we identify three main trends to watch out for over the next year. Sustainability and abuse of dominance The past year has seen sustainability become a new and important focus for competition regulators. The Dutch competition authority started the trend by setting 'sustainability' as a key priority and proposing a more permissible review for certain environmental agreements. The Hellenic Competition Commission followed, advocating for far-reaching policy changes to promote sustainability goals across all areas of competition policy. The European Parliament has called on the European Commission to 'urgently take the concrete action needed in order to fight and contain the threat of climate and environmental catastrophe before it is too late'. As Commissioner Vestager has noted, 'everyone is called upon to make our contribution to the necessary change – including enforcers'. The European Commission initiated a consultation, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development held several events to discuss the integration of climate and environmental goals in competition policy. Chinese competition law already provides an explicit exemption for 'agreements between undertakings which they can prove to be concluded for . . . serving public interests in energy conservation, environmental protection and disaster relief'. At core, the cause of the climate crisis is a market failure: the cost of pollution of air, water and land, and the damage wrought by greenhouse gas emissions to the climate today and in the future are generally not included in the price of goods and services. Because the market price of a polluting product excludes the social cost, production is higher than the social optimum, taking into account that consumption of natural resources now exceeds what the regenerative capacity of the Earth can sustain. To address this market failure, the discussion around including environmental goals in competition law has, so far, mostly focused on state aid, horizontal cooperation and merger control. For example, it has been argued that the consumer welfare analysis in merger control could include whether the merger could be expected to raise or lower the environmental price that consumers pay, which is not reflected in the market price in monetary terms or in quality (which could take account of non-market externalities such as emissions). Likewise, horizontal guidelines could be revised to allow cooperation in pursuit of environmental goals, where individual producers are willing to invest in greening production, but may be held back by the fear that they will be undercut by those who do not invest, or by cheaper imports. There is no inherent reason, however, why sustainability could not be incorporated into an abuse of dominance assessment, too. This could be done in a number of ways. First, pricing analysis (for example, for loyalty rebates, predatory pricing, margin squeeze) could take into account the actual costs incurred by the dominant company and by society, including not only the total costs of production, but also the environmental cost. A company may be able to price lower than its rivals because it is employing polluting or greenhouse gas emitting technology, at great societal cost, which is not reflected in its traditional variable and fixed costs. Second, a dominant provider with an incumbent polluting technology might commit an abuse by excluding rival, greener technologies by means other than competition on the merits. Such conduct should already violate dominance rules. In this case, however, 'competition on the merits' should be defined so as to exclude competition that relies on avoidable pollution or greenhouse gas emissions. Also, the assessment should take into account that consumer harm would be even higher from the abuse because of the exclusion of a greener technology. The theory would be not dissimilar to that pursued by the European Commission in its Car Emissions cartel investigation, albeit that case concerns horizontal collusion to restrict competition on innovation for emission cleaning systems. Third, there may be sui generis abuses that involve unsustainable business practices that also restrict competition. For example, a dominant producer might employ cheap and polluting means of production, and thereby price cheaper than its rivals. A dominant raw materials producer might make misleading representations to an environmental agency to secure a licence to extract minerals. And a dominant chemical producer could illegally dump products in rivers, thereby gaining an advantage over rivals that dispose of waster safely. All these might conceivably be an abuse of dominance because they distort competition, via means other than competition on the merits. The fact that they may also infringe other laws is no bar to bringing an abuse of dominance claim, just as a dominant factory owner burning down a rival's factory can be both arson and an abuse of dominance. Rivals should have a cause of action, especially where environmental rules are inadequate or insufficiently enforced.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Plan is key to <u>broader</u> environmental sustainability</h4><p>Dolmans 21</strong> (Maurits Dolmans, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, The Dominance and Monopolies Review: Editors' Preface, 6-14, https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-dominance-and-monopolies-review/editors-preface, y2k)</p><p>A third set of commentators believes that <u><strong>competition</u></strong> <u>policy is <strong>misdirected</u></strong>, <u>that the historic focus of</u> <u>competition</u> law <u>has been <strong>too narrow</u></strong>, and that <u>the <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>onsumer <strong><mark>w</strong></mark>elfare <strong><mark>s</strong></mark>tandard</u> <u><mark>should be <strong>expanded</strong> to</u></mark> <u><mark>take account of</u></mark> social, <u><strong><mark>industrial</u></strong>, <u><strong>environmental</u></strong></mark> and other <u><mark>considerations</u></mark> (sometimes referred to as 'hipster antitrust').</p><p>And a fourth critique, voiced by Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, maintains that many of today's problems result from too much 'toxic' competition overall, driven by ideologues, lobbyists and privatisation, and that we need to promote a kind of 'noble competition', where rivals mutually strive for excellence.</p><p>To address these challenges, a dizzying array of reports has emerged, commissioned by governments in the US, EU, UK, Germany, France, Australia and elsewhere. And from those reports, a constellation of ideas has emerged to overhaul competition law, including: reorienting the goals of antitrust policy away from the consumer welfare standard towards a broader societal welfare test; reversing the burden of proof in merger control; per se bans on certain categories of conduct in the digital sector (including prophylactic controls on vertical integration); lowering the standard of judicial review to give competition authorities more leeway; injecting political oversight into competition law enforcement; loosening the standard to impose duties to share data with rivals; introducing market study regimes; allowing authorities to impose remedies without formally establishing an infringement; and establishing mandatory codes of conduct for digital platforms.</p><p><u><strong>Where does this all leave busy practitioners and businesses that are trying to navigate the complex and constantly evolving rules concerning abuse of dominance? Helpfully, this ninth edition of The Dominance and Monopolies Review seeks to provide some respite, providing an accessible and easily understandable summary of global abuse of dominance rules. As with previous years, each chapter – authored by specialist local experts – summarises the abuse of dominance rules in a jurisdiction, provides a review of the regime's enforcement activity in the past year, and sets out a prediction for future developments. From those thoughtful contributions, we identify three main trends to watch out for over the next year.</p><p><mark>Sustainability</mark> and abuse of dominance</p><p></u></strong>T<u>he past year has seen sustainability become a new and <strong>important focus</strong> for <strong>competition regulators</u></strong>. The Dutch competition authority started the trend by setting 'sustainability' as a key priority and proposing a more permissible review for certain environmental agreements. The Hellenic Competition Commission followed, advocating for far-reaching policy changes to promote sustainability goals across all areas of competition policy. The European Parliament has called on the European Commission to 'urgently take the concrete action needed in order to fight and contain the threat of climate and environmental catastrophe before it is too late'. As Commissioner Vestager has noted, 'everyone is called upon to make our contribution to the necessary change – including enforcers'. The European Commission initiated a consultation, and <u>the</u> <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganisation for <u><strong><mark>E</u></strong></mark>conomic <u><strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>o-operation and <u><strong><mark>D</u></strong></mark>evelopment <u>held</u> several <u>events to <mark>discuss the <strong>integration</u></strong> <u>of <strong>climate and environmental goals</u></strong> <u>in</u></mark> <u><mark>competition policy</u></mark>. Chinese competition law already provides an explicit exemption for 'agreements between undertakings which they can prove to be concluded for . . . serving public interests in energy conservation, environmental protection and disaster relief'.</p><p>At core, <u><mark>the <strong>cause</strong> of the <strong>climate crisis</strong> is a <strong>market failure</u></strong></mark>: <u><mark>the cost of <strong>pollution</u></strong> <u>of <strong>air</u></strong>, <u><strong>water</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>land</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</mark> the <strong>damage</u></strong> <u>wrought by</u> greenhouse gas <u><strong><mark>emissions</u></strong></mark> to the climate today and in the future <u><mark>are</u></mark> generally <u><mark>not included in</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>price</u></strong> <u>of goods</mark> and services</u>. Because <u><mark>the</mark> market <mark>price</mark> of a polluting</u> <u>product <strong><mark>excludes</u></strong></mark> <u>the <mark>social cost</u></mark>, <u><mark>production is <strong>higher</u></strong> <u>than the</mark> <strong>social <mark>optimum</u></strong></mark>, <u>taking into account that <strong><mark>consumption</strong> of</mark> natural <mark>resources</u></mark> now <u><strong><mark>exceeds</u></strong></mark> what <u><mark>the <strong>regenerative capacity</u></strong> <u>of the Earth</mark> can</u> <u><strong>sustain</u></strong>.</p><p>To address this market failure, the discussion around including environmental goals in competition law has, so far, mostly focused on state aid, horizontal cooperation and merger control. For example, it has been argued that the consumer welfare analysis in merger control could include whether the merger could be expected to raise or lower the environmental price that consumers pay, which is not reflected in the market price in monetary terms or in quality (which could take account of non-market externalities such as emissions). Likewise, horizontal guidelines could be revised to allow cooperation in pursuit of environmental goals, where individual producers are willing to invest in greening production, but may be held back by the fear that they will be undercut by those who do not invest, or by cheaper imports.</p><p><u><mark>There is no</u></mark> inherent <u><mark>reason</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>why <strong>sustainability</u></strong> <u>could <strong>not</strong> be incorporated</mark> into <strong>an abuse of dominance assessment</u></strong>, too. This could be done in a number of ways.</p><p>First, <u><strong><mark>pricing analysis</u></strong></mark> (for example, for loyalty rebates, predatory pricing, margin squeeze) <u><mark>could take</u></mark> <u><mark>into account the</u></mark> actual <u><strong><mark>costs</u></strong> <u>incurred by the</mark> <strong>dominant <mark>company</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u><strong>by society</u></strong>, <u><mark>including</mark> not only the total costs of production, but also the <strong><mark>environmental</strong> cost</u></mark>. <u><mark>A company may</mark> be able to <strong><mark>price lower</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>than</u></mark> its <u><mark>rivals</u> <u>because</u> <u>it is employing <strong>polluting</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>or</u></strong> <u><strong>greenhouse</u></strong> gas emitting <u>technology</u>, at great societal cost, which is not reflected in its traditional variable and fixed costs.</p><p>Second, <u><strong><mark>a dominant provider</u></strong></mark> <u>with an incumbent polluting technology <mark>might commit an abuse by</mark> <mark>excluding <strong>rival, greener technologies</u></strong></mark> <u>by means</u> <u><strong><mark>other</u></strong> <u>than</mark> competition on the <strong><mark>merits</mark>. Such conduct should already violate dominance rules. In this case, however, 'competition on the merits' should be defined so as to exclude competition that relies on avoidable pollution or greenhouse gas emissions. Also, the assessment should take into account that consumer harm would be even higher from the abuse because of the exclusion of a greener technology. The theory would be not dissimilar to that pursued by the European Commission in its Car Emissions cartel investigation, albeit that case concerns horizontal collusion to restrict competition on innovation for emission cleaning systems.</p><p></u></strong>Third, <u><mark>there may be</mark> sui generis <strong>abuses</u></strong> <u>that involve <strong><mark>unsustainable business practices</u></strong></mark> that also restrict competition. For example<mark>, <u>a dominant producer</mark> might <mark>employ <strong>cheap</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>polluting means</u></strong> <u>of</mark> <mark>production</mark>, and</u> thereby <u>price cheaper</u> than its rivals. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> dominant <mark>raw materials producer</u></strong> <u>might make</u></mark> <u><mark>misleading representations to an</mark> environmental agency to <mark>secure</mark> a <mark>licence to <strong>extract</mark> minerals</u></strong>. <u>And a dominant <strong><mark>chemical producer</u></strong> <u>could</u></mark> <u><strong>illegally <mark>dump products</u></strong></mark> <u>in rivers</u>, thereby <u><mark>gaining an advantage</mark> <mark>over rivals that dispose of <strong>waster safely</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>All these</mark> might conceivably be an abuse of dominance</u> because <u>they <strong><mark>distort</strong> competition</u></mark>, <u>via means <strong>other</u></strong> <u>than competition on the merits</u>. The fact that they may also infringe other laws is no bar to bringing an abuse of dominance claim, just as a dominant factory owner burning down a rival's factory can be both arson and an abuse of dominance. <u><mark>Rivals</mark> <mark>should have <strong>a cause of action</u></strong>,</mark> <u>especially <mark>where <strong>environmental rules</u></strong> <u>are</u></mark> <u><strong>inadequate</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong><mark>insufficiently enforced.</p></u></strong></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jacques S. Gansler 11, Professor and Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Characteristics of the Defense Industry in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Chapter 4, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry, MIT Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-262-07299-1, p.188-192 fulltext: As the Congress elaborates — in minute detail — on executive branch operations, it decreases the DoD’s management flexibility to efficiently and effectively operate at minimum cost. When a problem is found in an individual case on an individual program, the Congress is tempted to write a new law that will prevent its recurrence. These new restrictions are applied to all other programs and all other acquisitions. This slows down and complicates all other cases — all to prevent one mistake from being repeated, without doing an analysis of the costs and benefits of such a change. Congress’s lawmaking process also tends to highly resist change — even as the world changes dramatically in terms of technological progress, warfighting requirements, business practices, and globalization. Sixty Senate votes are needed to take up important legislation, let alone pass it. As Steven Pearlstein wrote in the Washington Post, “ Immigration reform, a major energy bill, global warming legislation, the housing bill, overhaul of the aviation system and fixes for the alternative minimum tax have all been bottled up in the Senate, thanks to those quaint rules. ” 151 The world of defense has been globalized. The DoD gets advanced technology from offshore, U.S. defense firms sell U.S. equipment offshore, and the defense industry has multinational interests. However, the Congress continues to take a highly protectionist position in terms of both imports and exports. Restrictions enacted in the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill stalled delivery of more than 1,000 new trucks to the U.S. Army because the trucks contained metals from foreign suppliers. The presence of foreign metal was thought to violate Buy American provisions, which require that all specialty metals in U.S. defense hardware be sourced domestically. 152 In another example, when the air force selected an Airbus design for its new in-air-refueling tanker, Congress complained loudly about U.S. jobs that would be lost and threatened to cancel the program — despite the fact that the tanker was to be built in Alabama. 153 Unfortunately, many laws that are written for valid reasons to address special cases have unintended consequences in a broader context. The export-control provisions and the Buy American Act have not been updated to reflect the globalization of technology that has taken place. Although these laws were written to protect U.S. industry, they limit the Department of Defense in obtaining the higher-performance and lower-cost systems and components from offshore. They ultimately have a negative impact on U.S. national security. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the Congress legislated a 25 percent cut in the DoD acquisition workforce to cut back on overhead. As a result, the inadequate workforce was incapable of handling the large number of acquisition actions and the dollars expended in the first part of the twenty-first century as the dollars built up dramatically after 9/11. It is not surprising that members of the House and the Senate want to send dollars to their districts and states in the appropriation of funds. At election time, major points will be made by elected officials who have sent home large amounts of money. Besides attempting to garner votes with these budget appropriations, members of Congress are also influenced by contributions to their campaigns. Lobbyists walk the halls of Congress and remind their delegates of the jobs in their districts and states, the contributions from their firms, and the importance of their company’s programs. In 2007, lobbying expenditures reached $2.79 billion, with significant portions coming from major defense firms. Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and Lockheed spent over $10 million each on lobbying. 154 Key members of the authorization and appropriation committees and subcommittees that deal with defense received significant contributions from defense PACs for their reelection campaigns. In 2006, when Senator Jim Talent (R-MO) was chair of the Senate Armed Services Sea Power Committee, he accepted large sums from political action committees. Boeing contributed $52,400, and General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon contributed over $10,000 each. His challenger received a total of $250 from the defense sector. 155 These lobbying efforts and PAC contributions were intended to achieve two objectives — to maximize dollars for a company’s programs and to increase congressional “ earmarks ”for them. Naturally, lobbyists sought to maximize the number of dollars placed into the appropriations bills for their company’s programs. However, since the top line was somewhat limited (although appropriators often exceed the guidelines from the budget committees), an increase in some areas resulted in a reduction in others. When the House Armed Services Committee composed its budget for fiscal year 2008, it added three more ships and a host of additional aircraft, ultimately exceeding the amounts that the military had sought. However, the committee took out $1.6 billion from the requested funds for missile defense and the army’s future development plans. 156 Additionally, when the chief of naval operations urged Congress not to add the additional DDG-51 destroyers to the budget because it would be moving back to 1980s technology, Representative Gene Taylor (D-MS), the chair of the House Armed Services Sea Power Committee at that time, added them anyway. Taylor’s district is home to the Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard, which was facing the prospect of shutting down its DDG-51 production line. Ultimately, the chair of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, John Murtha (D-PA), refused to approve the DDG-51 purchase but wanted to add five other ships, specifying that one of these would be an additional Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine. 157 As these examples demonstrate, there is not always agreement between the authorizers and appropriators. Budgetary questions often become a power struggle with the one who controls the money holding the power. One must keep in mind the high costs involved in these actions — in this case, billions of dollars for just one submarine. Later, seven House members inserted a $2.42 billion addition into the defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2008 for Boeing to build new C-17 transports for the air force. These were not included in the Pentagon’s budget request, and, in fact, the Air Force had set aside money to halt production of the program. As the Congress raises and lowers hundreds of individual budget items, it introduces a great deal of unpredictability and instability into the industrial planning for each year’s labor force, regardless of whether it adds or subtracts dollars. The result is considerable inefficiency in industrial operations. In addition to these inefficiencies, uncertainties are associated with the rise and fall of quantities of equipment that will be authorized and appropriated. Long-lead parts cannot be ordered in advance, numbers of capital equipment for a given production quantity may be inadequate, and labor forces cannot be hired or have to be laid off in anticipation of the changed need. The military services are not totally innocent of these actions either. The Office of the Secretary of Defense may decide not to fund a program in an attempt to balance the overall DoD budget, even though the relevant service wants it to continue. In response, the services will often indirectly let it be known on Capitol Hill that they would really like that particular program to be inserted by Congress, and they will certainly get strong support from their industrial partner (and their industrial partner’s lobbyists and their labor union’s representative). The second and perhaps best-known effects of lobbying and congressional contributions are congressional “earmarks.” With 34,785 registered Washington lobbyists, many inserts are added to either authorization or appropriations bills by a congressman or senator in the interests of a local constituent. In fiscal year 2007, there were 15,500 earmarks, worth $64 billion (according to the Congressional Research Service). 158 The significance of this figure depends on what is categorized as an earmark. For example, does the addition of a few ships to be built in a congressman’s district for a few billion dollars count as an earmark, or should only small additions be counted, like money added for a local university’s library? Nonetheless, the dollars earmarked for defense are enormous. In 2008, the House defense authorization bill had $9.9 billion in earmarks, and the Senate bill contained an additional $5.4 billion (amounting to a total of $15.3 billion). 159 Government Executive examined the earmarks in the fiscal year 2008 defense appropriation bill and found that thirteen of the twenty largest defense contractors received eighty earmarks (that includes large orders for ships, planes, and tanks and major equipment add-ons). Only House rules require sponsors of earmarks and their intended recipients to be publicly identified. Senate rules require sponsors to certify that the earmarks will not result in personal gain (approximately 40 percent of the legislations ’earmarks — comprising $5.3 billion — were inserted by senators on behalf of unknown recipients). 160 Needless to say, these earmarks can be highly disruptive to an efficient operation planned by either the DoD or the industry. When the president receives a defense bill, he can veto the whole bill or approve it. He does not have the option of vetoing individual line items within the bill. He might strongly object to the addition of these billions of dollars worth of earmarks, but he can do nothing about it unless he vetoes the whole bill — which would stop the operation of the government. After signing the fiscal year 2008 appropriations bill, George W. Bush maintained the following about the 9,800 earmarks totaling more than $10 billion: “These projects are not funded through a merit-based process and provide a vehicle for wasteful government spending.” 161 The biggest effect of congressional micromanagement — continuous changes in budget line items and insertion of earmarks — is inefficiency and reduction in national security effectiveness. It also should be noted that senior executives in the Department of Defense and in other government agencies must spend significant amounts of time preparing and presenting testimony before congressional hearings that the multiple authorization and appropriation committees and subcommittees require. An extreme example of this process can be found in the Department of Homeland Security, where eighty-eight congressional committees and subcommittees have jurisdiction over some aspect of homeland security. 162 In addition to the regular hearings on authorization and appropriations, there are also many hearings in connection with Congress’s role of oversight. Cynics claim the objective is not to improve the system but rather to catch someone and make headlines in the process. When a problem is discovered — whether a cost overrun on a program, a violation of one of the congressional dictates in the law, or an inappropriate application of the government-unique cost accounting rules — hearings will be held, and new rules will be proposed. As noted above, these rules may prevent such an event from ever happening again, but when applied to all other programs, they usually have the adverse effect of slowing down operations and making them less efficient or effective. The transparency provided by such hearings (and usually amplified by the press) serves a valuable function in ensuring legal behavior, but despite the large funds being awarded by the Congress and the large dollars being provided to members for their reelection campaigns, there are actually very few examples of illegal actions. Although a Republican Congressman, Randy “ Duke ”Cunningham, was convicted in 2006 of taking millions of dollars in cash and gifts in exchange for earmarks benefiting a military contractor, it was considered a rare incident. Its visibility in the public media serves as the equivalent of a public hanging that discourages such behavior on the part of other public figures.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Devastates DoD flex</h4><p>Jacques S. <strong>Gansler 11</strong>, Professor and Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Characteristics of the Defense Industry in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Chapter 4, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry, MIT Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-262-07299-1, p.188-192</p><p><u>As the <strong>Congress</strong> elaborates — in <strong>minute detail</u></strong> — <u>on</u> executive branch <u>operations, it <strong>decreases</strong> the <strong>DoD’s management flexibility</strong> to <strong>efficiently</strong> and <strong>effectively</strong> <strong>operate at minimum cost</u></strong>. <u>When a problem is found in an individual case on an individual program, the Congress is tempted to <strong>write a new law</strong> that will prevent its recurrence. These <strong>new restrictions are applied to all other programs and all other acquisitions</strong>. This <strong>slows down</strong> and <strong>complicates</strong> <strong>all other cases</strong> — all to prevent one mistake from being repeated</u>, without doing an analysis of the costs and benefits of such a change.</p><p><u><strong>Congress’s lawmaking process</strong> also tends to highly resist change</u> — even as the world changes dramatically in terms of technological progress, warfighting requirements, business practices, and globalization. Sixty Senate votes are needed to take up important legislation, let alone pass it. As Steven Pearlstein wrote in the Washington Post, “ Immigration reform, a major energy bill, global warming legislation, the housing bill, overhaul of the aviation system and fixes for the alternative minimum tax have all been bottled up in the Senate, thanks to those quaint rules. ” 151</p><p>The world of defense has been globalized. The DoD gets advanced technology from offshore, U.S. defense firms sell U.S. equipment offshore, and the defense industry has multinational interests. However, the Congress continues to take a highly protectionist position in terms of both imports and exports. Restrictions enacted in the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill stalled delivery of more than 1,000 new trucks to the U.S. Army because the trucks contained metals from foreign suppliers. The presence of foreign metal was thought to violate Buy American provisions, which require that all specialty metals in U.S. defense hardware be sourced domestically. 152 In another example, when the air force selected an Airbus design for its new in-air-refueling tanker, Congress complained loudly about U.S. jobs that would be lost and threatened to cancel the program — despite the fact that the tanker was to be built in Alabama. 153</p><p><u>Unfortunately, many laws that are written for valid reasons to address special cases have <strong>unintended consequences</strong> in a broader context</u>. The export-control provisions and the Buy American Act have not been updated to reflect the globalization of technology that has taken place. Although these laws were written to protect U.S. industry, they limit the Department of Defense in obtaining the higher-performance and lower-cost systems and components from offshore. They ultimately have a negative impact on U.S. national security. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the Congress legislated a 25 percent cut in the DoD acquisition workforce to cut back on overhead. As a result, the inadequate workforce was incapable of handling the large number of acquisition actions and the dollars expended in the first part of the twenty-first century as the dollars built up dramatically after 9/11.</p><p>It is not surprising that members of the House and the Senate want to send dollars to their districts and states in the appropriation of funds. At election time, major points will be made by elected officials who have sent home large amounts of money. Besides attempting to garner votes with these budget appropriations, members of Congress are also influenced by contributions to their campaigns. Lobbyists walk the halls of Congress and remind their delegates of the jobs in their districts and states, the contributions from their firms, and the importance of their company’s programs. In 2007, lobbying expenditures reached $2.79 billion, with significant portions coming from major defense firms. Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and Lockheed spent over $10 million each on lobbying. 154</p><p>Key members of the authorization and appropriation committees and subcommittees that deal with defense received significant contributions from defense PACs for their reelection campaigns. In 2006, when Senator Jim Talent (R-MO) was chair of the Senate Armed Services Sea Power Committee, he accepted large sums from political action committees. Boeing contributed $52,400, and General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon contributed over $10,000 each. His challenger received a total of $250 from the defense sector. 155</p><p>These lobbying efforts and PAC contributions were intended to achieve two objectives — to maximize dollars for a company’s programs and to increase congressional “ earmarks ”for them. Naturally, lobbyists sought to maximize the number of dollars placed into the appropriations bills for their company’s programs. However, since the top line was somewhat limited (although appropriators often exceed the guidelines from the budget committees), an increase in some areas resulted in a reduction in others. When the House Armed Services Committee composed its budget for fiscal year 2008, it added three more ships and a host of additional aircraft, ultimately exceeding the amounts that the military had sought. However, the committee took out $1.6 billion from the requested funds for missile defense and the army’s future development plans. 156 Additionally, when the chief of naval operations urged Congress not to add the additional DDG-51 destroyers to the budget because it would be moving back to 1980s technology, Representative Gene Taylor (D-MS), the chair of the House Armed Services Sea Power Committee at that time, added them anyway. Taylor’s district is home to the Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard, which was facing the prospect of shutting down its DDG-51 production line. Ultimately, the chair of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, John Murtha (D-PA), refused to approve the DDG-51 purchase but wanted to add five other ships, specifying that one of these would be an additional Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine. 157 As these examples demonstrate, there is not always agreement between the authorizers and appropriators. Budgetary questions often become a power struggle with the one who controls the money holding the power. One must keep in mind the high costs involved in these actions — in this case, billions of dollars for just one submarine. Later, seven House members inserted a $2.42 billion addition into the defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2008 for Boeing to build new C-17 transports for the air force. These were not included in the Pentagon’s budget request, and, in fact, the Air Force had set aside money to halt production of the program.</p><p>As the Congress raises and lowers hundreds of individual budget items, it introduces a great deal of unpredictability and instability into the industrial planning for each year’s labor force, regardless of whether it adds or subtracts dollars. The result is considerable inefficiency in industrial operations. In addition to these inefficiencies, uncertainties are associated with the rise and fall of quantities of equipment that will be authorized and appropriated. Long-lead parts cannot be ordered in advance, numbers of capital equipment for a given production quantity may be inadequate, and labor forces cannot be hired or have to be laid off in anticipation of the changed need.</p><p>The military services are not totally innocent of these actions either. The Office of the Secretary of Defense may decide not to fund a program in an attempt to balance the overall DoD budget, even though the relevant service wants it to continue. In response, the services will often indirectly let it be known on Capitol Hill that they would really like that particular program to be inserted by Congress, and they will certainly get strong support from their industrial partner (and their industrial partner’s lobbyists and their labor union’s representative).</p><p>The second and perhaps best-known effects of lobbying and congressional contributions are congressional “earmarks.” With 34,785 registered Washington lobbyists, many inserts are added to either authorization or appropriations bills by a congressman or senator in the interests of a local constituent. In fiscal year 2007, there were 15,500 earmarks, worth $64 billion (according to the Congressional Research Service). 158 The significance of this figure depends on what is categorized as an earmark. For example, does the addition of a few ships to be built in a congressman’s district for a few billion dollars count as an earmark, or should only small additions be counted, like money added for a local university’s library? Nonetheless, the dollars earmarked for defense are enormous. In 2008, the House defense authorization bill had $9.9 billion in earmarks, and the Senate bill contained an additional $5.4 billion (amounting to a total of $15.3 billion). 159 Government Executive examined the earmarks in the fiscal year 2008 defense appropriation bill and found that thirteen of the twenty largest defense contractors received eighty earmarks (that includes large orders for ships, planes, and tanks and major equipment add-ons). Only House rules require sponsors of earmarks and their intended recipients to be publicly identified. Senate rules require sponsors to certify that the earmarks will not result in personal gain (approximately 40 percent of the legislations ’earmarks — comprising $5.3 billion — were inserted by senators on behalf of unknown recipients). 160 Needless to say, these earmarks can be highly disruptive to an efficient operation planned by either the DoD or the industry.</p><p>When the president receives a defense bill, he can veto the whole bill or approve it. He does not have the option of vetoing individual line items within the bill. He might strongly object to the addition of these billions of dollars worth of earmarks, but he can do nothing about it unless he vetoes the whole bill — which would stop the operation of the government. After signing the fiscal year 2008 appropriations bill, George W. Bush maintained the following about the 9,800 earmarks totaling more than $10 billion: “These projects are not funded through a merit-based process and provide a vehicle for wasteful government spending.” 161</p><p><u>The <strong>biggest effect</strong> of <strong>congressional micromanagement</u></strong> — continuous changes in budget line items and insertion of earmarks — <u>is <strong>inefficiency</strong> and <strong>reduction in national security effectiveness</u></strong>. It <u>also</u> should be noted <u>that senior executives in</u> the Department of <u><strong>Defense</u></strong> and in other government <u>agencies must <strong>spend significant amounts of time</strong> preparing and presenting <strong>testimony</strong> before congressional hearings</u> that the multiple authorization and appropriation committees and subcommittees require. An extreme example of this process can be found in the Department of Homeland Security, where eighty-eight congressional committees and subcommittees have jurisdiction over some aspect of homeland security. 162</p><p>In addition to the regular hearings on authorization and appropriations, there are also many hearings in connection with <u><strong>Congress’s</strong> role of oversight</u>. Cynics claim the <u><strong>objective</strong> is <strong>not</strong> to <strong>improve the system</strong> but <strong>rather</strong> to catch someone and <strong>make headlines</strong> in the process</u>. <u>When a problem is discovered — whether a cost overrun on a program, a violation of one of the congressional dictates in the law, or an inappropriate application of the government-unique cost accounting rules — hearings will be held, and new rules will be proposed</u>. As noted above, these rules may prevent such an event from ever happening again, but when applied to all other programs, they <u><strong>usually</strong> have the <strong>adverse effect</strong> of <strong>slowing down operations</strong> and making them <strong>less efficient</strong> or <strong>effective</u></strong>. The transparency provided by such hearings (and usually amplified by the press) serves a valuable function in ensuring legal behavior, but despite the large funds being awarded by the Congress and the large dollars being provided to members for their reelection campaigns, <u>there are <strong>actually very few examples of illegal actions</u></strong>. Although a Republican Congressman, Randy “ Duke ”Cunningham, was convicted in 2006 of taking millions of dollars in cash and gifts in exchange for earmarks benefiting a military contractor, it was considered a rare incident. Its visibility in the public media serves as the equivalent of a public hanging that discourages such behavior on the part of other public figures. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Black, 17 - Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law (Derek, “Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act”, 102 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:101, SSRN) fulltext: Congress can then realign the Elementary and Secondary Education Act with its historic mission of improving academic achievement and equity for low-income students, and also can enact better mechanisms to achieve those goals. First, the Congress must increase the federal investment in education. This is necessary to help states meet the full academic needs of disadvantaged students and to offset the proportionally higher costs of districts serving predominantly low-income students. An increase in federal investment is also necessary if states are to accept the second step: strict prohibitions on states’ unequal distribution of educational resources. Strict prohibitions with no transition steps, however, would surely fail. Thus, Congress should require incremental steps toward equity, as well as alternative compliance measures for districts that might be high performing regardless of their resources. The final step is to expand preschool education to all low-income students—a goal that the Department of Education has pushed in recent years, but that states seemingly lack the capacity to reach alone. A short-term federal investment could immediately expand preschool and, in the long term, generate new savings that states could use to fund preschool and offset the costs of equity compliance in later grades. The following sections explore each of these points in full. A. Increase the Federal Investment in Education The federal financial stake in education should substantially increase and move states toward delivering low-income students the full supplemental funding necessary to provide adequate educational opportunities. Estimates suggest that for low-income students to achieve at levels comparable to their peers, they require 30 to 60 percent more resources than those necessary for middle-income students.. 333 The federal government has officially pegged 40 percent as the appropriate supplement.334 States are far from meeting this standard and, as Part III.A. demonstrates, are regressing in many locations. Skeptics primarily ask why the federal government should take on a larger financial commitment in an area traditionally of state concern and control. And relatedly, why not simply demand that states meet appropriate resource goals themselves? The answer to these concerns is threefold. First, some states appear to lack the resources to fund education adequately and equitably.335 Ironically, a few states fund education roughly equally across districts, but the actual funding level itself is relatively low.336 These states lag far behind the national average in terms of fiscal capacity.337 They devote a greater percentage of their states’ overall wealth to education, but because they are poor states, their extra effort still generates relatively low levels of education funding. 338 As one study found, the greatest funding inequities are between poor and rich states, not within individual states. 339 Second, many states with relatively high fiscal capacity have taken very little initiative in equalizing education.340 These states may fund education at relatively high levels, but funding can be wildly unequal across districts. In other words, many states fall into two different camps: one with a commitment to equity but no capacity for adequacy, and another with the capacity for adequacy but no commitment to equity. As Josh Weishart explained, adequacy and equity are interconnected, and one cannot realistically be achieved without the other.341 Third, helping low-capacity states necessarily requires federal assistance and motivating high-capacity states necessarily requires federal leverage. The federal government cannot get either for nothing. Both involve substantial additional money— enough to make the deal enticing for states. While Congress plausibly could demand more equity and adequacy from states pursuant to its congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, 342 such authority has not been substantiated by courts or even remotely recognized by politicians. This leaves Congress’s power under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. As spending legislation, Congress can only secure states’ consent to conditions in exchange for money.343 Congress and President Bush clearly understood this relationship in passing the NCLB, as the NCLB drastically expanded the federal role in education but only in exchange for a major increase in federal funding.344 If Congress is to further equity and adequacy through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in the future, it must do the same again. The federal government has the capacity to make this investment with relatively little effort. The current outlays for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act hover around $25 billion a year345—a miniscule number compared to the $938 billion in annual spending on health care.346 Federal spending on education altogether, which includes far more than just the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, is about 3 percent of the federal budget and is roughly equivalent to transportation or scientific research spending.347 In recent years, Congress has demonstrated the willingness to inject new funds into education to address short-term agendas. During the recession, Congress appropriated $4.3 billion to fund education innovation grants to states.348 Congress made an even bigger appropriation of $53.6 billion to cover the states’ budget shortfalls during the recession and to prevent massive teacher layoffs.349 Toward that end, Congress appropriated $53.6 billion with almost no strings attached.350 An annual federal investment of $45 billion, rather than the current $15 billion, would be enough to ensure that low-income students, particularly those attending schools with concentrated poverty, receive the additional funds they need.351 These federal funds alone, if properly targeted, would amount to a 20 percent supplement for low-income students and would put states halfway to the goal of a 40 percent supplement.352 This investment would afford the federal government the leverage to demand that states appropriately weight their funding formulas to meet the needs of disadvantaged students.353 At that point, existing and new Title I funds and state remediation could combine to provide a 40 percent supplement for low-income students. Equally important, these federal funds would create the leverage and capacity the federal government needs for states to comply with the equity provisions outlined in the following sections. Footnote 351 351 In theory, Congress probably could cover half of the cost of a 40 percent bump to all low-income students with $25 billion, but as the percentage of low-income students in a school increases, so will the necessary per-pupil expenditures. See generally Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 344-46 (2010). This Article proposes a $45 billion investment, which would account for the effects of concentrated poverty. The data for that estimate comes from U.S. Census, Annual Survey of School System Finances: Per Pupil Amounts for Current Spending of Public Elementary-Secondary School Systems by State: Fiscal Year 2014, available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. The methodology and calculations were devised and performed by Professor Bruce D. Baker, Rutgers University Graduate School of Education. The data are on file with the author.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The CP ramps up Title I funding to 45 billion a year – anything short can’t account for the <u>scale</u> of <u>concentrated poverty</u>. Linking this to progressive state funding and fiscal effort provides 40% extra resources for low-income students. </h4><p><strong>Black, 17 </strong>- Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law (Derek, “Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act”, 102 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:101, SSRN)</p><p>Congress can then realign the Elementary and Secondary Education Act with its historic mission of improving academic achievement and equity for low-income students, and also can enact better mechanisms to achieve those goals. First, <u>the <mark>Congress must increase the federal investment in education</mark>. This is necessary <mark>to help states meet the </mark>full <mark>academic needs of disadvantaged students and to offset the </mark>proportionally <mark>higher costs of districts serving</mark> predominantly <mark>low-income students</u>.</mark> <u>An increase in federal investment is also necessary if states are to accept</u> the second step: <u>strict prohibitions on states’ unequal distribution of educational resources. Strict prohibitions with no transition steps, however, would surely fail.</u> Thus, <u>Congress should require incremental steps toward equity</u>, as well as alternative compliance measures for districts that might be high performing regardless of their resources. The final step is to expand preschool education to all low-income students—a goal that the Department of Education has pushed in recent years, but that states seemingly lack the capacity to reach alone. A short-term federal investment could immediately expand preschool and, in the long term, generate new savings that states could use to fund preschool and offset the costs of equity compliance in later grades. The following sections explore each of these points in full. A. Increase the Federal Investment in Education <u><mark>The federal financial stake in education should <strong>substantially increase</u></strong></mark> and move states toward delivering low-income students the full supplemental funding necessary to provide adequate educational opportunities. Estimates suggest that <u><mark>for low-income students to achieve</mark> at levels <mark>comparable to their peers</mark>, <mark>they require</mark> 30 to 60 percent <mark>more resources</mark> than </u>those necessary for<u> middle-income students</u>.. 333 <u><mark>The federal government has officially pegged</mark> <mark>40 percent</mark> <mark>as the appropriate supplement</u></mark>.334 <u><mark>States are <strong>far</strong> from meeting this standard and</u></mark>, as Part III.A. demonstrates, <u><mark>are <strong>regressing</strong> in many locations</mark>.</u> Skeptics primarily ask why the federal government should take on a larger financial commitment in an area traditionally of state concern and control. And relatedly, why not simply demand that states meet appropriate resource goals themselves? The answer to these concerns is threefold. First, <u>some states appear to lack the resources to fund education adequately and equitably</u>.335 Ironically, <u>a few states fund education roughly equally across districts, but the actual funding level itself is</u> relatively <u>low</u>.336 <u>These states lag far behind the national average in terms of <strong>fiscal capacity</u></strong>.337 They devote a greater percentage of their states’ overall wealth to education, but <u>because they are poor states, their extra effort still generates relatively low levels of education funding</u>. 338 As one study found, <u><mark>the greatest funding inequities are <strong>between poor and rich states</mark>, not within individual states</strong>.</u> 339 Second, many states with relatively high fiscal capacity have taken very little initiative in equalizing education.340 These states may fund education at relatively high levels, but funding can be wildly unequal across districts. In other words, many states fall into two different camps: one with a commitment to equity but no capacity for adequacy, and another with the capacity for adequacy but no commitment to equity. As Josh Weishart explained, adequacy and equity are interconnected, and one cannot realistically be achieved without the other.341 Third, <u><mark>helping low-capacity states</mark> necessarily <mark>requires federal assistance and motivating high-capacity states necessarily requires federal leverage</u></mark>. The federal government cannot get either for nothing. <u><mark>Both involve <strong>substantial additional money</u></strong></mark>— enough to make the deal enticing for states. While Congress plausibly could demand more equity and adequacy from states pursuant to its congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, 342 such authority has not been substantiated by courts or even remotely recognized by politicians. This leaves Congress’s power under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. As spending legislation, Congress can only secure states’ consent to conditions in exchange for money.343 Congress and President Bush clearly understood this relationship in passing the NCLB, as the NCLB drastically expanded the federal role in education but only in exchange for a major increase in federal funding.344 If Congress is to further equity and adequacy through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in the future, it must do the same again. The federal government has the capacity to make this investment with relatively little effort. The current outlays for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act hover around $25 billion a year345—a miniscule number compared to the $938 billion in annual spending on health care.346 Federal spending on education altogether, which includes far more than just the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, is about 3 percent of the federal budget and is roughly equivalent to transportation or scientific research spending.347 In recent years, Congress has demonstrated the willingness to inject new funds into education to address short-term agendas. During the recession, Congress appropriated $4.3 billion to fund education innovation grants to states.348 Congress made an even bigger appropriation of $53.6 billion to cover the states’ budget shortfalls during the recession and to prevent massive teacher layoffs.349 Toward that end, Congress appropriated $53.6 billion with almost no strings attached.350 <u>An annual federal investment of $45 billion, rather than the current $15 billion, would be enough to ensure that low-income students</u>, particularly those attending schools with concentrated poverty, <u>receive the additional funds they need</u>.351 <u>These federal funds alone, <strong>if properly targeted</strong>, would amount to a 20 percent supplement for low-income students</u> <u>and would put states <strong>halfway</strong> to the goal of a 40 percent supplemen</u>t.352 <u>This investment would afford the federal government the leverage to demand that states appropriately weight their funding formulas to meet the needs of disadvantaged students</u>.353 At that point, <u>existing and new Title I funds and state remediation could combine to provide a 40 percent supplement for low-income students.</u> Equally important, <u>these federal funds would create the leverage and capacity the federal government needs for states to comply with the equity provisions</u> outlined in the following sections. <strong>Footnote 351 </strong>351 <u>In theory, Congress probably could cover half of the cost of a 40 percent bump to all low-income students with $25 billion</u>, <u>but as the percentage of low-income students in a school increases, so will the necessary per-pupil expenditures</u>. See generally Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 344-46 (2010). <u>This Article proposes <mark>a $45 billion investment</mark>, which <mark>would <strong>account for the effects of concentrated poverty</strong></mark>. The data for that estimate comes from U.S. Census, Annual Survey of School System Finances: Per Pupil Amounts for Current Spending of Public Elementary-Secondary School Systems by State: Fiscal Year 2014, available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. The methodology and calculations were devised and performed by Professor Bruce D. Baker, Rutgers University Graduate School of Education. The data are on file with the author.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Stephen J. Cimbala 15, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, 2015, pp. 59-63 fulltext: Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow, the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was very real during the Cold War. This legacy has carried forward into the post-Cold War and twenty-first century world. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an unforeseen combination of human and technical factors, pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding war.¶ The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately, inside dope on the opponent’s political thinking and military planning may be hard to come by, under the exigent pressures of crisis. Therefore, states may infer the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces, from the behavior of its command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or from guesswork based on past experience.¶ For example: during Able Archer 83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18¶ Another example of the difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them.¶ A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion.¶ The Future: Issues of Concern¶ If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies: including those that might influence the decision for or against war.¶ Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis.¶ The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.20¶ The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.¶ The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation.¶ This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Allied prolif, especially in Asia, causes nuclear war</h4><p>Stephen J. <strong>Cimbala 15</strong>, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, 2015, pp. 59-63</p><p>Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow, <u><mark>the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war</mark> or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was <strong>very real during the Cold War</u></strong>. <u>This</u> legacy <u>has <strong><mark>carried forward</strong> into</mark> <mark>the</mark> post-Cold War and <mark>twenty-first century</mark> world</u>. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. <u>Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an unforeseen combination of human and technical factors</u>, pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding war.¶ The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately, <u>inside dope on <mark>the opponent’s</mark> political <mark>thinking and</mark> military <mark>planning may be hard to come by</u>,</mark> <u>under the exigent pressures of crisis</u>. Therefore, <u><mark>states may infer </mark>the other side’s <mark>intentions</mark> from the disposition of its forces</u>, from <u>the behavior of its command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or <mark>from <strong>guesswork</strong></mark> based on past experience</u>.¶ For example: during Able Archer 83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18¶ Another example of the difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them.¶ A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion.¶ The Future: Issues of Concern¶ <u>If <mark>the possibility existed of</mark> a <mark>mistaken preemption during</mark> and immediately after <mark>the Cold War</mark>, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then <mark>it may be </mark>a matter of <mark>even more concern with</mark> regard to <mark>states with</mark> <strong>newer and <mark>more opaque forces and command systems</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u>the Americans and</u> Soviets (and then <u>Russians</u>) <u>had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military</u> operational <u>proclivities and</u> doctrinal <u>idiosyncrasies</u>: including those that might influence the decision for or against war.¶ Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. <u>Future threats</u> to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction <u>may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis</u>.¶ <u><mark>The <strong>spread of nuclear weapons in Asia</u></strong></mark> (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) <u><mark>presents</mark> a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard</u>. <u>States with</u> nuclear forces of <u>variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into<mark> a matrix of</mark> complex political, social and cultural <mark>cross-currents <strong>contributory to </mark>the possibility of <mark>war</mark>.</u></strong> In addition to the existing nuclear powers <u><strong><mark>in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened</u></strong></mark> by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, <u>the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War</u>: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because <u>states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.</u>20¶ The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems <u><mark>in Asia</u></mark>, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because <u><mark>plausible adversaries live close together and are <strong>already engaged in </mark>ongoing <mark>disputes</strong></mark> about territory or other issues</u>. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.¶ <u>The <mark>short flight times</mark> of ballistic missiles</u> between the cities or military forces of contiguous states <u><mark>means</mark> that <strong>very <mark>little time will be available</strong></mark> <mark>for </mark>warning and attack <mark>assessment</mark> by the defender</u>. <u><mark>Conventional</mark>ly armed <mark>missiles could</mark> </u>easily <u><mark>be mistaken for</mark> a</u> tactical <u><mark>nuclear</mark> first use</u>. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, <u>potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have <mark>first strike vulnerable</mark> forces and command-control <mark>systems </mark>that <mark>increase</mark> decision <mark>pressures</mark> <mark>for</mark> <strong>rapid, and possibly mistaken, <mark>retaliation</u></strong></mark>.¶ <u><mark>This </mark>potpourri of possibilities <strong><mark>challenges conventional wisdom about</mark> nuclear <mark>deterrence</strong> and proliferation</u></mark> on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, <u>spreading nuclear</u> and other <u>weapons</u> of mass destruction in Asia<u> could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction</u> from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 <u>This would profoundly shake up prognostications </u>to the effect <u>that wars of mass destruction are now passé</u>, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Lockhart and Edwards, 19 Lockhart is a reporter for Vox, who writes about race: how it intersects with gender, sexuality, and economic status, how it influences social justice movements, and how communities of color interact with and are affected by policy and politics. Edwards received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Washington in 2017 and joined the Rutgers-Newark School of Criminal Justice in 2018. His work focuses on how systems of social control produce and reinforce inequality, and explores how politics, policy feedbacks, and social structures affect the relationships between families and the state. (P.R. Lockhart and Frank Edwards “Why police violence needs to be treated as a public health issue” accessed online 6-10-20 https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/8/14/20803872/police-violence-mortality-public-health-black-men-rutgers) fulltext: The deaths of unarmed black men and boys like Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and Tamir Rice kicked off a national conversation about police violence — particularly, fatal police violence against people of color — five years ago. That attention has fueled demands for police reform and officer accountability and has also led to media- and activist-led efforts to track the number of police shootings across the country. A new study finds that this attention to police violence is increasingly important, using statistics to argue that police killings are now a leading cause of death for young men in the United States. And researchers argue that policing has become an urgent public health concern with real impacts on communities. The study, conducted by a team of researchers from Rutgers University, the University of Michigan, and Washington University in St. Louis, was recently published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The researchers used data from Fatal Encounters, a journalist-compiled database of fatal interactions with police, to estimate the risk of being killed in a police use of force incident based on race, age, and sex. Using data from 2013 to 2018, they found that fatal police violence is the sixth-leading cause of death for men ages 25 to 29 across all racial groups. The study also found that the lifetime risk of dying from police violence is at its highest from ages 20 to 35, and that this applies to men and women of all races. While young men in general face a higher risk of being killed by police violence, the level of risk changes depending on race. Young men of color — specifically black, Latino, and Native American men — face a higher risk of being killed than white men and Asian American and Pacific Islander men (though the numbers suggest that fatal police violence against white Americans is also increasing). The estimated number of killings of young black men means that roughly one in 1,000 black men face fatal police violence — a rate 2.5 times greater than that of white men. The overall rate of police killings trails behind car accidents, suicides, homicide, heart disease, and cancer as a leading cause of death. “Our results show that people of color face a higher likelihood of being killed by police than do white men and women, that risk peaks in young adulthood, and that men of color face a nontrivial lifetime risk of being killed by police,” the researchers write. The study also shows how women experience fatal police violence: While women are killed at a lower rate than men, there are still racial disparities in these deaths. Black women and Native American women, for example, are more likely to be killed by police than white, Latina, and Asian American/Pacific Islander women. The data used in the study does not distinguish between fatal incidents that were later found to be justified uses of force and those that were not. (Data collected by the FBI, which is widely seen as incomplete, has found that 400 to 500 of the roughly 1,000 police shootings that occur each year are determined to be justified.) Instead, the study examined how fatal police use of force more generally affects different groups. There’s a “litany of negative consequences for health that this sort of aggressive and violent policing produces,” says Frank Edwards, the study’s lead author and an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University Newark. “The time has come for us to take this seriously as a cause of harm to public health.” I spoke with Edwards about the study, why there needs to be comprehensive federal data tracking police violence, and the importance of treating police killings as a public health issue. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity. P.R. Lockhart Why did you want to look at the rates of people being killed by police? Frank Edwards When we think of other causes of death — things like homicide, suicide, heart disease, cancer — we have really good numbers on who this affects, how often it occurs, how likely you are to die from these diseases over the course of your life. But we have no such data for police violence. We thought that we had a strong opportunity to improve how much we knew about people getting killed by police. Police violence often gets portrayed as a problem that is exclusively concentrated on black men living in cities. And that group is disproportionately affected, our research shows that clearly. But there are other groups affected, and incidence of police violence is pretty widespread. But there weren’t baseline numbers about how often this was occurring. We felt that the availability of unofficial databases like the Fatal Encounters database (which uses a combination of paid researchers, public records requests, and crowdsourced data to track fatal police violence) made the analysis possible — the federal government has failed to produce reliable numbers. P.R. Lockhart What are the biggest takeaways of the study? Frank Edwards Police violence is incredibly common. We find that among all men in the US, they face about one-in-2,000 odds of being killed by police over the course of their lives. For white men, it’s about a one-in-2,500 risk of being killed by police, but when we look at black men, it is every one in 1,000. That means that for every 1,000 black boys born in this country, if the risk of police killings stays where it has been over the past five years, then we expect one of those boys to be killed by police at some point of their life. We think that’s a really striking — and high — number. Women have a risk as well — it’s about one in 33,000 compared to one in 2,000 for men. But women still have a risk, and when we look at this further, you see that women being killed by police is also unequal across racial and ethnic groups. Black women and Native American women are about 1.5 times more likely than white women to be killed by police. Our study is really one of the first to provide detailed estimates of the risk faced by Asian American and Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and Latinos and Latinas, across age and race. I would say that there are a few big takeaways: one, that lifetime risk of fatal police violence, especially for men, is unequal across racial and ethnic groups — people of color are much more likely to be killed by police than white people. The risk of being killed by police is concentrated among the young; from the ages of 20 to 35, and for young men from the peak ages of 25 to 29, police violence is a significant contributor to overall mortality, especially for young men of color. Of all the men who die between the ages of 20 and 29, police are responsible for more than 1 percent of those deaths. P.R. Lockhart In the paper, you and your co-authors argue that police violence needs to be looked at as a public health issue. Can you talk to me about why that matters? Frank Edwards We think the research community has provided ample evidence that the way police operate is harmful to both individual and community health. Think about all the ways that policing affects communities that are less extreme than a killing. A police killing affects more than the deceased. There’s been great research finding that when an unarmed African American man is killed in a state, there is an increase in symptoms of depression among African Americans in that state following the shooting. When a white unarmed man is killed in a state, there’s no similar increase in depressive symptoms among white residents. It strongly suggests that black people see police as a distinctive threat to their well-being, and they — I would argue rightly — perceive police as dangerous. It increases their feelings of outsidership, their feelings of dehumanization, and it increases fear in their interactions with police. We also know that with policies like stop-and-frisk in New York City, where police aggressively target young men of color, and other policies in other areas as well, the young men who go through this and experience physical searches have increases in PTSD symptoms afterward. They become hypervigilant, and that can have all sorts of cascading negative health consequences as you’re inducing these chronic stresses on relatively young people. Heavily policed neighborhoods also see increases in anxiety, as people are fearful and they deal with the sorts of chronic stress that we know can be especially toxic. The research community has documented a litany of negative consequences for health that this sort of aggressive and violent policing produces. The time has come for us to take this seriously as a cause of harm to public health and something that is particularly expanding health inequality among racial groups. It’s particularly harming young African American men, but you look at the tragic cases of women like Erica Garner who are exposed to these deaths, and you see how it has an incredible toll on well-being that can lead to early mortality. We think the time is long past for the medical community and health community to not only identify these issues but design interventions that can help. P.R. Lockhart Any thoughts on what those possible interventions could look like? Frank Edwards As other researchers have examined, this is likely a problem of policing becoming a sort of catchall solution to every single problem that our society has. We’ve defunded services that give people alternatives to calling the police when there is a crisis. The defunding of mental health clinics and other kinds of social services means that officers take on these routine roles of responding to problems. When you talk to police officers, they will tell you that they are not mental health professionals, they’re not social workers, and that many of the things they are tasked with dealing with they’re not trained for and aren’t equipped to deal with. In the paper, we don’t look into particular interventions; our recommendations are based on other research. But we think adequately funding community-based services would almost certainly help reduce violence by providing communities with tools and alternatives to police. Another issue is that we don’t have official data on policing, and the data we do have is from journalists, not the government itself. We rely on the media, and in my mind it is unacceptable to need them to provide this basic public service and this basic check on police abuse of power. I’m optimistic that we will get more robust data from the federal government, and universities and nonprofits are building data tracking projects, so hopefully this is a problem that will be solved. But data is essential for building out systems for the public to be able to hold police accountable.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Police brutality has increased in recent years and is now the sixth-leading cause of death for men ages 25-29. Police Brutality has become a public health risk which has led to increasing cases of PTSD, Depression, dehumanization, and anxiety. These risks operate under racialized lines and can only be accounted for when we prioritize this violence in our national policies.</h4><p><strong>Lockhart and Edwards, 19</strong> Lockhart is a reporter for Vox, who writes about race: how it intersects with gender, sexuality, and economic status, how it influences social justice movements, and how communities of color interact with and are affected by policy and politics. Edwards received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Washington in 2017 and joined the Rutgers-Newark School of Criminal Justice in 2018. His work focuses on how systems of social control produce and reinforce inequality, and explores how politics, policy feedbacks, and social structures affect the relationships between families and the state. (P.R. Lockhart and Frank Edwards “Why police violence needs to be treated as a public health issue” accessed online 6-10-20 https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/8/14/20803872/police-violence-mortality-public-health-black-men-rutgers)<u><strong> </p><p></strong>The <strong><mark>deaths of unarmed black men and boys</strong></mark> like Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and Tamir Rice <strong><mark>kicked off a national conversation about police violence</u></strong></mark> — particularly, fatal police violence against people of color — five years ago. <u>That <strong>attention has fueled demands for police reform </strong>and officer accountability</u> and has also led to media- and activist-led efforts to track the number of police shootings across the country. A new study finds that <u><strong><mark>this attention</mark> to police violence <mark>is</mark> increasingly <mark>important</mark>, using statistics to argue that police killings are now a leading cause of death for young men in the United States</u></strong>. And researchers argue that <u><strong><mark>policing has become an urgent public health concern</mark> with real impacts on communities. </u></strong>The study, conducted by a team of researchers from Rutgers University, the University of Michigan, and Washington University in St. Louis, was recently published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The researchers used data from Fatal Encounters, a journalist-compiled database of fatal interactions with police, to estimate the risk of being killed in a police use of force incident based on race, age, and sex. <u>Using <strong><mark>data</mark> from 2013 to 2018</strong>, they <strong><mark>found</mark> that fatal <mark>police violence is the sixth-leading cause of death for men ages 25 to 29</mark> </strong>across all racial groups</u>. The study also found that the lifetime risk of dying from police violence is at its highest from ages 20 to 35, and that this applies to men and women of all races. <u>While young men in general face a higher risk of being killed by police violence, <strong><mark>the level of risk changes depending on race. Young men of color</mark> — specifically black, Latino, and Native American men — <mark>face a higher risk</strong></mark> of being killed than white men and Asian American and Pacific Islander men</u> (though the numbers suggest that fatal police violence against white Americans is also increasing). <u>The estimated number of killings of young black men means that roughly one in 1,000 black men face fatal police violence — a rate 2.5 times greater than that of white men. </u>The overall rate of police killings trails behind car accidents, suicides, homicide, heart disease, and cancer as a leading cause of death. “Our results show that people of color face a higher likelihood of being killed by police than do white men and women, that risk peaks in young adulthood, and that men of color face a nontrivial lifetime risk of being killed by police,” the researchers write. <u>The study also shows how women experience fatal police violence: While women are killed at a lower rate than men, there are still racial disparities in these deaths</u>. <u>Black women and Native American women, for example, are more likely to be killed by police than white, Latina, and Asian American/Pacific Islander women. </u>The data used in the study does not distinguish between fatal incidents that were later found to be justified uses of force and those that were not. (Data collected by the FBI, which is widely seen as incomplete, has found that 400 to 500 of the roughly 1,000 police shootings that occur each year are determined to be justified.) Instead, the study examined how fatal police use of force more generally affects different groups. <u><strong><mark>There’s a “litany of negative consequences for health that this sort of aggressive and violent policing produces,”</u></strong> s</mark>ays Frank Edwards, the study’s lead author and an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University Newark. <mark>“<u><strong>The time has come</mark> for us <mark>to take this seriously as a cause of harm to public health.”</mark> </u></strong>I spoke with Edwards about the study, why there needs to be comprehensive federal data tracking police violence, and the importance of treating police killings as a public health issue. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity. P.R. Lockhart Why did you want to look at the rates of people being killed by police? Frank Edwards When we think of other causes of death — things like homicide, suicide, heart disease, cancer — we have really good numbers on who this affects, how often it occurs, how likely you are to die from these diseases over the course of your life. But we have no such data for police violence. We thought that we had a strong opportunity to improve how much we knew about people getting killed by police. Police violence often gets portrayed as a problem that is exclusively concentrated on black men living in cities. And that group is disproportionately affected, our research shows that clearly. But there are other groups affected, and incidence of police violence is pretty widespread. But there weren’t baseline numbers about how often this was occurring. We felt that the availability of unofficial databases like the Fatal Encounters database (which uses a combination of paid researchers, public records requests, and crowdsourced data to track fatal police violence) made the analysis possible — the federal government has failed to produce reliable numbers. P.R. Lockhart What are the biggest takeaways of the study? Frank Edwards Police violence is incredibly common. We find that among all men in the US, they face about one-in-2,000 odds of being killed by police over the course of their lives. For white men, it’s about a one-in-2,500 risk of being killed by police, but when we look at black men, it is every one in 1,000. That means that for every 1,000 black boys born in this country, if the risk of police killings stays where it has been over the past five years, then we expect one of those boys to be killed by police at some point of their life. We think that’s a really striking — and high — number. Women have a risk as well — it’s about one in 33,000 compared to one in 2,000 for men. But women still have a risk, and when we look at this further, you see that women being killed by police is also unequal across racial and ethnic groups. Black women and Native American women are about 1.5 times more likely than white women to be killed by police. Our study is really one of the first to provide detailed estimates of the risk faced by Asian American and Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and Latinos and Latinas, across age and race. I would say that there are a few big takeaways: one, that <u>lifetime risk of fatal police violence, especially for men, is unequal across racial and ethnic groups — people of color are much more likely to be killed by police than white people</u>. The risk of being killed by police is concentrated among the young; from the ages of 20 to 35, and for young men from the peak ages of 25 to 29, police violence is a significant contributor to overall mortality, especially for young men of color. Of all the men who die between the ages of 20 and 29, police are responsible for more than 1 percent of those deaths. P.R. Lockhart In the paper, you and your co-authors argue that police violence needs to be looked at as a public health issue. Can you talk to me about why that matters? Frank Edwards We think <u>the research community has provided ample evidence that the way police operate is harmful to both individual and community health</u>. <u>Think about all the ways that policing affects communities that are less extreme than a killing.</u> <u><strong>A police killing affects more than the deceased.</u></strong> There’s been great research finding that <u><strong><mark>when an</mark> unarmed <mark>African American man is killed</mark> in a state, <mark>there is an increase in</mark> symptoms of <mark>depression among African Americans</mark> in that state following the shooting.</u></strong> When a white unarmed man is killed in a state, there’s no similar increase in depressive symptoms among white residents. <u>It strongly suggests that <strong><mark>black people see police as a distinctive threat to their well-being,</mark> and <mark>they</mark> — I would argue rightly — <mark>perceive police as dangerous</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It <mark>increases their feelings of outsidership,</mark> their feelings of <mark>dehumanization, and</mark> it increases <mark>fear</mark> in their interactions with police. </strong>We also know that with policies like stop-and-frisk in New York City, where police aggressively target young men of colo</u>r, <u>and other policies in other areas as well</u>, the <u><strong><mark>young men</mark> who go through this and experience physical searches <mark>have increases in PTSD symptoms afterward</mark>.</u></strong> They become hypervigilant, and <u>that can have all sorts of cascading negative health consequences as you’re inducing these chronic stresses on relatively young people.</u> <u>Heavily policed neighborhoods also see increases in anxiety, as people are fearful and they deal with the sorts of chronic stress that we know can be especially toxic</u>. The research community has documented <u>a litany of negative consequences for health that this sort of aggressive and violent policing produces</u>. <u><strong>The time has come for us to take this seriously as a cause of harm to public health and something that is particularly expanding health inequality among racial groups. </u></strong>It’s particularly harming young African American men, but you look at the tragic cases of women like Erica Garner who are exposed to these deaths, and you see how it has an incredible toll on well-being that can lead to early mortality. We think the time is long past for the medical community and health community to not only identify these issues but design interventions that can help. P.R. Lockhart Any thoughts on what those possible interventions could look like? Frank Edwards As other researchers have examined, this is likely a problem of policing becoming a sort of catchall solution to every single problem that our society has. We’ve defunded services that give people alternatives to calling the police when there is a crisis. The defunding of mental health clinics and other kinds of social services means that officers take on these routine roles of responding to problems. When you talk to police officers, they will tell you that they are not mental health professionals, they’re not social workers, and that many of the things they are tasked with dealing with they’re not trained for and aren’t equipped to deal with. In the paper, we don’t look into particular interventions; our recommendations are based on other research. But we think adequately funding community-based services would almost certainly help reduce violence by providing communities with tools and alternatives to police. Another issue is that we don’t have official data on policing, and the data we do have is from journalists, not the government itself. We rely on the media, and in my mind it is unacceptable to need them to provide this basic public service and this basic check on police abuse of power. I’m optimistic that we will get more robust data from the federal government, and universities and nonprofits are building data tracking projects, so hopefully this is a problem that will be solved.<u><strong> But data is essential for building out systems for the public to be able to hold police accountable.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jude Clemente 16, Principal at JTC Energy Research Associates, LLC, M.S. in Homeland Security from San Diego State University, with a focus on Energy Security, and an MBA from St. Francis University, with a focus on Energy Economics. 5-15-2016, "Six Threats For The U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Business," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/05/15/six-threats-for-the-u-s-liquefied-natural-gas-business/#42abb65a799c, Date Accessed: 12-14-2016 fulltext: Blue with China Scenario Green with India Scenario Purple with EU Scenario Combined with lower than expected growth, both oil-linked contract prices and spot prices have plummeted and narrowed the price differentials between the three major markets: the Americas, Europe, and Asia. Per WoodMac, "Up to half of US LNG at risk of shut-in over next 5 years." All businesses must keep on their toes by deploying constant SWOT analyses, so here goes six of the Threats for the current U.S. LNG industry. 1. Australia should surpass Qatar and become the largest LNG supplier by 2018. Over $250 billion has been invested since 2009, and Australia will soon have the world’s largest, most modern, and technologically advanced LNG export industry in the world. Australia is physically much closer to Asia than we are, taking just 7-10 days to get there, so shipping costs are lower. Asia already accounts for 70% of all LNG imports and is still see as the main growth market globally, based on rising needs in China and India. Moreover, most of Australia’s new LNG export capacity will be available before most U.S. capacity arrives, giving Australia first chance to secure contracts. In many ways, Australian LNG is less affected by the global slump in oil and gas prices, projects pre-sold under long-term contracts, with only 8% of over 9 Bcf/day of new project capacity being un-contracted (here). Australia's LNG export capacity now stands at 6.3 Bcf/day, and this could double to 12-13 Bcf/day by 2019. Australia is also installing floating liquefaction (FLNG) to monetize as much as 100-110 Tcf in offshore stranded gas. And Australia’s per capita income is significantly higher than those in both the U.S. and Canada (here), so even though LNG project costs are higher in Australia, the economic (and talent) capacity is major competition. 2. Of the nearly 70% of the European Union's natural gas demand that comes from imports, about 85% arrive via pipeline. Russian piped gas will remain the largest source of foreign gas in Europe, now constituting over 30-33% of supplies. Russian gas is cheaper and operating costs are low: the export infrastructure has already been built. Most of the existing long-term gas contracts between Gazprom and its European customers will still be in place in 2025, strengthened by today's low oil prices. Russia’s spare capacity to produce natural gas is without equal. Gazprom produces about 43-45 Bcf/day but has the capacity to produce nearly 60 Bcf/day. This giant surplus will allow Russia to ramp up output if Europe's demand for gas increases, a low cost source of supply that could push out U.S. LNG. Russia has the upper-hand in a price war with us to supply gas to Europe, and our ability to penetrate the European market could simply come down to the willingness of countries to accept higher prices just to reduce reliance on Russia. If Russia tries to support higher prices and let go market share in Europe, U.S. LNG export capacity could operate at 75%. But, if Russia lets prices fall to hold market share, like Saudi Arabia did to U.S. shale oil, our utilization rates could be just 40%. Note that China and Europe will NOT be competing for the same Russian gas sources. Europe is the designated market for Russia's current and future gas production in the traditional West Siberian gas basins, so there's great incentive to remain price competitive in Europe. At over 1,150 Tcf, Russia has three times the proven gas that we do. Normally rigid Gazprom has proven to be more flexible under the current oversupply, discounting Lithuania's prices by 25%. Russia needs Europe more than some realize: domestic demand is declining and LNG and projects to Asia are not progressing as quickly as hoped. The European Union is around 80% Gazprom’s gas sales. From 2013-2015, Gazprom reports the average gas production cost fell from $1.20 mmBtu in 2013 to $0.84 (here), and Gazprom might choose to flood Europe with cheap gas to damage U.S. LNG prospects (here). 3. China might be the world's largest incremental gas user and importer, but likely based on piped gas, not LNG. China has signed a $400 billion gas deal with Russia, comprising a framework whereby Gazprom would supply gas for 30 years commencing in 2018. "A $27 billion natural-gas project in the Russian Arctic has secured the billions in financing it needed from Chinese banks." Already sharing a nearly 2,700-mile border, a gas alliance between Russia, the 2nd largest gas producer, and China, the largest energy consumer, is a natural match, and eventually the disagreements on price and route preference will be straightened out. One estimate has China more than doubling its gas demand to over 40 Bcf/day by 2020, with about 40% of that coming from imports (63% pipelines, 37% LNG). Turkmenistan is committed to maintaining its 50% market share of China's imports, and two huge pipeline projects with Russia could block U.S. LNG. Other resource-rich former Soviet Republics like Kazakhstan have their sights set on China, and China also wants new prices in its 25-year gas deal with now more flexible Qatar. Other factors could limit China’s LNG imports, such as domestic production and shale gas. China’s gas production has quietly been booming, up nearly 35% since 2010 to about 12 Bcf/day. China has a solid 125 Tcf of proven natural gas, and holds the largest technically recoverable shale gas reserves at 1,115 Tcf. In fact, the most important question for the future global LNG market could be how shale gas develops in China. The Great Wall is a perfect example of China’s ingrained dedication to self-reliance, so rising gas (and oil) imports are a known problem that won't go unmitigated. China will remain a coal-based economy, and the Large Substituting for Small program has been installing some of the most efficient coal plants in the world, with super- and ultra-supercritical units reaching 45-50% efficiencies, versus the global average of under 33%. Even after COP21, LNG import leaders Japan and South Korea are also using more coal, with a combined 61 coal plants set to be built in the next 10 years (here). Coal for electricity in Asia is much cheaper than LNG: Accenture has coal costing 5 cents/kWh, compared to 11 cents for LNG. COP21 commitments will lower coal prices, enticing coal use. With nuclear just 4 cents, South Korea and developing Asia drive "strong growth" in nuclear power (here). 4. Over 90% of India's LNG imports come from mighty Qatar. Petronet LNG, the country's biggest importer, recently revised its contract with RasGas of Qatar. Penalties will be waived and Petronet’s gas price will be halved to $6-7 per mmBtu, demonstrating how key gas and LNG suppliers are willing to alter contracts to maintain market share. Qatar, "the world's richest country," already exports 12 Bcf/day and is well positioned to ride out low prices because it focuses on efficiency and lower costs, owning "the value chain from start to finish." About 33% of Qatar's export LNG volumes are unsold and could push higher cost suppliers out. India is easily the most energy derived nation on Earth and seeks all gas (all energy really) from all available. India has inked a $20 billion deal to invest in Iran's oil and gas industry. Iran has the world’s 2nd largest gas reserves at over 1,200 Tcf, and opening this endowment to international investment will cause major problems for all gas exporters. And "Russia, India Inch Closer To $40 Billion Gas Pipeline." Shockingly to most I'd bet, India’s natural gas demand has actually been falling, down about 25% since 2010 to under 5 Bcf/day. And just like China, coal-based India is also installing some of the most efficient coal plants with its Ultra Mega Power Projects program. Coal India wants to double output to over 1 billion tonnes by 2020. 5. The estimate is that over half of U.S. total LNG production is destined for Europe by 2020. Cheniere said in January that it can profitably sell LNG despite lower prices, though margins may be as little as $1 per million Btu to Europe. But, all of Europe's key gas suppliers, Russia, Norway, the Netherlands, and Algeria, will be doing all they can to maintain market share in their most important export market. In the first quarter of 2016, Norwegian and Russian gas to Europe reached record levels. Russian gas will be helped even more when sanctions are lifted (here). Europe's gas market has been contracting; efficiency improvements, more renewables, little economic growth, and low carbon prices that discourage coal-to-gas switching. Overall gas demand in the European Union is down 15% since 2010. Europe's LNG needs could depend on higher coal prices (here), which is unlikely anytime soon because of huge oversupply and COP21 commitments that will constrain coal use around the world thereby making coal more available and cheaper. And now, low gas prices and lower usage continue to reduce investment in critical infrastructure. Gas demand projections for Europe have continually been overstated, and most of the ones now indicate a slight incremental gain or even a drop. Eastern Europe is where U.S. LNG is needed most to lower reliance on Russia. The problem is that there's not enough infrastructure in the area to take in much LNG, or to even import gas from other parts of Europe. Less environmental regulations and a long over-influence of the former Soviet Republics have hurt gas market liquidity in Eastern Europe, where "gas markets remain fragmented and divided." Spain holds over 30% of Europe's LNG re-gasficiation capacity, and the lack of infrastructure to move supplies eastward is a major bottleneck: "they say the French have refused to allow these interconnections." The overall gas transport system in Europe runs east to west. And policymakers have been clear: Europe's energy policies are based on making sure that renewables and efficiency, not natural gas, come to dominate, regardless of the cost. "France studying possible ban on import of U.S. Shale gas." 6. The global LNG market is still 70% dominated by the long-term, oil-indexed gas contracts that U.S. LNG is expected to help scale down. But, “less than 15% of contracted volumes expiring in next 5 years.” Even these long-term contracts are becoming increasingly flexible, shown by Gazprom's move toward new market-driven tools.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>No LNG Exports & Exports Fail---Australian Contracts, Russia Flood Capacity, No Available Contracts, and All Their Scenarios Are Wrong</h4><p>Jude <u><strong>Clemente 16</u></strong>, Principal at JTC Energy Research Associates, LLC, M.S. in Homeland Security from San Diego State University, with a focus on Energy Security, and an MBA from St. Francis University, with a focus on Energy Economics. 5-15-2016, "Six Threats For The U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Business," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/05/15/six-threats-for-the-u-s-liquefied-natural-gas-business/#42abb65a799c, Date Accessed: 12-14-2016</p><p>Blue with China Scenario</p><p>Green with India Scenario</p><p>Purple with EU Scenario</p><p>Combined with lower than expected growth, <u><strong>both <mark>oil-linked</mark> contract prices <mark>and spot prices have</mark> plummeted and <mark>narrowed the price differentials</u></strong></mark> between the three major markets: the Americas, Europe, and Asia. Per WoodMac, <u><strong>"Up to <mark>half of US LNG at risk of shut-in</mark> over next 5 years.</u></strong>" All businesses must keep on their toes by deploying constant SWOT analyses, so here goes six of the Threats for the current U.S. LNG industry. </p><p><u><strong>1. <mark>Australia should</mark> surpass Qatar and <mark>become the largest</mark> LNG <mark>supplier by 2018.</u></strong></mark> Over $250 billion has been invested since 2009, and <u><strong>Australia will soon have the world’s largest</u></strong>, most modern,<u><strong> and technologically advanced LNG export industry in the world.</u></strong> Australia is physically much closer to Asia than we are, taking just 7-10 days to get there, so shipping costs are lower.</p><p>Asia already accounts for 70% of all LNG imports and is still see as the main growth market globally, based on rising needs in China and India. <u><strong>Moreover, most of <mark>Australia’s new</mark> LNG export <mark>capacity will be available before</mark> most <mark>U.S. capacity</mark> arrives, <mark>giving</mark> Australia <mark>first chance to secure contracts</mark>.</u></strong> In many ways, Australian LNG is less affected by the global slump in oil and gas prices, projects pre-sold under long-term contracts, with only 8% of over 9 Bcf/day of new project capacity being un-contracted (here).</p><p>Australia's LNG export capacity now stands at 6.3 Bcf/day, and this could double to 12-13 Bcf/day by 2019. Australia is also installing floating liquefaction (FLNG) to monetize as much as 100-110 Tcf in offshore stranded gas. And Australia’s per capita income is significantly higher than those in both the U.S. and Canada (here), so even though LNG project costs are higher in <u><strong><mark>Australia</u></strong></mark>, the economic (and talent) <u><strong>capacity <mark>is major competition</mark>.</p><p>2. Of the nearly 70% of the European Union's natural gas demand that comes from imports, about 85% arrive via pipeline.</u></strong> Russian piped gas will remain the largest source of foreign gas in Europe, now constituting over 30-33% of supplies. <u><strong><mark>Russia</mark>n gas <mark>is cheaper</mark> and operating costs are low: the export infrastructure has already been built. Most of the existing long-term gas contracts between Gazprom and its European customers will still be in place in 2025, strengthened by today's low oil prices.</p><p><mark>Russia’s spare capacity</mark> to produce natural gas <mark>is without equal</mark>.</u></strong> Gazprom produces about 43-45 Bcf/day but has the capacity to produce nearly 60 Bcf/day. <u><strong>This giant surplus will allow Russia to ramp up output if Europe's demand for gas increases, a low cost source of supply that could push out U.S. LNG.</p><p><mark>Russia has the upper-hand in a price war</mark> with us to supply gas to Europe, and our ability to penetrate the European market could simply come down to the willingness of countries to accept higher prices just to reduce reliance on Russia.</p><p></u></strong>If Russia tries to support higher prices and let go market share in Europe, U.S. LNG export capacity could operate at 75%. <u><strong>But, <mark>if Russia lets prices fall</mark> to hold market share</u></strong>, like Saudi Arabia did to U.S. shale oil, <u><strong><mark>our</mark> utilization <mark>rates could be</mark> just <mark>40%.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Note that China and Europe will NOT be competing for the same Russian gas sources. <u><strong>Europe is the designated market for Russia's current and future gas production in the traditional West Siberian gas basins, so there's great incentive to remain price competitive in Europe.</u></strong> At over 1,150 Tcf, <u><strong><mark>Russia has three times the</mark> proven <mark>gas</mark> that <mark>we do</mark>.</u></strong> Normally rigid Gazprom has proven to be more flexible under the current oversupply, discounting Lithuania's prices by 25%.</p><p>Russia needs Europe more than some realize: domestic demand is declining and LNG and projects to Asia are not progressing as quickly as hoped. The European Union is around 80% Gazprom’s gas sales. From 2013-2015, Gazprom reports the average gas production cost fell from $1.20 mmBtu in 2013 to $0.84 (here), and <u><strong><mark>Gazprom might</mark> choose to <mark>flood</mark> Europe with cheap gas <mark>to damage U.S. LNG prospects</u></strong></mark> (here).</p><p><u><strong><mark>3. China</u></strong></mark> might be the world's largest incremental gas user and importer, <u><strong>but likely <mark>based on piped gas, not LNG. China</mark> has <mark>signed</mark> a $400 billion gas deal <mark>with Russia</mark>,</u></strong> comprising a framework <u><strong><mark>whereby Gazprom would supply gas for 30 years</mark> commencing in 2018. "A $27 billion natural-gas project in the Russian Arctic has secured the billions in financing it needed from Chinese banks."</p><p></u></strong>Already sharing a nearly 2,700-mile border, a gas alliance between Russia, the 2nd largest gas producer, and China, the largest energy consumer, is a natural match, and <u><strong><mark>eventually</mark> the <mark>disagreements</mark> on price and route preference <mark>will be straightened out</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>One estimate has China more than doubling its gas demand to over 40 Bcf/day by 2020, with about 40% of that coming from imports (63% pipelines, 37% LNG). Turkmenistan is committed to maintaining its 50% market share of China's imports, and two huge pipeline projects with Russia could block U.S. LNG. Other resource-rich former Soviet Republics like Kazakhstan have their sights set on China, and China also wants new prices in its 25-year gas deal with now more flexible Qatar.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Other factors could limit</mark> China’s LNG <mark>imports</mark>, such as domestic production and shale gas. <mark>China’s</mark> gas <mark>production has</mark> quietly <mark>been booming</u></strong></mark>, up nearly 35% since 2010 to about 12 Bcf/day. China has a solid 125 Tcf of proven natural gas, and holds the largest technically recoverable shale gas reserves at 1,115 Tcf. In fact, the most important question for the future global LNG market could be how shale gas develops in China.</p><p>The Great Wall is a perfect example of China’s ingrained dedication to self-reliance, so rising gas (and oil) imports are a known problem that won't go unmitigated. <u><strong><mark>China will remain a coal-based economy</u></strong></mark>, and the Large Substituting for Small program has been installing some of the most efficient coal plants in the world, with super- and ultra-supercritical units reaching 45-50% efficiencies, versus the global average of under 33%.</p><p>Even after COP21, LNG import leaders Japan and South Korea are also using more coal, with a combined 61 coal plants set to be built in the next 10 years (here). Coal for electricity in Asia is much cheaper than LNG: Accenture has coal costing 5 cents/kWh, compared to 11 cents for LNG. COP21 commitments will lower coal prices, enticing coal use. With nuclear just 4 cents, South Korea and developing Asia drive "strong growth" in nuclear power (here).</p><p>4. <u><strong>Over 90% of India's LNG imports come from mighty Qatar.</u></strong> Petronet LNG, the country's biggest importer, recently revised its contract with RasGas of Qatar. Penalties will be waived and Petronet’s gas price will be halved to $6-7 per mmBtu, demonstrating how key gas and LNG suppliers are willing to alter contracts to maintain market share.</p><p>Qatar, "the world's richest country," already exports 12 Bcf/day and is well positioned to ride out low prices because it focuses on efficiency and lower costs, owning "the value chain from start to finish." About 33% of Qatar's export LNG volumes are unsold and could push higher cost suppliers out.</p><p>India is easily the most energy derived nation on Earth and seeks all gas (all energy really) from all available. India has inked a $20 billion deal to invest in Iran's oil and gas industry. Iran has the world’s 2nd largest gas reserves at over 1,200 Tcf, and opening this endowment to international investment will cause major problems for all gas exporters. And "Russia, India Inch Closer To $40 Billion Gas Pipeline."</p><p>Shockingly to most I'd bet, <u><strong>India’s natural gas demand has actually been falling</u></strong>, down about 25% since 2010 to under 5 Bcf/day. And just like China, <u><strong>coal-based India is also installing some of the most efficient coal plants</u></strong> with its Ultra Mega Power Projects program. Coal India wants to double output to over 1 billion tonnes by 2020. </p><p>5. <u><strong>The estimate is that over half of U.S. total LNG production is destined for Europe by 2020. </u></strong>Cheniere said in January that it can profitably sell LNG despite lower prices, though margins may be as little as $1 per million Btu to Europe.</p><p>But, <u><strong>all of <mark>Europe's</mark> key gas <mark>suppliers</u></strong></mark>, Russia, Norway, the Netherlands, and Algeria, <u><strong><mark>will</mark> be doing all they can to <mark>maintain market share</u></strong></mark> in their most important export market. In the first quarter of 2016, Norwegian and Russian gas to Europe reached record levels. Russian gas will be helped even more when sanctions are lifted (here).</p><p><u><strong><mark>Europe's</mark> gas <mark>market has been contracting; efficiency</mark> improvements, more <mark>renewables, little</mark> economic <mark>growth, and low carbon prices</u></strong></mark> that discourage coal-to-gas switching. Overall gas demand in the European Union is down 15% since 2010.</p><p><u><strong>Europe's <mark>LNG</mark> needs <mark>could depend on higher coal</mark> prices</u></strong> (here), <u><strong><mark>which is unlikely</mark> anytime soon because of huge oversupply and COP21 commitments that will constrain coal use around the world thereby making coal more available and cheaper.</u></strong> And now, low gas prices and lower usage continue to reduce investment in critical infrastructure. Gas demand projections for Europe have continually been overstated, and most of the ones now indicate a slight incremental gain or even a drop.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Eastern Europe</u></strong></mark> is where U.S. LNG is needed most to lower reliance on Russia. <u><strong>The problem is that <mark>there's not enough infrastructure</mark> in the area <mark>to take in</mark> much <mark>LNG</u></strong></mark>, or to even import gas from other parts of Europe. Less environmental regulations and a long over-influence of the former Soviet Republics have hurt gas market liquidity in Eastern Europe, where "gas markets remain fragmented and divided."</p><p>Spain holds over 30% of Europe's LNG re-gasficiation capacity, and the lack of infrastructure to move supplies eastward is a major bottleneck: "they say the French have refused to allow these interconnections." The overall gas transport system in Europe runs east to west. </p><p>And policymakers have been clear: Europe's energy policies are based on making sure that renewables and efficiency, not natural gas, come to dominate, regardless of the cost. "France studying possible ban on import of U.S. Shale gas."</p><p><u><strong>6. <mark>The global</mark> LNG <mark>market is</mark> still 70% <mark>dominated by</mark> the <mark>long-term</mark>, oil-indexed gas <mark>contracts</mark> that U.S. LNG is expected to help scale down. <mark>But, “less than 15%</mark> of contracted volumes <mark>expiring in next 5 years.”</u></strong></mark> Even these long-term contracts are becoming increasingly flexible, shown by Gazprom's move toward new market-driven tools.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Bataille 1 [Georges; “The Labyrinth” retrieved from “Visions of Excess” (1930); librarian by day, literary figure, sociologist, and philosopher by night; recut SHS KS] brackets for gendered lang fulltext: The very fact of assuming that knowledge is a function throws the philosopher back into the world of petty inconsistencies and dissections of lifeless organs. Isolated as much from action as from the dreams that turn action away and echo it in the strange depths of animated life, he led astray the very being that he chose as the object of his uneasy comprehension . ' 'Being'' increases in the tumultuous agitation of a life that knows no limits; it wastes away and disappears if he who is at the same time "being" and knowledge mutilates himself by reducing himself to knowledge . This deficiency can grow even greater if the object of knowledge is no longer being in general but a narrow domain, such as an organ, a mathematical question, a juridical form. Action and dreams do not escape this poverty (each time they are confused with the totality of being) , and, in the multicolored immensity of human lives, a limitless insufficiency is revealed; life, finding its endpoint in the happiness of a bugle blower or the snickering of a village chair-renter, is no longer the fulfillment of itself, but is its own ludicrous degradation-its fall is comparable to that of a king onto the floor. At the basis of human life there exists a principle of insufficiency. In isolation, each man sees the majority of others as incapable or unworthy of "being." There is found, in all free and slanderous conversation, as an animating theme , the awareness of the vanity and the emptiness of our fellowmen; an apparently stagnant conversation betrays the blind and impotent flight of all life toward an indefinable summit. The sufficiency of each being is endlessly contested by every other. Even the look that expresses love and admiration comes to me as a doubt concerning my reality. A burst of laughter or the expression of repugnance greets each gesture , each sentence or each oversight through which my profound insufficiency is betrayed-just as sobs would be the response to my sudden death, to a total and irremediable omission. This uneasiness on the part of everyone grows and reverberates, since at each detour, with a kind of nausea, men discover their solitude in empty night. The universal night in which everything finds itself-and soon loses itself-would appear to be existence for nothing , without influence, equivalent to the absence of being, were it not for human nature that emerges within it to give a dramatic importance to being and life. But this absurd night manages to empty itself of "being" and meaning each time a man discovers within it human destiny , itself locked in turn in a comic impasse, like a hideous and discordant trumpet blast. That which, in me , demands that there be "being" in the world, "being" and not just the manifest insufficiency of human or nonhuman nature, necessarily projects (at one time or another and in reply to human chatter) divine sufficiency across space, like the reflection of an impotence , of a servilely accepted malady of being . Being in the world is so uncertain that I can project it where I want-outside of me . It is a clumsy man, still incapable of eluding the intrigues of nature, who locks being in the me . Being in fact is found NOWHERE and it was an easy game for a sickly malice to discover it to be divine , at the summit of a pyramid formed by the multitude of beings, which has at its base the immensity of the simplest matter. Being could be confined to the electron if ipseity were precisely not lacking in this simple element. The atom itself has a complexity that is too elementary to be determined ipsely. 1 The number of particles that make up a being intervene in a sufficiently heavy and clear way in the constitution of its ipseity; if a knife has its handle and blade indefinitely replaced, it loses even the shadow of ipseity; it is not the same for a machine which, after five or six years, loses each of the numerous elements that constituted it when new. But the ipseity that is finally apprehended with difficulty in the machine is still only shadowlike . Starting from an extreme complexity , being imposes on reflection more than the precariousness of a fugitive appearance, but this complexity-displaced little by little-becomes in turn the labyrinth where what had suddenly come forward strangely loses its way . A sponge is reduced by pounding to a dust of cells; this living dust is formed by a multitude of isolated beings, and is lost in the new sponge that it reconstitutes. A siphonophore fragment is by itself an autonomous being , yet the whole siphonophore, to which this fragment belongs, is itself hardly different from a being possessing unity . Only with linear animals (worms, insects, fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals) do the living individual forms definitively lose the faculty of constituting aggregates bound together in a single body . But while societies of nonlinear animals do not exist, superior animals form aggregates without ever giving rise to corporeal links; men as well as beavers or ants form societies of individuals whose bodies are autonomous. But in regard to being, is this autonomy the final appearance, or is it simply error? In men, all existence is tied in particular to language , whose terms determine its modes of appearance within each person. Each person can only represent [their] his total existence, if only in his own eyes, through the medium of words. Words spring forth in his head, laden with a host of human or superhuman lives in relation to which he privately exists. Being depends on the mediation of words, which cannot merely present it arbitrarily as "autonomous being ," but which must present it profoundly as ' 'being in relation.'' One need only follow, for a short time, the traces of the repeated circuits of words to discover, in a disconcerting vision, the labyrinthine structure of the human being . What is commonly called knowing-when a man knows his neighbor-is never anything but existence composed for an instant (in the sense that all existence composes itselfthus the atom composes its unity from variable electrons) , which once made of these two beings a whole every bit as real as its parts. A limited number of exchanged phrases, no matter how conventional , sufficed to create the banal interpenetration of two existing juxtaposed regions. The fact that after this short exchange the man is aware of knowing his neighbor is opposed to a meeting without recognition in the street, as well as to the ignorance of the multitude of beings that one never meets, in the same way that life is opposed to death. The knowledge of human beings thus appears as a mode of biological connection, unstable but just as real as the connections between cells in tissue . The exchange between two human particles in fact possesses the faculty of surviving momentary separation. A [hu]man is only a particle inserted in unstable and entangled wholes . These wholes are composed in personal life in the form of multiple possibilities, starting with a knowledge that is crossed like a threshold-and the existence of the particle can in no way be isolated from this composition, which agitates it in the midst of a whirlwind of ephemerids. This extreme instability of connections alone permits one to introduce , as a puerile but convenient illusion, a representation of isolated existence turning in on itself. In the most general way , every isolable element of the universe always appears as a particle that can enter into composition with a whole that transcends it. Being is only found as a whole composed of particles whose relative autonomy is maintained. These two principles dominate the uncertain presence of an ipse being across a distance that never ceases to put everything in question . Emerging in universal play as unforeseeable chance, with extreme dread imperatively becoming the demand for universality , carried away to vertigo by the movement that composes it, the ipse being that presents itself as a universal is only a challenge to the diffuse immensity that escapes its precarious violence , the tragic negation of all that is not its own bewildered phantom's chance . But, as a man , this being falls into the meanders of the knowledge of his fellowmen , which absorbs his substance in order to reduce it to a component of what goes beyond the virulent madness of his autonomy in the total night of the world . Abdication and inevitable fatigue-due to the fact that "being" is, par excellence, that which, desired to the point of dread, cannot be endured-plunge human beings into a foggy labyrinth formed by the multitude of "acquaintances" with which signs of life and phrases can be exchanged. But when [one] he escapes the dread of "being" through this flight-a "being" that is autonomous and isolated in night-a man [one] is thrown back into insufficiency , at least if he cannot find outside of himself the blinding flash that he had been unable to endure within himself, without whose intensity his life is but an impoverishment, of which he feels obscurely ashamed.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The subject is fundamentally unstable, their connections as real as cells but at the same time uncertain. This state of being never-quite-here constantly immerses the subject into the principal of insufficiency.</h4><p><strong>Bataille 1</strong> [Georges; “The Labyrinth” retrieved from “Visions of Excess” (1930); librarian by day, literary figure, sociologist, and philosopher by night; recut SHS KS] brackets for gendered lang</p><p>The very fact of assuming that <u>knowledge is a function throws the philosopher back into the world of petty inconsistencies and dissections of lifeless organs</u>. Isolated as much from action as from the dreams that turn action away and echo it in the strange depths of animated life, he led astray the very being that he chose as the object of his uneasy comprehension . ' <u>'Being'' increases in the tumultuous agitation of a life that knows no limits; it wastes away and disappears if he who is at the same time "being" and knowledge mutilates himself by reducing himself to knowledge .</u> This deficiency can grow even greater <u>if the object of knowledge is no longer being in general but a narrow domain</u>, such as an organ, a mathematical question, a juridical form. Action and dreams do not escape this poverty (each time they are confused with the totality of being) , and, in the multicolored immensity of human lives, <u>a limitless insufficiency is revealed; life</u>, finding its endpoint in the happiness of a bugle blower or the snickering of a village chair-renter, <u>is no longer the fulfillment of itself, but is its own ludicrous degradation-its fall is comparable to that of a king onto the floor</u>. <u><strong><mark>At the basis of human life there exists a principle of insufficiency</mark>.</u></strong> In isolation, each man sees the majority of others as incapable or unworthy of "being." There is found, in all free and slanderous conversation, as an animating theme , the awareness of the vanity and the emptiness of our fellowmen; an apparently stagnant conversation betrays the blind and impotent flight of all life toward an indefinable summit. <u><strong><mark>The sufficiency of each being is endlessly contested by every other.</u></strong></mark> <u>Even the look that expresses love and admiration comes to me as a doubt concerning my reality.</u> A burst of laughter or the expression of repugnance greets each gesture , each sentence or each oversight through which my profound insufficiency is betrayed-just as sobs would be the response to my sudden death, to a total and irremediable omission. <u><strong>This uneasiness on the part of everyone grows and reverberates</strong>, since at each detour, with a kind of nausea, men discover their solitude in empty night.</u> The universal night in which everything finds itself-and soon loses itself-would appear to be existence for nothing , without influence, equivalent to the absence of being, were it not for human nature that emerges within it to give a dramatic importance to being and life. But <u>this absurd night manages to empty itself of "being" and meaning each time a man discovers within it human destiny , itself locked in turn in a comic impasse, like a hideous and discordant trumpet blast. That which, in me , demands that there be "being" in the world, "being" and not just the manifest insufficiency of human or nonhuman nature, necessarily projects (at one time or another and in reply to human chatter) divine sufficiency across space, like the reflection of an impotence , of a servilely accepted malady of being .</u> <u><strong><mark>Being in the world is</strong></mark> so <strong><mark>uncertain</strong></mark> that I can project it where I want-outside of me</u> . It is a clumsy man, still incapable of eluding the intrigues of nature, who locks being in the me . Being in fact is found NOWHERE and it was an easy game for a sickly malice to discover it to be divine , at the summit of a pyramid formed by the multitude of beings, which has at its base the immensity of the simplest matter. Being could be confined to the electron if ipseity were precisely not lacking in this simple element. The atom itself has a complexity that is too elementary to be determined ipsely. 1 The number of particles that make up a being intervene in a sufficiently heavy and clear way in the constitution of its ipseity; if a knife has its handle and blade indefinitely replaced, it loses even the shadow of ipseity; it is not the same for a machine which, after five or six years, loses each of the numerous elements that constituted it when new. But the ipseity that is finally apprehended with difficulty in the machine is still only shadowlike . <u>Starting from an extreme complexity , <strong>being imposes on reflection more than the precariousness of a fugitive appearance, but this complexity-displaced little by little-becomes in turn the labyrinth where what had suddenly come forward strangely loses its way </strong>.</u> A sponge is reduced by pounding to a dust of cells; this living dust is formed by a multitude of isolated beings, and is lost in the new sponge that it reconstitutes. A siphonophore fragment is by itself an autonomous being , yet the whole siphonophore, to which this fragment belongs, is itself hardly different from a being possessing unity . Only with linear animals (worms, insects, fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals) do the living individual forms definitively lose the faculty of constituting aggregates bound together in a single body . But while societies of nonlinear animals do not exist, superior animals form aggregates without ever giving rise to corporeal links; <u>men as well as beavers or ants form societies of individuals whose bodies are autonomous</u>. But in regard to being, is this autonomy the final appearance, or is it simply error? <u>In men, <strong>all existence is tied in particular to language </strong>,</u> <u>whose terms determine its modes of appearance within each person. <strong><mark>Each person can only represent [their] </mark>his <mark>total existence</mark>, if only in his own eyes, <mark>through the medium of words.</strong></mark> Words spring forth in his head, laden with a host of human or superhuman lives in relation to which he privately exists. Being depends on the mediation of words, which cannot merely present it arbitrarily as "autonomous being ," but <strong><mark>which must present it profoundly as ' 'being in relation</strong></mark>.'' One need only follow, for a short time, the traces of the repeated circuits of words to discover</u>, in a disconcerting vision,<u> the labyrinthine structure of the human being .</u> What is commonly called knowing-when a man knows his neighbor-is never anything but <u>existence composed for an instant</u> (in the sense that all existence composes itselfthus the atom composes its unity from variable electrons) , which once made of these two beings a whole every bit as real as its parts<u>. A limited number of exchanged phrases, no matter how conventional , sufficed to create the banal interpenetration of two existing juxtaposed regions.</u> The fact that after this short exchange the man is aware of knowing his neighbor is opposed to a meeting without recognition in the street, as well as to the ignorance of the multitude of beings that one never meets, in the same way that life is opposed to death<u>. <strong><mark>The knowledge of human beings </mark>thus <mark>appears as a mode of biological connection, unstable but just as real as the connections between cells in tissue .</u></strong></mark> <u>The exchange between two human particles in fact possesses the faculty of surviving momentary separation. <strong><mark>A [hu]man is only a particle inserted in unstable </mark>and entangled wholes . These wholes are composed in personal life in the form of multiple possibilities,</u></strong> starting with <u>a knowledge that is crossed like a threshold-and the existence of the particle can in no way be isolated from this composition, which agitates it in the midst of a whirlwind of ephemerids. <strong>This extreme instability of connections alone permits one to introduce</strong> , as a puerile but convenient illusion, <strong>a representation of isolated existence turning in on itself</strong>. In the most general way , every isolable element of the universe always appears as a particle that can enter into composition with a whole that transcends it. <strong><mark>Being is only found as a whole composed of particles whose relative autonomy is maintained.</u></strong></mark> These two principles dominate the uncertain presence of an ipse being across a distance that never ceases to put everything in question . Emerging in universal play as unforeseeable chance, with extreme dread imperatively becoming the demand for universality , carried away to vertigo by the movement that composes it, the ipse being that <u>presents itself as a universal is only a challenge to the diffuse immensity that escapes its precarious violence , the tragic negation of all that is not its own bewildered phantom's chance . <strong>But</u></strong>, as a man , <u><strong>this being falls into the meanders of the knowledge </u></strong>of his fellowmen<u> , which absorbs his substance in order to reduce it to a component of what goes beyond the virulent madness of his autonomy in the total night of the world .</u> Abdication and inevitable fatigue-due to the fact that "<u><strong>being" is, par excellence, that which, desired to the point of dread</u></strong>, <u><strong>cannot be endured-<mark>plunge human beings into a foggy</mark> <mark>labyrinth </mark>formed by the multitude of "acquaintances" <mark>with which signs </mark>of life and phrases <mark>can be exchanged. But when [one] </mark>he <mark>escapes the dread of "being</strong></mark>" through this flight-a "being" that is autonomous and isolated in night-a man <strong><mark>[one] is thrown back into insufficiency</strong></mark> </u>, at least if he cannot find outside of himself the blinding flash that he had been unable to endure within himself, without whose intensity his life is but an impoverishment, of which he feels obscurely ashamed.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jeffrey Lewis, in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Study Program- Worked In the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Center for Defense Information, ‘4, "What if Space Were Weaponized," July 2004 pg online @ www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf) fulltext: Accidental Nuclear War Scenario Crisis Over Kalningrad (2010) This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizing. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and conﬁgured to ﬁght a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?” 43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the “ﬁrst use” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reiterated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons “preemptively” in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack. 44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile ﬁelds in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the ofﬁcer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only ﬁve missiles. You can do little damage with just ﬁve missiles.” 45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high 26 What if Space Were Weaponized? altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident. 46 In both cases, Russian observers were conﬁdent that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines. 47 Further, Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline – only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack. 48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation. 49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable [hit] a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the ﬁrst phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difﬁcult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned 50 could make both the more difﬁcult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to deﬁnitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. Even the Accidental Nuclear War Scenarios 27 United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack – and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how conﬁdent could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983 – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. 51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difﬁcult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. 52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave. 54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a ﬁt of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be suspicious. It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising. 55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentiﬁed aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were ﬂying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian ﬂeet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew 28 What if Space Were Weaponized? Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the conﬂuence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a ﬂock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difﬁculties; and the Soviet ﬂeet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the ﬁrst major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortiﬁed by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American ofﬁcials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American ﬁrst strike during this period. 56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that conﬁdence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady ﬂow of reliable information. When that information ﬂow is disrupted – whether by a deliberate attack or an accident – conﬁdence collapses and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the conﬁdence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>AND Russia war </h4><p>Jeffrey <u><strong>Lewis</u></strong>, in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Study Program- Worked In the <u><strong>Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy</u></strong>, Center for Defense Information, <u><strong>‘4</u></strong>, "What if Space Were Weaponized," July 2004 pg online @ www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)</p><p>Accidental Nuclear War Scenario Crisis Over Kalningrad (2010) This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, th<u>e United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizi</u>ng. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and conﬁgured to ﬁght a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?” 43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that <u>the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might</u>. In the mid-1990s, <u><mark>Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from</u></mark> the “<u><mark>ﬁrst use</u></mark>” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, <u><strong>Russian Defense Minister</u></strong> <u>Sergei <mark>Ivanov reiterated that Moscow might use nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> “<mark>preemptively</mark>” in any number of contingencies, </u>including a NATO attack. 44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile ﬁelds in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the ofﬁcer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only ﬁve missiles. You can do little damage with just ﬁve missiles.” 45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high 26 What if Space Were Weaponized? altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident. 46 In both cases, <u>Russian observers were conﬁdent that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one.</u> In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, <u>space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines</u>. 47 Further, <u>Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline</u> – <u>only one or two of the six satellites remain operational</u>, <u>leaving Russia with early warning for only <strong>six hours a day</u></strong>. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But <u>Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack.</u> 48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation. 49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. <u>Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems</u> – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – <u>to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. <strong><mark>What would happen if</mark> a piece of space <mark>debris were to</mark> </u></strong>disable <u><strong><mark>[hit] a Russian early-warning satellite</mark> under these conditions</u></strong>? <u>Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the ﬁrst phase of a U.S. attack?</u> Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difﬁcult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but <u>given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question</u>. Further, the <u>advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs</u>, as now envisioned 50 could <u>make both the more difﬁcult orbital plane and any warning systems moot</u>. The unpleasant truth is that the <u><mark>Russians</mark> likely <mark>would</mark> have to <strong><mark>make a judgment call</u></strong></mark>. No <u>state has the ability to deﬁnitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. </u>Even the Accidental Nuclear War Scenarios 27 <u><mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>does not maintain</u></mark> (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) <u><mark>a</mark> sophisticated space surveillance <mark>system that would allow it to distinguish between</mark> a satellite malfunction, <mark>a debris strike or</mark> a deliberate <mark>attack</u></mark> – <u>and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. </u>Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But <u>how conﬁdent could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common</u> – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (<u>NORAD</u>) <u>experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983</u> – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. 51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difﬁcult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. 52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. <u>The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship.</u> While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave. 54 <u>If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a ﬁt of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be suspicious. <strong><mark>It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case</mark> light</u></strong>. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising. 55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentiﬁed aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were ﬂying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian ﬂeet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew 28 What if Space Were Weaponized? Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the conﬂuence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a ﬂock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difﬁculties; and the Soviet ﬂeet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the ﬁrst major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortiﬁed by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American ofﬁcials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American ﬁrst strike during this period. 56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that <u>conﬁdence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own</u>. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady ﬂow of reliable information. <u><mark>When</u></mark> that <u><mark>information ﬂow is disrupted</u></mark> – <u>whether <mark>by</mark> a deliberate <mark>attack or</mark> an <mark>accident</u></mark> – <u>conﬁdence collapses and <mark>the result is</mark> panic and <mark>escalation</u></mark>. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the conﬁdence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kroenig 15 [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015] fulltext: The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Nuclear prolif <u>guarantees war</h4><p></u><strong>Kroenig 15</strong> [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015<u>]</p><p><mark>The spread of <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> poses</mark> at least six <strong><mark>severe threats</strong> </mark>to international peace and security <mark>including</mark>: <strong><mark>nuclear war</strong></mark>, <strong>nuclear <mark>terrorism</strong>, global</mark> and</u> <u>regional <mark>instability</mark>, constrained US freedom of action, <strong><mark>weakened alliances</strong></mark>, and further nuclear proliferation.</u> Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why <u>we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation</u>. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War <u>The greatest threat</u> posed by the spread of nuclear weapons <u>is nuclear war. The <strong>more states</strong> in possession of nuclear weapons</u>, <u>the <strong>greater the probability</strong> that somewhere, someday, there will be a <strong>catastrophic nuclear</strong> war.</u> To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. <u><mark>Before</mark> reaching a state of <strong><mark>MAD</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>new</mark> nuclear <mark>states </mark>go through a <strong>transition</strong> period in which they<mark> <strong>lack</strong></mark> a secure-<strong><mark>second strike</strong> </mark>capability</u>. In this context, <u>one or both states might believe that <mark>it has an <strong>incentive</strong> to <strong>use</strong></mark> nuclear weapons <strong><mark>first</u></strong></mark>. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, <u>given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike</u>. Similarly, <u>Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force</u>. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, <u>the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a</u> <u>splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might</u>, therefore, <u>decide to launch <mark>a <strong>preventive</mark> nuclear <mark>strike</strong></mark> to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. </u>Indeed, <u>this</u> <u><strong>incentive</u></strong> <u>might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that <mark>emphasizes</mark> <strong>preemptive action</strong>.</u> Second, <u>the state with a small and vulnerable</u> nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, <u>might feel <strong><mark>use </mark>th<mark>em or lose </mark>th<mark>em pressures</u></strong></mark>. That is, <u>in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed</u>. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, <u>nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack</u>.49 If there are advantages to striking first, <u>one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second</u>. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, <u><strong>there is still a risk of nuclear war</u></strong>. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. <u>Iran’s theocratic government</u>, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it <u>contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war,</u> knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, <u>nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders</u> <u>still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries</u>. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, <u><mark>leaders</mark> can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.</u>52 <u><strong>They can <mark>initiate a nuclear crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>By playing </mark>these risky games of nuclear <strong><mark>brinkmanship</strong></mark>, <mark>states </mark>can <strong><mark>increase the risk of nuclear war</strong></mark> in an attempt <strong>to force a less resolved adversary</strong> to <strong>back down.</u></strong> Historical <u>crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them</u>, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, <u>have <strong>come close</u></strong>. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 <u>When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads</u>, such as Iran and Israel, <u>with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that <strong>a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange</u></strong>. Nuclear Terrorism <u>The <mark>spread</mark> of nuclear weapons also <strong><mark>increases the risk of nuclear terror</mark>ism</u></strong>.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin <u>Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire</u> <u>nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West</u>.55 <u>Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56</u> Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 <u><strong>Analysts</u></strong> <u>have pointed out</u> the tremendous<u><strong> hurdles</u></strong> <u>that terrorists would have to overcome</u> <u>in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58</u> <u><strong>Nevertheless</u></strong>, <u>as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will <strong>eventually fall into terrorist hands increases</u></strong>. <u>States could intentionally <strong>transfer nuclear weapons</u></strong>, <u>or</u> the fissile material required to build them, <u>to terrorist groups</u>. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, <u>as</u> nuclear <u><strong>weapons spread</u></strong>, <u>the probability that a leader might someday <strong>purposely arm a terrorist group increases</u></strong>. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, <u>a <strong>new nuclear state</strong>, with <strong>underdeveloped security</strong> procedures, might be vulnerable to <strong>theft</strong>, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists.</u> There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, <u>a nuclear-armed state could collapse</u>, <u>resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem</u>. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. <u><strong>Regional Instability </strong>The spread of <mark>nuclear weapons</mark> also <strong><mark>embolden</mark>s <mark>nuclear powers</u></strong>, <u>contributing to <strong>regional instability</u></strong></mark>. <u>States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct</u> <u>military attack from other states, but <mark>states with <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> </mark>can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive</u> <u>to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy</u>. In this way, n<u>uclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to <mark>engage in <strong>lower-level aggression</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 <u><strong>Historically</u></strong>, we have seen that <u>the <strong>spread of nuclear weapons</strong> has emboldened their possessors and contributed to <strong>regional instability</u></strong>. <u>Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear</u>-<u>weapon states</u> and that <u>this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.</u>61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A <u>nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy</u>. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, <u><strong>we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East.</u></strong> <u>And in a poly-nuclear Middle East</u> with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, <u><strong><mark>any</strong> </mark>one of those <strong><mark>crises</strong> could result in a <strong>catastrophic nuclear exchange</strong></mark>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Lin-Greenberg ’20 [Erik; Spring; postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House assistant professor of political science at MIT; Texas National Security Review, “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-making,” 3:2, https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-intelligence-obstacles-to-operations-and-decision-making] fulltext: Obstacles to Alliance Decision-Making In addition to creating obstacles to the conduct of multinational military operations, AI can also strain the ability of alliance leaders to make decisions during a crisis. Alliance decision-making is often characterized as a contentious process in which policymakers from states with different national interests, military capabilities, and risk tolerances coordinate their preferences.86 Policymakers seek to advance their state’s own interests during deliberations, frequently leading to negotiated policy compromises. NATO allies, for instance, routinely have policy disagreements — take, for instance, clashes over the response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.87 Alliances and coalitions are also fraught with commitment problems, where states fear that allies will back out of agreements or drag them into unwanted conflicts.88 Divergent national positions and fears of abandonment can lead decision-making consultations between states to be drawn out, and, if conducted in the midst of a crisis, leave alliances unable to respond decisively to threats.89 AI can complicate the coordination required for alliance decision-making and the subsequent ability to command and control multinational forces in three key ways. First, AI technologies promise to accelerate the speed of military operations, reducing the amount of time available for deliberations between states. Second, there are varying levels of uncertainty surrounding the reliability and effectiveness of AI technologies. If decision-makers from different states hold different degrees of trust in the ability of AI systems to provide accurate information or take appropriate actions, they may be hesitant to use these systems when making decisions on the use of force. Third, adversaries may use AI-enabled disinformation campaigns to degrade trust between allies and heighten fears that member states will renege on their alliance commitments. Compressed Decision-Making Timelines The proliferation of AI-enabled technologies among both friends and rivals will compress the time policymakers and military commanders have to deliberate over political and military decisions. In the hands of allies, AI-assisted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or command-and-control systems may identify adversary military maneuvers faster than non-AI systems. Once presented with this information, alliance decision-makers may need to quickly decide how to respond — particularly if adversary forces pose an immediate threat or must be targeted within a narrow window of opportunity. The U.S. military has already started to develop this type of capability. As part of a series of exercises, the Defense Department demonstrated a command-and-control network that uses AI to automatically detect enemy activity and pass targeting information between multiple intelligence and military assets. During one of these exercises, a space asset detected a simulated enemy ship, but was unable to identify it. The network automatically cued an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform to collect additional information on the adversary vessel, which it then sent to a command-and-control asset. The command-and-control platform used AI to select the best platform available to strike the enemy ship and passed targeting data to the nearby U.S. naval destroyer that would engage the adversary vessel. AI significantly shortened the targeting process relative to efforts without AI technology. When describing the AI-enabled network in November 2019, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein announced, “This is no longer PowerPoint. It’s real.”90 At the strategic level, this type of AI-enabled command-and-control system could present decision-makers with intelligence that a rival is preparing to deploy strategic forces — like ballistic missile submarines or mobile missile launchers — from its garrisons during a crisis. In such a case, senior policymakers from various alliance member states might hold differing opinions on how best to respond, but would have little time to debate their options before the adversary’s forces are dispersed and more difficult to locate.91 Commanders at the operational and tactical levels of alliance operations will face similar challenges as AI-enabled systems more rapidly provide battlefield intelligence about rival forces. As a result, commanders may be forced to quickly decide whether to strike a fleeting target detected by an AI-enabled system. To be sure, decision-makers in unilateral operations will confront these same issues, but settling on the best course of action is more complex in settings where multiple actors have a say in the decision-making process.92 An adversary’s use of AI-enabled systems can also compress timelines and complicate alliance decision-making. Just as AI can boost the tempo of allied operations, it can increase the frequency and speed of a rival’s military actions. AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems that allow states to launch military operations without putting personnel in harm’s way may lead rival leaders to launch operations that they might not otherwise carry out.93 China, for instance, has developed and exported autonomous drones capable of identifying targets and carrying out lethal strikes with little or no human oversight.94 Further, a rival’s integration of AI into its command-and-control networks may speed its decision-making process. Indeed, China’s military has expressed an interest in leveraging AI for military decision-making.95 A publication from the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center, for example, described how the use of AI to play the complex board game Go “demonstrated the enormous potential of artificial intelligence in combat command, program deduction, and decisionmaking.”96 These systems could be employed against the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, forcing allied commanders to respond more quickly to these threats. Uncertainty Surrounding AI Technology AI can also strain alliance decision-making by fueling uncertainty about information and military actions. Unlike human analysts or military personnel who can be asked to explain and justify their findings or decisions, AI generally operates in a “black box.” 97 The neural networks that underpin many cutting-edge AI systems are opaque and offer little insight into how they arrive at their conclusions.98 These networks rely on deep learning, a process that passes information from large data sets through a hierarchy of digital nodes that analyze data inputs and make predictions using mathematical rules. As data flows through the neural network, the net makes internal adjustments to refine the quality of outputs. Researchers are often unable to explain how neural nets make these internal adjustments. Because of this lack of “explainability,” users of AI systems may have difficulty understanding failures and correcting errors.99 Policymakers have called for the development of more transparent AI systems, and researchers are working to develop explainable AI tools that peer inside the AI black box.100 Yet, many decision-makers remain uncomfortable with the uncertainty surrounding AI-enabled systems. The commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command, for instance, publicly explained that he was not yet willing to rely on AI programs to analyze the full-motion video collected by reconnaissance drones. He argued that although systems are improving, they are still unable to consistently provide accurate analysis.101 So long as the decisions and analysis of AI systems remain opaque, military commanders may be reluctant to trust AI-enabled systems. And if used, AI may contribute to the fog of war, rather than reduce it, making it difficult to make decisions using information delivered by AI technologies. The operational implications associated with uncertainty and lack of trust in AI would likely be exacerbated in multinational alliance contexts. There is significant cross-national variation in trust in AI technologies, even among close allies. One 2018 survey, for instance, found that just 13 percent of respondents in Japan and 17 percent of respondents in South Korea trust artificial intelligence, compared to 25 percent of respondents in the United States. Similar disparities exist between the United States and many of its NATO allies. In Spain, 34 percent of respondents trust artificial intelligence, compared to 21 percent in Canada, 40 percent in Poland, and 43 percent in Turkey.102 Given this variation, policymakers and commanders from some states may be more reluctant to use AI-enabled systems or trust the information they deliver than leaders from other states during multinational operations. Allied decision-makers will also face uncertainty when confronting a rival’s use of AI-enabled technologies. Leaders will be forced to wrestle with whether to respond to actions carried out by AI-enabled systems — like autonomous aircraft or ships — in the same way as actions carried out by traditionally manned assets. Existing doctrine and law are generally silent on these issues, providing no guidance on the appropriate response. States have drafted domestic policies to govern their own use of autonomous weapon systems, but these regulations and international law make no distinction between how states should react to a rival’s AI-enabled military actions versus “traditional” military actions.103 Yet, decision-makers may believe that a rival’s use of AI technologies demands different responses than those involving manned platforms.104 What happens if a rival claims that an attack carried out by an AI-enabled system was the result of a flawed algorithm? Should air defense forces respond differently to an adversary’s autonomous drones that penetrate friendly airspace than to a manned aircraft that does the same? Decision-makers may find themselves with little time to consider these complicated issues, particularly as AI technology accelerates the speed of a rival’s military operations.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Military AI compresses <u>decision times</u>, reduces <u>trust</u>, and increases the <u>fog of war</u>. Existing NATO doctrine is insufficient</h4><p><strong>Lin-Greenberg ’20</strong> [Erik; Spring; postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House assistant professor of political science at MIT; Texas National Security Review, “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-making,” 3:2, https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-intelligence-obstacles-to-operations-and-decision-making]</p><p>Obstacles to Alliance Decision-Making</p><p>In addition to creating obstacles to the conduct of multinational military operations, <u><mark>AI can </mark>also <mark>strain the ability of alliance leaders to <strong>make decisions during a crisis</mark>.</u></strong> Alliance decision-making is often characterized as a contentious process in which policymakers from states with different national interests, military capabilities, and risk tolerances coordinate their preferences.86 Policymakers seek to advance their state’s own interests during deliberations, frequently leading to negotiated policy compromises. NATO allies, for instance, routinely have policy disagreements — take, for instance, clashes over the response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.87 <u>Alliances </u>and coalitions <u>are also fraught with commitment problems, where states fear that allies will back out of agreements or drag them into unwanted conflicts</u>.88 <u>Divergent national positions and fears of abandonment can lead decision-making consultations between states to be drawn out, and, if conducted in the midst of a crisis, leave alliances unable to respond decisively to threats</u>.89</p><p>AI can complicate the coordination required for alliance decision-making and the subsequent ability to command and control multinational forces in three key ways. First, <u><mark>AI</mark> technologies promise to <mark>accelerate the speed of military op</mark>eration<mark>s, reducing the </mark>amount of <mark>time </mark>available<mark> for deliberations</mark> between states. </u>Second, <u>there are varying levels of uncertainty surrounding the reliability and effectiveness of AI technologies. <mark>If decision-makers from different states hold <strong>different degrees of trust</strong> in</mark> the ability of <mark>AI</mark> systems <mark>to provide accurate info</mark>rmation or take appropriate actions, <mark>they may be hesitant </mark>to use these systems when making decisions on the use of force</u>. Third, <u>adversaries may use AI-enabled disinformation campaigns to degrade trust between allies and heighten fears that member states will renege on their alliance commitments</u>.</p><p>Compressed Decision-Making Timelines</p><p><u>The proliferation of AI-enabled technologies among both friends and rivals will compress the time policymakers and military commanders have to deliberate over political and military decisions</u>. In the hands of allies, AI-assisted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or command-and-control systems may identify adversary military maneuvers faster than non-AI systems. Once presented with this information, alliance decision-makers may need to quickly decide how to respond — particularly if adversary forces pose an immediate threat or must be targeted within a narrow window of opportunity.</p><p><u>The U.S. military has already started to develop this type of capability</u>. <u>As part of a series of exercises, the Defense Department demonstrated a command-and-control network that uses AI to automatically detect enemy activity and pass targeting information between multiple intelligence and military assets</u>. During one of these exercises, a space asset detected a simulated enemy ship, but was unable to identify it. The network automatically cued an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform to collect additional information on the adversary vessel, which it then sent to a command-and-control asset. The command-and-control platform used AI to select the best platform available to strike the enemy ship and passed targeting data to the nearby U.S. naval destroyer that would engage the adversary vessel. AI significantly shortened the targeting process relative to efforts without AI technology. When describing the AI-enabled network in November 2019, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein announced, “<u>This is no longer PowerPoint. It’s real</u>.”90</p><p>At the strategic level, this type of <u>AI-enabled command-and-control system could present decision-makers with intelligence that a rival is preparing to deploy strategic forces — like ballistic missile submarines or mobile missile launchers — from its garrisons during a crisis</u>. In such a case, senior policymakers from various alliance member states might hold differing opinions on how best to respond, but would have little time to debate their options before the adversary’s forces are dispersed and more difficult to locate.91 Commanders at the operational and tactical levels of alliance operations will face similar challenges as AI-enabled systems more rapidly provide battlefield intelligence about rival forces. As a result, commanders may be forced to quickly decide whether to strike a fleeting target detected by an AI-enabled system. To be sure, <u>decision-makers in unilateral operations will confront these same issues, but settling on the best course of action is more complex in settings where multiple actors have a say in the decision-making process</u>.92</p><p><u>An adversary’s use of AI-enabled systems can also compress timelines and complicate alliance decision-making.</u> <u>Just as AI can boost the tempo of allied operations, it can increase the frequency and speed of a rival’s military actions.</u> AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems that allow states to launch military operations without putting personnel in harm’s way may lead rival leaders to launch operations that they might not otherwise carry out.93 China, for instance, has developed and exported autonomous drones capable of identifying targets and carrying out lethal strikes with little or no human oversight.94 Further, <u>a rival’s integration of AI into its command-and-control networks may speed its decision-making process</u>. Indeed, <u>China’s military has expressed an interest in leveraging AI for military decision-making.</u>95 A publication from the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center, for example, described how the use of AI to play the complex board game Go “demonstrated the enormous potential of artificial intelligence in combat command, program deduction, and decisionmaking.”96 These systems could be employed against the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, forcing allied commanders to respond more quickly to these threats.</p><p>Uncertainty Surrounding AI Technology</p><p><u>AI can also strain alliance decision-making by fueling uncertainty about information and military actions</u>. Unlike human analysts or military personnel who can be asked to explain and justify their findings or decisions, <u>AI generally operates in a “black box</u>.” 97 <u>The neural networks that underpin many cutting-edge AI systems are opaque and offer little insight into how they arrive at their conclusions.</u>98 These networks rely on deep learning, a process that passes information from large data sets through a hierarchy of digital nodes that analyze data inputs and make predictions using mathematical rules. As data flows through the neural network, the net makes internal adjustments to refine the quality of outputs. Researchers are often unable to explain how neural nets make these internal adjustments. Because of this lack of “explainability,” users of AI systems may have difficulty understanding failures and correcting errors.99</p><p>Policymakers have called for the development of more transparent AI systems, and researchers are working to develop explainable AI tools that peer inside the AI black box.100 Yet, many decision-makers remain uncomfortable with the uncertainty surrounding AI-enabled systems. The commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command, for instance, publicly explained that he was not yet willing to rely on AI programs to analyze the full-motion video collected by reconnaissance drones. He argued that although systems are improving, they are still unable to consistently provide accurate analysis.101 <u>So long as the decisions and analysis of AI systems remain opaque, military commanders may be reluctant to trust AI-enabled systems. </u>And <u>if used,</u> <u><mark>AI may contribute to the <strong>fog of war</strong>, rather than reduce it,</mark> making it difficult to make decisions using information delivered by AI technologies.</p><p>The operational implications associated with uncertainty and lack of trust in AI would likely be exacerbated in multinational alliance contexts</u>. <u><mark>There is significant cross-national variation in trust in AI</mark> technologies, <strong><mark>even among close allies</u></strong></mark>. One 2018 survey, for instance, found that just 13 percent of respondents in Japan and 17 percent of respondents in South Korea trust artificial intelligence, compared to 25 percent of respondents in the United States. Similar disparities exist between the United States and many of its NATO allies. In Spain, 34 percent of respondents trust artificial intelligence, compared to 21 percent in Canada, 40 percent in Poland, and 43 percent in Turkey.102 Given this variation, policymakers and commanders from some states may be more reluctant to use AI-enabled systems or trust the information they deliver than leaders from other states during multinational operations.</p><p><u><mark>Allied decision-makers will </mark>also <mark>face uncertainty when <strong>confronting a rival’s use of AI</strong></mark>-enabled technologies. Leaders will be forced to wrestle with whether to respond to actions carried out by AI-enabled systems</u> — like autonomous aircraft or ships — <u>in the same way as actions carried out by traditionally manned assets</u>. <u><strong><mark>Existing doctrine</u></strong></mark> and law are generally silent on these issues, <u><mark>provid</u></mark>ing <u><strong><mark>no guidance on the appropriate response</u></strong></mark>. <u>States have drafted domestic policies to govern their own use of autonomous weapon systems, but these regulations and international law make no distinction between how states should react to a rival’s AI-enabled military actions versus “traditional” military actions</u>.103 Yet, decision-makers may believe that a rival’s use of AI technologies demands different responses than those involving manned platforms.104 What happens if a rival claims that an attack carried out by an AI-enabled system was the result of a flawed algorithm? Should air defense forces respond differently to an adversary’s autonomous drones that penetrate friendly airspace than to a manned aircraft that does the same? Decision-makers may find themselves with little time to consider these complicated issues, particularly as AI technology accelerates the speed of a rival’s military operations.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Markus Brückner and Hans Grüner 19. Ph.D. Economics, Professor of Economics @ Australian National University, & external consultant to IMF and World Bank; Ph.D. Economics, Professor of Economics @ University of Mannheim, & external consultant to European Central Bank. 10-31-2019. “Economic growth and political extremism.” Public Choice. Issue 185/1-2. pp 131-159. Springer. fulltext: Abstract We argue that the growth rate, but not the level of aggregate income, affects the support for extreme political parties. In our model, extreme parties offer short-run benefits to part of the population at the expense of a minority. Growth effects on the support for such parties arise when uncertainty exists over whether the same subset of individuals will receive the same benefits in the future. More people are willing to take political risks if economic growth is slow. Based on a panel of 16 European countries, our empirical analysis shows that slower growth rates are associated with a significant increase in right-wing extremism. We find no significant effect of economic growth on the support for extreme left-wing parties. 1 Introduction Distributional consequences are associated with political extremism, both in the short run and in the long run. Extreme political parties often propose to redistribute resources away from specific subgroups of society, such as the rich, ethnic minorities, or citizens living in specific regions. This paper analyzes the impact of economic growth on the support for extreme political parties in western democracies. We argue that the growth rate, but not the level of aggregate income, affects the support for extremism. In the first part of our paper, we discuss three alternative explanations for why an increase in the economic growth rate reduces the support for extreme political parties. Two well-known explanations are related to retrospective voting and behavioral effects, the latter meaning that voters may react more strongly to changes in than to levels of economic well-being. The third, novel explanation is that parties with extreme political platforms are perceived to create considerable uncertainty about the future distribution of income. We develop a simple game-theoretic model that analyzes that uncertainty effect. In our model, extreme political parties offer short-run gains from redistribution to a group of individuals. However, the same individuals also face long-run losses owing to the higher income risk that is associated with an extreme regime.1 The model permits a comparative static analysis with respect to several key variables of interest. The growth rate is associated with larger future income risk. Such risk reduces the number of voters favoring extreme parties. The level of aggregate income has no effect on the support for extremism. Income inequality raises support for redistribution and affects the impact that a change in the growth rate has on the support for extremism. An important feature of our model is that the effect of economic growth on the support for extremism depends on uncertainty of future income redistribution. If redistributive policies are perceived as predictable—in the sense that the same group will have income taken away from it in the future—then the political support for an extremist party is unaffected by growth. In the empirical part of our paper, we estimate the relationship between economic growth and the support for extreme political parties using a panel dataset comprising 16 European countries. Our dependent variable is a survey-based measure, compiled by Euro-barometer, of respondents' support for extreme right-wing parties and extreme left-wing parties. We use that data, which spans more than three decades and contains entries on a semi-annual frequency, to estimate the effects of economic growth on the support for extremism. Our empirical analysis shows a significant negative effect of real per capita GDP growth on the support for extreme right-wing parties: controlling for country and time fixed effects, a one percentage point decline in real per capita GDP growth increases the vote share of extreme right-wing parties by up to one percentage point. We document that the negative effect of economic growth on the support for right-wing extremism is robust across estimation techniques and model specifications. We do not find a systematic effect of growth on the support for left-wing extremism. A possible explanation for the differential effects between left-wing and right-wing extremism that relates closely to our theoretical model is that right-wing extremism might be associated with more uncertainty over what groups will be subject to income expropriation in the future. Left-wing extremism is associated with income redistribution, but little uncertainty exists over its target. Communist doctrine (see, for example, the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels 1848), envisions a classless society; i.e., a society wherein incomes are distributed equally. Over the past century, extreme left-wing parties have followed closely that doctrine by proposing to redistribute incomes from rich to poor; as opposition parties they have voted against laissez faire policies and, when in power, they have implemented programs that reduced the wealth and income prospects of the rich (see, e.g., Brown 2010). Right-wing extremism, in contrast to left-wing extremism, does not advocate a classless society. Instead, it often is associated with discrimination against specific groups of society for racial, religios, political or other reasons.2 An extreme case of a murderous and discriminatory regime was the German fascist rule during the first half of the 20th century. One can see it as a direct consequence of the Nazi party's "Fuhrerprinzip"—"the principle of unconditional authority of the leader" (Bernholz 2017, p.9)—which created considerable uncertainty over who might be stigmatized, imprisoned or killed in the future.3 Indeed, from the Nazi period we know that various groups were stigmatized for different reasons4 and that stigmatization also was particularly erratic.5,6 The empirical analysis of our paper is related to Stevenson (2001), who examines the determinants of aggregate policy preferences in a panel of 14 European countries. One of Stevenson's main findings is that declines in economic growth cause policy preferences to shift to the right, while increases in economic growth cause policy preferences to shift to the left.7 Our paper differs from Stevenson in at least three important aspects. First, in contrast to Stevenson, we show that our empirical results are robust to controlling for country fixed effects, meaning that our results also hold at the within-country level, and not just in cross-section. Relatedly, Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) showed that the cross-country relation between income and democracy turns insignificant when country fixed effects are entered into the econometric model. Second, we provide evidence that our empirical findings reflect a causal effect of economic growth on political extremism. We show that our main findings are robust to estimating dynamic models that enable to test for Granger causality; and we also show that the main findings hold with an instrumental variables approach. Third, we distinguish in our empirical analysis between extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing parties. That distinction matters: a robust negative effect of economic growth is found on the support for extreme right-wing parties, whereas no systematic effect exists for the support of extreme left-wing parties. Our finding of a significant negative effect of economic growth on the support for right-wing extremism is in line with the finding of Bromhead et al. (2012), who show that the vote share of right-wing extremists during the Great Depression was significantly larger in those countries that experienced a more severe economic crisis. Using subnational data for 218 European regions during 1990-2016, Rao et al. (2018) find a significant negative effect of regional output on the vote share of extreme right-wing parties, but no signicant effect on extreme left-wing parties.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>2. <u>Global leadership turnover</u>- slow growth fuels <u>right-wing nationalism</h4><p></u>Markus <strong>Brückner and</strong> Hans <strong>Grüner 19</strong>. Ph.D. Economics, Professor of Economics @ Australian National University, & external consultant to IMF and World Bank; Ph.D. Economics, Professor of Economics @ University of Mannheim, & external consultant to European Central Bank. 10-31-2019. “Economic growth and political extremism.” Public Choice. Issue 185/1-2. pp 131-159. Springer.</p><p>Abstract We argue that the growth rate, but not the level of aggregate income, affects the support for extreme political parties. In our model, extreme parties offer short-run benefits to part of the population at the expense of a minority. Growth effects on the support for such parties arise when uncertainty exists over whether the same subset of individuals will receive the same benefits in the future. <u>More <mark>people are willing to take political risks if</mark> economic <mark>growth is slow</mark>. Based on a panel of 16 European countries, our <strong><mark>empirical analysis</strong> shows </mark>that <mark>slower growth rates are associated with a <strong>significant increase in right-wing extremism</strong></mark>.</u> We find no significant effect of economic growth on the support for extreme left-wing parties. 1 Introduction Distributional consequences are associated with political extremism, both in the short run and in the long run. Extreme political parties often propose to redistribute resources away from specific subgroups of society, such as the rich, ethnic minorities, or citizens living in specific regions. This paper analyzes the impact of economic growth on the support for extreme political parties in western democracies. We argue that the growth rate, but not the level of aggregate income, affects the support for extremism. In the first part of our paper, we discuss three alternative explanations for why an increase in the economic growth rate reduces the support for extreme political parties. Two well-known explanations are related to retrospective voting and behavioral effects, the latter meaning that voters may react more strongly to changes in than to levels of economic well-being. The third, novel explanation is that parties with extreme political platforms are perceived to create considerable uncertainty about the future distribution of income. We develop a simple game-theoretic model that analyzes that uncertainty effect. In our model, <u>extreme political parties offer short-run gains from redistribution to a group of individuals. However, the same individuals also face long-run losses owing to the higher income risk that is associated with an extreme regime.1 The model permits a comparative static analysis with respect to several key variables of interest. The growth rate is associated with larger future income risk. Such risk reduces the number of voters favoring extreme parties</u>. The level of aggregate income has no effect on the support for extremism. Income inequality raises support for redistribution and affects the impact that a change in the growth rate has on the support for extremism. An important feature of our model is that the effect of economic growth on the support for extremism depends on uncertainty of future income redistribution. If redistributive policies are perceived as predictable—in the sense that the same group will have income taken away from it in the future—then the political support for an extremist party is unaffected by growth. In the empirical part of our paper, <u>we estimate the relationship between economic growth and the support for extreme political parties using a panel dataset comprising 16 European countries.</u> Our dependent variable is a survey-based measure, compiled by Euro-barometer, of respondents' support for extreme right-wing parties and extreme left-wing parties. We use <u>that <mark>data</mark>, <mark>which spans <strong>more than three decades</strong></mark> and contains entries on a semi-annual frequency, to estimate the effects of economic growth on the support for extremism. Our empirical analysis <mark>shows a <strong>significant</strong> negative effect of</mark> real per capita <mark>GDP growth on</mark> the <mark>support for extreme right-wing parties</mark>: controlling for country and time fixed effects, a one percentage point decline in real per capita GDP growth increases the vote share of extreme right-wing parties by up to one percentage point. We document that <mark>the</mark> negative <mark>effect</mark> of economic growth on the support for right-wing extremism <mark>is <strong>robust</strong></mark> across estimation techniques and model specifications. </u>We do not find a systematic effect of growth on the support for left-wing extremism. A possible explanation for the differential effects between left-wing and right-wing extremism that relates closely to our theoretical model is that right-wing extremism might be associated with more uncertainty over what groups will be subject to income expropriation in the future. Left-wing extremism is associated with income redistribution, but little uncertainty exists over its target. Communist doctrine (see, for example, the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels 1848), envisions a classless society; i.e., a society wherein incomes are distributed equally. Over the past century, extreme left-wing parties have followed closely that doctrine by proposing to redistribute incomes from rich to poor; as opposition parties they have voted against laissez faire policies and, when in power, they have implemented programs that reduced the wealth and income prospects of the rich (see, e.g., Brown 2010). <u>Right-wing extremism, in contrast to left-wing extremism, does not advocate a classless society. Instead, it often is associated with discrimination against specific groups of society for racial, religios, political or other reasons</u>.2 An extreme case of a murderous and discriminatory regime was the German fascist rule during the first half of the 20th century. One can see it as a direct consequence of the Nazi party's "Fuhrerprinzip"—"the principle of unconditional authority of the leader" (Bernholz 2017, p.9)—which created considerable uncertainty over who might be stigmatized, imprisoned or killed in the future.3 Indeed, from the Nazi period we know that various groups were stigmatized for different reasons4 and that stigmatization also was particularly erratic.5,6 The empirical analysis of our paper is related to Stevenson (2001), who examines the determinants of aggregate policy preferences in a panel of 14 European countries. One of Stevenson's main findings is that declines in economic growth cause policy preferences to shift to the right, while increases in economic growth cause policy preferences to shift to the left.7 Our paper differs from Stevenson in at least three important aspects. First, in contrast to Stevenson, we show that our empirical results are robust to <u>controlling for country fixed effects, meaning that our results also hold at the within-country level, and not just in cross-section. Relatedly, Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) showed that the cross-country relation between income and democracy turns insignificant when country fixed effects are entered into the econometric model. Second, we provide evidence that our empirical findings reflect a causal effect of economic growth on political extremism. We show that our main findings are robust to estimating dynamic models that enable to test for Granger causality; and we also show that the main findings hold with an instrumental variables approach. Third, we distinguish in our empirical analysis between extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing parties. That distinction matters: a robust negative effect of economic growth is found on the support for extreme right-wing parties, whereas no systematic effect exists for the support of extreme left-wing parties. Our finding of a significant negative effect of economic growth on the support for right-wing extremism is in line with the finding of Bromhead et al. (2012), who show that the vote share of right-wing extremists during the Great Depression was significantly larger in those countries that experienced a more severe economic crisis. Using subnational data for 218 European regions during 1990-2016, Rao et al. (2018) find a significant negative effect of regional output on the vote share of extreme right-wing parties</u>, but no signicant effect on extreme left-wing parties.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Mueller ’20 [John; Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies @ Ohio State University, Senior Fellow @ Cato Institute, PhD @ University of California, Los Angeles; “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism”; June 24th, 2020; https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/nuclear-alarmism-proliferation-terrorism] fulltext: Building a Bomb of One’s Own Because they are unlikely to be able to buy or steal a usable bomb and because they are further unlikely to have one handed off to them by an established nuclear state, the most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials. That is the course identified by a majority of leading experts as the one most likely to lead to nuclear terrorism.44 The simplest design is a “gun” type of device in which masses of highly enriched uranium are hurled at each other within a tube. Such a device would be, as Allison acknowledges, “large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient.“45 The process of making such a weapon is daunting even in this minimal case. In particular, the task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. To begin with, now and likely for the foreseeable future, stateless groups are incapable of manufacturing the requisite weapons‐grade uranium themselves because the process requires an effort on an industrial scale. Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb.46 Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase the crucial material. A successful armed theft is exceedingly unlikely, not only because of the resistance of guards but also because chase would be immediate. A more plausible route would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the necessary fissile material. However, that approach requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or — either out of guile or incompetence — furnish them with stuff that is useless.47 Moreover, because of improved safeguards and accounting practices, it is decreasingly likely that the theft would remain undetected.48 That development is important because if any missing uranium is noticed, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. Even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the smooth‐talking foreign terrorists might soon develop sobering second thoughts and go to the authorities. Insiders tempted to assist terrorists might also come to ruminate over the fact that, once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins puts it none too delicately, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.“49 It is also relevant to note that over the years, known thefts of highly enriched uranium have totaled fewer than 16 pounds. That amount is far less than that required for an atomic explosion: for a crude bomb, more than 100 pounds are necessary to produce a likely yield of one kiloton. Moreover, none of those thieves was connected to al Qaeda, and, most arrestingly, none had buyers lined up — nearly all were caught while trying to peddle their wares. Indeed, concludes analyst Robin Frost, “There appears to be no true demand, except where the buyers were government agents running a sting.” Because there appears to be no commercial market for fissile material, each sale would be a one‐time affair, not a continuing source of profit such as drugs, and there is no evidence of established underworld commercial trade in this illicit commodity.50 If terrorists were somehow successful in obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, probably while being pursued by security forces. Then, they would need to set up a large and well‐equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and populate it with a select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, and machinists. The process would also require good managers and organizers. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task without generating consequential suspicions among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Pakistan, for example, maintains a strict watch on many of its nuclear scientists even after retirement.51 Some observers have insisted that it would be “easy” for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material.52 However, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland’s Spiez Laboratory, conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint, the terrorist group “would most certainly be forced to redesign.” They also stress that the work, far from being “easy,” is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting and that the technical requirements “in several fields verge on the unfeasible.“53 Los Alamos research director Younger makes a similar argument, expressing his amazement at “self‐declared ‘nuclear weapons experts,’ many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon,” who “hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive.” Information is available for getting the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive, but none is detailed enough for “the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive.” Younger concludes, “To think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is far‐fetched at best.“54 Under the best of circumstances, the process could take months or even a year or more, and it would all, of course, have to be carried out in utter secret even while local and international security police are likely to be on the intense prowl. In addition, people, or criminal gangs, in the area may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant comings and goings of technicians unlikely to be locals. The process of fabricating a nuclear device requires, then, the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. In addition, a host of corrupted coconspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable; international and local security services must be kept perpetually in the dark; and no curious outsider must get wind of the project over the months, or even years, it takes to pull off. The finished product could weigh a ton or more. Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, as well as smuggled into, the relevant target country. Then, the enormous package would have to be received within the target country by a group of collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, and perhaps assembling the weapon. Then, they would have to detonate it somewhere under the fervent hope that the machine shop work has been proficient, that no significant shakeups occurred in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing — after all that effort — doesn’t prove to be a dud. The financial costs of the extended operation in its cumulating entirety could become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, as well as people to pay — or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of dedication, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of an array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals who are competent and capable enough to be an effective ally in the project are likely to be both smart enough to see opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>No nuclear terror. </h4><p>Mueller ’20 </strong>[John; Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies @ Ohio State University, Senior Fellow @ Cato Institute, PhD @ University of California, Los Angeles; “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism”; June 24th, 2020; https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/nuclear-alarmism-proliferation-terrorism]</p><p>Building a Bomb of One’s Own</p><p>Because they are unlikely to be able to buy or steal a usable bomb and because they are further unlikely to have one handed off to them by an established nuclear state, <u>the most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials</u>. That is the course identified by a majority of leading experts as the one most likely to lead to nuclear terrorism.44</p><p>The simplest design is a “gun” type of device in which masses of highly enriched uranium are hurled at each other within a tube. Such a device would be, as Allison acknowledges, “large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient.“45</p><p><u>The process</u> of making such a weapon <u>is <strong>daunting</strong> even in this <strong>minimal case</u></strong>. In particular, <u>the task requires</u> that <u>a considerable series of <strong>difficult hurdles</strong> be conquered and in sequence</u>.</p><p>To begin with, now and likely for the foreseeable future, <u>stateless <mark>groups</mark> are <strong><mark>incapable</strong> of manufacturing</mark> the requisite <strong>weapons‐grade <mark>uranium</strong></mark> themselves because the process requires an effort on an industrial scale</u>. Moreover, <u>they are <strong><mark>unlikely to be supplied</strong></mark> with the material <mark>by a state</mark> for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb</u>.46 <u>Thus, they would need to <strong>steal</strong> or illicitly purchase the crucial material</u>.</p><p><u>A successful armed <mark>theft is <strong></mark>exceedingly <mark>unlikely</strong></mark>, not only <mark>because of</mark> the <strong>resistance of <mark>guards</strong> but also</mark> because <strong><mark>chase</strong></mark> would be <strong>immediate</u></strong>. A more plausible route would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the necessary fissile material. However, that approach requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or — either out of guile or incompetence — furnish them with stuff that is useless.47 <u>Moreover, <mark>because of <strong></mark>improved <mark>safeguards</strong></mark> and <strong>accounting practices</strong>, <mark>it is</mark> <strong>decreasingly likely</strong> that the theft would remain un<strong><mark>detected</u></strong></mark>.48 That development is important because if any missing uranium is noticed, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. Even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the smooth‐talking foreign terrorists might soon develop sobering second thoughts and go to the authorities. Insiders tempted to assist terrorists might also come to ruminate over the fact that, once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins puts it none too delicately, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.“49</p><p>It is also relevant to note that over the years, <u>known thefts of <strong>h</u></strong>ighly <u><strong>e</u></strong>nriched <u><strong>u</u></strong>ranium <u>have totaled <strong>fewer than 16 pounds</strong>. That amount is <strong>far less</strong> than that required for an atomic explosion: <mark>for a <strong>crude bomb</strong></mark>, <strong>more than <mark>100 pounds </mark>are <mark>necessary</strong></mark> to produce a likely yield of one kiloton</u>. Moreover, none of those <u><strong><mark>thieves</u></strong></mark> was connected to al Qaeda, and, most arrestingly, none had buyers lined up — nearly all <u><mark>were caught</u></mark> while trying to peddle their wares. Indeed, concludes analyst Robin Frost, “There appears to be <u><strong><mark>no </mark>true <mark>demand</u></strong></mark>, except where the buyers were government agents running a sting.” Because there appears to be <u><strong><mark>no</mark> commercial <mark>market for fissile material</u></strong></mark>, each sale would be a one‐time affair, not a continuing source of profit such as drugs, and there is no evidence of established underworld commercial trade in this illicit commodity.50</p><p><u>If</u> terrorists were <u><strong>somehow</u></strong> successful in <u>obtaining</u> a sufficient mass of <u><strong>relevant material</u></strong>, they <u>would then have to <strong>transport</u></strong> it out of the country <u>over <strong>unfamiliar terrain</u></strong>, probably <u>while</u> being <u><strong>pursued by security forces</u></strong>. Then, they <u><mark>would need</u></mark> to set up a large and well‐equipped <u><strong><mark>machine shop</u></strong></mark> <u>to manufacture</u> a bomb <u>and</u> populate it with a select team of <u><strong>highly skilled <mark>scientists</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>technicians</u></strong>, and <u><strong>machinists</u></strong>. The process would also <u>require</u> good <u><strong><mark>managers</u></strong></mark> and <u><strong>organizers</u></strong>. The group <u>would have to be assembled</u> and retained for the monumental task <u><strong><mark>without</mark> generating consequential <mark>suspicions</strong></mark> among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Pakistan, for example, maintains a strict watch on many of its nuclear scientists even after retirement.51</p><p>Some</u> observers have <u>insisted</u> that <u>it would be “easy”</u> for terrorists <u>to assemble a <strong>crude bomb</u></strong> if they could get enough fissile material.52 <u>However</u>, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two <u>senior physicists</u> in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland’s Spiez Laboratory, <u>conclude that the task “could <strong>hardly be accomplished</strong> by a subnational group.”</u> They point out that <u><strong>precise <mark>blueprints</strong></mark> are <mark>required</u></mark>, not just sketches and general ideas, <u>and that even with a good blueprint, the terrorist group “would most certainly be forced to <strong>redesign</strong>.”</u> They also stress that <u>the <mark>work</mark>, far from being “easy,” <mark>is</mark> difficult, dangerous, and <strong>extremely <mark>exacting</strong> and</mark> that the <strong>technical <mark>requirements</strong> “in <strong></mark>several <mark>fields</strong></mark> verge on the <strong><mark>unfeasible</strong></mark>.“</u>53</p><p>Los Alamos research director Younger makes a similar argument, expressing his amazement at <u>“<strong>self‐declared ‘nuclear weapons experts</strong>,’ many of whom have <strong>never seen a real nuclear weapon</strong>,” who “hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive.”</u> Information is available for getting the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive, but none is detailed enough for “the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive.” Younger concludes, “To think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is far‐fetched at best.“54</p><p>Under the best of circumstances, the <u><strong><mark>process</u></strong></mark> could take months or even a year or more, and it would all, of course, <u><mark>have to be</u></mark> carried out <u>in <strong>utter <mark>secret</u></strong></mark> even <u><mark>while</u></mark> local and international security <u><strong><mark>police</u></strong></mark> are <u>likely to be <mark>on</u></mark> the intense <u><mark>prowl</u></mark>. In addition, <u><strong><mark>people</u></strong></mark>, or criminal gangs, <u><mark>in the area <strong></mark>may <mark>observe</u></strong></mark> with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant comings and goings of technicians unlikely to be locals.</p><p>The process of <u>fabricating</u> a nuclear device <u><mark>requires</u></mark>, then, the effective <u><strong><mark>recruitment</u></strong></mark> of people who at once have great <u><strong>technical <mark>skills</u></strong></mark> and will remain <u><strong><mark>completely devoted</u></strong></mark> to the cause. In addition, a host of <u><strong>corrupted <mark>coconspirators</u></strong></mark>, many of them foreign, <u>must remain</u> <u><strong>utterly reliable</u></strong>; international and local <u><strong>security services</u></strong> must be kept perpetually <u><strong>in the dark</u></strong>; and no curious outsider must get wind of the project over the months, or even years, it takes to pull off.</p><p>The <u>finished <mark>product</u></mark> could weigh a ton or more. Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it <u><mark>would</u></mark> then <u><mark>have to be <strong>transported</u></strong></mark> to, as well as smuggled into, the relevant target country. Then, the enormous package would have to be <u><strong><mark>received</u></strong></mark> within the target country <u><mark>by</u></mark> a group of <u><strong><mark>collaborators</u></strong></mark> who are at once <u><strong>totally dedicated</u></strong> and <u><strong>technically <mark>proficient</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>at</u></mark> <u><strong>handling</u></strong>, <u><strong>maintaining</u></strong>, and perhaps <u><strong><mark>assembling</mark> the weapon</u></strong>. <u><mark>Then</u></mark>, they would have to <u><strong><mark>detonate</u></strong></mark> it somewhere <u><mark>under</u></mark> the <u><strong>fervent <mark>hope</u></strong></mark> that the <u><strong>machine shop <mark>work</u></strong></mark> has been <u><mark>proficient</u></mark>, that no significant shakeups occurred in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing — after all that effort — doesn’t prove to be a dud.</p><p><u>The <strong><mark>financial costs</strong></mark> of the extended operation in its cumulating entirety could become <strong><mark>monumental</u></strong></mark>. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, as well as people to pay — or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of dedication, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of an array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals who are competent and capable enough to be an effective ally in the project are likely to be both smart enough to see opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Ross 3 Kelly Ross, philosophy at Los Angeles Valley College, 2003 (http://www.friesian.com/nietzsch.htm) fulltext: While the discussion of Existentialism treated Nietzsche as an Existentialist before his time, with the death of God producing the kind of nihilism characteristic of that movement, Nietzsche, for all his warnings about nihilism, does not in the end seem to be an actual nihilist. He is a kind of positivist instead -- that certain actual events and practices are the root of genuine value. The events and practices used by Nietzsche happen to be those of the most extreme 19th century Darwinian conception of nature. This very often sounds good, since Nietzsche sees himself, and can easily impress others, as simply making a healthy affirmation of life. Life for Nietzsche, however, is red in tooth and claw, and the most admirable and interesting form of life is the triumphant Darwinian predator, who in general is paradigmatic of beauty, grace, strength, intelligence, and activity, while living off of the less intelligent herds of herbivores, i.e. the dull and the bovine. In The Genealogy of Morals, one of Nietzsche's latest works (1887), he lays this all out with great clarity and eloquence. It is a performance that is also appalling -- and horrifying in relation to the uses to which Nietzsche's ideas were later put, for which he cannot, and would not care to, escape blame. ¶ First of all, Nietzsche's racism is unmistakable. The best way to approach this is to let Nietzsche speak for himself. In the quotes that follow, I will simply offer examples from The Genealogy of Morals alone, as translated by Francis Golffing [The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956]. ¶ The Latin malus ["bad"] (beside which I place melas [Greek for "black"]) might designate the common man as dark, especially black-haired ("hic niger est"), as the pre-Aryan settler of the Italian soil, notably distiguished from the new blond conqueror race by his color. At any rate, the Gaelic presented me with an exactly analogous case: fin, as in the name Fingal, the characteristic term for nobility, eventually the good, noble, pure, originally the fair-haired as opposed to the dark, black-haired native population. The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (The subject races are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe; in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in intellectual and social instincts. Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the commune, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists -- whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the Aryan race of conquerors is not doomed?) [p.164, boldface added]¶ Here we have an unmistakable racism: the good, noble, and blond Aryans, contrasted with the dark and primitive indigenes of Europe. While Nietzsche's thought is often defended as unrelated to the racism of the Nazis, there does not seem to be much difference from the evidence of this passage. One difference might be Nietzsche's characterization of the "commune" as "the most primitive of all social forms." Nazi ideology was totalitarian and "social," denigrating individualism. Nietzsche would not have gone for this -- the small, dark Hitler is certainly no Aryan -- but then many defenders of Nietzsche these days also tend to prefer a communitarian democracy, which means they might have more in common with the Nazis, despite their usual anti-racism, than Nietzsche himself. This is characteristic of the confusion of contemporary politics, let alone Nietzsche apologetics. The passage above, at least, provides as much aid and comfort for the Nazis as for any other interpretation or appropriation of Nietzsche. ¶ Nietzsche's racism might be excused as typical of its age, and criticism of it anachronistic. However, the racism of Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, involved an explicit denial that physical or intellectual differences between the races (about which Jefferson expressed no certainty) compromised the rights of the inferior races. To Nietzsche, however, the "subject races" have no "rights"; and domination, not to mention all the forms of "oppression" excoriated by the trendy Left, are positive and desirable goods. ¶ This anxiety or distemper may be due to a variety of causes. It may result from a crossing of races too dissimilar (or of classes too dissimilar. Class distinctions are always indicative of genetic and racial differences: the European Weltschmerz and the pessimism of the nineteenth century were both essentially the results of an abrupt and senseless mixing of classes)... [p.267, boldface added] ¶ In the litany of political sins identified by the Left, "racism, classism, and homophobia" are the holy trinity -- with "classism," of course, as a codeword for the hated capitalism. Here we see that for Nietzsche racism and "classism" are identical: the "subject races" form the subject classes. This is good and noble. We also get another aspect of the matter, the "mixing" of races and classes is "senseless" and productive of the pessimism and social problems of modern society. In these terms, Nietzsche can only have approved of the Nazis laws against marriage or even sex between Aryans and Untermenschen. ¶ The lack of rights for the dark underclasses brings us to the principal theme of The Genealogy of Morals: The morality of "good and evil" has been invented out of hatred and resentment by the defeated and subjugated races, especially the Jews. People who love Nietzsche for his celebration of creativity and his dismissal of the moralism of traditional religion, mainly meaning Christianity, usually seem to think of going "beyond good and evil" as merely legitimizing homosexuality, drugs, abortion, prostitution, pornography, and the other desiderata of progressive thinking. They don't seem to understand that Nietzsche wasn't particularly interested in things like that, but, more to the point, legitimizing rape, murder, torture, pillage, domination, and political oppression by the strong. The only honest Nietzschean graduate student I ever met frankly stated, "To be creative, you must be evil." We get something similar in the recent Sandra Bullock movie, Murder by Numbers [2002], where the young Nietzschean student simply says, "Freedom is crime." The story of the movie is more or less that of Leopold and Loeb, the Chicago teenagers who in 1924 murdered a young boy (Bobby Franks) to prove that they were "beyond good and evil." Leopold and Loeb understood their Nietzsche far better than most of his academic apologists. ¶ [continues]¶ But, one might think, violence and oppression are unjust! How could any progressive person not see that expoitation and abuse are wrong! We have Nietzsche's answer: ¶ No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically "unjust," since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. Even more disturbingly, we have to admit that from the biological [i.e. Darwinian] point of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions, since they limit the radical life-will bent on power and must finally subserve, as means, life's collective purpose, which is to create greater power constellations. To accept any legal system as sovereign and universal -- to accept it, not merely as an instrument in the struggle of power complexes, but as a weapon against struggle (in the sense of Dühring's communist cliché that every will must regard every other will as its equal) -- is an anti-vital principle which can only bring about man's utter demoralization and, indirectly, a reign of nothingness. [p.208, boldface added] ¶ Nietzsche is certainly life affirming, but then violence, rape, exploitation, and destruction are intrinsic to his view of life. Attempts to protect the weak, see that justice is done, and mitigate suffering are "anti-vital" projects that, being adverse to life itself, actually tend towards "a reign of nothingness." Thus, if we actually care about others and are not just interested in asserting power over them and using them for our own pleasure, then we can look forward to extinction. ¶ The delicacy -- even more, the tartufferie -- of domestic animals like ourselves shrinks from imagining clearly to what extent cruelty constituted the collective delight of older mankind, how much it was an ingredient of all their joys, or how naïvely they manifested their cruelty, how they considered disinterested malevolence (Spinoza's sympathia malevolens) a normal trait, something to which one's conscience could assent heartily.... To behold suffering gives pleasure, but to cause another to suffer affords an even greater pleasure. [pp.197-198, boldface added] A great part of the pleasure that we get, according to Nietzsche, from injustice to others is simply the pleasure of inflicting suffering. In this it is worth recollecting the feminist shibboleth that rape is not about sex, it is about power. Nietzsche would heartily concur. So much the better! And what is more, the value of rape is not just power, it is the chance to cruelly inflict suffering. The rapist who beats and mutilates, perhaps even kills, his victim, has done no evil, he is instead one of the heroes of true historic nobility. And people think that the droit de seigneur represents some "abuse" of power! No! It is the truly noble man as heroic rapist! Nietzsche would turn around Susan Brownmiller, who said that all men are rapists. No, it is just the problem that they are not. Nietzsche would regard most men as virtual castrati (domestic oxen, geldings) for not being rapists.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>The claim that suffering is inevitable and that intervention into suffering is life-negating is nothing more than a thinly-veiled cover for mass rape and genocide---accepting their argument necessitates an unconditional acceptance of brutal atrocities in all their forms. </h4><p>Ross 3 </strong>Kelly Ross, philosophy at Los Angeles Valley College, 2003 (http://www.friesian.com/nietzsch.htm)</p><p>While the discussion of Existentialism treated Nietzsche as an Existentialist before his time, with the death of God producing the kind of nihilism characteristic of that movement, Nietzsche, for all his warnings about nihilism, does not in the end seem to be an actual nihilist. He is a kind of positivist instead -- that certain actual events and practices are the root of genuine value. The events and practices used by Nietzsche happen to be those of the most extreme 19th century Darwinian conception of nature. This very often sounds good, since <u><strong><mark>Nietzsche sees himself</u></strong></mark>, and can easily impress others, <u><strong><mark>as simply making a healthy affirmation of life.</mark> Life for Nietzsche</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>is red in tooth and claw, and the most admirable and interesting form of life is the triumphant Darwinian predator, who in general is paradigmatic of beauty, grace, strength, intelligence, and activity, while living off of the less intelligent herds</u></strong> of herbivores, i.e. the dull and the bovine. In The Genealogy of Morals, one of Nietzsche's latest works (1887), he lays this all out with great clarity and eloquence. <u><strong>It is a performance that is</u></strong> also <u><strong>appalling</u></strong> -- <u><strong>and horrifying in relation to the uses to which Nietzsche's ideas were later put, for which he cannot</u></strong>, and would not care to, <u><strong>escape blame.</u></strong> ¶ First of all, Nietzsche's <u>racism</u> is unmistakable. The best way to approach this is to let Nietzsche speak for himself. In the quotes that follow, I will simply offer examples from The Genealogy of Morals alone, as translated by Francis Golffing [The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956]. ¶ The Latin malus ["bad"] (beside which I place melas [Greek for "black"]) might designate the common man as dark, especially black-haired ("hic niger est"), as the pre-Aryan settler of the Italian soil, notably distiguished from the new blond conqueror race by his color. At any rate, the Gaelic presented me with an exactly analogous case: fin, as in the name Fingal, <u><strong><mark>the characteristic term for nobility, eventually the good, noble, pure, originally the fair-haired as opposed to the dark, black-haired native population</u></strong>.</mark> The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (The subject races are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe; in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in intellectual and social instincts. Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the commune, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists -- whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the Aryan race of conquerors is not doomed?) [p.164, boldface added]¶ Here we have an unmistakable racism: <u><strong>the good, noble, and blond Aryans, contrasted with the dark and primitive indigenes of Europ</u></strong>e. <u><strong><mark>While Nietzsche's thought is often defended as unrelated to the racism of the Nazis, there does not seem to be much difference</mark> f</u></strong>rom the evidence of this passage. One difference might be Nietzsche's characterization of the "commune" as "the most primitive of all social forms." <u><strong>Nazi ideology was totalitarian and "social," denigrating individualism. Nietzsche would not have gone for this</u></strong> -- the small, dark Hitler is certainly no Aryan -- but then <u><strong>many defenders of Nietzsche these days also tend to prefer a </strong>communitarian<strong> democracy</u></strong>, which means they might have more in common with the Nazis, despite their usual anti-racism, than Nietzsche himself. This is characteristic of the confusion of contemporary politics, let alone Nietzsche apologetics. The passage above, at least, provides as much aid and comfort for the Nazis as for any other interpretation or appropriation of Nietzsche. ¶ Nietzsche's racism might be excused as typical of its age, and criticism of it anachronistic. However, the racism of Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, involved an explicit denial that physical or intellectual differences between the races (about which Jefferson expressed no certainty) compromised the rights of the inferior races. <u><strong>To Nietzsche</u></strong>, however<u><strong>, the "subject races" have no "rights"; and domination, not to mention all the forms of "oppression" excoriated by the trendy </strong>Left<strong>, are positive and desirable goods</u></strong>. ¶ This anxiety or distemper may be due to a variety of causes. It may result from a crossing of races too dissimilar (or of classes too dissimilar. Class distinctions are always indicative of genetic and racial differences: the European Weltschmerz and the pessimism of the nineteenth century were both essentially the results of an abrupt and senseless mixing of classes)... [p.267, boldface added] ¶ In the litany of political sins identified by the Left, "racism, classism, and homophobia" are the holy trinity -- with "classism," of course, as a codeword for the hated capitalism. Here we see that for Nietzsche racism and "classism" are identical: the "subject races" form the subject classes. This is good and noble. We also get another aspect of the matter, the "mixing" of races and classes is "senseless" and productive of the pessimism and social problems of modern society. In these terms, Nietzsche can only have approved of the Nazis laws against marriage or even sex between Aryans and Untermenschen. ¶<strong> </strong>The lack of rights for the dark underclasses brings us to the principal theme of The Genealogy of Morals: The morality of "good and evil" has been invented out of hatred and resentment by the defeated and subjugated races, especially the Jews. P<u><strong>eople who love Nietzsche for his celebration of creativity and his dismissal of</u></strong> the <u>moralism</u> of traditional religion, mainly meaning Christianity, usually seem to think of going "beyond good and evil" as merely legitimizing homosexuality, drugs, abortion, prostitution, pornography, and the other desiderata of progressive thinking. They don't seem to understand that <u><strong>Nietzsche wasn't particularly interested in things like that, but, more to the point, legitimizing rape, murder, torture, pillage, domination, and political oppression by the strong.</u></strong> The only honest Nietzschean graduate student I ever met frankly stated, "<u><strong><mark>To be creative, you must be evil</u></strong>."</mark> We get something similar in the recent Sandra Bullock movie, Murder by Numbers [2002], where the young Nietzschean student simply says, "Freedom is crime." The story of the movie is more or less that of Leopold and Loeb, the Chicago teenagers who in 1924 murdered a young boy (Bobby Franks) to prove that they were "beyond good and evil." Leopold and Loeb understood their Nietzsche far better than most of his academic apologists. ¶ [continues]¶ <u><strong>But, <mark>one might think, violence and oppression are unjust! How could any progressive person not see that expoitation and abuse are wrong</mark>! We have Nietzsche's answer</u></strong>: ¶ <u><strong>No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically "unjust," since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. Even more disturbingly, we have to admit that from the biological</u></strong> [i.e. Darwinian<u><strong>] point of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions, since they limit the radical life-will bent on power and must finally subserve</u></strong>, as means, <u><strong>life's collective purpose,</u></strong> which is to create greater power constellations. <u><strong>To accept any</u></strong> legal <u><strong>system</u></strong> as sovereign and universal -- to accept it, not merely as an instrument in the struggle of power complexes, but <u><strong>as a </strong>weapon against struggle</u> (in the sense of Dühring's communist cliché that every will must regard every other will as its equal) -- <u><strong>is an anti-vital principle which can only bring about man's utter demoralization and, indirectly, a reign of nothingness.</u></strong> [p.208, boldface added] ¶ <u><strong><mark>Nietzsche is certainly </strong>life affirming<strong>, but then violence, rape, exploitation, and destruction are intrinsic to his view of life. Attempts to protect the weak</u></strong>, </mark>see that justice is done, <u><strong><mark>and mitigate suffering are "anti-vital" projects that, being adverse to life itself, actually tend towards "a reign of nothingness</u></strong></mark>." Thus, <u><strong>if we actually care about others and are not just interested in asserting power over them and using them for our own pleasure, then we can look forward to extinction. </u></strong>¶<u><strong> The delicacy</u></strong> -- even more, the tartufferie -- <u><strong>of domestic animals like ourselves shrinks from imagining clearly to what extent cruelty constituted the collective delight of older mankind, how much it was an ingredient of all their joys, or how naïvely they manifested their cruelty, how they considered disinterested malevolence</u></strong> (Spinoza's sympathia malevolens) <u><strong>a normal trait</u></strong>, something to which one's conscience could assent heartily.... To behold suffering gives pleasure, but to cause another to suffer affords an even greater pleasure. [pp.197-198, boldface added] <u>A great part of the pleasure that we get</u>, according to Nietzsche, <u>from injustice to others is simply the pleasure of inflicting suffering</u>. In this it is worth recollecting the <u>feminist</u> shibboleth that <u>rape is not about sex, it is about power. Nietzsche would heartily concur. So much the better! And what is more, the <strong><mark>value of rape is not just power, it is the chance to cruelly inflict suffering</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>The rapist who beats and mutilates, perhaps even kills, his victim, has done no evil, <strong>he is instead one of the heroes of true historic nobility</u></strong></mark>. And people think that the droit de seigneur represents some "abuse" of power! No! <u>It is the truly noble man as heroic rapist</u>! Nietzsche would turn around Susan Brownmiller, who said that all men are rapists. No, it is just the problem that they are not. Nietzsche would regard most men as virtual castrati (domestic oxen, geldings) for not being rapists. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Arnold Ventures 20 9-24-2020 "'Evergreening' Stunts Competition, Costs Consumers and Taxpayers" https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/evergreening-stunts-competition-costs-consumers-and-taxpayers/ (Arnold Ventures is focused on evidence-based giving in a wide range of categories including: criminal justice, education, health care, and public finance)//Elmer fulltext: In 2011, Elsa Dixler was diagnosed with multiple myeloma. That August, she was prescribed Revlimid, a drug that had come on the market six years earlier. By January 2012, she went into full remission, where she has remained since. So long as Revlimid retains its effectiveness, she will take it for the rest of her life. “I was able to go back to work, see my daughter receive her Ph.D, and have a pretty normal life,” said Dixler, a Brooklyn resident who is now 74. “So, on the one hand, I feel enormously grateful.” But Dixler’s normal life has come at a steep financial cost to her family and to taxpayers. Revlimid typically costs nearly $800 per capsule, and Dixler takes one capsule per day for 21 days, then seven days off, and then resumes her daily dose, requiring 273 capsules a year. Since retiring from The New York Times at the end of 2017, she has been on Medicare. Dixler entered the Part D coverage gap (known as the donut hole) “within minutes,” she said. She estimates that adding her deductible, her copayment of $12,000, and what her Part D insurance provider pays totals approximately $197,500 a year. Revlimid should have been subject to competition from generic drug makers starting in 2009, bringing down its cost by many orders of magnitude. But by obtaining 27 additional patents, eight orphan drug exclusivities and 91 total additional protections from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) since Revlimid’s introduction in 2005, its manufacturer, Celgene, has extended the drug’s monopoly period by 18 years — through March 8, 2028. “I cannot fathom the immorality of a business that relies on squeezing people with cancer,” Dixler said, noting her astonishment that Revlimid has obtained orphan drug protections when it treats a disease that is not rare and does not serve a very limited population. She also observed that Revlimid’s underlying drug is thalidomide, which has been around for decades. “They didn’t invent a new drug, rather, they found a new use for it,” she said. “The cost of Revlimid has imposed constraints on our retirement,” Dixler said, “but when I hear other people’s stories, I feel very lucky. A lot of people have been devastated financially.” Revlimid is a case study in a process known as “evergreening” — artificially sustaining a monopoly for years and even decades by manipulating intellectual property laws and regulations. Evergreening is most commonly used with blockbuster drugs generating the highest prices and profits. Of the roughly 100 best-selling drugs, more than 70 percent have extended their protection from competition at least once. More than half have extended the protection cliff multiple times. The true scope and cost of evergreening has been brought into sharper focus by a groundbreaking, publicly available, comprehensive database released Thursday by the Center for Innovation at the University of California Hastings College of Law and supported by Arnold Ventures. The Evergreen Drug Patent Search is the first database to exhaustively track the patent protections filed by pharmaceutical companies. Using data from 2005 to 2018 on brand-name drugs listed in the FDA’s Orange Book — a listing of relevant patents for brand name, small molecule drugs — it demonstrates the full extent of how evergreening has been used by Big Pharma to prolong patents and delay the entry of generic, lower-cost competition. “Competition is the backbone of the U.S. economy,” said Professor Robin Feldman, Director of the UC Hastings Center for Innovation, who spearheaded the database’s creation. “But it’s not what we’re seeing in the drug industry. “With evergreening, pharmaceutical companies repeatedly make slight, often trivial, modifications to drugs, dosage levels, delivery systems or other aspects to obtain new protections,” she said. “They pile these protections on over and over again — so often that 78 percent of the drugs associated with new patents were not new drugs coming on the market, but existing drugs.” Competition is the backbone of the U.S. economy. But it’s not what we’re seeing in the drug industry. Professor Robin Feldman Director of the UC Hastings Center for Innovation In recent decades, evergreening has systematically undermined the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, which created the generic drug industry. Commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, it established a new patent and market exclusivity regime in which new drugs are protected from competition for a specified period of time sufficient to allow manufacturers to recoup their investments and earn a reasonable profit. When that protection expires, generic drug makers are incentivized to enter the market through a streamlined regulatory and judicial process. Drug prices typically drop by as much as 20 percent when the first generic enters the market, and with more than one generic manufacturer, prices can plummet by 80 to 85 percent. “Hatch-Waxman created an innovation/reward/competition cycle, but it’s been distorted into an innovation/reward/more reward cycle,” Feldman said. “To paraphrase something a former FDA commissioner once said, the greatest creativity in Big Pharma should come from the research and development departments, not from the legal and marketing departments.” Feldman led the development of the Evergreen Drug Patent Search in response to repeated requests from Congressional committees, members of Congress, state regulators and journalists for information about specific drugs and companies. “We want to make it so anyone can have the question about drug protections at their fingertips whenever they want,” Feldman said. “It’s designed to be easy and user-friendly, and to enhance public understanding about how competition may be limited rather than enhanced through the drug patent system.” The database was created through a painstaking process of combing through 160,000 data points to examine every instance where a pharmaceutical company added a new drug patent or exclusivity. “Most of it was done by hand,” Feldman said, “with multiple people reviewing it at every stage. And along the way we repeatedly made conservative choices. We erred on the side of underrepresenting the evergreen gain to be sure we were as fair and reasonable as possible.” Among the 2,065 drugs covered in Evergreen Drug Patent Search, there are many examples of the evergreening strategy used by pharma to delay the entry of competition, especially generics, often for widely prescribed drugs, including those used to treat heartburn, chronic pain, and opioid addiction. Nexium Before Nexium, there was Prilosec, a popular drug to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). But its patent exclusivity was due to expire in April 2001. In the late 1990s, with a precipitous drop in revenue looming, Prilosec’s manufacturer, AstraZeneca, decided to develop a replacement drug. Using “one-half of the Prilosec molecule — an isomer of it,” the result was Nexium, which received approval in February 2001. Essentially an evergreened version of Prilosec, Nexium’s exclusivity was then extended by more than 15 years, as AstraZeneca received 97 protections stemming from 16 patents. These included revised dosages, compounds, and formulations. Feldman said that tinkering changes such as Nexium’s do not involve the substantial research and development required for a new drug, nor do they constitute true innovations, yet for a decade and a half, patients and taxpayers were forced to pay far more than was warranted for GERD relief. In fact, in 2016 — one year after patent exclusivity expired — Nexium still topped all drugs in Medicare Part D spending, totaling $1.06 billion. Suboxone Use of this combination of buprenorphine and naloxone for treating opioid addiction has exploded in the wake of the opioid epidemic. Since its approval, Suboxone’s manufacturer, Reckitt Benckiser (now operating as Indivior), extended its protection cliff eight times, gaining nearly two extra decades of exclusivity through early 2030. The drug maker gained six patents for creating a film version of the drug — notably around the time protection was expiring for its tablet version. (The therapeutic benefits of the film and tablet are identical.) An earlier version of Suboxone also obtained an orphan drug designation, despite an opioid epidemic that has expanded Suboxone’s customer base to millions of potential customers. Suboxone generates more than $1 billion in annual revenue and ranks among the 40 top-selling drugs in the U.S. Truvada When Truvada, commonly referred to as PrEP, was approved in 2004, this HIV-prevention drug was a breakthrough. But 16 years later — and 14 years after its original exclusivity was to expire — it retains its monopoly status. Truvada’s manufacturer, Gilead, has received 15 patents and 120 protections since it came on the market, extending its exclusivity for more than 17 years, until July 3, 2024. In countries where generic Truvada is available, PrEP costs $100 or less per month, compared to $1,600 to $2,000 in the U.S. As a result, Truvada is unaffordable to many people who need protection from HIV. Barred from access, they are left vulnerable to infection. “We’re establishing a precedent that a pharmaceutical company can charge whatever it wants even as it allows an epidemic to continue, and the government refuses to intervene,” said James Krellenstein, co-founder of the group PrEP4All. “That should scare every American. If it’s HIV today, it will be another disease tomorrow.” EpiPen First approved in 1987, the EpiPen has saved the lives of countless numbers of people with deadly allergies. But it is protected from competition until 2025 — 38 years after its introduction — because its owner, Mylan, has filed five patents, four since 2010, all involving tweaks to the automatic injector. The actual medication used, epinephrine, has existed for more than a century — the innovation here is in the delivery device. Because these small changes to the injector have maintained its monopoly for so long, the cost of an EpiPen package (containing two injectors) has risen from $94 when Mylan purchased the device to between $650 and $700 today. For many people, especially parents of children with severe reactions to common allergens like peanuts, EpiPen’s increasing price tag imposes an onerous financial burden. What Can Be Done As the Evergreen Drug Patent Search makes clear, the positive impact of Hatch-Waxman has been steadily and severely eroded by a regulatory system vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated forms of manipulation. “You might say that the patent and regulatory system has been weaponized,” Feldman said. “When billions of dollars are at stake, there’s a lot of money available to look for ways to exploit the legal system. And companies have become adept at this, as our work has found.” There are several key steps that Congress could take to restore the balance between innovation and competition that is the key to a successful prescription drug regulatory process. These may include: Imposing restrictions on the number of patents that prescription drug manufacturers can defend in court to discourage the use of anticompetitive patent thickets. Limiting the patentability of so-called secondary patents — which don’t improve the safety or efficacy of a drug — through patent and exclusivity reform. Reforming the 180-day generic exclusivity, which can currently be abused to block other competitive therapies. “The Evergreen Drug Patent Search provides the publicly available, evidence-based foundation that defines the extent of the problem, and it can be used to develop policies that solve the problem of anti-competitive patent abuses,” said Kristi Martin, VP of Drug Pricing at Arnold Ventures. “Our incentives have gotten out of whack,” Martin said. “The luxury of monopoly protection should only be provided to innovations that provide meaningful benefits in saving lives, curing illnesses, or improving the quality of people’s lives. It should not be provided to those gaming the system. If we can change that, we can save consumers, employers, and taxpayers many billions of dollars while increasing the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to achieve breakthroughs."<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The <u>only</u> major study <u>confirms</u> our Internal Link – Evergreening <u>decimates competition</u> by resulting in <u>functional monopolies</u> </h4><p><strong>Arnold Ventures 20</strong> 9-24-2020 "'Evergreening' Stunts Competition, Costs Consumers and Taxpayers" https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/evergreening-stunts-competition-costs-consumers-and-taxpayers/ (Arnold Ventures is focused on evidence-based giving in a wide range of categories including: criminal justice, education, health care, and public finance)//Elmer </p><p><u>In 2011, Elsa Dixler was diagnosed with multiple myeloma. That August, she was prescribed Revlimid, a drug that had come on the market six years earlier</u>. By January 2012, she went into full remission, where she has remained since. So long as Revlimid retains its effectiveness, she will take it for the rest of her life. “I was able to go back to work, see my daughter receive her Ph.D, and have a pretty normal life,” said Dixler, a Brooklyn resident who is now 74. “So, on the one hand, I feel enormously grateful.” <u>But Dixler’s normal life has come at a steep financial cost to her family and to taxpayers. Revlimid typically costs nearly $800 per capsule, and Dixler takes one capsule per day for 21 days, then seven days off, and then resumes her daily dose, requiring 273 capsules a year</u>. Since retiring from The New York Times at the end of 2017, she has been on Medicare. Dixler entered the Part D coverage gap (known as the donut hole) “within minutes,” she said. She estimates that adding her deductible, her copayment of $12,000, and what her Part D insurance provider pays totals approximately $197,500 a year. <u><mark>Revlimid </mark>should have <strong>been subject to competition</strong> from generic drug makers starting in 2009, bringing down its cost by many orders of magnitude</u>. But <u>by obtaining</u> <u><strong><mark>27 additional patents</u></strong></mark>, eight orphan drug exclusivities and 91 total additional protections from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) <u>since Revlimid’s introduction in 2005, its manufacturer, Celgene, has <mark>extended </mark>the drug’s <strong><mark>monopoly</strong> <strong>period</strong> <strong>by 18 years</strong> </mark>— through March 8, 2028</u>. “I cannot fathom <u>the immorality of a business that relies on <strong>squeezing people with cancer</u></strong>,” Dixler said, noting her astonishment that Revlimid has obtained orphan drug protections when it treats a disease that is not rare and does not serve a very limited population. She also observed that Revlimid’s underlying drug is thalidomide, which has been around for decades. “<u>They didn’t invent a new drug, rather, they found a new use for it,” she said.</u> “<u>The cost of Revlimid has imposed constraints on our retirement</u>,” Dixler said, “but when I hear other people’s stories, I feel very lucky. A lot of people have been devastated financially.” <u>Revlimid is a case study in a process known as “<mark>evergreening</mark>” — <mark>artificially sustaining a monopoly for</mark> years and even <mark>decades </mark>by manipulating intellectual property laws and regulations</u>. <u>Evergreening is <mark>most commonly </mark>used <mark>with blockbuster drugs </mark>generating the highest prices and profits. <strong><mark>Of </mark>the roughly <mark>100 best-selling drugs</mark>, more than <mark>70 percent have extended </mark>their <mark>protection</strong> </mark>from competition at least once.</u> More than half have extended the protection cliff multiple times. <u>The true scope and cost of evergreening has been brought into sharper focus by a groundbreaking, publicly available, comprehensive database released Thursday by the Center for Innovation at the University of California Hastings College of Law and supported by Arnold Ventures</u>. <u><strong>The Evergreen Drug Patent Search is the first database to exhaustively track the patent protections filed by pharmaceutical companies</u></strong>. <u>Using data from 2005 to 2018</u> on brand-name drugs listed in the FDA’s Orange Book — a listing of relevant patents for brand name, small molecule drugs — it demonstrates the full extent of how evergreening has been used by Big Pharma to prolong patents and delay the entry of generic, lower-cost competition. “Competition is the backbone of the U.S. economy,” said Professor Robin Feldman, Director of the UC Hastings Center for Innovation, who spearheaded the database’s creation. “<u>But it’s not what we’re seeing in the drug industry. “With evergreening, pharmaceutical companies repeatedly make slight, often trivial, modifications to drugs, dosage levels, delivery systems or other aspects to obtain new protections,”</u> she said. “They pile these protections on over and over again — so often that 78 percent of the drugs associated with new patents were not new drugs coming on the market, but existing drugs.” <u>Competition is the backbone of the U.S. economy. But it’s not what we’re <strong>seeing in the drug industry</u></strong>. Professor Robin Feldman Director of the UC Hastings Center for Innovation In recent decades, <u>evergreening has systematically undermined the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, which created the generic drug industry.</u> Commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, it established a new patent and market exclusivity regime in which new drugs are protected from competition for a specified period of time sufficient to allow manufacturers to recoup their investments and earn a reasonable profit. When that protection expires, generic drug makers are incentivized to enter the market through a streamlined regulatory and judicial process. <u><mark>Drug prices </mark>typically <mark>drop by </mark>as much as <mark>20 percent when </mark>the first <mark>generic enters </mark>the market<strong>, and with more than one generic manufacturer, prices can plummet by 80 to 85 percent</u></strong>. “Hatch-Waxman created an innovation/reward/competition cycle, but it’s been distorted into an innovation/reward/more reward cycle,” Feldman said. “To paraphrase something a former FDA commissioner once said, the greatest creativity in Big Pharma should come from the research and development departments, not from the legal and marketing departments.” <u>Feldman led the development of the Evergreen Drug Patent Search in response to repeated requests from Congressional committees, members of Congress, state regulators and journalists for information about specific drugs and companies. </u>“We want to make it so anyone can have the question about drug protections at their fingertips whenever they want,” Feldman said. “It’s designed to be easy and user-friendly, and to enhance public understanding about how competition may be limited rather than enhanced through the drug patent system.” <u>The <strong><mark>database</strong> </mark>was <strong><mark>created through</strong> </mark>a painstaking process of <strong><mark>combing</strong> </mark>through <strong><mark>160,000 data points</strong> <strong>to examine every instance where a pharmaceutical company added a new drug patent or exclusivity</strong></mark>. “Most of it was done by hand,” Feldman said, “with multiple people reviewing it at every stage. And along the way we repeatedly made conservative choices. <strong><mark>We erred on the side of underrepresenting the evergreen gain</u></strong> <u></mark>to be sure we were as fair and reasonable as possible.” Among the 2,065 drugs covered in Evergreen Drug Patent Search, there are many examples of the evergreening strategy used by pharma to delay the entry of competition, especially generics, often for widely prescribed drugs, including those used to treat heartburn, chronic pain, and opioid addiction</u>. Nexium <u>Before Nexium, there was Prilosec, a popular drug to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). But its patent exclusivity was due to expire in April 2001. In the late 1990s, with a precipitous drop in revenue looming, Prilosec’s manufacturer, AstraZeneca, decided to develop a replacement drug. Using “one-half of the Prilosec molecule — an isomer of it,” the result was Nexium, which received approval in February 2001. Essentially an evergreened version of Prilosec, <mark>Nexium’s </mark>exclusivity was then <mark>extended by</mark> more than <mark>15 years</mark>, as AstraZeneca received 97 protections stemming from 16 patents. </u>These included revised dosages, compounds, and formulations. Feldman said that tinkering changes such as Nexium’s do not involve the substantial research and development required for a new drug, nor do they constitute true innovations, yet for a decade and a half, patients and taxpayers were forced to pay far more than was warranted for GERD relief. In fact, in 2016 — one year after patent exclusivity expired — Nexium still topped all drugs in Medicare Part D spending, totaling $1.06 billion. Suboxone Use of this combination of buprenorphine and naloxone for treating opioid addiction has exploded in the wake of the opioid epidemic. Since its approval, Suboxone’s manufacturer, Reckitt Benckiser (now operating as Indivior), extended its protection cliff eight times, gaining nearly two extra decades of exclusivity through early 2030. The drug maker gained six patents for creating a film version of the drug — notably around the time protection was expiring for its tablet version. (The therapeutic benefits of the film and tablet are identical.) An earlier version of Suboxone also obtained an orphan drug designation, despite an opioid epidemic that has expanded Suboxone’s customer base to millions of potential customers. Suboxone generates more than $1 billion in annual revenue and ranks among the 40 top-selling drugs in the U.S. Truvada <u>When <mark>Truvada</mark>, commonly referred to as PrEP, was approved in 2004, this HIV-prevention drug was a breakthrough. But <mark>16 years </mark>later — and 14 years after its original exclusivity was to expire — it retains its monopoly status.</u> Truvada’s manufacturer, Gilead, has received 15 patents and 120 protections since it came on the market, extending its exclusivity for more than 17 years, until July 3, 2024. In countries where generic Truvada is available, PrEP costs $100 or less per month, compared to $1,600 to $2,000 in the U.S. <u>As a result, Truvada is unaffordable to many people <strong>who need protection from HIV</strong>. Barred from access, they are left vulnerable to infection.</u> “<u>We’re establishing a precedent that a pharmaceutical company can charge whatever it wants even as it allows an epidemic to continue, and the government refuses to intervene,” said James Krellenstein, co-founder of the group PrEP4All. “That should scare every American. If it’s HIV today, it will be another disease tomorrow.”</u> EpiPen First approved in 1987, the <u><mark>EpiPen</u> </mark>has saved the lives of countless numbers of people with deadly allergies<u>. But it is protected from competition until 2025 — <mark>38 years </mark>after its introduction — because its owner, Mylan, has filed five patents, four since 2010, all involving tweaks to the automatic injector.</u> The actual medication used, epinephrine, has existed for more than a century — the innovation here is in the delivery device. Because these small changes to the injector have maintained its monopoly for so long, the cost of an EpiPen package (containing two injectors) has risen from $94 when Mylan purchased the device to between $650 and $700 today. For many people, especially parents of children with severe reactions to common allergens like peanuts, EpiPen’s increasing price tag imposes an onerous financial burden. What Can Be Done As the Evergreen Drug Patent Search makes clear, the positive impact of Hatch-Waxman has been steadily and severely eroded by a regulatory system vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated forms of manipulation. “<u>You might say that the patent and regulatory system has been weaponized,” Feldman said. “When billions of dollars are at stake, there’s a lot of money available to look for ways to exploit the legal system</u>. And companies have become adept at this, as our work has found.” There are several key steps that Congress could take to restore the balance between innovation and competition that is the key to a successful prescription drug regulatory process. <u>These may include: Imposing restrictions on the number of patents that prescription drug manufacturers can defend in court to discourage the use of anticompetitive patent thickets. Limiting the patentability of so-called secondary patents — which don’t improve the safety or efficacy of a drug — through patent and exclusivity reform. Reforming the 180-day generic exclusivity, which can currently be abused to block other competitive therapies. “<strong>The Evergreen Drug Patent Search provides the publicly available, evidence-based foundation that defines the extent of the problem</u></strong>, and it can be used to develop policies that solve the problem of anti-competitive patent abuses,” said Kristi Martin, VP of Drug Pricing at Arnold Ventures. “Our incentives have gotten out of whack,” Martin said. “The luxury of monopoly protection should only be provided to innovations that provide meaningful benefits in saving lives, curing illnesses, or improving the quality of people’s lives. It should not be provided to those gaming the system. If we can change that, we can save consumers, employers, and taxpayers many billions of dollars while increasing the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to achieve breakthroughs."</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hinton, UT Brownsville, 15 fulltext: (Kip Austin, Language, Literacy, and Intercultural Studies at UT Brownsville, 5-8-15, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color” Equity & Excellence in Education, accessed 2-15-22) nat It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor. Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu's (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu's original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu's initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism. Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kövecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem's definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners. In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms. Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capital-related social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism's hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.” Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges. Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician's description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study's content works against oppression, language choices may not. Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher push-out rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solórzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldúa's (1990) call for a more empowering theory. Yet I think of Lorde's (1984) warning, “the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master's relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist's tools, the capitalist's relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities. I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Market metaphors cannot be reappropriated---capital coopts and reifies structural oppression.</h4><p>Hinton, UT Brownsville, 15</p><p></strong>(Kip Austin, Language, Literacy, and Intercultural Studies at UT Brownsville, 5-8-15, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color” Equity & Excellence in Education<u><strong>, accessed 2-15-22) nat</p><p></u></strong>It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many <u>social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. <strong>Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice</u></strong>. The <u>agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory</u>” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). <u><strong>Public <mark>institutions</mark> have indeed become more <mark>market-driven,</mark> focused on capital in a way that <mark>disempowers communities of color,</mark> making it <mark>harder to enact democratic reforms</u></strong></mark> (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). <u><strong><mark>Metaphorical capital</mark> does not <mark>contribute</mark> to this directly, but rather indirectly—<mark>through metaphor</mark>. </u></strong>Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu's (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu's original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu's initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism. <u>Metaphors have influence. <mark>In a metaphor,</mark> one <mark>domain of</mark> human <mark>thought</mark> is <mark>superimposed</mark> on a different domain, <mark>creating important influence</mark> on the receiving domain</u> (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a <u><strong><mark>repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness,</mark> even <mark>altering neural processes</u></strong></mark> (Kövecses, 2010). <u><strong><mark>The way any issue is framed</u></strong>,</mark> writes Mehta (2013), “<u><strong><mark>changes the nature of the debate</u></strong></mark>” (p. 292). A problem's definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.<u><strong> </u></strong>In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “<u>deploying” metaphors “without limit</u>”: “Consequently <u>the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded</u>” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim <u><strong>social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse</u></strong>; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, <u>capital will not be divorced from capitalism</u>. Deployments of <u><strong>metaphorical capital</u></strong>, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories <u><strong><mark>position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship.</u></strong></mark> Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.<u><strong> Metaphorical capital <mark>advances</mark> an economic <mark>framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist</mark>, neoliberal, and market-based</u></strong>. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). <u>Political and social critiques</u> are central to critical race theory—yet <u>are marginalized by neoliberal discourse</u>. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capital-related social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism's hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). <u><strong><mark>Language influences thought</mark>, and <mark>educators</mark> begin to <mark>accept</mark> the <mark>market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure</u></strong>.</mark> The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”<u><strong> </u></strong>Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). <u>A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges</u>.<u><strong> </u></strong>Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines <u>the way a <mark>neoliberal</mark> framework <mark>asserts itself as common sense</mark> within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions.</u> <u>As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default</u>, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician's description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). <u><strong>Power relations <mark>connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination,</mark> and global financial institutions</u></strong> (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. <u><strong><mark>Even when a</mark> particular <mark>study's content works against oppression, language choices may not.</mark> </u></strong>Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher push-out rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solórzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldúa's (1990) call for a more empowering theory. Yet I think of Lorde's (1984) warning, “the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master's relationships” (p. 123). <u>Wealth and capital are the capitalist's tools, the capitalist's relationships</u>. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). <u><strong>The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism.</u></strong> These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.<u><strong> </u></strong>I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all<u>. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. <mark>Letting go of the metaphor of capital,</mark> we may <mark>find more </mark>relevant and more <mark>ethical ways to theorize culture.</p></u></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: MacDonald 19 [Myra, South Asian specialist, journalist and author of two books on India and Pakistan.] "India and Pakistan enter a new, dangerous era," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/india-and-pakistan-enter-a-new-dangerous-era-conflict-kashmir/ 2-28-2019 RE fulltext: Ever since India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, relations have been guided by an overarching assumption: that India would not retaliate directly on Pakistani territory for an act of terrorism by Pakistan-based militants out of fear of triggering a war that might go nuclear. That assumption no longer holds. A suicide car bombing claimed by Pakistan-based militants killed 40 Indian paramilitary police in Indian Kashmir on February 14, and India retaliated this week with airstrikes on a militant training camp deep within Pakistan. It was the first use of air power in history by one nuclear-armed power against another. The airstrikes targeted what India said was a training camp of the Jaish-e-Mohammed militant group — the same group that claimed the attack on the Indian security forces. Pakistan responded by attacking Indian fighter jets in Kashmir, downing at least one plane and capturing the pilot. While only a fool would dare predict what is likely to happen next, it is safe to say that all the old rules and assumptions which guided relations between India and Pakistan since they became declared nuclear-armed powers in 1998 are being rewritten. These are uncharted waters. India and Pakistan are having to rethink their assumptions about each other at a time when they also have to consider fast-moving changes in the outside world. That does not mean that everyone needs to dig nuclear fallout shelters. India and Pakistan have faced crises before in their post-nuclear history and come back from the brink. Moreover, the highly charged emotional public rhetoric can often be misinterpreted by Westerners and sometimes — but not infallibly so — disguises more sober reflection behind the scenes. Pakistan also has a tendency to boast loudly about its nuclear weapons — a message that is mainly designed to deter further military action by India, the larger power in terms of conventional forces — which can add to alarmism in the outside world. That said, this crisis is a step-change on those that preceded it. The Indian airstrikes alone would justify its description as a watershed. On top of that, it is happening at a time when Western countries are preoccupied with their own problems. It is thus a crisis that combines two new and unpredictable elements: a willingness by India and Pakistan to raise the stakes in ways they have not done before and an unwillingness or inability by Western countries to intervene to stop them. Changed dynamics India and Pakistan had already fought three full-scale wars when they declared themselves nuclear powers. Two of these wars were over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which both countries control in part and claim in full. India has won a huge pool of international sympathy in the past for its strategic restraint. It is now drawing on that credit in expecting — and largely getting — some tolerance for its reprisal airstrikes in Pakistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapons changed the dynamics in two important ways. First, it appeared to make outright war impossible. Second, it cemented a pre-existing tendency in Pakistan to use proxy forces against a more powerful India. Secure in the knowledge that its nuclear weapons protected it from Indian retaliation on Pakistani soil, Pakistan was able to maintain a low-level, undeclared war against what it sees as Indian hegemony in South Asia, one most powerfully symbolized in Pakistani eyes by Indian control of Muslim-majority Kashmir. The India-Pakistan crises that followed the nuclear tests fell into a predictable pattern, though it did not seem that way at the time. Pakistan would test how far it could use the protection of its nuclear umbrella to push back against India. In turn, India would threaten reprisals while refraining from attacking Pakistan directly. The outside world, alarmed by the prospect of nuclear war, would intervene to force Pakistan to back down, pulling both countries back from the brink of war while leaving their relationship fundamentally unchanged. For example, in 1999 Pakistan sent troops to occupy remote mountain positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control which divides Kashmir. In what became known as the Kargil War, India sent its own soldiers to drive them out but refrained from sending troops or aircraft across the Line of Control. Pakistan was forced to pull back its troops after coming under intense international pressure. In 2001-2002, India mobilized its army after an attack on the Indian parliament by militant groups based in Pakistan. Again, India refrained from crossing into Pakistan. The United States led international pressure on Pakistan to rein in its jihadi proxies, averting a war. But the anti-India Islamist militant groups flourishing in Pakistan were curbed rather than eliminated. After a few years of relative peace, they struck again when Pakistani gunmen from the Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group attacked Mumbai in 2008, killing 166 people. Under then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India decided against retaliating, again relying on international diplomatic pressure to convince Pakistan to disarm its Islamist militant groups. A fragile peace Somewhat unexpectedly, the pattern established through these crises created a precarious equilibrium. India’s policy of what became known as “strategic restraint” worked to its advantage. It allowed it to focus on growing its economy while gaining clout on the world stage. Pakistan as a country suffered. But the ongoing low-level conflict with India allowed Pakistan's military to maintain its position as the pre-eminent power domestically. It is that equilibrium which has now disappeared. India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has clearly decided that the gains of strategic restraint are no longer worth the pain of tolerating sporadic attacks by Pakistan-based militant groups. Pakistan in turn can no longer assume its nuclear weapons protect it from Indian retaliation. In that sense, both countries are rewriting their own rules and assumptions at the same time. All this is happening while Western countries are looking inward. Under President Donald Trump, the United States has lost some of the credibility and capacity that allowed it to lead diplomatic efforts to end previous India-Pakistan crises. In the past, Washington has also been able to elicit support from China, which despite being Pakistan’s main ally and a traditional rival with India, has frowned on any adventurism that might destabilize the region. But trade rows between the United States and China mean their relations are now far more frayed than during previous crises. Britain, which previously played a key role in shuttle diplomacy as a junior partner to the United States, is consumed by Brexit. In other words, India and Pakistan are having to rethink their assumptions about each other at a time when they also have to consider fast-moving changes in the outside world. On top of that, the U.S. is seeking Pakistani support for a peace deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan, potentially limiting its willingness to put pressure on Islamabad. India has won a huge pool of international sympathy in the past for its strategic restraint. It is now drawing on that credit in expecting — and largely getting — some tolerance for its reprisal airstrikes in Pakistan. But that sympathy will not last for too long if India is seen to be becoming too belligerent. Within these equations are other moving parts. Some of these are military. In recent years, Pakistan has been developing battlefield nuclear missiles intended for use against any armored Indian advance. While these are intended for use in remote parts of the Pakistani desert, their very development lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a way that was not the case before. Other moving parts are political or economic. Indian Prime Minister Modi, who has boasted of taking a tough line with Pakistan, faces an election within months. Unrest in Indian Kashmir is also rising as angry youth scarred by years of conflict protest against crackdowns by Indian security forces. That makes it easier to exploit by Pakistan-based militant groups, all too ready to turn Kashmir into a bloodbath to discredit India and press Pakistan’s claim on it. Pakistan, however, is also vulnerable at a time when the civilian government under Prime Minister Imran Khan is struggling to stabilize the economy and reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. It is impossible to predict how all these moving parts will end up. All that can be said is that Pakistan and India have entered a new and dangerous era in their relations at a time of massive global change.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Fourth, <u>aggression</u> – new unbalance and uncertainty, arms races, and international actors can’t check</h4><p><u><strong>MacDonald 19</u></strong> [Myra, South Asian specialist, journalist and author of two books on India and Pakistan.] "India and Pakistan enter a new, dangerous era," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/india-and-pakistan-enter-a-new-dangerous-era-conflict-kashmir/ 2-28-2019 RE</p><p>Ever since India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, relations have been guided by an overarching assumption: that India would not retaliate directly on Pakistani territory for an act of terrorism by Pakistan-based militants out of fear of triggering a war that might go nuclear.</p><p><u><strong>That assumption no longer holds.</p><p><mark>A suicide car bombing</mark> claimed by Pakistan-based militants killed 40 Indian paramilitary police in Indian Kashmir on February 14, and <mark>India retaliated this week with airstrikes</mark> on a militant training camp <mark>deep within Pakistan. It was the first use of air power</mark> in history <mark>by one nuclear-armed power against another.</p><p></u></strong></mark>The airstrikes targeted what India said was a training camp of the Jaish<u><strong>-e-Mohammed militant group — the same group that claimed the attack on the Indian security forces. Pakistan responded by attacking Indian fighter jets in Kashmir, downing at least one plane and capturing the pilot.</p><p></u></strong>While only a fool would dare predict what is likely to happen next, it is safe to say that <u><strong>all the old rules and assumptions which guided relations between India and Pakistan since they became declared nuclear-armed powers in 1998 are being rewritten. <mark>These are uncharted waters</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>India and Pakistan are having to rethink their assumptions about each other at a time when they also have to consider fast-moving changes in the outside world.</p><p>That does not mean that everyone needs to dig nuclear fallout shelters. India and Pakistan have faced crises before in their post-nuclear history and come back from the brink. Moreover, the highly charged emotional public rhetoric can often be misinterpreted by Westerners and sometimes — but not infallibly so — disguises more sober reflection behind the scenes.</p><p>Pakistan also has a tendency to<u><strong> boast loudly about its nuclear weapons — a message that is mainly designed to deter further military action by India, the larger power in terms of conventional forces — which can add to alarmism in the outside world.</p><p></u></strong>That said, <u><strong>this crisis is a step-change on those that preceded it. The Indian airstrikes alone would justify its description as a watershed. On top of that, it is happening at a time when <mark>Western countries are preoccupied</mark> with their own problems. <mark>It is</mark> thus <mark>a crisis that combines two new and unpredictable elements</mark>: a <mark>willingness</mark> by India and Pakistan <mark>to raise the stakes</mark> in ways they have not done before <mark>and</mark> an unwillingness or <mark>inability by Western countries to intervene</mark> to stop them.</p><p></u></strong>Changed dynamics</p><p>India and Pakistan had already fought three full-scale wars when they declared themselves nuclear powers. Two of these wars were over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which both countries control in part and claim in full.</p><p>India has won a huge pool of international sympathy in the past for its strategic restraint. It is now drawing on that credit in expecting — and largely getting — some tolerance for its reprisal airstrikes in Pakistan.</p><p>The acquisition of nuclear weapons changed the dynamics in two important ways. First, it appeared to make outright war impossible. Second, it cemented a pre-existing tendency in Pakistan to use proxy forces against a more powerful India. Secure in the knowledge that its nuclear weapons protected it from Indian retaliation on Pakistani soil, Pakistan was able to maintain a low-level, undeclared war against what it sees as Indian hegemony in South Asia, one most powerfully symbolized in Pakistani eyes by Indian control of Muslim-majority Kashmir.</p><p>The India-Pakistan crises that followed the nuclear tests fell into a predictable pattern, though it did not seem that way at the time. Pakistan would test how far it could use the protection of its nuclear umbrella to push back against India. In turn, India would threaten reprisals while refraining from attacking Pakistan directly.</p><p>The outside world, alarmed by the prospect of nuclear war, would intervene to force Pakistan to back down, pulling both countries back from the brink of war while leaving their relationship fundamentally unchanged.</p><p>For example, in 1999 Pakistan sent troops to occupy remote mountain positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control which divides Kashmir. In what became known as the Kargil War, India sent its own soldiers to drive them out but refrained from sending troops or aircraft across the Line of Control. Pakistan was forced to pull back its troops after coming under intense international pressure.</p><p>In 2001-2002, India mobilized its army after an attack on the Indian parliament by militant groups based in Pakistan. Again, India refrained from crossing into Pakistan. The United States led international pressure on Pakistan to rein in its jihadi proxies, averting a war. But the anti-India Islamist militant groups flourishing in Pakistan were curbed rather than eliminated.</p><p>After a few years of relative peace, they struck again when Pakistani gunmen from the Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group attacked Mumbai in 2008, killing 166 people. Under then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India decided against retaliating, again relying on international diplomatic pressure to convince Pakistan to disarm its Islamist militant groups.</p><p><u><strong>A fragile peace</p><p>Somewhat unexpectedly, the pattern established through these crises created a precarious equilibrium. India’s policy of what became known as “strategic restraint” worked to its advantage. It allowed it to focus on growing its economy while gaining clout on the world stage. Pakistan as a country suffered. But the ongoing low-level conflict with India allowed Pakistan's military to maintain its position as the pre-eminent power domestically.</p><p>It is that <mark>equilibrium</mark> which <mark>has</mark> now <mark>disappeared. </mark>India, under Prime Minister Narendra <mark>Modi</mark>, has clearly <mark>decided</mark> that the <mark>gains of strategic restraint are no longer worth</mark> the pain of <mark>tolerating</mark> sporadic <mark>attacks</mark> by Pakistan-based militant groups. <mark>Pakistan</mark> in turn <mark>can no longer assume</mark> its nuclear <mark>weapons protect it from Indian retaliation.</mark> In that sense, both countries are rewriting their own rules and assumptions at the same time.</p><p>All this is happening while Western countries are looking inward. Under President Donald Trump, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has <mark>lost</mark> some of the <mark>credibility</mark> and capacity <mark>that allowed it</mark> to lead diplomatic efforts <mark>to end previous</mark> India-Pakistan crises.</p><p>In the past, Washington has also been able to elicit support from <mark>China</mark>, which despite being Pakistan’s main ally and a traditional rival with India, has frowned on any adventurism that might destabilize the region. But trade rows between the United States and China mean their <mark>relations are </mark>now <mark>far more frayed</mark> than during previous crises.</p><p><mark>Britain</mark>, which previously played a key role in shuttle diplomacy as a junior partner to the United States, <mark>is consumed by Brexit.</p><p></u></strong></mark>In other words, India and Pakistan are having to rethink their assumptions about each other at a time when they also have to consider fast-moving changes in the outside world. <u><strong>On top of that, <mark>the U.S. is seeking Pakistani support for a peace deal with the Taliban</mark> in Afghanistan, potentially <mark>limiting its willingness to put pressure on Islamabad.</p><p></u></strong></mark>India has won a huge pool of international sympathy in the past for its strategic restraint. It is now drawing on that credit in expecting — and largely getting — some tolerance for its reprisal airstrikes in Pakistan. But that sympathy will not last for too long if India is seen to be becoming too belligerent.</p><p><u><strong>Within these equations are other moving parts. Some of these are military. In recent years, <mark>Pakistan has been developing battlefield nuclear missiles</mark> intended for use against any armored Indian advance. While these are intended for use in remote parts of the Pakistani desert, <mark>their </mark>very <mark>development lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons</mark> in a way that was not the case before</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Other moving parts are political or economic.</p><p>Indian Prime Minister Modi, who has boasted of taking a tough line with Pakistan, faces an election within months. Unrest in Indian Kashmir is also rising as angry youth scarred by years of conflict protest against crackdowns by Indian security forces. That makes it easier to exploit by Pakistan-based militant groups, all too ready to turn Kashmir into a bloodbath to discredit India and press Pakistan’s claim on it.</p><p><mark>Pakistan</mark>, however, is also vulnerable at a time when the civilian <mark>government</mark> under Prime Minister Imran Khan <mark>is struggling to stabilize the economy </mark>and reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.</p><p></u></strong>It is impossible to predict how all these moving parts will end up. All that can be said is that Pakistan and India have entered a new and dangerous era in their relations at a time of massive global change.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Gritten 20 (William Gritten; Contributing Writer @ the Week; 3/2/20; "In defense of 'endless' wars"; The Week; https://theweek.com/articles/896649/defense-endless-wars) fulltext: As the two-decade-long U.S. war in Afghanistan comes to its technical end with a peace deal signed between the U.S. and the Taliban, both poles of the current political spectrum have concluded, along with most of the country, that the massive investment of resources and lives in this conflict was materially, not to mention morally, fruitless. Western confidence has been undermined, and the belief that prosperous democracies can project their power for good now seems anachronistic ---naive to some, arrogant to others. There is a consensus: It is time to "end our endless wars." However, it is dangerous to draw such an unqualified conclusion. Bill Clinton and Tony Blair learned from Kosovo ---where intervention stopped a war ---and Rwanda ---where calls for intervention went unheeded and up to a million people were butchered ---that inaction can in fact be shameful, and this fostered a categorical conviction in righteous humanitarian intervention that propelled them into the follies of this millennium's first decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. The belief that liberalism can be forced on societies at gunpoint was then handed a crusading energy by the shock of 9/11. But now, the received wisdom is intervention does not work, but what if this new conviction propels us into the next decade's disaster? Why must we swing between such unnuanced extremes? It is important we understand that sometimes failing to intervene is the more costly decision, both morally and in terms of national self-interest. When it comes to the Afghan war, the mistake was not in the intervention itself, rather in how it was managed. Soon after the initial invasion [defeated] crippled the Taliban and sent it into hiding, its leadership consistently asked to meet at the negotiating table, but were rebuffed. Understandably, Washington's blood was up after September 2001, and the Bush administration was categorical: "We do not negotiate with terrorists." This was a mistake. Talks could have brought a reduction in NATO involvement under better terms than are being agreed now. The intervention could have been conducted with a pragmatism that acknowledged the impossibility of all-out military victory and brought the Taliban to the table early. The NATO presence could still have brought the country what it did: huge improvements in agriculture, infrastructure projects like the successful Dahla Dam rebuild, the social empowerment of women, and health initiatives like the one that vaccinated children nationwide. Writing in The Atlantic, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) is right to decry the "approach to foreign policy that relies on the U.S. military to achieve the impossible, instead of doing the hard work of statecraft." But this isn't, as she claims, an argument for ending the endless wars: We can, and should, ask the military to do the possible, while running intensive statecraft at the same time. Many think the cost of military intervention is simply too high ---but there are times when the cost of doing nothing is far greater. This is the case, for example, in Syria, where more than 1 million internal refugees face what the U.N. calls the "biggest humanitarian horror story of the 21st century." Learning the wrong lessons from Western intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration chose not to provide the rebels who rose up in 2011's Arab Spring with the support necessary to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A stronger U.S. commitment early on could have prevented ISIS from rising in Syria ---and prevented the huge, expensive war against ISIS that followed. It would also have helped stem the tide of refugees that continues to fuel de-democratizing forces across Europe. It could also have meant the end of the rapacious, vindictive Assad, who now terrorizes his people for daring to resist him. Intervening in Syria now would be a mistake, and this is another lesson: To be effective, intervention must be timely. The U.S. did maintain a limited troop presence in Northeastern Syria, but, to President Trump, these troops were simply more Americans involved in an endless war. As far as he saw it, the generals and national security advisers who urged him to let them stay were just repeating the conventions that got the U.S. too deeply involved in the Middle East to begin with. So, Trump got the troops out ---and all hell broke loose. Turkey and Assad moved to fill the vacuum, America's Kurdish allies were betrayed, ISIS fighters escaped captivity, and a million homeless Syrians now face devastation. In Libya, another country whose civil war seems to be reaching a nightmarish crescendo after a botched Western intervention, the problem was not in the intervention per se, but in, as former President Obama himself diagnosed, "failing to plan for the day after." That failure, he contends, was his worst mistake as president. Obama shared Trump's instinct for retrenchment ---most people agree with them both today ---but here he directly admits that instinct was wrong: It was more investment, not less, that would have prevented today's Libyan hellscape. But why did Obama fail to commit fully after Moammar Gaddafi was toppled? Surely it was the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan that drained, and continue to drain, Western governments of the confidence in their ability to do good through action. There are many examples of effective intervention and long-term presence, and they're not obscure: Japan, Taiwan, and Eastern Europe have their own, complex, imperfect stories, but each is a relatively stable, prosperous beneficiary of many decades of political and military investment. The United Nations Command in South Korea maintains a presence amid a war that has technically never ended since its outbreak in 1950. Another, lesser known example is the British-led United Nations involvement in Sierra Leone, in which military intervention ended a violent decade-long civil war. The Revolutionary United Front, whose leaders were convicted of war crimes in 2009, was bearing down on Freetown, the country's capital, but the British intervention stopped them short and brought peace. What's more, long-term engagement in the conflict's wake bolstered institutions and restored stability. Sierra Leone is still a country with problems, but it is no longer a country at war. It is no coincidence that this successful campaign began in 2000, at the height of Western confidence, before the tragedy of 9/11 turned intervention from something undertaken with discernment, strategy, and planning, into a solipsistic exercise in emotional therapy, craving glorious, impossible, all out victory. "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking," wrote the Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz, in Vom Kriege (On War), 200 years ago, "neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Failing to heed this guidance led to mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but heeding it, as Western governments could have done in Syria soon after the Arab Spring by giving decisive support to legitimate democratic forces, can lead to intervention that works. After the Afghanistan chapter closes, the world will continue to present Western governments with stark and urgent decisions on whether they should intervene. If the horror currently developing in Idlib province were unfolding, instead, in 1999, then Washington, intoxicated with recent successes and moral certitude, would be working much harder to protect the refugees ---and that would be the right thing to do. Caution is always appropriate, but the window of opportunity is invariably narrow, and closing fast. As a broader geopolitical strategy, well-judged intervention plus its sometimes-necessary accompaniment ---indefinite military effort ---can help keep the forces of totalitarianism at bay; not everywhere, and never without diplomatic engagement. Rather than vacillating between opposite doctrines that say intervening is good or not, or realistic or not, democracies should be engaging their collective thought to get better at it. We must remember that the destructive force behind the Afghanistan conflict was the collapse of the Twin Towers, not the principle of intervention itself, or even that of endless war.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>2---Intervention is an ethical policy tool that <u>reduces</u> global violence. </h4><p><strong>Gritten 20 </strong>(William Gritten; Contributing Writer @ the Week; 3/2/20; "In defense of 'endless' wars"; The Week<u>; https://theweek.com/articles/896649/defense-endless-wars)</p><p>As the</u> two-decade-long U.S. <u>war in Afghanistan comes to its</u> technical <u>end</u> with a peace deal signed between the U.S. and the Taliban, <u>both poles of the current political spectrum have concluded</u>, along with most of the country, <u>that the massive investment of resources and lives in this conflict was</u> materially, not to mention morally, <u>fruitless</u>. Western confidence has been undermined, and the belief that prosperous democracies can project their power for good now seems anachronistic ---naive to some, arrogant to others. <u>There is a <strong>consensus</strong>: It is time to "<strong>end our endless wars."</p><p></u></strong>However, <u><mark>it is <strong>dangerous</strong> to draw such an <strong>unqualified conclusion</u></strong></mark>. Bill Clinton and Tony Blair learned <u>from <strong><mark>Kosovo</u></strong></mark> ---where <u><mark>intervention <strong>stopped a war</u></strong></mark> ---<u><mark>and <strong>Rwanda</u></strong></mark> ---where <u><mark>calls for intervention went <strong>unheeded</strong> and</mark> up to <mark>a <strong>million people were butchered</u></strong></mark> ---that <u>inaction can in fact be <strong>shameful</u></strong>, and this fostered a categorical conviction in righteous humanitarian intervention that propelled them into the follies of this millennium's first decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. The belief that liberalism can be forced on societies at gunpoint was then handed a crusading energy by the shock of 9/11. But <u>now, the received wisdom is intervention does not work</u>, but what if this new conviction propels us into the next decade's disaster? <u>Why must we <strong>swing between such unnuanced extremes?</p><p></u></strong>It is important we understand that <u>sometimes <strong>failing to intervene</strong> is the <strong>more costly decision</strong>, both <strong>morally</strong> and in terms of <strong>national self-interest</u></strong>.</p><p><u>When it comes to <mark>the <strong>Afghan </mark>war</strong>, the mistake was <strong>not in the intervention itself</strong>, rather in <strong>how it was managed</u></strong>. Soon <u>after the initial invasion [<strong>defeated</strong>] </u>crippled <u>the <strong>Taliban</u></strong> and sent it into hiding, its <u>leadership consistently asked to meet at the negotiating table, but were <strong>rebuffed. Understandably, Washington's blood was up after September 2001, and the Bush administration was categorical: "We do not negotiate with terrorists."</p><p></strong>This was a <strong>mistake</strong>. Talks could have brought a reduction in NATO involvement under <strong>better terms</strong> than are being agreed now. The intervention could have been conducted with a <strong>pragmatism</strong> that acknowledged the <strong>impossibility of all-out military victory</strong> and brought the Taliban to the table <strong>early</u></strong>. The <u><strong>NATO <mark>presence</strong></mark> could still have <mark>brought</mark> the country what it did: <strong><mark>huge improvements</strong> in <strong>ag</mark>riculture</strong>, <strong><mark>infrastructure</mark> projects</strong> like the successful Dahla Dam rebuild, <mark>the</mark> <strong>social <mark>empowerment of women</strong>, and <strong>health initiatives</strong></mark> like the one <mark>that <strong>vaccinated children nationwide.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Writing in The Atlantic, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) is right to decry the "approach to foreign policy that relies on the U.S. military to achieve the impossible, instead of doing the hard work of statecraft." But this isn't, as she claims, an argument for ending the endless wars: We can, and should, ask the military to do the possible, while running intensive statecraft at the same time.</p><p><u>Many think the cost of military intervention is simply too high ---but there are times when the cost of doing nothing is far greater. This is the case, for example, in Syria, where more than 1 million internal refugees face what the U.N. calls the "biggest humanitarian horror story of the 21st century."</p><p></u>Learning the wrong lessons from Western intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, the <u>Obama</u> administration <u>chose not to provide the rebels who rose up in 2011's Arab Spring with the support necessary to <strong>topple</strong> Syrian President Bashar al-<strong>Assad</strong>. <mark>A <strong>stronger</mark> U.S. <mark>commitment</strong></mark> early on <mark>could have <strong>prevented ISIS from rising</mark> in Syria</strong> ---<mark>and prevented the <strong>huge, expensive war</strong></mark> against ISIS <mark>that followed</u></mark>. It would also have helped stem the tide of refugees that continues to fuel de-democratizing forces across Europe. <u>It could also have meant the end of the</u> rapacious, <u><strong>vindictive Assad</strong>, who now <strong>terrorizes his people</strong> for <strong>daring to resist him</u></strong>. <u>Intervening in Syria <strong>now</strong> would be a mistake, and this is another lesson: To be effective, intervention must be <strong>timely</strong>.</p><p>The U.S. did maintain a limited troop presence <mark>in</mark> Northeastern <strong><mark>Syria</u></strong></mark>, but, to President Trump, these troops were simply more Americans involved in an endless war. As far as he saw it, the generals and national security advisers who urged him to let them stay were just repeating the conventions that got the U.S. too deeply involved in the Middle East to begin with. So, <u><mark>Trump <strong>got the troops</strong> out ---and all <strong>hell broke loose</strong></mark>.</u> <u>Turkey and Assad moved to <strong>fill the vacuum</strong>, America's <strong>Kurdish allies</strong> were <strong>betrayed</strong>, <strong>ISIS fighters</strong> escaped captivity, and a <strong>million</strong> homeless Syrians now face <strong>devastation</strong>.</p><p><mark>In <strong>Libya</strong></mark>, another country whose civil war seems to be reaching a nightmarish crescendo after a botched Western intervention, <mark>the problem was <strong>not in the intervention</mark> per se</strong>, <mark>but</mark> in, as</u> former President <u>Obama himself diagnosed, "<strong><mark>failing</strong> to plan for the <strong>day after</strong></mark>."</u> That failure, he contends, was his worst mistake as president. Obama shared Trump's instinct for retrenchment ---most people agree with them both today ---but here he directly admits that instinct was wrong: <u>It was <strong><mark>more</strong> investment</mark>, <strong>not less</strong>, that <mark>would have prevented today's Libyan</mark> hellscape</u>. But why did Obama fail to commit fully after Moammar Gaddafi was toppled? Surely it was the <u><mark>mistakes</u></mark> made in Iraq and Afghanistan that drained, and continue to drain, Western governments of the confidence in their ability to do good through action.</p><p><u><mark>There are <strong>many examples</strong> of <strong>effective intervention</strong> </mark>and <strong>long-term presence</strong><mark>,</mark> and they're <strong>not obscure</strong>: <strong><mark>Japan</strong>, <strong>Taiwan</strong>, and <strong>Eastern Europe</strong></mark> have their own, complex, imperfect stories, but <mark>each is a <strong>relatively stable, prosperous beneficiary</strong> of <strong>many decades</strong> of</mark> political and military <mark>investment</u></mark>. The United Nations Command in South Korea maintains a presence amid a war that has technically never ended since its outbreak in 1950.</p><p>Another, lesser known example is <u>the British-led United Nations involvement in Sierra Leone, in which military intervention ended a <strong>violent decade-long civil war</u></strong>. <u>The Revolutionary United Front</u>, whose leaders were convicted of war crimes in 2009, <u>was bearing down on Freetown, the country's capital, but the British intervention <strong>stopped them short</strong> and <strong>brought peace</u></strong>. What's more, <u><strong>long-term engagement</strong> in the conflict's wake <strong>bolstered institutions</strong> and <strong>restored stability.</u></strong> <u>Sierra Leone is still a country with problems, but it is <strong>no longer a country at war</u></strong>. It is no coincidence that this successful campaign began in 2000, at the height of Western confidence, before the tragedy of 9/11 turned intervention from something undertaken with discernment, strategy, and planning, into a solipsistic exercise in emotional therapy, craving glorious, impossible, all out victory.</p><p><u><strong>"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking," wrote the Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz, in Vom Kriege (On War), 200 years ago, "neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Failing to heed this guidance led to mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but heeding it, as Western governments could have done in Syria soon after the Arab Spring by giving decisive support to legitimate democratic forces, can lead to intervention that works.</p><p></strong>After the Afghanistan chapter closes, the world will <strong>continue to present Western governments</strong> with <strong>stark</strong> and <strong>urgent decisions</strong> on <strong>whether they should intervene</strong>. If the horror currently developing in <strong>Idlib</strong> province were unfolding, instead, in 1999, then Washington</u>, intoxicated with recent successes and moral certitude, <u>would be working much harder to protect the refugees ---and that would be the <strong>right thing to do. Caution</strong> is always appropriate, but the window of opportunity is <strong>invariably narrow</strong>, and <strong>closing fast.</p><p></strong>As a broader geopolitical strategy, <strong><mark>well-judged intervention</strong></mark> plus its sometimes-necessary accompaniment ---<strong>indefinite military effort</strong> ---<mark>can help <strong>keep</mark> the forces of <mark>totalitarianism at bay</strong>;</mark> </u>not everywhere, and never without diplomatic engagement. <u>Rather than <strong>vacillating</strong> between <strong>opposite doctrines</strong> that say intervening is <strong>good or not,</strong> or realistic or not, democracies should be <strong>engaging their collective thought</strong> to <strong>get better at it</u></strong>. We must remember that the destructive force behind the Afghanistan conflict was the collapse of the Twin Towers, not the principle of intervention itself, or even that of endless war.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Pappas 16, Gregory Fernando (Prof of phil @ Texas A&M). "The Pragmatists' Approach to Injustice." the pluralist 11.1 (2016): 58-77. SM//brackets for ableist language fulltext: In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind [distract] us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Particularism means reducing specific instances of material violence—the nc better explains their framework and their fw collapses</h4><p><strong>Pappas 16</strong>, Gregory Fernando (Prof of phil @ Texas A&M). "The Pragmatists' Approach to Injustice." the pluralist 11.1 (2016): 58-77. SM//brackets for ableist language</p><p>In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus <u>an <mark>empirical inquiry about</mark> an <mark>injustice must</mark> <mark>begin with</mark> a rough and tentative <mark>designation of where </mark>the <mark>injustices</mark> from within the broader context of</u> our everyday <u>life</u> and activities <u><mark>are</u></mark>. Once we designate the subject matter, <u>we</u> then <u>engage</u> in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even <u>constructing theories and developing concepts</u>. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “<u>as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience</u>” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ <u><mark>Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at </mark>a <mark>particular</mark> time and in a <mark>situation. We need to</mark> start by pointing out and <mark>describ</mark>ing these prob- lematic <mark>experiences instead of starting with</mark> a <mark>theoretical</mark> account or <mark>diagnosis</mark> of them</u>. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, <u>theoretical criteria,</u> and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but <u>if stressed too much</u> at the start of inquiry, <u>they</u> can blind <u><mark>[distract] us to aspects of concrete problems</mark> that escape our theoretical lenses. <mark>We must</u></mark> attempt to <u><mark>pretheoretically designate the subject</u></mark> matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful <u>to designate the subject matter in such a way as <mark>not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory</u></mark> or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an <mark>honest</mark> effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because <u><mark>a concrete social problem</mark> </u>(e.g., injustice) <u><mark>is independent</mark> and neutral <mark>with respect to</mark> the different possible competing diagnoses or <mark>theories</mark> about its causes</u>. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. <u>The problem is</u> pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is <u>first <mark>suffered</mark> by someone <mark>in a particular context</u></mark>. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. <u><mark>To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem</u></mark>; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and <u>return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences</u>, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ <u><mark>Making</mark> problematic <mark>situations of injustice</mark> our explicit methodological commitment <mark>as a starting point</mark> rather than a diagnosis of the problem <mark>is</mark> an important and useful <mark>imperative for nonideal theories</u></mark>. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, <u>our <mark>cures should</mark> try to <mark>address</mark> as much as possible the <mark>unique circumstances</mark> of each injustice</u>. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Owen PhD 16 [Thomas Owen “Lacan, Laclau, and the Impossibility of Free Trade” Published: Medianz, Vol 16, No 2, 2016] [https://doi.org/10.11157/medianz-vol17iss2id207] [Owen: PhD Massey University. Auckland University of Technology School of Communication. Lectured for Victoria University of Wellington’s Media Studies Program and Massey University School of Communication, Journalism, and Marketing.] //MNHS NL cut \|\| SM fulltext: FTA = Free Trade Agreement For Lacan, identity is structured like a language (Lacan 1978, 1991, 2006). Words and language structure our thinking and, thus, our experience of the universe. But ‘words fail’ – the signifiers of language we use do not capture the totality of the signified they seek to represent. There is always a surplus of objective material reality that the words describing it cannot grasp. Importantly, however, we act as if they did grasp it – as if the words we use do fully represent the things they describe, in their awesome totality. For Lacan, this insurmountable limitation means we all operate within a realm where our most basic representations of reality are only partial, and yet treated by us as if they were total. It is in this sense that Lacan argues that ‘truth is structured like a fiction’ (Žižek 1989,154). Truth and reality exist, but for all intents and purposes our access to them is through the limited fictions of language. It is here that Lacan exhibits his debt to linguistics and semiotics, and his affinity with philosophers from Kant to Derrida on the impossibility to fully capture meaning and achieve total representation of externality.¶ For Lacan, a pure objective material reality does exist beyond the limits of representation, and he refers to this as the Real. The Lacanian Real is un-broken total reality, irreducible to difference, and far beyond the Symbolic – that is, the words, language and representations seeking to capture it. There is no lack in the Real. Rather, the lack is in our attempts to symbolise the Real through representation. The Real is thus ‘impossible’, as it is impossible to imagine or symbolise the Real in its totality without imposing limits, and therefore leaving surplus reality beyond the limits – and it is this impossibility that marks the traumatic aspect of existence. Unable to attain the totality, we are left constantly chasing something unattainable, both acting to some degree as if it were attained, while also being troubled to some degree by the implicit or explicit realisation that it was not. For Lacan, this is the haunting of the Real. It is traumatic, but also productive. It is precisely because a total representation of the Real cannot be attained that we constantly seek to attain it. If it were ever attainable, this productivity would cease. The ‘lack’ in Lacanian ontology, therefore, is a constitutive lack. The rupture in our identities is both what makes them impossible and what stimulates their constant drive to overcome impossibility – thus making identification itself possible in the first place (Stavrakakis 1999).¶ These initial summary comments already indicate that for Lacan, psychoanalysis is not merely a tool for treating individual cognition and perception, but is, rather, a theoretical lens for examining how ‘reality’ itself is constituted (Žižek, 2006). In this way, Lacan’s approach permits a confluence between psychoanalysis and political analysis – and it is here in the political application that Laclau chiefly focuses his work (Laclau 1990, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Laclau adopts the logic of a negative ontology and applies it beyond subjectivities to political discourses, social movements, and society itself. Indeed, to explicate Laclau’s famous ‘impossibility of society’ statement (1991, 24), society is impossible because it can never be totally represented and thus its meaning is in a constant state of flux and change. However, it is precisely this state of dislocation that makes new forms of the social possible. Without its inherent lack, society would be unchanging and could not exist – but, contradictorily, with its lack, it can never be totally achieved and is technically ‘impossible’. The radical lack is both the entry condition of any possibility and impassible limit to full possibility, marking the central paradox of the negative ontology.¶ It is important to emphasise, however, that this does not mean that all identities and political discourses are always in a state of total flux (Laclau 1990). That would be a chaotic realm, without any measure of coherence, and, more importantly, without any power relations structuring representation. Far from a disinterest in power relations, Laclau is centrally concerned with the respective interplay of hegemonic projects seeking to attain dominance and repress their opponents within a field of un-fixity. For Laclau, hegemonic projects are attempts to fix meaning by constructing chains of equivalence between concepts, and situating them in opposition to a shared antagonistic Other. Hegemonic projects thus seek to fix meaning by naturalising a specific and contingent interpretation of the Real as the universal and total representation. However, as such total representation and fixity is impossible, hegemonic projects are at best only temporary and unstable fixations of meaning. They are constantly open to rupture and dislocation from without – for instance, from counter-hegemonic projects and the intrusive return of elements excluded in their formation – and from within, by their own haunting lack of closure. Thus, while all identities and political discourses are impossible and unfixed, they also waver between various states of ‘relative structuration’ (Laclau 1990, 43). The contest between these states is the fabric of political contestation.¶ The Impossibility of Free Trade¶ The above illustration of Lacan and Laclau is by no means an attempt to exhaust all possible discussion of their ideas, and is inadequately brief to explore the many nuances of their negative ontology. However, by focusing on the concept of ontological lack and the inaccessibility of the Real, it has set the tone for the following historico-contextual analysis of FTAs and IPRs. In the first instance, it must be noted that FTAs and IPRs are purely social constructions. There is no reality to FTAs or IPRs external to how they are discursively constructed, no natural law dictating their symbolisation. There may be material consequences as a result of an FTA – for example, a farmer’s productivity relative to seed prices, or an HIV/AIDS patient’s ability to access antiretroviral medicine – but an FTA itself is not a material thing. It is purely symbolic, existing only in language – and as language is partial and open to contestation and change, for FTAs there is no escape beyond language, beyond ideology, or beyond a constant state of contestation and transformation.¶ Secondly, contemporary FTAs have come to include a myriad of other demands not typically considered part of ‘trade’ negotiations, such as financial regulations, environmental protections, and intellectual property rights (Kelsey 2010). In a Laclauian sense, the chain of equivalence constituting the hegemonic project of a contemporary FTA has been widely extended. IPRs are particularly interesting in this sense, because of the multiple and contradictory meanings ascribed to IPRs – for instance, as rights, privileges, monopolies, protectionist measures, and also as free trade mechanisms promoting competition. Given this, the inclusion of IPRs in FTAs demonstrates the contingency of meaning allowable within hegemonic projects. There is no necessary, self-evident way that IPRs and FTAs must be configured; rather, there are only possible ways. A historical analysis of just some of the ways this has been done reveals the un-fixity and ‘impossibility’ of identity formation.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The subject emerges from a communicative gap from the symbolic to the real. The 1ac is refuses to recognize the impossibility of the real. IPR and FTA’s are purely symbolic, but the 1ac claims that they are real constructs. Their refusal to recognize the ontology of FTA and IPR sustains hope that the real can be returned too – the K controls the root cause of identity formation</h4><p><strong>Owen PhD 16</strong> [Thomas Owen “Lacan, Laclau, and the Impossibility of Free Trade” Published: Medianz, Vol 16, No 2, 2016] [https://doi.org/10.11157/medianz-vol17iss2id207] [Owen: PhD Massey University. Auckland University of Technology School of Communication. Lectured for Victoria University of Wellington’s Media Studies Program and Massey University School of Communication, Journalism, and Marketing.] //MNHS NL cut \|\| SM</p><p><u>FTA = Free Trade Agreement</p><p>For Lacan, identity is structured like a language</u> (Lacan 1978, 1991, 2006). <u><mark>Words and language structure our</mark> thinking and</u>, thus, our <u><mark>experience of the universe</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>But ‘words fail’</u></strong></mark> – the <u><mark>signifiers</u></mark> of language we use <u><mark>do not capture the totality of the signified</mark> they seek to represent</u>. <u>There is always a surplus of objective material reality that the words describing it cannot grasp</u>. Importantly, however, <u><strong><mark>we act as if they did grasp it</u></strong></mark> – as if the words we use do fully represent the things they describe, in their awesome totality. <u>For Lacan, <mark>this</mark> insurmountable <mark>limitation means we</mark> all <mark>operate within a realm where our</mark> most basic representations of <mark>reality are only partial, and yet treated</mark> by us <mark>as</mark> if they were <mark>total</u></mark>. It is in this sense that <u>Lacan argues that ‘truth is structured like a fiction’</u> (Žižek 1989,154). Truth and reality exist, but for all intents and purposes our access to them is through the limited fictions of language. It is here that Lacan exhibits his debt to linguistics and semiotics, and his affinity with philosophers from Kant to Derrida on the impossibility to fully capture meaning and achieve total representation of externality.¶ <u>For Lacan, <mark>a pure objective</mark> material <mark>reality</mark> does <mark>exist beyond the limits of representation</u></mark>, and <u>he refers to this as the Real</u>. <u><mark>The</u></mark> Lacanian <u><mark>Real is un-broken total reality</u></mark>, irreducible to difference, and <u>far <mark>beyond the Symbolic</u></mark> – that is, <u>the words, language and representations seeking to capture it</u>. <u><mark>There is no lack in the Real</u></mark>. Rather, <u><strong><mark>the lack is in our attempts to symbolise the Real through representation</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The Real is thus ‘impossible’</u></strong></mark>, as it is impossible to imagine or symbolise the Real in its totality without imposing limits, and therefore leaving surplus reality beyond the limits – and it is <u>this impossibility that marks the traumatic aspect of existence</u>. <u><mark>Unable to attain the totality, we are left constantly chasing something unattainable</u></mark>, <u>both acting</u> to some degree <u>as if it were attained</u>, <u>while also being troubled</u> to some degree <u>by the</u> implicit or explicit <u>realisation that it was not</u>. For Lacan, this is the haunting of the Real. It is traumatic, but also productive. <u>It is precisely because a total representation of the Real cannot be attained that we constantly seek to attain it</u>. <u><mark>If it were</mark> ever <mark>attainable</mark>, <mark>this</mark> productivity <mark>would cease</u></mark>. <u><mark>The ‘lack’ in Lacanian ontology</mark>, therefore, <mark>is a constitutive lack</u></mark>. The rupture in our identities is both what makes them impossible and what stimulates their constant drive to overcome impossibility – thus making identification itself possible in the first place (Stavrakakis 1999).¶ These initial summary comments already indicate that for Lacan, psychoanalysis is not merely a tool for treating individual cognition and perception, but is, rather, a theoretical lens for examining how ‘reality’ itself is constituted (Žižek, 2006). In this way, Lacan’s approach permits a confluence between psychoanalysis and political analysis – and it is here in the political application that Laclau chiefly focuses his work (Laclau 1990, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Laclau adopts the logic of a negative ontology and applies it beyond subjectivities to political discourses, social movements, and society itself. Indeed, to explicate Laclau’s famous ‘impossibility of society’ statement (1991, 24), society is impossible because it can never be totally represented and thus its meaning is in a constant state of flux and change. However, it is precisely this state of dislocation that makes new forms of the social possible. Without its inherent lack, society would be unchanging and could not exist – but, contradictorily, with its lack, it can never be totally achieved and is technically ‘impossible’. The radical lack is both the entry condition of any possibility and impassible limit to full possibility, marking the central paradox of the negative ontology.¶ It is important to emphasise, however, that this does not mean that all identities and political discourses are always in a state of total flux (Laclau 1990). That would be a chaotic realm, without any measure of coherence, and, more importantly, without any power relations structuring representation. Far from a disinterest in power relations, Laclau is centrally concerned with the respective interplay of hegemonic projects seeking to attain dominance and repress their opponents within a field of un-fixity. For Laclau, hegemonic projects are attempts to fix meaning by constructing chains of equivalence between concepts, and situating them in opposition to a shared antagonistic Other. Hegemonic projects thus seek to fix meaning by naturalising a specific and contingent interpretation of the Real as the universal and total representation. However, as such total representation and fixity is impossible, hegemonic projects are at best only temporary and unstable fixations of meaning. They are constantly open to rupture and dislocation from without – for instance, from counter-hegemonic projects and the intrusive return of elements excluded in their formation – and from within, by their own haunting lack of closure. Thus, while all identities and political discourses are impossible and unfixed, they also waver between various states of ‘relative structuration’ (Laclau 1990, 43). The contest between these states is the fabric of political contestation.¶ The Impossibility of Free Trade¶ The above illustration of Lacan and Laclau is by no means an attempt to exhaust all possible discussion of their ideas, and is inadequately brief to explore the many nuances of their negative ontology. <u>However, by focusing on the concept of ontological lack and the inaccessibility of the Real</u>, <u>it has set the tone for the following</u> historico-contextual <u>analysis of FTAs and IPRs</u>. In the first instance, it must be noted that <u><mark>FTAs and IPRs are purely social constructions</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>There is no reality</mark> to FTAs or IPRs <mark>external to how they are discursively constructed</u></strong></mark>, no natural law dictating their symbolisation. <u>There may be material consequences as a result of an FTA</u> – for example, a farmer’s productivity relative to seed prices, or an HIV/AIDS patient’s ability to access antiretroviral medicine – <u>but an FTA</u> itself is not a material thing. It <u>is purely symbolic</u>, <u>existing only in language</u> – <u>and <mark>as language is</mark> partial and <mark>open to contestation</u></mark> and change, <u><mark>for FTAs there is no escape beyond language</u></mark>, beyond ideology, <u>or beyond a constant state of contestation and transformation.</u>¶<u> Secondly, <mark>contemporary FTAs</mark> have come to <mark>include a myriad of other demands not typically considered part of ‘trade’ negotiations</mark>, <mark>such as</mark> financial regulations, environmental protections, and <strong><mark>i</u></strong></mark>ntellectual <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>roperty <u><strong><mark>r</u></strong></mark>ight<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> (Kelsey 2010). In a Laclauian sense, <u>the chain of equivalence constituting <mark>the hegemonic project of a</mark> contemporary <mark>FTA has been</mark> widely <mark>extended</u></mark>. <u>IPRs are particularly interesting</u> in this sense, <u>because of <mark>the<strong> multiple and contradictory meanings ascribed to IPRs</u></strong></mark> – <u>for instance, <mark>as rights, privileges, monopolies, protectionist</mark> measures, <mark>and</mark> also <mark>as free trade</mark> mechanisms promoting competition</u>. Given this, <u><mark>the inclusion of IPRs in FTAs demonstrates the contingency of meaning</mark> allowable with<mark>in hegemonic projects</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>There is no</mark> necessary, <mark>self-evident way that IPRs and FTAs must be configured</u></strong></mark>; rather, <u><strong><mark>there are only possible ways</u></strong></mark>. A historical analysis of just some of the ways this has been done <u><mark>reveals the un-fixity and ‘impossibility’ of identity formation</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jaffery, '10/28 (Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is a South Asian Voices Visiting Fellow 2019-2020. He is a Research Associate at the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore. He is also the Associate Editor of Pakistan Politico, the country's first strategic and foreign affairs magazine, "What Happens After India and Pakistan Clash Over Kashmir?," National Interest, 10-28-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-happens-after-india-and-pakistan-clash-over-kashmir-91681, accessed 10-29-2019, SShaf) fulltext: Tensions between nuclear-armed archrivals India and Pakistan are increasing after the former ended the special status of Jammu and Kashmir on August 5. Ties are further vitiating as reports of torture and brutality in what Pakistan describes as an “Indian Occupied Kashmir” are being reported by international media outlets. Pakistan’s response to India’s Kashmir gambit has been a diplomatic one with Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan leading the campaign to fight Kashmir’s case globally. Khan, who began calling himself the “Ambassador of Kashmir,” vowed to take up the Kashmir cause at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). He gave an emotional speech on the topic as part of his blistering campaign at the UNGA. Hostilities began increasing between India and Pakistan after India claimed that it attacked alleged terror launchpads and killed many militants. Pakistan emphatically denied India’s assertions and took foreign diplomats to Kashmir to show them the wreckage caused by India’s artillery shelling. Though both countries remain embroiled in a war of words, threaten each other, and trade-fire on the Line of Control (LOC), a military confrontation between them has not taken place. However, the situation in Kashmir remains an incendiary force for yet another military crisis between Islamabad and New Delhi. Should it occur, it is likely to be more dangerous than the Pulwama-Balakot crisis that played out earlier this year. There are three reasons why a crisis between these two nemeses will be more intense. At the Tipping Point New Delhi’s annexation of Kashmir has been followed by the deployment of security forces in Kashmir. Also, not even spared pro-India politicians have been spared. Last month, eighty-three-year-old Farooq Abdullah and others were arrested under the controversial Public Safety Act. The incarceration of the erstwhile loyal corps of politicians has left New Delhi with a weak support base in Kashmir. Worse, they may find it difficult to lend political support and compensate for India’s lack of popular support in the disputed region, especially when their ties with the Modi government were strained long before August 5. Moreover, India’s troubles are likely to mount because of its high-handed policy towards the Kashmiris. The international media continues to document gory stories from Kashmir. There have been reports of widespread detentions and egregious torture. The coverage belies New Delhi’s claims of restoring normalcy in Kashmir. However, the use of brute force has not dampened the spirits of the Kashmiris who continue to defy and resist India. Unfazed, the Kashmiris have taken to the streets and clashed with security forces, despite a virtual lockdown. The besieged Kashmiris came out in numbers in support of Prime Minister Khan after his speech in UNGA, calling him a beacon of hope and support in their fight for freedom. The Kashmiri resistance is something that could turn this ongoing Kashmir crisis into a military one between India and Pakistan. In fact, major clashes between security forces and locals that yield security personnel casualties are a potential trigger. While Pakistan would describe such clashes as India’s false flag operation, India would accuse Pakistan of having perpetrated a terror attack. This argument is tenable given that the Pulwama attack was carried out by a local who was humiliated and tortured by Indian security forces. Regardless of how the two sides will view it, a military conflagration will more than likely ensue. Balakot + In an interview last month, Indian Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat said, “[Pakistanis] are worried that if something goes wrong in the hinterland, whether orchestrated by Pakistan or whether orchestrated from within the country with Pakistan’s help, India will hit back.” If Pakistan-driven violence appears to break out in Kashmir, then there will be pressure on its decisionmakers to inflict a punitive blow to Pakistan that will increase manifold. There are two concomitant reasons as to why India’s response to an alleged terror strike by Pakistan will be larger in scale than the Balakot strikes. First, a climb-down from a Balakot-like response will deride New Delhi’s claims of having called out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and established a “new normal” in punishing Pakistan. Anything short of deep incursions in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, or mainland Pakistan for that matter, could be brushed aside by Pakistan as a normal cross-LOC skirmish. Pakistan would dismiss such incursions the way it denied the highly-publicized surgical strikes post the attack in Uri in 2016. Second, the Balakot episode did not go according to plan for New Delhi. Contrary to India’s claims of hitting a major terrorists’ seminary, analyses and reports amplified that the target was missed. Pakistan’s swift retort the next day followed by a dogfight between the two air forces ended in India losing at least one of its aircraft with its pilot ejecting inside Pakistani territory. The pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, was taken into custody by Pakistan with his videos being broadcast on television. Also, the very day the Indian Air Force (IAF) shot down its own Mi-17 chopper that resulted in six casualties. New Delhi’s official claims of shooting down an F-16 of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) were denied by all neutral observers. The way the IAF fared in Balakot and the ensuing confrontation with Pakistan raised doubts about its war-fighting prowess. This is something that puts question marks on India’s capabilities to take on the role of a “Net Security Provider” in Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy against a burgeoning China. Thus, India will try to make amends on all counts, implying that the response could be more forceful and inherently escalatory. A weak response would have political costs for a government that has flaunted its muscle-flexing against Pakistan and gained political mileage out of it. New Delhi would also want to make a statement and buttress its credentials as a formidable military power that is a counterbalance to Beijing’s rise. The Gloves Are Off Pakistan will have its reasons to act differently. Days before heading to the United States to attend the UNGA session, Pakistan’s prime minister Imran Khan said dialogue with India was off the table unless the curfew was lifted and Jammu and Kashmir’s special status restored. Khan’s tone and tenor vis-à-vis India has drastically changed ever since India has taken away Kashmir’s autonomy. In his interviews, speeches, and op-eds, Khan has likened Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh to the Nazi party and by extension, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi to Adolf Hitler. Khan also warned the international community that Modi’s appeasement could lead to a confrontation between the two nuclear-armed countries that could have grievous consequences beyond South Asia. This is in contrast to his earlier reconciliatory refrain that called for talks with India. The tough line taken by Khan, along with the pledge by the Pakistan Army to go the distance for Kashmir and Kashmiris, is meaningful insofar as a future military engagement over Kashmir is concerned. Pakistan’s response to Indian aggression could predictably be more than a “show of intent.” This is primarily because of two reasons. First, in the midst of a heated Kashmir crisis, a restrained riposte will not be a politically popular decision, especially when critics and opponents are already casting aspersions on the government’s commitment to the Kashmir cause. The audience costs for the government and the military will be colossal if Pakistan gives a measured response and looks for ways to de-escalate the crisis. Unlike Pulwama, a military showdown sprouting out of the current tensions over Kashmir will not just be a fight to defend territorial integrity and re-establish deterrence—not if the Kashmir element will be added to the mix. A lackadaisical and limited response is likely to draw the ire of the Kashmiris on the Pakistani side of the LOC, and they’re already itching to cross the line. Also, India’s use of kinetic options will give Pakistan an ideal pretext to flex its military muscle, something that it has tried to avoid doing since the start of the Kashmir crisis. Second, the fog of war may just thicken in an altercation that stems from the ongoing Kashmir. Statements from three top Indian officials, including its foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, regarding India’s plans to get control of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, have been described as “provocative” by Pakistan. In such an emotive environment, Islamabad may not construe New Delhi’s military adventures as limited and therefore retaliate accordingly. Moreover, in the Pulwama-Balakot crisis, Khan’s unconditional release of Wing Varthaman became a cause of de-escalation. If not for that diplomatic gesture, then the crisis could have escalated precipitously, which is something Modi admitted during one of his election rallies. Last month, while speaking to a charged crowd in Muzzafarad, Khan said that India misconstrued his peace gesture as cowardice. Pakistan, he said, will fight ferociously till the very end if India kick starts a war. With tensions high, it is unreasonable to expect Pakistan to quickly climb down the escalation ladder like it did in February. The Escalation Ladder and Third Parties What will happen in the region once both sides harden their positions? The occasional crisis between India and Pakistan tends to elicit global attention because of the presence of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. If both sides believe that they can control escalation, then they are likely to heighten tensions until a third party steps in to mediate. In the current milieu, perceptions of third-party roles in the Kashmir crisis could determine how a military confrontation takes place. India, thinking that major powers have more or less backed its position on Kashmir, may take liberty in applying military power against Pakistan. Having implored the international community incessantly to intervene in the Kashmir crisis without veritable success, Pakistan could feel that it is on its own to fight out its battle and that of Kashmir, and hence increase its reliance on military options. Both these diametrically different views of third-party mediation could have dangerous repercussions on crisis stability, especially when both countries have all but ended bilateral communication. At a time when the Kashmir crisis simmers, a potential military conflict between India and Pakistan has the propensity to escalate further. As Herman Kahn said in his seminal book On Escalation, it’s difficult for anyone to know what might take a crisis to the next level and potential miscalculations cannot be ruled out during an Indo-Pak crisis.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Even small skirmishes are uniquely likely to escalate</h4><p><strong>Jaffery, '10/28</strong> (Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is a South Asian Voices Visiting Fellow 2019-2020. He is a Research Associate at the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore. He is also the Associate Editor of Pakistan Politico, the country's first strategic and foreign affairs magazine, "What Happens After India and Pakistan Clash Over Kashmir?," National Interest, 10-28-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-happens-after-india-and-pakistan-clash-over-kashmir-91681, accessed 10-29-2019, SShaf)</p><p><u><mark>Tensions</mark> between</u> nuclear-armed archrivals <u>India and Pakistan <mark>are increasing</u></mark> after the former ended the special status of Jammu and Kashmir on August 5. Ties are further vitiating as reports of torture and brutality in what Pakistan describes as an “Indian Occupied Kashmir” are being reported by international media outlets. Pakistan’s response to India’s Kashmir gambit has been a diplomatic one with Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan leading the campaign to fight Kashmir’s case globally. Khan, who began calling himself the “Ambassador of Kashmir,” vowed to take up the Kashmir cause at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). He gave an emotional speech on the topic as part of his blistering campaign at the UNGA. <u>Hostilities began increasing between India and Pakistan after India claimed that it attacked alleged terror launchpads and killed many militants. Pakistan emphatically denied India’s assertions and took foreign diplomats to Kashmir to show them the wreckage caused by India’s artillery shelling</u>. Though <u>both countries remain embroiled in a war of words, threaten each other, and trade-fire on the Line of Control (LOC),</u> a military confrontation between them has not taken place. However, <u><strong>the situation in <mark>Kashmir remains an incendiary force </mark>for yet another military crisis between Islamabad and New Delhi</u></strong>. Should it occur, <u>it is likely to be more dangerous than the Pulwama-Balakot crisis that played out earlier this year</u>. There are three reasons why a crisis between these two nemeses will be more intense. At the Tipping Point New Delhi’s annexation of Kashmir has been followed by the deployment of security forces in Kashmir. Also, not even spared pro-India politicians have been spared. Last month, eighty-three-year-old Farooq Abdullah and others were arrested under the controversial Public Safety Act. <u>The incarceration of the erstwhile loyal corps of <mark>politicians</mark> has left New Delhi with a weak support base in Kashmir</u>. Worse, <u>they may <mark>find it difficult to</mark> lend political support and <mark>compensate for </mark>India’s <mark>lack of popular support</mark> in the disputed region</u>, especially when their ties with the Modi government were strained long before August 5. Moreover, <u>India’s troubles are likely to mount because of its high-handed policy towards the Kashmiris</u>. The international media continues to document gory stories from Kashmir. There have been reports of widespread detentions and egregious torture. The coverage belies New Delhi’s claims of restoring normalcy in Kashmir. However, the use of brute force has not dampened the spirits of the <u><mark>Kashmiris</u></mark> who <u>continue to<mark> defy and resist </mark>India</u>. Unfazed, the <u>Kashmiris have taken to the streets and clashed with security forces, despite a virtual lockdown</u>. The besieged Kashmiris came out in numbers in support of Prime Minister Khan after his speech in UNGA, calling him a beacon of hope and support in their fight for freedom. The <u>Kashmiri resistance</u> is something that <u>could turn this ongoing</u> Kashmir <u>crisis into a military one</u> between India and Pakistan. In fact, <u><mark>major clashes between security forces and locals</mark> that <mark>yield</mark> security personnel casualties are <mark>a potential trigger</u></mark>. While <u><strong><mark>Pakistan would describe</mark> such <mark>clashes as India’s false flag </mark>operation<mark>, India would accuse Pakistan of</mark> having perpetrated <mark>a terror attack</u></strong></mark>. This argument is tenable given that the Pulwama attack was carried out by a local who was humiliated and tortured by Indian security forces. Regardless of how the two sides will view it, <u><strong>a <mark>military conflagration will</mark> more than likely <mark>ensue</mark>. </u></strong>Balakot + In an interview last month, Indian Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat said, “[Pakistanis] are worried that if something goes wrong in the hinterland, whether orchestrated by Pakistan or whether orchestrated from within the country with Pakistan’s help, India will hit back.” <u>If Pakistan-driven violence appears to break out in Kashmir, then <strong>there will be pressure on its decisionmakers to inflict a punitive blow to Pakistan that will increase manifold</u></strong>. <u>There are two</u> concomitant <u>reasons</u> as to why <u>India’s response to an alleged terror strike</u> by Pakistan <u>will be larger in scale</u> than the Balakot strikes. First, <u><strong>a climb-down from a Balakot-like response will deride New Delhi’s claims of having called out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and established a “new normal” in punishing Pakistan</u></strong>. <u><mark>Anything short of deep incursions</mark> in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, or mainland Pakistan for that matter, <mark>could be brushed aside </mark>by Pakistan as a normal cross-LOC skirmish. Pakistan would dismiss such incursions</u> the way it denied the highly-publicized surgical strikes post the attack in Uri in 2016. Second, <u><strong>the Balakot episode did not go according to plan for New Delhi</u></strong>. <u>Contrary to India’s claims</u> of hitting a major terrorists’ seminary, analyses and <u>reports</u> <u>amplified that the target was missed</u>. <u>Pakistan’s swift retort</u> the next day <u>followed by a dogfight between the two air forces ended in India losing at least one of its aircraft with its pilot ejecting inside Pakistani territory</u>. The pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, <u>was taken into custody by Pakistan with his videos being broadcast on television</u>. Also, the very day the Indian Air Force (IAF) shot down its own Mi-17 chopper that resulted in six casualties. New Delhi’s official claims of shooting down an F-16 of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) were denied by all neutral observers. <u><strong>The way the IAF fared in Balakot and the ensuing <mark>confrontation with Pakistan raised doubts about its war-fighting prowess</u></strong></mark>. <u>This is something that puts question marks on India’s capabilities to take on the role of a “Net Security Provider” in Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy</u> against a burgeoning China. Thus, <u>India will try to make amends on all counts, <strong>implying that the <mark>response could be</mark> more <mark>forceful and</mark> inherently <mark>escalatory</u></strong></mark>. <u>A weak response would have political costs for a government that has flaunted its muscle-flexing against Pakistan and gained political mileage out of it. New Delhi would also want to make a statement and buttress its credentials as a formidable military power that is a counterbalance to Beijing’s rise. </u>The Gloves Are Off Pakistan will have its reasons to act differently. Days before heading to the United States to attend the UNGA session, Pakistan’s prime minister Imran Khan said dialogue with India was off the table unless the curfew was lifted and Jammu and Kashmir’s special status restored. Khan’s tone and tenor vis-à-vis India has drastically changed ever since India has taken away Kashmir’s autonomy. In his interviews, speeches, and op-eds, Khan has likened Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh to the Nazi party and by extension, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi to Adolf Hitler. <u>Khan </u>also<u> warned the international community that Modi’s appeasement could lead to a confrontation between the two nuclear-armed countries that could have grievous consequences beyond South Asia.</u> <u><strong>This is in contrast to his earlier reconciliatory refrain that called for talks with India. </u></strong>The tough line taken by Khan, along with the pledge by the Pakistan Army to go the distance for Kashmir and Kashmiris, is meaningful insofar as a future military engagement over Kashmir is concerned. <u>Pakistan’s response to Indian aggression could predictably be more than a “show of intent</u>.” This is primarily because of two reasons. First, <u><strong>in the midst of a heated Kashmir crisis, a restrained riposte will not be a politically popular decision</u></strong>, especially when critics and opponents are already casting aspersions on the government’s commitment to the Kashmir cause. <u><mark>The audience costs</mark> for the government and the military <mark>will be colossal if Pakistan gives a measured response</mark> and looks for ways to de-escalate the crisis</u>. Unlike Pulwama, a military showdown sprouting out of the current tensions over Kashmir will not just be a fight to defend territorial integrity and re-establish deterrence—not if the Kashmir element will be added to the mix. A lackadaisical and limited response is likely to draw the ire of the Kashmiris on the Pakistani side of the LOC, and they’re already itching to cross the line. Also, <u><strong><mark>India’s use of kinetic options will give Pakistan an ideal pretext to flex its military muscle</strong></mark>, something that it has tried to avoid doing since the start of the Kashmir crisis.</u> Second, <u>the fog of war may just thicken in an altercation that stems from the ongoing Kashmir</u>. Statements from three top Indian officials, including its foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, regarding India’s plans to get control of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, have been described as “provocative” by Pakistan. In such an emotive environment, Islamabad may not construe New Delhi’s military adventures as limited and therefore retaliate accordingly. Moreover, <u>in the Pulwama-Balakot crisis, Khan’s unconditional release of Wing Varthaman became a cause of de-escalation<strong>. If not for that diplomatic gesture, then the crisis could have escalated precipitously</u></strong>, which is something Modi admitted during one of his election rallies. Last month, while speaking to a charged crowd in Muzzafarad, <u>Khan said that India misconstrued his peace gesture as cowardice.</u> <u><strong>Pakistan</u></strong>, he said, <u><strong>will fight ferociously till the very end if India kick starts a war</u></strong>. With tensions high, <u><strong>it is unreasonable to expect Pakistan to quickly climb down the escalation ladder like it did in February. </u></strong>The Escalation Ladder and Third Parties What will happen in the region once both sides harden their positions? The occasional crisis between India and Pakistan tends to elicit global attention because of the presence of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. <u>If both sides believe that they can control escalation, then they are likely to heighten tensions</u> until a third party steps in to mediate. In the current milieu, perceptions of third-party roles in the Kashmir crisis could determine how a military confrontation takes place. <u><mark>India</u></mark>, thinking that major powers have more or less backed its position on Kashmir, <u><strong><mark>may take liberty in applying military power</mark> against Pakistan.</u></strong> Having implored the international community incessantly to intervene in the Kashmir crisis without veritable success, <u><strong><mark>Pakistan could feel that it is on its own</mark> to fight out its battle and that of Kashmir, <mark>and</mark> hence <mark>increase</mark> its reliance on <mark>military options</u></strong></mark>. Both these diametrically different views of third-party mediation could have dangerous repercussions on crisis stability, especially when both countries have all but ended bilateral communication. At a time when the Kashmir crisis simmers<u>, a potential <mark>military conflict</mark> between India and Pakistan <mark>has the propensity to escalate</mark> further</u>. As Herman Kahn said in his seminal book On Escalation<u><strong>, it’s difficult for anyone to know what might take a crisis to the next level and potential miscalculations cannot be ruled out during an Indo-Pak crisis.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Busbridge, 18—Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University (Rachel, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018, dml) fulltext: The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007). Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes, under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7). The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) yet is a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, the categorical distinction produced by the frontier must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’. Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). Given the generally dreadful Fourth World circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples in settler societies, it could be argued that there is good reason for such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless, the fatalism of the settler colonial paradigm—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—has seen it come under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s ontology erase contingency, heterogeneity and (crucially) agency (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), but its polarised framework effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that the totalising logic of Wolfe’s structure of invasion rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Framing settler colonialism through a totalizing lens of [absolute decolonization/incommensurability/etc] makes indigenous liberation <u>impossible</u> by setting the terms of victory as all-or-nothing—pessimism <u>actively reifies</u> settler dominance </h4><p>Busbridge, 18</strong>—Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University (Rachel, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018, dml)</p><p><u>The prescription for decolonisation</u>—that is, <u>a normative project committed to the <strong>liberation of the colonised</strong> and the <strong>overturning of colonial relationships of power</u></strong> (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—<u>is</u> indeed <u>one of the <strong>most counterhegemonic implications</strong> of the settler colonial paradigm</u> as applied to IsraelPalestine, <u>potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’</u> (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). <u>What</u>, however, <u>does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of <strong>envisioning decolonisation</strong>?</u> As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), <u>there is</u> nevertheless <u>a ‘<strong>narrative deficit</strong>’ when it comes to <strong>imagining settler decolonisation</u></strong>. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that <u>the <strong><mark>structural perspective</strong></mark> of the paradigm</u> in many ways <u><strong><mark>closes dow</mark>n possibilities</strong> of <strong>imagining the type of social</strong> and <strong><mark>political transformation</strong> to which</mark> the <strong>notion of <mark>decolonisation aspires</u></strong></mark>. In this regard, <u>there is a <strong>worrying tendency</u></strong> (<u>if not <strong>tautological discrepancy</u></strong>) <u>in settler colonial studies, where <mark>the <strong>only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation</strong>—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm <strong>renders</mark> largely unachievable</strong>, if not <strong><mark>impossible</u></strong>.</mark> </p><p>To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The <u>structuralism</u> of this account <u>has <strong>immense power</strong> as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal</u>, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. <u>Yet, in seeking to <strong>elucidate the logic of elimination</strong> as the <strong>overarching historical force</strong> guiding settler-native relations there is an <strong>operational weakness</strong> in the theory, whereby such a logic is <strong>simply there</strong>, <strong>omnipresent</strong> and <strong>manifest</strong> even when (and perhaps especially when) it <strong>appears not to be</strong>; <mark>the settler colonial</mark> studies <mark>scholar need</mark> only <strong><mark>read it into a situation</strong> or <strong>context</strong>.</mark> It</u> thus <u><strong>hurtles from the past</strong> to the <strong>present</strong> into the <strong>future</strong>, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a <strong>powerful ontological</u></strong> (if not metaphysical) <u><strong>dimension</u></strong> to Wolfe’s account, <u>where there is such thing as a ‘<strong>settler will</strong>’ that <strong>inherently desires the elimination of the native</strong> and the distinction between the settler and native <strong>can only ever be categorical</strong>, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’</u> (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between <u>settler</u>, who <u>seeks to <strong>destroy</strong> and <strong>replace the native</strong>, and native</u>, who <u><strong>can only ever push back</u></strong>. Indeed, <u>if the settler colonial paradigm views history in</u> similar <u>teleological terms</u> to the Marxist framework, <u><mark>it <strong>does not offer</strong> the same hopeful vision of a liberated future</u></mark>. After all, <u><mark>set</mark>tler <mark>col</mark>onialism <mark>has <strong>only one story to tell</strong>—‘either <strong>total victory</strong> or <strong>total failure</strong>’</u></mark> (Veracini, 2007). </p><p>Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes, </p><p>under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7). </p><p>The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where <u>the <strong>categorical distinction</strong> between settler and native <strong>obstructs</strong> the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’</u> (by virtue of its lopsidedness) <u>yet is a <strong>necessary political strategy</strong> to <strong>guard against the absorption</strong> of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would <strong>represent settler colonialism’s final victory</u></strong>. <u>The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and <mark>an anti-colonial struggle that ‘<strong>must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going</strong>’</u></mark> (2011: 7). In other words, <u><mark>the categorical distinction</mark> produced by the frontier <strong><mark>must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects</u></strong></mark>. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’. </p><p>Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). <u>Given the generally dreadful</u> Fourth World <u>circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples</u> in settler societies, <u>it <strong>could be argued</strong> that there is good reason for</u> such <u><strong>pessimism</u></strong>. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. <u><strong>Nonetheless</strong>, the <strong><mark>fatalism</strong></mark> of the settler colonial paradigm</u>—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—<u>has</u> seen it <u>come under <strong>considerable critique</strong> for <strong><mark>reify</mark>ing <mark>set</mark>tler <mark>col</mark>onialism</strong> as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are <strong>inevitable</u></strong> (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). <u>Not only does</u> Wolfe’s <u><mark>ontology <strong>erase contingency</strong>, <strong>heterogeneity</strong> and</mark> (crucially) <strong><mark>agency</u></strong></mark> (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), <u>but its polarised framework effectively ‘<strong>puts politics to death</strong>’</u> (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that <u>the <strong><mark>totalising logic</strong></mark> of</u> Wolfe’s <u>structure of invasion <strong>rests on a disciplinary gesture</strong> where ‘<strong>any discussion</strong> which <strong>does not insist</strong> on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is <strong>assimilationist</strong>, worse still, <strong>genocidal</strong> in effect if not intent. <strong>Any attempt</strong> to ‘explore the <strong>dialogical</strong> or <strong>hybrid nature</strong> of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail <strong>working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity</strong>—is <strong>disciplined as complicit</strong> in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the <strong>only nonassimilationist position</strong> one that <strong>adheres strictly</strong> and <strong>solely</strong> to a <strong>critique</strong> of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only <strong><mark>disallows the possibility of counter-publics</strong> and <strong>strategic alliances</strong></mark> (even limited ones), but also <strong>comes dangerously close</strong> to ‘<strong>resistance as acquiescence</strong>’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may <strong>malign the structures set in play</strong> by settler colonialism, but <strong>only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness</strong> of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. <strong>Opposition</strong> is thus left as our <strong>only option</strong>, but</u>, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, <u>opposition</u> in itself <u>is <strong>not decolonisation</u></strong>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/) fulltext: Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>That is the only <u>egalitarian metric</u>---anything else collapses cooperation on <u>collective action</u> crises and makes extinction inevitable </h4><p><strong>Khan 18 <u></strong>(Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)</p><p><strong>Infinite</u></strong> future <u><strong>possibilities</u></strong> I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that <u><mark>human culture is <strong>far from immutable</u></strong>.</mark> That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That <u><strong><mark>we can</mark> master them and <mark>rise to</mark> unprecedented <mark>challenges</u></strong></mark>. Secondly, that <u>even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. </u>This is a humbling realization. Because <u><strong><mark>faced with an uncertain future, the </mark>only <mark>wise thing we can do is prepare</u></strong></mark> for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, <u>the possibilities seem endless. They range from</u> an era of <u>abundance to the end of humanity</u>, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. <u>Among the infinite future possibilities<strong>, <mark>only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction</u></strong>. <u>Concerns</u></mark> about extinction <u><mark>are</u></mark> often <u><mark>dismissed</mark> as <strong>apocalyptic alarmism</u></strong>. Sometimes, they are. But <u>repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a <strong>straw man argument</strong>.</u> <u><strong>The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility</u></strong>. And <u><mark>there have been <strong>far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy.</mark> </u></strong>As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in <u>Davos discusses</u> how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are <u>five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: </u>1. <u><strong><mark>Extinction is the rule</mark>, not the exception</u></strong> More than <u><mark>99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone</u>. <u><strong>Deep time is unfathomable</u></strong></mark> to the human brain. But <u>if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. </u>And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than <u>99.9% of all</u> the distinct <u>human cultures that have ever existed are extinct.</u> Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. <u>It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization</u>. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than <u>15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’</u>. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared <u>Diamond charts the history of past societies</u>. He makes the case that <u>overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, </u>if not the only, drivers <u>of collapse. </u>Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, <u>we must</u> still <u>achieve tremendous </u>step <u>changes in our response to several major environmental crises.</u> We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. <u><strong>Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050</u></strong>, <u><strong>and a 90% chance by 2075</u></strong>. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. <u>Visionaries</u> like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have <u>warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. </u>Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause <u>Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’</u>. <u>Tribes</u> have <u>overpowered tribes,</u> <u>empires have conquered rivals</u>. Even today, <u>our fiercest <mark>displays of unity typically happen at wartime</mark> We</u> give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, <u>we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an <strong>increasingly unstable island</strong>.</u> <u><mark>We may have a violent past, but</mark> <strong>we have <mark>no more dangerous enemy than ourselves</u></strong></mark>. <u>Our task is to find</u> our own Nunuku’s Law. <u>Our own shared contract, based on <mark>equity, would help us navigate safely.</u></mark> It <u>would ensure <mark>a future that unleashes the full potential of our</mark> still-budding human <mark>civilization</mark>, in all its diversity. <mark>We cannot do this unless we are <strong>humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction</u></strong>. <u><strong>Survival is life’s primal instinct</u></strong>. <u>In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival.</mark> Our future may depend on whether we realize this.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Walt 20 – [Stephen M. Walt is an American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 5/13/2020, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?” https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/] GBN-PK fulltext: By many measures, 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades. We’re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives, sickened millions of people, and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends. The world economy is in free fall, with unemployment rising dramatically, trade and output plummeting, and no hopeful end in sight. A plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa, and last week we learned about murderous killer wasps threatening the bee population in the United States. Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes potentially lethal nostrums and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors. Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won’t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change. Given all that, what could possibly make things worse? Here’s one possibility: war. It is therefore worth asking whether the combination of a pandemic and a major economic depression is making war more or less likely. What does history and theory tell us about that question? For starters, we know neither plague nor depression make war impossible. World War I ended just as the 1918-1919 influenza was beginning to devastate the world, but that pandemic didn’t stop the Russian Civil War, the Russo-Polish War, or several other serious conflicts. The Great Depression that began in 1929 didn’t prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931, and it helped fuel the rise of fascism in the 1930s and made World War II more likely. So if you think major war simply can’t happen during COVID-19 and the accompanying global recession, think again. But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace. Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen. Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede. For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>No war- assumes COVID </h4><p><strong>Walt 20</strong> – [Stephen M. Walt is an American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 5/13/2020, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?” https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/<u>] GBN-PK</p><p>By many measures, 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades. We’re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives, sickened millions of people, and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends. The world economy is in free fall, with unemployment rising dramatically, trade and output plummeting, and no hopeful end in sight. A plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa, and last week we learned about murderous killer wasps threatening the bee population in the United States. Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes potentially lethal nostrums and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors. Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won’t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change. Given all that, what could possibly make things worse? Here’s one possibility: war. It is therefore worth asking whether the combination of a pandemic and a major economic depression is making war more or less likely. What does history and theory tell us about that question? For starters, we know neither plague nor depression make war impossible. World War I ended just as the 1918-1919 influenza was beginning to devastate the world, but that pandemic didn’t stop the Russian Civil War, the Russo-Polish War, or several other serious conflicts. The Great Depression that began in 1929 didn’t prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931, and it helped fuel the rise of fascism in the 1930s and made World War II more likely. So if you think major war simply can’t happen during COVID-19 and the accompanying global recession, think again. But <mark>war</mark> could <mark>still</mark> be <strong>much <mark>less likely</strong></mark>. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes <strong><mark>COVID</mark>-19 <mark>is more likely to promote peace</strong></mark> instead. He argues that the <mark>current pandemic is affecting all</mark> the <mark>major powers</mark> adversely, which means <mark>it <strong>isn’t creating</mark> tempting windows of <mark>opportunity</strong> for unaffected states</mark> while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. <mark>Instead</mark>, it is making all <strong><mark>governments more pessimistic</strong></mark> about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because <mark>states</mark> often <mark>go to war out of</mark> sense of <strong><mark>overconfidence</strong></mark> (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), <strong><mark>pandemic-induced pessimism</strong></mark> should be <strong><mark>conducive</strong> to <strong>peace</strong></mark>. Moreover, by its very nature <mark>war requires</mark> states to assemble lots of people in <strong><mark>close proximity</strong></mark>—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s <strong><mark>not something you want</strong></mark> to do <mark>in the middle of a <strong>pandemic</strong></mark>. For the moment at least, beleaguered <mark>governments</mark> of all types are <mark>focus</mark>ing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power <mark>to <strong>protect the public</strong></mark> from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might <strong>explain</strong> why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like <strong><mark>Saudi Arabia</strong></mark>’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in <strong><mark>winding down</strong></mark> his <mark>brutal</mark> and unsuccessful military <mark>campaign in <strong>Yemen</strong></mark>. Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of <strong><mark>decoupling</strong> might <strong>reduce tensions</strong></mark> somewhat and <strong>cause the odds of war to recede</strong>. For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called <strong><mark>diversionary</strong></mark> (or “scapegoat”) <mark>theory</mark> of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as <strong><mark>unlikely</strong>, even if one ignores</mark> the <strong><mark>logical</strong> and <strong>empirical flaws</strong></mark> in the theory itself. War is <strong>always a gamble</strong>, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, <strong><mark>no</mark>ne</strong> of the <strong><mark>countries</strong></mark> Trump might <strong>consider</strong> going after <mark>pose an <strong>imminent threat</strong></mark> to U.S. security, and even his <strong>staunchest supporters</strong> may <strong>wonder why he is wasting time and money</strong> going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is <mark>hard to <strong>imagine any country launching a</mark> large-scale <mark>war</strong></mark>—with all its attendant risks—at a moment <mark>when <strong>debt levels are</strong></mark> already <strong><mark>soaring</strong></mark>. More importantly, <mark>there are</mark> lots of <mark>easier</mark> and more direct <mark>ways to stimulate the economy</mark>—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and <mark>launching a war</mark> has to be one of <mark>the least efficient methods</mark> available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, <strong>which any politician</strong> with their <strong>eye on the stock market would be loath</strong> to do. <mark>Economic downturns can encourage war</mark> in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. <mark>Yet I cannot think of <strong>any country</mark> in similar circumstances <mark>today</strong>. Now</mark> is <strong><mark>hardly the time</strong> for <strong>Russia</strong></mark> to try <mark>to <strong>grab</strong></mark> more of <strong><mark>Ukraine</strong></mark>—if it even wanted to—<strong><mark>or</strong></mark> for <strong><mark>China</strong></mark> to make a <strong><mark>play for Taiwan</strong></mark>, because <mark>the <strong>costs</strong></mark> of doing so <mark>would</mark> clearly <strong><mark>outweigh the economic benefits</strong></mark>. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, <mark>I do not think</mark> that even the <mark>extraordinary economic conditions</mark> we are witnessing today <mark>are going to</mark> have much <mark>impact</mark> on the <mark>likelihood of war</mark>. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has suffered 40</mark> or more <mark>recessions</mark> since the country was founded, <mark>yet it has fought</mark> perhaps <strong><mark>20 interstate wars</strong>, most</mark> of them <strong><mark>unrelated</strong> to the</mark> state of the <strong><mark>economy</strong></mark>. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states <strong>do not start wars</strong> unless they <strong>believe</strong> they will win a <strong>quick</strong> and <strong>relatively cheap victory</strong>. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: <strong><mark>No matter</strong></mark> what <strong>a country’s <mark>economic condition</strong></mark> might be, its <strong><mark>leaders will not go to war</strong></mark> unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the <strong><mark>primary</mark> <mark>motivation</strong></mark> for most wars <mark>is</mark> the <strong>desire for security, <mark>not economic gain</strong></mark>. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only <strong>one factor among many</strong> and <strong>rarely the most significant</strong>. <mark>Even if</mark> the<mark> COVID</mark>-19 pandemic <mark>has large</mark>, lasting, and negative <mark>effects on the</mark> world <mark>economy</mark>—as seems quite likely—<mark>it is not likely to affect the probability of war</mark> very much, especially in the short term.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Lustbader 20 --- Sarah Lustbader, Senior legal counsel, was previously senior program associate at the Vera Institute of Justice and a criminal defense attorney at The Bronx Defenders., HOW SUPER TUESDAY HAS BEEN SHAPED BY CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES”, The Appeal, March 3rd 2020, https://theappeal.org/how-super-tuesday-has-been-shaped-by-criminal-justice-issues/ (BJN) fulltext: Today, voters in 14 states and one territory will have the option of selecting a candidate to be the Democratic presidential nominee. They will choose among four major candidates: two moderates and two leftists. Among the more remarkable aspects of how the race has developed is the extent to which it has been shaped by criminal justice issues. As Jelani Cobb wrote for The New Yorker, before Pete Buttigieg and Amy Klobuchar dropped out of the race: “A crude way of summarizing the remaining viable contenders in the Democratic field is to note that voters have a choice of: a former mayor who championed stop-and-frisk practices that targeted African-American and Latino men; another former mayor, who fired a black police chief after he recorded phone calls in which senior white officers made racist comments; a former prosecutor who may have helped send a wrongfully accused black teen-ager to prison; a former Vice-President who co-wrote the 1994 crime bill; a democratic socialist who voted for and defended that bill; or Senator Elizabeth Warren, who has held office only since 2013, and has no comparable stain on her record.” “Individual politicians often face liabilities with particular segments of the electorate,” he continued. “It’s unusual, though, for so many in one field to be susceptible on such a similar theme; a now entirely white Democratic slate is being asked to explain past positions on criminal-justice issues, and, specifically, the effects of those positions on people of color.” And just as remarkable as who is on the ballot is who is not. Kamala Harris, an early favorite among many pundits, became an early dropout, in part because of her past as a prosecutor, which led to the meme, “Kamala is a cop.” Harris’s past was troubling not merely because she chose to rise to prominence by contributing to mass incarceration, but because, as I wrote last year for the Daily Appeal, she was a “tough-on-crime prosecutor in a Black Lives Matter era.” “Black communities, in particular Black women … radically re-evaluat[ed] Harris’ record and rhetoric on criminal justice,” wrote Camille Squires for Mother Jones. “On Black Twitter, calling out aspects of Harris’s record as a prosecutor wasn’t just about getting one over on a candidate. It was about holding her accountable for her past actions, which include an anti-truancy law that threatened the parents of students who skipped school with criminal charges, and various failures to hold police and prosecutors accountable for misconduct.” Harris also opposed a motion for DNA testing that could exonerate a possibly innocent man, changing her stance only after she was shamed for it in the New York Times. In The Atlantic, Conor Friedersdorf wrote that Harris’s “record casts significant doubts about whether she can be trusted to oversee federal law enforcement, the military, intelligence agencies, the detention of foreign prisoners, and more.” Doubt about whether she could win over progressives given this record may have contributed to her downfall. The more recent dropouts were also dogged by failures in the criminal system. Policing problems in South Bend, Indiana, came to national attention last summer, when a white sergeant fatally shot a 54-year-old Black resident named Eric Logan. The officer’s body camera was not turned on, and Buttigieg had to leave the campaign trail to fly back and face the fury of many residents, especially the Black community. And his decision to fire the city’s first Black police chief “shadowed his presidential campaign, giving rise to complaints he has a blind spot on race and raising questions about whether he can attract the support of African Americans who are crucial to earning the Democratic nomination,” according to the Associated Press. During the campaign, Amy Klobuchar took some criticism for her role in ramping up mass incarceration, especially for property crimes and quality-of-life violations, as top prosecutor in Hennepin County, Minnesota. But during the last few weeks, she has been slammed for overseeing a deeply flawed prosecution in a high-profile case that sent a possibly innocent teenager, Myon Burell, to prison for life. The vitriol culminated when Klobuchar canceled a rally she had planned in her home state on Sunday night after protesters took the stage and chanted “Klobuchar has got to go” and “Free Myon.” She dropped out of the race yesterday. Of the remaining candidates, former Vice President Joe Biden has been taken to task repeatedly for his role in crafting the infamous 1994 crime bill, which he used to take credit for and now tries to disavow. And of all the many, many problems that progressives, and even moderates, have with latecomer Michael Bloomberg, the one that has dogged him the most is his role in enthusiastically ramping up the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program, which he defended even after a federal judge ruled that it violated the constitutional rights of people of color. Not only was it discriminatory, but its effects are still being felt today, in higher school dropout rates and lower trust of police among those who were stopped. Bloomberg clearly embraced the tactic at the time, but he apologized for it just as he joined the presidential race. The apology was rejected by many who found it opportunistic and disingenuous. All of this ironically leaves President Trump with an opening to run to the left of the Democratic nominee on criminal justice. He has already started. During the Super Bowl this year, it was no secret that Trump was planning to run an ad; the question was only what the particular message would be. Would it peddle lies about the strength of the economy? Would it fearmonger about the dangers of immigrants? Would it just show his favorite image, the map of his 2016 win in the Electoral College? Many were surprised when the ad highlighted a different achievement: criminal justice reform. The ad featured Alice Johnson, who was serving a life sentence on drug charges until Trump granted her clemency at the request of Kim Kardashian West. It said that although other politicians “talk about criminal justice reform, President Trump got it done,” and it said “thousands of families are being reunited.” “Freeing Black women from unjust prison sentences has never been a focal point of Trump’s agenda before, so the ad was jarring,” Nathan J. Robinson wrote for Current Affairs. “With Trump’s history of calling for black teens to be executed and encouraging police to rough people up during arrests, why was he suddenly sounding like [Equal Justice Initiative founder] Bryan Stevenson?” Because he is “unprincipled,” Robinson posits, “he’s happy to try to steal issues from Democrats and show that he’s actually the one who cares about them. In 2016 he ran as an anti-war, anti-Wall Street candidate. In May of 2019, he used the injustice of American criminal punishment to attack Joe Biden as too harsh!” It is clear that Trump does not care about “reuniting families,” not after he separated thousands of children from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border. He certainly does not care about treating people fairly in the criminal system: Trump pardoned Joe Arpaio, the Arizona sheriff responsible for widespread abuse of power and the deaths of inmates. He has also enacted a federal policy allowing civil asset forfeiture, and threatened to “destroy” a legislator who opposed it. He cut federal support for halfway houses, thus keeping people incarcerated for longer, rescinded a rule that discouraged debtor’s prison practices among states, ended federal oversight of abusive police forces, and helped substantially grow the private prison industry. “Welcome to 2020,” wrote Maggie Astor for the New York Times yesterday, “featuring an entire Democratic field that wants to reduce or eliminate mandatory minimum sentences, divert low-level offenders from jail, end or at least modify the cash bail system, change drug laws and remove an array of legal barriers that restrict people’s lives after they have served their time.” This was unimaginable even four years ago. And while it is undoubtedly a good thing to see criminal justice issues get long-overdue attention, it’s important to keep in mind that candidates’ plans for the future are as important as their actions in the past, and there is no Democrat––not even Bloomberg––who would be worse than Trump.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Criminal justice reform is THE campaign issue in 2020 --- Trump has made it his focus</h4><p><strong>Lustbader 20</strong> --- Sarah Lustbader, Senior legal counsel, was previously senior program associate at the Vera Institute of Justice and a criminal defense attorney at The Bronx Defenders., HOW SUPER TUESDAY HAS BEEN SHAPED BY CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES”, The Appeal, March 3rd 2020, https://theappeal.org/how-super-tuesday-has-been-shaped-by-criminal-justice-issues/ (BJN) </p><p>Today, voters in 14 states and one territory will have the option of selecting a candidate to be the Democratic presidential nominee. They will choose among four major candidates: two moderates and two leftists. <u>Among the more remarkable aspects of</u> how <u>the race</u> has developed <u>is the extent to which <strong>it has been shaped by criminal justice issues</u></strong>.</p><p>As Jelani Cobb wrote for The New Yorker, before Pete Buttigieg and Amy Klobuchar dropped out of the race: “A crude way of summarizing the remaining viable contenders in the Democratic field is to note that voters have a choice of: a former mayor who championed stop-and-frisk practices that targeted African-American and Latino men; another former mayor, who fired a black police chief after he recorded phone calls in which senior white officers made racist comments; a former prosecutor who may have helped send a wrongfully accused black teen-ager to prison; a former Vice-President who co-wrote the 1994 crime bill; a democratic socialist who voted for and defended that bill; or Senator Elizabeth Warren, who has held office only since 2013, and has no comparable stain on her record.”</p><p>“<u>Individual politicians often face liabilities with particular segments of the electorate</u>,” he continued. “<u>It’s unusual, though, for so many in one field to be <strong>susceptible on such a similar theme</u></strong>; <u>a now entirely white Democratic slate is being asked to explain </u>past <u>positions on criminal-justice issues</u>, and, specifically, the effects of those positions on people of color.”</p><p>And just as remarkable as who is on the ballot is who is not. Kamala <u>Harris</u>, an early favorite among many pundits, <u>became an early dropout</u>, in part <u>because of her past as a prosecutor</u>, which led to the meme, “Kamala is a cop.” Harris’s past was troubling not merely because she chose to rise to prominence by contributing to mass incarceration, but because, as I wrote last year for the Daily Appeal, she was a “tough-on-crime prosecutor in a Black Lives Matter era.” “Black communities, in particular Black women … radically re-evaluat[ed] Harris’ record and rhetoric on criminal justice,” wrote Camille Squires for Mother Jones. “On Black Twitter, calling out aspects of Harris’s record as a prosecutor wasn’t just about getting one over on a candidate. It was about holding her accountable for her past actions, which include an anti-truancy law that threatened the parents of students who skipped school with criminal charges, and various failures to hold police and prosecutors accountable for misconduct.”</p><p>Harris also opposed a motion for DNA testing that could exonerate a possibly innocent man, changing her stance only after she was shamed for it in the New York Times. In The Atlantic, Conor Friedersdorf wrote that Harris’s “record casts significant doubts about whether she can be trusted to oversee federal law enforcement, the military, intelligence agencies, the detention of foreign prisoners, and more.” Doubt about whether she could win over progressives given this record may have contributed to her downfall.</p><p>The more recent dropouts were also dogged by failures in the criminal system. <u>Policing problems in</u> South Bend, <u>Indiana, came to national attention </u>last summer, when a white sergeant fatally shot a 54-year-old Black resident named Eric Logan. The officer’s body camera was not turned on, and <u>Buttigieg had to leave the campaign trail</u> to fly back and face the fury of many residents, especially the Black community. And his decision to fire the city’s first Black police chief “shadowed his presidential campaign, giving rise to complaints he has a blind spot on race and raising questions about whether he can attract the support of African Americans who are crucial to earning the Democratic nomination,” according to the Associated Press.</p><p>During the campaign, Amy <u>Klobuchar took some criticism for her role in ramping up mass incarceration</u>, especially for property crimes and quality-of-life violations, as top prosecutor in Hennepin County, Minnesota. But during the last few weeks, she has been slammed for overseeing a deeply flawed prosecution in a high-profile case that sent a possibly innocent teenager, Myon Burell, to prison for life. The vitriol culminated when Klobuchar canceled a rally she had planned in her home state on Sunday night after protesters took the stage and chanted “Klobuchar has got to go” and “Free Myon.” She dropped out of the race yesterday.</p><p>Of the remaining candidates, former Vice President Joe <u>Biden has been taken to task</u> repeatedly <u>for his role in crafting the</u> infamous 1994 <u>crime bill</u>, which he used to take credit for and now tries to disavow. And of all the many, many problems that progressives, and even moderates, have with latecomer Michael <u>Bloomberg</u>, the one that has dogged him the most is his <u>role in enthusiastically ramping up the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program</u>, which he defended even after a federal judge ruled that it violated the constitutional rights of people of color. Not only was it discriminatory, but its effects are still being felt today, in higher school dropout rates and lower trust of police among those who were stopped. Bloomberg clearly embraced the tactic at the time, but he <u>apologized for it just as he joined the presidential race. The apology was rejected</u> by many who found it opportunistic and disingenuous.</p><p><u>All of this ironically leaves</u> President <u><strong>Trump</u></strong> <u>with an <strong>opening</strong> to run to the <strong>left</u></strong> <u>of the Democratic nominee on criminal justice. He has already started. During the Super Bowl</u> this year, it was no secret that <u>Trump was planning to run an ad</u>; <u>the question was</u> only <u>what the</u> particular <u>message would be</u>. Would it peddle lies about the strength of the economy? Would it fearmonger about the dangers of immigrants? Would it just show <u><strong>his favorite image</u></strong>, the map of his 2016 win in the Electoral College? <u>Many were surprised when the ad highlighted </u>a different achievement: <u><strong>criminal justice reform.</u></strong> The ad featured Alice Johnson, who was serving a life sentence on drug charges until Trump granted her clemency at the request of Kim Kardashian West. It said that although other politicians “talk about criminal justice reform, President Trump got it done,” and it said “thousands of families are being reunited.”</p><p>“<u>Freeing Black women from unjust prison sentences has never been a focal point of Trump’s agenda</u> before, <u><strong>so the ad was jarring</u></strong>,” Nathan J. Robinson wrote for Current Affairs. “With Trump’s history of calling for black teens to be executed and encouraging police to rough people up during arrests, why was he suddenly sounding like [Equal Justice Initiative founder] Bryan Stevenson?” Because he is “unprincipled,” Robinson posits, “<u>he’s happy to try to steal issues from Democrats and show that he’s actually the one who cares</u> about them. <u>In 2016 he ran as an anti-war, anti-Wall Street candidate. In May of 2019, he used the injustice of American criminal punishment to attack Joe Biden</u> as too harsh!”</p><p>It is clear that <u>Trump does not care about “reuniting families</u>,” not after he separated thousands of children from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border. <u>He certainly does not care about treating people fairly in the criminal system</u>: Trump pardoned Joe Arpaio, the Arizona sheriff responsible for widespread abuse of power and the deaths of inmates. He has also enacted a federal policy allowing civil asset forfeiture, and threatened to “destroy” a legislator who opposed it. He cut federal support for halfway houses, thus keeping people incarcerated for longer, rescinded a rule that discouraged debtor’s prison practices among states, ended federal oversight of abusive police forces, and helped substantially grow the private prison industry.</p><p>“<u>Welcome to 2020</u>,” wrote Maggie Astor for the New York Times yesterday, “<u>featuring an entire</u> Democratic <u>field that wants to reduce</u> or eliminate <u>mandatory minimum sentences</u>, divert low-level offenders from jail, end or at least modify the cash bail system, <u>change drug laws and remove an array of legal barriers</u> that restrict people’s lives after they have served their time.” <u>This was unimaginable</u> even <u>four years ago.</p><p></u>And while it is undoubtedly a good thing to see <u><strong>criminal justice issues</u></strong> <u>get</u> <u><strong>long-overdue attention</u></strong>, it’s important to keep in mind that candidates’ plans for the future are as important as their actions in the past, and there is no Democrat––not even Bloomberg––who would be worse than Trump.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR, 22 - is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. MICHAEL KOFMAN is Research Program Director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.“Russia’s Dangerous Decline” Foreign Affairs, November/December, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-dangerous-decline fulltext: Given these factors, there will be a strong temptation to downgrade Russia as a threat. That would be a mistake, and not just because the war has yet to be won. In Ukraine and elsewhere, the more vulnerable Moscow perceives itself to be, the more it will try to offset those vulnerabilities by relying on unconventional tools—including nuclear weapons. In other words, Russian power and influence may be diminished, but that does not mean Russia will become dramatically less threatening. Instead, some aspects of the threat are likely to worsen. For the West, recognizing that reality means abandoning any near-term hopes of a chastened Russia and maintaining support for Russia’s targets. That effort should begin in Ukraine: the United States and its allies must provide sustained support to Kyiv to ensure that Russia suffers a defeat. But even if Putin loses, the problem that Russia poses will not be solved. In many ways, it will grow in intensity. So, too, should the response to it. PAYMENT DUE The war in Ukraine has dealt a blow to Russia’s global economic influence. Russia’s GDP is set to contract by six percent over the course of 2022, according to the International Monetary Fund. And that could be just the beginning, as the full brunt of Western measures are yet to be felt. Western export controls will curtail Moscow’s access to key technologies and components, hobbling an economy that depends heavily on foreign inputs and know-how. Already there are signs of struggle in car manufacturing and other major commercial sectors in which Russian dependence on foreign components or parts is especially pronounced. Moreover, Russia’s status as a major energy power is on shaky ground. To be sure, Europe faces challenges in securing alternatives to Russian energy imports in the coming decade. But over the long term, the political leverage that the Kremlin derives from energy exports will diminish. Western sanctions scheduled to take effect by the end of 2022 will block the issuance of commercial insurance for Russian tanker shipments, increasing the risks and costs of Russian oil transactions. The G-7, meanwhile, is imposing a price cap on the sale of Russian oil. Over time, the noose may tighten, forcing Russia to offer greater discounts for the purchase of its oil. There are growing signs of declining Russian exports and, hence, shrinking revenue, leading the Russian government to slash its budget in many departments by ten percent. Europe will steadily decrease its imports of Russian energy, giving Moscow less room to negotiate with other consumers, such as China and India. Russia has also hemorrhaged some of its best talent, including programmers, engineers, and information technology specialists, which will curtail its future competitiveness. Although those factors will take a significant toll, the full extent of the looming economic contraction and its impact on Russia is unclear. The effects of sanctions and export controls will largely depend on the West’s success in enforcing them and Europe’s success in reducing its dependence on Russian energy. The Kremlin, for its part, will work hard to circumvent the restrictions and find workarounds to blunt their damage. Moscow will resort to trading goods illegally through networks that transit friendly countries, such as the Eurasian Economic Union states, and to working with countries such as China to jointly develop technologies. It will be difficult for Russia to access the large volume of components required to supply key sectors of its economy, such as the automotive industry, but it may be able to secure the specific technologies needed to sustain select weapons programs. Rather than facing a total collapse, the Russian economy is likely headed toward scarcity, autarky, and a steady decoupling from the global economy. As conditions deteriorate, the Kremlin will grow more desperate, resorting to shadowy or illicit means to get by and flouting the rules that govern global commerce in which it no longer has a stake. The more marginalized and threatened the Kremlin becomes, the less predictable and restrained its behavior will be. It is worth considering that before the war, Russia was already a relatively weak great power, with poor economic foundations for its global influence. Yet its ability to contest U.S. interests has often been greater than any raw economic indicators would suggest. Russia tends to punch above its weight and, though lacking in dynamism, is known for its resilience. The country has also lost its share of wars yet has remained a consequential actor in European security. With that track record, it would be unwise to assume that an economically weaker Russia will necessarily be less threatening to U.S. interests in the years to come. BATTLEFIELD DEARTH The Russian military has been badly mauled in Ukraine. The war has consumed millions of artillery shells and worn out a massive quantity of Russian equipment, from artillery barrels to tank engines. More than 80,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in the fighting. Mobilized personnel from Russian-held Ukrainian territories in Donetsk and Luhansk and volunteer fighters make up a significant percentage of the more recent losses, but many of Russia’s best troops were lost early in the war. At the same time as it faces personnel shortages, the Russian military is increasingly having to bring old equipment out of storage to outfit new volunteer units. Moscow has addressed these problems piecemeal, allowing its troops to muddle through, but that ultimately won’t resolve the fundamental problems as the quality of the force degrades. Mobilization may extend Russia’s ability to sustain the war, introducing a degree of uncertainty to the medium and long term, but it is unlikely to resolve the structural problems in Russia’s military performance. As Western export controls cut Russia off from key components such as computer chips and Western machine tools, armament programs have been delayed and Moscow has been forced to pursue expensive workarounds. These measures will reduce the quality and reliability of such parts in weapons systems and, over time, substantially weaken Russia’s defense industry. Still, the West should not assume that the Russian military will be rendered harmless after its disastrous war with Ukraine. Russia is likely to find ways around the Western restrictions, especially given the difficulty of enforcing them. Moscow may not be particularly good at producing its own substitutes for imports, but it has a knack for skirting Western export controls. After its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia, despite an array of sanctions, still managed to maintain access to Western-made parts for many of its weapons. China may also work to lessen the pressure. Although Beijing has so far been reluctant to increase defense-military cooperation with Russia for fear of incurring U.S. penalties for violating sanctions, it is likely to find ways to support Moscow as the international spotlight moves away from Ukraine, including by providing computer chips and other crucial components. What is more, the war has left untouched many of the Russian capabilities that most worry the United States and NATO. Russia remains a leader in integrated air defenses, electronic warfare, antisatellite weapons, submarines, and other advanced systems. Although it at first seemed that Russia had not used cyber-operations during its attack on Ukraine, according to an analysis by Microsoft, Russia did in fact conduct almost 40 destructive cyberattacks against Ukraine in the first three months of the invasion, including a devastating cyber-campaign across Europe that blocked Ukrainian access to commercial satellites. To the extent that Moscow exercised restraint on that front, it probably did so because Putin envisioned a swift victory and planned to occupy the country thereafter. Last but not least, Russia still has a sizable nuclear arsenal—4,477 warheads, according to some estimates—that remains a significant factor shaping U.S. and NATO decision-making. Even as the Russian military invested more heavily in conventional weaponry, it maintained a capable tactical nuclear arsenal and poured billions of rubles into modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. Despite Russia’s conventional losses in Ukraine, its nuclear arsenal is a logical offset to its conventional vulnerability and poses a credible threat. Western policymakers, therefore, should not assume Russia can no longer endanger European security, nor should they imagine that Russia can’t recover its lost military capabilities. Russia retains considerable latent power, resilience, and mobilization potential even if the present regime is inept at capitalizing on those resources.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Russian latent power gives it the ability to reconstitute its military rapidly</h4><p>ANDREA <strong>KENDALL-TAYLOR, 22</strong> - is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. MICHAEL KOFMAN is Research Program Director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.“Russia’s Dangerous Decline” Foreign Affairs, November/December, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-dangerous-decline</p><p>Given these factors, there will be a strong temptation <u>to downgrade Russia as a threat</u>. That <u>would be a mistake,</u> and not just because the war has yet to be won. <u>In Ukraine and elsewhere, the more vulnerable Moscow perceives itself to be, the more it will try to offset those vulnerabilities by relying on unconventional tools—including nuclear weapons</u>. In other words, <u>Russian power and influence may be diminished, but that does not mean Russia will become dramatically less threatening</u>. Instead, <u>some aspects of the threat are likely to worsen</u>. For the West, recognizing that reality means abandoning any near-term hopes of a chastened Russia and maintaining support for Russia’s targets. That effort should begin in Ukraine: the United States and its allies must provide sustained support to Kyiv to ensure that Russia suffers a defeat. But <u>even if Putin loses, the problem that Russia poses</u> will not be solved. In many ways, it <u>will grow</u> in intensity. So, too, should the response to it.</p><p>PAYMENT DUE</p><p>The war in Ukraine has dealt a blow to Russia’s global economic influence. Russia’s GDP is set to contract by six percent over the course of 2022, according to the International Monetary Fund. And that could be just the beginning, as the full brunt of Western measures are yet to be felt. Western export controls will curtail Moscow’s access to key technologies and components, hobbling an economy that depends heavily on foreign inputs and know-how. Already there are signs of struggle in car manufacturing and other major commercial sectors in which Russian dependence on foreign components or parts is especially pronounced.</p><p>Moreover, Russia’s status as a major energy power is on shaky ground. To be sure, Europe faces challenges in securing alternatives to Russian energy imports in the coming decade. But over the long term, the political leverage that the Kremlin derives from energy exports will diminish. Western sanctions scheduled to take effect by the end of 2022 will block the issuance of commercial insurance for Russian tanker shipments, increasing the risks and costs of Russian oil transactions. The G-7, meanwhile, is imposing a price cap on the sale of Russian oil. Over time, the noose may tighten, forcing Russia to offer greater discounts for the purchase of its oil. There are growing signs of declining Russian exports and, hence, shrinking revenue, leading the Russian government to slash its budget in many departments by ten percent. Europe will steadily decrease its imports of Russian energy, giving Moscow less room to negotiate with other consumers, such as China and India. Russia has also hemorrhaged some of its best talent, including programmers, engineers, and information technology specialists, which will curtail its future competitiveness.</p><p>Although those factors will take a significant toll, the full extent of the looming economic contraction and its impact on Russia is unclear. The effects of sanctions and export controls will largely depend on the West’s success in enforcing them and Europe’s success in reducing its dependence on Russian energy. The Kremlin, for its part, will work hard to circumvent the restrictions and find workarounds to blunt their damage. Moscow will resort to trading goods illegally through networks that transit friendly countries, such as the Eurasian Economic Union states, and to working with countries such as China to jointly develop technologies. It will be difficult for Russia to access the large volume of components required to supply key sectors of its economy, such as the automotive industry, but it may be able to secure the specific technologies needed to sustain select weapons programs.</p><p>Rather than facing a total collapse, the Russian economy is likely headed toward scarcity, autarky, and a steady decoupling from the global economy. As conditions deteriorate, the Kremlin will grow more desperate, resorting to shadowy or illicit means to get by and flouting the rules that govern global commerce in which it no longer has a stake. The more marginalized and threatened the Kremlin becomes, the less predictable and restrained its behavior will be.</p><p>It is worth considering that <u>before the war, Russia was already a relatively weak great power, with poor economic foundations</u> for its global influence. <u>Yet</u> its ability to contest U.S. interests has often been greater than any raw economic indicators would suggest. <u>Russia tends to punch above its weight and</u>, though lacking in dynamism, <u>is known for its resilience. The country has also lost its share of wars yet has remained a consequential actor in European security</u>. With that track record, <u>it would be unwise to assume that an economically weaker Russia will necessarily be less threatening</u> to U.S. interests in the years to come.</p><p>BATTLEFIELD DEARTH</p><p>The Russian military has been badly mauled in Ukraine. The war has consumed millions of artillery shells and worn out a massive quantity of Russian equipment, from artillery barrels to tank engines. More than 80,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in the fighting. Mobilized personnel from Russian-held Ukrainian territories in Donetsk and Luhansk and volunteer fighters make up a significant percentage of the more recent losses, but many of Russia’s best troops were lost early in the war. At the same time as it faces personnel shortages, the Russian military is increasingly having to bring old equipment out of storage to outfit new volunteer units. Moscow has addressed these problems piecemeal, allowing its troops to muddle through, but that ultimately won’t resolve the fundamental problems as the quality of the force degrades. Mobilization may extend Russia’s ability to sustain the war, introducing a degree of uncertainty to the medium and long term, but it is unlikely to resolve the structural problems in Russia’s military performance. As Western export controls cut Russia off from key components such as computer chips and Western machine tools, armament programs have been delayed and Moscow has been forced to pursue expensive workarounds. These measures will reduce the quality and reliability of such parts in weapons systems and, over time, substantially weaken Russia’s defense industry.</p><p>Still, <u>the West should not assume that the Russian military will be rendered harmless after its disastrous war with Ukraine. Russia is likely to find ways around the Western restrictions</u>, <u>especially given the difficulty of enforcing them</u>. Moscow may not be particularly good at producing its own substitutes for imports, but <u>it </u>ha<u>s a knack for skirting Western export controls. After</u> its illegal annexation of Crimea in <u>2014, Russia, despite an array of sanctions, still managed to maintain access to Western-made parts for many of its weapons</u>. China may also work to lessen the pressure. Although Beijing has so far been reluctant to increase defense-military cooperation with Russia for fear of incurring U.S. penalties for violating sanctions, it is likely to find ways to support Moscow as the international spotlight moves away from Ukraine, including by providing computer chips and other crucial components.</p><p>What is more, <u>the war has left untouched many of the Russian capabilities that most worry</u> the United States and <u>NATO. Russia remains a leader in integrated air defenses, electronic warfare, antisatellite weapons, submarines, and other advanced systems</u>. Although it at first seemed that Russia had not used cyber-operations during its attack on Ukraine, according to an analysis by Microsoft, Russia did in fact conduct almost 40 destructive cyberattacks against Ukraine in the first three months of the invasion, including a devastating cyber-campaign across Europe that blocked Ukrainian access to commercial satellites. To the extent that Moscow exercised restraint on that front, it probably did so because Putin envisioned a swift victory and planned to occupy the country thereafter.</p><p>Last but not least, Russia still has a sizable nuclear arsenal—4,477 warheads, according to some estimates—that remains a significant factor shaping U.S. and NATO decision-making. Even as the Russian military invested more heavily in conventional weaponry, it maintained a capable tactical nuclear arsenal and poured billions of rubles into modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. Despite Russia’s conventional losses in Ukraine, its nuclear arsenal is a logical offset to its conventional vulnerability and poses a credible threat. Western policymakers, therefore, should not assume Russia can no longer endanger European security, nor should they imagine that Russia can’t recover its lost military capabilities. <u>Russia retains considerable <strong>latent power</u></strong>, <u>resilience, and <strong>mobilization potential</u></strong> even if the present regime is inept at capitalizing on those resources. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hill '19 [Meg; 10/6/19; writer for Red Flag, a publication of Socialist Alternative; "Under capitalism, even water is a tool of oppression," https://mronline.org/2019/10/11/under-capitalism-even-water-is-a-tool-of-oppression/] fulltext: All life depends on water. It covers 71 percent of the Earth’s surface, makes up 60 percent of our bodies and literally falls from the sky. It’s abundant and indispensable. But under capitalism, even water is a tool of social domination. That is the logic of a system of class rule. Capitalism turns material abundance into socially constructed scarcity. No resource–not even water–is exempt from that violent process. Resources like water are commodified and weaponised, through the workings of the market and through state violence. The human need for water makes it a potential weapon for the ruling class. Nigeria: a study in imposed water scarcity Nigeria’s Rivers state is home to the Ogoni people, an ethnic minority in Nigeria. Their dialect has a special term for water that denotes collective ownership–reflecting that it’s seen as a resource to be shared for the benefit of humanity. But the Ogoni were forcibly removed from their traditional water sources through both long-term groundwater pollution by oil companies and state violence and privatisation in the 1990s. By 2012, the lack of drinkable water had become so severe that the Nigerian government declared a “water emergency” and was supplying rationed water to the affected communities. “However, quantities of water supplied both during the water emergency and post-water emergency have been insufficient to prevent water scarcity”, argued a 2018 research article by Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie published in Africa Spectrum. “As a result, residents of the affected communities, including owners of the polluted wells, who were once water-sufficient, became water-insufficient and have been integrated as customers into the burgeoning water market in the region.” The opening of new markets and potential profits presupposes dispossession and destruction of traditional forms of property, particularly collective ones. In Nigeria, the new water market needed more consumers and workers than were provided by dispossession through privatisation. Groundwater pollution provided that extra nudge by rendering the remaining collective water sources poisonous. Ogoni activist Kenule Saro-Wiwa accused the oil companies of practising genocide against his people and led a mass movement against them. Three hundred thousand people marched against the ecological destruction. The response was repression. Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995 by Nigeria’s military dictatorship. In his “Statement Before Execution”, Saro-Wiwa asserted that the oil companies and the military government were allies in ecological warfare against the Ogoni: “Victory is assessed by profits, and in this sense, Shell’s victory in Ogoni has been total”. Last year, Shell celebrated 60 years of operation in Nigeria. Water privatisation and pollution were the two pillars used to force on the Ogoni a system premised on scarcity. Dr Okorie concluded: “What has eroded as the local wells turn black has been a set of social relations that were enabled by the fact that water was part of the commons and had more than monetary value”. Imperialism and water in Palestine Human need for water is a weapon in the service of imperialism and settler colonialism. Water can be not just a commodity, but a means of ethnic cleansing. In occupied Palestine, Israel-as-oasis is a prominent part of the state’s national mythology. The military occupation, expanding illegal settlements and apartheid are accompanied by assertions that Israel has brought life–human, animal and plant–to what was a barren, inhospitable landscape. Desolate-looking Palestinian villages are contrasted to thriving, green Israeli settlements. Halamish, an Israeli settlement in the occupied West Bank, sits above the Palestinian village of Nabi Saleh. In the documentary Thank God It’s Friday, a Halamish resident is filmed watering her garden while boasting, “There were no birds before we came”. In reality, it’s through violent dispossession–of houses, land, resources and life–that every Israeli settlement is built, and water theft has played a key role in that dispossession. When Palestinians had access to water, their agricultural communities thrived. Israel forced Palestinians off the arable land and took it under Israeli control. Palestinian access to water is increasingly restricted as settlements continue to be built on freshly stolen land. In Nabi Saleh, residents receive 12 hours of running water a week. In Halamish it’s provided 24 hours a day. A huge pool sits as a centrepiece in the settlement, probably filled with water from the village’s water spring that was confiscated for use by the settlement in 2009. Nabi Saleh is under constant siege by the Israeli military, which raids homes, murders civilians and destroys water tanks on the villagers’ roofs. With villagers forced off their land to make way for the Halamish settlement, and with their water spring confiscated, the targeting of water tanks ensures that they are reliant on water provided by the Israeli state. The village and settlement are located within Area C of the West Bank. An Al Jazeera article outlined Israel’s strategy in the area: “The lack of water and other basic services resulting from Israeli policies has created a coercive environment that often leaves Palestinians with no choice but to leave their communities in Area C, allowing Israel’s land takeover and further expansion of its settlements”. But it’s not just Area C. Since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, it has instituted water-sharing agreements that force all Palestinians in the region into dependence on Israel. Palestinians have refused to sit on the Joint Water Committee–within which Israel has a veto–since 2010. Water control is a key part of Israel’s ongoing process of dispossession: hence the myth of Palestine as a water-scarce region. The West Bank is not naturally short of water. It’s bordered by the Jordan River and sits above the Mountain Aquifer. United Nations data show that Ramallah gets more rainfall than London. But Israel’s policies ensure that it’s siphoned away from Palestinians. And it’s not just the West Bank. The 2 million Palestinians living in Gaza, the world’s biggest open-air prison, have access to virtually nothing that is not provided by Israel. The United Nations has predicted Gaza could be uninhabitable by 2020, partly due to its water crisis. There is nothing accidental about that crisis. Where the needs of capitalism are met through imperialism and ethnic cleansing, places like Palestine are made deserts. Water in the West Resources are never ordered in accordance with human need under capitalism. While competition and the profit motive reign, rational planning and allocation are inconceivable. So water use is also separated from human need in wealthy places like Australia and the US. Indigenous people in both the U.S. and Australia, more developed capitalist nations than Israel and Nigeria, have long been subject to the same brutal processes of dispossession. But capitalist forms of water management developed and spread as the commodity-based economy took control. The most recent catalysts for that development have been neoliberalism and climate change. The neoliberal era has removed water from the mostly illusory special status offered by state ownership–where a sector or resource is seemingly shielded from market pressures–in the postwar West, while across the world the escalating climate crisis is bringing to a head tensions associated with apparent scarcity. Some light has been shed on the scale of water management corruption in Australia this year by mass fish kills in the Murray-Darling Basin. Although the immediate cause was a toxic algae bloom, there was no hiding the social nature of the disaster: for years water has been systematically pulled from all over the basin for use by agribusiness, leaving downstream communities and the basin itself prone to crisis. Another flash point in Australia is the Adani coal mine. The monstrous project had polluted wetlands in Queensland before it was even approved. Its operations will require billions of litres of groundwater while almost certainly polluting the Great Artesian Basin, the largest of its kind in the world. And Adani, thanks to both the federal and Queensland governments, will get its water for free. For the rest of us, the water that comes out of our taps and that we need to survive comes with a bill. What’s left after priority is given to corporations like Adani is sold to us for profit. Meanwhile, in the US, Trump has just rolled back a mild water reform won under Obama. Regulations to the Clean Water Act established some federal oversight that would lessen the severity of local water pollution. Trump has rescinded those measures to the benefit of a range of profiteers. News reports of the changes have emphasised the differences between Trump and Obama, but they have more in common than not. While measures against some pollution were taken under Obama, his approach was simply striking a different balance than Trump. In fact, Obama’s wars over water proved that the ongoing development of capitalism never stops targeting Indigenous populations. In 2016 the world watched battles between the Native American Sioux and their supporters and the Obama administration over the Dakota Access oil pipeline. One of the major issues was the destruction of the Standing Rock Sioux reservation’s water supply. Under Obama’s watch, the military was sent in to break up a protest camp, dubbed the “water protectors”, of more than 10,000 people. The pipeline, now built, runs for almost 2,000 kilometres. According to the Intercept, it leaked oil at least five times in 2017 alone. Capitalism distorts our relationship with every resource, no matter its abundance or its importance to human survival. Those in charge are conscious of how the impending climate crisis affects those needs and are increasingly anxious to protect their control over resources, especially water, into the tumultuous future. Capitalists are increasingly worried both that those they’ve deprived of water will rise up against them, and that the climate catastrophe they’ve created will start to impede their business and security. A few remedies are being experimented with. Some capitalists are hiring firms of trained killers to protect them and their water supply if we come for it. Others are securing getaway strategies–like buying up remote land in New Zealand complete with the world’s freshest water sources–to wait out the apocalypse. And in the meantime, scarcity exacerbated by climate change is driving up water prices, and with them profits, everywhere. In Nigeria, a walled city is being built off the country’s coast to shelter the rich and powerful in the event of a climate apocalypse. The project is bankrolled by the Chagoury Group. Its founder, Gilbert Chagoury, was a Nigerian billionaire and adviser to the dictatorship that murdered Kenule Saro-Wiwa. Before he was executed, Saro-Wiwa said that history would put his murderers on trial. But if left unchallenged, our enemies can wait out the climate crisis on islands or sustain their rule through violent authoritarianism. The right side of history will win only through a collective struggle to the final victory of humanity over the rule of profit. Only then can water, nature and our wealth be used for human need and not for social control.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Protection of water resources <u>secures access</u> for capitalist growth and <u>weaponizes control</u> to <u>create new markets</u>---only through <u>collective struggle</u> against capitalism can water be <u>sustainably protected</u>.</h4><p><strong>Hill '19 </strong>[Meg; 10/6/19; writer for Red Flag, a publication of Socialist Alternative; "Under capitalism, even water is a tool of oppression," https://mronline.org/2019/10/11/under-capitalism-even-water-is-a-tool-of-oppression/]</p><p>All life depends on water. It covers 71 percent of the Earth’s surface, makes up 60 percent of our bodies and literally falls from the sky. It’s abundant and indispensable. But <u><mark>under <strong>capitalism</strong></mark>, even <strong><mark>water</strong> is</mark> a <strong>tool</strong> of social domination. That is the <strong>logic</strong> of a system of <strong>class rule</strong>. Capitalism turns <strong>material abundance</strong> into socially <strong>constructed scarcity</strong>. No resource–not even water–is exempt from that <strong>violent process</strong>. Resources like water are <strong>commodified</strong> and <strong><mark>weaponised</strong>, through</mark> the workings of <mark>the <strong>market</strong> and</mark> through <strong><mark>state</mark> violence</strong>. The human need for water makes it <mark>a <strong>potential weapon</strong> for the <strong>ruling class</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Nigeria: a study in imposed water scarcity</p><p>Nigeria’s Rivers state is home to the Ogoni people, an ethnic minority in Nigeria. Their dialect has a special term for water that denotes collective ownership–reflecting that it’s seen as a resource to be shared for the benefit of humanity. But the Ogoni were forcibly removed from their traditional water sources through both long-term groundwater pollution by oil companies and state violence and privatisation in the 1990s. By 2012, the lack of drinkable water had become so severe that the Nigerian government declared a “water emergency” and was supplying rationed water to the affected communities.</p><p>“However, quantities of water supplied both during the water emergency and post-water emergency have been insufficient to prevent water scarcity”, argued a 2018 research article by Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie published in Africa Spectrum. “As a result, residents of the affected communities, including owners of the polluted wells, who were once water-sufficient, became water-insufficient and have been integrated as customers into the burgeoning water market in the region.”</p><p>The <u><mark>opening</mark> of <strong><mark>new markets</strong></mark> and <strong>potential profits</strong> <mark>presupposes <strong>dispossession</strong></mark> and <strong>destruction</strong> of traditional forms of property, particularly collective ones</u>. In Nigeria, the new water market needed more consumers and workers than were provided by dispossession through privatisation. Groundwater pollution provided that extra nudge by rendering the remaining collective water sources poisonous.</p><p>Ogoni activist Kenule Saro-Wiwa accused the oil companies of practising genocide against his people and led a mass movement against them. Three hundred thousand people marched against the ecological destruction. The response was repression. Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995 by Nigeria’s military dictatorship. In his “Statement Before Execution”, Saro-Wiwa asserted that the oil companies and the military government were allies in ecological warfare against the Ogoni: “Victory is assessed by profits, and in this sense, Shell’s victory in Ogoni has been total”. Last year, Shell celebrated 60 years of operation in Nigeria.</p><p>Water privatisation and pollution were the two pillars used to force on the Ogoni a system premised on scarcity. Dr Okorie concluded: “What has eroded as the local wells turn black has been a set of social relations that were enabled by the fact that water was part of the commons and had more than monetary value”.</p><p>Imperialism and water in Palestine</p><p><u>Human need for water is a <strong>weapon</strong> in the service of <strong>imperialism</strong> and <strong>settler colonialism</strong>. Water can be not just a commodity, but a means of <strong>ethnic cleansing</u></strong>. In occupied Palestine, Israel-as-oasis is a prominent part of the state’s national mythology. The military occupation, expanding illegal settlements and apartheid are accompanied by assertions that Israel has brought life–human, animal and plant–to what was a barren, inhospitable landscape. Desolate-looking Palestinian villages are contrasted to thriving, green Israeli settlements.</p><p>Halamish, an Israeli settlement in the occupied West Bank, sits above the Palestinian village of Nabi Saleh. In the documentary Thank God It’s Friday, a Halamish resident is filmed watering her garden while boasting, “There were no birds before we came”. In reality, it’s through violent dispossession–of houses, land, resources and life–that every Israeli settlement is built, and water theft has played a key role in that dispossession. When Palestinians had access to water, their agricultural communities thrived. Israel forced Palestinians off the arable land and took it under Israeli control. Palestinian access to water is increasingly restricted as settlements continue to be built on freshly stolen land.</p><p>In Nabi Saleh, residents receive 12 hours of running water a week. In Halamish it’s provided 24 hours a day. A huge pool sits as a centrepiece in the settlement, probably filled with water from the village’s water spring that was confiscated for use by the settlement in 2009.</p><p>Nabi Saleh is under constant siege by the Israeli military, which raids homes, murders civilians and destroys water tanks on the villagers’ roofs. With villagers forced off their land to make way for the Halamish settlement, and with their water spring confiscated, the targeting of water tanks ensures that they are reliant on water provided by the Israeli state.</p><p>The village and settlement are located within Area C of the West Bank. An Al Jazeera article outlined Israel’s strategy in the area: “The lack of water and other basic services resulting from Israeli policies has created a coercive environment that often leaves Palestinians with no choice but to leave their communities in Area C, allowing Israel’s land takeover and further expansion of its settlements”.</p><p>But it’s not just Area C. Since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, it has instituted water-sharing agreements that force all Palestinians in the region into dependence on Israel. Palestinians have refused to sit on the Joint Water Committee–within which Israel has a veto–since 2010. Water control is a key part of Israel’s ongoing process of dispossession: hence the myth of Palestine as a water-scarce region. The West Bank is not naturally short of water. It’s bordered by the Jordan River and sits above the Mountain Aquifer. United Nations data show that Ramallah gets more rainfall than London. But Israel’s policies ensure that it’s siphoned away from Palestinians.</p><p>And it’s not just the West Bank. The 2 million Palestinians living in Gaza, the world’s biggest open-air prison, have access to virtually nothing that is not provided by Israel. The United Nations has predicted Gaza could be uninhabitable by 2020, partly due to its water crisis.</p><p>There is nothing accidental about that crisis. <u>Where the <strong>needs</strong> of capitalism are met through <strong>imperialism</strong> and <strong>ethnic cleansing</strong>, places like Palestine are <strong>made deserts</u></strong>.</p><p>Water in the West</p><p><u>Resources are never ordered in accordance with <strong>human need</strong> under capitalism. While <strong>competition</strong> and the <strong>profit motive</strong> reign, <strong>rational planning</strong> and <strong>allocation</strong> are <strong>inconceivable</strong>. So water use is also <strong>separated from human need</strong> in wealthy places like</u> Australia and <u>the US</u>.</p><p><u>Indigenous people</u> in both the U.S. and Australia, more developed capitalist nations than Israel and Nigeria, <u>have long been subject to the same brutal processes of dispossession. But <mark>capitalist </mark>forms of <strong><mark>water management</strong> developed</mark> and spread <mark>as the <strong>commodity</mark>-based <mark>economy</strong> took</mark> control</u>.</p><p><u>The most <strong><mark>recent catalysts</strong></mark> for that development <mark>have been <strong>neoliberalism</strong> and <strong>climate change</strong></mark>. The neoliberal era</u> has <u>removed water from the mostly illusory special status</u> offered by state ownership–where a sector or resource is seemingly shielded from market pressures–in the postwar West, while across the world the escalating climate crisis is bringing to a head tensions associated with apparent scarcity.</p><p>Some light has been shed on the scale of water management corruption in Australia this year by mass fish kills in the Murray-Darling Basin. Although the immediate cause was a toxic algae bloom, there was no hiding the social nature of the disaster: for years water has been systematically pulled from all over the basin for use by agribusiness, leaving downstream communities and the basin itself prone to crisis.</p><p>Another flash point in Australia is the Adani coal mine. The monstrous project had polluted wetlands in Queensland before it was even approved. Its operations will require billions of litres of groundwater while almost certainly polluting the Great Artesian Basin, the largest of its kind in the world. And Adani, thanks to both the federal and Queensland governments, will get its water for free. For the rest of us, the water that comes out of our taps and that we need to survive comes with a bill. What’s left after priority is given to corporations like Adani is sold to us for profit.</p><p>Meanwhile, in the US, Trump has just rolled back a mild water reform won under Obama. Regulations to the Clean Water Act established some federal oversight that would lessen the severity of local water pollution. Trump has rescinded those measures to the benefit of a range of profiteers. <u>News reports of the changes</u> have <u>emphasised the differences between Trump and Obama, but they have <strong>more in common than not</strong>. While measures against some pollution were taken under Obama, his approach was</u> simply <u>striking a different balance than Trump</u>.</p><p>In fact, <u>Obama’s <strong>wars over water</strong> proved that the <strong>ongoing development</strong> of <strong>capitalism</strong> never stops targeting Indigenous populations</u>. In 2016 the world watched battles between the Native American Sioux and their supporters and the Obama administration over the Dakota Access oil pipeline. One of the major issues was the destruction of the Standing Rock Sioux reservation’s water supply. Under Obama’s watch, the military was sent in to break up a protest camp, dubbed the “water protectors”, of more than 10,000 people. The pipeline, now built, runs for almost 2,000 kilometres. According to the Intercept, it leaked oil at least five times in 2017 alone.</p><p><u><mark>Capitalism <strong>distorts our relationship</strong> with <strong>every resource</strong>, no matter</mark> its <strong>abundance</strong> or <mark>its <strong>importance</strong> to</mark> <strong>human <mark>survival</strong></mark>. Those in charge are conscious of how the impending climate crisis affects those needs and are <strong>increasingly anxious</strong> to <strong>protect their control</strong> over resources, especially water,</u> into the tumultuous future. <u><mark>Capitalists are</mark> <strong>increasingly <mark>worried</strong></mark> both that <strong><mark>those they’ve deprived</strong></mark> of water <mark>will <strong>rise up</mark> against them</strong>, <mark>and</mark> that the <strong><mark>climate catastrophe</strong></mark> they’ve created <mark>will</mark> start to <strong><mark>impede</strong> their <strong>business</strong> and <strong>security</u></strong></mark>. A few <u><mark>remedies are</mark> being experimented with</u>. Some <u>capitalists are hiring firms</u> of trained killers <u><mark>to <strong>protect</mark> them</strong> and their <strong><mark>water</mark> supply</strong> <mark>if we come for it.</mark> Others are securing <strong>getaway strategies</u></strong>–like buying up remote land in New Zealand complete with the world’s freshest water sources–to wait out the apocalypse. And <u>in the meantime, scarcity exacerbated by climate change is driving up water prices, and with them profits, everywhere.</p><p></u>In Nigeria, a walled city is being built off the country’s coast to shelter the rich and powerful in the event of a climate apocalypse. The project is bankrolled by the Chagoury Group. Its founder, Gilbert Chagoury, was a Nigerian billionaire and adviser to the dictatorship that murdered Kenule Saro-Wiwa. Before he was executed, Saro-Wiwa said that history would put his murderers on trial. But <u>if <strong>left unchallenged</strong>, our enemies can <strong>wait out the climate crisis</strong> on islands or <strong>sustain their rule</strong> through <strong>violent authoritarianism</strong>. The right side of history will <strong>win only through a collective struggle</strong> to the <strong>final victory</strong> of humanity</u> over the rule of profit. <u>Only then can <strong>water</strong>, <strong>nature</strong> and our <strong>wealth</strong> be used for <strong>human need</strong> and not for social control.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hausknost 19, 11-21-19—Assistant Professor at the Institute for Social Change and Sustainability at WU, Vienna University of Economics and Business (Daniel, “Tackling the political economy of transformative change,” https://www.cusp.ac.uk/themes/p/blog-dh-transformative-change/, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets] fulltext: Myth number one is the widespread belief in the feasibility of an absolute long-term decoupling of global environmental pressures from economic activity in a growth-oriented economy. It’s the myth of green growth. Decoupling an economy that is addicted to growth from its material and energetic base is impossible. I am part of a larger team of researchers that is currently undertaking a systematic review of the empirical evidence of absolute decoupling around the world. We assessed more than 800 publications from the past 20 years and found no evidence of the possibility of long-term and substantial absolute decoupling within the existing economic model. Those instances of decoupling that can be observed (like the UK or Germany in past years) result mainly from deindustrialisation and the outsourcing of energy-intensive industrial production to other countries. However, if we take the consumption of goods and services into account, we come to realise that absolute decoupling is not happening—at least not at a significant and meaningful level. Decouple we must, however, but this will arguably require a politics of sufficiency to complement efficiency, meaning that the absolute levels of consumption at least in the rich countries must decrease quite considerably. The outlook on a politics of sufficiency and on a degrowing consumption level, however, is arguably incompatible with market Capitalism (and here I deliberately use the ‘C’ word that has been the elephant in the room and that no one has mentioned in three days). Myth number two is the believe in—and the reliance on—conscious individual behaviour change. There is mounting scientific evidence that our continuous efforts to convince consumers in rich countries to finally become ‘sustainable’ is, by and large, futile. Insights from environmental sociology show that individual behaviour is embedded in and guided by social, cultural and material structures that constitute the riverbed in which our behaviour flows. Add to that the insight from behavioural science that our brains have to navigate more than 200 biases that pull us in different directions, and you will see that the resolution to behave sustainably in a fundamentally unsustainable economic system will have very modest chances of success. Of course, middle class consumers around the world increasingly mix some organic and fair trade products in their weekly shopping and do their recycling but this does not reduce their overall environmental footprint. Quite to the contrary, a study by the German Environmental Agency found that those social strata with the highest environmental awareness tend to have the largest environmental footprint, too. Myth number three, finally, is the belief that innovation will save us. There is a widespread belief today that we simply need to replace fossil energy with renewables and combustion technology with electric motors to save the climate and the biosphere. There is a number of complicated reasons why this is not good enough. One of them is that with the technologies we can expect to have available in the next two to three decades it will be impossible to simply substitute the entire global fossil energy consumption with renewables. The renewable revolution only works if energy and material consumption levels drop dramatically—quite the opposite of what we observe today. If we take the challenge seriously of saving this planet’s biosphere and human life within it, then the transformation required means to prioritise on the biophysical planetary boundaries and to build a new economy within them. I am convinced that this is possible without leaving anyone behind—the resulting economic system, however, may be fundamentally different from what we know today under the name of Capitalism. Transformation is a half-blind endeavour: we know what we do not want anymore—that is fossil fuels, unsustainable modes and levels of production and consumption as well as poverty and economic injustice—but we can impossibly predict what a sustainable, inclusive, socially just and egalitarian society might look like in practice and on a global scale. Thus, a political economy of transformation must start from disabling [shutting down] that which we do not want in order to make room for the new. A political economy of transformation must be based on the principles of an intentional, creative destruction. If there is a take away message from this opening reflection of mine, then it is that in order for a new door to open, you must close another door. Without closing the door to fossil-based overconsumption, the door to a sustainable economic model will not open up. For Joseph Schumpeter, who has coined the concept, ‘creative destruction’ was an inherent feature of Capitalist development. New key technologies emerge and destroy the old socio-technical paradigm and its industrial structure, leading to a new business cycle of economic growth. The directionality of creative destruction has been defined only by its capacity to enable new consumer utility and thus new opportunities for consumption and profit. This logic has no consideration for sustainability, but only for expansion. To subject the logic of creative destruction to the goal of a comprehensive sustainability transformation requires a radical politicisation of creative destruction. It means to make collective and binding political decisions on which doors to close and which doors to open. Intentionally changing the course of civilisational development cannot avoid the re-politicisation of the very nature of the economy by posing the question what purposes the economy should serve in the first place. Accordingly, the key concept of a transformative politics of creative destruction is that of decision, not of solution. We have plenty of solutions at hand. The world is full of wonderful solutions. But we need to decide for them. And that requires the willingness to enter into conflict, to attack vested interests and to take great risks. We need to make such decisions even at the risk that they do not lead to further business opportunities and economic growth, but that they might even shrink the monetary volume of the economy. Take agroecology as an example. The GSDR makes it very clear that agroecology offers one of the most promising solutions to unsustainable land-use and related GHG emissions. Agroecological practices are trusted to globally bind millions and millions of tons of carbon in the soil. But they are not a business model that promises more or higher profits to private companies. Agroecology promises sustainable livelihoods to millions if not billions of people, but it is incompatible with the dominant economic model on a large scale. If we want to have it anyway, we need to decide for it (and against certain types of industrial agriculture) and 0.0face the political struggle and contradictions that go along with such a decision. The transformation of complex systems from one state of dynamic equilibrium to another necessarily entails non-linear, disruptive and at times chaotic change. On the way the system changes its identity—otherwise there would be no transformation. We need to accept the fact that the coming decades will entail non-linear, disruptive and chaotic change. This might be intimidating, but it is quite normal behaviour for complex systems. ‘Policy coherence’ and some of the other expectations of harmonious governance are not compatible with the definition of transformation. Rather what we need is to disrupt the coherence of our economic system in order to push it away from its unsustainable equilibrium. In my view, we have two options: option one is to embrace the fact that a purposive and time-bound transformation entails non-linear, disruptive and by definition unpredictable forms of change and to build political institutions with the capacity, power and legitimacy to make transformative decisions of creative destruction. Option two is that we continue to talk about transformation without meaning transformation. That way we may well govern ourselves into irreversible climate collapse.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Only reducing consumption can avert irreversible warming </h4><p>Hausknost 19</strong>, 11-21-19—Assistant Professor at the Institute for Social Change and Sustainability at WU, Vienna University of Economics and Business (Daniel, “Tackling the political economy of transformative change,” https://www.cusp.ac.uk/themes/p/blog-dh-transformative-change/, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]</p><p><u>Myth number one is the</u> widespread <u>belief in the <strong>feasibility of</u></strong> an absolute long-term <u><strong>decoupling</strong> of</u> global <u>environmental pressures from economic activity</u> in a growth-oriented economy. It’s the myth of green growth. <u><mark>Decoupling</mark> an economy that is <strong>addicted to growth</strong> from its material and energetic base <mark>is <strong>impossible</u></strong></mark>. I am part of <u>a <strong>larger team of researchers</u></strong> that is currently <u>undertaking a <strong><mark>systematic review</strong> of</mark> the <strong>empirical evidence</u></strong> of absolute decoupling around the world. We <u>assessed <strong>more than <mark>800 publications</strong></mark> from the past 20 years and <mark>found <strong>no ev</mark>idence</strong> of the possibility of</u> long-term and substantial absolute <u>decoupling</u> within the existing economic model. Those <u><mark>instances</u></mark> of decoupling <u>that can be observed</u> (like the UK or Germany in past years) <u><strong><mark>result</mark> mainly</strong> <mark>from</u></mark> deindustrialisation and <u>the <strong><mark>outsourcing</strong></mark> of energy-intensive industrial production</u> to other countries. However, <u>if we take</u> the <u><strong>consumption</u></strong> of goods and services <u>into account, we</u> come to <u>realise that absolute decoupling <strong>is not happening</u></strong>—at least not at a significant and meaningful level. Decouple we must, however, but this will arguably require a politics of sufficiency to complement efficiency, meaning that the absolute levels of consumption at least in the rich countries must decrease quite considerably. The outlook on a politics of sufficiency and on a degrowing consumption level, however, is arguably incompatible with market Capitalism (and here I deliberately use the ‘C’ word that has been the elephant in the room and that no one has mentioned in three days).</p><p><u>Myth number two is</u> the believe in—and the reliance on—<u><strong>conscious individual behaviour change</strong>. There is <strong>mounting scientific evidence</strong> that our continuous efforts to <strong>convince consumers in rich countries</strong> to</u> finally <u>become ‘<strong>sustainable</strong>’ is, <strong>by</strong> and <strong>large</strong>, <strong>futile</u></strong>. Insights from environmental sociology show that individual behaviour is embedded in and guided by social, cultural and material structures that constitute the riverbed in which our behaviour flows. Add to that the insight from behavioural science that our brains have to navigate more than 200 biases that pull us in different directions, and you will see that the resolution to behave sustainably in a fundamentally unsustainable economic system will have very modest chances of success. Of course, middle class consumers around the world increasingly mix some <u><strong>organic</strong> and <strong>fair trade products</u></strong> in their weekly shopping <u>and</u> do their <u><strong>recycling</u></strong> but this <u><strong>does not reduce</u></strong> their <u><strong>overall environmental footprint</strong>. <strong>Quite to the contrary</strong>, <mark>a <strong>study</u></strong></mark> by the German Environmental Agency <u><mark>found</mark> that <strong><mark>those</mark> social strata</strong> <mark>with</mark> the <strong><mark>highest</mark> environmental <mark>awareness</strong></mark> tend to <mark>have the <strong>largest</mark> environmental <mark>footprint</u></strong></mark>, too.</p><p><u>Myth number three</u>, finally, <u>is the belief that <strong>innovation will save us</u></strong>. There is a widespread belief today that we simply need to replace fossil energy with renewables and combustion technology with electric motors to save the climate and the biosphere. There is a number of complicated reasons why this is not good enough. One of them is that <u>with the <strong><mark>tech</mark>nologies we can expect to have available</strong> <mark>in</mark> the next <strong>two</strong> to <strong>three <mark>decades</strong></mark> it <mark>will be <strong>impossible</strong> to</mark> simply <strong><mark>substitute</mark> the entire global <mark>fossil energy</mark> consumption</strong> with renewables. The <mark>renewable</mark> revolution <strong><mark>only works</strong> if</mark> energy and material <mark>consumption</mark> levels <strong><mark>drop dramatically</strong></mark>—<strong>quite the opposite</strong> of what we observe today</u>.</p><p><u>If we take the challenge seriously of <strong>saving this planet’s biosphere</strong> and <strong>human life</u></strong> within it, <u>then the <strong>transformation required</strong> means to prioritise on the <strong>biophysical planetary boundaries</strong> and to <strong>build a new economy</strong> within them</u>. I am convinced that this is possible without leaving anyone behind—<u>the resulting economic system</u>, however, <u>may be <strong>fundamentally different</u></strong> from what we know today under the name of Capitalism.</p><p>Transformation is a half-blind endeavour: we know what we do not want anymore—that is fossil fuels, unsustainable modes and levels of production and consumption as well as poverty and economic injustice—but we can impossibly predict what a sustainable, inclusive, socially just and egalitarian society might look like in practice and on a global scale.</p><p>Thus, a political economy of <u>transformation must start from</u> disabling <u>[<strong>shutting down</strong>] that which we <strong>do not want</strong> in order to <strong>make room for the new</u></strong>. A political economy of <u>transformation <strong>must be based</strong> on</u> the principles of an <u><strong>intentional</strong>, <strong><mark>creative destruction</u></strong></mark>. If there is a take away message from this opening reflection of mine, then it is that <u>in order for a <strong>new door to open</strong>, you must <strong>close another door</strong>. Without <strong>closing the door to fossil-based overconsumption</strong>, the door to <mark>a sustainable</mark> economic <mark>model <strong>will not open up</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>For Joseph Schumpeter, who has coined the concept, ‘creative destruction’ was an inherent feature of Capitalist development. New key technologies emerge and destroy the old socio-technical paradigm and its industrial structure, leading to a new business cycle of economic growth. The directionality of creative destruction has been defined only by its capacity to enable new consumer utility and thus new opportunities for consumption and profit. This logic has no consideration for sustainability, but only for expansion.</p><p>To subject the logic of creative destruction to the goal of a comprehensive sustainability transformation requires a radical politicisation of creative destruction. It means to make collective and binding political decisions on which doors to close and which doors to open. <u><strong>Intentionally changing the course</strong> of civilisational development <strong>cannot avoid</u></strong> the re-politicisation of the very nature of the economy by <u>posing the question <strong>what purposes the economy should serve</strong> in the first place</u>.</p><p>Accordingly, the key concept of a transformative politics of creative destruction is that of decision, not of solution. <u>We have <strong>plenty of <mark>solutions</strong></mark> at hand. The world is <strong>full of wonderful solutions</strong>. But we <strong>need to decide for them</strong>. And that <strong><mark>requires</mark> the willingness</strong> to <strong>enter into conflict</strong>, to <strong>attack vested interests</strong> and to <strong>take great risks</strong>. We need to make such decisions <strong>even at the risk</strong> that they <strong>do not lead to further</u></strong> business opportunities and <u><strong>economic growth</strong>, but that they might even <strong><mark>shrink</u></strong></mark> the monetary volume of <u><strong>the <mark>economy</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>Take agroecology as an example. The GSDR makes it very clear that <u><strong>agro<mark>ecology</strong></mark> offers one of the <strong>most promising solutions</strong> to unsustainable land-use and related GHG emissions</u>. Agroecological practices are trusted to globally bind millions and millions of tons of carbon in the soil. <u>But they are <strong>not a business model</strong> that promises <strong>more</strong> or <strong>higher profits</u></strong> to private companies. <u>Agroecology promises <strong>sustainable livelihoods</u></strong> to millions if not billions of people, <u>but</u> it <u><mark>is <strong>incompatible</strong> with the <strong>dominant</mark> economic <mark>model</u></strong></mark> on a large scale. <u>If we want to have it anyway, we need to decide for it</u> (and against certain types of industrial agriculture) <u>and 0.0<strong>face the political struggle</strong> and <strong>contradictions</strong> that go along with such a decision.</p><p>The <mark>transformation</mark> of complex systems</u> from one state of dynamic equilibrium to another <u><strong>necessarily <mark>entails non-linear</strong>, <strong>disruptive</strong> and</u></mark> at times <u><strong><mark>chaotic change</strong></mark>. On the way the <mark>system <strong>changes</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>identity</strong></mark>—<mark>otherwise</mark> there would be <strong><mark>no transformation</strong></mark>. We <strong>need to accept the fact</strong> that the <strong>coming decades</strong> will entail <strong>non-linear</strong>, <strong>disruptive</strong> and <strong>chaotic change</strong>. This</u> might be intimidating, but it <u>is <strong>quite normal behaviour</strong> for complex systems</u>.</p><p><u>‘<strong>Policy coherence</strong>’ and</u> some of the other expectations of <u><strong>harmonious governance</strong> are <strong>not compatible</strong> with the definition of transformation</u>. Rather what <u><mark>we need</u></mark> is <u><mark>to <strong>disrupt</mark> the coherence</strong> of <mark>our <strong>economic system</u></strong></mark> in order <u>to <strong>push it <mark>away</strong> from</mark> its <strong>unsustainable equilibrium</u></strong>.</p><p>In my view, <u>we have two options: option one is to <strong>embrace the fact</strong> that</u> a purposive and time-bound <u>transformation entails <strong>non-linear</strong>, <strong>disruptive</strong> and</u> by definition <u><strong>unpredictable forms of change</u></strong> and to build political institutions with the capacity, power and legitimacy to make transformative decisions of creative destruction. <u>Option two is</u> that we continue to talk about transformation without meaning transformation. That way we may well govern ourselves into <u><strong><mark>irreversible climate collapse</u></strong></mark>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hughes 16 fulltext: Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies in PAIS, Research Associate at Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, degrees from Universities of Oxford, Rochester, and Sheffield (Christopher, Japan’s Resentful Realism and Balancing China’s Rise, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Summer 2016, P. 109-150, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#sec-2)//SJ Might Japan’s international strategy shift radically, or indeed is it already beginning a radical shift in response to China’s rise? How might such a shift exert impact, long-term, on Sino–Japanese security relations, and US-led attempts to ‘rebalance’ the regional security order? Might Japanese ‘Revisionist’ governments even actively and overtly balance against China? Japan clearly maintains a fundamental interest in the rise of China, possible associated disturbances in the overall international system and East Asian regional order and, most especially, the prospect of US unipolarity being displaced by a new multipolarity, or even China’s eventual challenge for hegemonic dominance.1 Japan’s vital interest in these developments is, of course, intensified all the more by its close geographical proximity to China, and interdependence of political, economic, and security interests; and by its position in the post-war period as essentially a status quo power supportive of the continuation of the US-led international order, and bound to the US by an ever-deepening alliance relationship. The expectation should be that any shifts in the US-led international and regional systems in which Japan has been so firmly embedded, and as precipitated by China, should pose questions about the precipitation of a similar counter-reaction from Japan. The more radical the impact of China on the regional order, the more proportionately radical Japan’s response might be. Japan may choose to channel its response via the US–Japan alliance, and this may bolster the US security presence in the Asia-Pacific. Alternatively, if Chinese hegemony is truly perceived as on the cards, then this might be considered as necessitating Japan’s initiation of a counter-hegemonic strategy, either in conjunction with or separate from the USA—all with potential ramifications for stability as the two largest East Asian states contend over the shape of the regional security order. Thus far, however, Japan’s reaction to China’s rise has been regarded—so the public argument goes for the majority of Japanese and US policymakers and commentators—as highly restrained, and as demonstrating no fundamental change in Japanese international strategy.2 Japanese policymakers, such as current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, even as they work to revise national security strategies and military capabilities to guard against China’s rise—most notably the Abe government’s passing in September 2015 of extensive legislation to overturn the 60-year-old ban on the exercise of collective self-defence to expand the range of military support for the US–Japan alliance—utilize language to describe such strategy as a ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ (sekkyoku-teki heiwashugi), so to stress essential continuity with the demilitarized post-war past rather than change. Abe has argued in National Diet policy speeches that ‘the peaceful rise of China offers a great opportunity for Japan as well as for the international community. Under the principle of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” (senryaku-teki gokei kankei), we will further strengthen the trend of improving relations’.3 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) maintains the official position that, despite various bilateral ‘differences’, especially over territorial and maritime security, ‘Stable Japan-China relations are essential not only to the citizens of both countries, but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as whole. Accordingly, based on the concept of the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests”, the Government of Japan will promote the development of Japan-China relations from a broad perspective through continued dialogues and cooperation at various levels.’4 Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 stressed that, even in response to China’s perceived attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, ‘Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalation’, so claiming that it would not be the power to break the status quo.5 Meanwhile, US–Japan alliance managers and insiders flatly reiterate the mantra that Japan remains a disciplined partner in any hedging strategy towards China.6 From the perspective of Neo-realism, many analysts agree that Japan has so far failed to react to the changing international structure or to display either significant balancing, or less probable bandwagoning behaviour, vis-à-vis China’s rise. Japan’s apparent lack of a balancing impulse appears to defy the conventional Neo-realist predictions of state behaviour and to continue to fulfil its characterization as a ‘structural anomaly’.7 In the absence of a compelling Neo-realist analysis, in recent years much explanation of Japan’s international relations has lapsed into Constructivist perspectives, which stress the primacy of deep-rooted domestic anti-militaristic norms and principles over international structural pressures.8 For the Constructivist take on Japan, therefore, the emphasis has been on continuity and stasis in Japan’s international strategy, to the point where its security policy is claimed as akin to an ‘immovable object’.9 Meanwhile, although Neo-liberal Institutionalism has been more marginal as a distinct perspective applied to Japan, especially given the dominance of Constructivism and its ‘positive’ norms of anti-militarism that offer crossover with key tenets of Liberalism-type outcomes, it too has emphasized continuity in Japanese international strategy, or ‘Cautious Liberalism’, marked again by a lack of impulse to pursue balancing.10 In the midst of this Constructivist stranglehold on the study of Japan’s international and security orientation, the best traction Neo-realism and its variants has been able to gain on the debate has been to introduce explanations that essentially corroborate the consensus on Japan’s lack of propensity to diverge from its post-war security stance and to avoid active balancing. Japan has been evaluated as pursuing various ‘Realist’-oriented strategies to respond to China’s rise, such as a Japanese-specific variant of ‘Defensive Realism’, which sees Japan concentrating on ‘homeland defence’ through the acquisition of ‘defensive’ weaponry and the eschewing of broader international security objectives outside its own territory that would involve influencing the balance of power.11 Japan has also been categorized as pursuing a ‘buck-passing’ strategy and essentially passive reliance on the USA to cope with China’s rise.12 More prevalently, Japan has been perceived as moving towards a strategy of ‘Reluctant Realism’, with a gradualistic propensity to work with its US ally to meet common security challenges.13 ‘Reluctant Realism’ is the view that perhaps edges closest to suggesting that Japan might cautiously consider balancing China, but in all these variants of Neo-realism/Realism, Japan is regarded as largely passive in responding to China’s rise, and likely to balance solely via the mechanism of the US–Japan alliance and never individually. In fact, most Neo-realist/Realist views settle on the argument that at the very most Japan is set to hedge rather than balance against China’s rise, or in one important formulation to practice ‘cooperative engagement with a soft hedge’.14 The somewhat curious implicit consensus among the supposedly contending perspectives of Neo-realism, Constructivism, and Liberalism that Japan has been, continues to be, and will likely remain, highly restrained in responding to China’s rise might seem to render redundant any further discussion of a possibly more radical Japanese reaction, including the impulse to balance more actively. Japan’s ‘Yoshida Doctrine’—classically formulated as a concentration on economic engagement, an ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ security posture, and reliance on the shield of US hegemony—would appear to be a highly entrenched grand strategy for Japanese policymakers.15<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Japan says yes—they have a <u>fundamental interest</u> in enhanced US engagement with China</h4><p><strong>Hughes 16</strong> </p><p>Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies in PAIS, Research Associate at Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, degrees from Universities of Oxford, Rochester, and Sheffield (Christopher, Japan’s Resentful Realism and Balancing China’s Rise, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Summer 2016, P. 109-150, <u>http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#sec-2</u>)//SJ</p><p>Might Japan’s international strategy shift radically, or indeed is it already beginning a radical shift in response to China’s rise? How might such a shift exert impact, long-term, on Sino–Japanese security relations, and US-led attempts to ‘rebalance’ the regional security order? Might Japanese ‘Revisionist’ governments even actively and overtly balance against China? <u><strong><mark>Japan</mark> clearly <mark>maintains a fundamental interest in the rise of China</u></strong>,</mark> possible <u><strong>associated</u></strong> disturbances in the overall international system and East Asian regional order and, most especially, <u><strong>the prospect of US unipolarity being displaced by a new multipolarity, or even China’s eventual challenge for hegemonic dominance.</strong>1</u> <u><strong><mark>Japan’s vital interest in these developments is</mark>,</u></strong> of course, <u><strong><mark>intensified </mark>all the more <mark>by </mark>its close geographical <mark>proximity</mark> to China,</u></strong> and<u><strong> interdependence of political, economic, and security interests</u></strong>; and by its position in the post-war period as essentially a status quo power supportive of the continuation of the US-led international order, <u><strong>and bound to the US by an ever-deepening alliance relationship.</u></strong> The expectation should be that any shifts in the US-led international and regional systems in which Japan has been so firmly embedded, and as precipitated by China, should pose questions about the precipitation of a similar counter-reaction from Japan. <u><strong>The more radical the impact of China on the regional order, the more proportionately radical Japan’s response might be. Japan may choose to channel its response via the US–Japan alliance</u></strong>, and <u><strong>this may bolster the US security presence in the Asia-Pacific.</u></strong> Alternatively, <u><strong>if Chinese hegemony is truly perceived as on the cards, then this might be considered as necessitating Japan’s initiation of a counter-hegemonic strategy</u></strong>, either in conjunction with or separate from the USA—all with potential ramifications for stability as the two largest East Asian states contend over the shape of the regional security order. Thus far, however, <u><strong>Japan’s reaction to China’s rise has been regarded</u></strong>—so the public argument goes for the majority of Japanese and US policymakers and commentators—<u><strong>as highly restrained, </u></strong>and as demonstrating no fundamental change in Japanese international strategy.<u>2</u> <u><strong>Japanese policymakers, such as current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, even as they work to revise national security strategies and military capabilities to guard against China’s rise</u></strong>—most notably the Abe government’s passing in September 2015 of extensive legislation to overturn the 60-year-old ban on the exercise of collective self-defence to expand the range of military support for the US–Japan alliance—<u><strong>utilize language to describe such strategy as a ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’</u></strong> (sekkyoku-teki heiwashugi), <u><strong>so to stress essential continuity with the demilitarized post-war past rather than change</u></strong>. <u><strong>Abe has argued</u></strong> in National Diet policy speeches <u><strong>that ‘the peaceful rise of China offers a great opportunity for Japan as well as for the international community</u></strong>. Under the principle of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” (senryaku-teki gokei kankei), we will further strengthen the trend of improving relations’.<u>3</u> <u><strong>Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs</u></strong> (MOFA) <u><strong>maintains the official position that, despite various bilateral ‘differences’, especially over territorial and maritime security, ‘Stable <mark>Japan-China relations are essential </mark>not only to the citizens of both countries, but also<mark> to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as whole</u></strong>.</mark> Accordingly, based on the concept of the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests”, the Government of Japan will promote the development of Japan-China relations from a broad perspective through continued dialogues and cooperation at various levels.’<u>4</u> Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 stressed that, even in response to China’s perceived attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, ‘<u><strong><mark>Japan will urge China to </mark>exercise <mark>self-restrain</mark>t and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalation’</u></strong>, so claiming that it would not be the power to break the status quo.<u>5</u> Meanwhile, US–Japan alliance managers and insiders flatly reiterate the mantra that Japan remains a disciplined partner in any hedging strategy towards China.<u>6</u> From the perspective of Neo-realism, many analysts agree that <u><strong>Japan has so far failed to react to the changing international structure or to display either significant balancing,</u></strong> or less probable bandwagoning behaviour, <u><strong>vis-à-vis China’s rise</u></strong>. Japan’s apparent lack of a balancing impulse appears to defy the conventional Neo-realist predictions of state behaviour and to continue to fulfil its characterization as a ‘structural anomaly’.<u>7</u> In the absence of a compelling Neo-realist analysis, in recent years much explanation of Japan’s international relations has lapsed into Constructivist perspectives, which stress the primacy of deep-rooted domestic anti-militaristic norms and principles over international structural pressures.<u>8</u> For the Constructivist take on Japan, therefore, the <u><strong>emphasis has been on continuity and stasis in Japan’s international strategy,</u></strong> to the point where its security policy is claimed as akin to an ‘immovable object’.<u>9</u> Meanwhile, although Neo-liberal Institutionalism has been more marginal as a distinct perspective applied to Japan, especially given the dominance of Constructivism and its ‘positive’ norms of anti-militarism that offer crossover with key tenets of Liberalism-type outcomes, it too has emphasized continuity in Japanese international strategy, or ‘Cautious Liberalism’, marked again by a lack of impulse to pursue balancing.<u>10</u> In the midst of this Constructivist stranglehold on the study of Japan’s international and security orientation, the best traction Neo-realism and its variants has been able to gain on the debate has been to introduce explanations that essentially corroborate the consensus on Japan’s lack of propensity to diverge from its post-war security stance and to avoid active balancing. <u><strong>Japan has been evaluated as pursuing various ‘Realist’-oriented strategies to respond to China’s rise</u></strong>, such as a Japanese-specific variant of ‘Defensive Realism’, which sees Japan concentrating on ‘homeland defence’ through the acquisition of ‘defensive’ weaponry and the eschewing of broader international security objectives outside its own territory that would involve influencing the balance of power.<u>11</u> <u><strong><mark>Japan </mark>has also been categorized as <mark>pursuing</mark> a ‘buck-passing’ strategy and essentially <mark>passive reliance on the USA to cope with China</mark>’s rise.</strong>12<strong> </u></strong>More prevalently, <u><strong>Japan has been perceived as moving towards a strategy of ‘Reluctant Realism’, with a gradualistic propensity to work with its US ally to meet common security challenges</u></strong>.<u>13</u> ‘Reluctant Realism’ is the view that perhaps edges closest to suggesting that Japan might cautiously consider balancing China, but in all these variants of Neo-realism/Realism, <u><strong><mark>Japan is regarded as largely passive</mark> in responding to China’s rise, <mark>and likely to balance solely via the mechanism of the US–Japan alliance and never individually</mark>. </u></strong>In fact, most Neo-realist/Realist views settle on the argument that at the very most Japan is set to hedge rather than balance against China’s rise, or in one important formulation to practice ‘cooperative engagement with a soft hedge’.<u>14</u> The somewhat curious implicit consensus among the supposedly contending perspectives of Neo-realism, Constructivism, and Liberalism that Japan has been, continues to be, and will likely remain, highly restrained in responding to China’s rise might seem to render redundant any further discussion of a possibly more radical Japanese reaction, including the impulse to balance more actively<u><strong>. Japan’s ‘Yoshida Doctrine’—classically formulated as a concentration</u></strong> on economic engagement, an ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ security posture, and reliance <u><strong>on the shield of US hegemony—would appear to be a highly entrenched grand strategy for Japanese policymakers</u></strong>.<u>15</u> </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Muelhapt et al 19 [(Theodore J., Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, 30 year Space Systems Analyst and Operator, Marlon E. Sorge, Jamie Morin, Robert S. Wilson), “Space traffic management in the new space era,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering, 6/18/19, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.007] TDI fulltext: The last decade has seen rapid growth and change in the space industry, and an explosion of commercial and private activity. Terms like NewSpace or democratized space are often used to describe this global trend to develop faster and cheaper access to space, distinct from more traditional government-driven activities focused on security, political, or scientific activities. The easier access to space has opened participation to many more participants than was historically possible. This new activity could profoundly worsen the space debris environment, particularly in low Earth orbit (LEO), but there are also signs of progress and the outlook is encouraging. Many NewSpace operators are actively working to mitigate their impact. Nevertheless, NewSpace represents a significant break with past experience and business as usual will not work in this changed environment. New standards, space policy, and licensing approaches are powerful levers that can shape the future of operations and the debris environment. 2. Characterizing NewSpace: a step change in the space environment In just the last few years, commercial companies have proposed, funded, and in a few cases begun deployment of very large constellations of small to medium-sized satellites. These constellations will add much more complexity to space operations. Table 1 shows some of the constellations that have been announced for launch in the next decade. Two dozen companies, when taken together, have proposed placing well over 20,000 [twenty thousand] satellites in orbit in the next 10 [10]years. For perspective, fewer than 8100[eight thousand one hundred] payloads have been placed in Earth orbit in the entire history of the space age, only 4800 [1] remain in orbit and approximately 1950 [2] of those are still active. And it isn't simply numbers – the mass in orbit will increase substantially, and long-term debris generation is strongly correlated with mass. [Table 1 Omitted] This table is in constant flux. It is based largely on U.S. filings with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and various press releases, but many of the companies here have already altered or abandoned their original plans, and new systems are no doubt in work. Although many of these large constellations may never be launched as listed, the traffic created if just half are successful would be more than double the number of payloads launched in the last 60 years and more than 6 times the number of currently active satellites. Current space safety, space surveillance, collision avoidance (COLA) and debris mitigation processes have been designed for and have evolved with the current population profile, launch rates and density of LEO space. By almost any metric used to measure activity in space, whether it is payloads in orbit, the size of constellations, the rate of launches, the economic stakes, the potential for debris creation, the number of conjunctions, NewSpace represents a fundamental change. 3. Compounding effects of better SSA, more satellites, and new operational concepts The changes in the space environment can be seen on this figurative map of low Earth orbit. Fig. 1 shows the LEO environment as a function of altitude. The number of objects found in each 10 km “bin” is plotted on the horizontal axis, while the altitude is plotted vertically. Objects in elliptical orbits are distributed between bins as partial objects proportional to the time spent in each bin. Some notable resident systems are indicated in blue text on the right to provide an altitude reference. The (dotted) red line shows the number of objects in the current catalog tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). All the COLA alerts and actions that must be taken by the residents are due to their neighbors in the nearby bins, so the currently visible risk is proportional to the red line. The red line of the current catalog does not represent the complete risk; it indicates the risk we can track and perhaps avoid. A rule of thumb is that the current SSN LEO catalog contains objects about 10 cm or larger. It is generally accepted that an impact in LEO with an object 1 cm or larger will cause damage likely to be fatal to a satellite's mission. Therefore, there is a large latent risk from unobserved debris. While we cannot currently track and catalog much smaller than 10 cm, experiments have been performed to detect and sample much smaller objects and statistically model the population at this size [3]. The (solid) blue line represents the model of the 1 cm and larger debris that is likely mission-ending, usually called lethal but not trackable. If LEO operators avoid collisions with all the objects in the red line, they are nonetheless inherently accepting the risk from the blue line. This risk is already present. The (dashed) orange line is an estimate of the population at 5 cm and larger and is thus an estimate of what the catalog might conservatively be a few years after the Space Fence, a new radar system being built by the Air Force, comes on line (currently planned for 2019) [4]. Commercial companies offering space surveillance services, such as LeoLabs, ExoAnalytics, Analytic Graphics Inc., Lockheed, and Boeing, might also add to the number of objects currently tracked. Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) [13] specifically seeks to expand the use of commercial SSA services. Existing operators can expect a sharp increase in the number of warnings and alerts they will receive because of the increase in the cataloged population. Almost all the increase will come from newly detected debris [5]. The pace of safety operations for each satellite on orbit will significantly change because of the increase in the catalog from the Space Fence. This effect is compounded because the NewSpace constellations described in Table 1 will drastically change the profile of satellites in LEO. The green bars in Fig. 1 represent the number of objects that will be added to the catalog (red or orange lines) from only the NewSpace large LEO constellations at their operational altitudes. This does not include the rocket stages that launch them, or satellites in the process of being phased into or removed from the operational orbits. Neighbors of one of these new constellations may face a radically different operations environment than their current practices were designed to address. Satellites in these large LEO constellations typically have planned operational lifetimes of 5–10 years. Some companies have proposed to dispose of their satellites using low thrust electric propulsion systems, which would spiral satellites down over a period of months or years from operating altitudes as high as 1500 km through lower orbits where the Hubble Space Telescope, the International Space Station, and other critical LEO satellites operate [6]. Similar propulsive techniques would raise replacement satellites from lower launch injection orbits to higher operational orbits. These disposal and replenishment activities will add thousands of satellites each year transiting through lower altitudes and posing a risk to all resident satellites in those lower orbits. More importantly, failures will occur both among transiting satellites and operational constellations, potentially leaving hundreds more stranded along the transit path.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Alt cause – broad space privatization and existing debris. </h4><p><strong>Muelhapt et al 19</strong> [(Theodore J., Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, 30 year Space Systems Analyst and Operator, Marlon E. Sorge, Jamie Morin, Robert S. Wilson), “Space traffic management in the new space era,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering, 6/18/19, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.007] TDI</p><p>The last decade has seen rapid growth and change in the space industry, and an explosion of commercial and private activity. <u><strong>Terms like <mark>NewSpace or democratized space</mark> are often used to <mark>describe this global trend to develop faster and cheaper access to space</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>distinct from more traditional government-driven activities</u></strong> focused on security, political, or scientific activities. The easier access to space has opened participation to many more participants than was historically possible. This <u><strong><mark>new activity could</mark> profoundly <mark>worsen</mark> the <mark>space debris</mark> environment</u></strong>, <u><strong>particularly in</u></strong> low Earth orbit (<u><strong>LEO</u></strong>), but there are also signs of progress and the outlook is encouraging. Many NewSpace operators are actively working to mitigate their impact. Nevertheless, <u><strong>NewSpace represents a significant break with past experience and business as usual will not work in this changed environment. </u></strong>New standards, space policy, and licensing approaches are powerful levers that can shape the future of operations and the debris environment.</p><p>2. Characterizing NewSpace<u><strong>: a step change in the space environment</p><p></u></strong>In just the last few years, commercial companies have proposed, funded, and in a few cases begun deployment of very large constellations of small to medium-sized satellites. These constellations will add much more complexity to space operations. Table 1 shows some of the constellations that have been announced for launch in the next decade. <u><strong><mark>Two dozen companies</mark>, when taken together, <mark>have proposed placing</mark> well <mark>over</mark> 20,000 [<mark>twenty thousand] satellites in</mark> orbit in <mark>the next</mark> 10 <mark>[10]years</mark>. For perspective, fewer than 8100[eight thousand one hundred] payloads have been placed in Earth orbit in the entire history of the space age, only 480</u></strong>0 [1] <u><strong>remain in orbit and approximately 1950</u></strong> [2] <u><strong>of those are still active.</u></strong> And it isn't simply numbers – <u><strong>the mass in orbit will increase substantially, and long-term <mark>debris generation is strongly correlated with mass</mark>.</p><p>[Table 1 Omitted]</p><p></u></strong>This table is in constant flux. It is based largely on U.S. filings with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and various press releases, but many of the <u><strong>companies here have already altered or abandoned their original plans,</u></strong> and new <u><strong>systems are no doubt in work</u></strong>. Although many of these large constellations may never be launched as listed, the <u><strong>traffic created if just half are successful would be more than double the number of payloads launched in the last 60 years and more than 6 times the number of currently active satellites.</p><p>Current space safety, space surveillance, collision avoidance (COLA) and debris mitigation processes have been designed for and have evolved with the current population profile, launch rates and density of LEO space.</p><p><mark>By</u></strong></mark> almost <u><strong>any metric</u></strong> <u><strong>used to measure activity in space, whether it is payloads in orbit, the size of constellations, the rate of launches, the economic stakes, <mark>the potential for debris creation</mark>, the number of conjunctions, <mark>NewSpace represents</mark> a <mark>fundamental change.</p><p></u></strong></mark>3. Compounding effects of better SSA, more satellites, and new operational concepts</p><p>The changes in the space environment can be seen on this figurative map of low Earth orbit. Fig. 1 shows the LEO environment as a function of altitude. The number of objects found in each 10 km “bin” is plotted on the horizontal axis, while the altitude is plotted vertically. Objects in elliptical orbits are distributed between bins as partial objects proportional to the time spent in each bin. Some notable resident systems are indicated in blue text on the right to provide an altitude reference. The (dotted) red line shows the number of objects in the current catalog tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). All the COLA alerts and actions that must be taken by the residents are due to their neighbors in the nearby bins, so the currently visible risk is proportional to the red line.</p><p>The red line of the current catalog does not represent the complete risk; it indicates the risk we can track and perhaps avoid. A rule of thumb is that the current SSN LEO catalog contains objects about 10 cm or larger. <u><strong>It is generally accepted that an impact in LEO with an object 1 cm or larger will cause damage likely to be fatal to a satellite's mission.</u></strong> Therefore, there is a large latent risk from unobserved debris. While we cannot currently track and catalog much smaller than 10 cm, experiments have been performed to detect and sample much smaller objects and statistically model the population at this size [3]. The (solid) blue line represents the model of the 1 cm and larger debris that is likely mission-ending, usually called lethal but not trackable. If LEO operators avoid collisions with all the objects in the red line, they are nonetheless inherently accepting the risk from the blue line. This risk is already present.</p><p>The (dashed) orange line is an estimate of the population at 5 cm and larger and is thus an estimate of what the catalog might conservatively be a few years after the Space Fence, a new radar system being built by the Air Force, comes on line (currently planned for 2019) [4]. Commercial companies offering space surveillance services, such as LeoLabs, ExoAnalytics, Analytic Graphics Inc., Lockheed, and Boeing, might also add to the number of objects currently tracked. Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) [13] specifically seeks to expand the use of commercial SSA services.</p><p><u><strong>Existing operators can expect a sharp increase in the number of warnings and alerts they will receive because of the increase in the cataloged population. Almost all the increase will come from newly detected debris </u></strong>[5].</p><p>The pace of safety operations for each satellite on orbit will significantly change because of the increase in the catalog from the Space Fence. This effect is compounded because the NewSpace constellations described in Table 1 will drastically change the profile of satellites in LEO. The green bars in Fig. 1 represent the number of objects that will be added to the catalog (red or orange lines) from only the NewSpace<u><strong> large LEO constellations at their operational altitudes. This does not include the rocket stages that launch them, or satellites in the process of being phased into or removed from the operational orbits. Neighbors of one of these new constellations may face a radically different operations environment than their current practices were designed to address.</p><p>Satellites in these large LEO constellations typically have planned operational lifetimes of 5–10 years</u></strong>. Some companies have proposed to dispose of their satellites using low thrust electric propulsion systems, which would spiral satellites down over a period of months or years from operating altitudes as high as 1500 km through lower orbits where the Hubble Space Telescope, the International Space Station, and other critical LEO satellites operate [6]. Similar propulsive techniques would raise replacement satellites from lower launch injection orbits to higher operational orbits. These <u><strong><mark>disposal and replenishment activities</mark> will <mark>add thousands of satellites each year</mark> transiting through lower altitudes and posing a risk to all resident satellites <mark>in</mark> those <mark>lower orbits.</u></strong></mark> More importantly, <u><strong><mark>failures will occur</mark> both <mark>among transiting satellites and operational constellations,</mark> potentially <mark>leaving hundreds</mark> more <mark>stranded</mark> along the transit path.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Alecci 20. Scilla Alecci – investigative reporter and video journalist for ICIJ. “Crumbling economies must tackle tax evasion to meet coronavirus crisis, experts warn,” April 7, 2020. https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/crumbling-economies-must-tackle-tax-evasion-to-tackle-coronavirus-crisis-experts-warn/ fulltext: As emergency coronavirus medical and social programs lay bare economic and social deficiencies around the world, experts are calling for a more forceful tax response to the crisis. They said the dramatic spike in jobless claims combined with the vast additional burden on health systems should be a tax call-to-arms for governments internationally. The pandemic has highlighted global reliance on digital and pharmaceutical behemoths, and at the same time should shine a spotlight on their tax behavior, said Rasmus Corlin Christensen, a researcher with the International Centre for Tax and Development. “Digital giants [and other companies] have been exploiting the international tax system, using its legal opportunities to reduce their tax burden and design their business model around minimizing their tax bill,” Christensen told the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. “There is this mismatch between the important role that they play in our society and their tax behavior.” Now that governments are facing an economic meltdown, they are confronted with a reality that many economists and tax justice advocates have been warning about for a long time: more than $800 billion in lost tax revenues, annually. In 2016, the ICIJ-led Panama Papers investigation exposed the offshore financial dealings of politicians, companies and criminals, helping governments recover at least $1.2 billion in fines and back taxes by April 2019. But trillions of dollars remain hidden offshore. Gabriel Zucman, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, told ICIJ one of the clear lessons of the current economic dislocation was: “Tax havens are at the heart of the financial and budgetary crisis.” Each year, he estimates, 40% of multinational profits are shifted to tax havens and 8% of personal wealth is stashed offshore. As past ICIJ investigations revealed, some of those multinationals include tech companies like Facebook, Uber and Amazon that have become vital links across the world, as it scrambles to deal with the viral outbreak through mass quarantines. The list continues with Apple, which said it’s producing protective gear for medical workers, medtech companies like Medtronic, which produces ventilators, and Johnson & Johnson, which is working on a vaccine in partnership with a U.S. state agency. Experts say the paradox of the current crisis is that the revenue lost due to the actions of tax havens, and these and other corporate giants, could have been used to save lives and keep entire economies afloat as governments responded to the crisis. Tax lessons from the coronavirus Zucman said if there was one lesson we could take from the current economic crisis, it was: “Shoring up our public services starts with fighting tax avoidance and tax evasion more aggressively.” When countries like Luxembourg offer “tailored tax deals to multinational companies, when the British Virgin Islands enables money launderers to create anonymous companies for a penny, and Switzerland keeps the wealth of corrupt elites out of sight in its coffers,” Zucman said, “they all steal the revenue of foreign nations.” Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to such a system, with yearly tax losses estimated at around $200 billion, a figure roughly equivalent to the amount the United Nations predicts they will lose due to the coronavirus pandemic. While often rich in natural resources, those nations routinely see their precious commodities extracted by multinationals that shift profits out to their offshore shell companies and deprive the source country of much-needed tax revenue. Last year, ICIJ’s Mauritius Leaks investigation revealed how many corporations and wealthy individuals exploit so-called tax treaties to essentially divert tax revenue from poor nations back to their coffers. While legal, tax treaties often become a way to avoid paying tax in developing countries, which may not be able to compete with the incentives offered by tax havens like Mauritius and others. “Sustainable, robust public responses to shocks require administrative capacity and tax resources,” Christensen said. “Tax avoidance and global tax competition, more broadly, strain the ability of countries to raise those resources.” To level the playing field, member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have been working on reforming the global tax system, which was set up in a pre-internet era. The plan would include new ways of taxing digital companies and reallocating some of their profits to the countries where they have customers — often different from their business address or the subsidiary holding their intellectual property. (Think, for instance, of social media, e-commerce or mobile banking companies that may be incorporated in Europe but make lots of profits in developing countries.) The OECD plan would also call for a minimum global effective tax rate for multinationals, making it harder to move profits around and cut their tax bills. The result is estimated to be an additional $100 billion of revenue a year, Christensen said. However, many important details, such as the minimum tax rate, are yet to be decided. And, in a tragic turn of events, the negotiations — which could benefit the countries whose economies are being badly hit by the coronavirus — may stall because of the pandemic. To mitigate COVID-19’s impact on global economies, some experts have also suggested more effective reforms targeting wealthy individuals and tax evasion. “Tax systems play another crucial role in that economic question at the heart of this crisis,” wrote Tax Justice Network’s Nicholas Shaxson, also the author of “Treasure Islands: Tax havens and the Men who Stole the World.” “Now is the time to push hard for tax justice,” he added, “calling for a strong fiscal stimulus which will lead to poor and vulnerable people paying less and rich people and strong, profitable corporations paying more.” ‘Solidarity is the best strategy’ The outbreak and the ensuing lockdown have “disproportionately” hit the most vulnerable, as high-income earners can continue to work from home or use their wealth “to weather the shock,” according to a recent study by Zucman, Camille Landais and Emmanuel Saez. “Solidarity is the best strategy,” the economists wrote in the report which focuses on Europe and its tax system. However, past crises have shown that more long-term reforms are necessary to create a sustainable system that lasts long after the emergency is over. A time-limited wealth tax on Europe’s 1%, they explained, could generate a large amount of tax revenue while preserving wealth for the rest of the population. Globally, bold measures are also needed to enforce laws against tax evasion, which causes an increased tax burden and an unequal distribution of such burden. Take for example, Italy, which has the world’s highest number of COVID-19-related deaths and recently announced a $28 billion plan to rescue the virus-hit economy. The country has a 30% evasion rate and, in 2016, it lost $118.5 billion to tax dodging and underreporting, according to the latest government estimates. “The taxes that are evaded have to be compensated for by higher taxes on the law-abiding,” Zucman told ICIJ via email “or else they translate into less public goods and services for the rest of us — such as less access to health care.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Tax <u>evasion</u> and <u>avoidance</u> locks in prolonged de-growth---<u>sustainable responses</u> require tax revenue. </h4><p><strong>Alecci 20.</strong> Scilla Alecci<u> – investigative reporter and video journalist for ICIJ. “Crumbling economies must tackle tax evasion to meet coronavirus crisis, experts warn,” April 7, 2020. https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/crumbling-economies-must-tackle-tax-evasion-to-tackle-coronavirus-crisis-experts-warn/</p><p>As <strong>emergency <mark>coronavirus</mark> medical and social programs</strong> lay bare economic and social deficiencies</u> around the world, <u>experts are call</u>ing <u>for a more <strong>forceful tax response</strong> to the crisis</u>. <u>They said the dramatic <strong>spike in jobless claims</u></strong> <u>combined with the vast additional <strong>burden on health systems</u></strong> <u><mark>should be <strong>a tax call-to-arms</u></strong></mark> <u>for governments</u> internationally. <u>The pandemic has highlighted global reliance on digital and pharmaceutical behemoths, and at the same time should <strong>shine a spotlight on their tax behavior</u></strong>, said Rasmus Corlin Christensen, a researcher with the International Centre for Tax and Development. “<u>Digital giants [and other <mark>companies</mark>] <mark>have been exploiting the</mark> international <mark>tax system</mark>, using its legal opportunities <mark>to <strong>reduce their</mark> tax <mark>burden</strong></mark> and design their business model around <strong>minimizing their tax bill</u></strong>,” Christensen told the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. “<u>There is this mismatch between the important role that they play in our society and their tax behavior.</u>” <u>Now that governments are facing an economic meltdown, they are confronted with a reality that many economists and tax justice advocates have been warning about for a long time: <strong>more than <mark>$800 billion</strong> in lost tax revenues, <strong>annually</strong></mark>.</u> In 2016, <u>the</u> ICIJ-led <u>Panama Papers</u> investigation <u>exposed the offshore financial dealings of politicians, companies and criminals, helping governments recover at least <strong>$1.2 billion</strong> in fines and back taxes</u> by April 2019. <u>But <strong><mark>trillions</strong></mark> of dollars <mark>remain <strong></mark>hidden <mark>offshore</strong></mark>.</u> Gabriel Zucman, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, told ICIJ one of the clear lessons of the current economic dislocation was: “<u><mark>Tax havens are</mark> at <mark>the <strong>heart</strong> of the <strong>financial</mark> and budgetary <mark>crisis</strong></mark>.</u>” Each year, he estimates, <u>40% of multinational profits are shifted to tax havens and 8% of personal wealth is stashed offshore.</u> As past ICIJ investigations revealed, some of those multinationals include tech companies like Facebook, Uber and Amazon that have become vital links across the world, as it scrambles to deal with the viral outbreak through mass quarantines. The list continues with Apple, which said it’s producing protective gear for medical workers, medtech companies like Medtronic, which produces ventilators, and Johnson & Johnson, which is working on a vaccine in partnership with a U.S. state agency. <u>Experts say the paradox of the current crisis is that the <mark>revenue lost</mark> due to the actions of <strong>tax havens</strong>, and these and other corporate giants, <mark>could</mark> have been used to save lives and <strong><mark>keep</mark> entire <mark>economies afloat</strong></mark> as governments responded to the crisis</u>. Tax lessons from the coronavirus Zucman said <u>if there was one lesson we could take from the current economic crisis, it was: “<mark>Shoring up</mark> our <strong>public <mark>services</strong> starts with fighting tax avoidance and</mark> tax <mark>evasion</mark> <strong>more <mark>aggressively</strong></mark>.”</u> <u>When countries like Luxembourg offer “tailored tax deals to multinational companies, when the British Virgin Islands enables money launderers to create anonymous companies for a penny, and Switzerland keeps the wealth of corrupt elites out of sight in its coffers,”</u> Zucman said<u>, “they all steal the revenue of foreign nations.”</u> Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to such a system, with yearly tax losses estimated at around $200 billion, a figure roughly equivalent to the amount the United Nations predicts they will lose due to the coronavirus pandemic. While often rich in natural resources, those nations routinely see their precious commodities extracted by multinationals that shift profits out to their offshore shell companies and deprive the source country of much-needed tax revenue. Last year, ICIJ’s Mauritius Leaks investigation revealed how many corporations and wealthy individuals exploit so-called tax treaties to essentially divert tax revenue from poor nations back to their coffers. While legal, tax treaties often become a way to avoid paying tax in developing countries, which may not be able to compete with the incentives offered by tax havens like Mauritius and others. “<u><strong>Sustainable, robust public <mark>responses</strong> </mark>to shocks <mark>require</mark> administrative capacity and <mark>tax resources</u></mark>,” Christensen said. “<u><strong>Tax avoidance</strong> and global tax competition, more broadly, strain the ability of countries to <strong>raise those resources</strong>.</u>” To level the playing field, member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have been working on reforming the global tax system, which was set up in a pre-internet era. The plan would include new ways of taxing digital companies and reallocating some of their profits to the countries where they have customers — often different from their business address or the subsidiary holding their intellectual property. (Think, for instance, of social media, e-commerce or mobile banking companies that may be incorporated in Europe but make lots of profits in developing countries.) <u>The OECD plan</u> would also <u>call for</u> a minimum global effective tax rate for multinationals, <u>making it harder to move profits around and cut their tax bills.</u> The result is estimated to be an additional $100 billion of revenue a year, Christensen said. However, many important details, such as the minimum tax rate, are yet to be decided. And, in a tragic turn of events, the negotiations — which could benefit the countries whose economies are being badly hit by the coronavirus — may stall because of the pandemic. <u><mark>To mitigate COVID</u></mark>-19<u>’s <strong>impact on global economies</u></strong>, some <u>experts have</u> also <u>suggested more effective reforms <mark>target</u>ing</mark> <u>wealthy individuals and <strong><mark>tax evasion</strong></mark>.</u> “<u>Tax systems play another crucial role in that economic question at the heart of this crisis</u>,” wrote Tax Justice Network’s Nicholas Shaxson, also the author of “Treasure Islands: Tax havens and the Men who Stole the World.” “<u><strong><mark>Now</strong> is the time</mark> to push hard for tax justice</u>,” he added, “<u>calling for a strong fiscal stimulus which will lead to poor and vulnerable people paying less and rich people and strong, profitable corporations paying more.</u>” ‘Solidarity is the best strategy’ <u>The outbreak and the ensuing lockdown have “disproportionately” hit the most vulnerable, as high-income earners can continue to work from home or use their wealth “to weather the shock,”</u> according to a recent study by Zucman, Camille Landais and Emmanuel Saez. “<u>Solidarity is the best strategy</u>,” the economists wrote in the report which focuses on Europe and its tax system. However, <u><strong><mark>past crises</strong></mark> have <mark>show</mark>n that more <strong><mark>long-term</strong> reforms </mark>are necessary to <mark>create a <strong>sustainable system</strong> that lasts <strong>long after</mark> the emergency</strong> is over.</u> A time-limited wealth tax on Europe’s 1%, they explained, could generate a large amount of tax revenue while preserving wealth for the rest of the population. Globally, <u>bold measures are</u> also <u>needed to enforce laws against tax evasion, which causes an increased tax burden and an unequal distribution of such burden.</u> Take for example, Italy, which has the world’s highest number of COVID-19-related deaths and recently announced a $28 billion plan to rescue the virus-hit economy. The country has a 30% evasion rate and, in 2016, it lost $118.5 billion to tax dodging and underreporting, according to the latest government estimates. <u>“The taxes that are evaded have to be <strong>compensated for by higher taxes</strong> on the law-abiding,”</u> Zucman told ICIJ via email <u>“or else they translate into less public goods and services for the rest of us — such as <strong>less access to health care</strong>.”</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Itza 17 (Felycia , Georgetown Law, J.D “Environmental Education in the Every Student Succeeds Act and the Role of Advocates” Georgetown Environmental Law Review, 29 Geo. Envtl. L. Rev. 417 Winter 2017) fulltext: Education has historically been regarded as the responsibility of the states. n61 As such, any education policy promulgated by the federal government usually tries to achieve a balance between federal, state, and local control. This concept is referred to as the "federalism fence" n62 and is present in policy areas aside from education as well. Typically, federalism fence legislation will include a goal, standard, or program, but leave the details to be determined by the states. This allows for the furthering of a federal goal with minimal intrusion into the states' side of the metaphorical fence. Education is a policy area that can be described as existing in the states' yard. This Part will first establish that there are certain reasons related to education why Congress and the Department of Education will tread further into the states' yard than usual. This Part will then argue that environmental education is not one of those reasons. Congress and the Department of Education are more likely to cross the federalism fence in education policy and regulation when it comes to ensuring equal access to education, particularly for low-income children, minority children, [427] and children with disabilities. n63 For example, the stated purpose of NCLB is "to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education." n64 It goes on to specifically mention "highest-poverty schools, limited English proficient children, migratory children, children with disabilities, Indian children, neglected or delinquent children, and young children in need of reading assistance." n65 In the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Congress states "it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist state and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to ensure equal protection of the law." These purposes speak to Congress's intention behind the act and define what the Secretary of the Department of Education will have in mind when promulgating regulations. By definition, environmental education is seemingly unrelated to equality or equal access to education. Although ESSA's stated purpose is "to provide all children significant opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and high-quality education and to close educational achievement gaps," n67 and does not include specific language identifying discrete groups, it is still primarily concerned with equality. Thus, when promulgating regulations or non-regulatory guidance, the Secretary will have equality in mind, and it is unlikely that environmental education will be a priority.Advocates, however, might think that environmental education is a subject that would fall within the realm of equality. Globally, environmental education is mandated and viewed as a right in several countries. In Brazil, a national mandate requires all public schools to include environmental education in the academic curriculum. n68 The Brazilian government recognizes environmental education as a legally protected right. n69 In Australia, the national government works closely with state and territory agencies to create environmental education curriculum. n70 The Netherlands mandates environmental education as one of its core subjects in primary schools. n71 In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child was passed by the United Nations General Assembly, which determined, amongst other things, that "education of the child shall be directed to: the development of respect for their natural environment." n72 A total of 191 countries ratified the [428] Convention, and it received early bipartisan support in the United States. n73 The U.S. has not yet ratified the Convention, but it did sign it, which shows its intention to do so. n74 Although this might seem compelling, in the United States there is no right to education mentioned anywhere, not even general K-12 education. n75 Thus, it is unlikely that the United States would ever consider environmental education a right, and even more unlikely that it would nationally mandate the subject. Advocates might also point to the Equal Justice Movement ("EJM"), which started as part of The Civil Rights Movement, for further reason to believe that the federal government may one-day view environmental education as a matter of equality. The EPA defines environmental justice as: Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies. Meaningful involvement means that: (1) people have an opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect their environment and/or health; (2) the publics contribution can influence the regulatory agency's decision; (3) their concerns will be considered in the decision making process; and (4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected. The EJM has drawn attention to how the most polluted environments in the United States primarily affect poor and minority populations. n77 The Movement refers to this phenomenon as "environmental racism." n78 One solution to environmental racism could be environmental education, as it would achieve the meaningful involvement the Movement seeks. The NAAEE states that "environmental education is a process that helps individuals, communities, and organizations learn more about the environment, develop skills to investigate their environment and to make intelligent, informed decisions about how they can help [429] take care of it." n79 The connection between environmental education and the EJM movement is clear, but it still seems like a stretch to argue that this could lead to environmental education being viewed as a right or nationally mandated when neither Congress nor the Department of Education has done so for education generally even in the face of blatant segregation and discrimination. The Department of Education's general avoidance of curriculum involvement further inhibits the promotion of environmental education. For example, NCLB hoped and ESSA hopes to improve the quality of education through "challenging" standards particularly in the areas of "math, reading or language arts and science." n80 Even though Congress is asking the states for higher standards in those subjects, Congress leaves it to the states to decide what those standards should be. n81 If Congress is hesitant to allow the Department of Education to create mere standards in core subjects in order to respect the states' side of the fence, it is even less likely to promulgate curricular regulations for a new, optional subject like environmental education, let alone a national mandate. Another roadblock to the Department of Education's promotion of environmental education is the political debate surrounding the subject. n82 As a government agency, the Department of Education is an unelected and therefore a non-politically accountable entity that in theory is supposed to make decisions based on evidence. Although it is possible that there could eventually be evidence showing the benefits of environmental education, given that it is new, data on such benefits is limited. Without evidence in support of regulatory decisions, and the political tension, the Secretary might choose to avoid the subject altogether so as not to infringe upon the states in a particularly political way. When considering environmental education from the perspective of the federalism fence, it seems doubtful that the Department of Education will take additional steps to promote environmental education or promulgate any extensive regulations. In the next Part, I will discuss how advocates can compensate for the language in the statute and the minimal federal involvement to realize the success they believe ESSA can achieve.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Fed doesn’t have mandatory environmental education requirements – but we are cooperative federalism</h4><p><strong>Itza 17</strong> (Felycia , Georgetown Law, J.D “Environmental Education in the Every Student Succeeds Act and the Role of Advocates” Georgetown Environmental Law Review, 29 Geo. Envtl. L. Rev. 417 Winter 2017)</p><p>Education has historically been regarded as the responsibility of the states. n61 As such, <u><strong>any education policy promulgated by the federal government usually tries to achieve a balance between federal, state, and local control. </u></strong>This concept is <u><strong>referred to as the "federalism fence</u></strong>" n62 and is present in policy areas aside from education as well. Typically, <u><strong>federalism fence legislation will include a goal, standard, or program, but leave the details to be determined by the states. This allows for the furthering of a federal goal with minimal intrusion into the states' side of the metaphorical fence. Education is a policy area that can be described as existing in the states' yard.</u></strong> This Part will first establish that there are certain reasons related to education why Congress and the Department of Education will tread further into the states' yard than usual. This Part will then argue that <u><strong>environmental education is not one of those reasons.</u></strong> <u><strong>Congress and the Department of Education are more likely to cross the federalism fence in education policy and regulation when it comes to ensuring equal access to education</u></strong>, particularly for low-income children, minority children, [427] and children with disabilities. n63 For example, the stated purpose of NCLB is "to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education." n64 It goes on to specifically mention "highest-poverty schools, limited English proficient children, migratory children, children with disabilities, Indian children, neglected or delinquent children, and young children in need of reading assistance." n65 In the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Congress states "it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist state and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to ensure equal protection of the law." These purposes speak to Congress's intention behind the act and define what the Secretary of the Department of Education will have in mind when promulgating regulations<u><strong>. By definition, environmental education is seemingly unrelated to equality or equal access to education. Although ESSA's stated purpose is "to provide all children significant opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and high-quality education and to close educational achievement gaps," n67 and does not include specific language identifying discrete groups, it is still primarily concerned with equality. Thus, when promulgating regulations or non-regulatory guidance, the Secretary will have equality in mind, and it is unlikely that environmental education will be a priority.</u></strong>Advocates, however, might think that environmental education is a subject that would fall within the realm of equality. <u><strong>Globally, environmental education is mandated and viewed as a right in several countries. In Brazil, a national mandate requires all public schools to include environmental education in the academic curriculum. </u></strong>n68 The Brazilian government recognizes environmental education as a legally protected right. n69 <u><strong>In Australia, the national government works closely with state and territory agencies to create environmental education curriculum</u></strong>. n70 <u><strong>The Netherlands mandates environmental education as one of its core subjects in primary schools.</u></strong> n71 In 1989, <u><strong>the Convention on the Rights of the Child was passed by the United Nations General Assembly, which determined, amongst other things, that "education of the child shall be directed to: the development of respect for their natural environment."</u></strong> n72 <u><strong>A total of 191 countries ratified the</u></strong> [428] <u><strong>Convention, and it received early bipartisan support in the United States.</u></strong> n73 <u><strong>The U.S. has not yet ratified the Convention, but it did sign it, which shows its intention to do so. n74 Although this might seem compelling, in the United States there is no right to education mentioned anywhere, not even general K-12 education.</u></strong> n75 <u><strong>Thus, it is unlikely that the United States would ever consider environmental education a right, and even more unlikely that it would nationally mandate the subject.</u></strong> Advocates might also point to the Equal Justice Movement ("EJM"), which started as part of The Civil Rights Movement, for further reason to believe that the federal government may one-day view environmental education as a matter of equality. The EPA<u><strong> </u></strong>defines environmental justice as: Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies. Meaningful involvement means that: (1) people have an opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect their environment and/or health; (2) the publics contribution can influence the regulatory agency's decision; (3) their concerns will be considered in the decision making process; and (4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected. The EJM has drawn attention to how the most polluted environments in the United States primarily affect poor and minority populations. n77 The Movement refers to this phenomenon as "environmental racism." n78 One solution to environmental racism could be environmental education, as it would achieve the meaningful involvement the Movement seeks. The NAAEE states that "environmental education is a process that helps individuals, communities, and organizations learn more about the environment, develop skills to investigate their environment and to make intelligent, informed decisions about how they can help [429] take care of it." n79 The connection between environmental education and the EJM movement is clear, but it still seems like a stretch to argue that this could lead to environmental education being viewed as a right or nationally mandated when neither Congress nor the Department of Education has done so for education generally even in the face of blatant segregation and discrimination. The Department of Education's general avoidance of curriculum involvement further inhibits the promotion of environmental education. For example, NCLB hoped and ESSA hopes to improve the quality of education through "challenging" standards particularly in the areas of "math, reading or language arts and science." n80 Even though Congress is asking the states for higher standards in those subjects, Congress leaves it to the states to decide what those standards should be. n81 <u><strong>If Congress is hesitant to allow the Department of Education to create mere standards in core subjects in order to respect the states' side of the fence, it is even less likely to promulgate curricular regulations for a new, optional subject like environmental education, let alone a national mandate. Another roadblock to the Department of Education's promotion of environmental education is the political debate surrounding the subject. n82 As a government agency, the Department of Education is an unelected and therefore a non-politically accountable entity that in theory is supposed to make decisions based on evidence. Although it is possible that there could eventually be evidence showing the benefits of environmental education, given that it is new, data on such benefits is limited. Without evidence in support of regulatory decisions, and the political tension, the Secretary might choose to avoid the subject altogether so as not to infringe upon the states in a particularly political way. When considering environmental education from the perspective of the federalism fence, it seems doubtful that the Department of Education will take additional steps to promote environmental education or promulgate any extensive regulations.</u></strong> In the next Part, I will discuss how advocates can compensate for the language in the statute and the minimal federal involvement to realize the success they believe ESSA can achieve.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Astore ’13 Astore, William. “The Business of America Is War: Disaster Capitalism on the Battlefield and in the Boardroom.” Truthout. 21 October 2018. https://truthout.org/articles/the-business-of-america-is-war-disaster-capitalism-on-the-battlefield-and-in-the-boardroom/. [Premier] fulltext: There is a new normal in America: our government may shut down, but our wars continue. Congress may not be able to pass a budget, but the U.S. military can still launch commando raids in Libya and Somalia, the Afghan War can still be prosecuted, Italy can be garrisoned by American troops (putting the “empire” back in Rome), Africa can be used as an imperial playground (as in the late nineteenth century “scramble for Africa,” but with the U.S. and China doing the scrambling this time around), and the military-industrial complex can still dominate the world’s arms trade. In the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, it’s business as usual, if your definition of “business” is the power and profits you get from constantly preparing for and prosecuting wars around the world. “War is a racket,” General Smedley Butler famously declared in 1935, and even now it’s hard to disagree with a man who had two Congressional Medals of Honor to his credit and was intimately familiar with American imperialism. War Is Politics, Right? Once upon a time, as a serving officer in the U.S. Air Force, I was taught that Carl von Clausewitz had defined war as a continuation of politics by other means. This definition is, in fact, a simplification of his classic and complex book, On War, written after his experiences fighting Napoleon in the early nineteenth century. The idea of war as a continuation of politics is both moderately interesting and dangerously misleading: interesting because it connects war to political processes and suggests that they should be fought for political goals; misleading because it suggests that war is essentially rational and so controllable. The fault here is not Clausewitz’s, but the American military’s for misreading and oversimplifying him. Perhaps another “Carl” might lend a hand when it comes to helping Americans understand what war is really all about. I’m referring to Karl Marx, who admired Clausewitz, notably for his idea that combat is to war what a cash payment is to commerce. However seldom combat (or such payments) may happen, they are the culmination and so the ultimate arbiters of the process. War, in other words, is settled by killing, a bloody transaction that echoes the exploitative exchanges of capitalism. Marx found this idea to be both suggestive and pregnant with meaning. So should we all. Following Marx, Americans ought to think about war not just as an extreme exercise of politics, but also as a continuation of exploitative commerce by other means. Combat as commerce: there’s more in that than simple alliteration. In the history of war, such commercial transactions took many forms, whether as territory conquered, spoils carted away, raw materials appropriated, or market share gained. Consider American wars. The War of 1812 is sometimes portrayed as a minor dust-up with Britain, involving the temporary occupation and burning of our capital, but it really was about crushing Indians on the frontier and grabbing their land. The Mexican-American War was another land grab, this time for the benefit of slaveholders. The Spanish-American War was a land grab for those seeking an American empire overseas, while World War I was for making the world “safe for democracy” — and for American business interests globally. Even World War II, a war necessary to stop Hitler and Imperial Japan, witnessed the emergence of the U.S. as the arsenal of democracy, the world’s dominant power, and the new imperial stand-in for a bankrupt British Empire. Korea? Vietnam? Lots of profit for the military-industrial complex and plenty of power for the Pentagon establishment. Iraq, the Middle East, current adventures in Africa? Oil, markets, natural resources, global dominance. In societal calamities like war, there will always be winners and losers. But the clearest winners are often companies like Boeing and Dow Chemical, which provided B-52 bombers and Agent Orange, respectively, to the U.S. military in Vietnam. Such “arms merchants” — an older, more honest term than today’s “defense contractor” — don’t have to pursue the hard sell, not when war and preparations for it have become so permanently, inseparably intertwined with the American economy, foreign policy, and our nation’s identity as a rugged land of “warriors” and “heroes” (more on that in a moment). War as Disaster Capitalism Consider one more definition of war: not as politics or even as commerce, but as societal catastrophe. Thinking this way, we can apply Naomi Klein’s concepts of the “shock doctrine” and “disaster capitalism” to it. When such disasters occur, there are always those who seek to turn a profit. Most Americans are, however, discouraged from thinking about war this way thanks to the power of what we call “patriotism” or, at an extreme, “superpatriotism” when it applies to us, and the significantly more negative “nationalism” or “ultra-nationalism” when it appears in other countries. During wars, we’re told to “support our troops,” to wave the flag, to put country first, to respect the patriotic ideal of selfless service and redemptive sacrifice (even if all but 1% of us are never expected to serve or sacrifice). We’re discouraged from reflecting on the uncomfortable fact that, as “our” troops sacrifice and suffer, others in society are profiting big time. Such thoughts are considered unseemly and unpatriotic. Pay no attention to the war profiteers, who pass as perfectly respectable companies. After all, any price is worth paying (or profits worth offering up) to contain the enemy — not so long ago, the red menace, but in the twenty-first century, the murderous terrorist. Forever war is forever profitable. Think of the Lockheed Martinsof the world. In their commerce with the Pentagon, as well as the militaries of other nations, they ultimately seek cash payment for their weapons and a world in which such weaponry will be eternally needed. In the pursuit of security or victory, political leaders willingly pay their price. Call it a Clausewitzian/Marxian feedback loop or the dialectic of Carl and Karl. It also represents the eternal marriage of combat and commerce. If it doesn’t catch all of what war is about, it should at least remind us of the degree to which war as disaster capitalism is driven by profit and power. For a synthesis, we need only turn from Carl or Karl to Cal — President Calvin Coolidge, that is. “The business of America is business,” he declared in the Roaring Twenties. Almost a century later, the business of America is war, even if today’s presidents are too polite to mention that the business is booming. America’s War Heroes as Commodities Many young people today are, in fact, looking for a release from consumerism. In seeking new identities, quite a few turn to the military. And it provides. Recruits are hailed as warriors and warfighters, as heroes, and not just within the military either, but by society at large. Yet in joining the military and being celebrated for that act, our troops paradoxically become yet another commodity, another consumable of the state. Indeed, they become consumed by war and its violence. Their compensation? To be packaged and marketed as the heroes of our militarized moment. Steven Gardiner, a cultural anthropologist and U.S. Army veteran, has written eloquently about what he calls the “heroic masochism” of militarized settings and their allure for America’s youth. Put succinctly, in seeking to escape a consumerism that has lost its meaning and find a release from dead-end jobs, many volunteers are transformed into celebrants of violence, seekers and givers of pain, a harsh reality Americans ignore as long as that violence is acted out overseas against our enemies and local populations. Such “heroic” identities, tied so closely to violence in war, often prove poorly suited to peacetime settings. Frustration and demoralization devolve into domestic violence and suicide. In an American society with ever fewer meaningful peacetime jobs, exhibiting greater and greater polarization of wealth and opportunity, the decisions of some veterans to turn to or return to mind-numbing drugs of various sorts and soul-stirring violence is tragically predictable. That it stems from their exploitative commodification as so many heroic inflictors of violence in our name is a reality most Americans are content to forget. You May Not Be Interested in War, but War Is Interested in You As Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky pithily observed, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” If war is combat and commerce, calamity and commodity, it cannot be left to our political leaders alone — and certainly not to our generals. When it comes to war, however far from it we may seem to be, we’re all in our own ways customers and consumers. Some pay a high price. Many pay a little. A few gain a lot. Keep an eye on those few and you’ll end up with a keener appreciation of what war is actually all about. No wonder our leaders tell us not to worry our little heads about our wars — just support those troops, go shopping, and keep waving that flag. If patriotism is famously the last refuge of the scoundrel, it’s also the first recourse of those seeking to mobilize customers for the latest bloodletting exercise in combat as commerce. Just remember: in the grand bargain that is war, it’s their product and their profit. And that’s no bargain for America, or for that matter for the world.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>War is not a function of politics – war is <u>first</u> and <u>foremost</u> an extension of <u>capitalism</u>. Arms sales are just one manifestation of the <u>military-industrial complex</u> that drives war.<strong> Only analysis through capital solves anything.</h4><p>Astore ’13</strong> Astore, William. “The Business of America Is War: Disaster Capitalism on the Battlefield and in the Boardroom.” Truthout. 21 October 2018. https://truthout.org/articles/the-business-of-america-is-war-disaster-capitalism-on-the-battlefield-and-in-the-boardroom/. [Premier]</p><p>There is a new normal in America: our government may shut down, but our wars continue. <u><strong>Congress may not be able to pass a budget, but the U.S. military can still launch commando raids in Libya and Somalia, the Afghan War can still be prosecuted, Italy can be garrisoned by American troops</u></strong> (putting the “empire” back in Rome), Africa can be used as an imperial playground (as in the late nineteenth century “scramble for Africa,” but with the U.S. and China doing the scrambling this time around), and <u><strong>the <mark>military-industrial complex can still dominate the world’s arms trade. In the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, it’s business as usual, if your definition of “business” is the power and profits you get from constantly preparing for and prosecuting wars around the world</u></strong></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>War is a racket</u></strong></mark>,” General Smedley Butler famously declared in 1935, and even now it’s hard to disagree with a man who had two Congressional Medals of Honor to his credit and was intimately familiar with American imperialism. War Is Politics, Right? Once upon a time, as a serving officer in the U.S. Air Force, I was taught that Carl von Clausewitz had defined war as a continuation of politics by other means. This definition is, in fact, a simplification of his classic and complex book, On War, written after his experiences fighting Napoleon in the early nineteenth century. <u><strong>The idea of war as a continuation of politics is</u></strong> both moderately interesting and <u><strong>dangerously misleading: <mark>interesting because it connects war to political processes and suggests that they should be fought for political goals; misleading because it suggests that war is essentially rational and so controllable</mark>.</u></strong> The fault here is not Clausewitz’s, but the American military’s for misreading and oversimplifying him. Perhaps another “Carl” might lend a hand when it comes to helping Americans understand what war is really all about. I’m referring to Karl Marx, who admired Clausewitz, notably for his idea that combat is to war what a cash payment is to commerce. <u><strong>However seldom combat</u></strong> (or such payments) <u><strong>may happen, they are the culmination and so the ultimate arbiters of the process. <mark>War</mark>, in other words, <mark>is settled by killing, a bloody transaction that echoes the exploitative exchanges of capitalism.</u></strong> </mark>Marx found this idea to be both suggestive and pregnant with meaning. So should we all. Following Marx, <u><strong><mark>Americans ought to think about war</u></strong> </mark>not just as an extreme exercise of politics, but also <u><strong><mark>as a continuation of exploitative commerce by other means.</u></strong></mark> Combat as commerce: there’s more in that than simple alliteration. <u><strong>In the history of war, such commercial transactions took many forms, whether as territory conquered, spoils carted away, raw materials appropriated, or market share gained.</u></strong> Consider American wars. <u><strong>The War of 1812</u></strong> is sometimes portrayed as a minor dust-up with Britain, involving the temporary occupation and burning of our capital, but it really <u><strong>was about crushing Indians on the frontier and grabbing their land. The Mexican-American War was another land grab, this time for the benefit of slaveholders. The Spanish-American War was a land grab for</u></strong> those seeking <u><strong>an American empire overseas, while World War I was for</u></strong> making the world “safe for democracy” — and for <u><strong>American business interests globally.</u></strong> Even World War II, a war necessary to stop Hitler and Imperial Japan, witnessed the emergence of the U.S. as the arsenal of democracy, the world’s dominant power, and the new imperial stand-in for a bankrupt British Empire. <u><strong><mark>Korea? Vietnam? Lots of profit for the military-industrial complex and plenty of power for the Pentagon establishment.</mark> Iraq, the Middle East, current adventures in Africa? <mark>Oil, markets, natural resources, global dominance</mark>. In societal calamities like war, </u></strong>there will always be winners and losers. But <u><strong>the <mark>clearest winners are often companies like Boeing and Dow Chemical, which provided B-52 bombers and Agent Orange</mark>, respectively, to the U.S. military in Vietnam. Such “arms merchants”</u></strong> — an older, more honest term than today’s “defense contractor” — <u><strong>don’t have to pursue the hard sell, not when <mark>war and preparations for it have become so permanently, inseparably intertwined with the American economy, foreign policy, and our nation’s identity as a rugged land of “warriors” and “heroes”</u></strong> </mark>(more on that in a moment). War as Disaster Capitalism Consider one more definition of war: not as politics or even as commerce, but as societal catastrophe. Thinking this way, <u><strong>we can apply Naomi Klein’s concepts of the “shock doctrine” and “disaster capitalism”</u></strong> to it. <u><strong>When such disasters occur, there are always those who seek to turn a profit.</u></strong> <u><strong>Most Americans are</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>discouraged from thinking about war this way</u></strong> thanks to the power of what we call “patriotism” or, at an extreme, “superpatriotism” when it applies to us, and the significantly more negative “nationalism” or “ultra-nationalism” when it appears in other countries. During wars, we’re told to “support our troops,” to wave the flag, to put country first, to respect the patriotic ideal of selfless service and redemptive sacrifice (even if all but 1% of us are never expected to serve or sacrifice). We’re discouraged from reflecting on the uncomfortable fact that, as “our” troops sacrifice and suffer, others in society are profiting big time. Such thoughts are considered unseemly and unpatriotic. <u><strong>Pay no attention to the war profiteers, who pass as perfectly respectable companies. After all, any price is worth paying</u></strong> (or profits worth offering up) <u><strong>to contain the enemy — not so long ago, the red menace, but in the twenty-first century, the murderous terrorist. Forever war is forever profitable. Think of the Lockheed Martinsof the world. In their commerce with the Pentagon, as well as the militaries of other nations, they ultimately seek cash payment for their weapons and a world in which such weaponry will be eternally needed.</u></strong> In the pursuit of security or victory, political leaders willingly pay their price. Call it a Clausewitzian/Marxian feedback loop or the dialectic of Carl and Karl. <u><strong>It also represents the eternal marriage of combat and commerce.</u></strong> If it doesn’t catch all of what war is about, it should at least remind us of the degree to which war as disaster capitalism is driven by profit and power. For a synthesis, we need only turn from Carl or Karl to Cal — President Calvin Coolidge, that is. “The business of America is business,” he declared in the Roaring Twenties. Almost a century later, <u><strong>the business of America is war, even if today’s presidents are too polite to mention that the business is booming. </u></strong>America’s War Heroes as Commodities Many young people today are, in fact, looking for a release from consumerism. In seeking new identities, quite a few turn to the military. And it provides. Recruits are hailed as warriors and warfighters, as heroes, and not just within the military either, but by society at large. Yet in joining the military and being celebrated for that act, our troops paradoxically become yet another commodity, another consumable of the state. Indeed, they become consumed by war and its violence. Their compensation? To be packaged and marketed as the heroes of our militarized moment. Steven Gardiner, a cultural anthropologist and U.S. Army veteran, has written eloquently about what he calls the “heroic masochism” of militarized settings and their allure for America’s youth. Put succinctly, in seeking to escape a consumerism that has lost its meaning and find a release from dead-end jobs, many volunteers are transformed into celebrants of violence, seekers and givers of pain, a harsh reality Americans ignore as long as that violence is acted out overseas against our enemies and local populations. Such “heroic” identities, tied so closely to violence in war, often prove poorly suited to peacetime settings. Frustration and demoralization devolve into domestic violence and suicide. In an American society with ever fewer meaningful peacetime jobs, exhibiting greater and greater polarization of wealth and opportunity, the decisions of some veterans to turn to or return to mind-numbing drugs of various sorts and soul-stirring violence is tragically predictable. That it stems from their exploitative commodification as so many heroic inflictors of violence in our name is a reality most Americans are content to forget. You May Not Be Interested in War, but War Is Interested in You As Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky pithily observed, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” <u><strong>If war is combat and commerce, calamity and commodity, it cannot be left to our political leaders alone</u></strong> — and certainly not to our generals. <u><strong>When it comes to war, however far from it we may seem to be, we’re all in our own ways customers and consumers.</u></strong> Some pay a high price. Many pay a little. A few gain a lot. Keep an eye on those few and you’ll end up with a keener appreciation of what war is actually all about. No wonder our leaders tell us not to worry our little heads about our wars — just support those troops, go shopping, and keep waving that flag. If <u><strong>patriotism is</u></strong> famously the last refuge of the scoundrel, it’s also <u><strong>the first recourse of those seeking to mobilize customers for the latest bloodletting exercise in combat as commerce</u></strong>. Just remember: <u><strong>in the grand bargain that is war, it’s their product and their profit. </u></strong>And that’s no bargain for America, or for that matter for the world.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Mollow 15[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Pg 85-88. Spring 2015. Accessed 3/6/20. https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf //Recut Houston Memorial DX from BL] fulltext: Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; 74 such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Subjectivity is defined through self-reflection- the confrontation with disability leads to ego death in primary pity, which necessitates secondary pity in an attempt to exclude disability, which renders disability as ontologically dead. </h4><p><strong>Mollow 15</strong>[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Pg 85-88. Spring 2015. Accessed 3/6/20. https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf //Recut Houston Memorial DX from BL]</p><p>Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. <u><strong>Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 <mark>Primary pity arises</mark> <mark>when one witnesses a fall of the self, </mark>a collapse <mark>of the ego</u></strong></mark>; 74 such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” <u><strong>Primary pity is difficult to bear because it <mark>involves</mark> a <mark>drive toward disability</mark> (one cannot bear not to look), which <mark>menaces</mark> <mark>the ego‟s</mark> <mark>investments </mark>in health, pleasure, and control—because to <mark>contemplate</mark> <mark>another</mark> person‟s <mark>suffering</mark> <mark>is to confront</mark> the question, “<mark>Could this happen to me</mark>?”</u></strong> Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. <u><strong><mark>Secondary pity attempts</mark> <mark>to</mark> <mark>heal</mark> primary pity‟s <mark>self-rupturing effects</mark> by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, <mark>and</mark> at the same time to <mark>defend against</mark> that <mark>threat to the ego</mark> <mark>by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense</mark>.</u></strong> Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that <u><strong><mark>trying to overcome pity</mark> will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately <mark>aggravates</mark> <mark>the violence of primary pity</mark>.</u></strong> One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. <u><strong>A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, <mark>primary pity is so unsettling</mark> <mark>that</mark> our <mark>culture</mark> has been driven to <mark>“mercifully” kill people</mark> in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to <mark>lock</mark> people <mark>in institutions</mark>, to let them <mark>languish on the streets</mark>, to stare, <mark>to punish</mark>, and to sentimentalize—<mark>all</mark>, I would suggest, <mark>in the interest of not</mark> owning, not naming, not <mark>acknowledging</mark> that self-shattering, <mark>ego-dissolving</mark>, instantaneous and intolerable moment of <mark>primary pity</mark>.</u></strong> Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Wolff 21 – Richard D, professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and a visiting professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University, in New York. “Massive Inequality Is a Feature of Capitalism, Not a Bug”, In These Times, https://inthesetimes.com/article/inequality-capitalism-biden-administration-economy, 02-08-2021 fulltext: To grasp the sheer magnitude of U.S. economic inequality in recent years, consider its two major stock market indices: the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 and Nasdaq. Over the last 10 years, the values of shares listed on them grew spectacularly. The S&P 500 went from roughly 1,300 points to over 3,800 points, almost tripling. The Nasdaq index over the same period went from 2,800 points to 13,000 points, more than quadrupling. Times were good for the 10 percent of Americans who own 80 percent of stocks and bonds. In contrast, the real median weekly wage rose barely over 10 percent across the same 10-year period. The real federal minimum wage fell as inflation diminished its nominal $7.25 per hour, officially fixed and kept at that rate since 2009. All the other relevant metrics likewise show that economic inequality in the United States kept worsening across the last half-century. This happened despite “concerns” about inequality expressed publicly across the years by many establishment politicians (including some in the new Biden administration), journalists, and academics. Inequality worsened through the capitalist downturns after 1970 and likewise through the three capitalist crashes of this century (2000, 2008, and 2020). Nor did the deadly pandemic provoke soul-searching or policies adequate to stop, let alone reverse, the ongoing redistribution of income and wealth upward. No advanced economics is required to grasp that divisions, bitterness, resentment, and anger flow from such a persistently widening gap between haves and have-nots. Among millions who search for explanations, many become prey for those mobilizing against scapegoats. White supremacists blame Black and Brown people. Nativists (calling themselves “patriots” or “nationalists”) point to immigrants and foreign trade partners. Fundamentalists blame those less zealous and especially the non-religious. Fascists try to combine those movements with economically threatened small-business owners, jobless workers, and alienated social outcasts to form a powerful political coalition. The fascists made good use of Trump to assist their efforts. U.S. history adds a special sharpness to the search for explanations. The dominant argument for capitalism in the 20th century after the 1930s Great Depression was that it “produced a great middle class.” Real U.S. wages had risen even during the Depression. They were generally higher than elsewhere across the globe, and especially in comparison with those in the USSR. High wages showed the superiority of U.S. capitalism according to the system’s apologists in politics, journalism, and academia. Demolition of that middle class at the end of the 20th and into the new century pained especially those who had bought the apologies. And indeed, the Great Depression and its aftermath had lessened inequality significantly, enabling such a defense of capitalism to have some semblance of validity. However, for that defense to be persuasive required two key facts to be forgotten or hidden. The first is that the U.S. working class fought harder for major economic gains in the 1930s than at any other time in U.S. history. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) then organized millions into labor unions utilizing militants from two socialist parties and a communist party. Those parties were then achieving their largest-ever numerical strengths and social influences. That is how and why together the unions and the parties won the establishment of Social Security, federal unemployment compensation, a minimum wage, and a huge federal jobs program: all firsts in U.S. history. The second fact is that capitalists in the 1930s and afterward fought harder than ever against each and every working-class advance. The “middle-class” status achieved by a large portion of the working class (by no means all and especially not minorities) happened despite not because of capitalism and capitalists. But it was certainly clever propaganda for capitalism to claim credit for working-class gains that capitalists tried but failed to block. The reduction of U.S. economic inequality accomplished then proved temporary. It was undone after 1945. Particularly after 1970, capitalism’s normal trajectory of deepening economic inequality resumed through to the present moment. Simply put, capitalism’s basic structure of production — how it organizes its enterprises — positioned capitalists to reverse the New Deal’s reduction of economic inequality. Much of the temporary U.S. middle class is now gone; the rest is fading fast. Over the last half-century, U.S. capitalism brought inequality to the extremes surrounding us now. No wonder a population once persuaded to support capitalism because it fostered a middle class now finds reasons to question it. In capitalist enterprises, tiny minorities of the persons involved occupy positions of leadership, command, and control. The owner, the owner’s family, the board of directors, or the major shareholders comprise such minorities: the class of employers. Opposite them are the vast majorities: the class of employees. The employer class determines, exclusively, what the enterprise produces, what technology it uses, where production occurs, and what is done with its net revenue. The employee class must live with the consequences of employers’ decisions from which it is excluded. The employer class uses its position atop the enterprise to distribute its profits partly to enrich itself (via dividends and top executive pay packages). It uses some of its profits to buy and control politics. The goal there is to prevent universal suffrage from moving the economic system beyond capitalism and the economic inequality it reproduces. Deepening U.S. inequality flows directly from this capitalist organization of production — its class system. Occasionally, under exceptional circumstances, rebellious social movements win reversals of that inequality. However, if such movements do not change the capitalist organization of production, capitalists will render such reversals temporary. To solve the extreme inequality of U.S. capitalism requires systemic change, an end to capitalism’s specific class structure pitting employers against employees. If production were organized instead in enterprises (factories, offices, stores) that were democratized — one worker, one vote — as worker cooperatives, economic inequality could and would be drastically reduced. Democratic decisions over the distribution of individual incomes across all the participants in an enterprise would far less likely give a small minority vast wealth at the expense of the vast majority. The same logic that dispensed with kings in politics applies to employers in capitalism’s enterprises.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Inequality is <u>baked</u> into <u>capitalism</u> – Even if the <u>AFF</u> wins a <u>temporary reversal</u>, capitalists will <u>overturn</u> it</h4><p><strong>Wolff 21</strong> – Richard D, professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and a visiting professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University, in New York. “Massive Inequality Is a Feature of Capitalism, Not a Bug”, In These Times, https://inthesetimes.com/article/inequality-capitalism-biden-administration-economy<u><strong>, 02-08-2021</p><p>To grasp the sheer magnitude</u></strong> <u><strong>of U.S. economic inequality in recent years, consider its two major stock market indices</u></strong>: <u><strong>the</u></strong> Standard and Poor <u><strong><mark>(S&P) 500</mark> and Nasdaq.</u></strong> Over the last 10 years, the <u><strong><mark>values of shares</mark> listed</u></strong> on them <u><strong>grew spectacularly</u></strong>. The S&P 500 went from roughly 1,300 points to over 3,800 points, almost tripling. The Nasdaq index over the same period went from 2,800 points to 13,000 points, <u><strong>more than <mark>quadrupl</mark>ing. Times were good for the 10 percent</u></strong> <u><strong>of Americans who own 80 percent of stocks</u></strong> and bonds. <u><strong><mark>In contrast</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>the <mark>real median</mark> weekly <mark>wage rose barely</mark> over <mark>10 percent</mark> across the same 10-year period. <mark>The</mark> real federal <mark>minimum wage fell</mark> as</u></strong> <u><strong>inflation diminished its nominal $7.25 per hour, officially fixed and kept at that rate since 2009.</p><p>All the other relevant metrics likewise show that economic <mark>inequality</mark> in the United</u></strong> <u><strong>States <mark>kept worsening</u></strong></mark> across the last half-century. <u><strong>This happened <mark>despite “concerns”</mark> about inequality</u></strong> <u><strong>expressed publicly across the years by many establishment politicians</u></strong> (including some in the new Biden administration), journalists, and academics. Inequality worsened through the capitalist downturns after 1970 and likewise through the three capitalist crashes of this century (2000, 2008, and 2020). <u><strong>Nor did the deadly pandemic provoke soul-searching or policies adequate to stop, let alone reverse, the ongoing redistribution of income and wealth upward.</p><p>No advanced economics is required to grasp that <mark>divisions</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong>bitterness</u></strong>, <u><strong>resentment</u></strong><mark>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>anger</u></strong> <u><strong>flow from</mark> <mark>such a </mark>persistently <mark>widening gap</u></strong></mark> between haves and have-nots. Among millions who search for explanations, <u><strong>many become prey for those mobilizing against</u></strong> <u><strong>scapegoats</u></strong>. <u><strong>White supremacists blame Black and Brown people. Nativists (</u></strong>calling themselves “patriots” or “nationalists”) <u><strong>point to immigrants and foreign trade partners</u></strong>. <u><strong>Fundamentalists blame those less zealous and especially the non-religious. Fascists try to combine those movements with economically threatened small-business owners</u></strong>, jobless workers, <u><strong>and alienated social outcasts to form a powerful political coalition</u></strong>. The fascists made good use of Trump to assist their efforts.</p><p>U.S. history adds a special sharpness to the search for explanations. The dominant argument for capitalism in the 20th century after the 1930s Great Depression was that it “produced a great middle class.” Real U.S. wages had risen even during the Depression. They were generally higher than elsewhere across the globe, and especially in comparison with those in the USSR. High wages showed the superiority of U.S. capitalism according to the system’s apologists in politics, journalism, and academia. Demolition of that middle class at the end of the 20th and into the new century pained especially those who had bought the apologies.</p><p>And indeed, the Great Depression and its aftermath had lessened inequality significantly, enabling such a defense of capitalism to have some semblance of validity. However, for that defense to be persuasive required two key facts to be forgotten or hidden. The first is that the U.S. working class fought harder for major economic gains in the 1930s than at any other time in U.S. history. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) then organized millions into labor unions utilizing militants from two socialist parties and a communist party. Those parties were then achieving their largest-ever numerical strengths and social influences. That is how and why together the unions and the parties won the establishment of Social Security, federal unemployment compensation, a minimum wage, and a huge federal jobs program: all firsts in U.S. history. The second fact is that capitalists in the 1930s and afterward fought harder than ever against each and every working-class advance. The “middle-class” status achieved by a large portion of the working class (by no means all and especially not minorities) happened despite not because of capitalism and capitalists. But it was certainly clever propaganda for capitalism to claim credit for working-class gains that capitalists tried but failed to block.</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>reduction</mark> <mark>of</mark> U.S. economic <mark>inequality</mark> accomplished </u></strong>then<u><strong> proved temporary</u></strong>. It <u><strong><mark>was undone after 1945</mark>. Particularly after 1970, <mark>capitalism’s normal trajectory</mark> of deepening economic inequality</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>resumed</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>through to the present moment</u></strong>. Simply put, <u><strong>capitalism’s basic structure of production</u></strong> — <u><strong>how it organizes its enterprises</u></strong> — <u><strong>positioned capitalists to reverse the New Deal’s reduction of economic inequality</u></strong>. <u><strong>Much of the temporary U.S. middle class is now gone; the rest is fading fast.</u></strong> Over the last half-century, U.S. <u><strong>capitalism brought inequality to the extremes surrounding us now.</u></strong> No wonder a population once persuaded to support capitalism because it fostered a middle class now finds reasons to question it.</p><p><u><strong><mark>In capitalist enterprises, tiny minorities</mark> of the persons involved <mark>occupy positions of</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>leadership, <mark>command</mark>, and control</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The ow</mark>ner,</u></strong> <u><strong>the owner’s family</u></strong>, <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>board</u></strong> of directors, <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong> <u><strong>the major shareholders</u></strong> <u><strong>comprise such minorities</mark>: the class of employers</u></strong>. <u><strong>Opposite them are the vast majorities: the class of employees. <mark>The employer class determines</mark>, exclusively, <mark>what the enterprise produces</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>what technology it uses</u></strong>, <u><strong>where production occurs</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>and what is done with</mark> its net <mark>revenue</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The employee class must live with the consequences of employers’ decisions from which it is excluded. The employer class <mark>uses</mark> its position atop the enterprise to distribute its <mark>profits</mark> partly <mark>to enrich itself</mark> (via dividends and top executive pay packages). It uses some of its profits <mark>to</u></strong> <u><strong>buy</mark> and control <mark>politics</u></strong></mark>. The goal there is to prevent universal suffrage from moving the economic system beyond capitalism and the economic inequality it reproduces.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Deepening</mark> U.S. <mark>inequality flows</mark> directly <mark>from this capitalist organization of production</u></strong> — <u><strong>its class system</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Occasionally</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>under exceptional circumstances</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>rebellious social movements win reversals</u></strong> <u><strong>of that inequality. However, if such movements</mark> <mark>do not change the capitalist organization</mark> of production</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>capitalists will render such reversals temporary</u></strong>. <u><strong>To solve</mark> the extreme <mark>inequality</mark> of U.S. capitalism</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>requires systemic change</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>an end to capitalism’s specific class structure pitting</u></strong> <u><strong>employers against employees</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>If production were</mark> organized instead in enterprises</u></strong> (factories, offices, stores) <u><strong>that were <mark>democratized</u></strong></mark> — one worker, one vote — <u><strong>as worker cooperatives</u></strong>, <u><strong>economic <mark>inequality</mark> could and <mark>would be drastically reduced</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>Democratic decisions over the distribution of individual incomes</u></strong> <u><strong>across all the participants in an enterprise would far less likely give a small minority vast wealth at the expense of the vast majority</u></strong>. The same logic that dispensed with kings in politics applies to employers in capitalism’s enterprises.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Mathew Maavak April 2021, Author at Atlas Institute for International Affairs, external researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University in Vilnius, Lithuania, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?,” Salus Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 2-17 fulltext: But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and self- sustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. Methodology An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. Economy According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. Environmental What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. Geopolitical The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction- adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Inequality-driven collapse escalates global hotspots, including reactor meltdowns. Its an existential threat. </h4><p>Mathew <strong>Maavak </strong>April <strong>2021</strong>, Author at Atlas Institute for International Affairs, external researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University in Vilnius, Lithuania, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?,” Salus Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 2-17</p><p>But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and self- sustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. <u><mark>Risks </mark>accrued in one system may <mark>cascade into</u></mark> an <u><mark>unforeseen crisis</u></mark> within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. Methodology An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. Economy According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “<u><mark>a global financial</u></mark> <u><mark>crash of a previously unprecedented scale</u></mark> is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This <u><mark>will lead to a</u></mark> trickle-down <u><mark>meltdown, impacting all</mark> </u>areas <u><mark>of human activity</u></mark>. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” <u><mark>and may lead to a Second Great Depression</u></mark>. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). <u><mark>Economic stressors</u></mark>, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also <u><mark>induce radical geopolitical realignments</u></mark>. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics <u><mark>– the United States and China</u></mark> – set <u><mark>on a collision course</u></mark> with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and <u><mark>a viral outbreak</u></mark> on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by <u><mark>rising nationalism and autarkic demands</u></mark>. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. Environmental What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate <u><mark>another</u></mark> Bhopal (1984), <u><mark>Chernobyl</u></mark> (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade <u><mark>climate change</u></mark>. Neither was the Fukushima <u><mark>nuclear disaster</u></mark> (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump <u><mark>radioactive wastes</u></mark> along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. Geopolitical The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include <u><mark>a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China </mark>military <mark>confrontation over Taiwan or </mark>the<mark> S</mark>outh<mark> C</mark>hina<mark> S</mark>ea;<mark> No</mark>rth<mark> Ko</mark>rean<mark> prolif</mark>eratio</u>n of nuclear and missile technologies; an <u><mark>India-Pakistan nuclear war</u></mark>; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; <u><mark>or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia</u></mark>. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction- adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: KatherineKellyAbraham’18 \|Three anonymous members of the Abolition Collective, April 22, 2018, “Burn it Down: Abolition, Insurgent Political Praxis, and the Destruction of Decency,” Abolition: A Journal of Insurgent Politics Volume 1 Issue 2. Footnotes i, iii, and iv included in curly braces\|KZaidi fulltext: This journal calls for abolition, a call implicitly asserting that contemporary sociopolitical and economic institutions are inherently unfixable and beyond resuscitation, reform, or rescue. The fantasy of radically changing political structures from within is simply not a viable political option for those concerned with the ultimate destruction of the mechanisms of carnage that shape modern life and its attendant regimes of governance, such as: the global war machine, the prison industrial complex, transnational resource extraction, and the national sacrifice areas (Ortiz 1992) generated in the wake of these lethal socioeconomic configurations and expressions of empire.[i] {As we further elaborate in the next section, we use the term “national sacrifice area,” coined by Simon Ortiz (Ortiz 1992, 337), to describe the intentional delineation of specific geopolitical areas that can be destroyed, with impunity, in order to consolidate Euro-American power—via resource extraction, for example.} Rather than drawing from these regimes of death for social and legal recognition, power, and welfare—what we broadly refer to as the “state”—consider what it would mean to the modern ordering of life to utterly destroy the state, to refuse its seductions and ruses of power, to incinerate it until nothing remains but ash? Our imperative to “burn it down” draws from a rich tradition of scholarship that positions the state as a technique, practice, and effect of modern governance and its optimization, rationalization, and normalization. Following Timothy Mitchell, we define the state as a “network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is maintained” (Mitchell 2006, 175). In the words of Michel Foucault, the state functions as “a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities” (Foucault 2004, 286). As a schematic and reality, we perceive the state as providing a legible matrix for the parameters of self-management and self-conduct: for social and political order. As Achille Mbembe insists, the adoption of state or sovereign power is “a twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation” (Mbembe 2003, 13). Attendant to the important critiques made by Fanon, we argue that this twofold process remains shaped by Euro-American colonial mores at the “objective as well as subjective level” of experience and perception (Fanon 2008, xv). That is to say, we understand state power as generative of inherently colonial relations of rule: relations that produce contemporary sociopolitical, juridical, and affective orientations, sensibilities, and subjectivities.[ii] As Glen Sean Coulthard argues, “colonial relations of power are no longer reproduced primarily through overtly coercive means, but rather through the asymmetrical exchange of mediated forms of state recognition and accommodation” (Coulthard 2014, 15). We add that the state accomplishes this mediation vis-à-vis the internalized politics of decency: an argument to which we shortly return. The project of this piece is not to think about how to make life more livable under current regimes of power or to ponder building something new or altered in the state’s place. Rather, we imagine alternative worlds based in the total abolition of these regimes because of their astonishingly responsive capabilities, which render profound social transformation impossible. The state successfully incorporates its margins and continually extends its representation in order to further its grasp on the body politic (for instance, the inclusion of women in combat roles or the Supreme Court ruling on same sex marriage). Simultaneously, and without coincidence, the state manipulates its boundaries through violent forms of capital accumulation and proxy wars, marks borders with fences and deportations, and uses its streets as a costly theater for subjects that deviate from its aims. However, the fundamentally lethal interests of state power have not changed since the European invasion of the Americas. Instead, global technologies of communication and visibility have forced the state to pivot, creating the illusion of a more transparent, democratic, and equal society. Nonetheless, the state relies on fantasies of “individual” participation (civil rights, voting, recognition, and protest) as much as it relies on its authoritarian power to revoke those fantasies without notice or recourse. As the violences executed by the state continue to shape everyday life in this country, we believe that it is by no means extreme to posit that one solution to these ills is to destroy—to burn down—contemporary institutions of governance, policing, and comfort, to cooperatively dismantle the workings of the state. For us, a radical project of abolition and insurgent political praxis refuses to negotiate with the state, or seek recognition from any of its bureaucratic apparatuses, in order to secure the small-scale concessions that only colonize and quell resistance. Political projects of compromise with the state have proven insufficient—especially in addressing everyday violence, such as police brutality, that continues to erupt unchecked in the face of mainstream “social justice” organizing. Ultimately, this organizing and activism treats the state as a central means of stopping the very political violence that insures its core function, operation, and maintenance. State tactics shift, but are nonetheless continually productive of social protocols for acceptable, legible citizens and aberrant, disposable subjects: a division and “existential deviation” (Fanon 2008, xvii) that we argue is rooted in Euro-American colonial power, such as white supremacy and heteropatriarchy. This power, which continues to inform the tangible parameters of the modern state, must remain the strategic target of abolition as a practice and vision if new worlds or alternative spaces of sociopolitical organization are to exist and thrive. As we show, one of the central challenges that insurgents face is the fact that colonial state power remains occluded by the representational moorings of the Euro-American civilizing mission, such as the political conceptions of civility and decency that remain the ideological cornerstones of democratic participation.[iii] {We loosely define “insurgents” as those political subjects who adamantly and violently refuse the seductions of the state, including its comforts and promises of safety. Consequently, these subjects are rendered disposable by the state, or are the focus of violent forms of state control, such as imprisonment, torture, and/or execution. Thus, we are not making an understatement to say that insurgents put their lives on the line for their politics. However, we do not make distinctions in this article between “good” insurgents vs. “bad” insurgents precisely because of the way Euro-American conceptual power is recuperated vis-à-vis these categorizations. Of course, we wrestle with the ethics of our position and consider this struggle to be the necessary and ongoing work of insurgent political organizing and strategizing.} These notions legitimize certain forms of organizing and comportment over others, ensuring that state power is distributed, unchanged, into the hands of those that best serve its interests. We dedicate the remainder of this article to examining how these concepts further colonial state power in order to ground our call for the incineration of decency as a starting point for insurgent political praxis. The terms “decency” and “civility” are used interchangeably in this article to describe a particular form of exclusionary, homicidal, and suicidal politics. This politics demands inclusion within the colonial state, as it currently exists—at the expense of dismantling white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, transphobia, and capitalism on a global level, in the name of respectability, conviviality, progress and democracy. Following Aimé Césaire, we argue that the politics of decency represents the true “barbarism” of the colonizer (Césaire 2000, 47). Césaire stated that: I make no secret of my opinion that at the present time the barbarism of Western Europe has reached an incredibly high level, being surpassed—far surpassed, it is true—by the barbarism of the United States. And I am not talking about Hitler, or the prison guard, or the adventurer, but about the “decent fellow” across the way…the respectable bourgeois [emphasis added] (Césaire 2000, 47). For Césaire, the problem of colonial domination did not lie solely within its more overt acts of death dealing, expressed “openly…in broad daylight” (Césaire 2000, 49). Rather, Césaire held that the problem of this domination also resided in its ideological shadows: its “decent” homes, families, schools and churches, its “respectable” citizen-subjects who turned a blind eye to the genocide shaping everyday life in colonized locations (e.g., the U.S.) and long before World War II. In fact, Césaire insisted that the politics of decency was central to legitimizing the genocide of the original civilizing mission: the violent implementation of Euro-American systems of thought, embodied taxonomies, historicity, and political governance to consolidate socioeconomic and biological power. As Césaire poignantly argued: “I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about achievements, diseases cured, improved standards of living. I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot…extraordinary possibilities wiped out” (Césaire 2000, 42). Thus, at the heart of the civilizing mission, the conceptual fuel that drove its murderous engine was the framing of its white supremacist, capitalist, and heteropatriarchal violences as the epitome of Euro-American decency and civility. We argue that the continued advancement and adoption of decency as a cultural commandment of behavior for participation in the civic sphere enacts the civilizing mission in its recalibrated form and lethally fortifies colonial statecraft and power. For example, these politics legitimize (what appears to be) the passive participation of the “decent fellow” and the “respectable bourgeois” in this mission vis-à-vis so-called “peaceful” desires for inclusion within the state. The danger of this passivity and desire is that both are absolutely violent and perpetuate an outside, “indecent” constituency. This “indecent” constituency is figured as the biopolitical break in the population that threatens to overrun state interests; wherein Muslims are imagined as terrorist, blackness is always already criminal, and whiteness remains the standard by which diversity is measured and extracted.[iv] {Foucault elaborates the term “biopolitics” to describe the contemporary techniques and technologies of governance that seek to maximize the productive and classificatory ordering of known political and biologic “life” and as an expression of sovereign or state power. Rather than the state wielding power through its ability to end life (through the “sword”), power expresses itself through the right to know, maximize, and shape the conditions of life. Examples of this include public health, institutions such as prisons or schools, conditions of labor, the bureaucracy of state management expressed in statistics, etc.} When everyday violence is deployed in the name of these ideologies, the state arbitrates between those who are innocent and guilty, offering a judgement that continues to be divided by race, class, gender, and sexuality. This violence is perceived as the “natural” expression of “civilization,” key to its maintenance and safety. When those who decry these judgements deploy violence, they do so outside of the Euro-American parameters of the “decent,” and are thus marked for rationalized, legitimized, “civilized” annihilation.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The affirmatives call for compulsory voting is cotemporaneous with what we will call: “politics of decency.” Decency is fundamentally a colonial enterprise that establishes a schema of intelligibility vis a vi the division between “good” and “bad” citizen subjects. The illusion of a “more democratic society” not only serves to calibrate the state’s ability to kill, but also leads to an internalized desire to aspire towards decency, thus eradicating the very potential for meaningful anti-institutional organizing. You should understand the politics of decency as fundamentally conducive of the current racial order – making possible globalized forms of authoritarian, racialized violence under the façade of democratic transparency. </h4><p><strong>KatherineKellyAbraham’18</strong> \|Three anonymous members of the Abolition Collective, April 22, 2018, “Burn it Down: Abolition, Insurgent Political Praxis, and the Destruction of Decency,” Abolition: A Journal of Insurgent Politics Volume 1 Issue 2. Footnotes i, iii, and iv included in curly braces\|KZaidi</p><p>This journal calls for abolition, a call implicitly asserting that contemporary sociopolitical and economic institutions are inherently unfixable and beyond resuscitation, reform, or rescue. The fantasy of radically changing political structures from within is simply not a viable political option for those concerned with the ultimate destruction of the mechanisms of carnage that shape modern life and its attendant regimes of governance, such as: the global war machine, the prison industrial complex, transnational resource extraction, and the national sacrifice areas (Ortiz 1992) generated in the wake of these lethal socioeconomic configurations and expressions of empire.[i] {As we further elaborate in the next section, we use the term “national sacrifice area,” coined by Simon Ortiz (Ortiz 1992, 337), to describe the intentional delineation of specific geopolitical areas that can be destroyed, with impunity, in order to consolidate Euro-American power—via resource extraction, for example.} Rather than drawing from these regimes of death for social and legal recognition, power, and welfare—what we broadly refer to as the “state”—consider what it would mean to the modern ordering of life to utterly destroy the state, to refuse its seductions and ruses of power, to incinerate it until nothing remains but ash?</p><p>Our imperative to “burn it down” draws from a rich tradition of scholarship that positions the state as a technique, practice, and effect of modern governance and its optimization, rationalization, and normalization. Following Timothy Mitchell, we define the state as a “network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is maintained” (Mitchell 2006, 175). In the words of Michel Foucault, the state functions as “a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities” (Foucault 2004, 286). As a schematic and reality, we perceive the state as providing a legible matrix for the parameters of self-management and self-conduct: for social and political order. As Achille Mbembe insists, the adoption of state or sovereign power is “a twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation” (Mbembe 2003, 13). Attendant to the important critiques made by Fanon, we argue that this twofold process remains shaped by Euro-American colonial mores at the “objective as well as subjective level” of experience and perception (Fanon 2008, xv). That is to say, we understand state power as generative of inherently colonial relations of rule: relations that produce contemporary sociopolitical, juridical, and affective orientations, sensibilities, and subjectivities.[ii] As Glen Sean Coulthard argues, “colonial relations of power are no longer reproduced primarily through overtly coercive means, but rather through the asymmetrical exchange of mediated forms of state recognition and accommodation” (Coulthard 2014, 15). We add that the state accomplishes this mediation vis-à-vis the internalized politics of decency: an argument to which we shortly return.</p><p>The project of this piece is not to think about how to make life more livable under current regimes of power or to ponder building something new or altered in the state’s place. Rather, we imagine alternative worlds based in the total abolition of these regimes because of their astonishingly responsive capabilities, which render profound social transformation impossible. The state successfully incorporates its margins and continually extends its representation in order to further its grasp on the body politic (for instance, the inclusion of women in combat roles or the Supreme Court ruling on same sex marriage). Simultaneously, and without coincidence, the state manipulates its boundaries through violent forms of capital accumulation and proxy wars, marks borders with fences and deportations, and uses its streets as a costly theater for subjects that deviate from its aims. However, the fundamentally lethal interests of state power have not changed since the European invasion of the Americas. Instead, global technologies of communication and visibility have forced the state to pivot, creating the illusion of a more transparent, democratic, and equal society. Nonetheless, the state relies on fantasies of “individual” participation (civil rights, voting, recognition, and protest) as much as it relies on its authoritarian power to revoke those fantasies without notice or recourse.</p><p>As the violences executed by the state continue to shape everyday life in this country, we believe that it is by no means extreme to posit that one solution to these ills is to destroy—to burn down—contemporary institutions of governance, policing, and comfort, to cooperatively dismantle the workings of the state. For us, a radical project of abolition and insurgent political praxis refuses to negotiate with the state, or seek recognition from any of its bureaucratic apparatuses, in order to secure the small-scale concessions that only colonize and quell resistance. Political projects of compromise with the state have proven insufficient—especially in addressing everyday violence, such as police brutality, that continues to erupt unchecked in the face of mainstream “social justice” organizing. Ultimately, this organizing and activism treats the state as a central means of stopping the very political violence that insures its core function, operation, and maintenance.</p><p>State tactics shift, but are nonetheless continually productive of social protocols for acceptable, legible citizens and aberrant, disposable subjects: a division and “existential deviation” (Fanon 2008, xvii) that we argue is rooted in Euro-American colonial power, such as white supremacy and heteropatriarchy. This power, which continues to inform the tangible parameters of the modern state, must remain the strategic target of abolition as a practice and vision if new worlds or alternative spaces of sociopolitical organization are to exist and thrive. As we show, one of the central challenges that insurgents face is the fact that colonial state power remains occluded by the representational moorings of the Euro-American civilizing mission, such as the political conceptions of civility and decency that remain the ideological cornerstones of democratic participation.[iii] {We loosely define “insurgents” as those political subjects who adamantly and violently refuse the seductions of the state, including its comforts and promises of safety. Consequently, these subjects are rendered disposable by the state, or are the focus of violent forms of state control, such as imprisonment, torture, and/or execution. Thus, we are not making an understatement to say that insurgents put their lives on the line for their politics. However, we do not make distinctions in this article between “good” insurgents vs. “bad” insurgents precisely because of the way Euro-American conceptual power is recuperated vis-à-vis these categorizations. Of course, we wrestle with the ethics of our position and consider this struggle to be the necessary and ongoing work of insurgent political organizing and strategizing.} These notions legitimize certain forms of organizing and comportment over others, ensuring that state power is distributed, unchanged, into the hands of those that best serve its interests. We dedicate the remainder of this article to examining how these concepts further colonial state power in order to ground our call for the incineration of decency as a starting point for insurgent political praxis.</p><p>The terms “decency” and “civility” are used interchangeably in this article to describe a particular form of exclusionary, homicidal, and suicidal politics. This politics demands inclusion within the colonial state, as it currently exists—at the expense of dismantling white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, transphobia, and capitalism on a global level, in the name of respectability, conviviality, progress and democracy. Following Aimé Césaire, we argue that the politics of decency represents the true “barbarism” of the colonizer (Césaire 2000, 47). Césaire stated that:</p><p>I make no secret of my opinion that at the present time the barbarism of Western Europe has reached an incredibly high level, being surpassed—far surpassed, it is true—by the barbarism of the United States. And I am not talking about Hitler, or the prison guard, or the adventurer, but about the “decent fellow” across the way…the respectable bourgeois [emphasis added] (Césaire 2000, 47).</p><p>For Césaire, the problem of colonial domination did not lie solely within its more overt acts of death dealing, expressed “openly…in broad daylight” (Césaire 2000, 49). Rather, Césaire held that the problem of this domination also resided in its ideological shadows: its “decent” homes, families, schools and churches, its “respectable” citizen-subjects who turned a blind eye to the genocide shaping everyday life in colonized locations (e.g., the U.S.) and long before World War II.</p><p>In fact, Césaire insisted that the politics of decency was central to legitimizing the genocide of the original civilizing mission: the violent implementation of Euro-American systems of thought, embodied taxonomies, historicity, and political governance to consolidate socioeconomic and biological power. As Césaire poignantly argued: “I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about achievements, diseases cured, improved standards of living. I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot…extraordinary possibilities wiped out” (Césaire 2000, 42). Thus, at the heart of the civilizing mission, the conceptual fuel that drove its murderous engine was the framing of its white supremacist, capitalist, and heteropatriarchal violences as the epitome of Euro-American decency and civility.</p><p>We argue that the continued advancement and adoption of decency as a cultural commandment of behavior for participation in the civic sphere enacts the civilizing mission in its recalibrated form and lethally fortifies colonial statecraft and power. For example, these politics legitimize (what appears to be) the passive participation of the “decent fellow” and the “respectable bourgeois” in this mission vis-à-vis so-called “peaceful” desires for inclusion within the state. The danger of this passivity and desire is that both are absolutely violent and perpetuate an outside, “indecent” constituency. This “indecent” constituency is figured as the biopolitical break in the population that threatens to overrun state interests; wherein Muslims are imagined as terrorist, blackness is always already criminal, and whiteness remains the standard by which diversity is measured and extracted.[iv] {Foucault elaborates the term “biopolitics” to describe the contemporary techniques and technologies of governance that seek to maximize the productive and classificatory ordering of known political and biologic “life” and as an expression of sovereign or state power. Rather than the state wielding power through its ability to end life (through the “sword”), power expresses itself through the right to know, maximize, and shape the conditions of life. Examples of this include public health, institutions such as prisons or schools, conditions of labor, the bureaucracy of state management expressed in statistics, etc.} When everyday violence is deployed in the name of these ideologies, the state arbitrates between those who are innocent and guilty, offering a judgement that continues to be divided by race, class, gender, and sexuality. This violence is perceived as the “natural” expression of “civilization,” key to its maintenance and safety. When those who decry these judgements deploy violence, they do so outside of the Euro-American parameters of the “decent,” and are thus marked for rationalized, legitimized, “civilized” annihilation.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hobson: Hobson, Christopher. [Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University] “Democracy: trap, tragedy or crisis?” Political Studies Review, 2016. AZ fulltext: The ‘third wave’ of democratization has been far more inconclusive than once expected, and in recent years there has been a resurgence of authoritarianism. China’s rise and Russia’s return means there are powerful countries supporting a political-economic form distinct from the liberal democratic model promoted by the West. Given that this constitutes an abbreviated list of the problems democracy is now facing, it is hardly surprising to see more publications on this topic. A common theme found in the books under review is the question or statement that connects to democracy with crisis. Yet as Ercan and Gagnon (2014) correctly ask, ‘which crisis? Which democracy?’. In this regard, a recurring difficulty in these books is grappling with the magnitude of the crisis democracy now is said to face. In noting the medical and theological roots of the term, Koselleck (2006: 370–1) observes that ‘a crisis either reveals a situation that may be unique but could also – as in the process of an illness – continue to recur.’ One finds both understandings of crisis at play here. 3 It could be, as Guillermo O’Donnell ( 2007: 9) has suggested, that ‘that democracy is and always will be in some kind of crisis’, a consequence of the inevitable gap between democracy’s dual existence as an ideal and a reality. This accords with the narrative that Runciman develops, in which democracies bumble from one problem to the next, never succumbing but never learning much either. Yet the sense underlying many of the analyses, including Runciman, is that perhaps this time things are different. Brown details how neo-liberal logic is steadily eroding the democratic sphere, while Mair takes a more empirical approach in detailing the major decline in the role played by political parties. Both share a concern that these longer term trends are reaching a point where their impact on democracy is becoming critical and perhaps irreversible. Yet, as Runciman notes, previously democracies have managed to escape from worse situations, so perhaps they will again. While there might be a lack of clarity over what kind of crisis we are dealing with, these books are united in their focus on the liberal democratic form that developed in the context of the modern states system over the twentieth century. The concern is with the ‘real world of democracy’, as Macpherson (1966) once termed it. This is particularly evident in Coggan and Mair, who point to the way the institutions and culture that give shape to democracy are being undermined and eroded. Coggan (2013: 8) presents his book as a ‘wake-up call’ and is clear about offering a defence of the embattled liberal democratic form. Mair voices similar concerns in considering the rapid decline in the role of parties in Western European democracies, identifying trends that have grave ramifications for the future: I am seeking to draw attention to an ongoing process in which there are party failings, in which democracy tends to adapt to these failings, and in which there is then a self-generating momentum whereby the parties become steadily weaker and democracy becomes even more stripped down. (Mair, 2013: 2) Coggan shares these worries, pointing to growing disillusionment and cynicism amongst voters fostering disengagement and a decline in turnout. Echoing Mair’s observations about the growing gap between parties and the people they are supposed to represent, Coggan emphasizes the problem of ‘double delegation’ in contemporary democracies, in which people vote for representatives, who in turn delegate responsibility to unelected officials – ‘experts’ – who can wield considerable power. 4 Both Coggan and Mair illustrate how the institutions fundamental to democracy’s success in the 20th century have been increasingly hollowed out, and there are few signs of these trends changing soon. In responding to this diverse array of problems that threaten to slowly erode liberal democracy to the point of destruction, this desire to hold onto what we have – or had – is very understandable. There is a danger, however, of idealizing a ‘golden era’ of democracy that followed the end of the Second World War and lasted until the social democratic consensus broke down and was replaced with the insurgent neo-liberalism of Thatcher and Reagan. He adds: The rise of Donald Trump in the United States suggests this is no longer an abstract proposition (Phillips, 2016). The contributions by Dunn and Runciman certainly do not suffer from ‘boundless optimism’ about democracy’s fortunes. Both are wary of its charms, warning against the common tendency to regard democracy’s successes as vindication of its inherent strengths. In these books, democracy is rendered in the image of Inspector Clouseau from The Pink Panther: bumbling, messy, over confident, unaware of limitations and oblivious to the role of luck in providing assistance. Dunn ( 2013: 5) writes that ‘the central judgement behind this book is the extreme urgency for citizens of the wealthier countries of the West to learn to distinguish better a (predominantly) happy accident from a magic formula projected drastically forward from the recent history of actually existing democracy.’ For someone who has spent so long writing and thinking about democracy, Dunn tends to display a certain crankiness when talking about it, and this is constantly on evidence here. He is at pains to emphasize its good fortune across history, and makes abundantly clear that democracy may lead to good government but the two should not be equated. Dunn is justified in rallying against simplistic belief in democracy’s good-ness, but one must wonder if he doth protest too much. His account gives short thrift to the solid empirical and normative grounds for valuing democracy, which have certainly played a role in its ascent and current standing. In the end, Dunn ends up swinging too much to the opposite extreme, going too far in emphasising ‘how epically unsuited’ (Dunn, 2013: 156) democracies are to deal with the manifold problems they now face. Similar themes are explored by Runciman, who does a better job of tempering his scepticism and presenting a more interesting narrative. Instead he depicts democracy as a regime that manages to keep muddling its way through: flexible enough to eventually manage each major problem it faces, but chronically unable to learn the 6 lessons of such experiences and in turn sowing the seeds for the next crisis. As Runciman (2013: 294) pithily surmises, ‘democracies survive their mistakes. So the mistakes keep coming.’ The result is a neat argument that recognizes democracy’s distinctive strengths of flexibility and adaptability, while identifying how these same traits ensure the problems will reoccur. The key question this raises is the one Runciman considers at the end, namely: is the contemporary crisis of democracy different? Runciman avers from giving a decisive answer, while noting that in four key areas – war, finance, the environment, and rival systems – democracies have fared badly over the past decade and the immediate outlook does not look promising. His reticence to avoid crystal ball gazing is certainly understandable, but leaving the contemporary crisis largely to the epilogue is frustrating and ultimately does a disservice to his core argument. Given that Runciman details how grim democracy’s fortunes appeared in the 1930s and 1940s when it suffered manifold failures while fascism and communism appeared as strong alternatives, it might be asked whether some kind of comparison could be made. From the 20th century, 1941 offers arguably the best benchmark for what an existential crisis for democracy looks like. At this time Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR controlled almost of all of Europe, Japan was waging a brutal war across Asia as it sought to extend its empire, the United States still remained on the sidelines of the conflict, and only a handful of democracies were left. Democracy’s very existence was in the balance. As bad as democracy’s woes currently may seem, this does put them in sharp relief. And this returns us again to the question of whether the current crisis is fundamentally different to the ones that democracy overcame in the 20th century. Runciman’s refusal to delve more deeply into this issue limits what is otherwise a provocative and worthwhile contribution. In American Dionysia, Johnston echoes some of Runciman’s general conclusions about democracy, but from a much darker register. He suggests that tragedy ‘seems ideally suited to democracy’ insofar as it offers a way of responsibly engaging with the unavoidable limits and harms that come with democratic rule. Johnston further proposes that: Tragedy does not seek to put a happy face on democratic realities. Rather than mollification, it is a discourse of candor and respect – for hard truths regarding life and world, which democracy requires given its (often) unbearable 7 combination of commitments made and failures produced, good realized and harm inflicted, justice delivered and injustice secured. (Johnston, 2015: 4–5)<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>[Hobson] And constant reinvestment in democracy sustains the problem – the system keeps promising to get better and never does.</h4><p><u><strong>Hobson</u>: </strong>Hobson, Christopher. [Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University] “Democracy: trap, tragedy or crisis?” Political Studies Review<u><strong>, 2016. AZ</p><p></u></strong>The ‘third wave’ of democratization has been far more inconclusive than once expected, and in recent years there has been a resurgence of authoritarianism. China’s rise and Russia’s return means there are powerful countries supporting a political-economic form distinct from the liberal democratic model promoted by the West. Given that this constitutes an abbreviated list of the problems democracy is now facing, it is hardly surprising to see more publications on this topic. A common theme found in the books under review is the question or statement that connects to democracy with crisis. Yet as Ercan and Gagnon (2014) correctly ask, ‘which crisis? Which democracy?’. In this regard, a recurring difficulty in these books is grappling with the magnitude of the crisis democracy now is said to face. In noting the medical and theological roots of the term, Koselleck (2006: 370–1) observes that ‘a crisis either reveals a situation that may be unique but could also – as in the process of an illness – continue to recur.’ One finds both understandings of crisis at play here. 3 It could be, as Guillermo O’Donnell ( 2007: 9) has suggested, that <u><strong>‘that <mark>democracy is</mark> and <mark>always</mark> will be <mark>in</mark> some kind of <mark>crisis</mark>’<mark>, a consequence of the</mark> inevitable <mark>gap between democracy’s dual existence as an ideal and a reality.</mark> This accords with the narrative that Runciman develops, in which <mark>democracies bumble from one problem to the next, never succumbing but never learning much either.</mark> </u></strong>Yet the sense underlying many of the analyses, including Runciman, is that perhaps this time things are different. Brown details how neo-liberal logic is steadily eroding the democratic sphere, while Mair takes a more empirical approach in detailing the major decline in the role played by political parties. Both share a concern that these longer term trends are reaching a point where their impact on democracy is becoming critical and perhaps irreversible. Yet, as Runciman notes, previously democracies have managed to escape from worse situations, so perhaps they will again. While there might be a lack of clarity over what kind of crisis we are dealing with, these books are united in their focus on the liberal democratic form that developed in the context of the modern states system over the twentieth century. <u><strong><mark>The concern is with the ‘real world of democracy’</mark>,</u></strong> as Macpherson (1966) once termed it. This is particularly evident in Coggan and Mair, who point to the way the institutions <u><strong><mark>and</mark> </u></strong>culture that give shape to democracy are being undermined and eroded. Coggan (2013: 8) presents his book as a ‘wake-up call’ and is clear about offering a defence of the embattled liberal democratic form. Mair voices similar concerns in considering the rapid decline in the role of parties in Western European democracies, identifying trends that have grave ramifications for the future: I am seeking to draw attention to an ongoing process in which there are party failings, in which democracy tends to adapt to these failings, and in which there is then a self-generating momentum whereby the parties become steadily weaker and democracy becomes even more stripped down. (Mair, 2013: 2) Coggan shares these worries, pointing to growing disillusionment and cynicism amongst voters fostering disengagement and a decline in turnout. Echoing Mair’s observations about the growing gap between parties and the people they are supposed to represent, Coggan emphasizes the problem of <u><strong><mark>‘double delegation’</mark> in contemporary democracies, <mark>in which people vote for representatives, who in turn delegate responsibility to unelected officials</mark> – ‘experts’ – who can wield considerable power<mark>.</u></strong></mark> 4 Both Coggan and Mair illustrate how the institutions fundamental to democracy’s success in the 20th century have been increasingly hollowed out, and there are few signs of these trends changing soon. In responding to this diverse array of problems that threaten to slowly erode liberal democracy to the point of destruction, this desire to hold onto what we have – or had – is very understandable. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> a <mark>danger</mark>, however, <mark>of idealizing a </mark>‘golden era’ of <mark>democracy</mark> </u></strong>that followed the end of the Second World War and lasted until the social democratic consensus broke down and was replaced with the insurgent neo-liberalism of Thatcher and Reagan<u><strong><mark>.</u></mark> </p><p><u><mark>He adds</mark>:</p><p><mark>The rise of</mark> Donald <mark>Trump</mark> in the United States <mark>suggests</mark> this is no longer an abstract proposition (Phillips, 2016). The contributions by Dunn and Runciman certainly do not suffer from <mark>‘boundless optimism’ about democracy’s fortunes.</mark> </u></strong>Both are wary of its charms, warning against the common tendency to regard democracy’s successes as vindication of its inherent strengths. In these books, democracy is rendered in the image of Inspector Clouseau from The Pink Panther: bumbling, messy, over confident, unaware of limitations and oblivious to the role of luck in providing assistance. Dunn ( 2013: 5) writes that ‘the central judgement behind this book is the extreme urgency for citizens of the wealthier countries of the West to learn to distinguish better a (predominantly) happy accident from a magic formula projected drastically forward from the recent history of actually existing democracy.’ For someone who has spent so long writing and thinking about democracy, Dunn tends to display a certain crankiness when talking about it, and this is constantly on evidence here. He is at pains to emphasize its good fortune across history, and makes abundantly clear that democracy may lead to good government but the two should not be equated. Dunn is justified in rallying against simplistic belief in democracy’s good-ness, but one must wonder if he doth protest too much. His account gives short thrift to the solid empirical and normative grounds for valuing democracy, which have certainly played a role in its ascent and current standing. In the end, Dunn ends up swinging too much to the opposite extreme, going too far in emphasising ‘how epically unsuited’ (Dunn, 2013: 156) democracies are to deal with the manifold problems they now face. Similar themes are explored by Runciman, who does a better job of tempering his scepticism and presenting a more interesting narrative. Instead he depicts democracy as a regime that manages to keep muddling its way through: flexible enough to eventually manage each major problem it faces, but chronically unable to learn the 6 lessons of such experiences and in turn sowing the seeds for the next crisis. As Runciman (2013: 294) pithily surmises, <u><strong><mark>‘democracies survive their mistakes. So the mistakes keep coming.’</mark> The result is a neat argument that recognizes <mark>democracy’s distinctive strengths of flexibility and adaptability</mark>, while identifying how these same traits <mark>ensure the problems will reoccur.</mark> </u></strong>The key question this raises is the one Runciman considers at the end, namely: is the contemporary crisis of democracy different? Runciman avers from giving a decisive answer, while noting that in four key areas – <u><strong><mark>war, finance, the environment, and rival systems – democracies have fared badly over the past decade and the immediate outlook does not look promising.</u></mark> </strong>His reticence to avoid crystal ball gazing is certainly understandable, but leaving the contemporary crisis largely to the epilogue is frustrating and ultimately does a disservice to his core argument. Given that Runciman details how grim democracy’s fortunes appeared in the 1930s and 1940s when it suffered manifold failures while fascism and communism appeared as strong alternatives, it might be asked whether some kind of comparison could be made. From the 20th century, 1941 offers arguably the best benchmark for what an existential crisis for democracy looks like. At this time Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR controlled almost of all of Europe, Japan was waging a brutal war across Asia as it sought to extend its empire, the United States still remained on the sidelines of the conflict, and only a handful of democracies were left. Democracy’s very existence was in the balance. As bad as democracy’s woes currently may seem, this does put them in sharp relief. And this returns us again to the question of whether the current crisis is fundamentally different to the ones that democracy overcame in the 20th century. Runciman’s refusal to delve more deeply into this issue limits what is otherwise a provocative and worthwhile contribution. In American Dionysia, Johnston echoes some of Runciman’s general conclusions about democracy, but from a much darker register. He suggests that <u><strong>tragedy ‘seems ideally suited to democracy’ insofar as it offers a way of responsibly engaging with the unavoidable limits and harms that come with democratic rule. </u></strong>Johnston further proposes that: Tragedy does not seek to put a happy face on democratic realities. Rather than mollification, it is a discourse of candor and respect – for hard truths regarding life and world, which democracy requires given its (often) unbearable 7 combination of commitments made and failures produced, good realized and harm inflicted, justice delivered and injustice secured. (Johnston, 2015: 4–5) </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Aldy 16 (Joseph Aldy, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, “Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy,” February 2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf) fulltext: [INDC = Intended Nationally-Determined Contribution] INDCs describe what a country intends to do to combat global climate change post-2020, including controlling GHG emissions, building climate-resilience, mobilizing financial resources, facilitating technology development and transfer, as well as enhancing institutional capacity for mitigation and adaptation, based on a country’s own assessment of its domestic political and socioeconomic conditions—and its own capabilities and opportunities for mitigation and adaptation. Because there were only a few suggestions from COP decision 1/ CP.2025 on the form or content of INDCs, the INDCs submitted to date vary widely in terms of scope, strategies, timeframes,26 and types of mitigation goals. The United States and the European Union, among others, have adopted absolute, economy-wide emissions-reduction targets relative to a particular base year. Some countries have established target years by which their CO2 or broader GHG emissions will peak, including China (2030), Singapore (2030), and South Africa (2025). A number of countries intend to reduce their emissions relative to a forecast business-as-usual level for the year 2030, such as Argentina, Indonesia, and Mexico. Another set of countries plans to reduce emission intensity, measured as the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP, including Chile, China, and India. While assessment of other effort (e.g., for adaptation) is also needed, it is particularly important to ensure the comparability of countries’ mitigation efforts. The ability to assess mitigation ambition—and compare it across different countries—is important for addressing equity and ambition concerns in the context of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Procedures for comparing effort could also facilitate—and indeed, make possible— enhancing clarification, transparency, and understanding of the INDCs. Comparison could facilitate linkage between and among the highly heterogeneous mitigation policies stated or implied in various INDCs, which could include both market-based policies and non-market regulatory approaches. Such procedures could even allow countries to link various non-market regulatory approaches. Finally, enabling countries to compare post-2020 mitigation targets and assess progress toward post-2020 mitigation commitments could help provide the basis for an equitable collaborative process through which individual parties increase their climate-change mitigation obligations over time.27 It is difficult to compare highly heterogeneous mitigation commitments. Table 2 shows the 2020 and post-2020 (Paris regime) mitigation targets adopted by the European Union (E.U.), the United States (U.S.), and China—as well as the E.U.’s Kyoto Protocol commitments. As indicated in the table, the E.U. and U.S. commitments include economy-wide, quantified emissions-reduction targets. China prefers to calculate emissions reductions against a projected, business-as-usual (BAU) emissions trajectory—that is against a forecast of China’s GHG emissions in the absence of any new mitigation polices. China’s 2020 and post-2020 mitigation goals are expressed in terms of a reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP), and China’s INDC states that total CO2 emissions will peak by 2030. In addition to these goals, China’s INDC includes an increase in forest volume and in the share of non-fossil fuels in the country’s overall energy mix.28 Despite such disparities, techniques may be available—or possible to construct—for comparing disparate mitigation systems—for example, an emissions trading (cap-and-trade) system in one country and a performance standard in another.32 Current research suggests four principles for evaluating possible metrics for comparing heterogeneous mitigation effort. First, an ideal metric should be comprehensive, capturing the entire effort undertaken by a country to achieve its mitigation commitment. Second, a metric should focus on observable—and preferably quantifiable—characteristics of effort. Third, individual countries or stakeholders should be able to reproduce a metric given (a) the inputs used by analysts, and (b) available public information. Finally, given the global nature of climate change, a metric should be universal, constructible by and applicable to as broad a set of countries as possible. Candidates are emission-related metrics (the historical norm), abatement cost, and carbon- or energy-price metrics. Each has its advantages, disadvantages, and appropriate potential applications in a system of voluntary, heterogeneous mitigation targets. The first set of metrics concerns emissions or other emissions-related physical measures. Emissions-based metrics have several advantages. First, they are directly linked to the environmental outcome of concern—in this case mitigating climate change by reducing the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. Emission levels are often known (though capacity to measure emissions varies from country to country) and are therefore not subject to major disputes. On the other hand, it has been difficult to form an international consensus about the specific form of an emissions-based metric, since different choices with respect to base year, transient versus accumulated emissions, or absolute versus per capita or intensity-based emissions would give different countries an advantage. As such, the process of comparison—or specific methods or metrics—could be politically sensitive in individual countries, especially in the context of multilateral processes. Moreover, absolute emissions can be affected by economic booms and recessions independent of mitigation efforts—in these situations, projected emissions relative to a BAU scenario may provide a better indicator of country-level effort. However, emissions relative to forecast values are not directly measurable, and BAU projections can bring a great deal of uncertainty. Comparison among individual countries’ mitigation efforts based on emission related metrics may also encounter technical difficulties, such as different timeframes, types of GHGs, coverage of sectors, and accounting methodologies adopted by individual countries. A second set of possible metrics, drawn from research though not yet put into practice,33 would focus on GHG prices. Prices could be explicit, as in the case of cap-and-trade systems or carbon taxes, or prices could be implicit, as in the shadow prices in a non-market regulatory system for reducing CO2 emissions. Price-based metrics could also focus on net energy prices or changes in energy prices over time. One advantage of such metrics is that market prices are observable, and in countries that adopt cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes, the explicit carbon price offers a relatively direct measure of the level of mitigation effort being undertaken by a country or region. Carbon prices are also a direct measure of the strength of incentives for long-term investment in mitigation and the deployment of low-carbon technologies. However, price-based metrics also have important downsides. Volatile exchange rates can make it difficult to compare across countries and a price-based approach cannot easily capture the level of effort associated with non-price policies, such as fuel standards. A third set of potential metrics—again not yet implemented in the context of the UNFCCC process—involves the costs of mitigation. Such metrics could focus on an absolute measure of costs incurred to mitigate GHG emissions, or on costs incurred relative to GDP. Mitigation costs can be estimated by modeling the effect of actual policies, or by analyses that attempt to identify the least-cost option for achieving a certain emissions objective. The cost of implementing a given policy closely reflects the level of effort associated with that policy, which is an advantage of cost-based metrics. But an important drawback of these metrics is that mitigation costs are not directly observable and must be estimated using economic modeling. Moreover, if the cost of a policy is taken as an indicator of effort, the use of a cost-based metric could have the effect of rewarding costly but ineffective policies. In that case, estimating costs for both actual policies and the theoretical least-cost approach could help identify opportunities for improving on existing policies. There is no single metric that satisfies all four design principles for an ideal metric (i.e., comprehensiveness, reproducibility, universality, and that the metric is based on observable data). Individual countries’ preference for specific metrics that reflect their own interests— whether emissions-related, which have been implemented extensively in practice, or other proposed approaches—may result in a lack of consensus among national governments that are members of the UNFCCC. Some governments have such significantly divergent ideas on equitable effort sharing as to make official efforts to compare and assess mitigation effort in the INDCs under the UNFCCC regime infeasible. Therefore, academics could provide useful and informative advice by developing a suite of metrics to assess and compare the mitigation efforts of different countries to facilitate mutual understanding and encourage increased ambition, taking into account the transition of emission trajectories, historical responsibility, cumulative emissions, national circumstances and capacity, and other factors. This is analogous to the approach commonly taken to evaluate the macroeconomic health of an economy, in which a set of metrics, such as GDP, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and interest rates may be considered. Similarly, using a suite of metrics rather than a single metric will better characterize the overall level of mitigation effort associated with a diverse set of climate policies. Beyond cooperating to develop metrics that can be used to compare country-level climate mitigation efforts, China and the United States can work together to develop rigorous, transparent, and systematic mechanisms for collecting and analyzing data and monitoring policy implementation (Aldy 2014). Transparent mechanisms for evaluating policy implementation can speed the learning process among different countries by identifying best practices and common mitigation challenges. Such mechanisms may also be helpful in assessing collective mitigation efforts and evaluating the aggregate cost and efficacy of those efforts. The participation of potentially neutral third parties, such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and academic researchers can support the gathering of accurate information, when desired by UNFCCC member governments. Experience with past non-climate agreements suggests that delegating responsibility for information collection and dissemination to such institutions can lower the costs of implementing an international agreement and enhance countries’ technical and policy-making capacities. Analysis generated by such organizations could improve transparency and help provide a scientific basis for the review process under the Paris Agreement—helping build a basis for conversations and facilitated dialogues between governments interested in learning about policies and outcomes in other countries. In particular, other existing international agreements and organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the Montreal Protocol, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), may offer experience and lessons in connection with collecting and processing data to help establish and operate a transparency system under the Paris Agreement. Some international organizations, such as CITES, formally rely on nongovernmental organizations to review national reports and monitor implementation. China and the United States could cooperate to identify the best approaches to building a transparent regime for review and assessment of progress under the Paris Agreement— conducted by national governments and perhaps supported by third-party organizations. The two countries will each bring strengths to bear on this important set of issues, yielding an outcome that will advance efforts to address climate change under the new Paris regime.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>First, <u>metrics</u>—US-China cooperation is key to develop <u>metrics</u> for comparing <u>policy implementation</u> in <u>different contexts</u>—that makes the Paris agreement <u>enforceable</u> and resolves <u>concerns of unfairness</h4><p></u><strong>Aldy 16</strong> (Joseph Aldy, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, “Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy,” February 2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf<strong>)</p><p>[INDC = Intended Nationally-Determined Contribution]</p><p><u></strong>INDCs describe what a country intends to do to combat global climate change post-2020</u>, including controlling GHG emissions, building climate-resilience, mobilizing financial resources, facilitating technology development and transfer, as well as enhancing institutional capacity for mitigation and adaptation, based on a country’s own assessment of its domestic political and socioeconomic conditions—and its own capabilities and opportunities for mitigation and adaptation. <u>Because there were only a few suggestions</u> from COP decision 1/ CP.2025 on the form or content of INDCs, <u>the <mark>INDCs</mark> submitted to date <strong><mark>vary widely</strong> in</mark> terms of <mark>scope, strategies, timeframes</u></mark>,26 <u><mark>and</mark> types of <mark>mitigation goals</u></mark>. The United States and the European Union, among others, have adopted absolute, economy-wide emissions-reduction targets relative to a particular base year. Some countries have established target years by which their CO2 or broader GHG emissions will peak, including China (2030), Singapore (2030), and South Africa (2025). A number of countries intend to reduce their emissions relative to a forecast business-as-usual level for the year 2030, such as Argentina, Indonesia, and Mexico. Another set of countries plans to reduce emission intensity, measured as the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP, including Chile, China, and India. While assessment of other effort (e.g., for adaptation) is also needed, <u><mark>it is <strong>particularly important</strong> to ensure</mark> the <mark>comparability of</mark> countries’ <mark>mitigation efforts</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>ability to <strong>assess mitigation ambition</u></strong>—<u>and compare it across</mark> different <mark>countries</u>—<u>is important for addressing <strong>equity and ambition concerns</u></strong></mark> <u>in the context of the UNFCCC and</u> the <u>Paris Agreement</u>. <u><mark>Procedures for comparing effort could</mark> also <mark>facilitate</u></mark>—and indeed, make possible— <u>enhancing clarification, <mark>transparency, and understanding</mark> of the INDCs</u>. Comparison could facilitate linkage between and among the highly heterogeneous mitigation policies stated or implied in various INDCs, which could include both market-based policies and non-market regulatory approaches. Such procedures could even allow countries to link various non-market regulatory approaches. Finally, enabling countries to compare post-2020 mitigation targets and assess progress toward post-2020 mitigation commitments could help provide the basis for an equitable collaborative process through which individual parties increase their climate-change mitigation obligations over time.27 <u>It is difficult to compare highly heterogeneous mitigation commitments</u>. Table 2 shows the 2020 and post-2020 (Paris regime) mitigation targets adopted by the European Union (E.U.), the United States (U.S.), and China—as well as the E.U.’s Kyoto Protocol commitments. As indicated in the table, <u>the E.U. and U.S. commitments include economy-wide, quantified emissions-reduction targets</u>. <u>China prefers to calculate emissions reductions against a</u> projected, <u>business-as-usual</u> (BAU) emissions <u>trajectory</u>—that is against a forecast of China’s GHG emissions in the absence of any new mitigation polices. China’s 2020 and post-2020 mitigation goals are expressed in terms of a reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP), and China’s INDC states that total CO2 emissions will peak by 2030. In addition to these goals, China’s INDC includes an increase in forest volume and in the share of non-fossil fuels in the country’s overall energy mix.28 <u><strong><mark>Despite</mark> such <mark>disparities</u></strong>, <u>techniques may be available</u></mark>—or possible to construct—<u><mark>for comparing disparate mitigation systems</u></mark>—for example, an emissions trading (cap-and-trade) system in one country and a performance standard in another.32 <u>Current research suggests four principles</u> for evaluating possible metrics for comparing heterogeneous mitigation effort. First, <u>an ideal metric should be comprehensive</u>, capturing the entire effort undertaken by a country to achieve its mitigation commitment. Second, <u>a metric should focus on observable</u>—and preferably quantifiable—<u>characteristics of effort</u>. Third, <u>individual countries or stakeholders should be able to reproduce a metric given</u> (a) the <u>inputs</u> used by analysts, <u>and</u> (b) <u>available public information</u>. Finally, given the global nature of climate change, <u>a metric should be universal, constructible by and applicable to as broad a set of countries as possible</u>. Candidates are emission-related metrics (the historical norm), abatement cost, and carbon- or energy-price metrics. Each has its advantages, disadvantages, and appropriate potential applications in a system of voluntary, heterogeneous mitigation targets. The first set of metrics concerns emissions or other emissions-related physical measures. Emissions-based metrics have several advantages. First, they are directly linked to the environmental outcome of concern—in this case mitigating climate change by reducing the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. Emission levels are often known (though capacity to measure emissions varies from country to country) and are therefore not subject to major disputes. On the other hand, it has been difficult to form an international consensus about the specific form of an emissions-based metric, since different choices with respect to base year, transient versus accumulated emissions, or absolute versus per capita or intensity-based emissions would give different countries an advantage. As such, the process of comparison—or specific methods or metrics—could be politically sensitive in individual countries, especially in the context of multilateral processes. Moreover, absolute emissions can be affected by economic booms and recessions independent of mitigation efforts—in these situations, projected emissions relative to a BAU scenario may provide a better indicator of country-level effort. However, emissions relative to forecast values are not directly measurable, and BAU projections can bring a great deal of uncertainty. Comparison among individual countries’ mitigation efforts based on emission related metrics may also encounter technical difficulties, such as different timeframes, types of GHGs, coverage of sectors, and accounting methodologies adopted by individual countries. A second set of possible metrics, drawn from research though not yet put into practice,33 would focus on GHG prices. Prices could be explicit, as in the case of cap-and-trade systems or carbon taxes, or prices could be implicit, as in the shadow prices in a non-market regulatory system for reducing CO2 emissions. Price-based metrics could also focus on net energy prices or changes in energy prices over time. One advantage of such metrics is that market prices are observable, and in countries that adopt cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes, the explicit carbon price offers a relatively direct measure of the level of mitigation effort being undertaken by a country or region. Carbon prices are also a direct measure of the strength of incentives for long-term investment in mitigation and the deployment of low-carbon technologies. However, price-based metrics also have important downsides. Volatile exchange rates can make it difficult to compare across countries and a price-based approach cannot easily capture the level of effort associated with non-price policies, such as fuel standards. A third set of potential metrics—again not yet implemented in the context of the UNFCCC process—involves the costs of mitigation. Such metrics could focus on an absolute measure of costs incurred to mitigate GHG emissions, or on costs incurred relative to GDP. Mitigation costs can be estimated by modeling the effect of actual policies, or by analyses that attempt to identify the least-cost option for achieving a certain emissions objective. The cost of implementing a given policy closely reflects the level of effort associated with that policy, which is an advantage of cost-based metrics. But an important drawback of these metrics is that mitigation costs are not directly observable and must be estimated using economic modeling. Moreover, if the cost of a policy is taken as an indicator of effort, the use of a cost-based metric could have the effect of rewarding costly but ineffective policies. In that case, estimating costs for both actual policies and the theoretical least-cost approach could help identify opportunities for improving on existing policies. There is no single metric that satisfies all four design principles for an ideal metric (i.e., comprehensiveness, reproducibility, universality, and that the metric is based on observable data). Individual countries’ preference for specific metrics that reflect their own interests— whether emissions-related, which have been implemented extensively in practice, or other proposed approaches—may result in a lack of consensus among national governments that are members of the UNFCCC. Some governments have such significantly divergent ideas on equitable effort sharing as to make official efforts to compare and assess mitigation effort in the INDCs under the UNFCCC regime infeasible. Therefore, academics could provide useful and informative advice by developing a suite of metrics to assess and compare the mitigation efforts of different countries to facilitate mutual understanding and encourage increased ambition, taking into account the transition of emission trajectories, historical responsibility, cumulative emissions, national circumstances and capacity, and other factors. This is analogous to the approach commonly taken to evaluate the macroeconomic health of an economy, in which a set of metrics, such as GDP, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and interest rates may be considered. Similarly, using a suite of metrics rather than a single metric will better characterize the overall level of mitigation effort associated with a diverse set of climate policies. <u><strong><mark>Beyond cooperating to develop metrics</u></strong> <u>that</mark> can</u> be used to <u><mark>compare country-level</mark> climate mitigation <mark>efforts</u>, <u><strong>China and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>can work together</strong> to develop</mark> rigorous, transparent, and <mark>systematic mechanisms for</u></mark> collecting and analyzing data and <u><mark>monitoring policy implementation</u></mark> (Aldy 2014). <u>Transparent <mark>mechanisms for evaluating</mark> policy <mark>implementation can <strong>speed the learning process</u></strong></mark> among different countries by identifying best practices and common mitigation challenges. Such mechanisms may also be helpful in assessing collective mitigation efforts and evaluating the aggregate cost and efficacy of those efforts. The participation of potentially neutral third parties, such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and academic researchers can support the gathering of accurate information, when desired by UNFCCC member governments. Experience with past non-climate agreements suggests that delegating responsibility for information collection and dissemination to such institutions can lower the costs of implementing an international agreement and enhance countries’ technical and policy-making capacities. Analysis generated by such organizations could improve transparency and help provide a scientific basis for the review process under the Paris Agreement—helping build a basis for conversations and facilitated dialogues between governments interested in learning about policies and outcomes in other countries. In particular, other existing international agreements and organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the Montreal Protocol, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), may offer experience and lessons in connection with collecting and processing data to help establish and operate a transparency system under the Paris Agreement. Some international organizations, such as CITES, formally rely on nongovernmental organizations to review national reports and monitor implementation. <u><mark>China and the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>could cooperate to</mark> identify the best approaches to <strong><mark>build</mark>ing <mark>a transparent regime</strong> for</mark> review and <mark>assessment of progress under</u></mark> the <u><mark>Paris</u></mark> Agreement— conducted by national governments and perhaps supported by third-party organizations. <u><mark>The two</mark> countries <mark>will each bring strengths</mark> to bear on this important set of issues</u>, <u><mark>yielding an outcome that will <strong>advance efforts to address climate change</strong></mark> under the new Paris regime</u>. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Beebe ’19 (George Beebe; vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, former head of Russia analysis at the CIA; 10/7/19; "We’re More at Risk of Nuclear War With Russia Than We Think"; POLITICO Magazine; https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436) language edited fulltext: Today, that old dread of disaster has all but disappeared, as have the systems that helped preclude it. But the actual threat of nuclear catastrophe is much greater than we realize. Diplomacy and a desire for global peace have given way to complacency and a false sense of security that nuclear escalation is outside the realm of possibility. That leaves us unprepared for—and highly vulnerable to—a nuclear attack from Russia. The most recent sign of American complacency was the death, a few weeks ago, of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—a pivotal 1987 agreement that introduced intrusive on-site inspection provisions, destroyed an entire class of dangerous weaponry, and convinced both Washington and Moscow that the other wanted strategic stability more than strategic advantage. The New START treaty, put in place during the Obama administration, appears headed for a similar fate in 2021. In fact, nearly all the key U.S.-Russian arms control and confidence-building provisions of the Cold War era are dead or on life support, with little effort underway to update or replace them. Meanwhile, U.S. officials from both parties are focused not on how we might avoid nuclear catastrophe but on showing how tough they can look against a revanchist Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. Summit meetings between White House and Kremlin leaders, once viewed as opportunities for peace, are now seen as dangerous temptations to indulge in Munich-style appeasement, the cardinal sin of statecraft. American policymakers worry more about “going wobbly,” as Margaret Thatcher once put it, than about a march of folly into inadvertent war. President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the United States and Russia might explore ways to manage their differences diplomatically has produced mostly head-scratching and condemnation. In my more than 25 years of government experience working on Russia matters, I’ve seen that three misguided assumptions underlie how the United States got to this point. The first is that American policymakers think that because neither side wants nuclear war, then such a war is very unlikely to occur. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that modern cyber duels, proxy battles, information operations and economic warfare might somehow erupt into direct nuclear attacks. If the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will end any differently? But wars do not always begin by design. Just as they did in 1914, a vicious circle of clashing geopolitical ambitions, distorted perceptions of each other’s intent, new and poorly understood technologies, and disappearing rules of the game could combine to produce a disaster that neither side wants nor expects. In fact, cyber technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced hypersonic weapons delivery systems and antisatellite weaponry are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war much more complex and dangerous than the old Cold War competition. They are blurring traditional lines between espionage and warfare, entangling nuclear and conventional weaponry, and erasing old distinctions between offensive and defensive operations. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, in the cyber arena, playing offense is increasingly seen as the best defense. And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations, media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, escalation from the cyber world into the physical domain is a serious danger. Cyber technology is also magnifying fears of our adversaries’ strategic intentions while prompting questions about whether warning systems can detect incoming attacks and whether weapons will fire when buttons are pushed. This makes containing a crisis that might arise between U.S. and Russian forces over Ukraine, Iran or anything else much more difficult. It is not hard to imagine a crisis scenario in which Russia cyber operators gain access to a satellite system that controls both U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons systems, leaving the American side uncertain about whether the intrusion is meant to gather information about U.S. war preparations or to [preclude] disable our ability to conduct nuclear strikes. This could cause the U.S. president to wonder whether he faces an urgent “use it or lose it” nuclear launch decision. It doesn’t help that the lines of communication between the United States and Russia necessary for managing such situations are all but severed. A related, second assumption American policymakers make is seeing the Russian threat as primarily a deterrence problem. The logic goes something like this: Wars often happen because the states that start them believe they can win, but the United States can disabuse a would-be aggressor of this belief through a show of force, thus deterring conflict. Indeed, Washington seems convinced that showing the Kremlin it will punish Russian transgressions—through toughened economic sanctions, an enhanced military posture in Europe and more aggressive cyber operations—is the best path to preserving peace. But, when dealing with states that believe they are under some form of assault, focusing on deterrence can be counterproductive. Rather than averting aggression by demonstrating the will to fight back, America might be unintentionally increasing the odds of a war. To a great degree, this is the situation the United States already faces. Years of enlargement of NATO and perceived U.S. involvement in Russia’s internal affairs have convinced the Kremlin that America poses an existential threat. In turn, Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, coupled with a string of aggressions against its neighbors, have convinced Washington that Moscow is going for the West’s jugular. The United States experienced this spiral phenomenon with Georgia in 2008. Convinced that Russia harbored aggressive designs on its southern neighbor, Washington policymakers accelerated U.S. military training in Georgia, openly advocated bringing Tbilisi into the NATO alliance and issued multiple warnings to Moscow against military action, believing this firm resolve would deter Russian aggression. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Russia grew increasingly alarmed by the prospect of Georgian membership in NATO, while Tbilisi felt emboldened to launch a military operation in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, which yielded an immediate and massive Russian military response. Lastly, the United States assumes that Russia’s anti-American hostility flows from the internal nature of its regime, and therefore is likely to diminish when a more enlightened leader with more liberal approaches succeeds Putin. Sooner or later, the unsatisfied longing for freedom will produce new leadership in Russia that will advance liberal reforms and seek cordial relations with Washington, just as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin once did. Compromising with the Putin regime, American policymakers believe, is not only immoral, but also unnecessary and counterproductive. But the notion that Moscow hates us for what we are—a democracy—rather than the ways we influence important Russian interests is inconsistent with Russia’s business-like, if not cordial, relations with democracies that it does not see as threatening, including Israel, India and Japan. Moreover, Putin’s domestic critics include not only the country’s narrow slice of liberal reformers but also its wider expanse of hard-liners on the left and right who think he has been too soft on Washington. The reality is that Russia’s differences with Washington flow from a deep mix of geopolitical, perceptual, historical and systemic factors that will not go away once Putin eventually does. Managing and containing the combustive mixture of volatile factors in the U.S.-Russian relationship is a daunting, but far from impossible, challenge. Washington’s approach must dispassionately balance firmness with accommodation, military readiness with diplomatic outreach—all without skewing too far toward either concession or confrontation. It’s a difficult balance, but the United States is not even attempting it at the moment. It will require more robust U.S.-Russian communication, as well as new rules of the game to deal with new weapons systems, game-changing cyber technologies and the shifting geopolitical order. None of this will be possible, however, absent a recognition that real danger is looming—not a modern variation of World War II-style planned aggression, but a nascent World War I-type escalatory spiral that few recognize is developing. That danger could end catastrophically if nothing changes.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>(1) Gray zone provocations – <u>emerging technology</u> and <u>misperceptions</u> mean those spiral uncontrollably <u> </h4><p></u><strong>Beebe ’19 </strong>(George Beebe; vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, former head of Russia analysis at the CIA; 10/7/19; "We’re More at Risk of Nuclear War With Russia Than We Think"; POLITICO Magazine; https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436) language edited </p><p>Today, that old dread of disaster has all but disappeared, as have the systems that helped preclude it. But <u><mark>the</mark> actual <strong><mark>threat of nuclear catastrophe</strong> is</mark> <strong>much <mark>great</mark>er than we realize</u></strong>. Diplomacy and <u>a desire for global peace have <strong>given way to complacency</u></strong> <u>and a <strong>false sense of security</strong> that nuclear escalation is outside the realm of possibility. That leaves us unprepared for—and highly vulnerable to—a <strong>nuclear attack</strong> from Russia.</p><p>The</u> most recent sign of American complacency was the <u><strong>death</u></strong>, a few weeks ago, <u>of the <strong>I</u></strong>ntermediate-Range <u><strong>N</u></strong>uclear <u><strong>F</u></strong>orces Treaty—a pivotal 1987 agreement that introduced intrusive on-site inspection provisions, destroyed an entire class of dangerous weaponry, and convinced both Washington and Moscow that the other wanted strategic stability more than strategic advantage. The <u>New START</u> treaty, put in place during the Obama administration, appears <u><strong>headed for a similar</strong> fate in 2021</u>. In fact, <u><strong>nearly all</strong> the key U.S.-Russian <strong><mark>arms control</strong> and <strong>confidence-building provisions</strong></mark> of the Cold War era <mark>are <strong>dead</strong> or on <strong>life support</strong>,</mark> with <strong>little effort underway</strong> to update or replace them.</p><p></u>Meanwhile, <u>U.S. officials</u> from both parties <u>are focused</u> not on how we might avoid nuclear catastrophe but <u>on showing <strong>how tough they can look</strong> against a <strong>revanchist Russia</strong> and</u> its leader, Vladimir <u><strong>Putin</u></strong>. <u>Summit meetings</u> between White House and Kremlin leaders, <u>once viewed as opportunities for peace, are now seen as <strong>dangerous temptations</strong> to <strong>indulge in</u></strong> Munich-style <u><strong>appeasement</strong>, the <strong>cardinal sin of statecraft</u></strong>. <u>American policymakers worry more about “going wobbly,”</u> as Margaret Thatcher once put it, <u>than about a <strong>march of folly into inadvertent war</u></strong>. President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the United States and Russia might explore ways to manage their differences diplomatically has produced mostly head-scratching and condemnation.</p><p>In my more than 25 years of government experience working on Russia matters, I’ve seen that three misguided assumptions underlie how the United States got to this point.</p><p>The first is that <u>American <mark>policymakers</mark> <strong><mark>think</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>because</strong> neither side <strong>wants</mark> nuclear <mark>war</strong></mark>, then such <mark>a war is</mark> <strong>very <mark>unlikely</mark> to occur</u></strong>. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that <u>modern <strong><mark>cyber duels</strong>, <strong>proxy battles</strong></mark>, <strong>information op</strong>eration<strong>s</strong> and <strong>economic warfare</strong> <mark>might</u></mark> somehow <u><strong><mark>erupt into direct nuclear attacks</strong></mark>. If the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will end any differently?</p><p></u>But <u><mark>wars <strong>do not always begin by design</u></strong></mark>. Just as they did in 1914, <u><mark>a <strong>vicious circle</strong> of</mark> <strong>clashing geopolitical ambitions</strong>, <strong><mark>distorted perceptions</strong></mark> of each other’s intent, <strong><mark>new</strong></mark> and <strong>poorly understood</strong> <strong><mark>tech</strong></mark>nologies, <mark>and <strong>disappearing rules</mark> of the game</strong> <mark>could <strong>combine</strong> to produce a <strong>disaster</strong></mark> that <strong>neither side wants</strong> nor <strong>expects.</p><p></u></strong>In fact, <u><strong><mark>cyber</u></strong></mark> technologies, <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>rtificial <u><strong><mark>i</u></strong></mark>ntelligence, advanced <u><strong><mark>hypersonic</u></strong></mark> weapon<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> delivery systems <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>a</u></strong></mark>nti<u><strong><mark>sat</u></strong></mark>ellite <u><mark>weaponry</mark> are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war <strong>much more complex</strong> and <strong>dangerous</strong> than the old Cold War competition. They are <strong><mark>blur</mark>ring <mark>traditional lines</strong></mark> between espionage and warfare, <strong><mark>entangl</mark>ing</strong> <strong><mark>nuclear</strong> and <strong>conventional</strong> weaponry</mark>, and <strong>erasing old distinctions</strong> between offensive and defensive operations</u>. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, <u>in the <strong>cyber arena</strong>, playing offense is <strong>increasingly seen</strong> as the <strong>best defense</strong>.</u> And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations, media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, <u><strong>escalation</strong> from the <strong>cyber world</strong> into the physical domain is a <strong>serious danger.</p><p></u></strong>Cyber technology is also magnifying fears of our adversaries’ strategic intentions while prompting questions about whether warning systems can detect incoming attacks and whether weapons will fire when buttons are pushed. <u><mark>This makes <strong>containing a crisis</strong></mark> that might arise between U.S. and Russian forces <mark>over <strong>Ukraine</u></strong></mark>, Iran or anything else <u><strong><mark>much more difficult</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is <strong>not hard to imagine</strong> a <strong>crisis scenario</strong> in which <mark>Russia cyber</mark> <mark>operators gain access to a <strong>satellite system</strong></mark> that controls <strong>both U.S. conventional</strong> and <strong>nuclear weapons systems</strong>, leaving the American side <strong>uncertain</strong> about whether the intrusion is meant to <strong>gather information</strong> about U.S. war preparations or to [<strong>preclude</strong>] </u>disable <u>our ability to <strong>conduct nuclear strikes</u></strong>. <u>This <mark>could cause</u></mark> the U.S. president to wonder whether he faces <u><mark>a</mark>n <strong>urgent</u></strong> “<u><strong><mark>use it or lose it</u></strong></mark>” <u><strong>nuclear <mark>launch decision</u></strong></mark>. <u>It doesn’t help that the <strong>lines of communication</u></strong> between the United States and Russia <u>necessary for managing such situations are <strong>all but severed</strong>.</p><p>A <strong>related</u></strong>, second <u><strong>assumption</u></strong> <u>American policymakers make is seeing the Russian threat as primarily a <strong>deterrence problem</u></strong>. The logic goes something like this: Wars often happen because the states that start them believe they can win, but the United States can disabuse a would-be aggressor of this belief through a show of force, thus deterring conflict. Indeed, <u>Washington seems <strong>convinced</strong> that showing the Kremlin it will <strong>punish Russian transgressions</u></strong>—through toughened economic sanctions, an enhanced military posture in Europe and more aggressive cyber operations—<u>is the <strong>best path to preserving peace</strong>.</p><p><strong>But</u></strong>, <u><mark>when dealing with states that <strong>believe</strong> they are <strong>under</mark> some form of <mark>assault</u></strong></mark>, <u>focusing on <mark>deterrence can be <strong>counterproductive</strong></mark>. Rather than averting aggression by <mark>demonstrating the <strong>will to fight back</strong></mark>, America might be <strong>unintentionally <mark>increasing the odds of a war</strong></mark>. </u>To a great degree, this is the situation the United States already faces. <u>Years of <strong><mark>enlargement of NATO</u></strong></mark> <u>and <strong>perceived U.S. involvement in Russia’s internal affairs</strong> have <mark>convinced the Kremlin</mark> that <mark>America poses an <strong>existential threat</strong></mark>.<strong> In turn, Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, coupled with a string of aggressions against its neighbors, have convinced Washington that Moscow is going for the West’s jugular.</p><p></strong>The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>experienced <mark>this <strong>spiral phenomenon</strong></mark> with Georgia <mark>in 2008</u></mark>. Convinced that Russia harbored aggressive designs on its southern neighbor, <u><mark>Washington</u></mark> policymakers <u><strong>accelerated</strong> U.S. military training in Georgia, <strong><mark>openly advocated</strong> bringing Tbilisi into</mark> the <mark>NATO</mark> alliance</u> and issued multiple warnings to Moscow against military action, <u><mark>believing this <strong>firm resolve</strong> would <strong>deter </mark>Russian <mark>aggression</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u><mark>it had the <strong>opposite effect</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Russia grew <strong>increasingly alarmed</strong></mark> by the prospect of <strong>Georgian membership in NATO</u></strong>, <u>while Tbilisi felt <strong>emboldened</u></strong> to <u>launch a military operation in</u> the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, <u><mark>which yielded a</mark>n <strong>immediate</strong> and <strong><mark>massive Russian military response.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Lastly, the United States assumes that Russia’s anti-American hostility flows from the internal nature of its regime, and therefore is likely to diminish when a more enlightened leader with more liberal approaches succeeds Putin. Sooner or later, the unsatisfied longing for freedom will produce new leadership in Russia that will advance liberal reforms and seek cordial relations with Washington, just as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin once did. Compromising with the Putin regime, American policymakers believe, is not only immoral, but also unnecessary and counterproductive.</p><p>But the notion <u>that Moscow hates us for what we are—a democracy—rather than the ways we <strong>influence important Russian</strong> interests is <strong>inconsistent</strong> with Russia’s business-like, if not <strong>cordial</strong>, relations with democracies that it <strong>does not see as threatening</u></strong>, <u>including <strong>Israel</strong>, <strong>India</strong> and <strong>Japan</u></strong>. Moreover, <u>Putin’s <strong>domestic critics</strong> include <strong>not only</strong> the country’s <strong>narrow slice of liberal reformers</strong> but also its <strong>wider expanse of hard-liners</strong> on the left and right who think he has been <strong>too soft on Washington.</u></strong> The reality is that Russia’s differences with Washington flow from a deep mix of geopolitical, perceptual, historical and systemic factors that will not go away once Putin eventually does.</p><p>Managing and containing the combustive mixture of volatile factors in the U.S.-Russian relationship is a daunting, but far from impossible, challenge. Washington’s approach must dispassionately balance firmness with accommodation, military readiness with diplomatic outreach—all without skewing too far toward either concession or confrontation. It’s a difficult balance, but the United States is not even attempting it at the moment. It will require more robust U.S.-Russian communication, as well as new rules of the game to deal with new weapons systems, game-changing cyber technologies and the shifting geopolitical order.</p><p>None of this will be possible, however, absent a recognition that real danger is looming—not a modern variation of World War II-style planned aggression, but a nascent World War I-type escalatory spiral that few recognize is developing. That danger could end catastrophically if nothing changes.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Grande 2K [Sandy Grande is associate professor and Chair of the Education Department at Connecticut College.; “American Indian Geographies of Identity and Power: At the Crossroads of Indígena and Mestizaje”; Harvard Educational Review; https://meridian.allenpress.com/her/article-abstract/70/4/467/31773/American-Indian-Geographies-of-Identity-and-Power?redirectedFrom=fulltext]//eleanor fulltext: The forces of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification pressure American Indian communities to employ essen- tialist tactics and construct relatively fixed notions of identity, and to render the concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic. It is evident from the examples above that the notion of fluid boundaries has never worked to the advantage of Indigenous peoples: federal agencies have in- voked the language offluid or unstable identities as the rationale for disman- tling the structures of tribal life and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; Whitestream America has seized its message to declare open season on Indians, thereby appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices, history, and literature; and Whitestream academics have now em- ployed the language of postmodern fluidity to unwittingly transmute centu- ries of war between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democ- racy based on the ideal of mestizaje represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities. In addition, the undercurrent of fluidity and sense of displacedness that permeates, if not defines, mestizaje runs contrary to American Indian sensi- bilities of connection to place, land, and the Earth itself. Consider, for exam- ple, the following statement on the nature of critical subjectivity by Peter Mc- Laren: The struggle for critical subjectivity is the struggle to occupy a space of hope — a liminal space, an intimation of the anti-structure, Of What lives in the in-between zone of undecided-ability — in which one can work toward a praxis of redemp- tion.... A sense of atopy has always bccn with me, a resplendent placelessness, a feeling ofliving in germinal formlessness.... I cannot find words to express what this border identity means to me. All I have are what Gcorgres Bastille (1988) calls mots glissants (slippery words). (1997, pp. 13—14) McLaren speaks passionately and directly about the crisis of modern society and the need for a "praxis of redemption." As he perceives it, the very possi- bility of redemption is situated in our willingness not only to accept but to flourish in the "liminal" spaces, border identities, and postcolonial hybrid- ities that are inherent in postmodern life and subjectivity. In fact, McLaren perceives the fostering of a "resplendent placelessness" itself as the gateway to a more just, democratic society. While American Indian intellectuals also seek to embrace the notion of transcendent subjectivities, they seek a notion of transcendence that remains rooted in historical place and the sacred connection to land. Consider, for example, the following commentary by Deloria (1992) on the centrality of place and land in the construction of American Indian subjectivity: Recognizing the sacredness of lands on which previous generations have lived and died is the foundation of all other sentiment. Instead of denying this di- mension of our emotional lives, we should be setting aside additional places that have transcendent meaning. Sacred sites that higher spiritual powers have chosen for manifestation enable us to focus our concerns on the specific form Of our lives.... Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and prac- tices because they represent the presence of the sacred in Our lives. They prop- crly inform us that we are not larger than nature and that we have responsibili- ties to the rest of the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes. This lesson must be learned by each generation. (pp. 278, 281) Gross misunderstanding of this connection between American Indian sub- jectivity and land, and, more importantly, between sovereignty and land has been the source of numerous injustices in Indian country. For instance, I be- lieve there was little understanding on the part of government officials that passage of the Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) would open a Pandora's box of discord over land, setting up an intractable conflict between property rights and religious freedom. American Indians, on the other hand, viewed the act as a invitation to return to their sacred sites, several of which were on government lands and were being damaged by commercial use. As a result, a flurry of lawsuits alleging mismanagement and destruction of sacred sites was filed by numerous tribes. Similarly, corporations, tourists, and even rock climbers filed suits accusing land managers of unlawfully restricting access to public places by implementing policies that violate the constitutional separa- tion between church and state. All of this is to point out that the critical pro- ject of mestizaje continues to operate on the same assumption made by the U. S. government in this instance, that in a democratic society, human subjec- riviry — and liberation for that matter — is conceived of as inherently rights- based as opposed to land-based. To be fair, I believe that both American Indian intellectuals and critical theorists share a similar vision — a time, place, and space free of the compul- sions Of Whitestream, global capitalism and the racism, sexism, classism, and xenophobia it engenders. But where critical scholars ground their vision in Western conceptions of democracy and justice that presume a liberated" self, American Indian intellectuals ground their vision in conceptions of sov- ereignty that presume a sacred connection to place and land. Thus, to a large degree, the seemingly liberatory constructs of fluidity, mobility, and trans- gression are perceived not only as the language of critical subjectivity, but also as part of the fundamental lexicon Of Western imperialism. Deloria (1999) writes: Although the loss of land must be seen as a political and economic disaster of the first magnitude, the real exile of the tribes occurred With the destruction Of ceremonial life (associated with the loss of land) and the failure or inability of white society to offer a sensible and cohesive alternative to the traditions which Indians remembered. People became disoriented with respect to the world in which they lived. They could not practice their old ways, and the new ways which they were expected to learn were in a constant State Of change because they were not a cohesive view of the world but simply adjustments which whites were making to the technology they had invented. (p. 247). In summary, insofar as American Indian identities continue to be defined and shaped in interdependence with place, the transgressive mestizaje func- tions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American "demo- cratic" Whitestream. The notion of mestizaje as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the mestizaje (belief that the continent's original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for centuries to force the in- tegration of Indigenous communities into the national mestizo model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1992) , the myth of mestiza- je has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American gov- ernmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nation- state through incorporation of all "non-national" (read "Indigenous") ele- ments into the mainstream. Thus, What Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as "the continent's unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the continents' long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the mestizo. While critical scholars do construct a very different kind of democratic solidarity that disrupts the sociopolitical and economic hegemony of the dominant culture around a transformed notion of mestizaje (one committed to the destabilization of the isolationist narratives of nationalism and cul- tural chauvinism), I argue that any liberatory project that does not begin with a clear understanding of the difference of American Indianness will, in the end, work to undermine tribal life. Moreover, there is a potential danger that the ostensibly "new" cultural democracy based upon the radical mes- tizaje will continue to mute tribal differences and erase distinctive Indian identities. Therefore, as the physical and metaphysical borders of the post- modern world become increasingly fluid, the desire of American Indian communities to protect geographic borders and employ "essentialist" tactics also increases. Though such tactics may be viewed by critical scholars as highly problematic, they are viewed by American Indian intellectuals as a last line of defense against the steady erosion of tribal culture, political sover- eignty, Native resources, and Native lands. The tensions described above indicate the dire need for an Indigenous, revolutionary theory that maintains the distinctiveness of American Indians as tribal peoples of sovereign nations (border patrolling) and also encour- ages the building of coalitions and political solidarity (border crossing). In contrast to critical scholars McLaren and Kris Gutierrez (1997) , who admon- ish educators to develop a concept of and difference as political mobili- zation rather than cultural authenticity, I urge American Indian intellectuals to develop a language that operates at the crossroads of unity and difference and defines this space in terms of political mobilization and cultural authen- ticity, thus expressing both the interdependence and distinctiveness of tribal peoples.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Embracing “fluidity” and “flux” pathologizes tribal notions of fixed relationships to land and place. </h4><p>Grande 2K [Sandy Grande is associate professor and Chair of the Education Department at Connecticut College.; “American Indian Geographies of Identity and Power: At the Crossroads of Indígena and Mestizaje”; Harvard Educational Review; https://meridian.allenpress.com/her/article-abstract/70/4/467/31773/American-Indian-Geographies-of-Identity-and-Power?redirectedFrom=fulltext]//eleanor</p><p><u></strong>The <strong>forces of identity appropriation</strong>, <strong>cultural encroachment</strong>, and <strong>corporate commodification </strong>pressure American Indian communities to employ essen- tialist tactics and <strong>construct relatively fixed notions of identity</strong>, and to render the <strong>concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic</u></strong>. It is evident from the examples above that <u><strong>the notion of fluid boundaries</u></strong> <u>has <strong>never worked to the advantage of Indigenous peoples</strong>: <strong>federal agencies have in- voked</strong> the <strong>language offluid or unstable identities</strong> as the <strong>rationale</strong> for <strong>disman- tling the structures of tribal life </strong>and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; <strong>Whitestream America</strong> has <strong>seized its message</strong> to declare open season on Indians, thereby <strong>appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices, history, and literature</strong>; and <strong>Whitestream academics</strong> have now <strong>em- ployed the language of postmodern fluidity </strong>to </u>unwittingly<u> <strong>transmute centu- ries of war </strong>between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue</u>" (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democ- racy based on the ideal of mestizaje represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities. In addition, <u><strong>the undercurrent of fluidity</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>sense of displacedness</u></strong> that permeates, if not defines, mestizaje <u>runs contrary to American Indian sensi- bilities of <strong>connection to place, land, and the Earth</strong> itself.</u> Consider, for exam- ple, the following statement on the nature of critical subjectivity by Peter Mc- Laren: The struggle for critical subjectivity is the struggle to occupy a space of hope — a liminal space, an intimation of the anti-structure, Of What lives in the in-between zone of undecided-ability — in which one can work toward a praxis of redemp- tion.... A sense of atopy has always bccn with me, a resplendent placelessness, a feeling ofliving in germinal formlessness.... I cannot find words to express what this border identity means to me. All I have are what Gcorgres Bastille (1988) calls mots glissants (slippery words). (1997, pp. 13—14) McLaren speaks passionately and directly about the crisis of modern society and the need for a "praxis of redemption." As he perceives it, the very possi- bility of redemption is situated in our willingness not only to accept but to flourish in the "liminal" spaces, border identities, and postcolonial hybrid- ities that are inherent in postmodern life and subjectivity. In fact, McLaren perceives the fostering of a "resplendent placelessness" itself as the gateway to a more just, democratic society. <u>While American Indian intellectuals also seek to embrace the notion of transcendent subjectivities, they seek a notion of transcendence that remains <strong>rooted in historical place</strong> and the <strong>sacred connection to land</u></strong>. Consider, for example, the following commentary by Deloria (1992) on the centrality of place and land in the construction of American Indian subjectivity: <u>Recognizing the sacredness of lands on which previous generations have lived and died is the foundation of all other sentiment</u>. Instead of denying this di- mension of our emotional lives, we should be setting aside additional places that have transcendent meaning. Sacred sites that higher spiritual powers have chosen for manifestation enable us to focus our concerns on the specific form Of our lives.... <u>Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and prac- tices because they represent the presence of the sacred in Our lives. They prop- crly inform us that we are not larger than nature and that we have responsibili- ties to the rest of the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes. </u>This lesson must be learned by each generation. (pp. 278, 281) <u>Gross misunderstanding of this connection between American Indian sub- jectivity and land, and, more importantly, between sovereignty and land has been the source of numerous injustices in Indian country</u>. For instance, I be- lieve there was little understanding on the part of government officials that passage of the Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) would open a Pandora's box of discord over land, setting up an intractable conflict between property rights and religious freedom. American Indians, on the other hand, viewed the act as a invitation to return to their sacred sites, several of which were on government lands and were being damaged by commercial use. As a result, a flurry of lawsuits alleging mismanagement and destruction of sacred sites was filed by numerous tribes. Similarly, corporations, tourists, and even rock climbers filed suits accusing land managers of unlawfully restricting access to public places by implementing policies that violate the constitutional separa- tion between church and state. All of this is to point out that the critical pro- ject of mestizaje continues to operate on the same assumption made by the U. S. government in this instance, that in a democratic society, human subjec- riviry — and liberation for that matter — is conceived of as inherently rights- based as opposed to land-based. To be fair, I believe that both American Indian intellectuals and critical theorists share a similar vision — a time, place, and space free of the compul- sions Of Whitestream, global capitalism and the racism, sexism, classism, and xenophobia it engenders. But where <u>critical scholars ground their vision in Western conceptions of democracy and justice that presume a liberated" self</u>, <u>American Indian intellectuals ground their vision in conceptions of sov- ereignty that presume a sacred connection to place and land.</u> Thus, to a large degree, <u>the <strong>seemingly liberatory constructs</strong> of <strong>fluidity, mobility, and trans- gression</strong> are perceived not only as the language of critical subjectivity, but also as part of the <strong>fundamental lexicon Of Western imperialism</u></strong>. Deloria (1999) writes: Although the loss of land must be seen as a political and economic disaster of the first magnitude, the real exile of the tribes occurred With the destruction Of ceremonial life (associated with the loss of land) and the failure or inability of white society to offer a sensible and cohesive alternative to the traditions which Indians remembered. People became disoriented with respect to the world in which they lived. They could not practice their old ways, and the new ways which they were expected to learn were in a constant State Of change because they were not a cohesive view of the world but simply adjustments which whites were making to the technology they had invented. (p. 247). In summary, <u>insofar as American Indian identities continue to be defined and shaped in interdependence with place, the transgressive</u> mestizaje <u>func- tions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American "demo- cratic" Whitestream.</u> The notion of mestizaje as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the mestizaje (belief that the continent's original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for centuries to force the in- tegration of Indigenous communities into the national mestizo model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1992) , the myth of mestiza- je has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American gov- ernmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nation- state through incorporation of all "non-national" (read "Indigenous") ele- ments into the mainstream. Thus, What Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as "the continent's unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the continents' long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the mestizo. While critical scholars do construct a very different kind of democratic solidarity that disrupts the sociopolitical and economic hegemony of the dominant culture around a transformed notion of mestizaje (one committed to the destabilization of the isolationist narratives of nationalism and cul- tural chauvinism), I argue that <u>any liberatory project that does not begin with a clear understanding of the difference of American Indianness will, in the end, work to undermine tribal life.</u> Moreover, there is a potential danger that the ostensibly "new" cultural democracy based upon the radical mes- tizaje will continue to mute tribal differences and erase distinctive Indian identities. Therefore, <u>as the physical and metaphysical borders of the post- modern world <strong>become increasingly fluid</strong>, the desire of American Indian communities to <strong>protect geographic borders</strong> and <strong>employ "essentialist" tactics</strong> also increases.</u> Though such tactics may be viewed by critical scholars as highly problematic, they are viewed by American Indian intellectuals as a last line of defense against the steady erosion of tribal culture, political sover- eignty, Native resources, and Native lands. <u>The tensions described above indicate the dire need for an Indigenous, revolutionary theory that maintains the distinctiveness of American Indians as tribal peoples of sovereign nations</u> (border patrolling) <u>and also encour- ages the building of coalitions and political solidarity</u> (border crossing). In contrast to critical scholars McLaren and Kris Gutierrez (1997) , who admon- ish educators to develop a concept of and difference as political mobili- zation rather than cultural authenticity, I urge American Indian intellectuals to develop a language that operates at the crossroads of unity and difference and defines this space in terms of political mobilization and cultural authen- ticity, thus expressing both the interdependence and distinctiveness of tribal peoples. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Erfani et al, 21 fulltext: (Parsa Erfani, Fogarty global health scholar1 2, Agnes Binagwaho, vice chancellor2, Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh, vice president3, Muhammad Yunus, chair4, Paul Farmer, professor57, Vanessa Kerry, associate professor810 Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA 2University of Global Health Equity, Rwanda 3Sierra Leone 4Yunus Centre, Bangladesh 5Global Health and Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA 6Division of Global Health Equity, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, USA 7Partners In Health, USA 8Seed Global Health, USA 9Program in Global Public Policy and Social Change, Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA 10Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital, USA Intellectual property waiver for covid-19 vaccines will advance global health equity BMJ 2021; 374 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n1837 (Published 03 August 2021) Cite this as: BMJ 2021;374:n1837 https://www.bmj.com/content/374/bmj.n1837.full) The barrier to adequate vaccine supply today is not lack of vaccine options, nor even theoretical production capacity; the problem is the intellectual property (IP) protection governing production and access to vaccines—and ultimately, the political and moral will to waive these protections in a time of global crisis. Without such liberty, there will not be enough vaccine fast enough to prevent the spread of variants, the avoidable deaths, and the continued choking of low and middle income countries (LMICs) through poor health. Beyond donor based models of global vaccine equity As covid-19 became a pandemic, global efforts emerged to help ensure vaccines would be delivered across the globe to the highest risk populations. One of the first was Covax, a risk sharing mechanism in which countries, tiered by means, contribute to collectively source and equitably distribute vaccines globally. The effort, however laudable in intent, has been undercut by vaccine scarcity and underfunding. Covax aims to vaccinate 20% of the population in 92 low and middle income countries by the end of 2021. At the end of April, however, it had shipped only one fifth of its projected estimates and lacked critical resources for distribution.3 LICs are wary about participating in well worn dynamics of global health aid. Instead, they are mobilising to overcome the fundamental paucity of available vaccines by challenging established global IP rules. At issue is the 1995 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which established minimum protection standards for IP—including patents, industrial designs, trade secrets, and copyright—that all 164 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) must respect.5 Subsequent rulings (such as the Doha declaration) have strived to clarify safeguards on patents, including compulsory licensing, which allows governments to license patents to a third party without consent (table 1).6 Today, these rules provide strong IP protection for vaccine technologies and affect the quantity and location of vaccine production and availability. Table 1 Licensing of intellectual property View popupView inline In October 2020, South Africa and India submitted a proposal to the WTO to temporarily waive certain provisions of the TRIPS agreement for covid-19 health products and technologies. The waiver would prevent companies that hold the IP for covid-19 vaccines from blocking vaccine production elsewhere on the grounds of IP and allow countries to produce covid-19 medical goods locally and import or export them expeditiously (table 1). Although the proposed IP waiver is supported by over 100 countries, WTO has not reached a consensus on the proposal because of opposition and filibustering by several high income countries, including the UK, Germany, and Japan.7 Waiver opponents argue that the limited capacity of LMICs to produce complex covid-19 vaccines safely is the true barrier to global production, not IP. They suggest that the TRIPS waiver would penalise drug companies, stifle biomedical innovation, and deter future investments in research and development—in sum, that it would reduce returns on investment and dismantle an IP system that provided the goods needed to end the pandemic. Others are concerned that an IP waiver would fuel supply chain bottlenecks for raw materials and undermine ongoing production. Moreover, policy makers argue that a waiver is unnecessary as company driven voluntary licensing—in which companies decide when and how to license their technologies—and existing TRIPS flexibilities (such as country determined compulsory licensing) should suffice in establishing production in LMICs (table 1). They suggest that waiving IP for covid-19 vaccines would provide no meaningful progress, but the data do not support this. What effect would a waiver have? Contrary to detractors’ concerns about the possible effect of a temporary TRIPS waiver, global health analyses suggest that it will be vital to equitable and effective action against covid-19. LMIC’s manufacturing capabilities have been underestimated, even though several LMICs have the scientific and manufacturing capacity to produce complex covid-19 vaccines. India, Egypt, and Thailand are already manufacturing viral vector or mRNA-based covid-19 vaccines,8910 and vaccine production lines could be established within months in some other LMICs,11 offering substantial benefit in a pandemic that will last years.11 Companies in India and China have already developed complex pneumococcal and hepatitis B recombinant vaccines, challenging existing vaccine monopolies.12 The World Health Organization launched an mRNA technology transfer hub in April 2021 to provide the logistical, training, and know-how support needed for manufacturers in LMICs to repurpose or expand existing manufacturing capacity to produce covid-19 vaccines and to help navigate accessing IP rights for the technology.13 Twenty five respondents from LMICs expressed interest, and South Africa was selected as the first hub, with plans to start producing the vaccine through the Biovac Institute in the coming months.14 Removing IP barriers through the waiver will facilitate these efforts, more rapidly enable future hubs, engage a greater number of manufacturers, and ultimately yield more doses faster. Moreover, as the waiver facilitates vaccine production, demand for raw materials and active ingredients will increase. Coupled with pre-emptive planning to anticipate and expand raw material production, the waiver—which encompasses the IP of all covid-19 vaccine-related technology— can offer a path to overcome bottlenecks and expand production of necessary vaccine materials. Current licensing mechanisms inadequate Voluntary licences have not and will not keep pace with public health demand. Since companies determine the terms of voluntary licences, they are often granted to LMICs that can afford them, leaving out poorer regions.10 For example, in South Asia, AstraZeneca has voluntarily licensed its vaccine to the Serum Institute of India, even though the region has multiple capable vaccine manufacturers.9 Many covid-19 vaccine developers have not taken steps towards licensing their technologies, simply because there is limited financial incentive to do so.11 To date, none have shared IP protected vaccine information with the WHO Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) established last year.15 Relying on the moral compass of companies that answer to shareholders to voluntarily license their technologies will have limited effect on vaccine equity. Their market is driven by profit margins, not public health. Compulsory licensing by LMICs will also be insufficient in rapidly expanding vaccine production, as each patent licence must be negotiated separately by each country and for each product based on its own merit. From 1995 to 2016, 108 compulsory licences were attempted and only 53 were approved.6 The case-by-case approach is slow and not suitable for a global crisis that requires swift action. In addition, TRIPS requires compulsory licences to be used predominantly for domestic supply, limiting exports of the licensed goods to nearby low income countries without production capacity.5 Although a “special” compulsory licence syc cc stem was agreed in the Doha declaration to allow for expeditious exportation and importation (formalised as the article 31bis amendment to TRIPS in 2017), the provision is limited by cumbersome logistical procedures and has been rarely used.16 Governments may also be hesitant to pursue compulsory licences as high income countries have previously bullied them for doing so. Since India first used compulsory licensing for sorafenib tosylate in 2012 (reducing the cancer drug’s price by 97%), the US has consistently pressured the country not to use further compulsory licences.17 During this pandemic, Gilead sued the Russian government for issuing a compulsory licence for remdesivir.18 Furthermore, while compulsory licences are primarily for patents, covid-19 vaccines often have other types of IP, including trade secrets, that are integral for production.19 The emergency TRIPS waiver removes all IP as a barrier to starting production (not just patents) and negates the prolonged time, inconsistency, frequent failure, and political pressure that accompany voluntary licensing and compulsory licensing efforts. It also provides an expeditious path for new suppliers to import and export vaccines to countries in need without bureaucratic limitations. Finally, there is no compelling evidence that the proposed TRIPS waiver would dismantle the IP system and its innovation incentives. The waiver is restricted to covid-19 related goods and is time limited, helping to protect future innovation. It would, however, reduce profit margins on current covid-19 vaccines. With substantial earnings in the first quarter of 2021, many drug companies have already recouped their research and development costs for covid-19 vaccines.20 However, they have not been the sole investors in vaccine development, and they should not be the only ones to profit. Most vaccines received a substantial portion of their direct funding from governments and not-for-profit organisations—and for some, such as Moderna and Novavax, nearly all.21 Decades of publicly funded research have laid the groundwork for current innovations in the background technologies used for vaccines.22 Given that companies were granted upfront risk protection for covid-19 vaccine research and development, a waiver that advances global public health but reduces vaccine profits in a global crisis is reasonable. Knowledge transfer An IP waiver for covid-19 vaccines is integral to boosting vaccine supply, breaking vaccine monopolies, and making vaccines more affordable in LMICs. It is, however, only a first, but necessary, step. Originator companies must transfer vaccine technology and share know-how with C-TAP, transfer hubs, or individual manufacturers to help suppliers begin production.23 In addition, governments must leverage domestic law, private sector incentives, and contract terms with pharmaceutical companies to compel companies to cooperate with such transfers.24 If necessary, governments can require technology transfers in exchange for continuing enterprise in a country or avoiding penalties. Politicians and leaders are at a critical juncture: they will either take the necessary steps to make vaccine technology available to scale production, stimulate global collaboration, and create a path to equity or they will protect a hierarchical system based on an economic bottom line. The former will not only build a vaccination trajectory that puts equal value on the lives of the rich and the poor, but will also help stem the pandemic’s relentless momentum and quell the emergence of variants. We are in the middle of one of the largest vaccination efforts in human history. We cannot rely on companies to thread the needle of corporate social and moral responsibility with shareholder and stock value returns nor expect impacted governments to endure lengthy bureaucratic licensing processes in this time of crisis. It will be a legacy of apathy and unnecessary death. As the human impact of the proposed IP waiver becomes clear, consensus behind it is growing. Countries that previously opposed the waiver—such as the US and Brazil—now support written text based negotiations.7 Opposing countries must stop blocking the waiver, engage in transparent text negotiations, and commit to reaching consensus swiftly. The longer states stall, the more people die needlessly. Covid-19 has repeatedly shown that people without access to resources such as strong health systems, health workers, medicines, and vaccines will preferentially fall ill and die. For too long, this cycle has been “other people’s” problem. It is not. It is our problem.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>2. Critics of the IP waiver are wrong- it’s the most effective way to combat covid inequality, alternatives fail</h4><p>Erfani</strong> et al, 21</p><p>(Parsa Erfani, Fogarty global health scholar1 2, Agnes Binagwaho, vice chancellor2, Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh, vice president3, Muhammad Yunus, chair4, Paul Farmer, professor57, Vanessa Kerry, associate professor810 Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA 2University of Global Health Equity, Rwanda 3Sierra Leone 4Yunus Centre, Bangladesh 5Global Health and Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA 6Division of Global Health Equity, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, USA 7Partners In Health, USA 8Seed Global Health, USA 9Program in Global Public Policy and Social Change, Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA 10Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital, USA Intellectual property waiver for covid-19 vaccines will advance global health equity BMJ 2021; 374 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n1837 (Published 03 August 2021) Cite this as: BMJ 2021;374:n1837 https://www.bmj.com/content/374/bmj.n1837.full) <u>The <mark>barrier to</u></mark> adequate <u><mark>vaccine supply</mark> </u>today <u><mark>is not lack of</mark> vaccine <mark>options, nor even</u></mark> theoretical <u><mark>production capacity</u>; <u>the problem is</u></mark> the intellectual property (<u><strong><mark>IP) protection</u></strong></mark> governing production and access to vaccines—and ultimately, the political and moral will to waive these protections in a time of global crisis. Without such liberty, <u><mark>there will not be enough vaccine</mark> fast enough <mark>to prevent the spread of variants</mark>,</u> the avoidable deaths, and the continued choking of low and middle income countries (LMICs) through poor health. Beyond donor based models of global vaccine equity As covid-19 became a pandemic, global efforts emerged to help ensure vaccines would be delivered across the globe to the highest risk populations. One of the first was Covax, a risk sharing mechanism in which countries, tiered by means, contribute to collectively source and equitably distribute vaccines globally. The effort, however laudable in intent, has been undercut by vaccine scarcity and underfunding. Covax aims to vaccinate 20% of the population in 92 low and middle income countries by the end of 2021. At the end of April, however, it had shipped only one fifth of its projected estimates and lacked critical resources for distribution.3 <u><mark>LICs are <strong>wary about participating </strong>in well worn dynamics of <strong>global health aid</mark>.</strong> </u>Instead, <u>they are mobilising to overcome the fundamental paucity of available vaccines by challenging established global IP rules</u>. At issue is the 1995 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which established minimum protection standards for IP—including patents, industrial designs, trade secrets, and copyright—that all 164 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) must respect.5 Subsequent rulings (such as the Doha declaration) have strived to clarify safeguards on patents, including compulsory licensing, which allows governments to license patents to a third party without consent (table 1).6 Today, <u>these rules provide strong IP protection for vaccine technologies and affect the quantity and location of vaccine production and availability</u>. Table 1 Licensing of intellectual property View popupView inline In October 2020, South Africa and India submitted a proposal to the WTO to temporarily waive certain provisions of the TRIPS agreement for covid-19 health products and technologies. <u><mark>The waiver would prevent companies that hold the IP</mark> for covid-19 vaccines <mark>from blocking vaccine production elsewhere</mark> on the grounds of IP and allow countries to produce covid-19 medical goods locally and import or export them expeditiously</u> (table 1). Although the proposed IP waiver is supported by over 100 countries, WTO has not reached a consensus on the proposal because of opposition and filibustering by several high income countries, including the UK, Germany, and Japan.7 <u>Waiver <mark>opponents argue</u></mark> that the <u><mark>limited</mark> <mark>capacity</u></mark> of LMICs <u>to produce complex</u> covid-19 <u>vaccines </u>safely <u><mark>is the true barrier</u></mark> to global production, <u>not IP.</u> <u><mark>They suggest</u></mark> that <u>the <mark>TRIPS waiver would penalise drug companies, stifle</u></mark> biomedical <u><mark>innovation</mark>,</u> and deter future investments in research and development—in sum, that it would reduce returns on investment and dismantle an IP system that provided the goods needed to end the pandemic. Others are concerned that an IP waiver would fuel supply chain bottlenecks for raw materials and undermine ongoing production. Moreover, policy makers argue that a waiver is unnecessary as company driven voluntary licensing—in which companies decide when and how to license their technologies—and existing TRIPS flexibilities (such as country determined compulsory licensing) should suffice in establishing production in LMICs (table 1). They suggest that waiving IP for covid-19 vaccines would provide no meaningful progress, but the data do not support this. What effect would a waiver have? <u><mark>Contrary to detractors’</u></mark> concerns about the possible effect of a temporary TRIPS waiver, <u><strong><mark>global health analyses suggest that it will be vital to equitable and effective action against covid-19</strong></mark>. LMIC’s manufacturing capabilities have been underestimated</u>, even though several LMICs have the scientific and manufacturing capacity to produce complex covid-19 vaccines. India, Egypt, and Thailand are already manufacturing viral vector or mRNA-based covid-19 vaccines,8910 and vaccine production lines could be established within months in some other LMICs,11 offering substantial benefit in a pandemic that will last years.11 Companies in India and China have already developed complex pneumococcal and hepatitis B recombinant vaccines, challenging existing vaccine monopolies.12 The World Health Organization launched an mRNA technology transfer hub in April 2021 to provide the logistical, training, and know-how support needed for manufacturers in LMICs to repurpose or expand existing manufacturing capacity to produce covid-19 vaccines and to help navigate accessing IP rights for the technology.13 Twenty five respondents from LMICs expressed interest, and South Africa was selected as the first hub, with plans to start producing the vaccine through the Biovac Institute in the coming months.14 <u><mark>Removing IP</mark> barriers</u> through the waiver <u><strong><mark>will facilitate these efforts</mark>, more rapidly enable future hubs, engage a greater number of manufacturers, and ultimately yield more doses faster</u></strong>. Moreover, <u>as the waiver facilitates vaccine production, demand for raw materials and active ingredients will increase</u>. Coupled with pre-emptive planning to anticipate and expand raw material production, <u>the waiver</u>—which encompasses the IP of all covid-19 vaccine-related technology— <u><strong>can offer a path to overcome bottlenecks and expand production of necessary vaccine materials. </u></strong>Current licensing mechanisms inadequate <u>Voluntary licences have not and will not keep pace with public health demand</u>. Since companies determine the terms of voluntary licences, they are often granted to LMICs that can afford them, leaving out poorer regions.10 For example, in South Asia, AstraZeneca has voluntarily licensed its vaccine to the Serum Institute of India, even though the region has multiple capable vaccine manufacturers.9 Many covid-19 vaccine developers have not taken steps towards licensing their technologies, simply because there is limited financial incentive to do so.11 To date, none have shared IP protected vaccine information with the WHO Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) established last year.15 Relying on the moral compass of companies that answer to shareholders to voluntarily license their technologies will have limited effect on vaccine equity. Their market is driven by profit margins, not public health. <u>Compulsory licensing</u> by LMICs <u>will also be insufficient in rapidly expanding vaccine production, as each patent licence must be negotiated separately by each country and for each product based on its own merit.</u> From 1995 to 2016, 108 compulsory licences were attempted and only 53 were approved.6 The case-by-case approach is slow and not suitable for a global crisis that requires swift action. In addition, TRIPS requires compulsory licences to be used predominantly for domestic supply, limiting exports of the licensed goods to nearby low income countries without production capacity.5 Although a “special” compulsory licence syc cc stem was agreed in the Doha declaration to allow for expeditious exportation and importation (formalised as the article 31bis amendment to TRIPS in 2017), the provision is limited by cumbersome logistical procedures and has been rarely used.16 Governments may also be hesitant to pursue compulsory licences as high income countries have previously bullied them for doing so. Since India first used compulsory licensing for sorafenib tosylate in 2012 (reducing the cancer drug’s price by 97%), the US has consistently pressured the country not to use further compulsory licences.17 During this pandemic, Gilead sued the Russian government for issuing a compulsory licence for remdesivir.18 Furthermore, <u>while compulsory licences are primarily for patents, covid-19 vaccines often have other types of IP, including trade secrets, that are integral for production</u>.<u>19 The emergency TRIPS waiver <strong>removes all IP</strong> as a barrier to starting production</u> (not just patents) <u>and negates the prolonged time, inconsistency, frequent failure, and political pressure that accompany voluntary licensing and compulsory licensing efforts. It also provides an expeditious path for new suppliers to import and export vaccines to countries in need without bureaucratic limitations. </u>Finally, <u>there is no compelling evidence</u> that <u><strong>the proposed TRIPS waiver would dismantle the IP system and its innovation incentives</u></strong>. <u>The waiver is restricted to covid</u>-19 related goods <u><strong>and is time limited</u></strong>, <u>helping to protect future innovation</u>. It would, however, reduce profit margins on current covid-19 vaccines. <u>With substantial earnings in the first quarter of 2021</u>, many drug <u><strong>companies have already recouped their research and development costs for covid</u></strong>-19 vaccines.20 However, <u>they have not been the sole investors in vaccine development, and they should not be the only ones to profit. Most vaccines received a substantial portion of their direct funding from governments</u> and not-for-profit organisations—and for some, such as Moderna and Novavax, nearly all.21 Decades of publicly funded research have laid the groundwork for current innovations in the background technologies used for vaccines.22 <u>Given that companies were granted upfront risk protection for covid-19 vaccine research and development, a waiver that advances global public health but reduces vaccine profits in a global crisis is reasonable</u>. Knowledge transfer <u><mark>An IP waiver</u></mark> for covid-19 vaccines <u><strong><mark>is integral to boosting vaccine supply</u></strong>, <u>breaking vaccine monopolies</mark>, and making vaccines more affordable in LMICs.</u> It is, however, only a first, but necessary, step. Originator companies must transfer vaccine technology and share know-how with C-TAP, transfer hubs, or individual manufacturers to help suppliers begin production.23 In addition, governments must leverage domestic law, private sector incentives, and contract terms with pharmaceutical companies to compel companies to cooperate with such transfers.24 If necessary, governments can require technology transfers in exchange for continuing enterprise in a country or avoiding penalties. <u>Politicians and leaders are at a critical juncture: they will either take the necessary steps to make vaccine technology available to scale production, stimulate global collaboration, and create a path to equity or they will protect a hierarchical system based on an economic bottom line. The former will not only build a vaccination trajectory that puts equal value on the lives of the rich and the poor, but will also help stem the pandemic’s relentless momentum and <strong>quell the emergence of variants.</u></strong> We are in the middle of one of the largest vaccination efforts in human history. We cannot rely on companies to thread the needle of corporate social and moral responsibility with shareholder and stock value returns nor expect impacted governments to endure lengthy bureaucratic licensing processes in this time of crisis. It will be a legacy of apathy and unnecessary death. As the human impact of the proposed IP waiver becomes clear, consensus behind it is growing. Countries that previously opposed the waiver—such as the US and Brazil—now support written text based negotiations.7 Opposing countries must stop blocking the waiver, engage in transparent text negotiations, and commit to reaching consensus swiftly. <u><mark>The longer states stall, the more people die needlessly</mark>. Covid-19 has repeatedly shown that people without access to resources such as strong health systems, health workers, medicines, and vaccines will preferentially fall ill and die</u>. For too long, this cycle has been “other people’s” problem. It is not. It is our problem.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Peter Campbell 13, faculty member in the Program in Composition, Literacy, Pedagogy, and Rhetoric at the University of Pittsburgh, JUDICIAL RHETORIC AND RADICAL POLITICS: SEXUALITY, RACE, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/45352/Peter_Campbell.pdf?sequence=1 fulltext: But—following Matsuda—I think that Butler seems to miss an important point. Given the material force of the fantasy of legal sovereignty in the margins, “‘at the point[s]’” where power is “‘completely invested in its real and effective practices,’” 31 I argue that resistance to the idea of legal sovereignty must not preclude what Cathy Cohen might call a “practical”32 understanding of the presently inevitable reality of the sovereign rhetorical operations of the law. The political project of resistance to the performative sovereignty of judicial rhetoric in the United States must not deny (as Matsuda and Richard Delgado said in 1987 to the “crits” of Critical Legal Studies) the need to construct strategically informed and tactically sound responses to those “formal” structures of law that already act as and with the material power of sovereign authority––authority over the constraints that legal forms of subjectivity already impose on personhood.33 As Butler herself acknowledges in 2004,34 the absolute critique of legal sovereign performatives does not adequately consider how the effects of the fantasy of legal sovereignty are most often (and most often most terribly) felt by “those who have” actually “seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise”35 of the U.S. judiciary as a shield against domination.¶ My experience of the law has occurred through my own participation in and observation of judicial sovereignty––both from a majoritarian perspective. I teach argumentation in a prison, a setting that emphasizes the paradoxical and simultaneous vitality and uselessness of rhetorical and argumentative interaction with those persons charged with enforcing the reasoned justification of judicial decision through coercive violence. In our present democratic state of laws, the production of legitimacy for judicial sovereignty through argument, and the production of legitimacy through force, work together in explicit and mutually supportive fashion. More happily, I was recently invited by two friends to officiate their wedding, at a ceremony in Rehoboth, Massachusetts. I agreed, and asked whether I should purchase an ordination online, so that I could legally perform the ceremony. There was no need— Massachusetts is unusual among U.S. states in maintaining a category of officiant called a “solemnizer.” Any person, with little qualification, can apply to be a solemnizer. The dichotomy between the “republican style”36 of the application process, and the quotidian ease with which I was granted the certificate made me think about the “sovereign performative”37 that I would stage in Rehoboth. The “I do” statement in a marriage ceremony is one of Austin’s core examples38 of an “illocutionary” performative, an utterance which “has a certain force” in the “saying” of it,39 but this example itself performs an interesting elision of the role of a state representative in a civil marriage ceremony. In Rehoboth, my friends would not be married until I pronounced them so publicly. That pronouncement would of course require other performative statements (“I do”) from my friends as a pre-requisite to its validity.40 But on the date and in the location specified by the solemnization certificate, I had, as a feature of the designation “solemnizer” bestowed on me by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, absolute power over whether they would be married or not—on that date and in that location. In the narrow context of the two possible realities of my friends becoming married or not on that day and in that location, my role was to exercise the sovereign performative power of the Commonwealth as its judge-like representative. ¶ But in that exercise, I would also be performing two arguments: one for the sovereign legitimacy (and successful performativity)41 of my utterances and the illegitimacy of any others; and one for the value and significance of “married” as a position of legal subjectivity in Massachusetts and the United States. I bring up this example to emphasize the specifically illocutionary power of the judicial rhetorical constitution of subjects before law. Austin describes illocution as “‘in saying x I was doing y’ or ‘I did y,’”42 but judicial illocution might more accurately be described as “in saying x I did x.” When I said that these people were married, I made them married. The statement and the doing were one and the same. If a judge sentences a person to death, she does not depress the needle; the pronouncement of sentence is an illocutionary act in the first sense (x and y). But in pronouncing the sentence, the judge does redefine the convicted (of a death-eligible crime) person’s subjectivity before law from “convicted” and/or “criminal” and/or “felon” and/or “murderer” and/or “traitor” to, more primarily, “condemned.” This is an illocutionary act in the second sense (x and x).¶ If a judge rules that it is unconstitutional to require a trans* person’s passport to list their gender contrary to that person’s “self-understanding,”43 this is a “perlocutionary” act (where the utterance effectively causes something to happen)44 in that the ruling enables the person who is trans* to change the official designation of their gender. But it is also an x and x illocutionary act in the context of the petitioner’s subjectivity before law—the utterance of the ruling has changed their self-understanding of their own identity from “not real” to “real” in the eyes of the law. This would be even more evident if the ruling did not merely realize the truth of a trans* person’s self-understanding as male or female, but went so far as to create, in the moment of the utterance itself, a legally recognized trans* identity category. ¶ All of these examples are performatives enabled by the fantasy of the sovereign location of power in law. When asked, I considered (given my own views on marriage as an institution) declining to perform the ceremony—even in Massachusetts, whose marriage laws mean that the sexual orientation identity of the two people I married cannot be discerned from this story. I understood that my performative and the discourse of the ceremony surrounding it would contribute in a small way to the sovereign power of the state over human relational and sexual legitimacy. But this refusal would not have made the present sovereignty of the state over the determination of legally legitimate and illegitimate forms of relation any less inevitable.¶ Petitions to the law are inevitable; they will be made, often by people with no other recourse to save their life, or to preserve their life's basic quality. As Butler demonstrates, any such petition will have performative effect. I do not offer this brief critique of Butler’s theory of “sovereign performatives” to dispute the facticity of her arguments. I begin this project with the stipulation that politics of resistance to the “sovereign performative” must include actions of resistance to statist law itself—that is, the specific articulation of opposition, within progressive social movements, to strategies that privilege appeals for help from judges. But these politics must also acknowledge that those who undertake such strategies do not always do so without knowledge of the sovereign performative function of their actions—“recourse to the law” does not always or even usually “imagine” the law “as neutral.”45 These radical politics must also be undertaken with knowledge of the effects of the petitions to law-as-sovereign that will inevitably be made—and particularly with knowledge of the effects that flow from the (also performative and also inevitable) judicial rhetorical responses to these inevitable petitions. ¶ Austin teaches us that it is in the nature of performatives to not always work, and to produce effects in excess of their explicit ones. The judicial rhetorical constitution of subject and abject forms of being-in-relation to law operates through legal performatives that contain the possibilities for their own future “infelicity.”46 My project is an attempt to explore some future possibilities for the counter-sovereign articulation of subjectivity before U.S. law—possibilities that are both foreclosed and engendered in the argumentative justifications for judicial decisions. Specifically, I examine some key Supreme Court cases relating to sexual practice, race in education policy, and marriage. I perform a legal rhetorical criticism of critic-constructed “meta”-texts47 that form argumentative frameworks through which judges apply various legal doctrines to questions of sexual, racial, educational, and relational freedom.¶ Following Perelman, I understand judicial argument to be the explanatory justifications offered for judges’ authoritative interpretive application of legal doctrine to problems of public concern––problems that have been framed as legal, either by jurists themselves, petitioners to the courts, or both. In the United States, judicial arguments about constitutional interpretation have the privileged function of delimiting the grounds on which the authority of all other statist legal argument is based. Given the overwhelming salience of constitutional legal discourse in U.S. everyday life,48 this means that the judicial rhetoric of constitutional law plays a significant role in delimiting the grounds on which a person can base their claim—literally49––to existence and legitimacy in the U.S. polity.50 Jurists’ arguments from and about the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution in particular perform a final arbitration function in the ongoing and generally contentious process of the statist determination of what forms of racialized queer identity and relation will be eligible for recognized and legitimated status in U.S. public life. ¶ In this dissertation, I focus on the Fourteenth Amendment—due process and equal protection—rhetoric of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. I read this rhetoric in terms of “genealogies of precedent,” or the argumentative possibilities for queer subjectivity before law that are brought into being by the doctrinal frameworks Kennedy and other judicial rhetors use in a given opinion. Each chapter offers a case study of opinions in several Federal and Supreme Court cases that are foundational to Kennedy’s development of a new constitutional jurisprudence of substantive due process and equality. I demonstrate that this jurisprudence is both productive of and violent to possibilities for practical and strategic sexually “progressive”51 interactions with U.S. constitutional law. These interactions, despite their practical or strategic formulation, can be undertaken and/or framed in terms of anti-statist and institutional radical queer political goals. Possibilities for the success of such radical framing of practical interaction are partially delimited in the argumentative choice of U.S. judicial opinions.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Rejection of institutional projects in favor of radical, individual queer politics ignores the saturation of sovereign power in everyday life and leads to stagnation</h4><p>Peter <strong>Campbell 13</strong>, faculty member in the Program in Composition, Literacy, Pedagogy, and Rhetoric at the University of Pittsburgh, JUDICIAL RHETORIC AND RADICAL POLITICS: SEXUALITY, RACE, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/45352/Peter_Campbell.pdf?sequence=1</p><p>But—following Matsuda—I think that <u>Butler seems to miss an important point</u>. <u>Given the material force of the fantasy of legal sovereignty in the margins, “‘at the point[s]’” where power is “‘completely invested in its real and effective practices,</u>’” 31 <u>I argue that <mark>resistance to the idea of legal sovereignty must not preclude</u></mark> what Cathy Cohen might call <u>a “<mark>practica</mark>l</u>”32 <u><mark>understanding of the</mark> <strong>presently <mark>inevitable reality of the</mark> sovereign rhetorical operations of <mark>the law</mark>.</u></strong> <u>The political project of <mark>resistance to</mark> the performative <mark>sovereignty</mark> of judicial rhetoric in the United States <mark>must not deny</u></mark> (<u>as Matsuda and</u> Richard <u>Delgado said</u> in 1987 to the “crits” of Critical Legal Studies) <u><mark>the need to construct</mark> <strong>strategically informed and <mark>tactically sound responses</strong> to</mark> those <strong><mark>“formal” structures </mark>of law that already act as</strong> and <strong>with the material power of sovereign authority</u></strong>––<u>authority over the <mark>constraints that <strong>legal forms of subjectivity already impose</strong></mark> on personhood</u>.33 As <u>Butler herself acknowledges</u> in 2004,34 <u>the <strong>absolute <mark>critique</strong></mark> of legal sovereign performatives <strong><mark>does</mark> not adequately <mark>consider how</mark> the effects of <mark>the fantasy of </mark>legal <mark>sovereignty are</mark> most often (and most <mark>often most terribly) felt</strong> by “those who have</mark>” actually “seen and <mark>felt the falsity of the liberal promise</mark>”</u>35 <u>of the U.S. judiciary as a shield against domination.¶ </u>My experience of the law has occurred through my own participation in and observation of judicial sovereignty––both from a majoritarian perspective. I teach argumentation in a prison, a setting that emphasizes the paradoxical and simultaneous vitality and uselessness of rhetorical and argumentative interaction with those persons charged with enforcing the reasoned justification of judicial decision through coercive violence. In our present democratic state of laws, the production of legitimacy for judicial sovereignty through argument, and the production of legitimacy through force, work together in explicit and mutually supportive fashion. More happily, I was recently invited by two friends to officiate their wedding, at a ceremony in Rehoboth, Massachusetts. I agreed, and asked whether I should purchase an ordination online, so that I could legally perform the ceremony. There was no need— Massachusetts is unusual among U.S. states in maintaining a category of officiant called a “solemnizer.” Any person, with little qualification, can apply to be a solemnizer. The dichotomy between the “republican style”36 of the application process, and the quotidian ease with which I was granted the certificate made me think about the “sovereign performative”37 that I would stage in Rehoboth. The “I do” statement in a marriage ceremony is one of Austin’s core examples38 of an “illocutionary” performative, an utterance which “has a certain force” in the “saying” of it,39 but this example itself performs an interesting elision of the role of a state representative in a civil marriage ceremony. In Rehoboth, my friends would not be married until I pronounced them so publicly. That pronouncement would of course require other performative statements (“I do”) from my friends as a pre-requisite to its validity.40 But on the date and in the location specified by the solemnization certificate, I had, as a feature of the designation “solemnizer” bestowed on me by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, absolute power over whether they would be married or not—on that date and in that location. In the narrow context of the two possible realities of my friends becoming married or not on that day and in that location, my role was to exercise the sovereign performative power of the Commonwealth as its judge-like representative. ¶ But in that exercise, I would also be performing two arguments: one for the sovereign legitimacy (and successful performativity)41 of my utterances and the illegitimacy of any others; and one for the value and significance of “married” as a position of legal subjectivity in Massachusetts and the United States. I bring up this example to emphasize the specifically illocutionary power of the judicial rhetorical constitution of subjects before law. Austin describes illocution as “‘in saying x I was doing y’ or ‘I did y,’”42 but judicial illocution might more accurately be described as “in saying x I did x.” When I said that these people were married, I made them married. The statement and the doing were one and the same<u>. If a judge sentences a person to death, she does not depress the needle; the pronouncement of sentence is an illocutionary act in the first sense (x and y). But in pronouncing the sentence, the judge does redefine the convicted (of a death-eligible crime) person’s subjectivity before law from “convicted”</u> and/or “criminal” and/or “felon” and/or “murderer” and/or “traitor” <u>to, </u>more primarily, <u>“condemned.” This is an illocutionary act </u>in the second sense (x and x).¶ <u>If a judge rules that it is unconstitutional to require a trans* person’s passport to list their gender contrary to that person’s “self-understanding,”</u>43 <u>this is a “perlocutionary” act (where the utterance effectively causes something to happen</u>)44 <u>in that the ruling enables the person who is trans* to change the official designation of their gender</u>. But it is also an x and x illocutionary act <u>in the context of the petitioner’s subjectivity before law</u>—t<u>he utterance of the ruling has changed their self-understanding of their own identity from “not real” to “real” in the eyes of the law.</u> This would be even more evident if the ruling did not merely realize the truth of a trans* person’s self-understanding as male or female, but went so far as to create, in the moment of the utterance itself, a legally recognized trans* identity category. ¶ All of these examples are performatives enabled by the fantasy of the sovereign location of power in law. When asked, I considered (given my own views on marriage as an institution) declining to perform the ceremony—even in Massachusetts, whose marriage laws mean that the sexual orientation identity of the two people I married cannot be discerned from this story. I understood that my performative and the discourse of the ceremony surrounding it would contribute in a small way to the sovereign power of the state over human relational and sexual legitimacy. But this refusal would not have made the present sovereignty of the state over the determination of legally legitimate and illegitimate forms of relation any less inevitable.¶ <u><strong>Petitions to the law are inevitable</strong>; they will be made, <strong>often by people with no other recourse to save their life,</u></strong> <u>or to preserve their life's basic quality.</u> <u>As Butler demonstrates, any such petition will have performative effect</u>. I do not offer this brief critique of Butler’s theory of “sovereign performatives” to dispute the facticity of her arguments. I begin this project with the stipulation that <u>politics of resistance to the “sovereign performative” must include actions of resistance to statist law itself</u>—<u>that is, the <strong>specific articulation of opposition,</strong> within progressive social movements, <strong>to strategies that privilege appeals for help from judges</u></strong>. But these <u>politics must</u> also <u>acknowledge that those who undertake such strategies do not always do so without knowledge of the sovereign performative function of their actions—“<mark>recourse to the law” does not</mark> always or even usually <mark>“imagine” the law “as neutral</u></mark>.”45 These radical politics must also be undertaken with knowledge of the effects of the <u><mark>petitions to law-as-sovereign</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>will inevitably be made</u></strong></mark>—<u>and particularly with knowledge of the effects that flow from the</u> (also performative and also inevitable) <u>judicial rhetorical responses to these inevitable petitions. ¶ </u>Austin teaches us that it is in the nature of performatives to not always work, and to produce effects in excess of their explicit ones. The judicial rhetorical constitution of subject and abject forms of being-in-relation to law operates through legal performatives that contain the possibilities for their own future “infelicity.”46 My project is an attempt to explore some future possibilities for the counter-sovereign articulation of subjectivity before U.S. law—possibilities that are both foreclosed and engendered in the argumentative justifications for judicial decisions. Specifically, I examine some key Supreme Court cases relating to sexual practice, race in education policy, and marriage. I perform a legal rhetorical criticism of critic-constructed “meta”-texts47 that form argumentative frameworks through which judges apply various legal doctrines to questions of sexual, racial, educational, and relational freedom.¶ Following Perelman, I understand judicial argument to be the explanatory justifications offered for judges’ authoritative interpretive application of legal doctrine to problems of public concern––problems that have been framed as legal, either by jurists themselves, petitioners to the courts, or both. <u>In the United States, judicial arguments about constitutional interpretation have the privileged function of delimiting the grounds on which the authority of all other statist legal argument is based</u>.<u><strong> <mark>Given the</mark> overwhelming <mark>salience of constitutional legal discourse in</mark> U.S. everyday life</u></strong>,48 <u>this means that the <mark>judicial rhetoric</mark> of constitutional law <mark>plays a significant role in</mark> delimiting <mark>the grounds on which a person can base their claim</mark>—literally</u>49––<u><strong><mark>to existence </mark>and legitimacy in the U.S. polity.</u></strong>50 Jurists’ <u>arguments from and about the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments </u>to the U.S. Constitution in particular perform a final arbitration <u><mark>function in the</mark> ongoing and generally <mark>contentious process of the</mark> statist <mark>determination of what forms of <strong>racialized queer identity</mark> and relation <mark>will be eligible for recognized</mark> and legitimated status <mark>in</mark> U.S. <mark>public life</strong>.</mark> ¶ </u>In this dissertation, I focus on the Fourteenth Amendment—due process and equal protection—rhetoric of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. I read this rhetoric in terms of “genealogies of precedent,” or the <u>argumentative <mark>possibilities for queer subjectivity before law</mark> that <mark>are brought into being by </mark>the <mark>doctrinal frameworks</mark> Kennedy and other judicial rhetors use</u> in a given opinion. Each chapter offers a case study of opinions in several Federal and Supreme Court cases that are foundational to Kennedy’s development of a new constitutional jurisprudence of substantive due process and equality. I demonstrate that this jurisprudence is both productive of and violent to possibilities for practical and strategic sexually “progressive”51 interactions with U.S. constitutional law. <u><mark>These interactions, <strong>despite their practical</mark> or strategic <mark>formulation</strong>, can be</mark> undertaken and/or <strong><mark>framed in</u></strong></mark> terms of anti-statist and <u><strong><mark>institutional radical queer political goals</u></strong></mark>. Possibilities for the success of such radical framing of practical interaction are partially delimited in the argumentative choice of U.S. judicial opinions. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Wright 15. Michelle Wright, professor of African American studies at Northwestern University, The Physics of Blackness, University of Minnesota Press, 2015, pg. 13 fulltext: At the heart of this problem of accurately representing a Black collective is the fact that “Blackness” does not exist outside of its intersection with other collective identities. If I cannot tell you whether the collective or individual under discussion is male, female, gay, transgender, Brazilian, an adult, or a child—if I can tell you nothing other than that the “person” is Black, I truly have the “empty,” weightless identity of which Young and Braziel warn their readers, signifying nothing. Because trying to narrate all these collective identities appears impossible, they are primarily narrated through the lives of perspectives of Black men, under the default assumption that they are the leaders and therefore the agents of the collective. These narratives rarely claim to be speaking for all members of the Black collective all the time; instead they hope to represent most of the collective most of the time by considering various historical events, ancestral narratives, cultural practices, sociopolitical movements . . . the list continues. While the problem of holistic representation is understandable, its effects are hard to swallow: as certain bodies crowd the foreground of our representations, we begin to assume and look only for similar bodies, producing an inaccurate history of which peoples, groups, movements, or individuals were part of which events, much less of the (interpretive) effect of those moments on their lives. In other words, we run the risk that our mistakes will only be compounded in future generations: raised on histories that primarily feature men, we grow up to assume that women didn’t accomplish anything and same-sex desire and relationships rarely if ever occurred. This conundrum that accompanies all attempts to inclusively represent Blackness is not merely abstract; it affects which groups become forgotten in history when we historicize Blackness (as historians are always so pain- fully aware), and it affects the ability of county, state, federal, and private nonprofits to draw attention to, accurately represent, and effectively advocate for Black populations that are either passively or actively disqualified from city, county, state, or federal support; educational grants; and health studies—to mention just a few of the resources that Black communities struggle to access. As the Middle Passage epistemology itself attests, there is something truly soul-destroying in the repeated discursive erasure from or marginalization of vulnerable identities, whether in the media, on the street, in the classroom, or in the legislative chamber. The only way to produce a definition of Blackness that is wholly inclusive and nonhierarchical is to understand Blackness as the intersection of constructs that locate the Black collective in history and in the specific moment in which Blackness is being imagined—the “now” through which all imaginings of Blackness will be mediated. Constructs of Blackness are produced through history, culture, and ancestry, which are predicated on a notion of time and space that is linear and driven by progress (with set- backs along the way); however, this linear spacetime, while offering the necessary “weight” of a material Blackness, at times excludes those who, in the contemporary moment, perceive and perform themselves as Black but do not share that linear timeline. As the linear spacetime that dominates the academic canon on Black diasporic identities, the Middle Passage epistemology is a commanding one: it negotiates the complexity of the origins of Blackness in the West by stressing the process of being ripped from one existence and brutally thrust into another; it forces us to question the very heart and intention of white Western democratic discourses by presenting centuries of the moral and ethical corruption of chattel slavery and the equally corrupt logic that attended its constant justification; it belies those anti-Black discourses of African inferiority by presenting an endless fountain of thinkers, warriors, scientists, politicians, activists, artists, and entrepreneurs who achieved far more than the supposedly superior white majority. Intellectually, its counternarrative to Western claims of Enlightenment and modernity do not erase but complicate our understanding of those claims. Morally, it has not only been invoked and successfully used to critique older and con- temporary forms of slavery but also been borrowed by Western women’s movements and LGBTTQ movements to locate these identities within Western history writ large and assert their progressive nature. In other words, those scholars who have toiled in previous centuries and decades to bring the Black experience to light have inspired and driven not only Black studies but also a host of other disciplines such as sociology, history, literature, psychology, education, and so on. Western physics and philosophy define in large part the linear spacetime that shapes and informs the Middle Passage Epistemology. Newtonian laws of motion and gravity, a hallmark of the European Scientific revolution, reveal, as Newton himself asserted, that “absolute, true and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without ref- erence to anything external, flows uniformly.” Nevertheless, as Dan Falk’s In Search of Time suggests, “Newton’s view of time built on—but also departed from—the recent work of Galileo and Descartes. Galileo had envisioned time geometrically as a line marked off at regular intervals. . . . Newton went further by envisioning both time and space as geometrical structures that had a real existence.”12 Indeed, this “real existence” therefore rendered them, as Newton also asserted according to Brian Greene in The Fabric of the Cosmos, “absolute and immutable entities that provided the universe with a rigid, unchangeable arena. According to Newton, space and time supplied an invisible scaffolding that gave the universe shape and structure.”13 While Falk and Greene add “space” to their discussion of Newton’s theories of time, not all physicists or Newton scholars agree that Newton did indeed understand his theories as implicitly applying to space. This is where the humanities offers its own distinctive lay discourses on time; borrowing from my own fields of postcolonial studies and poststructuralist theory, which argue that time and space are inextricable from one another because each informs the other in our discourses (i.e., not the physical world), this book uses the term spacetime. “Newtonian spacetime” is not equivalent to Newton’s theories but rather is how philosophy and political science—as well as nearly all Western discourses, really, academic and lay—have (mis)translated Newton’s concept of linear time into a linear spacetime or progress narrative. Newton’s laws, with the addition of Einstein’s argument that time is com- plemented by rather than wholly separate from space, operate quite well in the observable physical world and related technological applications. The problem arises with the translation of this concept of linear spacetime into the humanities and social sciences. The idea that time, as we experience it, only moves forward became popular among eighteenth- and nineteenth- century European philosophers and political scientists who increasingly came to argue that if we do not already see the evidence borne out by science (we see the young only growing old, not the other way around; an egg hatching, not reassembling), we can see it in the progress of “man- kind” from huts, villages, and tribal chiefs to buildings, cities, machines, and “more advanced” forms of government.14 Given the immediate cogency it provides in presenting information and knowledge, it is no surprise that the linear progress narrative is what organizes most of our knowledge and knowledge production in the West. Today across the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities, we organize most of our epistemologies according to this spacetime, teaching and arguing that our current knowledge is the result of or based on previous achievements and that we are more “advanced” than previous generations of scholars and practitioners—that word itself presuming a linear movement forward. Sometimes we use post to further indicate how far we have come—as in postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, postlapsarian, the postwar era, postfeminist, even “post- Black”—even though scholars who work with all these ideologies point to the illogic of claiming to be “past” that which one still needs to define oneself (post-Blackness defines itself through Blackness, not outside of it, and so forth).<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Their arguments about the role of the middle passage in producing the historical stillness colludes FAR MORE with a white-washed, colonial way of knowing ontology by subsuming history to a predictive model of calculation. </h4><p><strong>Wright 15.</strong> Michelle Wright, professor of African American studies at Northwestern University, The Physics of Blackness, University of Minnesota Press, 2015, pg. 13</p><p>At the heart of this problem of accurately representing a Black collective is the fact that “<u><strong><mark>Blackness” does not exist outside of its intersection with other collective identities</u></strong>.</mark> <u>If I cannot tell you whether the collective or individual under discussion is male, female, gay, transgender, Brazilian, an adult, or a child—if I can tell you nothing other than that the “person” is Black, I truly have <strong>the “empty,” weightless identity</u></strong> of which Young and Braziel warn their readers, <u><strong>signifying nothing</u></strong>. <u><strong>Because trying to narrate all these <mark>collective identities</mark> appears impossible, they <mark>are</mark> primarily <mark>narrated through the lives of perspectives of Black men, under the default assumption that they are the leaders and therefore the agents of the collective</u></strong>.</mark> <u>These narratives rarely claim to be speaking for all members of the Black collective all the time; <strong>instead they hope to represent most of the collective most of the time by considering various historical events, ancestral narratives, cultural practices, sociopolitical movements . . . the list continues</u></strong>. <u>While the problem of holistic representation is understandable, its effects are hard to swallow: <mark>as certain bodies crowd the foreground of our representations, we begin to assume and look only for similar bodies, producing an inaccurate history</mark> of which peoples, groups, movements, or individuals were part of which events, much less of the (interpretive) effect of those moments on their lives</u>. In other words, <u><strong><mark>we run the risk that our mistakes will only be compounded in future generations: raised on histories that primarily feature men, we grow up to assume that women didn’t accomplish anything and same-sex desire and relationships rarely if ever occurred</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>This </mark>conundrum that accompanies all attempts to inclusively represent Blackness is not merely abstract; it <strong><mark>affects which groups become forgotten in history when we historicize Blackness</strong></mark> (as historians are always so pain- fully aware), <mark>and it affects the ability</mark> of county, state, federal, and private nonprofits <mark>to draw attention to, accurately represent, and effectively advocate for Black populations</mark> that are either passively or actively disqualified from city, county, state, or federal support; educational grants; and health studies—to mention just a few of the resources that Black communities struggle to access. <strong><mark>As the Middle Passage epistemology itself attests, there is something truly soul-destroying in the repeated discursive erasure from or marginalization of vulnerable identities</mark>, whether in the media, on the street, <mark>in the classroom, or in the legislative chamber</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The only way to produce a definition of Blackness that is wholly inclusive and nonhierarchical is to understand Blackness as the intersection of constructs that locate the Black collective in history and in the specific moment in which Blackness is being imagined—the “now” through which all imaginings of Blackness will be mediated</u></strong>. <u>Constructs of Blackness</mark> are <mark>produced through</mark> history, culture, and ancestry, which are predicated on a notion of time and space that is linear and driven by progress (with set- backs along the way</u>); however, <u><strong>this <mark>linear spacetime</mark>, while offering the necessary “weight” of a material Blackness, at times <mark>excludes those who</mark>, in the contemporary moment, <mark>perceive and perform themselves as Black but do not share that linear timeline</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>As the linear spacetime that dominates the academic canon on Black diasporic identities, <strong>the Middle Passage epistemology</mark> is a commanding one</u></strong>: <u><strong>it <mark>negotiates the complexity of the origins of Blackness</mark> in the West <mark>by stressing the process of being ripped from one existence and</mark> brutally <mark>thrust into another</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>it forces us to question the very heart and intention of white Western democratic discourses by presenting centuries of the moral and ethical corruption of chattel slavery and the equally corrupt logic that attended its constant justification</u></strong>; <u>it belies those anti-Black discourses of African inferiority by presenting an endless fountain of thinkers, warriors, scientists, politicians, activists, artists, and entrepreneurs who achieved far more than the supposedly superior white majority</u>. Intellectually, <u><strong>its counternarrative to Western claims of Enlightenment and modernity do not erase but complicate our understanding of those claims</u></strong>. Morally, it has not only been invoked and successfully used to critique older and con- temporary forms of slavery but also been borrowed by Western women’s movements and LGBTTQ movements to locate these identities within Western history writ large and assert their progressive nature. In other words, those scholars who have toiled in previous centuries and decades to bring the Black experience to light have inspired and driven not only Black studies but also a host of other disciplines such as sociology, history, literature, psychology, education, and so on. <u><strong><mark>Western physics and philosophy define</mark> in large part <mark>the linear spacetime that shapes</mark> and informs <mark>the Middle Passage Epistemology</u></strong>. <u>Newtonian laws of motion and gravity, a hallmark of the European Scientific revolution, reveal</u>,</mark> <u><strong>as Newton himself asserted</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>that “absolute, true and mathematical time</mark>, in and of itself and of its own nature, <mark>without ref- erence to anything external, flows uniformly</u></strong></mark>.” Nevertheless, as Dan Falk’s In Search of Time suggests, “Newton’s view of time built on—but also departed from—the recent work of Galileo and Descartes. Galileo had envisioned time geometrically as a line marked off at regular intervals. . . . Newton went further by envisioning both time and space as geometrical structures that had a real existence.”12 Indeed, <u>this “real existence” therefore rendered them, as Newton also asserted according to Brian Greene in The Fabric of the Cosmos, “absolute and immutable entities that provided the universe with a rigid, unchangeable arena. According to Newton, space and time supplied an invisible scaffolding that gave the universe shape and structure</u>.”13 While Falk and Greene add “space” to their discussion of Newton’s theories of time, <u>not all physicists or Newton scholars agree that Newton did indeed understand his theories as implicitly applying to space</u>. <u>This is where the humanities offers its own distinctive lay discourses on time; borrowing from my own fields of postcolonial studies and poststructuralist theory, which argue that time and space are inextricable from one another because each informs the other in our discourses (i.e., not the physical world), <strong>this book uses the term spacetime</u></strong>. <mark>“<u>Newtonian spacetime”</mark> is not equivalent to Newton’s theories but rather <mark>is how philosophy and political science</mark>—as well as nearly all Western discourses, really, academic and lay—<mark>have <strong>(mis)translated Newton’s concept of linear time into a linear spacetime</mark> or progress narrative</u></strong>. Newton’s laws, with the addition of Einstein’s argument that time is com- plemented by rather than wholly separate from space, operate quite well in the observable physical world and related technological applications. The problem arises with the translation of this concept of linear spacetime into the humanities and social sciences. The idea that time, as we experience it, only moves forward became popular among eighteenth- and nineteenth- century European philosophers and political scientists who increasingly came to argue that if we do not already see the evidence borne out by science (we see the young only growing old, not the other way around; an egg hatching, not reassembling), we can see it in the progress of “man- kind” from huts, villages, and tribal chiefs to buildings, cities, machines, and “more advanced” forms of government.14 <u><strong>Given the immediate cogency it provides in presenting information and knowledge, it is no surprise that <mark>the linear progress narrative is what organizes most of our knowledge and knowledge production in the West</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Today across the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities, we organize most of our epistemologies according to this spacetime, teaching and arguing that our current knowledge is the result of or based on previous achievements and that we are more “advanced” than previous generations of scholars and practitioners—that word itself <strong>presuming a linear movement forward</u></strong>. Sometimes we use post to further indicate how far we have come—as in postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, postlapsarian, the postwar era, postfeminist, even “post- Black”—even though scholars who work with all these ideologies point to the illogic of claiming to be “past” that which one still needs to define oneself (post-Blackness defines itself through Blackness, not outside of it, and so forth). </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Linke, Uli (2010). (ULE LINKE is professor of anthropology at Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY. Her principal areas of interest include the political anthropology of the body, racial formations, regimes of exclusion, violence and genocide, the politics of memory and suffering and human rights. Linke’s major publications include Blood and Nation: The European Aesthetics of Race (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), German Bodies: Race and Representation After Hitler (Routledge, 1999) and, as co-editor, Cultures of Fear: A Critical Reader (Pluto Press, 2009). Recent essays include Contact Zones: Rethinking the Sensual Life of the State (Anthropological Theory, 2006), and Gendering Europe, Europeanizing Gender in Handbook of Modern European History (Oxford University Press, 2010)). Fortress Europe: Globalization, Militarization and the Policing of Interior Borderlands. TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies, 23-24(), 100–120. doi:10.3138/topia.23-24.100) IlanB fulltext: My essay opens with this ethnographic instance of military training because it renders visible the hidden imaginaries of border militarism in contemporary Europe. The videotaped scenario reveals that the recruit is taught how to handle an automatic weapon while learning its application as a killing tool at the same time. The soldier’s training begins by staging a social context for the legitimate use of the gun: an airport, as a site of translocal transit and global mobility, is identified as a security risk and imagined as a probable setting for a terrorist attack. As the recruit is ordered to fire his weapon, the use of the gun is given a political function; when the conjured attackers are killed, national space is protected. In the German training session, this staged threat to the national order is subsequently globalized. Situated beyond the confines of established political borders, the source of danger is displaced to a different nation and equated with the contested masculinity of the black Other. The implausibility of the scenario (a German soldier patrolling the streets of New York City) is deflected, even rendered credible, by recourse to a gendered and racialist plot. As urban global space is transposed into a borderless killing field, black men are imagined as legitimate military targets whose words are judged to be as dangerous as a terrorist event. In acquiring the techniques of warfare through a synchronized coordination of body, mind and weapon, the soldier learns to equate acts of urban military terror against non-white Others with matters of security and with the mandates of European border protection. The soldier’s use of deadly force is authorized not only to secure corporate property (the airplane) or to protect national space (terrorism) but in defence of the white female/maternal figure (by an appeal to filial honour). The videotape reveals how a racist imagination is implanted and normalized for soldiers by basic military training exercises. While these machinations and practices are extracted from a single video clip, German historian Jay Lockenour has observed that given standard military training procedures founded on chain of command, obedience, discipline and perpetual practice, it is difficult to “imagine that this is an isolated incident” (Lockenour 2007: n.p.). Lockenour continues: The racism inherent in the scenario is so blatant. [The use of ] lethal force in response to insults ... is bound to violate the rules of engagement any democratic military would establish for its soldiers.... The scenario is not only racist, it imagines the recruit committing a “war crime.” (n.p.) But why are black males—in this case “Afro-American” men (in the drill sergeant’s words)—depicted as potential threats in the German military imagination? The black signifier seems to override political concerns for national sovereignty, citizenship, NATO membership, European Union security and defence treaties. Rooted in colonial fabrications of indigenous and native life-worlds far away from European space, black subjects have been imagined as Europe’s antithetical counters throughout the 20th century and into the present (Linke 1999; Mazón and Steingröver 2005; Pred 2000; Scheck 2006). “The idea of Europe,” as Goldberg notes, “excludes those historically categorized as non-European, as being not white” (2006: 347). How are such machinations of a white Europe sustained in this 21st-century era of globalization? Why is the social construction of the otherness of “the black Other” so central for this sense of Europeanness, even in contemporary Europe? Cultural assumptions about non-white criminality and violence continue to resonate in the present despite recent shifts in political regimes. During the past two decades, beginning in late 1980s, the political landscape of Europe has undergone dramatic change. The powerful matrix of global capitalism has deeply affected European nation forms, social ideologies and political systems, as shown by German unification, the collapse of the Soviet regime, the war in the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent formation of the European Union, including the ongoing Europeanization of post-socialist states. In this context, the historical fixity of borders, bodies and spaces has been untethered. The end of the cold war in the 1990s has furnished new possibilities for envisioning society, promoting major realignments of border regimes and fundamental transpositions in the topographic fabric of Europe’s political imagination. In addition, the emergent entanglements of state and corporate interests not only changed the political contours of Europe but also altered the social conditions under which ethnoracial imaginaries are brought to public visibility. Under the conditions of European reformation and globalization in the 1990s, the cultural production of identities, bodies and lifestyles has increasingly shifted to the marketplace and the terrain of advertising, fashion and media. Culture industries manufacture national distinction by means of commodity desire and consumption. The seductive promise of unlimited possibilities made by neoliberal economies is simultaneously and paradoxically defended as a state-protected privilege and a con-cession of citizenship reserved for European nationals. The political spaces of capitalism are closely guarded. Cultural imaginaries of gender, sexuality and race are called upon to authorize participation in the dream-worlds of prosperity. The formation of the European security state after 9/11 has intensified this process by giving rise to fortified border regimes, ethnic profiling and militarized racism. From this perspective, the focus on citizenship in Europe considered according to the master narratives of cold-war national history requires a critical reassessment. The impact of globalization, founded on a cohesive network of political, military and corporate interests, includes fundamental shifts the parameters, discourses and possibilities for negotiating matters of national belonging in Europe. How have Europeans “fashioned their distinctions” and “conjured up their ‘whiteness’” (Cooper and Stoler 1997: 16) in attempts to reconstitute themselves as global citizens in a multi-ethnic, post-imperial Europe? In a post-national Europe, the realities of ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism have unravelled the idea of citizens as a homogenous or undifferentiated group. As Europe strives to achieve political and economic unity in the 21st century, we see a concurrent push toward inequality, exclusion and marginalization. The legacies of colonialism and nationalism continue to imprint the privilege of whiteness onto the new map of Europe, and sustain the political fortification of Europe as a hegemonic white space. Within the post-9/11 European Union, the promotion of this ethnopolitical project can be documented in “the state-specific forms of attack against asylum, asylum seekers, and foreigners, and the ways in which fundamental rights are being legally altered and police powers built [or expanded] in specific states” (Glick-Schiller 2005: 527). In addition to these state-sponsored security measures against unwanted immigration, the whitening of European space is also attested to by the proliferation of hate crimes and the intensification of racial violence in Europe’s interior “borderlands,” those everyday zones of contact that Gloria Anzaldúa envisioned as “open wound[s],” “where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds” (qtd. in Fine et al. 2007: 76). In these quotidian border zones, the European intimacies of contact with different cultures and peoples are increasingly patterned by the use of terror against those whose visual appearances and lifestyles are rejected as non-European.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>European countries have historically kept people of color out of their countries- the racism is inherent to their society- empirics prove</h4><p><strong>Linke</strong>, Uli (20<strong>10</strong>). (ULE LINKE is professor of anthropology at Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY. Her principal areas of interest include the political anthropology of the body, racial formations, regimes of exclusion, violence and genocide, the politics of memory and suffering and human rights. Linke’s major publications include Blood and Nation: The European Aesthetics of Race (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), German Bodies: Race and Representation After Hitler (Routledge, 1999) and, as co-editor, Cultures of Fear: A Critical Reader (Pluto Press, 2009). Recent essays include Contact Zones: Rethinking the Sensual Life of the State (Anthropological Theory, 2006), and Gendering Europe, Europeanizing Gender in Handbook of Modern European History (Oxford University Press, 2010)). Fortress Europe: Globalization, Militarization<u> and the Policing of Interior Borderlands. TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies, 23-24(), 100–120. doi:10.3138/topia.23-24.100) IlanB</p><p></u>My essay opens with this ethnographic instance of military training because it renders visible the hidden imaginaries of border militarism in contemporary Europe. <u>The videotaped scenario reveals that <mark>the recruit is taught</mark> how <mark>to handle a</mark>n automatic <mark>weapon while learning its application as a killing tool</mark> at the same time.</u> The soldier’s training begins by staging a social context for the legitimate use of the gun: an airport, as a site of translocal transit and global mobility, is identified as a security risk and imagined as a probable setting for a terrorist attack. As the recruit is ordered to fire his weapon, the use of the gun is given a political function; when the conjured attackers are killed, national space is protected. In the German training session, this staged threat to the national order is subsequently globalized. Situated beyond the confines of established political borders, the source of danger is displaced to a different nation and equated with the contested masculinity of the black Other. The implausibility of the scenario (a German soldier patrolling the streets of New York City) is deflected, even rendered credible, by recourse to a gendered and racialist plot. <u><mark>As</mark> urban <mark>global space is transposed into a</mark> borderless <mark>killing field, black men are imagined as</mark> legitimate<mark> military targets whose words are judged to be as dangerous as a terrorist event</mark>. In acquiring the techniques of warfare through a synchronized coordination of body, mind and weapon, <mark>the soldier learns to equate acts of urban military terror against non-white Others with matters of security and with the mandates of European border protection. The soldier’s use of deadly force is authorized</mark> not only to secure corporate property (the airplane) or to protect national space (terrorism) but <mark>in defence of the white female</mark>/maternal figure (by an appeal to filial honour).</u> The videotape reveals how a racist imagination is implanted and normalized for soldiers by basic military training exercises. While these machinations and practices are extracted from a single video clip, German historian Jay Lockenour has observed that given standard military training procedures founded on chain of command, obedience, discipline and perpetual practice, it is difficult to “imagine that this is an isolated incident” (Lockenour 2007: n.p.). Lockenour continues: <u><mark>The racism</mark> inherent <mark>in the scenario is</mark> so <mark>blatant. [The use of ] lethal force in response to insults</mark> ... is bound to <mark>violate the rules of engagement </mark>any <mark>democratic military would establish for its soldiers</mark>.... <mark>The scenario is not only racist, it imagines the recruit committing a “war crime.”</mark> (n.p.) But why are <mark>black males</mark>—in this case “Afro-American” men (in the drill sergeant’s words)—<mark>depicted as potential threats in the German military imagination</mark>?</u> The black signifier seems to override political concerns for national sovereignty, citizenship, NATO membership, European Union security and defence treaties. <u><mark>Rooted in colonial fabrications</mark> of indigenous and native life-worlds far away from European space, <mark>black subjects have been imagined as Europe’s antithetical counters</mark> throughout the 20th century and into the present</u> (Linke 1999; Mazón and Steingröver 2005; Pred 2000; Scheck 2006). <u>“<mark>The idea of Europe</mark>,” as Goldberg notes, “<mark>excludes those historically categorized as non-European, as being not white</mark>” (2006: 347). How are such machinations of a white Europe sustained in this 21st-century era of globalization? <mark>Why is the social construction of the otherness of “the black Other” so central for this sense of Europeanness</mark>, even in contemporary Europe?</u> Cultural assumptions about non-white criminality and violence continue to resonate in the present despite recent shifts in political regimes. During the past two decades, beginning in late 1980s, the political landscape of Europe has undergone dramatic change. The powerful matrix of global capitalism has deeply affected European nation forms, social ideologies and political systems, as shown by German unification, the collapse of the Soviet regime, the war in the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent formation of the European Union, including the ongoing Europeanization of post-socialist states. In this context, the historical fixity of borders, bodies and spaces has been untethered. The end of the cold war in the 1990s has furnished new possibilities for envisioning society, promoting major realignments of border regimes and fundamental transpositions in the topographic fabric of Europe’s political imagination. In addition, the emergent entanglements of state and corporate interests not only changed the political contours of Europe but also altered the social conditions under which ethnoracial imaginaries are brought to public visibility. Under the conditions of European reformation and globalization in the 1990s, the cultural production of identities, bodies and lifestyles has increasingly shifted to the marketplace and the terrain of advertising, fashion and media. Culture industries manufacture national distinction by means of commodity desire and consumption. The seductive promise of unlimited possibilities made by neoliberal economies is simultaneously and paradoxically defended as a state-protected privilege and a con-cession of citizenship reserved for European nationals. The political spaces of capitalism are closely guarded. Cultural imaginaries of gender, sexuality and race are called upon to authorize participation in the dream-worlds of prosperity. The formation of the European security state after 9/11 has intensified this process by giving rise to fortified border regimes, ethnic profiling and militarized racism. From this perspective, the focus on citizenship in Europe considered according to the master narratives of cold-war national history requires a critical reassessment. <u>The impact of <mark>globalization, founded on</mark> a cohesive network of <mark>political, military and corporate interests</mark>, includes fundamental<mark> shifts the </mark>parameters, discourses and <mark>possibilities for negotiating matters of national belonging in Europe</mark>. How have <mark>Europeans “fashioned their distinctions” and “conjured up their ‘whiteness’”</mark> (Cooper and Stoler 1997: 16) <mark>in attempts to reconstitute themselves as global citizens</mark> in a multi-ethnic, post-imperial Europe?</u> In a post-national Europe, the realities of ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism have unravelled the idea of citizens as a homogenous or undifferentiated group. As Europe strives to achieve political and economic unity in the 21st century, we see a concurrent push toward inequality, exclusion and marginalization. The legacies of colonialism and nationalism continue to imprint the privilege of whiteness onto the new map of Europe, and sustain the political fortification of Europe as a hegemonic white space. Within the post-9/11 European Union, the promotion of this ethnopolitical project can be documented in “the state-specific forms of attack against asylum, asylum seekers, and foreigners, and the ways in which fundamental rights are being legally altered and police powers built [or expanded] in specific states” (Glick-Schiller 2005: 527). <u>In addition to these <mark>state</mark>-sponsored <mark>security measures against unwanted immigration, the whitening of European space is</mark> also <mark>attested to by the proliferation of hate crimes and the intensification of racial violence in Europe</mark>’s interior “borderlands,” those everyday zones of contact that Gloria Anzaldúa envisioned as “open wound[s],” “where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds” (qtd. in Fine et al. 2007: 76). <mark>In these</mark> quotidian <mark>border zones,</mark> the <mark>European</mark> intimacies of <mark>contact with different cultures and peoples are </mark>increasingly <mark>patterned by the use of terror against those whose </mark>visual<mark> appearances </mark>and lifestyles are rejected as non-European.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Some et al 21. [https://africa.panda.org/?36702/Why-biodiversity-matters-for-Africa] //L. Su fulltext: Yes! We are losing nature at a rate never seen before, as is clear from WWF’s Living Planet Report (LPR), which found that population sizes of mammals, birds, fish, amphibians and reptiles have seen an alarming average decline of 68% since 1970. This cannot continue! We must stop destroying our natural world and instead restore the biodiversity we all depend on. For Africa, the LPR reports an alarming 65% decline in population sizes of mammals, fish, amphibians and reptiles. These declines are largely driven by increasing demand on natural resources to support a growing population and global patterns of unsustainable consumption and production that lead to widespread habitat loss (45.9%), over exploitation of species (35.5%), and invasive species and disease (11.6%). The impacts of these drivers will be magnified through globalization and intensified under climate change. But why is biodiversity so important? Biodiversity is the variety of all life on Earth. Biodiversity and nature’s contributions in Africa are economically, socially and culturally important, essential in providing the continent’s food, water, energy, health and secure livelihood, and represent a strategic asset for sustainable development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. We are part of this huge biological web of natural organisms, which includes everything from the tiny microorganisms that live in the soil to the iconic elephants or pandas we seek to protect. The total biodiversity of our planet is immense, which is a good thing because diversity means more resilient, and healthy, ecosystems. Many people today are distanced from nature and its life-giving benefits. But the reality is that the air you breathe, the water you drink and the food you eat all ultimately rely on biodiversity. Biodiversity sustains us and is the building blocks of healthy, resilient and happy societies. We must maintain this vital source of life. How is biodiversity sustaining me? We see biodiversity every day. Some examples are plants: without our leafy friends there would be no oxygen. Tall trees and large swathes of lush forests and rainforests, like those in the Amazon, help stabilise the climate, playing a critical role in carbon and water cycles. Unknown territories - mangroves in Madagascar There are also less known benefits of biodiversity - things like coral reefs and mangrove swamps provide invaluable protection from cyclones and tsunamis for people living on coasts, while trees can absorb air pollution in urban areas. These environments are also home to some of the most incredible species: in Madagascar, mangroves (small trees growing in coastal areas) provide shelter for crabs and shrimps and homes or food for birds, sea turtles and dugongs, an endangered marine sea mammal. This amazing biological diversity and the benefits it provides is why leaders around the world are taking part in global meetings to protect nature and biodiversity. Join us in calling for them to secure a strong biodiversity agreement next year that reverses nature loss and delivers a sustainable future for both us and the planet! . Find out more about COP15 link Africa policy commitments towards COP 15 WWF welcomes the progressive work of the African Group of Negotiators on Biodiversity towards the development of the post-2020 global biodiversity framework for adoption at the fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity. At its recently concluded 18th ordinary meeting, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) called for ways to promote a biodiversity economy that can provide economic incentives to overcome the drivers of biodiversity loss, and supports sustainable livelihoods, business. They also stressed that mainstreaming is an essential tool for unlocking the necessary scale of investment in biodiversity in Africa. The integration of Agenda 2063 (The Africa we Want) goals and Sustainable Development Goals into the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) is crucial to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity that enhances human well-being and development outcomes in Africa. For the rest of the world, the opening of COP15 is a critical opportunity for China, taking on the CBD COP15 presidency, to lead and inspire world leaders to show political will to reverse biodiversity loss towards a nature positive world by 2030. Current institutions are incapable of adequately preventing environmental degradation Adelle 16. [https://theconversation.com/how-africa-can-up-its-game-to-meet-environmental-challenges-54204]//L. Su Africa has enormous natural resource wealth. At the same time it is extremely vulnerable to the impact of environmental degradation, including climate change. These are two good reasons, one might assume, for prioritising the environment in development efforts. Yet the continent has a woefully inadequate structure for the governance of the environment. This predicament is partly due to obvious constraints on national governments. These include a lack of finances, expertise, and data with which to design, implement and monitor effective environmental policies. But much of the blame can also be laid at the door of regional organisations like the African Union. Environmental issues like climate change, air pollution and water scarcity do not stop at national borders. The AU is ideally positioned to coordinate a pan-African approach for dealing with cross border environmental problems. It certainly has made a number of longstanding commitments to safeguard the environment. One of the earliest conventions adopted by the AU’s predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity – was the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. Don’t let yourself be misled. Understand issues with help from experts And in 2000, when the AU was set up, sustainable development was made one of its underlying objectives. So, the executive council - consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs of member states - could take decisions relating to the environment. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development or NEPAD, an official programme of the AU, also highlights the environment as one of its priorities. The AU’s latest Strategic Plan also places importance on environment and natural resources management. The challenge is to move beyond the rhetoric and translate these high level commitments and plans into action. There must be robust institutions to ensure that regional and international decisions can be translated into policy changes at a national level and then into on action on the ground. What’s missing The institutional arrangements for implementation, monitoring and enforcement of environmental commitments are generally weak or absent. For example, until 2003, the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources - an African wide agreement on the environment - had no provision for a Conference of the Parties or a Secretariat. Both are central to the implementation of the convention. The Convention was amended in 2003 to include these but they haven’t come into force. This is because too few member states have ratified it. Fifteen AU countries need to ratify it for it to come into effect. But so far, only 12 have done so. This means countries that are not abiding by the Convention cannot be brought to task. Integration across all sectors is needed for regional environmental governance to work. Many environmental agreements require cooperation between several different ministries and agencies. These must span across multiple sectors like water, transport, energy, agriculture and the environment. If not, then competing and conflicting sectoral strategies towards human and natural development are inevitable. This kind of policy coordination has been the eternal quest of governments around the world. But it poses a particular challenge in Africa. This is because institutions can be unstable, scattered and lacking in trained personnel and capacity. The AU has a colossal task in promoting effective environmental governance infrastructure across the continent. But Africa will suffer more acutely than other regions if the AU fails to act. Africa is more dependent on renewable natural resources and ecosystem services than other regions. It also has fewer resources than other regions of the world to adapt to environmental change.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>African integration is key to pursue sustainable development goals and preserve biodiversity.</h4><p><strong>Some et al 21.</strong> [https://africa.panda.org/?36702/Why-biodiversity-matters-for-Africa] //L. Su</p><p>Yes! We are losing nature at a rate never seen before, as is clear from WWF’s Living Planet Report (LPR), which found that population sizes of mammals, birds, fish, amphibians and reptiles have seen an alarming average decline of 68% since 1970. This cannot continue! <u><strong><mark>We must </u></strong></mark>stop destroying our natural world and instead <u><strong><mark>restore</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>biod</u></strong></mark>iversity we all depend on. <u><strong><mark>For Africa,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the LPR reports a</u></strong></mark>n alarming <u><strong><mark>65% decline</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>in population sizes</u></strong></mark> of mammals, fish, amphibians and reptiles. These declines are largely driven by increasing demand on natural resources to support a growing population and global patterns of unsustainable consumption and production that lead to widespread habitat loss (45.9%), over exploitation of species (35.5%), and invasive species and disease (11.6%). <u><strong><mark>The impacts</u></strong></mark> of these drivers <u><strong><mark>will be magnified through globalization</u></strong></mark> and intensified under climate change. But why is biodiversity so important? Biodiversity is the variety of all life on Earth. Biodiversity and nature’s contributions in Africa are economically, socially and culturally important, essential in providing the continent’s food, water, energy, health and secure livelihood, and represent a strategic asset for sustainable development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. We are part of this huge biological web of natural organisms, which includes everything from the tiny microorganisms that live in the soil to the iconic elephants or pandas we seek to protect. The total biodiversity of our planet is immense, which is a good thing because diversity means more resilient, and healthy, ecosystems. Many people today are distanced from nature and its life-giving benefits. But the reality is that the air you breathe, the water you drink and the food you eat all ultimately rely on biodiversity. Biodiversity sustains us and is the building blocks of healthy, resilient and happy societies. We must maintain this vital source of life. How is biodiversity sustaining me? We see biodiversity every day. Some examples are plants: without our leafy friends there would be no oxygen. Tall trees and large swathes of lush forests and rainforests, like those in the Amazon, help stabilise the climate, playing a critical role in carbon and water cycles. Unknown territories - mangroves in Madagascar There are also less known benefits of biodiversity - things like <u><strong><mark>coral reefs and</u></strong></mark> mangrove <u><strong><mark>swamps</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>provide</u></strong></mark> invaluable <u><strong><mark>protection</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>from</u></strong></mark> cyclones and <u><strong><mark>tsunamis for people living on coasts</u></strong></mark>, while trees can absorb air pollution in urban areas. These environments are also home to some of the most incredible species: in Madagascar, mangroves (small trees growing in coastal areas) provide shelter for crabs and shrimps and homes or food for birds, sea turtles and dugongs, an endangered marine sea mammal. This amazing biological diversity and the benefits it provides is why leaders around the world are taking part in global meetings to protect nature and biodiversity. Join us in calling for them to secure a strong biodiversity agreement next year that reverses nature loss and delivers a sustainable future for both us and the planet! . Find out more about COP15 link Africa policy commitments towards COP 15 WWF welcomes the progressive work of the African Group of Negotiators on Biodiversity towards the development of the post-2020 global biodiversity framework for adoption at the fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity. At its recently concluded 18th ordinary meeting, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) called for ways to promote a biodiversity economy that can provide economic incentives to overcome the drivers of biodiversity loss, and supports sustainable livelihoods, business. They also stressed that mainstreaming is an essential tool for unlocking the necessary scale of investment in biodiversity in Africa. <u><strong><mark>The integration of Agenda 2063</u></strong></mark> (The Africa we Want) <u><strong><mark>goals</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Sustainable Development Goals</u></strong></mark> into the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) <u><strong><mark>is crucial to the conservation</u></strong></mark> and sustainable use <u><strong><mark>of biod</u></strong></mark>iversity that enhances human well-being and development outcomes in Africa. For the rest of the world, the opening of COP15 is a critical opportunity for China, taking on the CBD COP15 presidency, to lead and inspire world leaders to show political will to reverse biodiversity loss towards a nature positive world by 2030. </p><p><strong>Current institutions are incapable of adequately preventing environmental degradation</p><p>Adelle 16.</strong> [https://theconversation.com/how-africa-can-up-its-game-to-meet-environmental-challenges-54204]//L. Su</p><p><u><strong><mark>Africa</u></strong></mark> has enormous natural resource wealth. At the same time it <u><strong><mark>is </u></strong></mark>extremely <u><strong><mark>vulnerable</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong></mark> the impact of <u><strong><mark>environmental degradation, </u></strong></mark>including climate change. These are two good reasons, one might assume, for prioritising the environment in development efforts. Yet the continent has a woefully inadequate structure for the governance of the environment. This predicament is partly due to obvious constraints on national governments. These include a lack of finances, expertise, and data with which to design, implement and monitor effective environmental policies. But much of the blame can also be laid at the door of regional organisations like the African Union. Environmental issues like <u><strong><mark>climate change, air pollution and water scarcity do not stop at national borders</u></strong></mark>. The AU is ideally positioned to coordinate a pan-African approach for dealing with cross border environmental problems. It certainly has made a number of longstanding commitments to safeguard the environment. One of the earliest conventions adopted by the AU’s predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity – was the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. Don’t let yourself be misled. Understand issues with help from experts And in 2000, when the AU was set up, sustainable development was made one of its underlying objectives. So, the executive council - consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs of member states - could take decisions relating to the environment. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development or NEPAD, an official programme of the AU, also highlights the environment as one of its priorities. The AU’s latest Strategic Plan also places importance on environment and natural resources management. The challenge is to move beyond the rhetoric and translate these high level commitments and plans into action. There must be robust institutions to ensure that regional and international decisions can be translated into policy changes at a national level and then into on action on the ground. What’s missing The institutional arrangements for implementation, monitoring and enforcement of environmental commitments are generally weak or absent. For example, until 2003, the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources - an African wide agreement on the environment - had no provision for a Conference of the Parties or a Secretariat. Both are central to the implementation of the convention. The Convention was amended in 2003 to include these but they haven’t come into force. This is because too few member states have ratified it. Fifteen AU countries need to ratify it for it to come into effect. But so far, only 12 have done so. This means countries that are not abiding by the Convention cannot be brought to task. <u><strong><mark>Integration</u></strong></mark> across all sectors <u><strong><mark>is needed for regional environmental governance</u></strong></mark> to work. Many environmental <u><strong><mark>agreements</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>require</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>cooperation</u></strong></mark> between several different ministries and agencies. These must span across multiple sectors like water, transport, energy, agriculture and the environment. If not, then competing and conflicting sectoral strategies towards human and natural development are inevitable. This kind of <u><strong><mark>policy</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>coordination</u></strong></mark> has been the eternal quest of governments around the world. But it <u><strong><mark>poses</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark> particular <u><strong><mark>challenge in Africa.</u></strong></mark> This is because <u><strong><mark>institutions</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>can be unstable</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>scattered and lacking in trained personnel</u></strong></mark> and capacity. The AU has a colossal task in promoting effective environmental governance infrastructure across the continent. But Africa will suffer more acutely than other regions if the AU fails to act. <u><strong><mark>Africa</u></strong></mark> is more dependent on renewable natural resources and ecosystem services than other regions. It also <u><strong><mark>has fewer resources</u></strong></mark> than other regions of the world <u><strong><mark>to adapt</u></strong></mark> to environmental change.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Essertier, 19—associate professor at the Nagoya Institute of Technology (Joseph, “Henoko, the Latest Sacrifice Zone of the US-Japan Military Alliance,” https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/henoko-the-latest-sacrifice-zone-of-the-us-japan-military-alliance/, dml) fulltext: Last year Business Insider explained that “without coral reefs, there could be a rippling ecosystem collapse in the oceans, with devastating effects on the planet.” And in 2012 Roger Bradbury, an ecologist at Australian National University told us that the coral reefs are dying; that the International Coral Reef Symposium called “on all governments to ensure the future of coral reefs;” that “hundreds of millions of people in poor, tropical countries like Indonesia and the Philippines who depend on coral reefs for food” will suffer; that the tourism industry of “rich countries with coral reefs, like the United States, Australia and Japan” are threatened; that Mexico and Thailand’s “food security and tourism industries” will be “badly damaged;” and that there will be a huge loss of biodiversity (New York Times). By now there is a consensus about what is killing the coral: warming sea-surface temperatures, ocean acidification, pollution, overfishing, and maybe even invasive species and coastal development. But there is one other coral killer. It is one of the world’s primary environment killers, and it is endangering the survival of our very own species. I write of the US military and, in this example, its assault on the coral of Oura Bay in Okinawa, Japan. The US war machine effect on the coral there is especially deadly because it has at its side another killer, the government of Japan, who are notorious now for ocean killing—for assaulting whales, dolphins, and fish, not to mention those people unfortunate enough to live near the ocean and subsist on fish or whose livelihoods once depended on fishing. (That government helped build nuclear power plants near tsunami-prone coastal areas, and even backed up Tokyo Electric Power Company or TEPCO after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster that has spewed highly radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean). With the new Henoko base construction, in which they are expanding Camp Schwab into Oura Bay, Tokyo is gifting Washington another huge US Marine Corps airbase—stealing from the poor and giving to the rich. (Camp Schwab is located in the Henoko district of Nago City). On one side stand powerful forces—Tokyo, Washington, and the various companies that are profiting from the base construction—while on the other side stand the people of Uchinā. Uchinā is the name for “Okinawa” in Uchināguchi, the language that is native to Okinawa Island. The Battle of Okinawa killed one-third of the Uchinā people, left most of them homeless, and devastated their homeland, so needless to say, they do not want that to happen again. Uchinā people have struggled for three-quarters of a century to demilitarize their land and prevent these two powerful states, the US and Japan, from turning their land into a battlefield once more. They have struggled, with some success, virtually on their own, for decades. The population of Japan as a whole is roughly 100 times the population of Okinawa Prefecture. By comparison, Korea is roughly 50 times the population of Okinawa. When it has been difficult even for Koreans to maintain their independence from Tokyo and Washington, imagine what the Uchinā people have been up against. Uchināguchi is the native language of Okinawa Island and is not mutually intelligible with the language of Tokyo. The Uchinā people enjoyed independence as a separate kingdom until the 17th century and even after that they were able to maintain semi-independence from Japan until 1874. Twenty percent of the total area of Okinawa Island is now occupied by US bases. The rest of it is ruled by Tokyo. Okinawa Island is only one of many islands in Okinawa Prefecture that have military installations, of either the US military or Japan’s “Self-defense” Forces (SDF). Miyako Island and Ishigaki Island are two of the other major islands that make up Okinawa Prefecture. Three-quarters of the 50,000 US military personnel who are stationed in Japan live in Okinawa Prefecture. Washington and Tokyo want to use Uchinā again as what I call a “sacrifice zone,” borrowing Naomi Klein’s term. For the last for 20 years the Uchinā people have successfully held their ground against Tokyo’s efforts to construct a base there. They have blocked, temporarily stopped, or slowed it down over and over again. But on the 14th of December, last month, Tokyo managed to begin to actually injure the coral in Henoko, on Oura Bay. (You can watch the outrageous killing of the coral yourself at the “Stand With Okinawa” website: standwithokinawa.net/2018/12/14/dec14news/ ). They dumped dirt and crushed rock on top of it. Fortunately for everyone, anti-base activists did not back down. For that we should be thankful. The coral is still alive. As the political scientist and activist C. Douglas Lummis pointed out the other day, “It Ain’t Over ‘Till It’s Over.” (His latest article is entitled, “It Ain’t Over ‘Till It’s Over: Reflections on the Okinawan Anti-Base Resistance”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 1 January 2019). He knows the Uchinā people and their postwar history as deeply as anyone, and he knows their strength. The vast majority of Uchinā people are opposed to the Henoko base construction; 55% of Japanese are opposed. Allied with the Uchinā people are thousands of socially-conscious, active Japanese citizens and hundreds of good world citizens from outside Japan. This is the tiny portion of humanity who understand what is at stake. Humanity is now in the midst of a “global extinction event,” in which the coral in seas around the globe are about to go extinct. Coral are a type of marine invertebrate. The marine invertebrates are the most ancient type of animal on our planet. The extinction of this entire ecosystem is in the cards. Henoko should be a nature preserve. “Coral reefs,” then, are the “rainforests of the sea,” but the Henoko coral reef may be on its last legs. We decide whether it lives or dies. The survival of the dugong (a kind of “sea cow”) and 200 other species may depend on the survival of the coral reef in Henoko. But the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is now, in effect, commanding people to kill it—this precious healthy coral that is only beginning to suffer from the coral bleaching that plagues coral in other regions of the world. The administration coldly put on its nature-killer mask and began the landfill work on the 14th of December—probably an act that violates Japanese law—hoping to break the will of the resistance. They are trying to build on a sea bottom that has the “resilience of mayonnaise,” so this project is going to cost far more than originally projected if the engineers can actually build it and if the legal hurdles can be overcome. As Gavan McCormack and Satoko Norimatsu have written in their book Resistant Islands (2012), building a military base in Henoko is akin to building one in the Grand Canyon. Why build one there anyway? Modern imperialism, in a word. As Japan stepped out of its centuries-long seclusion and into the dog-eat-dog world of Western colonialism in the late nineteenth century, the government of Japan, too, engaged in Western-style imperialism—against the people of Uchinā in the south, the Ainu in the north, and other neighbors, such as the people of Korea and China. Resisting colonization by the West and becoming a Western-style empire itself (completing one of the tasks of so-called “modernization”) meant that it had to be hell-bent on industrial expansion at any cost—from its wary birth in 1868 until its disorienting defeat in 1945. In the postwar period, Japan transitioned into “Japan Inc.” This new power center represented a duopoly of the national government in Tokyo on the one hand and Japanese big business on the other. The two bonded together to form one policy-making body that continued that same hell-bent industrialization that Japanese elites had begun in the late nineteenth century, minus the overtly militarist component. As much as in the US, maybe even more so, profits come before people in Japan, Inc. And one of the main sources of profits has been the Department of Killing, the Pentagon. The destructive behavior we see in Henoko today is pathological from a human survival perspective but completely in line with Tokyo and Washington’s overall industrializing and geopolitical goals. Conclusion The destruction being done to our planet by the war machines of the US, Japan, and other countries is pushing the possibility of human survival past the point of no return, just like the burning of fossil fuels that Klein has explained so well. Henoko is a classic example of Our Military turning a nature preserve into a sacrifice zone. This largely unreported crime of killing off one of the last healthy coral reefs could send shock waves throughout the world’s ecosystems. The people of Uchinā and those who stand with them are giving us some hope though, through their small but tenacious voices that are calling out to the world, “Stop the construction of the new base in Henoko!”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Specifically, the Henoko base will destroy <u>Oura Bay reefs</u>, which are key to <u>planetary survival</u>. Only <u>closing</u> it solves by <u>empowering</u> anti-imperial struggles.</h4><p><strong>Essertier, 19</strong>—associate professor at the Nagoya Institute of Technology (Joseph, “Henoko, the Latest Sacrifice Zone of the US-Japan Military Alliance,” https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/henoko-the-latest-sacrifice-zone-of-the-us-japan-military-alliance/, dml)</p><p>Last year Business Insider explained that “<u>without coral reefs, there could be a <strong>rippling ecosystem collapse</strong> in the oceans, with <strong>devastating effects</strong> on the <strong>planet</u></strong>.” And in 2012 Roger Bradbury, an ecologist at Australian National University told us that <u>the coral reefs are dying</u>; that the International Coral Reef Symposium called “on all governments to ensure the future of coral reefs;” that “hundreds of millions of people in poor, tropical countries like Indonesia and the Philippines who depend on coral reefs for food” will suffer; that the tourism industry of “rich countries with coral reefs, like the United States, Australia and Japan” are threatened; that Mexico and Thailand’s “food security and tourism industries” will be “badly damaged;” and that there will be a huge loss of biodiversity (New York Times). By now <u>there is a consensus about what is killing the coral</u>: warming sea-surface temperatures, ocean acidification, pollution, overfishing, and maybe even invasive species and coastal development. </p><p><u>But there is one other coral killer. It is one of the world’s <strong>primary environment killers</strong>, and it is <strong>endangering the survival of our very own species</u></strong>. I write of <u>the <strong>US military</u></strong> and, in this example, its <u><strong>assault</strong> on the <strong>coral of Oura Bay</strong> in Okinawa</u>, Japan. <u>The US war machine effect on the coral there is <strong>especially deadly</strong> because it has at its side another killer, the government of <strong>Japan</strong>, who are notorious now for <strong>ocean killing</strong>—for assaulting <strong>whales</strong>, <strong>dolphins</strong>, and <strong>fish</strong>, not to mention those people unfortunate enough to live near the ocean and subsist on fish or whose livelihoods once depended on fishing</u>. (That government helped build nuclear power plants near tsunami-prone coastal areas, and even backed up Tokyo Electric Power Company or TEPCO after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster that has spewed highly radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean).</p><p><u>With the new <strong><mark>Henoko base</strong></mark> construction</u>, in which they are <u><strong><mark>expanding</u></strong></mark> Camp Schwab <u><mark>into <strong>Oura Bay</strong></mark>, Tokyo is gifting Washington another huge US Marine Corps airbase</u>—stealing from the poor and giving to the rich. (Camp Schwab is located in the Henoko district of Nago City). <u>On one side stand <strong>powerful forces</u></strong>—Tokyo, Washington, and the various companies that are profiting from the base construction—<u>while on the other side stand the people of <strong>Uchinā</u></strong>. Uchinā is the name for “Okinawa” in Uchināguchi, the language that is native to Okinawa Island. The Battle of Okinawa killed one-third of the Uchinā people, left most of them homeless, and devastated their homeland, so needless to say, they do not want that to happen again. <u><mark>Uchinā people have struggled </mark>for three-quarters of a century <mark>to</mark> <strong><mark>demilitarize</mark> their <mark>land</strong></mark> and <strong>prevent</u></strong> these two powerful states, <u>the US and Japan</u>, <u>from turning their land into a <strong>battlefield</u></strong> once more. <u>They have struggled, with some success, virtually on their own, for decades</u>. The population of Japan as a whole is roughly 100 times the population of Okinawa Prefecture. By comparison, Korea is roughly 50 times the population of Okinawa. When it has been difficult even for Koreans to maintain their independence from Tokyo and Washington, imagine what the Uchinā people have been up against.</p><p>Uchināguchi is the native language of Okinawa Island and is not mutually intelligible with the language of Tokyo. <u>The Uchinā people enjoyed independence as a <strong>separate kingdom</u></strong> until the 17th century and even after that they were able to maintain semi-independence from Japan until 1874. <u><strong>Twenty percent</strong> of the total area of Okinawa Island is now <strong>occupied by US bases</strong>. The rest of it is <strong>ruled by Tokyo</u></strong>. Okinawa Island is only one of many islands in Okinawa Prefecture that have military installations, of either the US military or Japan’s “Self-defense” Forces (SDF). Miyako Island and Ishigaki Island are two of the other major islands that make up Okinawa Prefecture. <u><strong>Three-quarters</strong> of the 50,000 US military personnel who are stationed in Japan live in Okinawa Prefecture</u>.</p><p><u>Washington and Tokyo want to use Uchinā again as</u> what I call <u>a “<strong>sacrifice zone</strong>,”</u> borrowing Naomi Klein’s term. For the last <u>for 20 years the Uchinā people have <strong>successfully held their ground</strong> against Tokyo’s efforts to construct a base there. <mark>They have <strong>blocked</strong>, <strong></mark>temporarily <mark>stopped</strong>, or <strong>slowed it down</strong></mark> over and over again. But</u> on the 14th of December, last month, <u><mark>Tokyo managed to </mark>begin to <strong>actually <mark>injure</strong> the coral</mark> in Henoko, on Oura Bay</u>. (You can watch the outrageous killing of the coral yourself at the “Stand With Okinawa” website: standwithokinawa.net/2018/12/14/dec14news/ ). They dumped dirt and crushed rock on top of it. Fortunately for everyone, <u>anti-<mark>base activists <strong>did not back down</strong></mark>. For that we should be <strong>thankful</strong>. The <mark>coral is <strong>still alive</strong></mark>. As the political scientist and activist C. Douglas Lummis pointed out the other day, “It Ain’t Over ‘Till It’s Over.” (His latest article is entitled, “It Ain’t Over ‘Till It’s Over: Reflections on the Okinawan Anti-Base Resistance”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 1 January 2019). He knows the Uchinā people and their postwar history as deeply as anyone, and he knows their strength. </p><p>The <strong>vast majority</strong> of Uchinā people are <strong>opposed</strong> to the Henoko base construction</u>; 55% of Japanese are opposed. <u>Allied with the Uchinā people are <strong>thousands of socially-conscious</strong>, <strong>active Japanese citizens</strong> and <strong>hundreds of good world citizens</strong> from outside Japan. This is the tiny portion of humanity who understand <strong>what is at stake</strong>. Humanity is now in the midst of a “<strong>global extinction event</strong>,” in which the coral in seas around the globe are <strong>about to go extinct</u></strong>. Coral are a type of marine invertebrate. The marine invertebrates are the most ancient type of animal on our planet. <u>The <strong><mark>extinction </mark>of this entire ecosystem</strong> <mark>is in the cards</mark>. Henoko should be a <strong>nature preserve</strong>. </p><p>“<mark>Coral reefs</mark>,”</u> then, <u><mark>are</mark> the “<strong><mark>rainforests of the sea</strong></mark>,” but the <mark>Henoko</mark> coral reef <mark>may be on its <strong>last legs</strong></mark>. We decide whether it lives or dies. The survival of the <strong>dugong</u></strong> (a kind of “sea cow”) <u>and <strong>200 other species</strong> may depend on the survival of the coral reef in Henoko</u>. <u>But</u> the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo <u><strong>Abe</strong> is</u> now, in effect, <u>commanding people to <strong>kill it</strong>—this precious healthy coral that is <strong>only beginning</strong> to suffer from</u> the <u><strong>coral bleaching</u></strong> that plagues coral in other regions of the world. <u>The administration</u> coldly put on its nature-killer mask and <u>began the landfill work</u> on the 14th of December—probably an act that violates Japanese law—<u>hoping to <strong>break the will</strong> of the resistance. They are trying to build on a sea bottom that has the “<strong>resilience of mayonnaise</strong>,” so this project is going to cost <strong>far more</strong> than originally projected</u> if the engineers can actually build it and if the legal hurdles can be overcome. As Gavan McCormack and Satoko Norimatsu have written in their book Resistant Islands (2012), <u>building a military base in Henoko is akin to building one in the <strong>Grand Canyon</strong>. <strong>Why build one there anyway</strong>?</p><p>Modern <strong>imperialism</u></strong>, in a word. <u>As Japan stepped out of its centuries-long seclusion and into the <strong>dog-eat-dog world</strong> of Western colonialism</u> in the late nineteenth century, <u>the government of Japan</u>, too, <u>engaged in <strong>Western-style imperialism</u></strong>—against the people of Uchinā in the south, the Ainu in the north, and other neighbors, such as the people of Korea and China. Resisting colonization by the West and becoming a Western-style empire itself (completing one of the tasks of so-called “modernization”) meant that it had to be hell-bent on industrial expansion at any cost—from its wary birth in 1868 until its disorienting defeat in 1945. </p><p>In the postwar period, Japan transitioned into “Japan Inc.” This new power center represented a duopoly of the national government in Tokyo on the one hand and Japanese big business on the other. The two bonded together to form one policy-making body that continued that same hell-bent industrialization that Japanese elites had begun in the late nineteenth century, minus the overtly militarist component. As much as in the US, maybe even more so, profits come before people in Japan, Inc. And one of the main sources of profits has been the Department of Killing, the Pentagon. The destructive behavior we see in Henoko today is pathological from a human survival perspective but completely in line with Tokyo and Washington’s overall industrializing and geopolitical goals.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p><u><mark>The <strong>destruction </mark>being done to our planet</strong> by the war machines of the US, Japan</u>, and other countries <u><mark>is pushing </mark>the possibility of <mark>human survival <strong>past the point of no return</u></strong></mark>, just like the burning of fossil fuels that Klein has explained so well. <u><mark>Henoko is</mark> a classic example of Our Military turning a nature preserve into <mark>a <strong>sacrifice zone</strong></mark>. This largely unreported crime of <mark>killing</mark> off <mark>one of the last healthy</mark> coral <mark>reefs could send shock waves <strong>throughout the world’s ecosystems</strong></mark>. The <mark>people of Uchinā</mark> and those who stand with them <mark>are giving</u></mark> us some <u><strong><mark>hope</u></strong></mark> though, <u><mark>through</mark> their <strong>small</strong> but <strong>tenacious <mark>voices</strong> </mark>that are <mark>calling out</u></mark> to the world, “<u><strong><mark>Stop</mark> the construction of <mark>the new base </mark>in Henoko!</u></strong>”</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kmentt ‘8 Alexander Kmentt is Austria's Director for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament. For the period between 2006 and 2011 Kmentt was the Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Alexander Kmentt also received the highest number of votes in a poll to determine the "2014 Arms Control Person of the Year." Nine other worthy candidates were nominated by the staff of the Arms Control. Alexander has been a leading disarmament diplomat for many years. From the Chapter: “A Beacon of Light: The Mine Ban Treaty Since 1997” – From the Book: Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security, edited by Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose, et al - page 19-21 fulltext: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have had an admirable record of compliance with the key provisions. Perhaps above all, they have observed the core prohibitions on use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines. This certainly is a huge success, which even supporters of the treaty may not have expected. To date there is no proven case of States Parties using antipersonnel mines.4 Similarly, no state sanctioned transfers of antipersonnel mines are definitively known to have occurred.5 There have been no allegations of continued production of antipersonnel mines by a State Party. The obligation to destroy stockpiled antipersonnel landmines constitutes another key disarmament provision of the treaty. State Parties are given four years to complete this undertaking that for some can be costly, technically challenging, or vast.6 To date, only a very few State Parties have not fulfilled their stockpile destruction obligation within the four-year deadline.7 Collectively, States Parties have destroyed about forty million stockpiled antipersonnel landmines. As of September 2007, eighty States Parties had completed stockpile destruction, and ten still have to complete their stockpile destruction programs (the remaining sixty-five did not hold operational stocks upon joining the treaty). This is disarmament in its truest form: the prevention of the use of a weapon through its destruction and, hence, the prevention of casualties. While compliance by States Parties has been very good, it is also important to look at the behavior of states that have remained outside the treaty. Here some significant developments have taken place as a positive "spillover" from the Mine Ban Treaty. At one time, there were more than fifty states producing antipersonnel landmines. That figure has now fallen to thirteen, and several states not party to the treaty have stopped production.8 Until the mine ban movement took hold, legal trade in antipersonnel mines was widespread, but it has now virtually ceased, even among those not party to the treaty. Many outside the treaty have formal bans or moratoria on export.9 While small-scale illicit trade still occurs, the international market for antipersonnel landmines has all but disappeared. The use of antipersonnel mines has also fallen sharply. In recent years, only a handful (or fewer) of governments have actively laid antipersonnel mines, including Burma (Myanmar), Georgia, Nepal, and Russia. The United States, whose decision not to join the treaty put it at the receiving end of often very harsh criticism, has not used antipersonnel mines since 1991. Arguably, the global drop in use has been caused by exactly the kind of political pressure and stigmatization of the weapon that the Treaty Community has been able to generate. The political price to be paid in terms of public criticism has perhaps been too high compared to the actual military value of antipersonnel landmines. Clearly the norms established by the Mine Ban Treaty have led to a significant change in the behavior of states outside the treaty. On the other hand, moral authority, a key strength of the treaty, does not seem to have the desired effect in some countries. Some states that apparently are not as susceptible to humanitarian arguments or public opinion have continued to use the weapon. The behavior of armed nonstate actors, some of whom are responsible for widespread use of antipersonnel mines, is also a great cause for concern.10 Because those groups are beyond the scope of the treaty, we are challenged as to how best to address this important issue. Outside of the treaty's membership, states still hold large stocks. Although the numbers are not known exactly, it is believed that over 140 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by China, Russia, and the United States. India, Pakistan, and others hold millions more. This is, of course, a major challenge to the global disarmament objective of the Mine Ban Treaty. However, if the aim of the treaty is to have an impact on the lives of affected people, destroying stockpiles in those countries which have until recently deployed them (for example, States Parties like Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan) has more significance than the stocks still held in big countries. A total ban on use, production, trade, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines has not yet been achieved, but progress is impressive, and even the behavior of some hold-out states has clearly altered for the better. The parties to the treaty have an obligation to clear mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. For this task, the treaty foresees a deadline of ten years, which can be extended upon agreement of the other State Parties. Even with the first deadlines approaching in 2009, assessing progress in this area is not as straightforward as it might seem. The situation varies greatly from country to country. For example, in some States Parties such as Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Cambodia, the landmine contamination is of such a scale that large parts of the population are directly and severely affected. In other countries only remote parts of a territory may be mined with little or no impact on people's daily lives. But the same ten-year deadline applies in all cases. There are seventy-seven countries worldwide with mine-contaminated area, and fifty-three are party to the treaty. Since 1997 significant progress has been made not only in getting mines out of the ground, but also in the way that mine clearance is conducted. Although undertaken before the treaty came into existence, humanitarian demining has only been put on a solid and systematic footing since then. This is undoubtedly due to the treaty and the framework that it has provided for the range of mine action activities (clearance, risk education, and victim assistance) as well as for banning the weapon. As a starting point, we now know much more about the extent of the landmine contamination in most affected countries. Systematic landmine impact surveys have been conducted, and information about where mines are located as well as where they have the greatest impact has increased dramatically. Internationally recognized mine action standards have been developed and disseminated and, consequently, the performance of demining operators has improved significantly. In most cases, mine clearance is now carried out much more effectively and efficiently than was the case not that long ago. States Parties have focused most (but not ail) of their funding and other assistance for mine clearance on the treaty's mine-affected countries. These affected states have, by joining the treaty, foresworn the use of antipersonnel mines. This provides donors with a degree of assurance that once the mines have been cleared, the land will not be mined again in the future.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Demining solves and justifies optimism. But - going forward - reversing holdouts will be key </h4><p>Kmentt ‘8 </strong>Alexander Kmentt is Austria's Director for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament. For the period between 2006 and 2011 Kmentt was the Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Alexander Kmentt also received the highest number of votes in a poll to determine the "2014 Arms Control Person of the Year." Nine other worthy candidates were nominated by the staff of the Arms Control. Alexander has been a leading disarmament diplomat for many years. From the Chapter: “A Beacon of Light: The Mine Ban Treaty Since 1997” – From the Book: <u>Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security</u>, edited by Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose, et al - page 19-21 </p><p><u><mark>States Parties to the</u></mark> Mine Ban <u><mark>Treaty have</mark> had <mark>an <strong>admirable record of compliance</u></strong></mark> <u>with the key provisions.</u> Perhaps above all, <u><mark>they have observed</mark> </u>the <u><mark>core prohibitions</u></mark> <u>on use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel </u>land<u>mines.</u> <u><mark>This</mark> <strong>certainly</strong> <mark>is a huge success</u></mark>, <u><mark>which even supporters</mark> of the treaty <mark>may not have expected</mark>.</u> <u><mark>To date there is <strong>no proven case</strong> of States </mark>Parties <mark>using</u></mark> antipersonnel <u><mark>mines</u></mark>.4 Similarly, <u><strong>no state sanctioned transfers </strong>of</u> antipersonnel <u>mines are</u> definitively <u>known to have occurred</u>.5 <u>There have been <strong>no allegations of continued production </strong>of antipersonnel mines by a State Party.</u> The <u><mark>obligation <strong>to destroy</u></strong></mark> stockpiled antipersonnel land<u><mark>mines</u></mark> <u><mark>constitutes a</u></mark>nother <u><mark>key</u></mark> disarmament <u><mark>provision</mark> of the treaty</u>. State Parties are given four years to complete this undertaking that for some can be costly, technically challenging, or vast.6 To date, only a very few State Parties have not fulfilled their stockpile destruction obligation within the four-year deadline.7 Collectively, States <u><strong><mark>Parties have destroyed</u></strong></mark> about <u><strong><mark>forty million</u></strong></mark> stockpiled antipersonnel land<u><strong>mines. </u></strong>As of September 2007, eighty States Parties had completed stockpile destruction, and ten still have to complete their stockpile destruction programs (the remaining sixty-five did not hold operational stocks upon joining the treaty). This is disarmament in its truest form: the prevention of the use of a weapon through its destruction and, hence, the prevention of casualties. <u><mark>While compliance by</u></mark> States <u><strong><mark>Parties</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>has been</mark> very <mark>good</u></mark>, <u><mark>it is </mark>also <mark>important to look at</u></mark> the behavior of <u><mark>states</mark> </u>that have remained <u><strong><mark>outside the treaty</mark>. </u></strong>Here some significant developments have taken place as a positive "spillover" from the Mine Ban Treaty. At one time, there were more than fifty states producing antipersonnel landmines. That figure has now fallen to thirteen, and several states not party to the treaty have stopped production.8 <u><mark>Until the</mark> mine <mark>ban</u></mark> movement took hold, legal <u><mark>trade in</u></mark> antipersonnel <u><mark>mines was widespread</u></mark>, <u><mark>but it has now</mark> virtually <mark>ceased</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>even among those not party</mark> to the treaty.</u></strong> Many outside the treaty have formal bans or moratoria on export.9 While small-scale illicit trade still occurs, <u><mark>the international market for</u></mark> antipersonnel land<u><mark>mines has all but disappeared.</u></mark> The use of antipersonnel mines has also fallen sharply. In recent years, only a handful (or fewer) of governments have actively laid antipersonnel mines, including Burma (Myanmar), Georgia, Nepal, and Russia. The United States, whose decision not to join the treaty put it at the receiving end of often very harsh criticism, has not used antipersonnel mines since 1991. Arguably, the global drop in use has been caused by exactly the kind of political pressure and stigmatization of the weapon that the Treaty Community has been able to generate. The political price to be paid in terms of public criticism has perhaps been too high compared to the actual military value of antipersonnel landmines. Clearly the norms established by the Mine Ban Treaty have led to a significant change in the behavior of states outside the treaty. On the other hand, moral authority, a key strength of the treaty, does not seem to have the desired effect in some countries. Some states that apparently are not as susceptible to humanitarian arguments or public opinion have continued to use the weapon. The behavior of armed nonstate actors, some of whom are responsible for widespread use of antipersonnel mines, is also a great cause for concern.10 Because those groups are beyond the scope of the treaty, we are challenged as to how best to address this important issue. <u>Outside</u> of the <u>treaty</u>'s <u>membership, states still hold large stocks</u>. Although the numbers are not known exactly,<u> it is believed that over 140 million </u>antipersonnel <u>mines are stockpiled by China, Russia, and the United States.</u> <u>India, Pakistan, and others hold millions more.</u> This is, of course, a major challenge to the global disarmament objective of the Mine Ban Treaty. However, if the aim of the treaty is to have an impact on the lives of affected people, destroying stockpiles in those countries which have until recently deployed them (for example, States Parties like Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan) has more significance than the stocks still held in big countries. A total ban on use, production, trade, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines has not yet been achieved, but progress is impressive, and even the behavior of some hold-out states has clearly altered for the better. The <u><mark>parties</mark> to the treaty</u> <u><strong><mark>have an obligation to clear mined areas</u></strong></mark> under their jurisdiction or control. For this task, the treaty foresees a deadline of ten years, which can be extended upon agreement of the other State Parties. Even with the first deadlines approaching in 2009, assessing progress in this area is not as straightforward as it might seem. The situation varies greatly from country to country. For example, in some States Parties such as Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Cambodia, the landmine contamination is of such a scale that large parts of the population are directly and severely affected. In other countries only remote parts of a territory may be mined with little or no impact on people's daily lives. But the same ten-year deadline applies in all cases. <u><mark>There are <strong>seventy-seven countries</u></strong></mark> worldwide <u><mark>with mine-contaminated area</u></mark>, <u><mark>and <strong>fifty-three are party to the treaty</strong>.</u></mark> Since 1997 <u><mark>significant progress has been made</mark> not only <mark>in getting mines out of the ground</u></mark>, <u>but also in the way</u> that <u>mine clearance is conducted.</u> Although undertaken before the treaty came into existence, humanitarian <u><mark>demining has</u></mark> only <u><mark>been put on</u></mark> a <u><mark>solid</mark> </u>and systematic <u><mark>footing</u></mark> since then. <u><strong><mark>This is undoubtedly due to the treaty</strong> and the framework</u></mark> that <u>it has <mark>provided</mark> </u>for the range of mine action activities (clearance, risk education, and victim assistance) as well as for banning the weapon. As a starting point, <u>we now <strong>know much more</strong> about the extent of</u> the land<u>mine contamination in</u> most <u>affected countries.</u> Systematic landmine impact surveys have been conducted, and information about where mines are located as well as where they have the greatest impact has increased dramatically. Internationally recognized mine action standards have been developed and disseminated and, consequently, the performance of demining operators has improved significantly. In most cases, mine <u><mark>clearance is now carried out much more effectively</u></mark> and efficiently <u><mark>than </mark>was the case not that <mark>long ago</mark>.</u> States <u><strong><mark>Parties</u></strong></mark> have <u><strong><mark>focus</u></strong></mark>ed most (but not ail) of <u><mark>their</u></mark> funding and other <u><mark>assistance for mine clearance on the treaty's</u></mark> <u><strong>mine-<mark>affected countries</strong></mark>.</u> These <u>affected states have</u>, <u>by joining the treaty, foresworn the use of</u> antipersonnel <u>mines. This provides donors with a degree of assurance that once the mines have been cleared, the land will not be mined again </u><strong>in the future.</p></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Turse 14 – Turse 1/16/2014 (Nick, associate editor of TomDispatch.com and the winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction as well as a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism. His work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation, In These Times, and regularly at TomDispatch. Turse is currently a fellow at New York University's Center for the United States and the Cold War, January 16, Tomgram: Nick Turse, Secret Wars and Black Ops Blowback, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/01/16/1270073/-Tomgram-Nick-Turse-Secret-Wars-and-Black-Ops-Blowback) fulltext: Last year, Special Operations Command chief Admiral William McRaven explained his vision for special ops globalization. In a statement to the House Armed Services Committee, he said: “USSOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to support our interagency and international partners in order to gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and opportunities. The network enables small, persistent presence in critical locations, and facilitates engagement where necessary or appropriate...” While that “presence” may be small, the reach and influence of those Special Operations forces are another matter. The 12% jump in national deployments -- from 120 to 134 -- during McRaven’s tenure reflects his desire to put boots on the ground just about everywhere on Earth. SOCOM will not name the nations involved, citing host nation sensitivities and the safety of American personnel, but the deployments we do know about shed at least some light on the full range of missions being carried out by America’s secret military. Last April and May, for instance, Special Ops personnel took part in training exercises in Djibouti, Malawi, and the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean. In June, U.S. Navy SEALs joined Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, and other allied Mideast forces for irregular warfare simulations in Aqaba, Jordan. The next month, Green Berets traveled to Trinidad and Tobago to carry out small unit tactical exercises with local forces. In August, Green Berets conducted explosives training with Honduran sailors. In September, according to media reports, U.S. Special Operations forces joined elite troops from the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Cambodia -- as well as their counterparts from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, China, India, and Russia for a US-Indonesian joint-funded counterterrorism exercise held at a training center in Sentul, West Java. In October, elite U.S. troops carried out commando raids in Libya and Somalia, kidnapping a terror suspect in the former nation while SEALs killed at least one militant in the latter before being driven off under fire. In November, Special Ops troops conducted humanitarian operations in the Philippines to aid survivors of Typhoon Haiyan. The next month, members of the 352nd Special Operations Group conducted a training exercise involving approximately 130 airmen and six aircraft at an airbase in England and Navy SEALs were wounded while undertaking an evacuation mission in South Sudan. Green Berets then rang in the new year with a January 1st combat mission alongside elite Afghan troops in Bahlozi village in Kandahar province. Deployments in 134 countries, however, turn out not to be expansive enough for SOCOM. In November 2013, the command announced that it was seeking to identify industry partners who could, under SOCOM’s Trans Regional Web Initiative, potentially “develop new websites tailored to foreign audiences.” These would join an existing global network of 10 propaganda websites, run by various combatant commands and made to look like legitimate news outlets, including CentralAsiaOnline.com, Sabahi which targets the Horn of Africa; an effort aimed at the Middle East known as Al-Shorfa.com; and another targeting Latin America called Infosurhoy.com. SOCOM’s push into cyberspace is mirrored by a concerted effort of the command to embed itself ever more deeply inside the Beltway. “I have folks in every agency here in Washington, D.C. -- from the CIA, to the FBI, to the National Security Agency, to the National Geospatial Agency, to the Defense Intelligence Agency,” SOCOM chief Admiral McRaven said during a panel discussion at Washington’s Wilson Center last year. Speaking at the Ronald Reagan Library in November, he put the number of departments and agencies where SOCOM is now entrenched at 38. 134 Chances for Blowback Although elected in 2008 by many who saw him as an antiwar candidate, President Obama has proved to be a decidedly hawkish commander-in-chief whose policies have already produced notable instances of what in CIA trade-speak has long been called blowback. While the Obama administration oversaw a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq (negotiated by his predecessor), as well as a drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (after a major military surge in that country), the president has presided over a ramping up of the U.S. military presence in Africa, a reinvigoration of efforts in Latin America, and tough talk about a rebalancing or “pivot to Asia” (even if it has amounted to little as of yet). The White House has also overseen an exponential expansion of America’s drone war. While President Bush launched 51 such strikes, President Obama haspresided over 330, according to research by the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Last year, alone, the U.S. also engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Recent revelations from National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden have demonstrated the tremendous breadth and global reach of U.S. electronic surveillance during the Obama years. And deep in the shadows, Special Operations forces are now annually deployed to more than double the number of nations as at the end of Bush’s tenure. In recent years, however, the unintended consequences of U.S. military operations have helped to sow outrage and discontent, setting whole regions aflame. More than 10 years after America’s “mission accomplished” moment, seven years after its much vaunted surge, the Iraq that America helped make is in flames. A country with no al-Qaeda presence before the U.S. invasion and a government opposed to America’s enemies in Tehran now has a central government aligned with Iran and two cities flying al-Qaeda flags. A more recent U.S. military intervention to aid the ouster of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi helped send neighboring Mali, a U.S.-supported bulwark against regional terrorism, into a downward spiral, saw a coup there carried out by a U.S.-trained officer, ultimately led to a bloody terror attack on an Algerian gas plant, and helped to unleash nothing short of a terror diaspora in the region. And today South Sudan -- a nation the U.S. shepherded into being, has supported economically and militarily (despite its reliance on child soldiers), and has used as a hush-hush base for Special Operations forces -- is being torn apart by violence and sliding toward civil war. The Obama presidency has seen the U.S. military’s elite tactical forces increasingly used in an attempt to achieve strategic goals. But with Special Operations missions kept under tight wraps, Americans have little understanding of where their troops are deployed, what exactly they are doing, or what the consequences might be down the road. As retired Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, has noted, the utilization of Special Operations forces during the Obama years has decreased military accountability, strengthened the “imperial presidency,” and set the stage for a war without end. “In short,” he wrote at TomDispatch, “handing war to the special operators severs an already too tenuous link between war and politics; it becomes war for its own sake.” Secret ops by secret forces have a nasty tendency to produce unintended, unforeseen, and completely disastrous consequences. New Yorkers will remember well the end result of clandestine U.S. support for Islamic militants against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s: 9/11. Strangely enough, those at the other primary attack site that day, the Pentagon, seem not to have learned the obvious lessons from this lethal blowback. Even today in Afghanistan and Pakistan, more than 12 years after the U.S. invaded the former and almost 10 years after it began conducting covert attacks in the latter, the U.S. is still dealing with that Cold War-era fallout: with, for instance, CIA drones conducting missile strikes against an organization (the Haqqani network) that, in the 1980s, the Agency supplied with missiles. Without a clear picture of where the military’s covert forces are operating and what they are doing, Americans may not even recognize the consequences of and blowback from our expanding secret wars as they wash over the world. But if history is any guide, they will be felt -- from Southwest Asia to the Mahgreb, the Middle East to Central Africa, and, perhaps eventually, in the United States as well. In his blueprint for the future, SOCOM 2020, Admiral McRaven has touted the globalization of U.S. special ops as a means to “project power, promote stability, and prevent conflict.” Last year, SOCOM may have done just the opposite in 134 places.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Unaccountable executive operations are <u>escalating</u>---causes <u>blowback</u> and <u>regional instability</h4><p></u><strong>Turse 14</strong> – Turse 1/16/2014 (Nick, associate editor of TomDispatch.com and the winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction as well as a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism. His work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation, In These Times, and regularly at TomDispatch. Turse is currently a fellow at New York University's Center for the United States and the Cold War, January 16, Tomgram: Nick Turse, Secret Wars and Black Ops Blowback, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/01/16/1270073/-Tomgram-Nick-Turse-Secret-Wars-and-Black-Ops-Blowback)</p><p>Last year, Special Operations Command chief Admiral William McRaven explained his vision for special ops globalization. In a statement to the House Armed Services Committee, he said: </p><p>“USSOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to support our interagency and international partners in order to gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and opportunities. The network enables small, persistent presence in critical locations, and facilitates engagement where necessary or appropriate...” </p><p><u>While that “presence” may be small, the </u>reach and <u><mark>influence of</u></mark> those <u><mark>S</mark>pecial <mark>O</mark>perations <mark>f</mark>orces <mark>are another matter</mark>.</u> The <u>12% <mark>jump in</mark> national <mark>deployments</u></mark> -- from 120 to 134 -- during McRaven’s tenure <u><mark>reflects</u></mark> his <u><mark>desire to put boots</mark> on the ground</u> just about <u><mark>everywhere</mark> on Earth</u>. SOCOM will not name the nations involved, citing host nation sensitivities and the safety of American personnel, but the deployments we do know about shed at least some light on the full range of missions being carried out by America’s secret military. </p><p>Last April and May, <u>for instance</u>, Special Ops <u>personnel</u> <u>took part in training exercises in</u> <u><strong>Djibouti</u></strong>, <u><strong>Malawi</u></strong>, and the <u><strong>Seychelles</u></strong> Islands in the <u><strong>Indian Ocean</u></strong>. In June, U.S. Navy SEALs joined <u><strong>Iraqi</u></strong>, <u><strong>Jordanian</u></strong>, <u><strong>Lebanese</u></strong>, and other allied <u><strong>Mideast forces</u></strong> for irregular warfare simulations in Aqaba, Jordan. The next month, Green Berets traveled to <u><strong>Trinidad and Tobago</u></strong> to carry out small unit tactical exercises with local forces. In August, Green Berets conducted explosives training with <u><strong>Honduran</u></strong> sailors. In September, according to media reports, U.S. Special Operations forces joined elite troops from the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- <u><strong>Indonesia</u></strong>, <u><strong>Malaysia</u></strong>, <u><strong>the Philippines</u></strong>, <u><strong>Singapore</u></strong>, <u><strong>Thailand</u></strong>, <u><strong>Brunei</u></strong>, <u><strong>Vietnam</u></strong>, <u><strong>Laos</u></strong>, <u><strong>Myanmar (Burma), and Cambodia</u></strong> -- as well as their counterparts from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, China, India, and Russia for a US-Indonesian joint-funded counterterrorism exercise held at a training center in Sentul, West Java. </p><p>In October, elite <u>U.S.</u> troops carried out <u>commando raids in</u> <u><strong>Libya</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>Somalia</u></strong>, kidnapping a terror suspect in the former nation while SEALs killed at least one militant in the latter before being driven off under fire. In November, Special Ops troops conducted humanitarian operations in the Philippines to aid survivors of Typhoon Haiyan. <u>The next month</u>, members of the 352nd Special Operations Group conducted a <u>training exercise involving</u> approximately 130 airmen and six aircraft at an airbase in England and Navy SEALs were wounded while undertaking an evacuation mission in <u><strong>South Sudan</u></strong>. <u>Green Berets then rang in the new year </u>with a January 1st combat mission alongside elite Afghan troops in Bahlozi village <u>in</u> <u><strong>Kandahar</u></strong> province. </p><p>Deployments in 134 countries, however, turn out not to be expansive enough for SOCOM. In November 2013, the command announced that it was seeking to identify industry partners who could, under SOCOM’s Trans Regional Web Initiative, potentially “develop new websites tailored to foreign audiences.” These would join an existing global network of 10 propaganda websites, run by various combatant commands and made to look like legitimate news outlets, including CentralAsiaOnline.com, Sabahi which targets the Horn of Africa; an effort aimed at the Middle East known as Al-Shorfa.com; and another targeting Latin America called Infosurhoy.com. </p><p><u><strong>SOCOM’s push into cyberspace is mirrored by a concerted effort of the command to embed itself ever more deeply inside the Beltway. “I have folks in every agency here in Washington, D.C. -- from the CIA, to the FBI, to the National Security Agency, to the National Geospatial Agency, to the Defense Intelligence Agency,” SOCOM chief Admiral McRaven said during a panel discussion at Washington’s Wilson Center last year. Speaking at the Ronald Reagan Library in November, he put the number of departments and agencies where SOCOM is now entrenched at 38. </p><p>134 Chances for Blowback </p><p></u></strong>Although elected in 2008 by many who saw him as an antiwar candidate, President Obama has proved to be a decidedly hawkish commander-in-chief whose policies have already produced notable instances of what in CIA trade-speak has long been called blowback. While the Obama administration oversaw a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq (negotiated by his predecessor), as well as a drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (after a major military surge in that country), the president has presided over a ramping up of the U.S. military presence in Africa, a reinvigoration of efforts in Latin America, and tough talk about a rebalancing or “pivot to Asia” (even if it has amounted to little as of yet). </p><p>The White House has also overseen an exponential expansion of America’s drone war. While President Bush launched 51 such strikes, President Obama haspresided over 330, according to research by the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Last year, alone, the U.S. also engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Recent revelations from National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden have demonstrated the tremendous breadth and global reach of U.S. electronic surveillance during the Obama years. And deep in the shadows, <u><mark>S</mark>pecial <mark>O</mark>perations <mark>f</mark>orces are <mark>now</mark> annually <mark>deployed</mark> to <strong><mark>more than double</strong></mark> the number of nations as <mark>at the end of Bush</mark>’s tenure</u>. </p><p>In recent years, however, <u>the <mark>unintended consequences</mark> of U.S. military operations <mark>have helped to <strong>sow outrage</strong></mark> and discontent, <mark>setting</mark> whole <mark>regions aflame</mark>. </u>More than 10 years after America’s “mission accomplished” moment, seven years after its much vaunted surge, the Iraq that America helped make is in flames. A country with no al-Qaeda presence before the U.S. invasion and a government opposed to America’s enemies in Tehran now has a central government aligned with Iran and two cities flying al-Qaeda flags. </p><p><u>A more recent U.S. military intervention to aid the ouster of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi helped send neighboring Mali, a U.S.-supported bulwark against regional terrorism, into a downward spiral, saw a coup there carried out by a U.S.-trained officer, ultimately led to a bloody terror attack on an Algerian gas plant, and helped to unleash nothing short of a terror diaspora in the region. </p><p></u>And today <u><mark>South Sudan</u></mark> -- a nation the U.S. shepherded into being, has supported economically and militarily (despite its reliance on child soldiers), and <u><mark>has used as a hush-hush base</mark> </u>for Special Operations forces -- is being <u>torn apart by violence and <mark>sliding toward <strong>civil war.</strong></mark> </p><p></u>The Obama presidency has seen the U.S. military’s elite tactical forces increasingly used in an attempt to achieve strategic goals. <u><mark>But</u> <u>with</mark> Special Operations <mark>missions</mark> kept <strong><mark>under tight wraps</strong></mark>, <mark>Americans have little understanding of where</mark> their troops are deployed, <mark>what</mark> exactly they are doing<mark>, or</mark> what the <mark>consequences</mark> might be </u>down the road. As retired Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, has noted, the utilization of Special Operations forces during the Obama years has <u><strong><mark>decreased</mark> military <mark>accountability</strong></mark>, strengthened the <strong>“imperial presidency,”</strong> and <mark>set the stage for a <strong>war without end</u></strong></mark>. “In short,” he wrote at TomDispatch, “handing war to the special operators severs an already too tenuous link between war and politics; it becomes war for its own sake.” </p><p><u><mark>Secret ops</mark> by secret forces <mark>have a nasty tendency to produce</mark> <strong><mark>unintended</mark>, unforeseen, and completely <mark>disastrous consequences</u></strong></mark>. New Yorkers will remember well the end result of clandestine U.S. support for Islamic militants against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s: 9/11. Strangely enough, those at the other primary attack site that day, the Pentagon, seem not to have learned the obvious lessons from this lethal blowback. Even today in Afghanistan and Pakistan, more than 12 years after the U.S. invaded the former and almost 10 years after it began conducting covert attacks in the latter, the U.S. is still dealing with that Cold War-era fallout: with, for instance, CIA drones conducting missile strikes against an organization (the Haqqani network) that, in the 1980s, the Agency supplied with missiles. </p><p><u>Without a clear picture of where the military’s covert forces are operating and what they are doing, <mark>Americans may not</mark> even <mark>recognize</mark> the <mark>consequences of</mark> and <strong><mark>blowback</strong> from</mark> our expanding <mark>secret wars</mark> as they wash over the world</u>. <u><mark>But</mark> if history is any guide,</u> <u><mark>they will be felt</u></mark> -- <u><mark>from <strong>Southwest Asia</strong> to the <strong>Mahgreb</strong>, the <strong>Middle East</strong> to <strong>Central Africa</strong>,</mark> </u>and, perhaps eventually, in the United States as well. </p><p>In his blueprint for the future, SOCOM 2020, Admiral McRaven has touted the globalization of U.S. special ops as a means to “project power, promote stability, and prevent conflict.” Last year, SOCOM may have done just the opposite in 134 places.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Stevens, 18—Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London (Tim, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets] fulltext: Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former. As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74 Productive pessimism and temporality In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote: For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75 Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77 This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84 Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance: The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85 Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88 Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading. Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations. The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95 The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Preventing extinction isn’t liberal futurity or naïve optimism – pessimism doesn’t justify <u>fatalism</u> in the context of <u>nuclear geopolitics</u>.</h4><p><strong>Stevens, 18<u></strong>—Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London (Tim, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]</p><p></u>Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s <u>implicit recognition of an <strong>open</strong> yet <strong>linear temporality</strong> allowed him to <strong>imagine possible futures</strong> aligned with the survival ethic, whilst <strong>at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct</u></strong>. His <u><strong>pessimism</strong> about the latter <strong>did not preclude</strong> working towards the former. </p><p></u>As Herz recognised, <u><mark>it was one thing to develop</mark> an <mark>ethics of survival but</mark> quite <mark>another to <strong>translate theory</mark> in<mark>to practice</strong>. What was required was</mark> a <strong><mark>collective</strong></mark>, <strong>transnational</strong> and <strong>inherently interdisciplinary <mark>effort</strong> to address <strong>nuclear</u></strong></mark> and environmental <u><strong><mark>issues</strong></mark> and to problematize notions of security</u>, sustainability and survival <u><mark>in</mark> the context of <strong>nuclear <mark>geopolitics</u></strong></mark> and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68 </p><p>Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. <u>The <strong>principal <mark>responsibilities</strong> of</u></mark> survival <u><strong><mark>researchers</strong> were</mark> two-fold. <mark>One, to <strong>raise awareness</strong> of survival</mark> issues in the minds of <strong>policy-makers</strong> and the <strong>public</strong>, <mark>and</mark> to <strong><mark>demonstrate</mark> the <mark>link between</mark> political <mark>inaction</mark> now</strong> <mark>and</mark> its <mark>effect on</mark> <strong>subsequent human <mark>survival</strong>. Two, to</mark> <strong>suggest</strong> and <strong><mark>shape</mark> new <mark>attitudes</strong> more ‘appropriate to</mark> the solution of new and <mark>unfamiliar</mark> survival <mark>problems’, rather than <strong>relying on ingrained modes of thought</strong></mark> and <strong>practice</u></strong>.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: <u>‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the <strong>primary responsibility of scholars</strong> to engage in survival issues’</u>.72 Herz considered <u><mark>IR</u></mark> an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It <u><strong><mark>should not be afraid to think the worst</strong></mark>, if the worst is at all possible, and to <strong>establish the various requirements</u></strong> – social, economic, political – <u>of ‘a <strong>livable world</strong>’.</u>73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74 </p><p>Productive pessimism and temporality </p><p>In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote:</p><p>For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75 </p><p><u>Of <mark>significance</mark> here <mark>is <strong>not</mark> the <mark>appeal to futurism</mark> per se</u></strong>, although this is important, <u><mark>but</mark> the <mark>suggestion this is ‘the <strong>first time</strong>’ futurism is <strong>necessary to ensur</mark>ing human <mark>survival</strong>. This is</u></mark> Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is <u><strong><mark>not bound to</mark> a <mark>cyclical vision</strong> of</mark> political or historical <mark>time</mark> in which events and processes reoccur over and again</u>. His <u>identification of <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</u></mark> as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics <u><mark>demonstrate</mark>s this <mark>belief in</mark> the <strong><mark>non-cyclical nature of</mark> humankind’s unfolding <mark>temporality</u></strong></mark>.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, <u>‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a <strong>temporal break</strong> with the past, and simultaneously carried a <strong>promise for the future</strong>’</u>.77 </p><p><u>This ‘<mark>promise for the future’ was <strong>not</strong></mark>, however, a <strong><mark>simple</mark> liberal <mark>view</strong> of</mark> a <strong><mark>better future</mark> consonant <mark>with</mark> human <mark>progress</u></strong></mark>. His autobiography is clear that his <u>experiences of <strong>Nazism</strong> and the <strong>Holocaust</strong> destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘<strong>inevitable progress</strong>’</u>.78 His <u>frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but <strong>demanded a rejection</strong> of the <strong>liberal dream</strong> and the <strong>inevitability of its consummation</strong>. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</u>,</mark> he wrote, <u>is <mark>characterised by</mark> anything, it is by its ‘<strong>indefiniteness of the age</strong> and the <strong><mark>uncertainties of</mark> the <mark>future</strong>’</mark>; it was <strong>impossible</strong> under these conditions to <strong>draw firm conclusions</strong> about the future course of international politics</u>.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80 </p><p>Herz was uneasy with <u>both <strong>cyclical</strong> and <strong>linear-progressive ways</strong> of perceiving historical time</u>. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, <u>each <strong>marginalises</strong> and <strong>diminishes</strong> the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the <strong>agency of political actors</strong> in effecting change</u>. Simultaneously, <u>each <strong>shapes the futures that may be imagined</strong> and <strong>brought into being</u></strong>. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that <u>without care and attention, ‘the <strong>assumption may determine the event</strong>’</u>.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in <u>the difference between</u> the <u>‘<strong>deterministic pessimism</strong>’</u> of ‘pure’ realism <u>and</u> those <u><strong><mark>realists</u></strong></mark> ‘who have made their mark on history’; <u>the latter <strong><mark>may be pessimists</strong> but</mark> they still <mark>believe ‘human affairs can be</mark> <strong>directed</strong> and <strong><mark>modified</strong> by human action</mark> and human thought’</u>.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, <u>the <strong>possibility of <mark>agency</strong> is</mark> a <mark>product of</mark> a <mark>temporality ‘neither</mark> <strong>temporally <mark>closed</strong> nor <strong>deterministic</strong></mark>, neither <strong>cyclical</strong> nor <strong>linear-progressive</strong>; it is <strong>rooted in contingency</strong>’</u>.84 </p><p>Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance: </p><p>The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85 </p><p>Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88 </p><p>Herz was explicit about this: <u>a <strong>realistic</strong> and <strong>consistent pessimism</strong> can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary</u>.89 <u>Pessimism is a <strong>necessary component</strong> of a realistic view of the world, upon which <strong>proper</strong> and <strong>reasoned action can be founded</u></strong>. In this sense, <u><mark>pessimism can be <strong>productive</strong></mark>. It <strong><mark>produces positive outcomes through action</strong></mark>, rather than <strong>negative ones through inaction</strong> or <strong>resignation</strong>. These are <strong>subjective value-judgements</u></strong>, to be sure, <u>but are obtained through a <strong>process of realist engagement with the world</strong>, rather than</u> blind <u>[mere] <strong>fumbling</strong> or <strong>ideological railroading</u></strong>. <u><mark>Survival</u></mark> Research <u><mark>was</mark> a <strong><mark>response to</u></strong></mark> Herz’s <u><strong><mark>pessimism</strong> about</mark> the <mark>future, <strong>not a rejection</mark> of it</u></strong>. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations.</p><p>The first is that <u>pessimism <strong>does not imply disengagement</strong> from the world</u>. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of <u>pessimism was no ‘<strong>passive fatalism</strong>’</u>.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 <u>Pessimism can be a <strong>spur to thought</strong> and to <strong>action</strong> and <strong>need not be a watchword for conservatism</strong> in theory or practice</u>.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his <u><mark>pessimism</u></mark> about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This <u><mark>required</mark> that <mark>scholars</mark> <strong>chart different paths</strong> through troublesome times and <strong><mark>articulate alternative visions</strong> of i</mark>nternational <mark>order, not to <strong>preclude political action</strong> but</mark> to <strong><mark>facilitate it</u></strong></mark>; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 <u>In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this <strong>attention to the production of alternative futures</strong> that prevents ‘pessimism from <strong>turning into fatalism</strong>’.95 </p><p></u>The second observation is that <u>it is <strong>unhelpful</strong> and <strong>misleading</strong> to treat pessimism and optimism as <strong>oppositional</u></strong>.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, <u>they <strong>mingle</strong> and <strong>cross-pollinate</strong> in ways that defy easy explication</u>. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s <u>optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was <strong>never more than guarded</strong>’</u>, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 <u>Even as</u> his <u>pessimism deepened</u> over the course of his career, he was <u><strong>always</u></strong> wont to <u><strong>end</u></strong> his <u><strong>analyses</strong> with a ‘<strong>yet</strong>’ or ‘<strong>in spite of it all</strong>’</u>.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His <u>growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to <strong>tackle the problems of the world head-on</u></strong>, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. <u><mark>This drive seems not to be rooted in <strong>optimistic conviction</strong></mark>, nor even a <strong>subtle version of hope</strong>, <mark>but in</mark> a <strong>properly <mark>pessimistic reading</strong> of the world</mark> and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the <strong>ontological temporality of perpetual change</strong>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Cooper 8 [Cooper, Nikhil D. "Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and Development of United States Space Commerce." Hastings Const. LQ 36 (2008): 457.] TDI fulltext: The latest piece of congressional legislation regulating the commercial space industry was the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) 77 that was spurred on in part by the host of new technologies capable of commercially exploiting space. 78 The CSLA streamlined the earlier space-launch bureaucracy and mandated the DOT to issue licenses for all commercial space launch programs, 79 regulate forms of space tourism8 and space advertising, 8 ' impose minimum liability insurance and financial responsibility requirements, and82 provide for administrative and judicial review of DOT Secretariat decisions.83 Il. A Legal System? The CSLA represents the most recent and comprehensive United States space commerce legislation; but, in the years since its passage, no one has seriously questioned its consistency with United States international obligations of "non-appropriation." The issue is especially apt now, however, because the current and future capacities of commercially exploiting space seem primed to challenge non-appropriation as the guiding theme in space commerce. Therefore, the question we must ask now is whether or not the United States is circumventing the intent of non-appropriation by encouraging and protecting private commercial expansion into space. A. Treaties Versus Congressional Acts Whether the regulatory regime outlined in the CSLA conflicts with the national non-appropriation principle, as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and in its succeeding treaties, is an issue that could be reviewed by the federal judiciary under its constitutional grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over cases "arising under" treaties.8 4 The judiciary's power to interpret treaties is a power distinct from the treaty-making authority delegated to the executive and legislative branches. Article II of the United States Constitution authorizes the president to ratify treaties with the consent of two-thirds membership of the Senate. 5 Treaties entered into in this manner are the supreme law of the United States and bind state constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries.8 6 Generally, courts employ distinct methods of interpretation when called on to perform the separate but related tasks of interpreting treaties and resolving treaty-statutory disputes. As to the former, courts generally will liberally construct a treaty "to give effect to the purpose which animates it" and will prefer that liberal construction "[e]ven where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging [of] rights which may be claimed under it."87 A preference for broad construction, however, is not a license for courts to impose any interpretation they deem appropriate. For example, although courts have a greater ability to construct treaties more broadly than private contracts, they are still precluded from interpreting a treaty beyond the "apparent intent and purport" of its language.88 in this way, determining a treaty's "intent" delineates the boundaries of how broadly or narrowly the court may interpret a treaty's provision. Courts obviously have a much easier time determining a treaty's intent where the treaty language is unambiguous. In these instances, courts expressly forbid looking beyond the language of the treaty to supply the intent of the parties at the time the treaty was drawn.89 When the language of the treaty is ambiguous, however, the court will attempt to effectuate the drafter's intent through a broader inquiry into "the letter and spirit of the instrument," and may take into account "considerations deducible from the situation of the parties; and the reasonableness, justice, and nature of the thing, for which provision has been made." 90 The United States Supreme Court summarized its interpretive process in the case Eastern Airlines Inc., v. Floyd: When interpreting a treaty, [begin] "with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used." 91 [When confronted with difficult or ambiguous passages, the Court provided that] [o]ther general rules of construction may be brought to bear[.] [And it finally noted that] treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties. 92 Treaty interpretation as described above is important when determining whether the treaty conflicts with an act of Congress. Each being the supreme law of the land, treaties and congressional acts are governed by the last-in-time rule: when they conflict, courts must privilege the last enacted treaty or congressional act over the other. 93 Still, federal courts often avoid finding such conflicts between congressional acts and treaty obligations. As Justice Marshall opined in 1804: [A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country. 94 Supreme Court jurisprudence since has largely followed the same presumption and, therefore, courts are inclined to harmonize treaties and congressional legislation that are seemingly antithetical to one another. 95 In the event that a congressional act were to supplant United States treaty obligations, courts would look for unambiguous evidence appearing “clearly and distinctly" in the text of the statute or treaty provision. 96 In other words, repeals of prior statutes or treaty provision must likely be made express. In contrast, "repeals by implication" are generally disfavored "unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and, therefore, to displace the prior statute. 97 B. CSLA Versus the Outer Space Treaty Both being duly enacted, the CSLA and the Outer Space Treaty are considered the supreme law of the land. If there is a conflict between the United States space commerce provisions as outlined in the CSLA and the Outer Space Treaty, a reviewing court would first be called upon to interpret the intent of the treaty itself. Recall that in the context of treaty interpretation, a court would be at liberty to give the treaty a broad construction to effectuate its intent. The key provision of the Outer Space Treaty at issue would be the language of Article II which forecloses "national appropriation" of space by claims of sovereignty, means of use, occupation, or any other means.98 Black's Law Dictionary defines "appropriation" as "the exercise of control over property, a taking of possession." 99 If defined broadly enough, the joint enterprise nature of the United States space commerce, as implemented in the CSLA, might violate the "spirit" of non-appropriation as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The best argument one could make against the CSLA's provisions is to advocate the court to broadly interpret the "appropriation" principle of the Outer Space Treaty. The proponent of this argument would urge that in so doing, a court should look beyond the words of the treaty and examine the history, negotiations, and practical considerations at the time of the treaty's negotiation to determine its true intent. 100 One would also want to argue that the space commerce industry violates perhaps not the "letter" of the treaty, but circumvents entirely its "spirit" if a court were taking into account "considerations deducible from the situation of the parties; and the reasonableness, justice, and nature of the thing, for which provision has been made."' 01 One who attacked the CSLA's general legitimacy in this way could argue that the United States is effectively "appropriating" space through its protection and encouragement of private industry. Such an appropriation would take place not by realizing a "sovereign" right to space property or the uses of space as expressly proscribed in the Outer Space Treaty, but, instead, through the effective use of government power, services, and contracts to encourage and support the rapid development of the private space commerce industry in the United States. In essence, the result of such government encouragement might not amount to wholesale sovereign appropriation, but, at the very least, a kind of sovereign and private space activity that would cast doubt on whether the non-appropriation principle is actually being respected. Therefore, one arguing that such activities were tantamount to sovereign appropriation would highlight the interrelatedness of government and private industry and argue for a broad interpretation of "appropriation" that encompassed the practical effects of such a relationship. In addition to the regulatory interaction between the CSLA and private space commerce industries, the interrelatedness between government and private industry is clearly illustrated by the interaction between CSLA and the 1972 Liability Convention. Recall that the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny envision a "state-oriented" system of responsibility 10 2 where each member state is responsible for all actions in outer space undertaken by the state and its nationals. 10 3 The Liability Convention further binds member states by holding each strictly liable for its actions or the actions of its nationals within outer space and permits only member states to petition for remuneration under the terms of the treaty. 1 04 In its text, the CSLA cites to such international obligations,'0 5 while also mitigating the United States' liability under the Liability Convention. 0 6 The CSLA licensing program ensures overall safety of private space ventures, 0 7 raises the funds necessary to pay "potential treaty claims through its liability insurance requirement,' 10 8 and limits the United States' joint and several liability exposure through restricting private use of foreign launch and reentry facilities.'09 These provisions effectively allow the United States to pass on the financial cost and recover from their private entities the amount of damages for which they are internationally liable. 110 In this way, the government is limiting its international liability exposure by passing on the cost to the private sector. When highlighting the further interrelatedness between government and private industry, one could also note that the United States government holds something of a monopoly in launch services and currently requires that decisions regarding commercial space-launch must be approved through the CSLA. 1' In addition, one making this argument would want to highlight the highly interdependent nature of investment flowing from government to private space commerce: in a February 4, 2008 press release, NASA Deputy Administrator Shana Dale justified the agency's 2009 budget request of $17.6 billion by claiming that "[t]he development of space simply cannot be 'all government all the time[]' . . . . NASA's budget for [fiscal year] 2009 provides $173 million for entrepreneurs-from big companies or small ones-to develop commercial transport capabilities. . . [and] NASA is designating $500 million toward the development of this commercial space capability." 2<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Banning of space colonization and exploration from private companies solves, the US has already circumvented so legal clarity is key.</h4><p><strong>Cooper 8</strong> [Cooper, Nikhil D. "Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and Development of United States Space Commerce." Hastings Const. LQ 36 (2008): 457.] TDI</p><p>The latest piece of congressional legislation regulating the commercial space industry was <u>the <strong>C</strong>ommercial <strong>S</strong>pace <strong>L</strong>aunch <strong>A</strong>ct</u> (<u><mark>CSLA</u></mark>) 77 that was spurred on in part by the host of new technologies capable of commercially exploiting space. 78 The CSLA<u> streamlined the earlier space-launch bureaucracy and <strong><mark>mandated</strong></mark> the DOT to issue <strong><mark>licenses</mark> for</strong> all <strong>commercial space launch</strong> programs,</u> 79<u> regulate forms of <strong><mark>space tourism</u></strong>8</mark> and space advertising, 8 ' <u>impose minimum liability insurance <strong>and <mark>financial responsibility</strong></mark> requirements, and</u>82 <u>provide for administrative and judicial review</u> of DOT Secretariat decisions.83 Il. A Legal System? <u>The CSLA represents the most recent and comprehensive United States space commerce legislation; but, in the years since its passage, no one has seriously questioned its consistency with United States international obligations of "non-appropriation." The issue is especially apt now, however, because the current and future capacities of commercially exploiting space seem primed to challenge non-appropriation as the guiding theme in space commerce. Therefore, the question we must ask now is whether or not <strong>the <mark>U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> is circumventing the intent</mark> of non-appropriation by <mark>encouraging and protecting private</mark> commercial <mark>expansion</mark> into space</strong>.</u> A. Treaties Versus Congressional Acts <u>Whether the regulatory regime outlined in the CSLA conflicts with the national non-appropriation principle, as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and in its succeeding treaties, is <strong>an issue that could be reviewed by the federal judiciary under its constitutional grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over cases "arising under" treaties</u></strong>.8 4 The judiciary's power to interpret treaties is a power distinct from the treaty-making authority delegated to the executive and legislative branches. Article II of the United States Constitution authorizes the president to ratify treaties with the consent of two-thirds membership of the Senate. 5 <u>Treaties</u> entered into in this manner <u>are the supreme law of the United States and bind state constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries.</u>8 6 Generally, courts employ distinct methods of interpretation when called on to perform the separate but related tasks of interpreting treaties and resolving treaty-statutory disputes. As to the former, courts generally will liberally construct a treaty "to give effect to the purpose which animates it" and will prefer that liberal construction "[e]ven where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging [of] rights which may be claimed under it."87 A preference for broad construction, however, is not a license for courts to impose any interpretation they deem appropriate. For example, although courts have a greater ability to construct treaties more broadly than private contracts, they are still precluded from interpreting a treaty beyond the "apparent intent and purport" of its language.88 in this way, determining a treaty's "intent" delineates the boundaries of how broadly or narrowly the court may interpret a treaty's provision. Courts obviously have a much easier time determining a treaty's intent where the treaty language is unambiguous. In these instances, courts expressly forbid looking beyond the language of the treaty to supply the intent of the parties at the time the treaty was drawn.89 When the language of the treaty is ambiguous, however, the court will attempt to effectuate the drafter's intent through a broader inquiry into "the letter and spirit of the instrument," and may take into account "considerations deducible from the situation of the parties; and the reasonableness, justice, and nature of the thing, for which provision has been made." 90 The United States Supreme Court summarized its interpretive process in the case Eastern Airlines Inc., v. Floyd: When interpreting a treaty, [begin] "with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used." 91 [When confronted with difficult or ambiguous passages, the Court provided that] [o]ther general rules of construction may be brought to bear[.] [And it finally noted that] treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties. 92 Treaty interpretation as described above is important when determining whether the treaty conflicts with an act of Congress. Each being the supreme law of the land, treaties and congressional acts are governed by the last-in-time rule: when they conflict, courts must privilege the last enacted treaty or congressional act over the other. 93 Still, federal courts often avoid finding such conflicts between congressional acts and treaty obligations. As Justice Marshall opined in 1804: [A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country. 94 Supreme Court jurisprudence since has largely followed the same presumption and, therefore, courts are inclined to harmonize treaties and congressional legislation that are seemingly antithetical to one another. 95 In the event that a congressional act were to supplant United States treaty obligations, courts would look for unambiguous evidence appearing “clearly and distinctly" in the text of the statute or treaty provision. 96 In other words, repeals of prior statutes or treaty provision must likely be made express. In contrast, "repeals by implication" are generally disfavored "unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and, therefore, to displace the prior statute. 97 B. CSLA Versus the Outer Space Treaty Both being duly enacted, the CSLA and the Outer Space Treaty are considered the supreme law of the land. If there is a conflict between the United States space commerce provisions as outlined in the CSLA and the Outer Space Treaty, a reviewing court would first be called upon to interpret the intent of the treaty itself. Recall that in the context of treaty interpretation, a court would be at liberty to give the treaty a broad construction to effectuate its intent. The key provision of the Outer Space Treaty at issue would be the language of Article II which forecloses "national appropriation" of space by claims of sovereignty, means of use, occupation, or any other means.98 Black's Law Dictionary defines "appropriation" as "the exercise of control over property, a taking of possession." 99 If defined broadly enough, the joint enterprise nature of the United States space commerce, as implemented in the CSLA, might violate the "spirit" of non-appropriation as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. <u>The best argument one could make against the CSLA's provisions is to advocate the court to broadly interpret the "appropriation" principle of the Outer Space Treaty.</u> The proponent of this argument would urge that <u>in so doing, a court should look beyond the words of the treaty and examine the history, negotiations, and practical considerations at the time of the treaty's negotiation to determine its true intent.</u> 100 One would also want to argue <u><strong>that the <mark>space commerce industry violates</strong></mark> perhaps not the "letter" of the treaty, but circumvents entirely <strong><mark>its "spirit</strong></mark>" if a court were taking into account "considerations deducible from the situation of the parties; and the reasonableness, justice, and nature of the thing, for which provision has been made."'</u> 01 One who attacked the CSLA's general legitimacy in this way could argue that <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <strong><mark>is</mark> effectively "<mark>appropriating" space</mark> through its protection and encouragement of private industry</strong>. Such an appropriation would take place</u> not by realizing a "sovereign" right to space property or the uses of space as expressly proscribed in the Outer Space Treaty, but, instead, <u>through the effective use of government power, services, and contracts to encourage and support the rapid development of the private space commerce industry in the United States.</u> In essence, the result of such government encouragement might not amount to wholesale sovereign appropriation, but, at the very least, a kind of sovereign and private space activity that would cast doubt on whether the non-appropriation principle is actually being respected. Therefore, one arguing that such activities were tantamount to sovereign appropriation would highlight the interrelatedness of government and private industry and argue for a broad interpretation of "appropriation" that encompassed the practical effects of such a relationship. In addition to the regulatory interaction between the CSLA and private space commerce industries, the interrelatedness between government and private industry is clearly illustrated by the interaction between CSLA and the 1972 Liability Convention. Recall that <u>the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny envision a "state-oriented" system of responsibility</u> 10 2 <u>where each member state is responsible for all actions in outer space undertaken by the state and its nationals.</u> 10 3 The Liability Convention further binds member states by holding each strictly liable for its actions or the actions of its nationals within outer space and permits only member states to petition for remuneration under the terms of the treaty. 1 04 In its text, the CSLA cites to such international obligations,'0 5 while also mitigating the United States' liability under the Liability Convention. 0 6 <u><strong>The CSLA licensing program</u></strong> ensures overall safety of private space ventures, 0 7 <u>raises the funds necessary to pay "potential treaty claims through its liability insurance requirement,'</u> 10 8 <u>and limits the United States' joint and several liability exposure through <strong><mark>restricti</strong></mark>ng <strong><mark>private use of foreign launch</mark> and reentry facilities</strong>.</u>'09 These <u>provisions <strong>effectively <mark>allow the</mark> <mark>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <strong>to <mark>pass on</strong></mark> the financial cost and recover from their private entities the amount of <strong><mark>damages</mark> for which they are internationally liable</u></strong>. 110<u> In this way, the government is limiting its international liability exposure by passing on the cost to the private sector. </u>When highlighting the further interrelatedness between government and private industry, one could also note that the United States government holds something of a monopoly in launch services and currently requires that decisions regarding commercial space-launch must be approved through the CSLA. 1' In addition, one making this argument would want to highlight the highly interdependent nature of investment flowing from government to private space commerce: in a February 4, 2008 press release, NASA Deputy Administrator Shana Dale justified the agency's 2009 budget request of $17.6 billion by claiming that "[t]he development of space simply cannot be 'all government all the time[<u>]' . . . . NASA's budget for [fiscal year] 2009 provides $173 million for entrepreneurs-from big companies or small ones-to develop commercial transport capabilities. . . [and] NASA is designating $500 million toward the development of this commercial space capability." 2</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Interior Ministry, 18 (an anonymous group of guerilla militants and semioticians, here’s their description of themselves: https://alienistmanifesto.wordpress.com/about/, “Guerilla Semiotix,” ALIENIST Magazine #4 (December 2018): RAGE AGAINST THE ALGORITHM, https://alienistmanifesto.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/Alienist_Magazine-4_December_2018-1.pdf) fulltext: It was never a question of WHEN WILL THE REVOLUTION BEGIN? A revolution has been in progress for over two hundred years. The question is HOW HAS THIS REVOLUTION CONTINUED TO BE ABDUCTED, BEHIND THE SPECTACLE OF A FEW MOMENTARY “ERUPTIONS” – events left to yellow on the pages of history books? Decade after decade of pornographic commodification has transformed the “historical aura” of transgression & emancipation into a new form of impoverished labour. This production of self-alienation has entered a vicious circle which masquerades as the predominant “revolutionary thought” of today: dissociated to such a degree that it is capable not only of experiencing its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order (Benjamin), but that it is capable of doing so repeatedly, ad infinitum. 39 THE PERMANENT OBSOLESCENCE OF “REVOLUTION”? It has been said that today the study of political economy is more closely related to paleoanthropology than to the “emancipation” of everyday life. One of these disciplines takes the Stone Age as its object of inquiry, the other inhabits it. Too often “revolutionary thought” likewise suff ers from terminal anachronism. In the 50 years since 1968, the cybernetic Corporate-State Apparatus has taken Marx’s invocation to change the world & Rimbaud’s to change life far more literally & far more seriously than those romantic custodians of the holy relics who in half a century have barely produced one revolutionary carrot. Like true reactionaries they cling to the cycle of manufactured controversy, projecting a vague & opportune hopefulness against a meridian of despair. But revolution isn’t this travesty of alienation dressed-up as “protest movements,” distracted by the spectacle of endless “reform.” It’s as if the first thing that had to be forgotten is that reform, like election cycles & market adjustment, is code for SYSTEMIC ERROR. THE IMPOVERISHED LABOUR OF ALIENATED INDIVIDUALISM In any society in which Power projects itself through a system of conspicuous consumption, complicity is the norm. But the system isn’t separate from the “individual” that complies. Compliance is already a matrix of false choices. To comply or not to comply: the illusion of autonomous action, an alibi against inaction, a death sentence. Yet complicity is the system. It’s an existential “reply” to a totalising demand: that the system be acknowledged as the sole determinant of everything that is the case. The possible world, no less. This isn’t a philosophical problem. Even its apparent forms of contradiction have been internalised to it: it produces simulacra of its own “negation” as a matter of course. Like neurotic symptoms they displace onto a mechanism of escalating catastrophe what can only be perceived in the form of the impossible. THE END OF HISTORY. THE END OF REASON. THE END OF CIVILISATION. THE END OF MAN. THE END OF THE WORLD. Yet corresponding to each of these ENDs – these zero-sum demands for all-or-nothing – is a secret pathology. For the Corporate-State Apparatus was born from the abduction & repression of a “revolutionary” impulse. The existence of this sublimated “revolution” is, however, still perceptible through an incidence of menace, at the moment when imminent danger concentrates our vision on the foundational logic of every system of Power that promotes the idea that all revolutions must fail. A logic that encapsulates both the possibility & fragility of Power’s concrete existence. Thus brought to view, its structures can then be critically threatened. Not to perform in the theatre of permitted pseudo-critique, but to directly intervene in the immune system of its counterrevolutionary “social body.” To turn upon itself its totalising feedback mechanism of global “mind-control.” To jam not only the signal but the entire transmissional apparatus. THE CAPACITY TO TRANSFORM KNOWLEDGE INTO POWER RESTS UPON THE CAPACITY TO TRANSFORM THEORY INTO PRAXIS? The world doesn’t come with readymade political content. Other than in response to the terms of Power being more & more dictated in unison – in a simulation of World Order – there are no truly universal tactics. All guerrilla tactics are situational. A tactic cannot be indefi nitely held in reserve: it is always defi ned by a window of opportunity, an emergent possibility, an event. While the ability to choose the occasion of engagement is essential above all, interminable deferment isn’t a strategic option (the “No Action Alternative”). Nor does inaction confer any advantage in the realm of tactical engagement as such, if the objective is merely to preserve the advantage of inaction. Nor does a failed action automatically confer an advantage upon the enemy, by exposing a tactic to discovery & co-option. Co-opted into the arsenal of the Corporate-State, a “surrendered” tactic does not necessarily cede anything, since neither the tactic itself nor the circumstances of its employment are transferable. Indeed, by virtue of the Corporate-State Apparatus’ compulsion to repeat, co-option introduces an element of useless non-knowledge into the enemy system, thereby contributing to the rate of increase in its overall entropy. AVANT-GARDE-LUMPEN-PROLETARIAT The tactics adopted by Alienist counter-semiotic practices (SEMIOTIX) are therefore neither abstractions nor simply actions but an entire complex of spatio-temporalities. Guerrilla SEMIOTIX are closely calculated yet never programmatic. A merely repeated action isn’t a repeated tactic: but the repetition of an action may in & of itself be a tactic (whether a noncompulsive, unpredictable repetition, producing surprise; or a predictable action, designed to trap the enemy in a predictable response). A tactic can’t be reduced to the sum of its individual actions, its repertoire. It must be understood, then, that the true objective of any tactical response by the Corporate-State Apparatus is thus not the neutralisation or capture of critical weaponry, but the capture of their logic (for example, the capitulation to a “theatre of engagement”: ballotbox, TV news, protest march, opinion poll, social media) thus allowing the exploitation of an entire tactical line of thought before it has even been articulated. Such logic capture has provided the cybernetic Corporate-State Apparatus with the appearance of unworldly Power, like an alien entity against which there’s no defence & upon which every attack conveys ever-greater resilience. 41 Yet such an appearance is precisely that: an intricately constructed mirror effect, in which every action has its algorithmic double which, like the image in a mirror, seems to pre-empt it. This is no mere illusion, but the very foundation of real Power: the accumulated mass of surplus-value that – like the authoritarian spectacle in Lear – turns nothing into the reified force of no-thing. THE IMPOSSIBLE IS RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF A REVOLUTIONARY CRITERION In principle, tactical advantage is always limited against a brute force analytic response. A tactic by defi nition requires some element that is unknown or unpredictable to the adversary – yet the Corporate-State Apparatus has the capacity in principle to calculate & analyse to a depth that negates any but the most trivial element of surprise or socalled “psychological element.” In truth, the variables aff ecting the character & extent of the CorporateState Apparatus’ response to a tactical action cannot be described as psychological, except where political (& not cybernetic) control is a determining factor. Even where a tactic may be designed simply to produce confusion by its apparent randomness, the Corporate-State Apparatus will define that randomness & compute its probabilities. Anticipating counter-tactical actions in advance is thus the most common “tactical value” in ideological guerrilla warfare. The Corporate-State Apparatus knows its vulnerabilities & exploits them as a weapon. But this knowledge, too, is situational & these exploits can themselves become unforeseen vulnerabilities. Such an “epiphany” – the way in which the Corporate-State Apparatus’ system of totalising control can be made to decentre itself into an entirely diff erent, self-subversive confi guration – is a fundamental tactical objective of Alienist SEMIOTIX.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>1st, False Consciousness DA – racial capitalism is primarily a process of desire and abstraction through white subject formation, not just a material reference – the alternative fails without addressing the spectacularization of power that conforms agents to desire the system through logistics, the supply chain of humanity -- class as conceptual frame misses how capitalism has jacked into our fears and desires through the network not through the assembly line. The impact is incorporation -- they become bernie bros and beto dorks, which naturalizes mass violence.</h4><p><u><strong>Interior Ministry, 18</u></strong> (an anonymous group of guerilla militants and semioticians, here’s their description of themselves: https://alienistmanifesto.wordpress.com/about/, “Guerilla Semiotix,” ALIENIST Magazine #4 (December 2018): RAGE AGAINST THE ALGORITHM, https://alienistmanifesto.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/Alienist_Magazine-4_December_2018-1.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>It was never a question of WHEN WILL <mark>THE REVOLUTION</mark> BEGIN</u></strong>? <u><strong>A revolution <mark>has been</mark> in progress for over two hundred years</u></strong>. <u><strong>The question is HOW HAS THIS REVOLUTION CONTINUED TO BE <mark>ABDUCTED</mark>, BEHIND THE SPECTACLE OF A FEW MOMENTARY “ERUPTIONS</u></strong>” – <u><strong>events left to yellow on the pages of history books</u></strong>? D<u><strong>ecade after decade of <mark>pornographic commodification has transformed</mark> the “historical aura” of <mark>transgression </mark>& emancipation <mark>into </mark>a new form of impoverished <mark>labour</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>This production of self-alienation has entered a vicious circle which masquerades as the predominant “revolutionary thought” of today: dissociated to such a degree that it is capable not only of experiencing its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order (Benjamin), but that it is capable of doing so repeatedly, ad infinitum</u></strong>. 39 THE PERMANENT OBSOLESCENCE OF “REVOLUTION”? It has been said that today the study of political economy is more closely related to paleoanthropology than to the “emancipation” of everyday life. One of these disciplines takes the Stone Age as its object of inquiry, the other inhabits it. Too often “revolutionary thought” likewise suff ers from terminal anachronism. <u><strong>In the 50 years since 1968, the cybernetic Corporate-State Apparatus has taken Marx’s invocation to change the world & Rimbaud’s to change life far more literally & far more seriously than those romantic custodians of the holy relics who in half a century have barely produced one revolutionary carrot</u></strong>. Like true reactionaries they <u><strong>cling to the cycle of manufactured controversy, projecting a vague & opportune hopefulness against a meridian of despair</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>revolution isn’t </mark>this travesty of <mark>alienation dressed-up as “protest movements,” distracted by</mark> the spectacle of endless “<mark>reform</u></strong></mark>.” It’s as if <u><strong>the first thing that had to be forgotten is that <mark>reform</mark>, like election cycles & market adjustment, <mark>is code for SYSTEMIC ERROR</mark>.</u></strong> THE IMPOVERISHED LABOUR OF ALIENATED INDIVIDUALISM <u><strong>In any society in which Power projects itself through a system of conspicuous consumption, complicity is the norm</u></strong>. <u><strong>But the system isn’t separate from the “individual” that complies</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Compliance is already a matrix of false choices</mark>. To comply or not to comply: the illusion of autonomous action, an alibi against inaction, a death sentence</u></strong>. Yet complicity is the system. <u><strong>It’s an existential “reply” to a totalising demand: that the system be acknowledged as the sole determinant of everything that is the case</u></strong>. The possible world, no less. This isn’t a philosophical problem. <u><strong><mark>Even </mark>its apparent <mark>forms of contradiction have been internalised</mark> to it: <mark>it produces simulacra of its own “negation</mark>” as a matter of course</u></strong>. <u><strong>Like neurotic symptoms they displace onto a mechanism of escalating catastrophe what can only be perceived in the form of the impossible</u></strong>. <u><strong>THE END OF HISTORY. THE END OF REASON. THE END OF CIVILISATION. THE END OF MAN</u></strong>. <u><strong>THE END OF THE WORLD</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>corresponding to each of these ENDs – these zero-sum demands for all-or-nothing – is a secret pathology</u></strong>. For <u><strong><mark>the Corporate-State Apparatus was born from the abduction</mark> & repression <mark>of a “revolutionary” impulse</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The existence of this sublimated “revolution” is</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>still perceptible through an incidence of menace, at the moment when imminent danger concentrates our vision on the foundational logic of every system of Power that promotes the idea that all revolutions must fail</u></strong>. <u><strong>A logic that encapsulates both the possibility & fragility of Power’s concrete existence</u></strong>. Thus brought to view, its structures can then be critically threatened. <u><strong>Not to perform in the theatre of permitted pseudo-critique, but to directly intervene in the immune system of its counterrevolutionary “social body</u></strong>.” To turn upon itself its totalising feedback mechanism of global “mind-control.” <u><strong>To jam not only the signal but the entire transmissional apparatus</u></strong>. THE CAPACITY TO TRANSFORM KNOWLEDGE INTO POWER RESTS UPON THE CAPACITY TO TRANSFORM THEORY INTO PRAXIS? The world doesn’t come with readymade political content. Other than in response to the terms of Power being more & more dictated in unison – in a simulation of World Order – there are no truly universal tactics. All guerrilla tactics are situational. A tactic cannot be indefi nitely held in reserve: it is always defi ned by a window of opportunity, an emergent possibility, an event. While the ability to choose the occasion of engagement is essential above all, interminable deferment isn’t a strategic option (the “No Action Alternative”). Nor does inaction confer any advantage in the realm of tactical engagement as such, if the objective is merely to preserve the advantage of inaction. Nor does a failed action automatically confer an advantage upon the enemy, by exposing a tactic to discovery & co-option. Co-opted into the arsenal of the Corporate-State, a “surrendered” tactic does not necessarily cede anything, since neither the tactic itself nor the circumstances of its employment are transferable. Indeed, by virtue of the Corporate-State Apparatus’ compulsion to repeat, co-option introduces an element of useless non-knowledge into the enemy system, thereby contributing to the rate of increase in its overall entropy. AVANT-GARDE-LUMPEN-PROLETARIAT The tactics adopted by Alienist counter-semiotic practices (SEMIOTIX) are therefore neither abstractions nor simply actions but an entire complex of spatio-temporalities. Guerrilla SEMIOTIX are closely calculated yet never programmatic. A merely repeated action isn’t a repeated tactic: but the repetition of an action may in & of itself be a tactic (whether a noncompulsive, unpredictable repetition, producing surprise; or a predictable action, designed to trap the enemy in a predictable response). A tactic can’t be reduced to the sum of its individual actions, its repertoire. It must be understood, then, that <u><strong><mark>the true objective of</mark> any tactical response by <mark>the </mark>Corporate-State <mark>Apparatus is</mark> thus <mark>not</mark> the <mark>neutralisation</mark> or capture of critical weaponry, <mark>but </mark>the <mark>capture </mark>of their logic</u></strong> (<u><strong><mark>for example, the capitulation to a “theatre of engagement”: ballotbox, </mark>TV <mark>news, protest </mark>march, opinion poll, social <mark>media</u></strong></mark>) <u><strong>thus <mark>allowing </mark>the <mark>exploitation </mark>of an entire tactical line of thought <mark>before it has even been articulated</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Such logic capture has provided the cybernetic Corporate-State Apparatus with the appearance of unworldly Power</mark>, like an alien entity against which there’s no defence & upon which every attack conveys ever-greater resilience</u></strong>. 41 Yet <u><strong><mark>such</mark> an <mark>appearance is</mark> precisely that: <mark>a</mark>n intricately constructed <mark>mirror effect, in which every action has its algorithmic double </mark>which, like the image in a mirror, seems <mark>to pre-empt it</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>This is no mere illusion, but the very foundation of real Power: the accumulated mass of surplus-value that – like the authoritarian spectacle in Lear – turns nothing into the reified force of no-thing</u></strong>. THE IMPOSSIBLE IS RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF A REVOLUTIONARY CRITERION In principle, tactical advantage is always limited against a brute force analytic response. A tactic by defi nition requires some element that is unknown or unpredictable to the adversary – yet the Corporate-State Apparatus has the capacity in principle to calculate & analyse to a depth that negates any but the most trivial element of surprise or socalled “psychological element.” In truth, the variables aff ecting the character & extent of the CorporateState Apparatus’ response to a tactical action cannot be described as psychological, except where political (& not cybernetic) control is a determining factor. <u><strong>Even where a tactic may be designed simply to produce confusion by its apparent randomness, the Corporate-State Apparatus will define that randomness & compute its probabilities</u></strong>. <u><strong>Anticipating counter-tactical actions in advance is thus the most common “tactical value” in ideological guerrilla warfare</u></strong>. <u><strong>The Corporate-State Apparatus knows its vulnerabilities & exploits them as a weapon</u></strong>. But this knowledge, too, is situational & these exploits can themselves become unforeseen vulnerabilities. Such an “epiphany” – the way in which the Corporate-State Apparatus’ system of totalising control can be made to decentre itself into an entirely diff erent, self-subversive confi guration – is a fundamental tactical objective of Alienist SEMIOTIX. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Nehring ’22 — Christopher; Academic Director German Spy Museum, Berlin, Germany. He has a PhD in Intelligence and Eastern European History from the University of Heidelberg, Germany. February 9, 2022; "NATO and Russia: Conflicting views in southeastern Europe"; DW; https://www.dw.com/en/ NATO-and-russia-conflicting-views-in-southeastern-europe/a-60706025; //CYang fulltext: NATO is uncharacteristically divided on how to deal with Russia in the escalating crisis over Ukraine. "The US and the UK favor deterrence and a hard line; Germany, France and Italy are emphasizing dialogue, and a third group, including Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, wants to stay out of the conflict and any troop deployment," says Stefan Meister, an expert on Russia and eastern Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). He told DW that, while Germany is usually the moderate link between these groups, that link is currently missing because of weak leadership. He warns that, in addition, NATO is already weakened by populism, Trump, and Brexit. "Russia's President Vladimir Putin is trying to exploit this to negotiate a new security order in Europe – without the United States," he explains. And in this situation, the NATO countries of southeastern Europe have an unusually important role to play. Croatia: 'If it escalates, retreat'? However, there are some strident, and conflicting, voices making themselves heard in the region. At the end of January, the president of Croatia, Zoran Milanovic, caused confusion both at home and abroad when he declared that, in the event of a conflict in Ukraine, his country would retreat. Speaking in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, Milanovic said: "If it comes to an escalation, we will withdraw, down to the last Croatian soldier." He did not, however, specify exactly what he meant. There are no Croatian soldiers stationed in Ukraine. The government of Croatia — a member of both the EU and NATO — immediately issued a contradictory statement. "The president does not speak for Croatia, but for himself," said the Croatian foreign minister, Gordan Grlic Radman. "We are and remain a loyal member of NATO." What is most peculiar about the Croatian president's threat is that no one — not NATO, not the US, not Ukraine — had requested the Croatian military's involvement. "Milanovic's statements serve domestic political purposes. They have to be seen against the background of his ongoing feud with Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic," explained Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Vienna, in an interview with DW. "Lately, the president seems to be playing the nationalist card. He has called Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, a 'partner,' and he wants to pander to Croatian nationalists, who dream of redrawing the borders in Bosnia, with Russian support." Bulgaria: History as a 'lobbyist' for Russia In an appearance on Bulgarian television BTV on February 1, 2022, Russian ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova made it very clear what Russia is demanding of NATO: that it withdraw behind the borders of states that were members of the organization in 1997. This would require NATO to withdraw all its troops from countries like Romania and Bulgaria and close its bases there. Mitrofanova said that these countries could formally remain NATO members — but only formally. Bulgaria's defense minister, Stefan Yanev, is apparently comfortable with the idea. In December 2021 he was publicly reprimanded by the prime minister, Kiril Petkov, after he spoke out on Facebook against the redeployment of NATO troops to Bulgaria. In a parliamentary hearing the following month, Yanev then declared: "We should stop reading the foreign press and speculating. We should be bulgarophiles, and think in terms of Bulgarian national interests." If any NATO troops were to be stationed in Bulgaria, he said, they should be exclusively Bulgarian. There is a domestic political background to the emphasis on "national interests" in Bulgaria, too. In December 2021, the nationalist Rebirth party entered parliament, and since then it has been putting pressure on the government. The ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova is well aware of Bulgarian nationalists' traditionally pro-Russian sympathies. "Russia has an influence in Bulgaria: our common history," she says. "That is the most important lobbyist, the most important influencer in our relations." Romania: 60% approval The situation in Romania is quite different. Along with Germany and Poland, it is one of the countries to which additional US and NATO troops are already being deployed. According to a survey by the INSCOP Research polling institute, of all the countries in the region, Romania is the one where NATO enjoys the highest level of trust among the population. "Additional NATO troops are not just welcome, they're also a political asset for the government," Sorin Ionita, a political scientist at the Expert Group think tank in Bucharest, told DW. "Not even the nationalists dare to speak out against it." Hungary: 'Putin's pinscher' in Budapest Hungary is also a focus for NATO troop deployments, since, like Romania, it shares a border with Ukraine. Prime Minister Viktor Orban has maintained a "special relationship" with Russia for years. His public admiration for President Putin, and rejection of sanctions against his regime, have earned him the nickname "Putin's pinscher." A few days ago, at the start of February 2022, Orban traveled to Moscow on what he called a "peace mission." However, the main issues under discussion were actually supplies of Russian gas, which Hungary buys at well below market value, and Russian involvement in the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant. Consequently, Budapest is avoiding any discussion of Hungary getting more involved in NATO activities. Turkey: A 'delicate balancing act' Turkey is a strategically important NATO member that also has a particularly complex relationship with Russia. Putin and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are cooperating in the Syrian civil war, but in Libya they support different groups. Erdogan first snubbed his NATO partners by buying Russian S-400 air defense missiles – then Ankara supplied Ukraine with military drones. Like Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, Turkey is also dependent on Russian gas and oil. "It's a delicate balancing act for Ankara," says Asli Aydintasbas of the European Council on Foreign Relations. "Erdogan has a special connection with Ukraine, and will support both it and NATO. On the other hand, he mustn't anger Putin so much that he turns off the gas, or seeks revenge in Syria." Western Balkans: Putin and the nationalist elites "Putin knows exactly what he wants in eastern Europe – unlike the West," the British eastern Europe expert Timothy Garton Ash comments in the Guardian newspaper. "He wants to restore as much as possible of the empire, great power status and sphere of influence that Russia lost so dramatically 30 years ago, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union." In southeastern Europe, the Kremlin aims to achieve this by means of cheap gas and nationalism. Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation adds: "Russia is also offering the nationalist elites in the western Balkans something the West is not offering, and should not offer: the promise of redrawing the borders in the region."<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>6---Regional divergence.</h4><p>Nehring ’22</strong> — Christopher; Academic Director German Spy Museum, Berlin, Germany. He has a PhD in Intelligence and Eastern European History from the University of Heidelberg, Germany. February 9, 2022; "NATO and Russia: Conflicting views in southeastern Europe"; DW; https://www.dw.com/en/ NATO-and-russia-conflicting-views-in-southeastern-europe/a-60706025; //CYang</p><p><u><mark>NATO</u></mark> is <u><strong><mark>uncharacteristically divided</strong></mark> on how to deal with</u> Russia in the escalating crisis over <u>Ukraine</u>. "The <u><mark>US and</u></mark> the <u><mark>UK</mark> favor</u> deterrence and <u>a <mark>hard line</u></mark>; <u><mark>Germany</u></mark>, <u><mark>France</mark> and <mark>Italy</u></mark> are <u>emphasizing <mark>dialogue</u></mark>, and a third group, including <u><mark>Bulgaria</u></mark>, <u><mark>Hungary</u></mark> and <u><mark>Slovakia</u></mark>, <u>wants to <mark>stay out</mark> of</u> the <u>conflict</u> and any troop deployment," says Stefan Meister, an expert on Russia and eastern Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).</p><p>He told DW that, while <u><mark>Germany</u></mark> is <u>usually the moderate link</u> between these groups, that link is <u><strong>currently <mark>missing</strong></mark> because of weak leadership</u>.</p><p>He warns that, in addition, <u><mark>NATO</u></mark> is <u><strong><mark>already weak</mark>ened</strong> by <mark>populism</u></mark>, <u>Trump</u>, and <u>Brexit</u>. "Russia's President Vladimir Putin is trying to exploit this to negotiate a new security order in Europe – without the United States," he explains. And in this situation, the <u>NATO countries of southeastern Europe have</u> an <u><strong>unusually important</strong> role</u> to play.</p><p><u><mark>Croatia</u></mark>: '<u>If it escalates</u>, <u>retreat</u>'?</p><p>However, there are some <u><strong>strident</u></strong>, <u>and conflicting</u>, <u>voices making themselves heard</u> in the region. At the end of January, the president of Croatia, Zoran <u>Milanovic</u>, caused <u>confusion</u> both at home and abroad when he <u><mark>declared</u></mark> that, <u>in the event of</u> a <u>conflict</u> in Ukraine, <u>his country would <mark>retreat</u></mark>. Speaking in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, Milanovic said: "If it comes to an escalation, we will withdraw, down to the last Croatian soldier." He did not, however, specify exactly what he meant. There are no Croatian soldiers stationed in Ukraine.</p><p>The <u>government of Croatia</u> — a member of both the EU and NATO — <u>immediately issued</u> a <u><strong><mark>contradictory</mark> statement</u></strong>. "The president does not speak for Croatia, but for himself," said the Croatian foreign minister, Gordan Grlic Radman. "We are and remain a loyal member of NATO."</p><p>What is most peculiar about the Croatian president's threat is that no one — not NATO, not the US, not Ukraine — had requested the Croatian military's involvement. "Milanovic's statements serve domestic political purposes. They have to be seen against the background of his ongoing feud with Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic," explained Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Vienna, in an interview with DW. "Lately, the president seems to be playing the nationalist card. He has called Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, a 'partner,' and he wants to pander to Croatian nationalists, who dream of redrawing the borders in Bosnia, with Russian support."</p><p><u><mark>Bulgaria</u></mark>: History as <u>a</u> '<u><strong><mark>lobby</mark>ist</u></strong>' <u><mark>for Russia</p><p></u></mark>In an appearance on Bulgarian television BTV on February 1, 2022, Russian ambassador Eleonora <u>Mitrofanova made</u> it <u><strong>very clear</strong> what Russia is demanding of NATO</u>: that it withdraw behind the borders of states that were members of the organization in 1997. This would require NATO to withdraw all its troops from countries like Romania and Bulgaria and close its bases there. <u>Mitrofanova said</u> that these <u><mark>countries</u></mark> could <u><mark>formally</u></mark> remain <u>NATO <mark>members</u></mark> — <u><mark>but <strong>only formally</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Bulgaria's defense minister, Stefan <u>Yanev</u>, is apparently comfortable with the idea. In December 2021 he was publicly reprimanded by the prime minister, Kiril Petkov, after he <u><mark>spoke out</u></mark> on Facebook <u><mark>against</u></mark> the <u>redeployment of <mark>NATO</mark> troops to Bulgaria</u>. In a parliamentary hearing the following month, Yanev then declared: "<u>We should stop reading the foreign press</u> and speculating. <u>We should</u> be bulgarophiles, and <u>think in terms of <strong>Bulgarian national interests</u></strong>." If any NATO troops were to be stationed in Bulgaria, he said, they should be exclusively Bulgarian.</p><p>There is a <u>domestic political background to</u> the <u><mark>emphasis on</u></mark> "<u>national interests</u>" in Bulgaria, too. In December 2021, the <u><mark>nationalist Rebirth</mark> party</u> entered parliament, and since then it has been <u>putting pressure on the government</u>. The ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova is well aware of Bulgarian nationalists' <u><mark>traditionally <strong>pro-Russian</mark> sympathies</u></strong>. "<u>Russia has</u> an <u>influence in Bulgaria</u>: our common history," she says. "That is <u>the <strong>most important</strong> lobbyist</u>, the <u>most important influencer in our relations</u>."</p><p>Romania: 60% approval</p><p>The situation in Romania is quite different. Along with Germany and Poland, it is one of the countries to which additional US and NATO troops are already being deployed. According to a survey by the INSCOP Research polling institute, of all the countries in the region, Romania is the one where NATO enjoys the highest level of trust among the population. "Additional NATO troops are not just welcome, they're also a political asset for the government," Sorin Ionita, a political scientist at the Expert Group think tank in Bucharest, told DW. "Not even the nationalists dare to speak out against it."</p><p><u><mark>Hungary</u></mark>: '<u><strong><mark>Putin's pinscher</u></strong></mark>' <u>in Budapest</p><p></u>Hungary is also a focus for NATO troop deployments, since, like Romania, it shares a border with Ukraine. Prime Minister Viktor <u>Orban</u> has <u>maintained</u> a "<u><strong>special relationship</u></strong>" <u>with Russia</u> for years. His <u>public admiration for</u> President <u>Putin</u>, and rejection of sanctions against his regime, have <u>earned him</u> the <u>nickname</u> "<u>Putin's pinscher</u>."</p><p>A few days ago, at the start of February 2022, <u>Orban traveled to Moscow</u> on what he called a "peace mission." However, the main issues under discussion were actually supplies of Russian gas, which Hungary buys at well below market value, and Russian involvement in the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant. Consequently, <u>Budapest</u> is <u><mark>avoiding <strong>any</mark> discussion</strong> of Hungary <strong>getting more involved</strong> in <mark>NATO activities</u></mark>.</p><p><u>Turkey</u>: <u>A</u> '<u>delicate balancing act</u>'</p><p>Turkey is a strategically important NATO member that also has a particularly complex relationship with Russia. <u><mark>Putin and</u></mark> President Recep Tayyip <u><mark>Erdogan</u></mark> are <u><mark>cooperating</u></mark> in the Syrian civil war, but in Libya they support different groups. <u>Erdogan</u> first <u>snubbed</u> his <u>NATO</u> partners <u>by buying Russian S-400</u> air defense missiles – then Ankara supplied Ukraine with military drones. Like Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, Turkey is also dependent on Russian gas and oil.</p><p>"<u>It's a <strong>delicate balancing act</strong> for Ankara</u>," says Asli Aydintasbas of the European Council on Foreign Relations. "<u>Erdogan</u> has a special connection with Ukraine, and will support both it and NATO. On the other hand, he <u><strong><mark>mustn't anger Putin</strong></mark> so much that he turns off</u> the <u>gas</u>, <u>or seeks <strong>revenge in Syria</u></strong>."</p><p><u>Western <mark>Balkans</u></mark>: Putin and the nationalist elites</p><p>"<u>Putin <mark>knows</mark> <strong>exactly <mark>what he wants</strong></mark> in eastern Europe</u> – unlike the West," the British eastern Europe expert Timothy Garton Ash comments in the Guardian newspaper. "He wants to restore as much as possible of the empire, great power status and sphere of influence that Russia lost so dramatically 30 years ago, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union." <u>In southeastern</u> Europe, the <u>Kremlin aims to achieve this by</u> means of <u><mark>cheap gas</mark> and <mark>nationalism</u></mark>.</p><p>Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation adds: "<u>Russia</u> is also <u><mark>offering</u></mark> the <u><strong>nationalist elites</strong> in</u> the <u>western Balkans something the West is not</u> offering, and should not offer: <u>the promise of <mark>redrawing</u></mark> the <u><mark>borders</u></mark> in the region."</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Blair, 18 (Bruce Blair, nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and the co-founder of Global Zero, Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch Authority, January/February 2018, Arms Control Today, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/features/strengthening-checks-presidential-nuclear-launch-authority) fulltext: U.S. nuclear launch protocol has important virtues and serious liabilities. Major changes are needed to constrain a president who would seek to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons without apparent cause and to prevent him or her from being pushed into making nuclear retaliatory decisions in haste. The virtues of the protocol—the procedures and timelines for ordering the use of nuclear weapons and for carrying out such an order—are twofold. First, it concentrates launch authority at the highest level of the executive branch, the presidency, taking it out of the hands of the military and others. This is a function of paramount importance. The principle of civilian control over weapons of mass destruction must never be compromised. Together with the imposition of organizational and technical safeguards on the weapons and their handlers, the protocol elevates the locus of launch capability, as well as of launch authority, to the highest practical level.1 Second, it is designed to allow the president and the nuclear forces under his command to respond rapidly and decisively in the face of an enemy attack by nuclear-armed missiles that can fly from the opposite side of the planet to U.S. territory in 30 minutes or from forward-deployed submarines in 15 minutes.2 This is of critical importance in view of the acute vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications, as well as of a large portion of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, particularly the silo-based missile force and the bomber fleet in its normal peacetime posture.3 Despite fast-flying inbound warheads, the protocol on paper provides enough time for detecting and assessing an attack, convening an emergency conference between the president and his top nuclear advisers, briefing the president on his options and their consequences, authenticating the president’s decision, and formatting and transmitting a launch order to the launch crews in time to ensure the survival and execution of their forces. The flip side of these virtues are serious liabilities. The protocol concentrates authority and emphasizes speed to such a degree that it may allow a president to railroad the nuclear commanders into initiating a first strike without apparent cause and quickly executing an order that may be horrifyingly misguided, illegal, or both. A demented commander-in-chief could start a nuclear conflagration that no one could forestall, veto, or stop. Equally deleterious, a president can become hostage to the protocol itself, like a conductor on a runaway train, if an enemy nuclear strike appears underway. He may be pushed into hastily ordering “retaliation” in response to a false alarm. Rationality would be lost in the fog of crisis under a short deadline fraught with confusion and emotion. Protocol for Intentional First Use If the president wishes to order the first use of nuclear weapons, he would be expected to do so in close consultation with his top national security advisers, particularly the secretaries of defense and state (statutory advisers on the National Security Council), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the national security adviser, and the senior generals who command the military forces. Depending on the urgency of the situation, this could be a protracted process with extensive planning, heightened force readiness, and regular briefings of the president, or it could be truncated to minutes if an imminent attack is perceived. When a decision is imminent, the process goes critical. The commander-in-chief would be connected to his key advisers via a secure communications network designed to support nuclear emergency actions. The president could initiate this conference anytime, even abruptly in the night, through his military aide who is always nearby with the “football”—a satchel containing the nuclear war plans, including a one-pager graphically depicting the major options at his disposal. The best location for conferencing would be the blast-resistant emergency operations center under the East Wing of the White House. Advisers could be assembled there, and others linked by secure phone. Such a conference could be convened almost anywhere, from Mar-a-Lago or other locations or aboard his ground-transport vehicles and dedicated aircraft, including Air Force One and his “doomsday” plane.4 Secure communications are far less reliable when the president is traveling or in the process of being evacuated to a safe location. The advisers may or may not join the conference in a timely way. If a brewing crisis suddenly escalates and catches them off guard, key advisers may fail to get on the call before a president decides the time to strike has arrived. During nuclear release exercises and real-world incidents involving North Korea and other nations over the past decade, missile launch preparations or actual firings posing a potential threat triggered emergency conferences, but notification often failed to reach key advisers in time. Sometimes none of the advisers checked in, leaving the president and the head of Strategic Command (StratCom), whose role is to brief the president on nuclear options and their consequences, alone in the hot seats.5 After this briefing, the president may seek advice from any, all, or none of the advisers in the room or on the telephone before rendering a decision, which likely but not necessarily involves choosing a preprogrammed option.6 Formally, he does not need any approval or consent, although StratCom or others on the call could attempt to dissuade the president if his thinking or final decision veer into the realm of the obviously misguided or illegal.7 Even the defense secretary has no particular role other than offering advice if asked. Contrary to widespread belief, he does not confirm the order or otherwise bless it in any way. But this is their last chance to change the president’s mind before a formal launch order is prepared by the Pentagon, disseminated, and inexorably implemented. Listening in on the exchange is the Pentagon war room, a kind of boutique service dedicated to executing the orders of the president and the defense secretary.8 Following the drift of the conversation, this entity would start preparing a launch order. When the president finally declares his choice of option, it would challenge the president to authenticate using a special code known as the “biscuit,” or Gold Code. This would take a few seconds. If the codes match properly, it would quickly format and transmit a launch order over multiple communications channels directly to the submarine, bomber, and underground launch crews. This would take a couple of minutes. Shorter than the length of a “tweet,” the order would specify the war plan, the time to begin the strike, an unlock code needed by the firing crews to release their weapons, and a Sealed Authentication Code that must match the codes in the firing crews’ safe. If the codes match, the crews assume the order originated with the president, even though all the codes in the launch order are held exclusively by the Pentagon war room and alternate command centers such as StratCom itself. The underground Minuteman crews could complete their launch checklist in a little more than a minute. Today, as many as 400 missiles could be launched from their underground silos in less than five minutes after the president gave the order.9 Submarines and bombers would be the primary attackers in a scenario involving North Korea. With two boats typically on launch-ready patrol in the Pacific Ocean, the sub force would be capable of quickly firing about 200 warheads roughly 15 minutes after the president gave the order.10 If the order came without a prior raising of alert readiness, however, the boats would surface to confirm its validity. Bombers on full alert with bombs and cruise missiles loaded,11 as they would be in times of heightened tension, would need eight hours or so to fly from their U.S. bases to near the border of their target countries, where they would fire cruise missiles at inland targets or proceed to fly into enemy airspace to drop gravity bombs. They could deliver upward of 500 weapons. Protocol for Second-Strike Scenarios A decision to strike back in retaliation theoretically could be drawn out for days and weeks, but the protocol is designed to yield one in minutes. The basic procedures are the same for first and second use of nuclear weapons, but the timelines shrink in the latter case. Reactions from the bottom to the top of the chain of command to an apparent attack are driven by checklists and virtually preordained. The action could be described as a rote enactment of a prepared script with very high expectations in all quarters that a nuclear response would be authorized immediately. Historically, the notion of riding out an attack has been operationally anathema to the military. As General Lee Butler, a former head of the strategic forces, stated, “Our policy was premised on being able to accept the first wave of attacks…. Yet at the operational level it was never accepted…. They built a construct that powerfully biased the president’s decision process toward launch before the arrival of the first enemy warhead…a move in practice to a system structured to drive the president invariably toward a decision to launch under attack.”12 This is called “jamming” the president, or pressuring him to quickly authorize retaliation while under apparent or confirmed attack.13 Jamming is still the norm in current nuclear operations. Although President Barack Obama directed the Pentagon to reduce our reliance on launch on warning and find ways to increase warning and decision time, nuclear exercises still feature this high-pressure tactic. In some high-threat situations, the StratCom commander’s briefing of the president may be compressed to as little as 30 seconds, and then the president may be pressed to “deliberate and decide” in six minutes or less. The persistent vulnerability of the nuclear command system and hundreds of U.S. missiles requires extremely fast reaction at all levels. In truth, everyone gets jammed. The risk of mistaken launch on false warning remains significant even today, 25 years after the end of the Cold War. It also creates pressure to pre-empt an imminent attack. To relieve the jamming pressure today, the protocol must start earlier and under conditions of greater uncertainty about the degree of threat posed by missile launch preparations or actual firings. During the Cold War, even the really close calls did not rise to the level of presidential notification.14 Today, there are more missile launches than ever to track, and assessing whether they pose a threat has become more difficult.15 Ironically this surge, which has happened over the past decade or so, has spawned great unpredictability, complicated assessment, and led on multiple occasions to presidents being notified of an ambiguous imminent threat in progress.16 Reforms: Toward a True Retaliatory Posture A six-minute deadline for deliberation and decision is ridiculous. The president needs much more warning and decision time to rationally cope with indications of a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. He must no longer be jammed to authorize what could be a civilization-ending response to attack indications that may be false. The risks of miscalculation and irrational decision-making leading to incoherent operations and further escalation are unacceptably high. This terrifying reality has been ignored for decades. Reform is long overdue. This means that the current prompt-launch posture must be drastically altered. Use-or-lose forces such as the silo-based missile force should be eliminated. Launch on warning should be eliminated. Reducing the vulnerability of command, control, and communications to kinetic attack and cyberattack should be the top priority of the nuclear modernization plan, even if it means cutting spending on replacement forces in the pipeline. The submarine force has already become the premier leg of the strategic triad, the central component of U.S. deterrence policy. This force can patiently wait for months for direction from higher authority. Equally overdue is the adoption of a policy that eschews the first use of nuclear weapons. A clear marker would be established in limiting the president’s leeway to initiate a first strike.17 If taken seriously, the operational plans would also be modified in ways that would hamstring any effort to order the use of nuclear weapons without apparent cause. Congress has considerable legal standing to pass legislation that prohibits first use. A recent bill introduced by Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) is a step in this direction,18 but a law would draw real redlines around the policy. Crossing them would make the president accountable and even impeachable. The Trump administration appears to be heading in the opposite direction. Its nuclear review in the works is leaning toward the deployment of smaller-yield nuclear weapons (e.g., a primary-only warhead on Trident missiles) that will make them more usable in both first- and second-use scenarios. It is also leaning toward widening the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used first in response to non-nuclear strategic aggression and toward revoking Obama-era assurances given to non-nuclear countries that the United States would never attack them with nuclear weapons.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>A statutory NFU is key to prevent crisis escalation from ambiguity</h4><p><strong>Blair, 18</p><p></strong>(Bruce Blair, nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and the co-founder of Global Zero, Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch Authority, January/February 2018, Arms Control Today, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/features/strengthening-checks-presidential-nuclear-launch-authority)</p><p><u>U.S. nuclear launch protocol has important virtues and serious liabilities</u>. <u>Major changes are needed to constrain a president who would seek to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons</u> without apparent cause <u>and</u> to <u>prevent him or her from being pushed into making nuclear retaliatory decisions in haste.</p><p></u>The virtues of the protocol—the procedures and timelines for ordering the use of nuclear weapons and for carrying out such an order—are twofold. First, it concentrates launch authority at the highest level of the executive branch, the presidency, taking it out of the hands of the military and others. This is a function of paramount importance. The principle of civilian control over weapons of mass destruction must never be compromised. Together with the imposition of organizational and technical safeguards on the weapons and their handlers, the protocol elevates the locus of launch capability, as well as of launch authority, to the highest practical level.1</p><p>Second, it is designed to allow the president and the nuclear forces under his command to respond rapidly and decisively in the face of an enemy attack by nuclear-armed missiles that can fly from the opposite side of the planet to U.S. territory in 30 minutes or from forward-deployed submarines in 15 minutes.2 This is of critical importance in view of the acute vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications, as well as of a large portion of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, particularly the silo-based missile force and the bomber fleet in its normal peacetime posture.3</p><p>Despite fast-flying inbound warheads, the protocol on paper provides enough time for detecting and assessing an attack, convening an emergency conference between the president and his top nuclear advisers, briefing the president on his options and their consequences, authenticating the president’s decision, and formatting and transmitting a launch order to the launch crews in time to ensure the survival and execution of their forces.</p><p><u><strong><mark>The flip side of these virtues are serious liabilities</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>protocol concentrates authority</u> <u>and emphasizes speed to such a degree that it may allow a president to railroad the nuclear commanders</mark> into initiating a first strike without apparent cause and quickly executing an order that may be horrifyingly misguided,</u> <u>illegal, or both. A <mark>demented commander-in-chief could start a nuclear conflagration</u></mark> that <u>no one could forestall,</u> veto, or stop.</p><p><u>Equally deleterious, a president can become hostage to the protocol itself, like a conductor on a runaway train, if an enemy nuclear strike appears underway</u>. <u>He may be pushed into hastily ordering “retaliation”</u> in response <u>to a false alarm</u>. <u><mark>Rationality would be lost in the fog of crisis</mark> under a short deadline fraught with confusion and emotion.</p><p>Protocol for Intentional First Use</p><p>If the president wishes to order the first use of nuclear weapons, he would be expected to do so in close consultation with his top national security advisers</u>, particularly the secretaries of defense and state (statutory advisers on the National Security Council), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the national security adviser, and the senior generals who command the military forces. Depending on the urgency of the situation, this could be a protracted process with extensive planning, heightened force readiness, and regular briefings of the president, or <u>it could be truncated</u> to minutes <u>if an imminent attack is perceived.</p><p><mark>When a decision is imminent, the process goes critical</mark>. </u>The commander-in-chief would be connected to his key advisers via a secure communications network designed to support nuclear emergency actions. The president could initiate this conference anytime, even abruptly in the night, through his military aide who is always nearby with the “football”—a satchel containing the nuclear war plans, including a one-pager graphically depicting the major options at his disposal.</p><p>The best location for conferencing would be the blast-resistant emergency operations center under the East Wing of the White House. Advisers could be assembled there, and others linked by secure phone. Such a conference could be convened almost anywhere, from Mar-a-Lago or other locations or aboard his ground-transport vehicles and dedicated aircraft, including Air Force One and his “doomsday” plane.4 Secure communications are far less reliable when the president is traveling or in the process of being evacuated to a safe location. The advisers may or may not join the conference in a timely way. If a brewing crisis suddenly escalates and catches them off guard, key advisers may fail to get on the call before a president decides the time to strike has arrived. During nuclear release exercises and real-world incidents involving North Korea and other nations over the past decade, missile launch preparations or actual firings posing a potential threat triggered emergency conferences, but notification often failed to reach key advisers in time. Sometimes none of the advisers checked in, leaving the president and the head of Strategic Command (StratCom), whose role is to brief the president on nuclear options and their consequences, alone in the hot seats.5 After this briefing, the president may seek advice from any, all, or none of the advisers in the room or on the telephone before rendering a decision, which likely but not necessarily involves choosing a preprogrammed option.6 Formally, he does not need any approval or consent, although StratCom or others on the call could attempt to dissuade the president if his thinking or final decision veer into the realm of the obviously misguided or illegal.7 Even the defense secretary has no particular role other than offering advice if asked. Contrary to widespread belief, he does not confirm the order or otherwise bless it in any way. But this is their last chance to change the president’s mind before a formal launch order is prepared by the Pentagon, disseminated, and inexorably implemented. Listening in on the exchange is the Pentagon war room, a kind of boutique service dedicated to executing the orders of the president and the defense secretary.8 Following the drift of the conversation, this entity would start preparing a launch order. When the president finally declares his choice of option, it would challenge the president to authenticate using a special code known as the “biscuit,” or Gold Code. This would take a few seconds. If the codes match properly, it would quickly format and transmit a launch order over multiple communications channels directly to the submarine, bomber, and underground launch crews. This would take a couple of minutes. Shorter than the length of a “tweet,” the order would specify the war plan, the time to begin the strike, an unlock code needed by the firing crews to release their weapons, and a Sealed Authentication Code that must match the codes in the firing crews’ safe. If the codes match, the crews assume the order originated with the president, even though all the codes in the launch order are held exclusively by the Pentagon war room and alternate command centers such as StratCom itself. The underground Minuteman crews could complete their launch checklist in a little more than a minute. Today, as many as 400 missiles could be launched from their underground silos in less than five minutes after the president gave the order.9 Submarines and bombers would be the primary attackers in a scenario involving North Korea. With two boats typically on launch-ready patrol in the Pacific Ocean, the sub force would be capable of quickly firing about 200 warheads roughly 15 minutes after the president gave the order.10 If the order came without a prior raising of alert readiness, however, the boats would surface to confirm its validity. Bombers on full alert with bombs and cruise missiles loaded,11 as they would be in times of heightened tension, would need eight hours or so to fly from their U.S. bases to near the border of their target countries, where they would fire cruise missiles at inland targets or proceed to fly into enemy airspace to drop gravity bombs. They could deliver upward of 500 weapons. Protocol for Second-Strike Scenarios A decision to strike back in retaliation theoretically could be drawn out for days and weeks, but the protocol is designed to yield one in minutes. The basic procedures are the same for first and second use of nuclear weapons, but the timelines shrink in the latter case. Reactions from the bottom to the top of the chain of command to an apparent attack are driven by checklists and virtually preordained. The action could be described as a rote enactment of a prepared script with very high expectations in all quarters that a nuclear response would be authorized immediately. Historically, the notion of riding out an attack has been operationally anathema to the military. As General Lee Butler, a former head of the strategic forces, stated, “Our policy was premised on being able to accept the first wave of attacks…. Yet at the operational level it was never accepted…. They built a construct that powerfully biased the president’s decision process toward launch before the arrival of the first enemy warhead…a move in practice to a system structured to drive the president invariably toward a decision to launch under attack.”12 This is called “jamming” the president, or pressuring him to quickly authorize retaliation while under apparent or confirmed attack.13 Jamming is still the norm in current nuclear operations. Although President Barack Obama directed the Pentagon to reduce our reliance on launch on warning and find ways to increase warning and decision time, nuclear exercises still feature this high-pressure tactic. In some high-threat situations, the StratCom commander’s briefing of the president may be compressed to as little as 30 seconds, and then the president may be pressed to “deliberate and decide” in six minutes or less. The persistent vulnerability of the nuclear command system and hundreds of U.S. missiles requires extremely fast reaction at all levels. In truth, everyone gets jammed. The risk of mistaken launch on false warning remains significant even today, 25 years after the end of the Cold War. It also creates pressure to pre-empt an imminent attack. To relieve the jamming pressure today, the protocol must start earlier and under conditions of greater uncertainty about the degree of threat posed by missile launch preparations or actual firings. During the Cold War, even the really close calls did not rise to the level of presidential notification.14 Today, there are more missile launches than ever to track, and assessing whether they pose a threat has become more difficult.15 Ironically this surge, which has happened over the past decade or so, has spawned great unpredictability, complicated assessment, and led on multiple occasions to presidents being notified of an ambiguous imminent threat in progress.16</p><p>Reforms: Toward a True Retaliatory Posture</p><p><u>A six-minute deadline for deliberation and decision is ridiculous. The president needs</u> much <u>more</u> warning and decision time to rationally cope with indications of a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. <u>He must no longer be jammed to authorize</u> <u>what could be a civilization-ending response</u> to attack indications that may be false. <u><strong><mark>The risks of</mark> <mark>miscalculation and irrational decision-making leading to incoherent operations</mark> and <mark>further escalation are unacceptably high</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>This terrifying reality has been ignored for decades. Reform is long overdue.</p><p>This means that the current prompt-launch posture must be drastically altered. <u><mark>Use-or-lose</mark> forces</u> such as the silo-based missile force <u><mark>should be eliminated</u></mark>. Launch on warning should be eliminated. Reducing the vulnerability of command, control, and communications to kinetic attack and cyberattack should be the top priority of the nuclear modernization plan, even if it means cutting spending on replacement forces in the pipeline. The submarine force has already become the premier leg of the strategic triad, the central component of U.S. deterrence policy. This force can patiently wait for months for direction from higher authority.</p><p><u>Equally overdue is the adoption of a policy that eschews the first use of nuclear weapons</u>. <u><strong><mark>A clear marker</mark> would be <mark>established in limiting the president’s</mark> <mark>leeway</mark> to initiate a first strike</u></strong>.17 If taken seriously, <u>the <mark>operational plans would</mark> also <mark>be modified</mark> in ways that would <mark>hamstring any effort to order the use of nuclear weapons</mark> without apparent cause<strong>.</p><p><mark>Congress has</mark> considerable <mark>legal standing to pass legislation that prohibits first use</u></strong></mark>. A recent bill introduced by Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) is a step in this direction,18 but <u><strong><mark>a law would draw real redlines around the policy</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Crossing</mark> them <mark>would make the president accountable and even impeachable</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>The <u>Trump</u> administration <u>appears to be heading in the opposite direction</u>. Its nuclear review in the works is leaning toward the deployment of smaller-yield nuclear weapons (e.g., a primary-only warhead on Trident missiles) that will make them more usable in both first- and second-use scenarios. <u>It is</u> also <u>leaning toward widening the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used first</u> in response to non-nuclear strategic aggression and toward revoking Obama-era assurances given to non-nuclear countries that the United States would never attack them with nuclear weapons.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jeffrey Lewis, in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Study Program- Worked In the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Center for Defense Information, ‘4, "What if Space Were Weaponized," July 2004 pg online @ www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf) fulltext: Accidental Nuclear War Scenario Crisis Over Kalningrad (2010) This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizing. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and conﬁgured to ﬁght a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?” 43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the “ﬁrst use” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reiterated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons “preemptively” in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack. 44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile ﬁelds in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the ofﬁcer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only ﬁve missiles. You can do little damage with just ﬁve missiles.” 45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high 26 What if Space Were Weaponized? altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident. 46 In both cases, Russian observers were conﬁdent that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines. 47 Further, Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline – only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack. 48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation. 49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable [hit] a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the ﬁrst phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difﬁcult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned 50 could make both the more difﬁcult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to deﬁnitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. Even the Accidental Nuclear War Scenarios 27 United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack – and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how conﬁdent could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983 – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. 51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difﬁcult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. 52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave. 54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a ﬁt of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be suspicious. It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising. 55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentiﬁed aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were ﬂying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian ﬂeet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew 28 What if Space Were Weaponized? Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the conﬂuence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a ﬂock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difﬁculties; and the Soviet ﬂeet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the ﬁrst major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortiﬁed by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American ofﬁcials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American ﬁrst strike during this period. 56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that conﬁdence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady ﬂow of reliable information. When that information ﬂow is disrupted – whether by a deliberate attack or an accident – conﬁdence collapses and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the conﬁdence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Space debris causes <u>Russia war</u>.<u> </h4><p></u>Jeffrey <u><strong>Lewis</u></strong>, in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Study Program- Worked In the <u><strong>Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy</u></strong>, Center for Defense Information, <u><strong>‘4</u></strong>, "What if Space Were Weaponized," July 2004 pg online @ www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)</p><p>Accidental Nuclear War Scenario Crisis Over Kalningrad (2010) This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, th<u>e United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizi</u>ng. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and conﬁgured to ﬁght a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?” 43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that <u>the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might</u>. In the mid-1990s, <u><mark>Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from</u></mark> the “<u><mark>ﬁrst use</u></mark>” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, <u><strong>Russian Defense Minister</u></strong> <u>Sergei Ivanov reiterated that <mark>Moscow might use nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</mark> “<mark>preemptively</mark>” in any number of contingencies, </u>including a NATO attack. 44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile ﬁelds in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the ofﬁcer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only ﬁve missiles. You can do little damage with just ﬁve missiles.” 45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high 26 What if Space Were Weaponized? altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident. 46 In both cases, <u>Russian observers were conﬁdent that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one.</u> In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, <u>space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines</u>. 47 Further, <u>Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline</u> – <u>only one or two of the six satellites remain operational</u>, <u>leaving Russia with early warning for only <strong>six hours a day</u></strong>. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But <u>Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack.</u> 48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation. 49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. <u>Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems</u> – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – <u>to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. <strong><mark>What would happen if</mark> a piece of space <mark>debris were to</mark> </u></strong>disable <u><strong><mark>[hit] a Russian early-warning satellite</mark> under these conditions</u></strong>? <u>Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the ﬁrst phase of a U.S. attack?</u> Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difﬁcult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but <u>given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question</u>. Further, the <u>advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs</u>, as now envisioned 50 could <u>make both the more difﬁcult orbital plane and any warning systems moot</u>. The unpleasant truth is that the <u><mark>Russians</mark> likely <mark>would</mark> have to <strong><mark>make a judgment call</u></strong></mark>. No <u>state has the ability to deﬁnitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. </u>Even the Accidental Nuclear War Scenarios 27 <u><mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>does not maintain</u></mark> (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) <u><mark>a</mark> sophisticated space surveillance <mark>system that would allow it to distinguish between</mark> a satellite malfunction, a <mark>debris </mark>strike <mark>or</mark> a deliberate <mark>attack</u></mark> – <u>and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. </u>Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But <u>how conﬁdent could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common</u> – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (<u>NORAD</u>) <u>experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983</u> – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. 51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difﬁcult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. 52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. <u>The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship.</u> While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave. 54 <u>If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a ﬁt of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be suspicious. <strong><mark>It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case</mark> light</u></strong>. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising. 55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentiﬁed aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were ﬂying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian ﬂeet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew 28 What if Space Were Weaponized? Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the conﬂuence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a ﬂock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difﬁculties; and the Soviet ﬂeet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the ﬁrst major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortiﬁed by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American ofﬁcials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American ﬁrst strike during this period. 56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that <u>conﬁdence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own</u>. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady ﬂow of reliable information. <u><mark>When</u></mark> that <u><mark>information ﬂow is disrupted</u></mark> – <u>whether by a deliberate attack or an accident</u> – <u>conﬁdence collapses and <mark>the result is</mark> panic and <mark>escalation</u></mark>. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the conﬁdence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jacobs 19 [Christopher Jacobs, the Founder and CEO of Juniper Research Group and author of the book, The Case Against Single Payer, has over a decade of experience in a variety of policy roles on and off Capitol Hill. 2019 “The Case Against Single Payer: How 'Medicare for All' Will Wreck America's Health Care System--And Its Economy” p. 67 – 72 ] //aaditg fulltext: As of 2017, Americans spent 17.9% of the U.S. gross domestic product on health care, a percentage projected to rise to 19.4% of GDP by 2027. The United States spends more on health care than other industrialized nations do, both per person and as a percentage of gross domestic product. Some have argued that the United States needs to lower its level of health spending, or at minimum slow its growth. Policy makers often express their desire to “bend the cost curve,” such that health-care spending will not continue to grow faster than ination, or the economy as a whole. However, a single-payer system represents exactly the wrong approach to lower health care costs, for multiple reasons, including these: 1. It does not focus on getting incentives right—if anything, it does just the opposite. As we have seen, by making health care “free,” single payer will only increase demand for care. Having raised demand for health care signicantly, single payer attempts to control spending by limiting the available supply—restricting access to care through government rationing. 2. Government cannot allocate resources as efficiently as individuals can. Single-payer advocates foolishly assume that a group of bureaucrats can operate health markets better than individual doctors, patients, and hospitals can. Economic theory, to say nothing of sheer common sense, suggests the opposite. 3. A rapid transition from the current system to single payer—four years in the Senate bill, and a mere two years in the House bill—would lead to economic shocks. The legislation would put many individuals in the private health insurance industry out of business, and would sharply reduce payments to doctors and hospitals. Even if one believes the United States should reduce its level of health spending over time, doing so this quickly would almost guarantee a recession, given health care’s share of the American economy, given health care’s share of the American economy 4. The massive tax increases needed to fund single payer—more than doubling current individual and corporate income tax rates—would distort the economy even more, particularly if phased in rapidly as the new program comes online. 4 Not only would single payer not lower health costs effectively; it would bring numerous adverse consequences, both within and outside the health sector. If enacted, the legislation would have negative effects that would ripple through the economy for many years to come. ABOLISHING A MAJOR INDUSTRY First and most obviously, single payer would make private health insurance “unlawful,” effectively abolishing an entire industry. The New York Times noted that the legislation would unleash economic disruption on a scale never before seen in American history: The private health insurance business employs at least a half a million people, covers about 250 million Americans, and generates roughly a trillion dollars in revenues. Its companies’ stocks are a staple of the mutual funds that make up millions of Americans’ retirement savings. 5 Many health insurance companies do have other lines of business. For instance, insurer Aetna was recently acquired by pharmacy behemoth CVS. And some individuals currently working for insurers could end up working for the single-payer program, particularly because the federal government would need to build an alternative insurance infrastructure very quickly. 6 But with health and medical insurance carriers employing 542,300 workers as of March 2019, a minimum of hundreds of thousands of Americans would face job disruption, if not outright unemployment, under single payer. 7 Even talk of single-payer legislation has spooked investors in the healthcare sector. On the day in February 2019 that Rep. Pramila Jayapal reintroduced her single-payer bill in the House, insurance industry stocks fell by nearly 5%. 8 The sell-off continued throughout the beginning of 2019, such that health-care stocks have shown one of the widest divergences from he broader Standard and Poor’s 500 index—falling by 0.9%, even as the rest of the market gained a whopping 16%—this century. 9 In response to news of the stock declines, Jayapal tweeted, “Sorry not sorry.” 10 But the hundreds of thousands of American workers employed by health insurers, to say nothing of the millions of Americans with investments in the industry, might take a slightly less lackadaisical view toward massive disruption in their jobs, investments, and livelihoods. LOWER REIMBURSEMENTS, FEWER JOBS In addition to its direct effects on the insurance industry, single payer will attempt to save money by paying doctors and hospitals less. The legislation would base reimbursements on the current Medicare program, which pays doctors 75% of private insurance rates, and hospitals 60% of private insurance. 11 Medicare does not just pay doctors and hospitals less than private insurance—in many cases, it pays doctors and hospitals less than the cost of care. According to the Medicare actuary, 72% of hospitals lost money on their Medicare patients in 2017. 12 Paying doctors and hospitals at much lower Medicare rates will lead to dramatic changes for the entire health-care sector. As the New York Times noted, job losses could represent the least of hospitals’ concerns: Some hospitals, especially struggling rural centers, would close virtually overnight, according to policy experts. Others, they say, would try to offset the steep [reimbursement] cuts by laying off hundreds of thousands of workers and abandoning lower-paying services like mental health. 13 One health policy professor the Times interviewed admitted that “I have no idea what would happen” should a single-payer system apply lower reimbursements to all hospital patients. 14 But, should the Le succeed in forcing hospitals to become guinea pigs in this socialist experiment, one can credibly guess the likely outcome. As with many other elements of single payer, this change would hit the most vulnerable elements of the system— rural hospitals already struggling to make ends meet, or important yet unprotable services and facilities—hardest. To illustrate the impact of a single-payer system, the consulting rm Navigant outlined its effects on a hypothetical small hospital system, one with ve hospitals, 1,000 total beds, and annual revenues of $1.2 billion. Navigant concluded that a single-payer system paying hospitals current Medicare rates would reduce the hospital network’s revenue by $330 million —approximately one-quarter—turning a slight annual surplus (2.3%) into a massive operating loss (22.1%). 15 Obviously, a hospital couldn’t long survive under conditions like that. Another study showed the sizable impact of these reimbursement reductions on hospitals and jobs within hospitals nationwide. This analysis, published in the prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), indicated a slightly smaller effect per hospital—an average 15.9% decline in revenue, as opposed to the one-quarter decline predicted by Navigant. 16 However, the JAMA authors concluded that single payer would reduce hospital payments by $151 billion per year nationwide. 17 ey noted that “an estimated 1.5 million hospital clinical and administrative jobs could be lost if hospitals reduced labor costs to compensate for the entire clinical shortfall;” if hospitals were willing to absorb some of the losses by eating into their operating margins, job losses could total “only” 855,999 workers. 18 Several gures put the size and scale of the losses contemplated by single payer into perspective: 1. e Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis calculated total GDP for 2018 as $20.5 trillion. 19 A $151 billion reduction in hospital revenue equates to a reduction of approximately 0.7% of America’s GDP—enough to turn a period of robust growth into sluggish growth, or to tip a period of sluggish growth into recession. 2. In 2018, the United States created a total of just fewer than 2.7 million jobs. 20 Reductions in hospital employment on the magnitude outlined in the JAMA study would erase between one-third and one-half of that job growth. 3. As of 2018, spending on hospital care ($1.19 trillion) equaled less than one-third (32.7%) of total health spending of $3.65 trillion. 21 Extending the 15-25% payment reductions projected for the hospital sector to physician care ($728 billion in spending in 2018) and other sectors of health care will only magnify the effects on the broader economy. The evidence strongly suggests that payment reductions on the magnitude single payer contemplates could result in millions of job losses, over and above those associated with eradicating the private insurance sector, and lead the economy into a recession.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>The 1AC makes it a functional recession– single payer is founded on a contradiction, reduces payments to doctors/hospitals, abolishes a whole industry, and fosters job disruption </h4><p>Jacobs 19 </strong>[Christopher Jacobs, the Founder and CEO of Juniper Research Group and author of the book, The Case Against Single Payer, has over a decade of experience in a variety of policy roles on and off Capitol Hill. 2019 “The Case Against Single Payer: How 'Medicare for All' Will Wreck America's Health Care System--And Its Economy” p. 67 – 72 ] //aaditg</p><p><u><strong>As of 2017, Americans spent 17.9% of the U.S. gross domestic product on health care,</strong> <strong>a percentage projected to rise to 19.4% of GDP by 2027. </u></strong>The United States spends more on health care than other industrialized nations do, both per person and as a percentage of gross domestic product. Some have argued that the United States needs to lower its level of health spending, or at minimum slow its growth. Policy makers often express their desire to “bend the cost curve,” such that health-care spending will not continue to grow faster than ination, or the economy as a whole. <u>However, a <strong><mark>s</mark>ingle-<mark>p</mark>ayer system represents exactly the <mark>wrong approach to lower</mark> health care costs,</strong> for multiple reasons, including these: 1. It does not focus on getting incentives right—if anything, it does just the opposite. As we have seen, <strong>by <mark>making</mark> <mark>h</mark>ealth <mark>c</mark>are “<mark>free,</mark>”</strong> single payer <strong>will only <mark>increase demand</mark> for care. </strong>Having raised demand for health care signicantly, single payer <strong>attempts to <mark>control spending by limiting</mark> the available <mark>supply</strong></mark>—<strong>restricting access to care through government </strong>rationing. 2. <mark>Gov</mark>ernment <mark>can</mark>no<mark>t</mark> <mark>allocate</mark> resources <mark>as efficiently as individuals</mark> can. Single-payer advocates foolishly assume that a group of bureaucrats can operate health markets better than individual doctors, patients, and hospitals can. </u>Economic theory, to say nothing of sheer common sense, suggests the opposite. <u>3. A rapid t<mark>ransition</mark> from the current system to single payer—four years in the Senate bill, and a mere two years in the House bill—would <mark>lead to economic shocks</mark>. The legislation would <mark>put</mark> many <mark>individuals in</mark> the private health insurance <mark>i</mark>ndustry <mark>out of business</mark>, and would sharply <mark>reduce payments to doctors</mark> and hospitals. </u>Even if one believes the United States should reduce its level of health spending over time<u>, doing so this quickly would <mark>almost guarantee a recession</mark>, given health care’s share of the American economy, given health care’s share of the American economy 4. The massive <mark>tax increases</mark> needed to fund single payer—more than doubling current individual and corporate income tax rates—would distort the economy even more, particularly if phased in rapidly as the new program comes online. 4 <mark>Not only</mark> would single payer <mark>not lower</mark> health costs <mark>effectively</mark>; it would bring numerous adverse consequences, both within and outside the health sector. If enacted, the legislation would have negative effects that would ripple through the economy for many years to come. ABOLISHING A MAJOR INDUSTRY First and most obviously, single payer would <mark>make</mark> private <mark>health insurance “unlawful</mark>,” effectively abolishing an entire industry. </u>The New York Times noted that the legislation would unleash economic disruption on a scale never before seen in American history: <u>The private health insurance business employs at least a <mark>half a million people</mark>, covers about <mark>250 million American</mark>s, and generates <mark>roughly a trillion</mark> dollars <mark>in revenue</mark>s. Its companies’ stocks are a staple of the mutual funds that make up millions of Americans’ retirement savings. 5 Many health insurance companies do have other lines of business. For instance, insurer Aetna was recently acquired by pharmacy behemoth CVS. And some individuals currently working for insurers could end up working for the single-payer program, particularly because the federal government would need to build an alternative insurance infrastructure very quickly. 6 </u>But with health and medical insurance carriers employing 542,300 workers as of March 2019<u>, a minimum of <mark>hundreds of thousands</mark> of Americans would <mark>face job disruption</mark>, if not outright unemployment, under single payer. 7 </u>Even talk of single-payer legislation has spooked investors in the healthcare sector. On the day in February 2019 that Rep. Pramila Jayapal reintroduced her single-payer bill in the House, insurance industry stocks fell by nearly 5%. <u>8 The sell-off continued throughout the beginning of 2019, such that health-care stocks have shown one of the widest divergences from he broader Standard and Poor’s 500 index—falling by 0.9%, even as the rest of the market gained a whopping 16%—this century. 9 In response to news of the stock declines, Jayapal tweeted, “Sorry not sorry.” </u>10 But the hundreds of thousands of American workers employed by health insurers, to say nothing of the millions of Americans with investments in the industry, might take a slightly less lackadaisical view toward massive disruption in their jobs, investments, and livelihoods. <u>LOWER REIMBURSEMENTS, FEWER JOBS In addition to its direct effects on the insurance industry, <strong>single payer will attempt to save money by <mark>pay</mark>ing doctors and hospitals <mark>less</strong></mark>. </u>The legislation would base reimbursements on the current Medicare program, which pays doctors 75% of private insurance rates, and hospitals 60% of private insurance. 11 Medicare does not just pay doctors and hospitals less than private insurance—in many cases, it pays doctors and hospitals less than the cost of care. According to the Medicare actuary, 72% of hospitals lost money on their Medicare patients in 2017. 12 Paying doctors and hospitals at much lower Medicare rates will lead to dramatic changes for the entire health-care sector. As the New York Times noted, job losses could represent the least of hospitals’ concerns: Some hospitals, especially struggling rural centers, would close virtually overnight, according to policy experts. Others, they say, would try to offset the steep [reimbursement] cuts by laying off hundreds of thousands of workers and abandoning lower-paying services like mental health. 13 One health policy professor the Times interviewed admitted that “I have no idea what would happen” should a single-payer system apply lower reimbursements to all hospital patients. 14 But, should the Le succeed in forcing hospitals to become guinea pigs in this socialist experiment, one can credibly guess the likely outcome. As with many other elements of single payer, this change would hit the most vulnerable elements of the system— rural hospitals already struggling to make ends meet, or important yet unprotable services and facilities—hardest. To illustrate the impact of a single-payer system, the consulting rm Navigant outlined its effects on a hypothetical small hospital system, one with ve hospitals, 1,000 total beds, and annual revenues of $1.2 billion. Navigant concluded that a single-payer system paying hospitals current <u>Medicare rates would reduce the hospital network’s revenue by $330 million —approximately one-quarter—turning a slight annual surplus (2.3%) into a massive operating loss (22.1%). 15 Obviously, a hospital couldn’t long survive under conditions like that. Another study showed the sizable impact of these reimbursement reductions on hospitals and jobs within hospitals nationwide. </u>This analysis, published in the prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), indicated a slightly smaller effect per hospital—an average 15.9% decline in revenue,<u> as </u>opposed to the one-quarter decline predicted by Navigant. <u>16 <strong>However, the JAMA authors concluded that <mark>s</mark>ingle <mark>p</mark>ayer would <mark>reduce hospital payments</mark> by <mark>$151 billion</mark> per year nationwide. </strong>17 ey noted that “an estimated 1.5 million hospital clinical and administrative jobs could be lost if hospitals reduced labor costs to compensate for the entire clinical shortfall;” if hospitals were willing to absorb some of the losses by eating into their operating margins, job losses could total “only” 855,999 workers. 18 Several gures put the size and scale of the losses contemplated by single payer into perspective: 1. e Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis calculated total GDP for 2018 as $20.5 trillion. 19 A $151 billion reduction in hospital revenue <mark>equates to</mark> a reduction of approximately <mark>0.7% of America’s GDP—<strong></mark>enough to turn a period of robust growth into sluggish growth, or to <mark>tip</mark> a period of <mark>sluggish growth into recession</strong></mark>. </u>2. In 2018, the United States created a total of just fewer than 2.7 million jobs. 20 Reductions in hospital employment on the magnitude outlined in the JAMA study would erase between one-third and one-half of that job growth. 3. As of 2018, spending on hospital care ($1.19 trillion) equaled less than one-third (32.7%) of total health spending of $3.65 trillion. 21 Extending the 15-25% payment reductions projected for the hospital sector to physician care ($728 billion in spending in 2018) and other sectors of health care will only magnify the effects on the broader economy. The evidence strongly suggests that payment reductions on the magnitude single payer contemplates could result in millions of job losses, over and above those associated with eradicating the private insurance sector, and lead the economy into a recession.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Columbia Law 17 (This report is the product of a collaboration between the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict. At the Columbia Human Rights Clinic, research and authorship includes: Naureen Shah, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Rashmi Chopra, J.D. ‘13, Janine Morna, J.D. ‘12, Chantal Grut, L.L.M. ‘12, Emily Howie, L.L.M. ‘12, Daniel Mule, J.D. ‘13, Zoe Hutchinson, L.L.M. ‘12, Max Abbott, J.D. ‘12. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict., https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf “THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS”, accessed 9/6/18, jmg) fulltext: Although intended to provide assurance, the analogy to business regulation is disconcerting. It suggests that rather than seeing itself as duty-bound to the law and culturally invested in its rationales, the agency relates to the law as a constraint that may undermine the agency’s goals if not carefully managed, and perhaps, in some cases, circumvented. Even in accounts favorable to the CIA, the CIA’s relationship to the law is discussed only in terms of avoiding liability and political fall-out for actions that might, if revealed, be perceived as illegal even if technically legal. There is no allusion to a concern for whether actions, though technically legal, might offend the purposes and values of the law, or brush up too closely to their limits to be appropriate. For example, Jack Goldsmith, former lawyer in the Bush administration, writes that the CIA’s 150 or so lawyers “help operators sort through the cognitive dissonance that arises from the twin injunctions to violate some laws and norms but not others.” According to Goldsmith, these lawyers “provide comfort that whatever other fallout might occur from their CIA activities, operators needn’t worry about violating what to them often felt like bewildering US legal restrictions.” In any event, “everyone in the CIA knows that trouble follows from violating US law” and people “are watching for violations and can impose various types of legal or political punishment if they find one.”304 Likewise, former CIA lawyer Afsheen John Radsan conjectures that the CIA has sought legal approval for its drone strikes because “[t] he CIA, we know is accustomed to checking off the boxes in its paperwork” and is “[m]indful of their potential legal exposure on targeted killing.”305 To be sure, recent accounts of the CIA’s torture and secret detention programs under the Bush administration reflect that CIA personnel are deeply concerned with liability and public perception. CIA personnel aggressively sought clearance from agency lawyers and others in the Bush administration for the detention and torture programs—and, for the most part, received approval. John Rizzo, a leading CIA lawyer at the time, reportedly advised the CIA to tell as many people as possible about the programs to minimize political fall-out and maximize political support.306 In internal debates at the CIA, Rizzo notes: “I never heard— and I think I would have heard—any dissent, any moral objection,” to the programs.307 The CIA’s concern with legal liability and exposure is unsurprising given the agency’s history as a covert spy agency. But it contrasts with the military’s engagement with complex legal questions and outsider perspectives that we previously discussed. If CIA lawyers sometimes push the agency to grapple with humanitarian and ethical norms underlying the law, they have provided no inkling of that to the public. They do not engage with outside experts or academics; top CIA lawyer Stephen Preston’s speeches, noted above, are the only exceptions of which we are aware. International law—particularly the laws of war—would require the CIA to take steps to reduce civilian harm in using force, but observers debate whether the CIA sees itself as bound by it. The statements of government officials have been ambiguous.308 In a major address, Preston described the CIA’s compliance with international law “principles”—as opposed to “rules” or treaty provisions. (To be fair, the same can be said of remarks by his counterparts at other agencies.309) Some observers speculate that the CIA interprets statutory provision 50 USC section 413b(a)(5)—which prohibits the president from authorizing “any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States”—as freeing the CIA from international law obligations, since it omits mention of them.310 A US Army colonel notes that the Department of Defense “is legally bound to execute its military operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict”; “the CIA, however, is under no similar requirement regarding international law.”311 Accounts of the CIA’s lawyering practices describe adherence to US law, but seldom mention international law. According to Goldsmith: These operators spend their days and nights on deceptive and deceitful tasks that violate foreign and some international laws as well as everyday ethics. They are constantly reminded that whatever other rules and laws they must violate in their work, they must not violate US law.312 Beyond the question of obligation to abide by international laws, the agency does not have an institutional history of engaging in a process that military lawyers and scholars refer to as “operationalizing” the law. The process includes applying treaty provisions and rules applicable to a given situation even when, as a technical matter, they do not unambiguously apply.313 It involves an understanding and appreciation of underlying norms and values, and cognizance of a range of sources—such as military handbooks, rules of engagement, and the best practices of militaries over time. Operationalizing the law is not merely a matter of following clear rules; this is especially true in the context of US operations aimed at alQaeda and its affiliates, which call for commanders to apply “traditional legal concepts to complex and ever-changing circumstances.”314 The covert drone strikes context compounds the complexity. The CIA is a relative novice in the field of the laws of war. According to former CIA lawyer Afsheen John Radsan: “On 9/11, there were far more lawyers who knew the details of the Geneva conventions at the defence department (and at the state department) than at CIA.”315 Whereas conventional military forces benefit from extensive Judge Advocate General training programs and established international law departments like the Naval War College’s, the CIA General Counsel’s office does not appear to benefit from similar structures—unless such institutions exist secretly. Nor do CIA lawyers benefit from open debate or engagement with academic communities or civil society. Given the rapid expansion of CIA involvement in drone strikes, some observers speculate that the CIA may consult the military on its targeting procedures, and the Department of Defense and the State Department about international law application generally.316 Yet the CIA’s relative inexperience with targeting decisions and international law questions cannot completely be compensated for by borrowing lawyers and protocols. In complex and uncertain situations where time is of the essence, decision-makers must fall back on their experience and specific training, as well as the sophisticated analysis provided by seasoned lawyers. CIA lawyers working alongside drone operators have no doubt acquired considerable on-the-job experience, but this is not assuring in the absence of any disclosure about their training, understanding of the laws of war or independence. In contrast, uniformed military lawyers “describe a strong sense of commitment to [law of war] rules and the values that underlie them”317 and are part of an independent chain of command, bolstering their objectivity and ability to adhere to the law without prejudice.318 As one judge advocate put it, the military lawyer’s role is “not like an inspector general but rather an internal conscience.”319 While CIA lawyers may be effective at describing law of war constraints to CIA decisionmakers, we do not know whether they have internalized the rules and perceive a duty to ensure that operations conform with the law’s underlying values in situations where the law is not technically applicable. In light of the legal complexity of the covert drone context, there is a risk that decision-makers at the CIA might conduct strikes relying on a gap or ambiguity in the law, with CIA lawyers unable or unwilling to exert countervailing pressure. Again, our concern is rooted in the CIA’s secrecy, including its failure to make public key manuals and guidances on law of war application, as the military has often done. We have described the CIA as motivated by a fear of scandal or legal liability. In the covert drone strikes context, these pressures to minimize civilian harm and ensure accountability are lacking, particularly because of significant public and congressional support for the program. The CIA portrays itself—rightly or wrongly—as fully capable and expert at fulfilling its drone strikes mission, but claims secrecy is necessary to protect national security. The agency’s refusal to share information forecloses effective litigation and prevents informed public debate.320 Instead, the CIA has fended off criticism through anonymous leaks to the press— a forum in which its claims cannot be actively questioned. In leaks, the CIA has not only pressed its claim that drone strikes are “extremely precise and effective,”321 it has also sought to discredit some journalists and human rights advocates who have documented civilian deaths, suggesting they are complicit in an effort to “help al-Qaeda succeed” or that they “unwittingly draw on false propaganda claims by militants.”322 Taken together, this disclosure/non-disclosure has allowed the CIA to put forward its claims without having to engage meaningfully with criticism.323<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Legal Liability is the only effective way to stop circumvention – It produces CIA change </h4><p><strong>Columbia Law 17</strong> (This report is the product of a collaboration between the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict. At the Columbia Human Rights Clinic, research and authorship includes: Naureen Shah, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Rashmi Chopra, J.D. ‘13, Janine Morna, J.D. ‘12, Chantal Grut, L.L.M. ‘12, Emily Howie, L.L.M. ‘12, Daniel Mule, J.D. ‘13, Zoe Hutchinson, L.L.M. ‘12, Max Abbott, J.D. ‘12. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict., https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf “THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS”, accessed 9/6/18, jmg)</p><p>Although intended to provide assurance, the analogy to business regulation is disconcerting. It suggests that rather than seeing itself as duty-bound to the law and culturally invested in its rationales, the agency relates to the law as a constraint that may undermine the agency’s goals if not carefully managed, and perhaps, in some cases, circumvented. <u><strong>Even in accounts favorable to the CIA</u></strong>, <u><strong>the <mark>CIA’s relationship to the law is discussed only in </mark>terms of <mark>avoiding liability</u></strong></mark> and political fall-out for actions <u><strong>that</u></strong> might, <u><strong>if revealed</u></strong>, <u><strong>be perceived as illegal even if technically legal</u></strong>. There is no allusion to a concern for whether actions, though technically legal, might offend the purposes and values of the law, or brush up too closely to their limits to be appropriate. For example, Jack Goldsmith, former lawyer in the Bush administration, writes that the <u><strong><mark>CIA’s</mark> 150 or so <mark>lawyers</u></strong></mark> “help operators sort through the cognitive dissonance that arises from the twin injunctions to violate some laws and norms but not others.” According to Goldsmith, these lawyers “<u><strong><mark>provide comfort</u></strong></mark> that whatever other fallout might occur from their CIA activities, <u><strong><mark>operators needn’t worry about violating </mark>what to them often felt like bewildering <mark>US legal restriction</u></strong></mark>s.” In any event, “everyone in the CIA knows that trouble follows from violating US law” and people “are watching for violations and can impose various types of legal or political punishment if they find one.”304 Likewise, former CIA lawyer Afsheen John Radsan conjectures that the CIA has sought legal approval for its drone strikes because “[t] he CIA, we know is accustomed to checking off the boxes in its paperwork” and is “[m]indful of their potential legal exposure on targeted killing.”305 To be sure, recent accounts of the CIA’s torture and secret detention programs under the Bush administration reflect that CIA personnel are deeply concerned with liability and public perception. CIA personnel aggressively sought clearance from agency lawyers and others in the Bush administration for the detention and torture programs—and, for the most part, received approval. John Rizzo, a leading CIA lawyer at the time, reportedly advised the CIA to tell as many people as possible about the programs to minimize political fall-out and maximize political support.306 In internal debates at the CIA, Rizzo notes: “I never heard— and I think I would have heard—any dissent, any moral objection,” to the programs.307 The CIA’s concern with legal liability and exposure is unsurprising given the agency’s history as a covert spy agency. But it contrasts with the military’s engagement with complex legal questions and outsider perspectives that we previously discussed. <u><strong><mark>If CIA lawyers</u></strong></mark> sometimes push the agency to <u><strong><mark>grapple with</u></strong></mark> humanitarian and ethical <u><strong><mark>norms</u></strong></mark> underlying the law, <u><strong><mark>they have provided no inkling of that to the public</u></strong></mark>. They do not engage with outside experts or academics; top CIA lawyer Stephen Preston’s speeches, noted above, are the only exceptions of which we are aware. International law—particularly the laws of war—would require the CIA to take steps to reduce civilian harm in using force, but observers debate whether the CIA sees itself as bound by it. The statements of government officials have been ambiguous.308 In a major address, Preston described the CIA’s compliance with international law “principles”—as opposed to “rules” or treaty provisions. (To be fair, the same can be said of remarks by his counterparts at other agencies.309) Some observers speculate that the <u><strong>CIA interprets</u></strong> statutory provision <u><strong>50 USC section</u></strong> 413b(a)(5)—which prohibits the president from authorizing “any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States”—<u><strong>as freeing the CIA from international law obligations</u></strong>, since it omits mention of them.310 A US Army colonel notes that the Department of Defense “is legally bound to execute its military operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict”; “the CIA, however, is under no similar requirement regarding international law.”311 Accounts of the CIA’s lawyering practices describe adherence to US law, but seldom mention international law. According to Goldsmith: These operators spend their days and nights on deceptive and deceitful tasks that violate foreign and some international laws as well as everyday ethics. They are constantly reminded that whatever other rules and laws they must violate in their work, they must not violate US law.312 Beyond the question of obligation to abide by international laws, the agency does not have an institutional history of engaging in a process that military lawyers and scholars refer to as “operationalizing” the law. The process includes applying treaty provisions and rules applicable to a given situation even when, as a technical matter, they do not unambiguously apply.313 It involves an understanding and appreciation of underlying norms and values, and cognizance of a range of sources—such as military handbooks, rules of engagement, and the best practices of militaries over time. Operationalizing the law is not merely a matter of following clear rules; this is especially true in the context of US operations aimed at alQaeda and its affiliates, which call for commanders to apply “traditional legal concepts to complex and ever-changing circumstances.”314 The covert drone strikes context compounds the complexity. The CIA is a relative novice in the field of the laws of war. According to former CIA lawyer Afsheen John Radsan: “On 9/11, there were far more lawyers who knew the details of the Geneva conventions at the defence department (and at the state department) than at CIA.”315 Whereas conventional military forces benefit from extensive Judge Advocate General training programs and established international law departments like the Naval War College’s, the CIA General Counsel’s office does not appear to benefit from similar structures—unless such institutions exist secretly. Nor do CIA lawyers benefit from open debate or engagement with academic communities or civil society. Given the rapid expansion of CIA involvement in drone strikes, some observers speculate that the CIA may consult the military on its targeting procedures, and the Department of Defense and the State Department about international law application generally.316 Yet the <u><strong>CIA’s relative inexperience with targeting decisions</u></strong> and international law questions <u><strong>cannot</u></strong> completely <u><strong>be compensated for by borrowing lawyers</u></strong> and protocols. In complex and uncertain situations where time is of the essence, decision-makers must fall back on their experience and specific training, as well as the sophisticated analysis provided by seasoned lawyers. CIA lawyers working alongside drone operators have no doubt acquired considerable on-the-job experience, but this is not assuring in the absence of any disclosure about their training, understanding of the laws of war or independence. <u><strong>In contrast,</u></strong> uniformed <u><strong><mark>military lawyers</u></strong></mark> “<u><strong><mark>describe a strong sense of commitment to</mark> [law of war] <mark>rules and</mark> the <mark>values that underlie them</u></strong></mark>”317 and are <u><strong>part of an independent chain of command</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>bolstering their</u></strong></mark> objectivity and <u><strong><mark>ability to adhere to the law without prejudice</u></strong></mark>.318 As one judge advocate put it, the military lawyer’s role is “not like an inspector general but rather an internal conscience.”319 While CIA lawyers may be effective at describing law of war constraints to CIA decisionmakers, we do not know whether they have internalized the rules and perceive a duty to ensure that operations conform with the law’s underlying values in situations where the law is not technically applicable. In light of the legal complexity of the covert drone context, <u><strong>there is a risk that decision-makers at the <mark>CIA might conduct strikes relying on</mark> a gap or <mark>ambiguity</mark> in the law</u></strong>, with CIA lawyers unable or unwilling to exert countervailing pressure. Again, <u><strong>our <mark>concern is rooted in the CIA’s secrecy</u></strong></mark>, including its failure to make public key manuals and guidances on law of war application, as the military has often done. <u><strong>We have described the <mark>CIA</mark> as <mark>motivated by a fear</mark> <mark>of</u></strong></mark> scandal or <u><strong><mark>legal liability</u></strong></mark>. In the covert drone strikes context, these pressures to minimize civilian harm and ensure accountability are lacking, particularly because of significant public and congressional support for the program. <u><strong>The <mark>CIA</u></strong></mark> portrays itself—rightly or wrongly—as fully capable and expert at fulfilling its drone strikes mission, but <u><strong><mark>claims secrecy is necessary to protect national security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The <mark>agency’s refusal to share information forecloses</mark> effective <mark>litigation </mark>and prevents informed public debate</u></strong>.320 Instead, the CIA has fended off criticism through anonymous leaks to the press— a forum in which its claims cannot be actively questioned. In leaks, the CIA has not only pressed its claim that drone strikes are “extremely precise and effective,”321 it has also sought to discredit some journalists and human rights advocates who have documented civilian deaths, suggesting they are complicit in an effort to “help al-Qaeda succeed” or that they “unwittingly draw on false propaganda claims by militants.”322 Taken together, this disclosure/non-disclosure has allowed the CIA to put forward its claims without having to engage meaningfully with criticism.323</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Escalante 18, Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. Forgenews, “Against Electorpace apalism, For Dual Power!” 2018. https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/ brett fulltext: Lenin argues that we must understand the state as an institution which emerges out of class struggle. The ruling class cannot simply secure their rule through immediate seizure of private property. The capitalist class, for example, relies upon a whole host of state institutions to maintain its position as the ruling class. Police, armies, and various other state agencies maintain property relations and protect the power of the ruling class. The proletariat, of course, greatly outnumber the bourgeoisie. As a result of this, the ruling class requires state power. Lenin summarizes this succinctly: “ The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonism objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.” The state exists because the ruling class and the subjugated class cannot exist in harmony. Class struggle is consistently being waged in a non revolutionary manner within capitalist society. Workers unionize, police break strikes. The struggle continues and the ruling class uses the state to wage it. This insight allowed Lenin to realize that the bourgeois state cannot be a venue for achieving socialist gains. If the state exists precisely to ensure the domination of the capitalist class, then the socialists working within the state will necessarily have to bend to the will of the capitalists or be expelled from the state. This insight can explain the shift in Ocasio’s rhetoric from (admittedly tepid) socialist ideas to standard democratic party bourgeois politics. Upon gaining enternece into the institutions of the bourgeois state, Ocasio was immediately faced with a decision: hold her ground as a socialist and be incapable of functioning within state machinery designed to crush socialism, or continue to call herself a socialist while adopting the politics of the bourgeoisie. It is obvious which decision Ocasio has made. Lenin was profoundly aware of these limits and forced compromises which working within the bourgeois state requires. As a result, Lenin and the Bolsheviks argued against working with the provisional government, and instead argued for its overthrow. Lenin wrote: “ all previous revolutions perfected the state machine, whereas it must be broken, smashed.” If we, as socialists, truly fight for a classless world, we must smash the mechanisms which ensure class domination. We must smash the bourgeois state. This realization led the Bolsheviks to reject the opportunism of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Menshiviks in the Soviets and they chose to overthrow the provisional government themselves. Shockingly, their revolution was successful. After months of compromise, the workers had grown tired of the opportunist bourgeois socialists. They had seen that the dual power of the soviets and the provisional government was not tenable. One side had to take unitary power. Most importantly, the workers saw that the bourgeois government had done nothing for them: it had smashed their printing presses, it had crushed their demonstrations, it had broken their strikes. Of course, it could do nothing else, the bourgeois state is designed to do precisely this. The events of October, 1917 ought to have concretely proven that the strategy of infiltrating the bourgeois government is untenable. Lenin and the Bolsheviks proved that the workers are willing to throw the bourgeois state away in favor of a dictatorship of the proletariat. And yet, here we are 111 years later and large factions of the largest socialist organization in the United States echo the cowardly and worthless drivelings of the Menshiviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. Dual Power Today I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success. To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state. What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers. The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense. In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it. And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers. And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us? The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare. And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power. Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs? The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power. The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time. The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people. And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The alternative is the communist party. Democratic-centralist dual power organizing builds support to overthrow capitalism BUT wasting energy trades off.</h4><p><strong>Escalante 18</strong>, Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. Forgenews, “Against Electorpace apalism, For Dual Power!” 2018. https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/<u> brett</p><p></u>Lenin argues that <u>we must understand <mark>the state</mark> as an institution which <mark>emerges out of class struggle</u></mark>. <u><mark>The ruling class</mark> cannot simply secure their rule through immediate seizure of private property</u>. The capitalist class, for example, <u><mark>relies upon</mark> a whole host of <mark>state institutions</mark> to maintain its position as the ruling class. Police, armies, and various other state agencies maintain property relations and protect the power of the ruling class. The proletariat, of course, greatly outnumber the bourgeoisie. As a result of this, the ruling class requires state power.</p><p></u>Lenin summarizes this succinctly: “ <u>The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonism objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.”</p><p>The state exists because the ruling class and the subjugated class cannot exist in harmony. Class struggle is consistently being waged in a non revolutionary manner within capitalist society. Workers unionize, police break strikes. The struggle continues and the ruling class uses the state to wage it. This insight allowed Lenin to realize that <strong><mark>the bourgeois state cannot be a venue for achieving socialist gains</strong></mark>. If the state exists precisely to ensure the domination of the capitalist class, then the socialists working within the state will necessarily have to bend to the will of the capitalists or be expelled from the state.</p><p>This insight can explain the shift in Ocasio’s rhetoric from (admittedly tepid) socialist ideas to standard democratic party bourgeois politics. Upon gaining enternece into the institutions of the bourgeois state, Ocasio was immediately faced with a decision: hold her ground as a socialist and be incapable of functioning within state machinery designed to crush socialism, or continue to call herself a socialist while adopting the politics of the bourgeoisie. It is obvious which decision Ocasio has made.</p><p></u>Lenin was profoundly aware of these limits and forced compromises which working within the bourgeois state requires. As a result, Lenin and the Bolsheviks argued against working with the provisional government, and instead argued for its overthrow. Lenin wrote: “ <u>all previous revolutions perfected the state machine, whereas it must be broken, smashed.”</p><p></u>If we, as socialists, truly fight for a classless world, we must smash the mechanisms which ensure class domination. We must smash the bourgeois state.</p><p>This realization led the Bolsheviks to reject the opportunism of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Menshiviks in the Soviets and they chose to overthrow the provisional government themselves. Shockingly, their revolution was successful. After months of compromise, the workers had grown tired of the opportunist bourgeois socialists. They had seen that the dual power of the soviets and the provisional government was not tenable. One side had to take unitary power. Most importantly, the workers saw that the bourgeois government had done nothing for them: it had smashed their printing presses, it had crushed their demonstrations, it had broken their strikes. Of course, it could do nothing else, the bourgeois state is designed to do precisely this.</p><p>The events of October, 1917 ought to have concretely proven that the strategy of infiltrating the bourgeois government is untenable. Lenin and the Bolsheviks proved that the workers are willing to throw the bourgeois state away in favor of a dictatorship of the proletariat. And yet, here we are 111 years later and large factions of the largest socialist organization in the United States echo the cowardly and worthless drivelings of the Menshiviks and Socialist Revolutionaries.</p><p>Dual Power Today</p><p>I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success.</p><p>To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state.</p><p>What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of <u><strong><mark>institutions and councils</strong></mark> which <mark>met the needs of the workers</u></mark>. The soviets, <u><mark>a parallel socialist government</u></mark> made up of individual councils, successfully <u><mark>took over</u></mark> many <u><mark>governmental responsibilities</u></mark> in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense.</p><p>In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it <u><strong><mark>to build dual power</u></strong></mark>. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it.</p><p>And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.</p><p>And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?</p><p>The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want <u><strong><mark>to win small changes</u></strong></mark> that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare.</p><p>And do this, we reply: <u><strong><mark>what makes you think reformism is the only way</u></strong></mark> to do this. <u><mark>When</u></mark> the bourgeois state in <u><mark>California</u></mark> was happy to <u><mark>let black children go to school unfed</u></mark>, <u><mark>the Black Panthers</u></mark> didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they <u><strong><mark>became militant</u></strong></mark> and fed the children themselves. <u><strong><mark>In the 40s</u></strong></mark> and 50s, <u><mark>socialists</mark> in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to <strong><mark>provide healthcare directly</u></strong></mark>. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.</p><p><u><mark>Imagine if</mark> all <mark>those hours</u></mark> the DSA <u><mark>poured into electing Ocasio were</u></mark> instead <u><mark>used to feed the people of New York</u></mark>, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. <u><mark>Imagine the masses seeing socialism</mark> not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but <mark>as a concrete movement</mark> which is <strong><mark>currently meeting their needs</strong></mark>?</p><p></u>The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.</p><p>The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time.</p><p>The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: <u><strong><mark>there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. <u>Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.</p><p></u>And so, <u><mark>we should commit to</mark> undertake the difficult</u> and dangerous <u>task of <mark>building dual power</u></mark>. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Stephen J. Cimbala 15. Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State. The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy. 59-63. fulltext: Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow, the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was very real during the Cold War. This legacy has carried forward into the post-Cold War and twenty-first century world. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an unforeseen combination of human and technical factors, pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding war. The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately, inside dope on the opponent’s political thinking and military planning may be hard to come by, under the exigent pressures of crisis. Therefore, states may infer the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces, from the behavior of its command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or from guesswork based on past experience. For example: during Able Archer 83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18 Another example of the difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them. A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion. The Future: Issues of Concern If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies: including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.20 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Goes nuclear. </h4><p>Stephen J. <strong>Cimbala</strong> <strong>15</strong>. Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State. The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy. 59-63. </p><p>Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow, <u>the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was very real during the Cold War.</u> <u>This</u> legacy <u>has carried forward into the post-Cold War and twenty-first century world</u>. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. <u>Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an unforeseen combination of human and technical factors</u>, pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding war. The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately, <u>inside dope on the opponent’s political thinking and military planning may be hard to come by</u>, <u><mark>under the</mark> exigent <strong><mark>pressures of crisis</u></strong></mark>. Therefore, <u>states may infer the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces</u>, from <u>the behavior of its command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or from guesswork based on past experience</u>. For example: during Able Archer 83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18 Another example of the difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them. A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion. The Future: Issues of Concern <u>If the possibility existed of a <strong><mark>mistaken preemption</strong></mark> during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter <mark>of</mark> even more <mark>concern</mark> with regard to states <mark>with</mark> newer and more <mark>opaque</mark> forces and command <mark>systems</u></mark>. In addition, <u>the Americans and</u> Soviets (and then <u>Russians</u>) <u>had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military</u> operational <u>proclivities and</u> doctrinal <u>idiosyncrasies</u>: including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. <u>Future threats</u> to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction <u>may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis</u>. <u>The <mark>spread </mark>of nuclear weapons <mark>in Asia</u></mark> (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) <u>presents a <strong>complicated mosaic of possibilities</strong> in this regard</u>. <u>States <mark>with</u></mark> nuclear forces of <u><strong><mark>variable force structure</strong>, <strong>operational experience</strong>, and <strong>command-control systems</strong> will be</mark> thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and cultural cross-currents <mark>contributory to</mark> the possibility of <strong><mark>war</strong></mark>.</u> In addition to the existing nuclear powers <u>in Asia, <mark>others</mark> may <mark>seek</mark> <strong>nuclear <mark>weapons</strong> if</mark> they feel <mark>threatened</u></mark> by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, <u>the present century is <strong><mark>unlikely</strong> to see</mark> the nuclear hesitancy or risk <mark>aversion</mark> that marked the Cold War</u>: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because <u><mark>states</mark> in Asia <mark>have</mark> new <strong><mark>aspirations</strong> for</mark> regional or global <mark>respect</mark>.</u>20 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems <u>in Asia</u>, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because <u>plausible <mark>adversaries</mark> live close together and <mark>are <strong>already engaged</strong> in</mark> ongoing <mark>disputes</mark> about territory or other issues</u>. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. <u>The <strong><mark>short flight times</strong></mark> of ballistic missiles</u> between the cities or military forces of contiguous states <u><mark>means</mark> that very <mark>little time</mark> will be available <mark>for warning and</mark> attack <mark>assessment</mark> by the defender</u>. <u><mark>Conventional</mark>ly armed <mark>missiles </mark>could easily be <strong><mark>mistaken</strong> for</mark> a</u> tactical <u><mark>nuclear</mark> first use</u>. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, <u>potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have <strong><mark>first strike vulnerable</strong> forces</mark> and command-control systems that <strong><mark>increase decision pressures</strong> for rapid</mark>, and possibly mistaken, <mark>retaliation</u></mark>. <u>This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation</u> on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, <u>spreading nuclear</u> and other <u>weapons</u> of mass destruction in Asia<u> could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction</u> from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 <u>This would profoundly shake up prognostications </u>to the effect <u>that wars of mass destruction are now passé</u>, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Farr 02, Arnold (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. [recut by Lex CH] fulltext: One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>3] Kantian theory has the best tools for fighting oppression as everyone is equal </h4><p><strong>Farr 02</strong>, Arnold (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. [recut by Lex CH]</p><p>One of the most popular criticisms of <u><strong><mark>Kant’s</u></strong></mark> moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the <u><strong><mark>universal and</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>concrete</u></strong></mark> is a valid distinction, the <u><strong><mark>unity</u></strong></mark> of the two <u><strong><mark>is required</u></strong></mark> for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that <u><strong><mark>I cannot simply satisfy</u></strong></mark> my <u><strong><mark>desires without considering</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>rightness</u></strong></mark> or wrongness of my actions suggests that my <u><strong><mark>empirical character must be</u></strong></mark> held <u><strong><mark>in check</u></strong></mark> by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate <u><strong><mark>principles</u></strong></mark> that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula <u><strong><mark>of Universal Law</u></strong></mark> enjoins no more than <mark>that <u><strong>we act only on maxims that are open to others also</u></strong></mark>.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. <u><strong><mark>The individual is</u></strong> <u><strong>not allowed to exclude others</u></strong> as rational</mark> moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the <u><strong><mark>abstraction</u></strong></mark> requirement may be best understood <u><strong><mark>as a demand for intersubjectivity</u></strong></mark> or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt <u><strong><mark>to avoid ethical egoism</u></strong></mark> in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. <u><strong><mark>To avoid</u></strong></mark> ethical <u><strong><mark>egoism one must abstract from</u></strong></mark> (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and <u><strong><mark>subjective maxims</u></strong>. </mark>That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is <u><strong><mark>that</u></strong></mark> it <u><strong>contravenes <mark>racist ideology</u></strong></mark> to the extent that racist ideology is based <u><strong><mark>on the use of persons</u></strong></mark> of a different race <u><strong><mark>as a means to an end</u></strong></mark> rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What <u><strong><mark>deconstruction will reveal</u></strong> i</mark>s not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the <u><strong><mark>disunity</u></strong></mark> between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, <u><strong><mark>Kant</u></strong></mark> the <mark>man <u><strong>has his own</u></strong></mark> personal and moral <u><strong><mark>problems</u></strong></mark>. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, <u><strong><mark>it would be equally deplorable to reject</u></strong></mark> the categorical imperative <u><strong><mark>without ﬁrst exploring</u></strong> its <u><strong>emancipatory potential</u></strong></mark>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: H.S. Hiim 18, Oslo PhD, “Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” Asian Security, 14.3, Taylor and Francis fulltext: Issue-Linkage and nonproliferation How can nonproliferation policy translate into a source of leverage for China over the United States? In essence, China has engaged in issue-linkage as a bargaining tactic. By linking its policy on nonproliferation to other, initially unrelated issues – such as US policy toward Taiwan – China has sought to enhance its bargaining leverage. This bargaining approach conforms to what Ernst Haas has defined as tactical issue-linkage, namely “introducing into the agenda of multilateral negotiations items that are not connected by any intellectual coherence at all” in order to obtain greater bargaining leverage.7 The question of issue-linkage has received increasing attention during the last decades, partly because of what some have termed the issue-proliferation in international politics.8 The politics of linkage has often been associated with neoliberal theories, as issue-proliferation is a key tenet of interdependence.9 It has also often been seen as a primarily positive mechanism that facilitates cooperation. In Haas’ view, for example, positive inducements such as promises of side-payments can lead to cooperation in an initially unrelated area. Such bargaining can take place within international regimes.10 However, issue-linkage is no recent invention, and it is just as much – or perhaps even more – a phenomenon of realist international politics.11 That states have multiple goals, which facilitates issue-linkage, is not at odds with realist theories.12 Moreover, issue-linkage strategies do not necessarily take the form of positive inducements but can also be used for blackmail and threats.13 There are numerous examples of what may be termed realist applications of issue-linkage. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon made extensive use of linkage in their diplomacy towards the Soviet Union, for example, by making cooperation on arms control contingent on Soviet behavior towards the settlement of the Vietnam War.14 China, which arguably is a quintessentially realist actor, has also made use of linkage strategies in its foreign policy in other areas besides nonproliferation policy.15 For example, Krista Wiegand has demonstrated how China has used the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands territorial conflict to compel Japan to change its policy in other, unrelated areas.16 Several scholars make an analytical separation between issue-linkage as a condition and a bargaining strategy. For example, Robert Art refers to “functional” and “artificial” linkages. In case of the former, there is a causal connection between two issues. For example, the price of the dollar and the price of oil are functionally linked. In the latter case, “a statesman has made a connection where none before existed.” 17 Although this separation is analytically useful, it is important to highlight that once an initially “artificial” linkage between two issues have been made by a statesman, that linkage may stick. Upon their next encounter, even if a linkage is not communicated, a state’s counterpart may assume that it is still in place. Linkage strategies may therefore have a deterrent effect: the assumption that a linkage is in place may stay the hand of the other party. Linkage strategies may thus be used not only to compel policy shifts or extract concessions but also to deter other states from initiating unwanted policies at a later stage. A purpose of linkage politics is to transfer strength from one issue to an area where you are relatively weak.18 Bargaining strength can be defined in this context as: (a) having the ability to affect or even control an outcome (b) over which another party has significant interests. Put differently, a party can enhance its bargaining strength by having the ability to impose costs on its counterpart.19 Both of the conditions outlined are present in the case of China and nonproliferation. First, China occupies a pivotal position in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Its importance springs from two major dimensions. China is a major source of nuclear technology and materials. It is also a crucial supplier of ballistic missiles and missile technology, which are most states’ preferred means of delivery for nuclear weapons. Beijing has provided several states with nuclear and missile assistance, potentially easing their path to the bomb. More broadly, as a major player in the international system, China has a strong influence on how nonproliferation challenges are managed in arenas like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as in multilateral negotiations. Beyond its institutional role, China has provided economic, diplomatic, and military support to confirmed or suspected proliferators such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. Through these ties, China has a determining impact on whether international efforts to curb proliferation fail or succeed. Second, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a key US foreign policy objective. Although the strength of the preferences has varied across administrations and between different instances of proliferators, halting proliferation has been a key leg of US grand strategy since the dawn of the nuclear age, according to a recent study.20 If anything, preventing proliferation has only become more central to US policymakers in the post-Cold War era. With the decline of the Soviet threat, US policymakers have identified nuclear proliferation as the most significant threat facing America. After 9/11, worries about terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons exacerbated these concerns.21 The credibility and likely effectiveness of linkage strategies is dependent on the linking state’s interest in the outcome. If a state threatens to take actions that are not in its interests if the other party fails to comply on another issue, the other party may regard the threat as lacking credibility. If the action, on the other hand, is in the interest of the linking state, the linkage is likely to appear as more credible.22 As I will detail in the following, this difference is important in the case of China and its policy of linking proliferation cooperation to other policy outcomes. This linkage has been more credible in cases where China has had an interest in supporting a proliferating state (or at least been indifferent to the outcome), such as the Iran case. It has been less credible in cases where it is not in China’s interest to support the proliferating state, such as in the North Korean case. A further, related point is that credibility is enhanced if the linker follows through on its threats. Conversely, credibility is reduced if the threats are exposed as bluffs. This has arguably affected China’s linkage approach. To demonstrate that it is not bluffing, China has at several junctures followed through and impeded cooperation with the US on nonproliferation, at least partly to demonstrate that the linkage is credible. A final point worth noting is that issue-linkage is most likely to occur – or worthwhile to pursue – if your counterpart has influence over an issue where you have major interests. Put differently, if the counterpart does not have anything you want, there is no point in bargaining. However, in Sino–US relations, the US wields influence over a range of issues that are of major importance to Beijing. A crucial one is the Taiwan issue, and particularly US weapons sales to Taipei. To China, preventing Taiwanese independence is a core interest, and US arms transfers are perceived in Beijing as particularly unwelcome interferences. However, there are also several other issues that China can and has linked to nonproliferation policy. Washington’s missile defense efforts have been unwelcome in Beijing, and China has on several occasions tried to signal to the US that these efforts may lead to Chinese non-cooperation in other areas. Another example is receiving the Dalai Lama and other actions that China perceives as support of the Tibetan exile government, which Beijing sees as violating crucial national interests.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>China is the <u>key player</u> on preventing prolif – a <u>US concession on Taiwan</u> is key to <u>unlock</u> further cooperation </h4><p>H.S. <strong>Hiim 18,</strong> Oslo PhD, “Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” Asian Security, 14.3, Taylor and Francis</p><p>Issue-Linkage and nonproliferation How can <u>nonproliferation</u> policy <u>translate into a source of leverage for China over the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates? In essence, <u><mark>China</mark> has <mark>engaged </mark>in issue-linkage as a <strong>bargaining tactic</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>By linking</mark> its policy on <mark>nonprolif</mark>eration <mark>to</strong></mark> other, initially unrelated issues – such as <strong><mark>US policy toward Taiwan</strong></mark> – China has sought to enhance its bargaining leverage</u>. This bargaining approach conforms to what Ernst Haas has defined as tactical issue-linkage, namely “<u>introducing</u> into the agenda of multilateral negotiations <u>items that are not connected by any intellectual coherence at all</u>” in order to obtain greater bargaining leverage.7 The question of issue-linkage has received increasing attention during the last decades, partly because of what some have termed the issue-proliferation in international politics.8 The politics of linkage has often been associated with neoliberal theories, as issue-proliferation is a key tenet of interdependence.9 It has also often been seen as a primarily positive mechanism that facilitates cooperation. In Haas’ view, for example, positive inducements such as promises of side-payments can lead to cooperation in an initially unrelated area. Such bargaining can take place within international regimes.10 However, issue-linkage is no recent invention, and it is just as much – or perhaps even more – a phenomenon of realist international politics.11 That states have multiple goals, which facilitates issue-linkage, is not at odds with realist theories.12 Moreover, <u>issue-linkage strategies</u> do not necessarily take the form of positive inducements but <u>can also be used for <strong>blackmail</strong> and <strong>threats</u></strong>.13 There are numerous examples of what may be termed realist applications of issue-linkage. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon made extensive use of linkage in their diplomacy towards the Soviet Union, for example, by making cooperation on arms control contingent on Soviet behavior towards the settlement of the Vietnam War.14 <u>China</u>, which arguably is a quintessentially realist actor, <u>has also made use of linkage strategies in</u> its foreign policy in <u>other areas besides nonproliferation</u> policy.15 For example, Krista Wiegand has demonstrated how <u>China has used the Senkaku</u>/Diaoyu islands territorial <u>conflict to compel Japan to change its policy in other, unrelated areas</u>.16 Several scholars make an analytical separation between issue-linkage as a condition and a bargaining strategy. For example, Robert Art refers to “functional” and “artificial” linkages. In case of the former, there is a causal connection between two issues. For example, the price of the dollar and the price of oil are functionally linked. In the latter case, “a statesman has made a connection where none before existed.” 17 Although this separation is analytically useful, it is important to highlight that once an initially “artificial” linkage between two issues have been made by a statesman, that linkage may stick. Upon their next encounter, even if a linkage is not communicated, a state’s counterpart may assume that it is still in place. <u>Linkage strategies may</u> therefore <u>have a deterrent effect</u>: the assumption that a linkage is in place may stay the hand of the other party. Linkage strategies may thus be used not only to compel policy shifts or extract concessions but also to deter other states from initiating unwanted policies at a later stage. A purpose of linkage politics is to transfer strength from one issue to an area where you are relatively weak.18 Bargaining strength can be defined in this context as: (a) having the ability to affect or even control an outcome (b) over which another party has significant interests. Put differently, a party can enhance its bargaining strength by having the ability to impose costs on its counterpart.19 Both of the conditions outlined are present in the case of China and nonproliferation. First, <u><mark>China occupies a <strong>pivotal position</strong></mark> in international efforts <strong><mark>to prevent</mark> nuclear <mark>prolif</mark>eration</u></strong>. Its importance springs from two major dimensions. <u>China is <mark>a <strong>major source of nuclear tech</mark>nology and materials</strong>. It is also a crucial <mark>supplier of</mark> ballistic <mark>missiles</mark> and missile technology, which are most states’ preferred means of delivery</u> for nuclear weapons. <u><mark>Beijing has provided several states with nuclear</u></mark> and missile <u><mark>assistance</u></mark>, potentially <u><mark>easing their path to the bomb</u></mark>. More broadly, as a major player in the international system, <u><mark>China has a <strong>strong influence</strong> on how nonprolif</mark>eration <mark>challenges are managed</mark> <mark>in</mark> arenas like the</u> United Nations Security Council (<u><mark>UNSC</u></mark>) <u>and</u> the International Atomic Energy Agency (<u><mark>IAEA</u></mark>), <u>as well as in multilateral negotiations</u>. Beyond its institutional role, <u>China has provided economic, diplomatic, and military support to confirmed or suspected proliferators such as <strong>Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran</u></strong>. Through these ties, <u><mark>China has a <strong>determining impact</strong> on whether</mark> international <mark>efforts to curb prolif</mark>eration <strong><mark>fail or succeed</strong></mark>.</u> Second, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a key US foreign policy objective. Although the strength of the preferences has varied across administrations and between different instances of proliferators, halting proliferation has been a key leg of US grand strategy since the dawn of the nuclear age, according to a recent study.20 If anything, preventing proliferation has only become more central to US policymakers in the post-Cold War era. With the decline of the Soviet threat, US policymakers have identified nuclear proliferation as the most significant threat facing America. After 9/11, worries about terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons exacerbated these concerns.21 The credibility and likely effectiveness of linkage strategies is dependent on the linking state’s interest in the outcome. If a state threatens to take actions that are not in its interests if the other party fails to comply on another issue, the other party may regard the threat as lacking credibility. If the action, on the other hand, is in the interest of the linking state, the linkage is likely to appear as more credible.22 As I will detail in the following, this difference is important in the case of China and its policy of linking proliferation cooperation to other policy outcomes. <u>This linkage has been <strong>more credible</strong> in cases where China has had an interest in supporting a proliferating state</u> (or at least been indifferent to the outcome), <u>such as the Iran case</u>. It has been less credible in cases where it is not in China’s interest to support the proliferating state, such as in the North Korean case. A further, related point is that credibility is enhanced if the linker follows through on its threats. Conversely, credibility is reduced if the threats are exposed as bluffs. This has arguably affected China’s linkage approach. To demonstrate that it is not bluffing, <u>China has at several junctures followed through and impeded cooperation with the US on nonproliferation, at least partly to demonstrate that the linkage is credible</u>. A final point worth noting is that <u>issue-<mark>linkage is most likely</mark> to occur</u> – or worthwhile to pursue – <u><mark>if your counterpart has <strong>influence over</mark> an issue where you have <mark>major interests</u></strong></mark>. Put differently, if the counterpart does not have anything you want, there is no point in bargaining. However, <u>in Sino–US relations, <mark>the US wields influence over</u></mark> a range of issues that are of major importance to Beijing. A crucial one is <u><strong>the <mark>Taiwan</mark> issue</strong>, and <strong>particularly US <mark>weapons sales to Taipei</strong>. To China, <strong></mark>preventing Taiwanese independence is a core interest<mark>, and US arms transfers are</strong></mark> perceived in Beijing as particularly <strong><mark>unwelcome interferences</strong></mark>.</u> However, there are also several other issues that China can and has linked to nonproliferation policy. Washington’s missile defense efforts have been unwelcome in Beijing, and China has on several occasions tried to signal to the US that these efforts may lead to Chinese non-cooperation in other areas. Another example is receiving the Dalai Lama and other actions that China perceives as support of the Tibetan exile government, which Beijing sees as violating crucial national interests.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Adam, Karl Martin. "SETTLER COLONIALISM AND ARGUMENTS FOR OPEN BORDERS." (2018). DOA: December 8, 2022 // LHPHL fulltext: Oddly enough considering their importance in debates over global justice more generally, influential contemporary utilitarians like Peter Singer have not become prominent participants in the debate over open borders. Open borders proponents who are not utilitarians, however, bolster their other arguments with the claim that open borders would maximize utility because open borders maximize economic efficiency. The same reasons that justify free trade, they argue, also justify free movement of people to where the jobs are. Free movement of workers would ensure that skilled workers go where their skills can best be put to use and unskilled workers would work where cheap labor is most efficient maximizing production and minimizing production costs (Carens 1987, 263; Johnson 2007, 137-43; Legrain 2007, Chs. 3-4; Sager 2020, 32-3). More, as I mentioned above, provides an early Utilitarian argument for settler colonialism. What is relevant for my purposes here is that the Utopians justify their settler colonialism in part by the fact that their methods of agriculture are more productive. Because of this, the land they colonize can support both the colonists and the original inhabitants at a higher 21 standard of living than the original inhabitants enjoyed prior to the founding of the colony. So when the Utopians give the natives of nearby lands the choice between living as members of a Utopian colony or being driven out, they are offering them the chance to have a higher standard of living (More 2014, 66-7). A much more famous, and very influential argument, along the same lines was provided by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government. This argument is embedded in a larger argument in which Locke attempts to show that individual appropriation of things owned in common can be justified. Locke has argued that individual appropriation is permissible only when "enough and as good" is left for others (5.33). He then points out that cultivated land produces significantly more than uncultivated land. Therefore, when someone appropriates land and cultivates it, they increase the amount of produce available to humanity. In Locke's example, cultivated land produces ten times as much as uncultivated land, so someone who appropriates and cultivates ten acres of land produces as much from those ten acres as was originally produced from 100 acres. This means, according to Locke, that the person has in effect given 90 acres to humanity since the yield of the remaining 90 acres is now in addition to the yield from the ten cultivated acres, which produce a yield of the same quantity as the original 100 acres (5.37). He then goes on to claim that American Indian land management practices are unproductive in this way compared to European methods of land use (5.41-3). Furthermore, American Indian lands can be appropriated by anyone who will appropriate and cultivate them because American Indian lands have not been claimed by individual American Indians and are, thus, still part of the global commons. Or as he puts it, "in the beginning all the World was America" (5.49). Thus, by implication, European settlers who appropriate and cultivate American Indian land are benefiting humanity. 22 There are significant problems with Locke's overall complex argument. For one thing, it is not clear that someone who cultivates ten acres and makes them produce as much as 100 uncultivated acres has left enough and as good for others even if they have increased global production. This is because the cultivator keeps the product of the ten cultivated acres and leaves only the product of the 90 acres free to be gathered by the rest of humanity. Humanity as a whole may have more product to use in this situation, but less of the product is available to everyone except the cultivator. Of course, the rest of humanity could trade for what is now owned by the cultivator, but in many cases having to exchange something else for this product leaves them with less than when they could simply gather and hunt on the land that has now been cultivated. Perhaps more importantly, Locke offers an inconsistent position in that he recognizes that one cannot simply appropriate part of the land set aside as a commons by law in European countries. This is because this land is common to a particular community not to humanity as a whole, and members of the community must follow the law (5.35). But American Indian communities also had societal agreements that land was common to a particular community (Greer 2018, Chs. 2, 7; Jennings 1975, 67, 71, 94). If the fact that England say has reserved some land in common means that people from other political communities cannot increase the resources available to humanity by appropriating and cultivating it, then it is quite dubious to claim that people can increase the resources available to humanity by appropriating and cultivating the land held in common by American Indian communities. Abstracted from Locke's larger argumentative structure, however, his appeal to economic efficiency and to the increase in the standard of living it enables one to form a powerful argument if one is a utilitarian or regards utility as extremely important. Here, for instance, is Andrew Jackson ma[de] the economic efficiency argument by itself as a justification for settler 23 colonialism: Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has been long busily employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by one have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections. But true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one generation to make room for another... Nor is there anything in this which, upon a comprehensive view of the general interests of the human race, is to be regretted. Philanthropy could not wish to see this continent restored to the condition in which it was found by our forefathers. What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of Liberty civilization, and religion? (qtd in Richter 2003, 235-6) Now, there are many reasons to question whether open borders would in fact maximize utility. Like the benefits of "free trade," the benefits from free movement of workers might primarily go to the already wealthy, which given the diminishing marginal utility of wealth could mean that aggregate utility actually goes down. Then there are possible negative side effects of open borders. As David Miller argues, for instance, open borders could seriously harm global efforts to reduce population growth since countries have less of an interest in limiting population growth if people can easily move to a less populated country (Miller 2005, 201). More importantly for my purposes here, however, is the fact that the appeal to economic efficiency of the contemporary advocates for open borders is almost identical to the appeal to economic efficiency of Locke or Andrew Jackson. The only difference is that the contemporary version of the argument appeals to workers maximizing efficiency by moving to where the jobs are while the settler colonial variant appeals to farmers maximizing efficiency by moving to where the land is. If anything, the utilitarian argument for settler colonialism is stronger than the utilitarian argument for open borders--as I have suggested, there are many reasons to question whether open borders would in fact maximize utility, but at least aggregate utility was clearly maximized 24 when Europeans displaced American Indians and formed societies with much higher population densities.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The 1AC’s appeals to open borders for the sake of economic efficiency and population growth is rooted in displacement of the unproductive natives for the utilitarian benefit of humanity, Adam “18:</h4><p>Adam, Karl Martin. "SETTLER COLONIALISM AND ARGUMENTS FOR OPEN BORDERS." (2018). DOA: December 8, 2022 // LHPHL</p><p>Oddly enough considering their importance in debates over global justice more generally, influential contemporary utilitarians like Peter Singer have not become prominent participants in the debate over open borders. <u><strong>Open borders proponents who are not <mark>utilitarians</mark>, however, <mark>bolster</mark> <mark>their</mark> other <mark>arguments with the claim that open border</mark>s would maximize utility because open borders maximize economic efficiency. The same reasons that <mark>justify free trade</mark>, they argue, also justify <mark>free movement of people to where the jobs ar</mark>e. <mark>Free movement</mark> of workers <mark>would</mark> <mark>ensure</mark> that <mark>skilled workers go where their skills can best be put to use</mark> and unskilled workers would work where cheap labor is most efficient maximizing production and minimizing production costs</u></strong> (Carens 1987, 263; Johnson 2007, 137-43; Legrain 2007, Chs. 3-4; Sager 2020, 32-3). <u><strong>More, as I mentioned above, provides an early Utilitarian argument for settler colonialism. What is relevant for my purposes here is that <mark>the Utopians justify their settler colonialism in part by the fact that their methods of agriculture are more productive</u></strong></mark>. Because of this, the land they colonize can support both the colonists and the original inhabitants at a higher 21 standard of living than the original inhabitants enjoyed prior to the founding of the colony. <u><strong>So when the Utopians give the natives of nearby lands the choice between living as members of a Utopian colony or being driven out, they are offering them the chance to have a higher standard of living</u></strong> (More 2014, 66-7). A much more famous, and very influential argument, along the same lines was provided by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government. <u><strong>This argument is embedded in a larger argument in which Locke attempts to show that individual appropriation of things owned in common can be justified. <mark>Locke</mark> has <mark>argued</mark> that individual appropriation is permissible only when "enough and as good" is left for others</u></strong> (5.33). <u><strong>He then points out th<mark>at cultivated land produces significantly more than uncultivated land.</mark> Therefore, when someone appropriates land and cultivates it, they increase the amount of produce available to humanity</u></strong>. In Locke's example, cultivated land produces ten times as much as uncultivated land, so someone who appropriates and cultivates ten acres of land produces as much from those ten acres as was originally produced from 100 acres. This means, according to Locke, that the person has in effect given 90 acres to humanity since the yield of the remaining 90 acres is now in addition to the yield from the ten cultivated acres, which produce a yield of the same quantity as the original 100 acres (5.37). <u><strong><mark>He then goes on to claim that American Indian land management practices are unproductive</mark> in this way compared to European methods of land use (5.41-3). Furthermore, <mark>American Indian lands can be appropriated by anyone who will appropriate and cultivate them</mark> because American Indian lands have not been claimed by individual American Indians and are, thus, still part of the global commons</u></strong>. Or as he puts it, "in the beginning all the World was America" (5.49). <u><strong>Thus, by implication, European settlers who appropriate and cultivate American Indian land are benefiting humanity</u></strong>. 22 There are significant problems with Locke's overall complex argument. For one thing, it is not clear that someone who cultivates ten acres and makes them produce as much as 100 uncultivated acres has left enough and as good for others even if they have increased global production. This is because the cultivator keeps the product of the ten cultivated acres and leaves only the product of the 90 acres free to be gathered by the rest of humanity. Humanity as a whole may have more product to use in this situation, but less of the product is available to everyone except the cultivator. Of course, the rest of humanity could trade for what is now owned by the cultivator, but in many cases having to exchange something else for this product leaves them with less than when they could simply gather and hunt on the land that has now been cultivated. <u><strong>Perhaps more importantly, Locke offers an inconsistent position in that he recognizes that one cannot simply appropriate part of the land set aside as a commons by law in European countries. This is because this land is common to a particular community not to humanity as a whole, and members of the community must follow the law (5.35). But <mark>American Indian communities</mark> also h<mark>ad societal agreements that land was common to a particular community</u></strong></mark> (Greer 2018, Chs. 2, 7; Jennings 1975, 67, 71, 94). If the fact that England say has reserved some land in common means that people from other political communities cannot increase the resources available to humanity by appropriating and cultivating it, then it is quite dubious to claim that people can increase the resources available to humanity by appropriating and cultivating the land held in common by American Indian communities. <u><strong>Abstracted from Locke's larger argumentative structure, however, his <mark>appeal to economic efficiency</mark> <mark>and to the increase in the standard of living it enables one to form a powerful argument if one is a utilitarian</mark> or regards utility as extremely important.</u></strong> Here, for instance, is Andrew Jackson ma[de] the economic efficiency argument by itself as a justification for settler 23 colonialism: Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has been long busily employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by one have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections. But true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one generation to make room for another... Nor is there anything in this which, upon a comprehensive view of the general interests of the human race, is to be regretted. Philanthropy could not wish to see this continent restored to the condition in which it was found by our forefathers. <u><strong>What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of Liberty civilization, and religion? (qtd in Richter 2003, 235-6)</u></strong> Now, there are many reasons to question whether open borders would in fact maximize utility. Like the benefits of "free trade," the benefits from free movement of workers might primarily go to the already wealthy, which given the diminishing marginal utility of wealth could mean that aggregate utility actually goes down. <u><strong>Then there are possible negative side effects of open borders. As David Miller argues, for instance, open borders could seriously harm global efforts to reduce population growth since countries have less of an interest in limiting population growth if people can easily move to a less populated country</u></strong> (Miller 2005, 201). <u><strong>More importantly for my purposes here, however, is the fact that the <mark>appeal to economic efficiency</mark> of the contemporary advocates for open borders <mark>is</mark> almost <mark>identical to</mark> the appeal to economic efficiency of Locke or <mark>Andrew Jackson</u></strong></mark>. The only difference is that the contemporary version of the argument appeals to workers maximizing efficiency by moving to where the jobs are while the settler colonial variant appeals to farmers maximizing efficiency by moving to where the land is. If anything, the utilitarian argument for settler colonialism is stronger than the utilitarian argument for open borders--as I have suggested, there are many reasons to question whether open borders would in fact maximize utility, <u><strong>but at least aggregate utility was clearly maximized 24 when Europeans displaced American Indians and formed societies with much higher population densities.</u></strong> </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Moten & Harney 9 – Fred Moten, professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa, and Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 2009 (“Policy and Planning” Social Text 100 • Vol. 27, No. 3 • Fall 2009 Pages 182-186) fulltext: Policy is correction. Policy distinguishes itself from planning by distinguishing those who dwell in policy and x things, from those who dwell in planning and must be xed. This is the first rule of policy. It xes others. In an extension of Michel Foucault, we might say of this first rule that it remains concerned with how to be governed just right, how to x others in a position of equi- librium, even if this today requires constant recalibration. But the objects of this constant adjustment provoke this attention because they just don’t want to govern at all. And because such policy emerges materially from post-Fordist oppor- tunism, policy must optimally, for each policy maker, x others as others, as those who have not just made an error in planning (or indeed an error by planning) but who are themselves in error. And from the perspective of policy, of this post-Fordist opportunism, there is indeed something wrong with the multitude. They are out of joint — instead of constantly positing their position in contingency, they seek solidity, a place from which to plan, some ground on which to imagine, some love on which to count. Nor is this just a political problem from the point of view of policy, but an ontological one. Seeking xity, nding a steady place from which to launch a plan, hatch an escape, signals a problem of essentialism, of beings who think and act like they are something in particular, like they are somebody, although at the same time that something is, from the perspective of policy, whatever you say I am. To get these planners out of this problem of essentialism, this x- ity and repose, this security and base, they have to come to imagine they can be more, they can do more, they can change, they can be changed. Because right now, there is something wrong with them. We know there is something wrong with them because they keep making plans. And plans fail. Plans fail because that is policy. Plans must fail because planners must fail. Planners are static, essential, just surviving. They do not see clearly. They hear things. They lack perspective. They fail to see the complexity. Planners have no vision, no real hope for the future, just a plan here and now, an actually existing plan. They need hope. They need vision. They need to have their sights lifted above the furtive plans and night launches of their despairing lives. Vision. Because from the perspective of policy, it is too dark in there to see, in the black heart of the multitude. You can hear something, you can feel something, feel people going about their own business in there, feel them present at their own making. But hope can lift them above ground into the light, out of the shadows, away from these dark senses. Whether the hope is Fanonian redemption or Arendtian revaluation, policy will x these humans. Whether they lack consciousness or politics, utopianism or common sense, hope has arrived. With new vision, planners will become participants. And participants will be taught to reject essence for contingency, as if planning and improvisation, flexibility and fixity, and complexity and simplicity were opposed within an imposed composition there is no choice but to inhabit, as some exilic home. All that could not be seen in the dark heart of the multitude will be supposed absent, as policy checks its own imagination. But most of all they will participate. Policy is a mass effort. Left intellectuals will write articles in the newspapers. Philosophers will hold conferences on new utopias. Bloggers will debate. Politicians will surf. Change is the only constant here, the only constant of policy. Participating in change is the second rule of policy. Now hope is an orientation toward this participation in change, this participation as change. This is the hope policy gives to the multitude, a chance to stop digging and start circulating. Policy not only offers this hope, but enacts it. Those who dwell in policy do so not just by invoking contingency but riding it, by, in a sense, proving it. Those who dwell in policy are prepared. They are legible to change, liable to change, lendable to change. Policy is not so much a position as a disposition, a disposition toward display. This is why policy’s chief manifestation is governance. Governance should not be confused with government or governmen- tality. Governance is the new form of expropriation. It is the provocation of a certain kind of display, a display of interests as disinterestedness, a display of convertibility, a display of legibility. Governance offers a forum for policy, for bidding oneself, auctioning oneself, to post-Fordist production. Gover- nance is harvesting of immaterial labor, but a willing harvest, a death drive of labor. As capital cannot know directly affect, thought, sociality, imagi- nation, it must instead prospect for these in order to extract and abstract them as labor. This is the real bioprospecting. Governance, the voluntary but dissociative offering up of interests, willing participation in the general privacy and privation, grants capital this knowledge, this wealth-making capacity. Who is more keen on governance than the dweller in policy? On the new governance of universities, hospitals, corporations, governments, and prisoners, on the governance of NGOs, of Africa, of peace processes? Policy offers to help by offering its own interests, and if it really seeks to be valuable, provoking others to offer up their own interests, too. But governance despite its own hopes to universality is for the initi- ated, for those who know how to articulate interests disinterestedly, who know why they vote (not because someone is black or female but because he or she is smart), who have opinions and want to be taken seriously by serious people. In the meantime, policy also orders the quotidian sphere of aborted plans. Policy posits curriculum against study, child develop- ment against play, careers against jobs. It posits voice against voices, and gregariousness against friendship. Policy posits the public sphere, and the counterpublic sphere, and the black public sphere, against the illegal occupation of the illegitimately privatized. Policy is not the one against the many, the cynical against the roman- tic, or the pragmatic against the principled. It is simply baseless vision. It is against all conservation, all rest, all gathering, cooking, drinking, and smoking, if they lead to marronage. Policy’s vision is to break it up, move along, get ambition, and give it to your children. Policy’s hope is that there will be more policy, more participation, more change. However, there is also a danger in all this participation, a danger of crisis. When the multitude participates in policy without first being xed, this leads to crisis: participation without fully entering the enlightenment, without fully functioning families, without financial responsibility, with- out respect for the rule of law, without distance and irony; participation that is too loud, too fat, too loving, too full, too owing, too dread. This leads to crisis. People are in crisis. Economies are in crisis. We are facing an unprecedented crisis, a crisis of participation, a crisis of faith. Is there any hope? Yes, there is, if we can pull together, if we can share a vision of change. For policy, any crisis in the productivity of radical contingency is a crisis in participation, which is to say, a crisis provoked by the wrong participation of the multitude. This is the third rule of policy. The crisis of the credit crunch caused by subprime debtors, the crisis of race in the U.S. elections produced by Reverend Wright and Bernie Mac, the crisis in the Middle East produced by peace movements, the crisis of obesity produced by unhealthy eaters, the crisis of the environ- ment produced by Chinese and Indians, are all instances of uncorrected, unmanaged participation. If the multitude is to stop its sneaky plans only to participate in this way, crisis is inevitable. But policy diagnoses the problem: participation must be hopeful, it must have vision, it must embrace change. Participants must be fashioned who are hopeful, visionary change agents. Those who dwell in policy will lead the way, toward concrete changes in the face of the crisis. Be smart. Believe in change. This is what we have been waiting for. It’s time for the Left to offer solutions. Now’s the time, before it’s night again, and you start hearing D.O.C. They got a secret plan of their own and they won’t be corrected. Before you get stopped by KRS-One and asked for your plan, before Storm says “holla if you understand my plan ladies.” Before you start singing another half-illiterate fantasy. Before you are in the ongoing amplification at the dark heart of the multitude, the operations in its soft center. Before someone says let’s get together and get some land where we’ll still plan to be communist about communism, still plan to be unreconstructed about reconstruction, and still plan to be absolute about abolition. Policy can’t see it, policy can’t read it, but it’s intelligible if you got a plan.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The 1AC is a <u>misdiagnosis of the university</u> – their techniques are enfolded within <u>logistical transparency</u> in which the worlds <u>visibility</u> and <u>mappability</u> is taken as ontological presumption to be achieved by <u>techniques of resistance</u>. The aff’s praxis of resistance is articulated through a grammar of <u>concrete planning</u> utilized by <u>state governance</u> and <u>the neoliberal university</u> that reproduces logistics as the <u>terrain of the political</u> – only a refusal of the aesthetics of <u>planning</u>, <u>logistics</u>, and <u>transparency</u><strong> can facilitate fugitivity</h4><p>Moten & Harney 9 </strong>– Fred Moten, professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa, and Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 2009 (“Policy and Planning” Social Text 100 • Vol. 27, No. 3 • Fall 2009 Pages 182-186)</p><p><u>Policy is correction. <strong><mark>Policy distinguishes </mark>itself <mark>from</mark> planning by distinguishing</strong> <mark>those who <strong>dwell in</strong></mark> policy and x things, from those who dwell <strong>in <mark>planning</strong></mark> and must be xed.</u> This is the first rule of policy. It xes others. In an extension of Michel Foucault, we might say of this first rule that it remains concerned with how to be governed just right, how to x others in a position of equi- librium, even if this today requires constant recalibration. But the objects of this constant adjustment provoke this attention because they just don’t want to govern at all. And because such policy emerges materially from post-Fordist oppor- tunism, policy must optimally, for each policy maker, x others as others, as those who have not just made an error in planning (or indeed an error by planning) but who are themselves in error. And from the perspective of policy, of this post-Fordist opportunism, there is indeed something wrong with the multitude. They are out of joint — instead of constantly positing their position in contingency, they seek solidity, a place from which to plan, some ground on which to imagine, some love on which to count. Nor is this just a political problem from the point of view of policy, but an ontological one. Seeking xity, nding a steady place from which to launch a plan, hatch an escape, signals a problem of essentialism, of beings who think and act like they are something in particular, like they are somebody, although at the same time that something is, from the perspective of policy, whatever you say I am. To get these planners out of this problem of essentialism, this x- ity and repose, this security and base, they have to come to imagine they can be more, they can do more, they can change, they can be changed. Because right now, there is something wrong with them. <u>We know there is something wrong with them <strong>because <mark>they keep making plans.</strong></mark> And plans fail. <strong>Plans fail because <mark>that is policy</strong></mark>. Plans must fail because planners must fail. <strong><mark>Planners </mark>are static, essential</strong>, just surviving. They do not see clearly. They hear things. <strong>They lack perspective</strong>. They fail to see the complexity. Planners have no vision, no real hope for the future, just a plan here and now, an actually existing plan.</u> <u>They need hope. <strong>They <mark>need vision</mark>. They need <mark>to have their sights lifted above</strong></mark> the <strong>furtive <mark>plans</strong></mark> and night launches of their despairing lives.</u> Vision. <u>Because <strong>from the perspective of policy, it is too dark in there to see, in the black heart of the multitude.</u></strong> You can hear something, you can feel something, feel people going about their own business in there, feel them present at their own making. But hope can lift them above ground into the light, out of the shadows, away from these dark senses. Whether the hope is Fanonian redemption or Arendtian revaluation, policy will x these humans. Whether they lack consciousness or politics, utopianism or common sense, hope has arrived. <u><mark>With <strong>new vision, planners </mark>will <mark>become participants.</strong></mark> And participants will be taught <strong><mark>to reject essence for contingency</strong></mark>, as <mark>if planning and improvisation</mark>, flexibility and fixity, and complexity and simplicity <mark>were opposed within an imposed composition</mark> there is no choice but to inhabit, as some exilic home.</u> All that could not be seen in the dark heart of the multitude will be supposed absent, as <u>policy checks its own imagination</u>. But most of all they will participate. Policy is a mass effort. Left intellectuals will write articles in the newspapers. Philosophers will hold conferences on new utopias. Bloggers will debate. Politicians will surf. Change is the only constant here, the only constant of policy. Participating in change is the second rule of policy. Now hope is an orientation toward this participation in change, this participation as change. This is the hope policy gives to the multitude, a chance to stop digging and start circulating. <u>Policy not only offers this hope, but enacts it. <mark>Those <strong>who dwell in policy </mark>do so not just <mark>by</mark> invoking contingency but <mark>riding it</strong></mark>, by, in a sense, proving it. <strong>Those who dwell in policy <mark>are</mark> </strong>prepared. They are <strong><mark>legible</strong></mark> to change, liable to change, lendable to change. <mark>Policy is</mark> not so much a position as a disposition, a disposition toward <mark>display</mark>. This is why policy’s chief manifestation is governance. </u>Governance should not be confused with government or governmen- tality. Governance is the new form of expropriation. It is the provocation of a certain kind of display, a display of interests as disinterestedness, a display of convertibility, a display of legibility. <u>Governance offers a forum for policy, for bidding oneself, auctioning oneself, to post-Fordist production. Gover- nance is harvesting of immaterial labor, but a willing harvest, a death drive of labor. </u>As capital cannot know directly affect, thought, sociality, imagi- nation, it must instead prospect for these in order to extract and abstract them as labor. This is the real bioprospecting. Governance, the voluntary but dissociative offering up of interests, willing participation in the general privacy and privation, grants capital this knowledge, this wealth-making capacity. <u>Who is more keen on governance than the dweller in policy</u>? On the new governance of universities, hospitals, corporations, governments, and prisoners, on the governance of NGOs, of Africa, of peace processes? Policy offers to help by offering its own interests, and if it really seeks to be valuable, provoking others to offer up their own interests, too. But governance despite its own hopes to universality is for the initi- ated, for those who know how to articulate interests disinterestedly, who know why they vote (not because someone is black or female but because he or she is smart), who have opinions and want to be taken seriously by serious people. In the meantime, policy also orders the quotidian sphere of aborted plans. <u><strong>Policy posits curriculum against study</strong>, child develop- ment against play, careers against jobs. It posits voice against voices, and gregariousness against friendship. <strong><mark>Policy posits the public sphere</strong></mark>, and the counterpublic sphere, and the black public sphere, against the illegal occupation of the illegitimately privatized. </u>Policy is not the one against the many, the cynical against the roman- tic, or the pragmatic against the principled. It is simply baseless vision.<u> It is against all conservation, all rest, all gathering, cooking, drinking, and smoking, if they lead to marronage. Policy’s vision is to break it up, move along, get ambition, and give it to your children. Policy’s <mark>hope </mark>is that <mark>there will be more policy,</mark> more participation, more change. However, <mark>there is</mark> also a <mark>danger in </mark>all this <mark>participation</mark>, a danger of crisis. </u>When the multitude participates in policy without first being xed, this leads to crisis: <u>participation without fully entering the enlightenment</u>, without fully functioning families, without financial responsibility, with- out respect for the rule of law, without distance and irony; participation that is too loud, too fat, too loving, too full, too owing, too dread.<u> <strong><mark>This leads to crisis</strong></mark>. People are in crisis. Economies are in crisis. <strong>We are facing an unprecedented crisis, a crisis of participation, a crisis of faith.</u></strong> Is there any hope? Yes, there is, if <u>we can pull together, if we can share a vision of change.</u> For policy, any crisis in the productivity of radical contingency is a crisis in participation, which is to say, a crisis provoked by the wrong participation of the multitude. This is the third rule of policy. The crisis of the credit crunch caused by subprime debtors, the crisis of race in the U.S. elections produced by Reverend Wright and Bernie Mac, the crisis in the Middle East produced by peace movements, the crisis of obesity produced by unhealthy eaters, the crisis of the environ- ment produced by Chinese and Indians, are all instances of uncorrected, unmanaged participation. If the multitude is to stop its sneaky plans only to participate in this way, crisis is inevitable. But <u>policy diagnoses the problem: participation must be hopeful, it must have vision, it must embrace change. Participants must be fashioned who are hopeful, visionary change agents. <strong><mark>Those who dwell in policy will lead the way, toward </mark>concrete <mark>changes in </mark>the face of the <mark>crisis.</strong></mark> </u>Be smart. Believe in change. This is what we have been waiting for. <u><mark>It’s time for</mark> the Left to offer solutions.</u> Now’s the time, before it’s night again, and you start hearing D.O.C. <u><strong>They got <mark>a secret plan </mark>of their own and <mark>they won’t be corrected.</strong></mark> </u>Before you get stopped by KRS-One and asked for your plan, before Storm says “holla if you understand my plan ladies.” Before you start singing another half-illiterate fantasy. Before you are in the ongoing amplification at the dark heart of the multitude, the operations in its soft center. <u>Before someone says let’s get together and get some land where we’ll still plan to be communist about communism, <strong>still <mark>plan to be unreconstructed about reconstruction,</strong></mark> and still plan to be absolute about abolition. Policy can’t see it, policy can’t read it, but it’s intelligible if you got a plan.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Santoro, senior fellow @ Pacific Forum CSIS, 15 (David, and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf) fulltext: Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both cases, the critical factor is perception. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing.6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u>Assurance is on the brink</u> – perception of US commitment is key to prevent <u>wildfire proliferation</u> which <u>collapses the NPT</u><strong> </h4><p>Santoro, senior fellow @ Pacific Forum CSIS, 15 </p><p></strong>(David, and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf) </p><p>Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>challenges of</mark> extended deterrence and <mark>assurance</u></strong> <u><strong>have been starker in Northeast Asia</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>can deter its adversaries and assure its allies</u></strong>. In both cases, <u><strong><mark>the critical factor is perception</u></strong></mark>. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—<u><strong><mark>the potential for war,</mark> <mark>and</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>nuclear use,</u></strong> <u><strong>is growing</mark>.</u></strong>6 Not surprisingly, <u><strong><mark>these developments have led</mark> U.S. <mark>allies to seek</mark> strengthened <mark>assurances that the</mark> <mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates, <u><strong>their main security guarantor</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>will continue to protect them</mark> from coercion</u></strong> and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, <u><strong>the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries</u></strong>, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. <u><strong><mark>North Korea continues to develop</mark> long-range missiles and nuclear weapons,</u></strong> and <u><strong><mark>China is modernizing its military</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and acting</u></strong> increasingly <u><strong>assertively</u></strong>. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and <u>Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests</u>. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But <u><strong><mark>if the gap between the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>and its allies becomes</u></strong></mark> too <u><strong><mark>large</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>allies</mark> will <mark>lose faith</mark> in</u></strong> U.S. <u><strong>assurance</u></strong>, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, <u><strong><mark>Japan or South Korea</mark> <mark>might</u></strong></mark> choose to <u><strong>bandwagon</u></strong> <u><strong>with</u></strong> U.S. <u><strong>competitors</u></strong> in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, <u><strong>possibility</u></strong> is for <u><strong>Tokyo and Seoul</u></strong> to <u><strong><mark>develop</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear arsenals</u></strong></mark> of their own, <u><strong><mark>which would</u></strong></mark> likely <u><strong><mark>eviscerate the remaining credibility of the</u></strong></mark> Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (<u><strong><mark>NPT</u></strong></mark>). In either case, <u><strong>a <mark>loss of confidence in the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>as a</mark> reliable <mark>security guarantor in Northeast Asia</u></strong> <u><strong>would send reverberations across</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the entire U.S. alliance system</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Development of nuc</u></strong></mark>lear weapon<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>by</u></strong> <u><strong>Japan</u></strong></mark> or South Korea <u><strong><mark>is not</mark> a <mark>farfetched</mark> scenario</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Both possess</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>latent capability</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to develop</u></strong></mark> weapons <u><strong><mark>programs</u></strong></mark> relatively <u><strong><mark>quickly</u></strong></mark>, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hawkins 21, MSc in Environment, Politics and Development from the University of London (Mark, January 2021, Imagining a Post-Development Future: What can the Degrowth and Rights of Nature Debates Offer Each Other, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22674.48328, Available Online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348785651_Imagining_a_Post-Development_Future_What_can_the_Degrowth_and_Rights_of_Nature_Debates_Offer_Each_Other) fulltext: Complementarities, or Towards a Great Transformation “Utopia has been yang. In one way or another, from Plato on, utopia has been the big yang motorcycle trip. Bright, dry, clear, strong, firm, active, aggressive, lineal, progressive, creative, expanding, advancing, and hot. Our civilization is now so intensely yang that any imagination of bettering its injustices or eluding its self-destructiveness must involve a reversal.” (Le Guin (1982) [online] p.11) Beyond aiding in the covering of ‘blind spots’ both degrowth and the RoN complement each other in addressing the path dependency of the current system by acting as inversions of its key pillars and paving the way for a Great Transformation. That is to say, they address the inherent logics that allow for: the overwhelming domination of the natural world by human civilization, the expansion of the frontiers of commodification, the global and class compositions of labour, and the organization of work that maintains expanding productive activates within the system. Two of the fundamental logics at the heart of the world system are the logic of growth, that can be articulated as the pressing need to maintain and expand high levels of social metabolic processes with the aim of accumulating capital and producing more, and, connected to this, the logic of anthropocentrism, or the overwhelming value of the human vis a vis a nature which is constructed as a separate realm of existence and used as an infinite store of resources and sink for waste elements. As Gudynas (2010) puts it, in modernity the human is “the medium, origin and destination of all values, they appropriate natural resources, understanding them as merely the medium through which to feed contemporary productive processes” (ibid p.49). Anthropocentrism is thus a “mode of being in the world” and a “cosmovision” that maintains the human/nature duality (ibid p.54 translations my own). These values are hard to pinpoint in terms of their historical genesis and such a task is beyond this essay. Suffice to say these inherent logics are two of the most dominant ones in our current period, and the contradictions of said logics are accelerating. A sixth mass extinction. De Vos et al. (2015) put the background rate of extinction at roughly 0.1 new species per million species per year, which would put the current rate of extinction at roughly 1000 times the background rate, with a likely increase to 10000 in the near future. Extreme as this is Ceballos et al. (2017) note that the general focus on extinction as indicative of biodiversity loss hides the true extent of the current biodiversity crisis. Their study focuses on vertebrates due to the more accurate evidence that can be garnered for a global picture, finding that if the focus is redirected to populations (set geographically defined groups within a species), the total community extinction is numbered in the billions, meaning roughly 50% of vertebrate life on this planet has been lost. As noted in this essay's introduction the LPR puts this number at 68 per cent for directly monitored populations. At 1.5°C warming, the most optimistic target in place, will still lead to between 70-90% loss in coral reefs, a host of risks to human health and livelihoods and reduced food supplies; at 2°C warming and beyond these negative externalities worsen exponentially (IPCC 2018). Humans and our society are a subset of this complex and deeply interconnected system, we are dependent on the natural world. New imaginative spaces Degrowth and the RoN offer a way beyond these accelerating contradictions. Take the RoN, which is more than “merely an exercise in in environmental politics or green jurisprudence”. Instead it brings into question anthropocentricism as a pillar of modernity (Gudynas 2010 p.54). The separating of the human from nature can also be reframed as the separating of the material from the social, yet “there is no social cream to skim of the top” of the material, they are one and the same thing (Tallbear 2011 [online]). Anthropocentrism can be divided into a number of subsidiary elements: the construction of nature as an object for use, the prioritising of human needs and desires over ecosystem stability and the reduction of nature into mechanistic parts separate from the sphere of humanity. The impacts of the first are relatively obvious, “the disappearance of natural areas, indiscriminate felling of trees, desertification of new territories, dumping of toxic substances, oil slicks and endless other actions that cause environmental damage” (Barras 2016 p.114). The second is evident in our analysis above of Ecuador and Bolivia, where the perceived need to increase extraction and grow material throughput/economic activity to alleviate poverty wins out over the need to preserve the health of the megadiverse regions of those nations. The third is more subtle and has far reaching effects. On the macro scale the low priority assigned to the environmental crisis itself as well as environmental degradation more generally indicates a belief that the global environment is somehow separate from human civilization. Psychologically the separation of the non-human enables the consignment of the non-human to the category of ‘bare-life’ or “that which is killable”, enabling the destruction of biomes for this or that economic or developmental goal (Tallbear 2011 [online]). The RoN challenge anthropocentrism not only by reimagining nature as the bearer of inherent value, but as a legal element they affect culture directly. Law, more than just a set of rules and regulations, is “one of the most potent signifying practices” within society, it acts to “organize meaning” and imagine reality (Mezey 2001 p.46). In the words of Robert Gadon (quoted in Mezey 2001 p.47 footnote 57): “The power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live”. Law is fundamental to how we, nationally and internationally construct the world. To take the oceans of the world as an example, the greater part are poorly covered by international law, leaving 50 per cent of the worlds surface without effective global oversight or responsibility to nature on the part of humans. This has led to situation where fish stocks globally are three quarters over exploited or depleted and oceans are flooded with 300 million tons of plastic every year from inter alia aquaculture, commercial fishing, illegal dumping of consumer waste largely in the form of single use plastics and industrial activities (IPBES chapter 2.1.11.1, IUCN issues brief). To be successful in “[e]ffectively recognising and respecting connectivity in the global ocean context would require much of the international community to develop new ways of conceptualising and interacting with ocean ecosystems and species, and the imposition of much stronger obligations" (Harden-Davies et al. 2020 p.7). Through doing this a narrow view of the ocean as a source of resources would be replaced by a more “comprehensive approach that reflects the ecological, social and cultural importance of ocean and biodiversity” (ibid p.8). Taken together these twin pillars form the limits of what can be imagined within our societies. It is these inherent logics that dictate the adaptation strategies that can be adopted. In terms of growth, looking at its current manifestation in the form of neoliberal economic organization, humans are constructed as consumers, that drive economic growth by their daily life patterns. Thus, consumption becomes integral to the management of society, and in addressing the environmental crisis sustainable consumption governance (SCG) is adopted as a policy path. Lorek and Fuchs (2013) describe two forms of SCG, weak and strong, with the former involving changes in the way we consume, while the latter involves less consumption. As it is, they note the former is far more prevalent, with the EUs policy on SCG indicative as to why. The focus is on “smarter consumption” in “global markets” of “better products”, not significant changes to how humans consume (ibid p.39). Such logics are evident elsewhere in adaptation policy, take the disastrous pursuit of biofuels as a way of greening transportation and the concordant land use changes across the global south this strategy incurred (Lavidouw and Paul 2011, Mintz-Habib 2015). Private vehicle use remained unquestioned, with reducing vehicle use out of the question; consumption volume is unquestioned, reducing it is also out of the question. The limits of the possible are bounded by a logic of growth unquestioned and nature as external and unaffected. It is unlikely that a solution can be found to the multiple-crisis within this bounded realm. A focus on these inherent logics should not drift into the a-political. These logics are ‘useful’ within our society and allow for certain forms of eco-social organization, as well as pillars of modernity they are pillars of capitalism and the power structures that maintain the global system. Attempts to implement sustainable policies face constant, opposition and counter lobbying by a wide variety of interests (for example see Lyon and Delmas 2018, Laville 2019 [online]). In Australia the mining and energy sector have been successful at defeating carbon control policies, despite the fact we are well beyond any doubt as to the validity of climate change and despite destruction wreaked on some of the continent's most diverse and unique ecosystems by mining (Hobbs 2020). Though these power structures shift they also evidence a continuity in inherent logic and consequent outcomes: “[w]hatever the historically changing positions of different countries or regions, the metabolic processes that maintain the world system centres are guaranteed by ecologically unequal exchange, deteriorating terms of trade for natural resources, cheap labour and cheap human lives in the peripheries, and, when necessary, by military power” (Martinez-Alier 2009 p.75). To challenge this systems continuity before disaster really sets in requires not only challenging power, it also requires challenging logics that allows for its perpetuation. A Great Derangement or a Great Transformation? Simply changing the class composition, political power centre, or economic core will not lead to a great transformation. Change in how the world is imagined is required. In this vein technical fixes will also not suffice. As noted by Nightingale et al. (2020) in the contexts of climate change adaptation and mitigation, the framing of environmental crisis as a technical problem limits the scope of solutions to technical solutions. In this context solutions can only come from changes in methods of governance or the adoption of new technologies, not in more root and branch changes that involve upsetting deeper ways of being and organising as humans. Drawing on Amitav Ghosh the authors refer to this “failure to reimagine humans place in the world” as the “great derangement” (quoted in ibid p.343). Historically, even outward recognition that more than technical solutions are necessary leads to the “slippage” of the system towards these same technical solutions (ibid pg344). A more fundamental reimagining of society is needed. Such a reimagining cannot focus solely on the environmental but must be just. Otherwise, there is a risk of slippage into the belief simple solutions will suffice and the possibility of ‘ecofascism’, most notably through neo-Malthusian claims of overpopulation (Ross & Bevensee 2020, Lawton 2019). In this context degrowth and the RoN act as inversions of key pillars of the current system, namely developmentalist economic growth and anthropocentrism. Acting together, they offer a deeper change in how we reproduce our societies and environments and thus also a more robust chance of countering the current multiple crisis. Care will have to be given not to water down the commitment to justice evident in the two movements.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>That solves their offense---can argue the TVA is in line with a general economy and opposition to individualism</h4><p><u><strong>Hawkins 21</u></strong>, MSc in Environment, Politics and Development from the University of London (Mark, January 2021, Imagining a Post-Development Future: What can the Degrowth and Rights of Nature Debates Offer Each Other, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22674.48328, Available Online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348785651_Imagining_a_Post-Development_Future_What_can_the_Degrowth_and_Rights_of_Nature_Debates_Offer_Each_Other)</p><p>Complementarities, or Towards a Great Transformation</p><p>“Utopia has been yang. In one way or another, from Plato on, utopia has been the big yang motorcycle trip. Bright, dry, clear, strong, firm, active, aggressive, lineal, progressive, creative, expanding, advancing, and hot. Our civilization is now so intensely yang that any imagination of bettering its injustices or eluding its self-destructiveness must involve a reversal.” (Le Guin (1982) [online] p.11)</p><p>Beyond aiding in the covering of ‘blind spots’ <u>both <mark>degrowth and</mark> the <mark>RoN</u> <u><strong>complement each other</u></strong></mark> <u>in addressing the path dependency of the current system by acting as inversions of its key pillars</u> and paving the way for a Great Transformation. That is to say, <u><mark>they address</mark> the <strong><mark>inherent logics</u></strong> <u>that allow for</mark>: the <mark>overwhelming domination of the natural world by human civilization</u></mark>, the expansion of the frontiers of <u>commodification</u>, the global and class compositions of <u>labour</u>, <u>and</u> the organization of work that maintains <u>expanding productive activates within the system</u>. <u><mark>Two</mark> of the fundamental <mark>logics at the heart of the world system are the</u> <u><strong>logic of growth</u></strong></mark>, that can be articulated as the pressing need to maintain and expand high levels of social metabolic processes with the aim of accumulating capital and producing more, <u>and, connected to this, <mark>the <strong>logic of anthropocentrism</u></strong></mark>, <u>or the <mark>overwhelming value of the human</mark> vis a vis a nature </u>which is constructed as a separate realm of existence and used as an infinite store of resources and sink for waste elements. As Gudynas (2010) puts it, <u>in modernity the human is “the medium, origin and destination of all values</u>, they appropriate natural resources, understanding them as merely the medium through which to feed contemporary productive processes” (ibid p.49). Anthropocentrism is thus a “mode of being in the world” and a “cosmovision” that maintains the human/nature duality (ibid p.54 translations my own). These values are hard to pinpoint in terms of their historical genesis and such a task is beyond this essay. Suffice to say <u>these inherent logics are two of the most dominant ones in our current period, and the contradictions of said logics are accelerating</u>.</p><p>A sixth mass extinction.</p><p>De Vos et al. (2015) put <u>the background rate of extinction at roughly 0.1 new species per million species per year, which would put the current rate of extinction at roughly 1000 times the background rate</u>, with a likely increase to 10000 in the near future. Extreme as this is Ceballos et al. (2017) note that <u>the <mark>general focus</mark> on extinction as indicative of biodiversity loss <mark>hides the true extent of the <strong>current biodiversity crisis</u></strong></mark>. Their study focuses on vertebrates due to the more accurate evidence that can be garnered for a global picture, finding that if the focus is redirected to populations (set geographically defined groups within a species), <u>the total community extinction is numbered in the billions, meaning roughly 50% of vertebrate life on this planet has been lost</u>. As noted in this essay's introduction the LPR puts this number at 68 per cent for directly monitored populations. <u><mark>At</u> <u><strong>1.5°C warming</u></strong></mark>, <u>the most optimistic target in place, will still lead to</u> between 70-<u><mark>90% loss in coral reefs, a host of</u> <u><strong>risks to human health</u></strong></mark> and livelihoods <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>reduced food supplies</u></strong>; <u>at</u> <u><strong>2°C</u></strong></mark> warming <u><mark>and beyond these <strong>negative externalities worsen exponentially</u></strong></mark> (IPCC 2018). Humans and our society are a subset of this complex and deeply interconnected system, we are dependent on the natural world. </p><p>New imaginative spaces</p><p><u>Degrowth and the RoN offer a way beyond these accelerating contradictions</u>. Take <u>the RoN</u>, which <u>is more than “merely an exercise</u> in in environmental politics or green jurisprudence”. Instead <u>it <strong>brings into question anthropocentricism</u></strong> <u>as a pillar of modernity</u> (Gudynas 2010 p.54). The separating of the human from nature can also be reframed as the separating of the material from the social, yet “there is no social cream to skim of the top” of the material, they are one and the same thing (Tallbear 2011 [online]). Anthropocentrism can be divided into a number of subsidiary elements: the construction of nature as an object for use, the prioritising of human needs and desires over ecosystem stability and the reduction of nature into mechanistic parts separate from the sphere of humanity. The impacts of the first are relatively obvious, “the disappearance of natural areas, indiscriminate felling of trees, desertification of new territories, dumping of toxic substances, oil slicks and endless other actions that cause environmental damage” (Barras 2016 p.114). <u>The second is evident in our analysis above of Ecuador and Bolivia, where the perceived need to increase extraction and grow material throughput/economic activity to alleviate poverty wins out over the need to preserve the health of the megadiverse regions of those nations</u>. The third is more subtle and has far reaching effects. On the macro scale the low priority assigned to the environmental crisis itself as well as environmental degradation more generally indicates a belief that the global environment is somehow separate from human civilization. Psychologically <u>the separation of the non-human enables the consignment of the non-human to the category of</u> ‘bare-life’ or “<u>that which is killable</u>”, <u><strong>enabling the destruction of biomes</u></strong> <u>for this or that economic</u> or developmental <u>goal</u> (Tallbear 2011 [online]).</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>RoN challenge anthropocentrism</u></strong> <u>not only by</u> <u><strong>reimagining nature</u></strong> <u>as the bearer of</u> <u><strong>inherent value</u></strong>, <u>but as a</u> <u><strong>legal element</u></strong> <u>they <strong>affect culture directly</u></strong>. <u>Law</u></mark>, more than just a set of rules and regulations, <u><mark>is “one of the most potent</u> <u><strong>signifying practices</u></strong></mark>” <u>within society, it acts to “organize meaning” and imagine reality</u> (Mezey 2001 p.46). In the words of Robert Gadon (quoted in Mezey 2001 p.47 footnote 57): “<u><mark>The power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its</u> <u><strong>capacity to persuade people</u></strong></mark> that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live”. <u>Law is fundamental to how we, nationally and internationally</u> <u><strong>construct the world</u></strong>. To take the oceans of the world as an example, the greater part are poorly covered by international law, leaving 50 per cent of the worlds surface without effective global oversight or responsibility to nature on the part of humans. This has led to situation where fish stocks globally are three quarters over exploited or depleted and oceans are flooded with 300 million tons of plastic every year from inter alia aquaculture, commercial fishing, illegal dumping of consumer waste largely in the form of single use plastics and industrial activities (IPBES chapter 2.1.11.1, IUCN issues brief). To be successful in “[e]ffectively recognising and respecting connectivity in the global ocean context would require much of the international community to develop new ways of conceptualising and interacting with ocean ecosystems and species, and the imposition of much stronger obligations" (Harden-Davies et al. 2020 p.7). Through doing this a narrow view of the ocean as a source of resources would be replaced by a more “comprehensive approach that reflects the ecological, social and cultural importance of ocean and biodiversity” (ibid p.8). </p><p><u>Taken together these twin pillars form the limits of what can be imagined within our societies</u>. <u><mark>It is these</u> <u><strong>inherent logics</u></strong> <u>that dictate the adaptation strategies that can be adopted</u></mark>. <u>In terms of growth</u>, looking at its current manifestation in the form of neoliberal economic organization, <u>humans are constructed as consumers</u>, that drive economic growth by their daily life patterns. Thus, consumption becomes integral to the management of society, and in addressing the environmental crisis sustainable consumption governance (SCG) is adopted as a policy path. Lorek and Fuchs (2013) describe two forms of SCG, weak and strong, with the former involving changes in the way we consume, while the latter involves less consumption. As it is, they note the former is far more prevalent, with the EUs policy on SCG indicative as to why. The focus is on “smarter consumption” in “global markets” of “better products”, not significant changes to how humans consume (ibid p.39). Such logics are evident elsewhere in adaptation policy, take the disastrous pursuit of biofuels as a way of greening transportation and the concordant land use changes across the global south this strategy incurred (Lavidouw and Paul 2011, Mintz-Habib 2015). Private vehicle use remained unquestioned, with reducing vehicle use out of the question; consumption volume is unquestioned, reducing it is also out of the question. <u>The limits of the possible are bounded by a logic of growth unquestioned and nature as external and unaffected</u>. It is unlikely that a solution can be found to the multiple-crisis within this bounded realm. </p><p><u><mark>A focus on these inherent logics <strong>should not drift into the a-political</u></strong></mark>. These logics are ‘useful’ within our society and allow for certain forms of eco-social organization, as well as pillars of modernity they are pillars of capitalism and the power structures that maintain the global system. <u>Attempts to implement sustainable policies face constant, opposition and counter lobbying by a wide variety of interests</u> (for example see Lyon and Delmas 2018, Laville 2019 [online]). In Australia the mining and energy sector have been successful at defeating carbon control policies, despite the fact we are well beyond any doubt as to the validity of climate change and despite destruction wreaked on some of the continent's most diverse and unique ecosystems by mining (Hobbs 2020). Though these power structures shift they also evidence a continuity in inherent logic and consequent outcomes: “[w]hatever the historically changing positions of different countries or regions, the metabolic processes that maintain the world system centres are guaranteed by ecologically unequal exchange, deteriorating terms of trade for natural resources, cheap labour and cheap human lives in the peripheries, and, when necessary, by military power” (Martinez-Alier 2009 p.75). <u><mark>To challenge this systems</mark> continuity before disaster really sets in requires not only challenging power, it also <strong><mark>requires challenging logics</u></strong> <u>that allows for its perpetuation</u></mark>. </p><p>A Great Derangement or a Great Transformation?</p><p>Simply changing the class composition, political power centre, or economic core will not lead to a great transformation. Change in how the world is imagined is required. In this vein technical fixes will also not suffice. As noted by Nightingale et al. (2020) in the contexts of climate change adaptation and mitigation, <u>the framing of environmental crisis as a technical problem <strong>limits the scope</strong> of solutions to technical solutions</u>. In this context solutions can only come from changes in methods of governance or the adoption of new technologies, not in more root and branch changes that involve upsetting deeper ways of being and organising as humans. Drawing on Amitav Ghosh the authors refer to <u>this “<strong>failure to reimagine</strong> humans place in the world” as the “great derangement”</u> (quoted in ibid p.343). Historically, even outward recognition that more than technical solutions are necessary leads to the “slippage” of the system towards these same technical solutions (ibid pg344). <u><mark>A more</u> <u><strong>fundamental reimagining of society</u></strong> <u>is</u> <u><strong>needed</u></strong>. <u>Such</mark> a <mark>reimagining cannot focus solely on the environmental but must be just</u>. <u>Otherwise, there is a risk of slippage into</mark> the belief simple solutions will suffice and <mark>the <strong>possibility of ‘ecofascism’</u></strong></mark>, <u>most notably through neo-Malthusian claims of overpopulation</u> (Ross & Bevensee 2020, Lawton 2019). <u>In this context degrowth and the</u> <u><strong><mark>RoN act as inversions of key pillars of the current system, namely developmentalist economic growth and anthropocentrism</u></strong></mark>. <u>Acting together, <mark>they offer a <strong>deeper change</u></strong> <u>in how we reproduce our societies and environments and</mark> thus also <mark>a more <strong>robust chance</strong> of countering the</mark> current multiple <mark>crisis</u></mark>. Care will have to be given not to water down the commitment to justice evident in the two movements. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Heath & Thompson 17 Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation, & William R. Thompson, Political Science Professor at Indiana University. [U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-to-lead-to-war.html]//BPS fulltext: Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely. In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison's article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China's disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison's groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison's analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today's rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views—a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation. To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict. The most important driver, as Allison recognizes, would be a growing parity between China and the United States as economic, technological and geostrategic leaders of the international system. The United States and China feature an increasing parity in the size of their economies, but the United States retains a considerable lead in virtually every other dimension of national power. The current U.S.-China rivalry is a regional one centered on the Asia-Pacific region, but it retains the considerable potential of escalating into a global, systemic competition down the road. A second important driver would be the mobilization of public opinion behind the view that the other country is a primary source of threat, thereby providing a stronger constituency for escalatory policies. A related development would be the formal designation by leaders in both capitals of the other country as a primary hostile threat and likely foe. These developments would most likely be fueled by a growing array of intractable disputes, and further accelerated by a serious militarized crisis. The cumulative effect would be the exacerbation of an antagonistic competitive rivalry, repeated and volatile militarized crisis, and heightened risk that any flashpoint could escalate rapidly to war—a relationship that would resemble the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Yet even if the relationship evolved towards a more hostile form of rivalry, unique features of the contemporary world suggest lessons drawn from the past may have limited applicability. Economic interdependence in the twenty-first century is much different and far more complex than in it was in the past. So is the lethality of weaponry available to the major powers. In the sixteenth century, armies fought with pikes, swords and primitive guns. In the twenty-first century, it is possible to eliminate all life on the planet in a full-bore nuclear exchange. These features likely affect the willingness of leaders to escalate in a crisis in a manner far differently than in past rivalries. More broadly, Allison’s analysis about the “Thucydides Trap” may be criticized for exaggerating the risks of war. In his claims to identify a high propensity for war between “rising” and “ruling” countries, he fails to clarify those terms, and does not distinguish the more dangerous from the less volatile types of rivalries. Contests for supremacy over land regions, for example, have historically proven the most conflict-prone, while competition for supremacy over maritime regions has, by contrast, tended to be less lethal. Rivalries also wax and wane over time, with varying levels of risks of war. A more careful review of rivalries and their variety, duration and patterns of interaction suggests that although most wars involve rivalries, many rivals avoid going to war.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>No US China war</h4><p><strong>Heath & Thompson 17<u></strong> Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation, & William R. Thompson, Political Science Professor at Indiana University. [U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-to-lead-to-war.html]//BPS</p><p></u>Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because <u><strong><mark>it neglects</mark> the <mark>key</mark> political and geostrategic <mark>conditions that make war plausible</u></strong></mark> in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the <u><strong><mark>risk</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>a crisis could</u></strong> accidentally <u><strong>escalate</u></strong> into war <u><strong><mark>becomes</mark> far <mark>lower</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong>U.S.-China</u></strong> relationship today <u><strong>may</u></strong> be <u><strong>trend</u></strong>ing <u><strong>to</u></strong>wards <u><strong>greater tension, but</u></strong> the <u><strong>relative <mark>stability and</mark> overall <mark>low</mark> level of <mark>hostility make</mark> </u></strong>the prospect of an accidental <u><strong><mark>escalation</u></strong></mark> to war <u><strong>extremely <mark>unlikely</u></strong></mark>. In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison's article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China's disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison's groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison's analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis. <u><strong><mark>Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its</mark> principal <mark>enemy</mark>. </u></strong>By contrast, <u><strong>the U.S.-China relationship</u></strong> today <u><strong>operates at</u></strong> a much <u><strong>lower</u></strong> level of <u><strong>hostility</u></strong> and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but <u><strong>the two countries remain far from</u></strong> the bitter, acrimonious <u><strong>rivalry</u></strong> that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today's <u><strong><mark>rivals</u></strong></mark> may <u><strong><mark>view each other</mark> warily <mark>as competitors</u></strong></mark> and threats on some issues, <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> they also <u><strong>view each other as <mark>important trade partners and</mark> partners <mark>on</mark> some <mark>shared concerns</mark>, such as North Korea</u></strong>, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The <u><strong>military <mark>competition</u></strong></mark> between China and the United States may be growing, but it <u><strong><mark>operates at</u></strong></mark> a far <u><strong><mark>lower</u></strong></mark> level of <u><strong><mark>intensity</u></strong></mark> than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, <u><strong><mark>U.S. and Chinese</mark> militaries are <mark>not postured to fight</mark> each other in major wars</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>polls show</u></strong></mark> that the <u><strong>people of the two countries regard each other with <mark>mixed views</mark>—a</u></strong> considerable <u><strong>contrast from</u></strong> the <u><strong>hostile sentiment</u></strong> expressed <u><strong>by the U.S. and Soviet publics</u></strong> for each other. <u><strong><mark>Lacking</mark> both preparations for major war and <mark>a constituency for conflict</mark>, leaders and bureaucracies</u></strong> in both countries <u><strong>have <mark>less incentive to misjudge crisis</u></strong></mark> situations <u><strong>in favor of</u></strong> unwarranted <u><strong>escalation. To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies</u></strong> currently <u><strong>face</u></strong> a <u><strong>strong incentive</u></strong> to find ways <u><strong>of defusing crises</u></strong> in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict. The most important driver, as Allison recognizes, would be a growing parity between China and the United States as economic, technological and geostrategic leaders of the international system. The United States and China feature an increasing parity in the size of their economies, but the United States retains a considerable lead in virtually every other dimension of national power. The current U.S.-China rivalry is a regional one centered on the Asia-Pacific region, but it retains the considerable potential of escalating into a global, systemic competition down the road. A second important driver would be the mobilization of public opinion behind the view that the other country is a primary source of threat, thereby providing a stronger constituency for escalatory policies. A related development would be the formal designation by leaders in both capitals of the other country as a primary hostile threat and likely foe. These developments would most likely be fueled by a growing array of intractable disputes, and further accelerated by a serious militarized crisis. The cumulative effect would be the exacerbation of an antagonistic competitive rivalry, repeated and volatile militarized crisis, and heightened risk that any flashpoint could escalate rapidly to war—a relationship that would resemble the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Yet <u><strong><mark>even if</mark> the relationship evolved towards a more <mark>hostile</mark> form of rivalry, unique <mark>features</mark> of the contemporary world <mark>suggest </mark>lessons drawn from <mark>the past may have limited applicability</mark>. Economic <mark>interdependence</mark> in the twenty-first century <mark>is</mark> much different and far <mark>more complex</mark> than in it was in the past</u></strong>. So is <u><strong>the <mark>lethality of</u></strong></mark> weaponry available to the major powers. In the sixteenth century, armies fought with pikes, swords and primitive guns. In the twenty-first century, it is possible to eliminate all life on the planet in a full-bore <u><strong><mark>nuclear</u></strong></mark> exchange. These features likely <u><strong><mark>affect</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>willingness</u></strong></mark> of leaders <u><strong>to <mark>escalate</u></strong></mark> in a crisis in a manner far differently than in past rivalries. More broadly, Allison’s analysis about the “Thucydides Trap” may be criticized for exaggerating the risks of war. In his claims to identify a high propensity for war between “rising” and “ruling” countries, he fails to clarify those terms, and does not distinguish the more dangerous from the less volatile types of rivalries. Contests for supremacy over land regions, for example, have historically proven the most conflict-prone, while competition for supremacy over maritime regions has, by contrast, tended to be less lethal. <u><strong><mark>Rivalries</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong>wax and <mark>wane</u></strong></mark> over time, with varying levels of risks of war. <u><strong>A more <mark>careful review</mark> of rivalries</u></strong> and their variety, duration and patterns of interaction <u><strong><mark>suggests</u></strong></mark> that although most wars involve rivalries, <u><strong>many <mark>rivals avoid</mark> going to <mark>war</strong></mark>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Dr. Glen Barry, president, Ecological Internet and PhD, Land Resources, University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Ecology Bubble Bursts," EARTH MEANDERS, updated 3—1—17, originally published July 25, 2011, www.ecoearth.info/blog/2011/07/earth_meanders_ecology_bubble.asp#more, accessed 9-1-17. fulltext: Ever since the human family embraced a growth based mentality and obsequious faith in liberal economics, we have witnessed a series of bubbles. The most recent boom-bust cycle has been the still unresolved financial and mortgage bubbles, but bubbles go as far back as the Dutch tulip mania of 1637. Exuberant yet clearly unsustainable growth, or inversely destruction, appears to be inherent to industrial, speculative, and growth obsessed capitalism. Bubbles represent the human proclivity for greed, to grow too fast, overshooting demand, while often exhausting key resources. Global ecology, the biggest bubble of all, is now collapsing and will soon burst. Voracious economic and human growth have raged for three centuries upon the back of dismantling ecosystems globally. Humanity’s economic outputs have been over-valued relative to the ecologically mediated resources incautiously razed for their production. Earth’s carrying capacity - meaning ecology's finite ability to provide ecosystem services and absorb pollution – has been surpassed. Having grown beyond what Earth can bear, the human family is said to be in "overshoot", which can only lead to collapse. Earth is a living being and like all life can die. Earth is dying now as virus-like humanity destroys its host's ecosystem organs. Every day we scrape Earth of its plants and animals, dig and drill into toxic “resources” not meant to be unearthed, and crap our wastes into air, land and water. Systems biology tells us an exponentially growing system in positive feedback – such as the super-sized economy feasting upon finite and precious global ecology – always eventually destroys itself. This is particularly so given perilous lag times of many ecosystem processes and losses. The ecological systems underlying human existence are beginning to burst like bubbles. Virtually every type of ecosystem and their output – fish, food, water, air, climate, forests, land, wetlands, soil, etc – are now collapsing locally and regionally. We are witnessing this steady biological impoverishment, of virtually every life-giving ecosystem, aggregate to the whole biosphere – the thin mantle of life surrounding an otherwise lifeless Earth. When speaking of a biosphere bubble burst it is accurate to say Earth is dying. And that it need not be that way, if only we were able to change to maintain ecosystems that foster all human and life’s being. Ecology has provided a constant stream of services to humanity and other life, making Earth habitable, for what seems like eternity. Food offers one illustrative example of humanity’s utter dependence upon ecology: sun, water, soil, climate, seeds and healthy agro-ecological systems are where food comes from - not grocery stores and mini-marts. That we need air, water, soil and other ecosystems are demonstrable truths – unlike beliefs in unknowable ancient messiahs, which have guided so much of Earth ecology’s destruction. Industrial capitalism is dependent upon destroying ecosystems as resources for temporary increases in the well-being of some. While climate change is one of several global ecosystems that are collapsing due to human over-use, it is important to remember there are other collapsing ecological systems – including soil, water, forest, wetland, nitrogen, ocean, toxic, ecosystem, poverty, food and others - that singly and together threaten continued human and ecological being. It is these potentially cumulative impacts of several assaults upon key global ecosystems that are most problematic and potentially chaotic. And it’s not even done fairly, as 2.5 billion live on under $2 a day. The industrial growth machine’s rampant misuse of inappropriate technology to rip apart Earth’s life-support systems for endless frivolous wants by some as others starve and eke out a living must yield to some basic truths. If we are to sustain the required ecosystem habitats necessary, we cannot cut and burn them simultaneously, or multiply to such numbers that we overwhelm them. If you’ve ever seen an over-grazed pasture you know what over-population does to a limited land and resource base – human population must be urgently and humanely reduced. Hubristic faith in technological solutions to Earth being beyond its carrying capacity is fanatical madness. Continued technological reliance to “solve” Earth’s ecological carrying capacity problem will only inflate the bubble further and result in a bigger bursting, and less remnants from which to try to reconstitute an ecologically based future. Inane techno-optimism such as geo-engineering is ecocide right up to the end – pushing Earth to the wall, raping her, before killing her. It is far preferable to begin to adjust human demands upon ecology to reasonable limits. Not only is ecology truth, and you cannot eat money, but collapsing ecosystems are not substitutable with technology. What to do? We need knowledge based solutions to sustaining global ecology that are also just, equitable and enhance human dignity - not superstitious, illogical, greedy, and ignorant responses of god's self-chosen ruling elites. It is too late to stop the global ecology bubble from bursting. Yet a short window exists, perhaps, to lessen the impact of the ecology bubble burst, and provide for some manner of decent existence and potential for restoration and regeneration of a new human/nature project post-collapse. But if we continue to do nothing, or next to nothing, the cumulative impacts of global ecological collapse will intensify and prove to be unrecoverable, unless met with opposing force to end the ecocidal activities surpassing ecology's limits. It is time for us to return to the land, air, water and oceans and fight for their and our protection and restoration. Simply we must embrace ecological restoration, ecosystem protection, industrial power down, escalating protest and a people’s power Earth Revolution. For continued shared survival the human family must protect and restore natural ecosystems as the keystone response to biodiversity, ecosystem, climate, food, water, poverty and rights crises. Few are doing so as rigorously as is necessary. Both the perpetrators and greenwashers of ecosystem destruction must be confronted with a wave of people power protests for ecologically sufficient policies like ending primary forest logging, fossil fuels and industrial agriculture. Existing non-violent, direct action protest is fine and must be enlarged, though it has not yet, nor is it likely to be, scaled to an extent able to win on its own. We will need to further intensify our efforts to use the wide myriad of civil and uncivil disobedience tactics known that disrupt ecocide. And if these appeals are not responded to affirmatively after 40 years of stonewalling, we may need to escalate tactics to sabotage, carefully targeted insurgency, and as a last resort, guerrilla warfare. We face a planetary ecological emergency. Misery and premature death from ecological collapse is all our fates unless we together and all at once resist ecocide. If we all rush and dismantle a coal mine or old forest logging operation, and when asked who did, we respond we all did, we will have won. To speak of sustaining ecology while pursuing anything less than the destruction and overthrow of the industrial growth machine is greenwash and subject itself to being destroyed. The only hope for surviving and regenerating from ecology’s burst bubble is to stop destroying ecosystems and change how we live – including more sustainability, equity and justice. Maybe people aren’t ready for what I have to say, but I am going to keep saying it because it is ecology truth vital for shared human and all life’s survival. At times it is hard to be heard because I and my organization Ecological Internet refuse to sugar coat our message as we take on difficult issues with ecological science based diagnoses and recommendations. In a world of so much hurt, pain and illness; it is outrageous to futilely cling to an industrial consumer way of living that destroys ecology, people and all that is good and necessary to simply live. Do not wait for others to heal yourself or your relationship with Earth. You have to start now and work harder at both, doing what your conscience tells you is necessary, and taking full responsibility for doing so.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>It’s try or die—fast collapse is the only way to avoid total extinction </h4><p>Dr. Glen <u><strong>Barry</u></strong>, president, Ecological Internet and PhD, Land Resources, University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Ecology Bubble Bursts," EARTH MEANDERS, updated 3—1—<u><strong>17</u></strong>, originally published July 25, 2011, www.ecoearth.info/blog/2011/07/earth_meanders_ecology_bubble.asp#more, accessed 9-1-17.</p><p>Ever since the human family embraced a growth based mentality and obsequious faith in liberal economics, we have witnessed a series of bubbles. The most recent boom-bust cycle has been the still unresolved financial and mortgage bubbles, but bubbles go as far back as the Dutch tulip mania of 1637. Exuberant yet clearly unsustainable growth, or inversely destruction, appears to be inherent to industrial, speculative, and growth obsessed capitalism. Bubbles represent the human proclivity for greed, to grow too fast, overshooting demand, while often exhausting key resources. Global ecology, the biggest bubble of all, is now collapsing and will soon burst. Voracious economic and human growth have raged for three centuries upon the back of dismantling ecosystems globally. Humanity’s economic outputs have been over-valued relative to the ecologically mediated resources incautiously razed for their production. Earth’s carrying capacity - meaning ecology's finite ability to provide ecosystem services and absorb pollution – has been surpassed. Having grown beyond what Earth can bear, the human family is said to be in "overshoot", which can only lead to collapse. Earth is a living being and like all life can die. Earth is dying now as virus-like humanity destroys its host's ecosystem organs. Every day we scrape Earth of its plants and animals, dig and drill into toxic “resources” not meant to be unearthed, and crap our wastes into air, land and water. Systems biology tells us <u><strong><mark>an exponentially growing system in positive feedback</u></strong></mark> – such as the super-sized economy feasting upon finite and precious global ecology – <u><strong><mark>always</u></strong></mark> eventually <u><strong><mark>destroys itself</u></strong></mark>. This is particularly so <u><strong><mark>given</u></strong></mark> perilous <u><strong><mark>lag times of</u></strong></mark> many ecosystem <u><strong><mark>processes </u></strong></mark>and losses. The <u><strong><mark>ecological systems </u></strong></mark>underlying human existence are beginning to<u><strong><mark> burst like bubbles</u></strong></mark>. Virtually <u><strong><mark>every type of ecosystem </u></strong></mark>and their output<u><strong><mark> </u></strong></mark>– fish, food, water, air, climate, forests, land, wetlands, soil, etc – <u><strong><mark>are now collapsing</u></strong></mark> locally and regionally. We are witnessing this steady biological impoverishment, of virtually every life-giving ecosystem, aggregate to the whole biosphere – the thin mantle of life surrounding an otherwise lifeless Earth. When speaking of a biosphere bubble burst it is accurate to say Earth is dying. And that it need not be that way, if only we were able to change to maintain ecosystems that foster all human and life’s being. Ecology has provided a constant stream of services to humanity and other life, making Earth habitable, for what seems like eternity. Food offers one illustrative example of humanity’s utter dependence upon ecology: sun, water, soil, climate, seeds and healthy agro-ecological systems are where food comes from - not grocery stores and mini-marts. That we need air, water, soil and other ecosystems are demonstrable truths – unlike beliefs in unknowable ancient messiahs, which have guided so much of Earth ecology’s destruction. Industrial capitalism is dependent upon destroying ecosystems as resources for temporary increases in the well-being of some. While climate change is one of several global ecosystems that are collapsing due to human over-use, it is important to remember there are other collapsing ecological systems – including soil, water, forest, wetland, nitrogen, ocean, toxic, ecosystem, poverty, food and others - that singly and together threaten continued human and ecological being. It is these potentially cumulative impacts of several assaults upon key global ecosystems that are most problematic and potentially chaotic. And it’s not even done fairly, as 2.5 billion live on under $2 a day. The industrial <u><strong><mark>growth </u></strong></mark>machine<u><strong><mark>’s</u></strong></mark> rampant <u><strong><mark>misuse of</u></strong></mark> inappropriate <u><strong><mark>tech</u></strong></mark>nology <u><strong><mark>to rip apart</u></strong></mark> Earth’s <u><strong><mark>life-support systems </mark>for endless frivolous wants by some as others starve</u></strong> and eke out a living <u><strong><mark>must yield</u></strong></mark> to some basic truths. If we are to sustain the required ecosystem habitats necessary, we cannot cut and burn them simultaneously, or multiply to such numbers that we overwhelm them. If you’ve ever seen an over-grazed pasture you know what over-population does to a limited land and resource base – human population must be urgently and humanely reduced. Hubristic faith in technological solutions to Earth being beyond its carrying capacity is fanatical madness. Continued <u><strong><mark>tech</u></strong></mark>nological reliance to “solve” Earth’s ecological carrying capacity problem <u><strong><mark>will only inflate the bubble</u></strong></mark> further <u><strong><mark>and result in a bigger bursting, </u></strong></mark>and less remnants from which to try to reconstitute an ecologically based future. Inane <u><strong><mark>techno-optimism</u></strong></mark> such as geo-engineering<u><strong><mark> is</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>ecocide </u></strong></mark>right up to the end – pushing Earth to the wall, raping her, before killing her. It is far preferable to begin to adjust human demands upon ecology to reasonable limits. Not only is ecology truth, and you cannot eat money, but collapsing ecosystems are not substitutable with technology. What to do? We need knowledge based solutions to sustaining global ecology that are also just, equitable and enhance human dignity - not superstitious, illogical, greedy, and ignorant responses of god's self-chosen ruling elites. It is too late to stop the global ecology bubble from bursting. Yet <u><strong><mark>a short window exists,</u></strong></mark> perhaps, <u><strong><mark>to lessen the impact</u></strong></mark> of the ecology bubble burst, <u><strong><mark>and provide for some manner of</u></strong></mark> decent <u><strong><mark>existence and potential for restoration</u></strong></mark> and regeneration of a new human/nature project <u><strong><mark>post-collapse</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>But if we continue</u></strong></mark> to do nothing, or next to nothing, <u><strong><mark>the cumulative impacts of global ecological collapse will intensify and prove to be unrecoverable</u></strong></mark>, unless met with opposing force to end the ecocidal activities surpassing ecology's limits. It is time for us to return to the land, air, water and oceans and fight for their and our protection and restoration. Simply we must embrace ecological restoration, ecosystem protection, industrial power down, escalating protest and a people’s power Earth Revolution. For continued shared survival the human family must protect and restore natural ecosystems as the keystone response to biodiversity, ecosystem, climate, food, water, poverty and rights crises. Few are doing so as rigorously as is necessary. Both the perpetrators and greenwashers of ecosystem destruction must be confronted with a wave of people power protests for ecologically sufficient policies like ending primary forest logging, fossil fuels and industrial agriculture. Existing non-violent, direct action protest is fine and must be enlarged, though it has not yet, nor is it likely to be, scaled to an extent able to win on its own. We will need to further intensify our efforts to use the wide myriad of civil and uncivil disobedience tactics known that disrupt ecocide. And if these appeals are not responded to affirmatively after 40 years of stonewalling, we may need to escalate tactics to sabotage, carefully targeted insurgency, and as a last resort, guerrilla warfare. We face a planetary ecological emergency. Misery and premature death from ecological collapse is all our fates unless we together and all at once resist ecocide. If we all rush and dismantle a coal mine or old forest logging operation, and when asked who did, we respond we all did, we will have won. To speak of sustaining ecology while pursuing anything less than the destruction and overthrow of the industrial growth machine is greenwash and subject itself to being destroyed. The only hope for surviving and regenerating from ecology’s burst bubble is to stop destroying ecosystems and change how we live – including more sustainability, equity and justice. Maybe people aren’t ready for what I have to say, but I am going to keep saying it because it is ecology truth vital for shared human and all life’s survival. At times it is hard to be heard because I and my organization Ecological Internet refuse to sugar coat our message as we take on difficult issues with ecological science based diagnoses and recommendations. In a world of so much hurt, pain and illness; it is outrageous to futilely cling to an industrial consumer way of living that destroys ecology, people and all that is good and necessary to simply live. Do not wait for others to heal yourself or your relationship with Earth. You have to start now and work harder at both, doing what your conscience tells you is necessary, and taking full responsibility for doing so.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jefferson et al. 8/21/14 (Catherine, senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, where she led a project on Neuroscience, Conflict and Security. Prior to this she was a research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the University of Sussex, where she also obtained her DPhil, Filippa Lentzos, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, King’s College, Claire Marris, Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College, “Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”‘, http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full) fulltext: Myth 5 Terrorists want to pursue biological weapons for high consequence, mass casualty attacks Underlying the first four myths are certain assumptions about who the terrorists might actually be, what their intentions are, what capabilities they might pursue, and the level of skills and resources available to them. Despite a lack of analysis of the potential adversaries involved in the misuse of life science research, the bioterrorism threat has generally been portrayed in policy circles as an imminent concern, and emphasis is placed on high consequence, mass casualty attacks, performed with “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). For example, in one of the President George W. Bush’s earliest statements following 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks that drew the American people’s attention to the biological weapons threat, he said: Since September 11, America and others have been confronted by the evils these [biological] weapons can inflict. This threat is real and extremely dangerous. Rogue states and terrorists possess these weapons and are willing to use them (58). Later, he set up a WMD Commission and tasked it with examining the threat posed by the nexus of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In its report, this Commission asserted: Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack [(59), p. xv]. Bioterrorism became one of the Bush Administration’s key security concerns over its two terms in office. One estimate of civilian biodefense expenditure across the federal government since 2001 is that more than $70 billion have been spent (60). Despite this, on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks, the former US senators who chaired the WMD Commission, Bob Graham and Jim Talent, released a “report card” on America’s bio-response capabilities that concluded the US was still unprepared to respond to large-scale biological attacks. It also warned: Naturally occurring disease remains a serious biological threat; however, a thinking enemy armed with these same pathogens — or with multi-drug-resistant or synthetically engineered pathogens — could produce catastrophic consequences. A small team of individuals with graduate training in several key disciplines, using equipment readily available for purchase on the Internet could produce the type of bioweapons created by nation-states in the 1960s. Even more troubling, the rapid advances in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology, will allow non-state actors to produce increasingly powerful bioweapons in the future [(61), p. 11]. We see here how the myths we previously discussed, about de-skilling and increased access, and about the ease of designing new dangerous pathogens, underlie concerns about terrorists’ potential ability to launch a mass attack, and how these are connected, by actors, with the advent of synthetic biology. The senators were not alone in their assessments. For instance, the US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist made a similar warning in an earlier speech outlining the global threat of infectious disease and bioterrorism, and the need to better prepare the US and the world to respond to epidemics and outbreaks: No intelligence agency, no matter how astute, and no military, no matter how powerful and dedicated, can assure that a few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment in a small and apparently innocuous setting cannot mount a first-order biological attack … Never have we had to fight such a battle, to protect so many people against so many threats that are so silent and so lethal (62). Similar messages were reinforced at the highest level. Addressing BWC members at their five-yearly meeting in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: The advances in science and technology make it […] easier for states and non-state actors to develop biological weapons. A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology (63). She also acknowledged, however, that not everyone in the international community shared the US assessment: I know there are some in the international community who have their doubts about the odds of a mass biological attack or major outbreak. They point out that we have not seen either so far, and conclude the risk must be low. But that is not the conclusion of the United States, because there are warning signs, and they are too serious to ignore (63). The belief that the focus should be on mass attacks was bluntly stated by an FBI agent at a symposium on synthetic biology this year (1st May), when she warned: “These technologies do not just pose a risk to individual buildings or cities, but if cleverly deployed, can reduce our population by significant percentages” (64). Challenges to Myth 5 There are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the intention of would-be terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons programs. While most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and very present, they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be very small (65). This is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low casualty events aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than excessive death tolls: (i) the Rajneesh cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters and make them stay away from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95 attempted use of botulinum toxin and anthrax by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; (iii) and the “anthrax letters” sent to media outlets and members of US Congress in 2001 resulting in at least 22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67). The second dimension to Myth 5 is the implicit assumption that producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and developing a suitable dissemination method. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers. Drawing from her in-depth study of the Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains: Scaling up fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions and susceptible to change — and viruses are more sensitive than bacteria — has been one of the stiffest challenges for past bioweapons programs to overcome, even with appropriate expertise at hand. Scaling-up requires a gradual approach, moving from laboratory sample, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production, and then to even larger-scale production. During each stage, the production parameters need to be tested and often modified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire scaling-up process can take several years (68). The dissemination of biological agents also poses difficult technical challenges. Whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless the skin has already been broken. Biological agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection. To expose large numbers of people through the gastrointestinal tract, possible means of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet neither of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban reservoirs are usually unguarded, but unless terrorists added massive quantities of biological agent, the dilution effect would be so great that no healthy person drinking the water would receive an infectious dose (66). Moreover, modern sanitary techniques such as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill pathogens from natural sources and would probably be equally effective against a deliberately released agent. Bacterial contamination of the food supply is also unlikely to inflict mass casualties. Cooking, boiling, pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally sufficient to kill pathogenic bacteria. The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an invisible cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by large numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely populated urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simultaneously. After an incubation period of a few days, depending on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed population would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or fatal illness. Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome. To infect through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in size—between 1 and 5 μm in diameter. Terrorists would therefore have to develop or acquire a sophisticated delivery system capable of generating an aerosol cloud with the necessary particle size range and a high enough agent concentration to cover a broad area. Overall, an important trade-off exists between ease of production and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to produce microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the ground so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized. In contrast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then milled into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the drying and milling process is technically difficult. The Aum Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67, 69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed unknown, but probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol (most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis from the roof of the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the eight-story building, each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were filled with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude below that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol). In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around the Kanagawa prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to prosecutors’ statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing, amongst other equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier, DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each having about a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the Aum was unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step toward an effective bioweapon. If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved, the effective delivery of biological agents in the open air is highly dependent on atmospheric and wind conditions, creating additional uncertainties. Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled, rather than being rapidly dispersed. Moreover, most microorganisms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot survive more than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time attacks. One major exception is anthrax, which can be induced to form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of course, stage a biological attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena. Such an attack, if it involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people, but even here the technical hurdles would by no means be trivial.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Producing a pathogen isn’t the same as producing a bioweapon—tons of logistical barriers - zero historical evidence for this impact</h4><p><strong>Jefferson et al.<u></strong> </u>8/21/<strong>14</strong> (Catherine, senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, where she led a project on Neuroscience, Conflict and Security. Prior to this she was a research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the University of Sussex, where she also obtained her DPhil, Filippa Lentzos, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, King’s College, Claire Marris, Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College, “Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”‘, http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full)</p><p><u><strong>Myth 5 Terrorists want to pursue biological weapons for high consequence, mass casualty attacks </u></strong>Underlying the first four myths are certain assumptions about who the terrorists might actually be, what their intentions are, what capabilities they might pursue, and the level of skills and resources available to them. Despite a lack of analysis of the potential adversaries involved in the misuse of life science research, the bioterrorism threat has generally been portrayed in policy circles as an imminent concern, and emphasis is placed on high consequence, mass casualty attacks, performed with “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). For example, in one of the President George W. Bush’s earliest statements following 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks that drew the American people’s attention to the biological weapons threat, he said: Since September 11, America and others have been confronted by the evils these [biological] weapons can inflict. This threat is real and extremely dangerous. Rogue states and terrorists possess these weapons and are willing to use them (58). Later, he set up a WMD Commission and tasked it with examining the threat posed by the nexus of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In its report, this Commission asserted: Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack [(59), p. xv]. Bioterrorism became one of the Bush Administration’s key security concerns over its two terms in office. One estimate of civilian biodefense expenditure across the federal government since 2001 is that more than $70 billion have been spent (60). Despite this, on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks, the former US senators who chaired the WMD Commission, Bob Graham and Jim Talent, released a “report card” on America’s bio-response capabilities that concluded the US was still unprepared to respond to large-scale biological attacks. It also warned: Naturally occurring disease remains a serious biological threat; however, a thinking enemy armed with these same pathogens — or with multi-drug-resistant or synthetically engineered pathogens — could produce catastrophic consequences. A small team of individuals with graduate training in several key disciplines, using equipment readily available for purchase on the Internet could produce the type of bioweapons created by nation-states in the 1960s. Even more troubling, the rapid advances in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology, will allow non-state actors to produce increasingly powerful bioweapons in the future [(61), p. 11]. We see here how the myths we previously discussed, about de-skilling and increased access, and about the ease of designing new dangerous pathogens, underlie concerns about terrorists’ potential ability to launch a mass attack, and how these are connected, by actors, with the advent of synthetic biology. The senators were not alone in their assessments. For instance, the US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist made a similar warning in an earlier speech outlining the global threat of infectious disease and bioterrorism, and the need to better prepare the US and the world to respond to epidemics and outbreaks: No intelligence agency, no matter how astute, and no military, no matter how powerful and dedicated, can assure that a few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment in a small and apparently innocuous setting cannot mount a first-order biological attack … Never have we had to fight such a battle, to protect so many people against so many threats that are so silent and so lethal (62). Similar messages were reinforced at the highest level. Addressing BWC members at their five-yearly meeting in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: The advances in science and technology make it […] easier for states and non-state actors to develop biological weapons. A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology (63). She also acknowledged, however, that not everyone in the international community shared the US assessment: I know there are some in the international community who have their doubts about the odds of a mass biological attack or major outbreak. They point out that we have not seen either so far, and conclude the risk must be low. But that is not the conclusion of the United States, because there are warning signs, and they are too serious to ignore (63). The belief that the focus should be on mass attacks was bluntly stated by an FBI agent at a symposium on synthetic biology this year (1st May), when she warned: “These technologies do not just pose a risk to individual buildings or cities, but if cleverly deployed, can reduce our population by significant percentages” (64). <u><strong>Challenges to Myth 5 </u></strong>There are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the intention of would-be terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons programs. While most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation <u><mark>experts</u></mark> believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and very present, they <u><mark>consider</mark> the <mark>risk of</mark> sophisticated large-scale <mark>bioterrorism attacks to be </mark>very <mark>small</u></mark> (65). <u>This is <mark>backed up by <strong>historical evidence</u></strong></mark>. The <u>three confirmed attempts</u> to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past <u>were small-scale, low casualty events aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than excessive death tolls</u>: (i) the <u>Rajneesh</u> cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters and make them stay away from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95 attempted use of botulinum toxin and anthrax by the Japanese <u>Aum Shinrikyo</u> cult; (iii) <u>and the “anthrax letters”</u> sent to media outlets and members of US Congress in 2001 resulting in at least 22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67). <u>The second dimension to Myth 5 is the implicit <strong>assumption that producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not</u></strong>. <u>Considerable <mark>knowledge</mark> <mark>and resources are necessary for</mark> the processes of <mark>scaling up, storage, and developing</mark> a suitable <mark>dissemination method</u></mark>. <u>These <mark>processes present <strong>significant technical and logistical barriers</u></strong></mark>. Drawing from her in-depth study of the Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains: <u><mark>Scaling up</mark> fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions and susceptible to change</u> — and viruses are more sensitive than bacteria — <u>has <mark>been</mark> one of the stiffest <mark>challenges for past bioweapons</mark> programs to overcome, <strong><mark>even with appropriate expertise at hand</u></strong></mark>. <u>Scaling-up requires a gradual approach, moving from laboratory sample, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production, and then to even larger-scale production</u>. During each stage, the <u>production parameters need to be tested and often modified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire scaling-up process can take several years</u> (68). The <u>dissemination</u> of biological agents also <u>poses difficult technical challenges</u>. Whereas <u>persistent chemical agents</u> such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas <u>are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless the skin has already been broken</u>. <u>Biological agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection</u>. To expose large numbers of people through the gastrointestinal tract, possible means of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet neither of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban reservoirs are usually unguarded, but <u>unless terrorists added massive quantities of biological agent, the <mark>dilution effect would be so great</mark> that <mark>no healthy person drinking</mark> the <mark>water would receive an infectious dose</u></mark> (66). Moreover, <u>modern sanitary techniques such as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill pathogens from natural sources and would probably be equally effective against a deliberately released agent</u>. Bacterial contamination of the food supply is also unlikely to inflict mass casualties. <u>Cooking, boiling, pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally sufficient to kill pathogenic bacteria</u>. The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an invisible cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by large numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely populated urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simultaneously. After an incubation period of a few days, depending on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed population would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or fatal illness. <u>Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome. To infect through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in size</u>—between 1 and 5 μm in diameter. <u><mark>Terrorists would</mark> therefore <mark>have to develop</mark> or acquire a <strong><mark>sophisticated delivery system capable of</mark> <mark>generating</mark> an <mark>aerosol cloud with</mark> the <mark>necessary particle size range and a high enough agent concentration</mark> to cover a broad area</u></strong>. Overall, <u>an important trade-off exists between ease of production and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to produce microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the ground so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized</u>. In contrast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then milled into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the drying and milling process is technically difficult. The Aum Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67, 69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed unknown, but probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol (most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis from the roof of the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the eight-story building, each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were filled with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude below that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol). In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around the Kanagawa prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to prosecutors’ statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing, amongst other equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier, DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each having about a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the Aum was unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step toward an effective bioweapon. <u>If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved</u>, the <u><mark>effective delivery of biological agents</mark> in the open air is <mark>highly dependent on atmospheric</mark> and wind <mark>conditions, creating</mark> <mark>additional uncertainties</u>.</mark> <u>Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled, rather than being rapidly dispersed</u>. Moreover, <u>most microorganisms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot survive more than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time attacks</u>. One major exception is anthrax, which can be induced to form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of course, stage a biological attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena. Such an attack, if it involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people, but even here the technical hurdles would by no means be trivial.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Adam Klein 17, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security, “Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on The FISA Amendments Act: Reauthorizing America’s Vital National Security Authority and Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties,” 06/27/17, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=808335 fulltext: Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. Our nation faces an unusually complex array of national security threats, ranging from adversary powers, to non-state terrorist groups, to cyber intruders whose identities are often unclear. Recently retired Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said last year that in his 50-year career in intelligence, he could not “recall a more diverse array of challenges and crises than we confront today.”1 The American people are fortunate to have the world’s most capable intelligence services to confront these threats. Our intelligence agencies carry out the signals intelligence mission under what the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies described as a system of “oversight, review, and checks-and-balances” that “reduce[s] the risk that elements of the Intelligence Community would operate outside of the law.”2 The Review Group, which President Obama commissioned in the wake of the 2013 leaks to review U.S. signals intelligence activities, emphasized in its report that it had found “no evidence of illegality or other abuse of authority for the purpose of targeting domestic political activity.”3 That accords with other reports that have recognized the culture of compliance and legal oversight at NSA.4 Most importantly, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board found “no evidence of intentional abuse” in its review of Section 702.5 At the same time, the 2013 disclosures revealed that the scale of government data collection—even collection that was lawful and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—was greater than most Americans would have anticipated given the available public information, including the text of the relevant statutes. The resulting climate of skepticism, at home and abroad, continues to harm U.S. interests in various ways.6 Recent controversies involving leaks and alleged partisan unmasking of U.S.-person identifiers have amplified and broadened this skepticism. This is not merely a civil liberties problem: Public skepticism is also a problem for national security, because public trust is the foundation on which national security powers, including Section 702, ultimately rest. Needed surveillance authorities will be politically sustainable only if the public believes that they are necessary, appropriate, and lawful. For that reason, strengthening public confidence in the legal and institutional controls on surveillance powers should be seen as a national security imperative. The challenge is how to strengthen transparency, privacy, oversight, and ultimately public confidence without harming needed national security capabilities. In a Center for a New American Security report, Surveillance Policy: A Pragmatic Agenda for 2017 and Beyond, coauthors Michèle Flournoy, Richard Fontaine, and I offered 61 recommendations to build public trust, increase transparency, and strengthen oversight, while preserving important intelligence and counterterrorism tools. This testimony suggests a number of ways the Committee can advance these goals while reauthorizing Section 702. II. SECTION 702’S VALUE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY In our report, my co-authors and I concluded, based on the available unclassified sources, that Section 702 “has become a vital intelligence tool, is legitimate in its basic contours, and is subject to adequate transparency in many, but not all, respects.”7 For that reason, we recommended that Section 702 be reauthorized with existing statutory authorities intact. The Committee has access to classified information documenting Section 702’s value for foreign intelligence and counterterrorism, but most Americans do not. This section briefly summarizes for the general public the unclassified assessments that my co-authors and I found persuasive in reaching our judgment. The most significant unclassified review of Section 702’s efficacy and legality remains the landmark 2014 report by the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.8 The Board’s five members, three Democrats and two Republicans, received classified briefings from the implementing agencies, but also consulted with outside civil society groups, academics, and technology companies. The Board documented its findings and conclusions in a 160-page report, which explained to the American public many previously classified details about how 702 operates: the program’s downstream (PRISM) and upstream components, the court-approved targeting and minimization procedures that constrain agencies’ use of these tools and the data they generate, and the multi-layered oversight system that ensures compliance. After this review, the Board unanimously reached a measured but broadly positive conclusion about the overall utility, lawfulness, and oversight of Section 702: “[T]he information the program collects has been valuable and effective in protecting the nation’s security and producing useful foreign intelligence. The program has operated under a statute that was publicly debated, and the text of the statute outlines the basic structure of the program. Operation of the Section 702 program has been subject to judicial oversight and extensive internal supervision, and the Board has found no evidence of intentional abuse.”9 Publicly available statistics declassified by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence suggest that Section 702 has become a central foreign intelligence tool. Overall, in 2016, the intelligence community targeted 106,469 overseas individuals, groups, or entities under Section 702, up from 94,368 last year. 10 That is compared to only 1,687 targets of court orders issued under “traditional” FISA.11 While this is not an apples-to-apples comparison, it does give a rough sense of the significance of Section 702 for our foreign intelligence enterprise. The available evidence also indicates that Section 702 has been a particularly significant tool for counterterrorism. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reported that, as of 2014, “over a quarter of the NSA’s reports concerning international terrorism include information based in whole or in part on Section 702 collection, and this percentage has increased every year since the statute was enacted.”12 The Board also found that 702 “has led the government to identify previously unknown individuals who are involved in international terrorism” and that it “has played a key role in discovering and disrupting specific terrorist plots aimed at the United States and other countries.”13 NSA has described Section 702 as the “most significant tool in the NSA collection arsenal for the detection, identification, and disruption of terrorist threats to the U.S. and around the world.”14 In several publicly reported cases, 702 is known to have played a key role in a significant counterterrorism success. The best-known case is that of Najibullah Zazi, a Colorado resident who emailed an al Qaeda courier in Pakistan seeking advice on building explosives. Fortunately, the courier’s email was being collected by NSA under Section 702. That collection enabled the FBI to identify Zazi and arrest him and his co-conspirators before they could execute their “imminent plans” to bomb the New York City subway.15 Mohamed Mohamud, an Oregon resident, communicated with a foreigner abroad who was targeted under 702. Alerted by that contact, the FBI began investigating Mohamud, who was ultimately convicted of trying to bomb Portland’s annual Christmas Tree Lighting ceremony.16 Most recently, Director of National Intelligence Coats reported that intelligence from Section 702 enabled U.S. Special Forces to track down Abd alRahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka “Hajji Imam”), a top-level member of ISIS’s leadership in Syria. The IC provided several additional real-world examples in a recent Fact Sheet. 17 It is important to note, however, that Section 702’s value for counterterrorism cannot be measured solely in terms of specific, identifiable plots disrupted. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board explained that “[m]onitoring terrorist networks under Section 702 has enabled the government to learn how they operate, and to understand their priorities, strategies, and tactics.”18 These broader insights are enormously valuable in the global struggle against terrorist groups. Moreover, intelligence operations and analytic assessments typically rely on a mosaic of sources, meaning that it is often hard to identify one source as exclusively responsible for a given success. Taking a significant piece out of the broader mosaic of information available to our intelligence agencies will make our efforts against terrorism, espionage, cyber intrusions, counterproliferation, and other intelligence challenges less effective. That effect may be hard to quantify, but the publicly available evidence suggests that it would be significant.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Backlash threatens the <u>mosaic approach</u>---denying <u>key pieces</u> for countering <u>cyber</u> and <u>WMD terror</h4><p></u>Adam <strong>Klein 17</strong>, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security, “Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on The FISA Amendments Act: Reauthorizing America’s Vital National Security Authority and Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties,” 06/27/17, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=808335</p><p>Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. <u>Our nation faces an unusually complex array of national security threats, ranging from <strong>adversary</strong> power<strong>s,</strong> to <strong>non-state terror</strong>ist groups<strong>,</strong> to <strong>cyber intruders</strong> whose identities are often unclear</u>. Recently retired Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said last year that in his 50-year career in intelligence, he could not “recall a more diverse array of challenges and crises than we confront today.”1 </p><p>The American people are <u>fortunate to have the world’s most capable <strong>intel</strong>ligence services to <strong>confront these</strong> threats. Our intelligence agencies carry out the signals intelligence mission under</u> what the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies described as a system of “<u>oversight, review, and checks-and-balances</u>” that “reduce[s] the risk that elements of the Intelligence Community would operate outside of the law.”2 The Review Group, which President Obama commissioned in the wake of the 2013 leaks to review U.S. signals intelligence activities, emphasized in its report that it had found “no evidence of illegality or other abuse of authority for the purpose of targeting domestic political activity.”3 That accords with other reports that have recognized the culture of compliance and legal oversight at NSA.4 Most importantly, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board found “no evidence of intentional abuse” in its review of Section 702.5 </p><p>At the same time, the 2013 disclosures revealed that the scale of government data collection—even collection that was lawful and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—was greater than most Americans would have anticipated given the available public information, including the text of the relevant statutes. <u>The resulting climate of <strong>skepticism</strong>, at home and abroad, continues to <strong>harm U.S. interests</strong> in various ways</u>.6 <u>Recent controversies involving leaks and <strong>alleged <mark>partisan</mark> unmasking</strong> of U.S.-person identifiers have <strong>amplified</strong> and <strong>broadened</strong> this <strong>skepticism</u></strong>. </p><p>This is not merely a civil liberties problem: <u>Public <strong><mark>skepticism</strong> is</u></mark> also <u><mark>a problem</mark> for national security, because public <strong><mark>trust</strong> is the <strong>foundation</strong> on which national security powers</mark>, including Section 702, ultimately <mark>rest. <strong>Needed surveillance</strong></mark> authorities <mark>will be <strong>politically sustainable only if the public believes</mark> that <mark>they are</mark> necessary, <mark>appropriate</mark>, and lawful</strong>. For that reason, <strong><mark>strengthening</mark> public <mark>confidence in</strong></mark> the legal and <strong><mark>institutional controls</strong></mark> on surveillance powers <mark>should be</mark> seen as a national security <strong><mark>imperative</u></strong></mark>. </p><p><u>The challenge is how to strengthen transparency, privacy, oversight, and ultimately public confidence <strong>without harming</strong> needed national security capabilities</u>. In a Center for a New American Security report, Surveillance Policy: A Pragmatic Agenda for 2017 and Beyond, coauthors Michèle Flournoy, Richard Fontaine, and I offered 61 recommendations to build public trust, increase transparency, and strengthen oversight, while preserving important intelligence and counterterrorism tools. This testimony suggests a number of ways the Committee can advance these goals while reauthorizing Section 702. </p><p>II. SECTION 702’S VALUE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY </p><p>In our report, my co-authors and I concluded, based on the available unclassified sources, that Section 702 “has become a vital intelligence tool, is legitimate in its basic contours, and is subject to adequate transparency in many, but not all, respects.”7 For that reason, we recommended that Section 702 be reauthorized with existing statutory authorities intact. </p><p>The Committee has access to classified information documenting Section 702’s value for foreign intelligence and counterterrorism, but most Americans do not. This section briefly summarizes for the general public the unclassified assessments that my co-authors and I found persuasive in reaching our judgment. </p><p>The most significant unclassified review of Section 702’s efficacy and legality remains the landmark 2014 report by the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.8 The Board’s five members, three Democrats and two Republicans, received classified briefings from the implementing agencies, but also consulted with outside civil society groups, academics, and technology companies. The Board documented its findings and conclusions in a 160-page report, which explained to the American public many previously classified details about how 702 operates: the program’s downstream (PRISM) and upstream components, the court-approved targeting and minimization procedures that constrain agencies’ use of these tools and the data they generate, and the multi-layered oversight system that ensures compliance. </p><p>After this review, the Board unanimously reached a measured but broadly positive conclusion about the overall utility, lawfulness, and oversight of Section 702: </p><p>“[T]he information the program collects has been valuable and effective in protecting the nation’s security and producing useful foreign intelligence. The program has operated under a statute that was publicly debated, and the text of the statute outlines the basic structure of the program. Operation of the Section 702 program has been subject to judicial oversight and extensive internal supervision, and the Board has found no evidence of intentional abuse.”9 </p><p><u>Publicly available <strong><mark>stat</strong></mark>istic<strong><mark>s</strong></mark> declassified by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence <mark>suggest</mark> that Section 702 has become a central foreign intelligence tool. Overall, in 2016, the intelligence community targeted 106,469 overseas individuals, groups, or entities under Section 702, up from 94,368 last year. 10 That is compared to only 1,687 targets of court orders issued under “traditional” <strong><mark>FISA</u></strong></mark>.11 While this is not an apples-to-apples comparison, it does <u>give a rough sense of the significance of Section 702 for our foreign intelligence enterprise</u>. </p><p><u>The available <strong>evidence</strong> also indicates that Section 702 has been a particularly significant tool <strong><mark>for counterterror</strong></mark>ism</u>. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reported that, as of 2014, “<u>over a quarter of the NSA’s reports concerning international terrorism include information based in whole or in part on Section 702 collection, and this percentage has increased every year</u> since the statute was enacted.”12 The Board also found that <u>702 “has led the government to identify previously unknown individuals who are involved in international <strong>terror</strong>ism” and that it “has <strong><mark>played a key</strong> role in</mark> discovering and <strong><mark>disrupting</strong> specific</mark> terrorist <strong><mark>plots</strong></mark> aimed at the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and other countries</u>.”13 <u>NSA has described Section 702 as <mark>the “<strong>most significant tool</strong> in the</mark> NSA collection <mark>arsenal</mark> for the detection, identification, and disruption of terrorist threats to the U.S. and around the world</u>.”14 </p><p><u>In several publicly reported cases, 702 is known to have played a key role in a significant counterterrorism success. The best-known case is that of Najibullah Zazi, a Colorado resident who emailed an al Qaeda courier in Pakistan seeking advice on building explosives. Fortunately, the courier’s email was being collected by NSA under Section 702. That collection enabled the FBI to identify Zazi and arrest him and his co-conspirators before they could execute their “imminent plans” to bomb the New York City subway.15 Mohamed Mohamud, an Oregon resident, communicated with a foreigner abroad who was targeted under 702. Alerted by that contact, the FBI began investigating Mohamud, who was ultimately convicted of trying to bomb Portland’s annual Christmas Tree Lighting ceremony.16 Most recently, Director of National Intelligence Coats reported that intelligence from Section 702 enabled U.S. Special Forces to track down Abd alRahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka “Hajji Imam”), a top-level member of ISIS’s leadership in Syria. The IC provided several additional real-world examples in a recent Fact Sheet. 17 </p><p></u>It is important to note, however, that <u>Section 702’s value for counterterrorism cannot be measured solely in terms of specific, identifiable plots disrupted</u>. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board explained that “<u>[m]onitoring terrorist networks under Section 702 has enabled the government to learn how they operate, and to understand their priorities, strategies, and tactics</u>.”18 <u>These broader insights are enormously valuable in the global struggle against terrorist groups. Moreover, <strong><mark>intel</strong></mark>ligence <strong><mark>op</strong></mark>eration<strong><mark>s</strong></mark> and analytic assessments typically <strong><mark>rely on a mosaic</strong> of sources</mark>, meaning that it is often hard to identify one source as exclusively responsible for a given success. </p><p><strong><mark>Taking a</mark> significant <mark>piece out</mark> of the broader mosaic</strong> of information available to our intelligence agencies <mark>will make</mark> our <mark>efforts against <strong>terror</strong></mark>ism, espionage, <strong><mark>cyber</strong></mark> intrusions</u>, counterproliferation, <u><mark>and other</mark> intelligence <mark>challenges <strong>less effective</strong></mark>. That effect may be <strong><mark>hard to quantify</strong>, but</mark> the <strong><mark>public</strong></mark>ly available <strong><mark>ev</strong></mark>idence <mark>suggests</mark> that it would be <strong><mark>significant</strong></mark>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: James Cole 13, who cares it’s a k card, “Terrorism: Realities, Constructs, and Theatre”, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/03/terrorism-realities-constructs-and-theatre/ fulltext: The fourth wave of terrorism is the leviathan of international security, and simultaneously the greatest performance of the 21st century. This wave of terrorism is a performance both in that (1), it has been responsible for unprecedented political spectacles, such as the destruction of the twin towers, and (2), on a metaphysical level it has provided actors a role to play, and has structured their relationships with others as well as with themselves. This paper takes an unconventional approach to the question by looking at how contemporary terrorism originates from the desire to construct identify, but, situates this within the context of the international system’s dependence on macro-securitizations to structure the priorities, assumptions and expectations of international relations. Due to this, terrorism, in the context of the Global War on Terror [GWoT], is simply a temporalized and dialectical phenomenon (Schinkel, 2009, p. 188): it has been installed as the referent object in a pre-existing security framework that works by dividing “us” and “them”. This paper therefore, seeks to make the argument that to measure the threat from terrorism, it is important to assess terrorism as the sum of many elements. These include physical attacks, discourses spoken and visuals presented. More importantly however, this paper seeks to identify that the threat from terrorism largely comes from the need for a macro-securitization, which necessitate the construction of a relationship with an “other”. To achieve this, this paper proceeds in three parts: firstly, with an outline of the “objective” reality of terrorism; secondly, an exploration of the necessity of an “other” in Western philosophy; finally, with a detailed assessment into the construction of terrorism as a threat, by looking at the process of macro-securitization. It will then be summarised that the threat from terrorism comes from the need to construct an “other”, and that to measure the size, it is necessary to also recognise the process and elements used to securitize the threat. The securitization of terrorism relies on more than simply the physical threat from terrorism. Nevertheless, without a physical threat, a securitizing actor’s speech act would lack legitimacy. Thus, with a largely Western bias, this section seeks to recognise the threat from terrorism as a physical phenomenon. However, this section will also provide evidence for the argument that terrorism, especially in the West, is largely a constructed threat; as individuals ‘are 6 times more likely to die from hot weather than from a terrorist attack’ (Jones, 2013). The recent Boston bombing is a useful example to identify the context in which the threat of contemporary terrorism is situated, and is indicative of those perceived to be responsible for its perpetration. Khaled Beydoun argues that the ‘interim moments, between catastrophe and discovering the real culprits, define what it means to be Arab and Muslim-American today’ (Beydoun, 2013). Simply put, Beydoun refers to the fact that: (1), despite a lack of evidence, there was a significant volume of responses questioning if AQ were responsible, and (2), recent investigations are now probing into what extent the AQ propagandist magazine Inspire influenced the bombers (Horwitz, 2013). This assumption is statistically the most obvious one to arrive at, due to the fact that Sunni extremists [of which AQ are a section] have: (1), ranked highest in terms of casualties inflicted through terrorism, (2), were responsible for 56% of terrorist attacks in 2011, and (3), have caused 70% of the fatalities from terrorism (U.S. Department of State , 2011). However, it is equally important to recognise the context in which these claims are made, as the West constantly presents the idea that AQ wants to harm ‘us’. As examples, the UK’s security agency MI5 remarks that ‘Al Qaeda represents the biggest threat to the UK’ (MI5, 2013); the UK’s Home Office has claimed that they ‘know’ groups like ‘Al-Qaeda are determined to exploit our openness to attack us, and plot to kill as many of our citizens as possible’ (UK Home Office , 2011). This perception is similarly echoed in US foreign policy which states that ‘Al Qaeda may be plotting additional attacks against the United States at home or overseas’ (NCTC, 2013, p. 4). Despite AQ being portrayed as ‘wanting to hurt the West’, it is necessary to look at the actual victims of terrorist activities in order to further assess if the claims that AQ represents the biggest threat to the UK and US today, can in fact be founded. In terms of an objective assessment it seems they cannot not. The victims of terrorist activities can be narrowed down to specific countries; in some cases they can be narrowed down to single regions. For example, in 2011, around 10,00 terrorist attacks took place in the world. Yet over half of these were isolated to Afghanistan and Iraq, with Europe and the Western Hemisphere experiencing just over 1,000 (U.S. Department of State , 2011). An even more recent example to use is that of Pakistan. Within Pakistan, so far in 2013, there have been 2155 fatalities as a result of terrorist attacks. However, out of the eight regions of Pakistan, two are disproportionately affected. In terms of casualties, 955 were located in the FATA and 556 in the Sindh region; the Gilgit-Baltistan region only suffering 2, and the Azad Kashmir region experiencing none (South Asia Terrorism Portal , 2013). Moreover, non-Westerners are 38 times more likely to be killed by an AQ attack than Westerners (Musharbash, 2009). In fact, in the West, more people die from accidents than do people worldwide, from pre-meditated terrorist attacks (Rogers, 2011). In addition, whilst Sunni extremists may have inflicted 70% of fatalities from terrorist attacks, the Animal and Earth liberation fronts have conducted 2200% more terrorist attacks on American soil since 2001 (START, 2012, p. 26). However, these do not attract the same rhetoric as the GWoT. Finally, to return to the Boston bombings as an example, it must be remembered that this represents the first attack by internationally linked terrorists on American soil in 12 years. Therefore, America is evidently not perpetually plagued by terrorism. Thus, what begins to emerge is a picture in which it is possible to identify (1) groups responsible for, (2) victims of, and (3) locations of terrorist attacks. However, the claims made by Western governments, such as the UK and US, do not necessarily correlate to the statistics showing that (1) mainly non-westerns are victims of terrorist activities, and (2), the majority of terrorist attacks occur outside of Western sovereign territory. Therefore, it is now the aim of this paper to explore the idea that, whilst the physical threat from terrorism is less in the West, it is simply a single essential element in the overall securitization and presentation of terrorism as ‘the biggest threat to the UK’. Having put forth the argument that terrorism is a threat but not to the extent it is presented, this next section seeks to assess terrorism as a necessary threat. The argument presented is that the West requires the existence of an “other” in order to form a stable identity, that in turn, allows it to practice sovereignty, security and war. To talk about identity is to shift the debate surrounding the GWoT into the context of an international epistemological and ontological crisis, and, as David Campbell argues, the ‘crisis of international politics is now very much a crisis of representation’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 169). This paper utilises the post-structuralist argument that, no stable identity exists to show why the macro-securitization of the GWoT, stems from the lack of foundation to knowledge and the need to secure an “other”. This paper agrees with the post-structural critique of positivism that no foundations for knowledge exist, and thus, the international paradigm of McWorld and Jihad is not an objective reality (Barber, 1992). This may be a nihilistic statement, which would receive critique from the like of Keohane, who argues that ‘a debate at the purely theoretical level … will take us away from our subject matter’ (Keohane in Walker, 1993, pp. 99-100). However, the ambiguity of identity has too often been dismissed in order to ‘investigate “serious” questions of international relations’ (Weber, 1995, p. 2). When these ‘serious’ questions lead to the U.S. spending $1.28 trillion on counter-terrorism (Stein, 2011), surely they should be questioned? Walker argues that ‘despite all appearances, sovereignty is not a permanent principle of political order; the appearance of permanence is simply an effect of complex practices’ (Walker, 1993, p. 163), and the GWoT is one of these complex practices. Ashley further argues that: ‘the desperate longing for sovereign foundations for the interpretation of practices of politics is today anything but an exclusive preoccupation of modern theories. It is a preoccupation in evidence throughout the entirety of modern culture’ (Ashley, 1988, p. 255). Therefore, what may be clear now is: the threat of terrorism may come from the FATA of Pakistan, but it similarly emerges from the need to put on a performance, as to not expose the lack of foundations knowledge has. Simply put, to remain employed, the actors in the GWoT seek to make the audience believe that their performance is in fact reality. This denial of a secure ontology raises problems for international relations as, ‘how can international relations speak of such foundational concepts such as the state, security, war, danger, sovereignty and so on? [and] After all, isn’t security determined by the requirements of a pre-existing sovereignty state and war conducted in its name as a response to objective danger?’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 111). Recognising the arbitrary nature of many Western concepts could undermine the project of modernity, the conception of the international system being occupied by sovereign states would be destroyed. The Western state, therefore, needs to constantly practice representation as, to cease ‘would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations [and] stasis would be death’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 12). The GWoT thus comes from the fear of death; not of individuals from an actual terrorist attack, but the death of the state. To escape death, the modern state utilises the heroic practice, rather than having to recognise it has no stable identity. It therefore creates an “other” to situate itself against. Ashley’s conception of the heroic practice involves placing competing terms in hierarchical opposition where: ‘[one] term is privileged as a higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the [other] term is understood only in a derivative and negative way, as a failure to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers this ideal’ (Ashley, 1988, p. 230). It is further argued that without boundaries, ‘”we” cannot say for sure who “we” are because “we” cannot decide what must be the exclusionary boundaries of the remembered inheritance to which “we” … must pay respects’ (Ashley & Walker, 1990, p. 387). Boundaries are created between the inside/outside. Therefore, ‘the disciplinary practice of creating boundaries and dichotomous relationships is practiced in order to reaffirm the reality of the inside and ‘constitutive of our modern understanding of political space’ (Walker, 1993, p. 174). In the context of the GWoT, this is most apparent in Bush’s declaration of ‘you are with us or you are against us’ almost immediately after 9/11. The heroic practice in terms of the GWoT has simultaneously portrayed the state and liberal ideals in a hierarchy, with the non-state associations and the religious motives of fourth wave terrorism. However this practice has allowed the ‘higher reality’ to continue unquestioned. As a consequence of the heroic practice, identity is created in relation to difference (Campbell, 1992, p. 9). Due to the hierarchy imposed, ‘difference’ often means ‘danger’. International relations, therefore, ‘involves little more than an endless parlaying of representation of danger’ (Ashley, 1989, p. 311), and as Campbell argues, ‘state identity is secured through discourses of danger’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 51). The concept of the non-state terrorist is, therefore, used as the opposite to the state. This need to represent the “other” helps explain why the macro-securitizations explored later, work best when they are structured in binary opposites. When terrorism became the biggest threat in international relations within 10 years of the end of the Cold War, it filled a void that, if left unfilled, could have seen the demise of the project of modernity. After the Cold War, there was no shortage of potential candidates for new discourses of danger, such as drugs, the environment or humanitarian crises (Campbell, 1992, p. 170). Simply put, the GWoT was not only in the right place at the right time, but also fulfilled the criteria of being able to create an “other”. This may explain why the environment has not been as successfully securitized, despite presenting a more obvious and irreversible danger (Brown & Oliver, 2004). This equally explains why China may present itself as the security concern that displaces terrorism (Buzan, 2006).<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Securitizing terrorists is probably definitely bad</h4><p>James <strong>Cole 13</strong>, who cares it’s a k card, “Terrorism: Realities, Constructs, and Theatre”, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/03/terrorism-realities-constructs-and-theatre/</p><p>The fourth wave of <u><mark>terrorism is the</u></mark> leviathan of international security, and simultaneously the <u><strong><mark>greatest performance of the 21st century</u></strong></mark>. This wave of terrorism is a performance both in that (1), <u><mark>it has been responsible for unprecedented political spectacles</u></mark>, such as the destruction of the twin towers, and (2), <u><strong><mark>on a metaphysical level it has provided actors a role to play</u></strong></mark>, and has structured their relationships with others as well as with themselves. This paper takes an unconventional approach to the question by looking at how contemporary terrorism originates from the desire to construct identify, but, situates this within the context of the <u><mark>international system’s dependence on macro-securitizations</u></mark> to structure the priorities, assumptions and expectations of international relations. Due to this, <u><mark>terrorism</u></mark>, in the context of the Global War on Terror [GWoT], <u><mark>is simply a temporalized and dialectical phenomenon</u></mark> (Schinkel, 2009, p. 188): it has been <u><strong><mark>installed as the referent object in a pre-existing security framework that works by dividing “us” and “them</u></strong></mark>”. This paper therefore, seeks to make the argument that to measure the threat from terrorism, it is important to assess terrorism as the sum of many elements. These include physical attacks, discourses spoken and visuals presented. More importantly however, this paper seeks to identify that <u><strong><mark>the threat from terrorism largely comes from the need for a macro-securitization</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>which necessitate the construction of</u></mark> a relationship with <u><mark>an “other”.</u></mark> To achieve this, this paper proceeds in three parts: firstly, with an outline of the “objective” reality of terrorism; secondly, an exploration of the necessity of an “other” in Western philosophy; finally, with a detailed assessment into the construction of terrorism as a threat, by looking at the process of macro-securitization. It will then be summarised that the threat from terrorism comes from the need to construct an “other”, and that to measure the size, it is necessary to also recognise the process and elements used to securitize the threat. The <u><mark>securitization of terrorism relies on</u></mark> more than simply the physical threat from terrorism. Nevertheless, without a physical threat, a securitizing actor’s speech act would lack legitimacy. Thus, with<u><strong><mark> a largely Western bias,</u></strong></mark> this section seeks to recognise the threat from terrorism as a physical phenomenon. However, this section will also provide <u><mark>evidence for the argument</u></mark> that terrorism, especially in the West, <u><strong><mark>is largely a constructed threat; as individuals ‘are 6 times more likely to die from hot weather than from a terrorist attack’</u></strong></mark> (Jones, 2013). The recent Boston bombing is a useful example to identify the context in which the threat of contemporary terrorism is situated, and is indicative of those perceived to be responsible for its perpetration. Khaled Beydoun argues that the ‘interim moments, between catastrophe and discovering the real culprits, define what it means to be Arab and Muslim-American today’ (Beydoun, 2013). Simply put, Beydoun refers to the fact that: (1), despite a lack of evidence, there was a significant volume of responses questioning if AQ were responsible, and (2), recent investigations are now probing into what extent the AQ propagandist magazine Inspire influenced the bombers (Horwitz, 2013). This assumption is statistically the most obvious one to arrive at, due to the fact that Sunni extremists [of which AQ are a section] have: (1), ranked highest in terms of casualties inflicted through terrorism, (2), were responsible for 56% of terrorist attacks in 2011, and (3), have caused 70% of the fatalities from terrorism (U.S. Department of State , 2011). However, it is equally important to recognise the context in which these claims are made, as the West constantly presents the idea that AQ wants to harm ‘us’. As examples, the UK’s security agency MI5 remarks that ‘Al Qaeda represents the biggest threat to the UK’ (MI5, 2013); the UK’s Home Office has claimed that they ‘know’ groups like ‘Al-Qaeda are determined to exploit our openness to attack us, and plot to kill as many of our citizens as possible’ (UK Home Office , 2011). This perception is similarly echoed in US foreign policy which states that ‘Al Qaeda may be plotting additional attacks against the United States at home or overseas’ (NCTC, 2013, p. 4). Despite AQ being portrayed as ‘wanting to hurt the West’, it is necessary to look at the actual victims of terrorist activities in order to further assess if the claims that AQ represents the biggest threat to the UK and US today, can in fact be founded. In terms of an objective assessment it seems they cannot not. The victims of terrorist activities can be narrowed down to specific countries; in some cases they can be narrowed down to single regions. For example, in 2011, around 10,00 terrorist attacks took place in the world. Yet over half of these were isolated to Afghanistan and Iraq, with Europe and the Western Hemisphere experiencing just over 1,000 (U.S. Department of State , 2011). An even more recent example to use is that of Pakistan. Within Pakistan, so far in 2013, there have been 2155 fatalities as a result of terrorist attacks. However, out of the eight regions of Pakistan, two are disproportionately affected. In terms of casualties, 955 were located in the FATA and 556 in the Sindh region; the Gilgit-Baltistan region only suffering 2, and the Azad Kashmir region experiencing none (South Asia Terrorism Portal , 2013). Moreover, <u><mark>non-Westerners are 38 times more likely to be killed by an AQ attack than Westerners</u></mark> (Musharbash, 2009). In fact, in the West, <u><mark>more people die from accidents</u></mark> than do people worldwide, from pre-meditated terrorist attacks (Rogers, 2011). In addition, whilst Sunni extremists may have inflicted 70% of fatalities from terrorist attacks, the Animal and Earth liberation fronts have conducted 2200% more terrorist attacks on American soil since 2001 (START, 2012, p. 26). However, these do not attract the same rhetoric as the GWoT. Finally, to return to the Boston bombings as an example, it must be remembered that this represents the first attack by internationally linked terrorists on American soil in 12 years. Therefore, America is evidently not perpetually plagued by terrorism. Thus, what begins to emerge is a picture in which it is possible to identify (1) groups responsible for, (2) victims of, and (3) locations of terrorist attacks. However, the claims made by Western governments, such as the UK and US, do not necessarily correlate to the statistics showing that (1) mainly non-westerns are victims of terrorist activities, and (2), the majority of terrorist attacks occur outside of Western sovereign territory. Therefore, it is now the aim of this paper to explore the idea that, whilst the physical threat from terrorism is less in the West, it is simply a single essential element in the overall securitization and presentation of terrorism as ‘the biggest threat to the UK’. Having put forth the argument that <u><strong><mark>terrorism is a threat but not to the extent it is presented</u></strong></mark>, this next section seeks to assess terrorism as a necessary threat. The argument presented is that <u><strong><mark>the West requires the existence of an “other” in order to form a stable identity, that</u></strong></mark> in turn, <u><strong><mark>allows it to practice sovereignty, security and war</u></strong></mark>. To talk about identity is to shift the debate surrounding the GWoT into the context of an international epistemological and ontological crisis, and, as David Campbell argues, <u><mark>the ‘crisis of international politics is now very much a crisis of representation’</u></mark> (Campbell, 1992, p. 169). This paper utilises the post-structuralist argument that, no stable identity exists to show why the macro-securitization of the GWoT, stems from the lack of foundation to knowledge and the need to secure an “other”. This paper agrees with the post<u><mark>-structural critique of positivism that no foundations for knowledge exist</u></mark>, and thus, <u><strong><mark>the international paradigm of McWorld and Jihad is not an objective reality</u></strong></mark> (Barber, 1992). This may be a nihilistic statement, which would receive critique from the like of Keohane, who argues that ‘a debate at the purely theoretical level … will take us away from our subject matter’ (Keohane in Walker, 1993, pp. 99-100). However, the ambiguity of identity has too often been dismissed in order to ‘investigate “serious” questions of international relations’ (Weber, 1995, p. 2). When these ‘serious’ questions lead to the U.S. spending $1.28 trillion on counter-terrorism (Stein, 2011), surely they should be questioned? Walker argues that ‘despite all appearances, sovereignty is not a permanent principle of political order; the appearance of permanence is simply an effect of complex practices’ (Walker, 1993, p. 163), and the GWoT is one of these complex practices. Ashley further argues that: ‘the <u><mark>desperate longing for sovereign foundations</u></mark> for the interpretation of practices of politics <u><mark>is</u></mark> today anything but <u><mark>an exclusive preoccupation of modern theories</u></mark>. It is a preoccupation in evidence throughout the entirety of modern culture’ (Ashley, 1988, p. 255). Therefore, what may be clear now is: the <u><mark>threat of terrorism</u></mark> may come from the FATA of Pakistan, but it similarly <u><strong><mark>emerges from the need to put on a performance, as to not expose the lack of foundations knowledge has</u></strong></mark>. Simply put, to remain employed, the actors in the GWoT seek to make the audience believe that their performance is in fact reality. This <u><strong><mark>denial of a secure ontology raises problems for international relations as</u></strong></mark>, ‘<u><strong><mark>how can international relations speak of such foundational concepts such as the state, security, war, danger, sovereignty and so on</u></strong></mark>? [and] After all, isn’t <u><mark>security determined by the requirements of a pre-existing sovereignty state and war</u></mark> conducted in its name as a response to objective danger?’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 111). Recognising the arbitrary nature of many Western concepts could undermine the project of modernity, the conception of the international system being occupied by sovereign states would be destroyed. <u><mark>The Western state</u></mark>, therefore, needs to <u><mark>constantly practice representation as, to cease ‘would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations</u></mark> [and] stasis would be death’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 12). The GWoT thus comes from the fear of death; not of individuals from an actual terrorist attack, but the death of the state. To escape death, the <u><mark>modern state utilises the heroic practice</u></mark>, rather than having <u><mark>to recognise it has no stable identity</u></mark>. It <u><strong><mark>therefore creates an “other” to situate itself against</u></strong></mark>. Ashley’s conception of the heroic practice involves placing competing terms in hierarchical opposition where: ‘[<u><strong><mark>one</u></strong></mark>] term <u><strong><mark>is privileged as a higher reality, a regulative ideal</u></strong></mark>, and the [other] term is understood only in a derivative and negative way, as a failure to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers this ideal’ (Ashley, 1988, p. 230). It is further argued that without boundaries, ‘”<u><strong><mark>we” cannot say for sure who “we” are because “we” cannot decide what must be the exclusionary boundaries of the remembered inheritance to which “we”</u></strong></mark> … must pay respects’ (Ashley & Walker, 1990, p. 387). <u><mark>Boundaries are created between the inside/outside. Therefore, ‘the disciplinary practice of creating boundaries</u></mark> and dichotomous relationships <u><mark>is practiced in order to reaffirm the reality of the inside and ‘constitutive of our modern understanding of political space’</u></mark> (Walker, 1993, p. 174). In the context of the GWoT, this is most apparent in Bush’s declaration of ‘you are with us or you are against us’ almost immediately after 9/11. The heroic practice in terms of the GWoT has simultaneously portrayed the state and liberal ideals in a hierarchy, with the non-state associations and the religious motives of fourth wave terrorism. However this practice has allowed the ‘higher reality’ to continue unquestioned. As a consequence of the heroic practice, <u><mark>identity is created in relation to difference</u></mark> (Campbell, 1992, p. 9). Due to the hierarchy imposed, ‘<u><strong><mark>difference’ often means ‘danger’</u></strong></mark>. International relations, therefore, ‘involves little more than an endless parlaying of representation of danger’ (Ashley, 1989, p. 311), and as Campbell argues, ‘state identity is secured through discourses of danger’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 51). The <u><mark>concept of the non-state terrorist is, therefore, used as the opposite to the state</u></mark>. This need to represent the “other” helps explain why the macro-securitizations explored later, work best when they are structured in binary opposites. When terrorism became the biggest threat in international relations within 10 years of the end of the Cold War, it filled a void that, if left unfilled, could have seen the demise of the project of modernity. After the Cold War, there was no shortage of potential candidates for new discourses of danger, such as drugs, the environment or humanitarian crises (Campbell, 1992, p. 170). Simply put, the GWoT was not only in the right place at the right time, but also fulfilled the criteria of being able to create an “other”. This may explain why the environment has not been as successfully securitized, despite presenting a more obvious and irreversible danger (Brown & Oliver, 2004). This equally explains why China may present itself as the security concern that displaces terrorism (Buzan, 2006).</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Rondeaux ’20 [Candace; March 6; Senior Fellow and Professor of Practice at the Center on the Future of War at New America and Arizona State University, M.P.P. in Public Policy from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University; World Politics Review, “NATO is in Denial About the Risk of War Between Turkey and Russia,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28583/for-nato-turkey-russia-war-is-a-nightmare-scenario] fulltext: For most close observers, it has long seemed only a matter of time before the long, bloody proxy war between Turkey and Russia for regional predominance in the Middle East would break out into full-scale direct hostilities. That came closer to happening last week, when Russian-backed Syrian forces attacked a Turkish military outpost in Idlib province, leaving more than 30 Turkish soldiers dead. However, few observers would have predicted the utter impotence of Turkey’s ostensible military partners in NATO in the face of what is arguably the gravest threat to the future of the alliance since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In retaliation for last week’s attack, which some initial reports claimed was the work of Russian bombers, Turkey has pounded Syrian forces with drone strikes and taken out the Syrian army’s Russian-made anti-aircraft batteries. Earlier this week, Russian warships in the Black Sea fleet steamed across the Bosporus strait to boost the Russian navy’s presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan flew to Moscow on Thursday for an emergency summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin to tamp down tensions. They announced yet another cease-fire in Idlib and joint patrols in a corridor along a strategic highway, but the deal is likely to be temporary and tenuous at best. To increase his leverage prior to the trip, Erdogan sought support from NATO, including the imposition of a no-fly zone in northwestern Syria. Following an emergency meeting last Friday, the alliance expressed its “full solidarity” with Turkey, but announced no specific measures to assist it. The question now is whether any of the 26 European members of the alliance realize how pivotal Turkey’s clash with Russia is for the future of NATO and security on the European continent. As proxy wars go, the ongoing conflict between Turkey and Russia in the Middle East has in many ways hewed closely to script. For nearly a decade, the two have danced on the edge of the escalatory precipice, deploying irregular forces along the narrow corridor of Syria’s northern border. In December 2015, Turkey downed two Russian fighter jets it claimed had entered its airspace, raising fears of direct conflict. But Erdogan and Putin were able to deescalate the situation, and they subsequently arrived at an understanding for operating discretely—and often at cross-purposes—in Syria, while avoiding any more direct confrontations. More recently, in January, Turkey and Russia’s battle for regional primacy took a sharper turn, as thousands of Turkish-backed Syrian rebel fighters began streaming into Libya to defend the internationally recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli against an ever more aggressive campaign mounted by the forces of Gen. Khalifa Haftar with the support of Russian mercenaries. Almost from the start of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Erdogan began cultivating a mix of secular and Islamist armed factions fighting to topple President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. On the other side, Russia took incremental steps toward protecting Assad, first deploying Russian warplanes to provide air support, and then Russian private military contractors with the Wagner Group and other cutouts from Russian state enterprises to train up and fight alongside a hodgepodge of Syrian army forces and local militias. The Wagner Group’s involvement in Syria burst into the spotlight after it suffered serious setbacks in skirmishes with U.S. forces in Deir Ezzor in 2018. By then, its fighters had been helping Haftar secure oil production facilities in eastern Libya for at least a year. Three years on, it now seems that the negative feedback loop between the two proxy wars in Libya and Syria has become so intense that years of relatively stable crisis management between Moscow and Ankara may finally be at an end. The trouble is there are truly no obvious answers for solving the conundrum provoked by Putin’s and Erdogan’s adventurism, and that should scare every one of NATO’s members. With the U.S. effectively sidelined by a combination of White House incompetence and election year jitters about wading deeper into the Middle East, there is little evidence the most powerful member of the North Atlantic alliance will be willing or able to influence Turkey to deescalate. The European members, meanwhile, are up in arms over Erdogan’s bold and cynical effort to pressure NATO to come to its aid by opening its border with Greece to Syrian refugees, thereby threatening a repeat of the 2015 refugee crisis. Since becoming a full member of the North Atlantic alliance in 1952, Turkey has actively supported multiple NATO missions, most critically perhaps by investing millions of dollars in support of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan over the past 19 years. As a result, Turkey was until recently viewed as a rock-solid ally in Washington and Brussels. Its progressive descent into the schizophrenic politics of autocracy, however, has driven a wedge between Erdogan and his American and European allies. That has come back to haunt him now, leaving him with few real friends inside or outside the NATO alliance. On Wednesday, it appeared that Erdogan was also losing sway domestically, as fist fights broke out in Turkey’s parliament over his handling of the military crisis in Syria. This latest political upheaval should give Turkey’s partners in NATO real pause. If Erdogan’s government is unsuccessful in tamping down political fractures over the crisis in Syria, how long before dissent turns into even greater internal instability in Turkey? Under the circumstances, Turkey’s European partners are faced with a choice between the lesser of two evils. Delivering more humanitarian aid and financial support via the European Union for Syrian refugees already in Turkey might seem like a costly and less than optimal solution to the burgeoning crisis. But at the very least, it would be a show of support for Erdogan, at a time when there is a very real possibility that Turkey will purposely or inadvertently spark an open conflict with Russia. If that happens, NATO would be forced to seriously consider whether an Article 5 declaration of mutual defense would be an appropriate response. It would be nice to think that NATO’s charter still meant something to its members, and 19 years of mutual defense in Afghanistan following 9/11 certainly suggest that it does. But the Turkish-Russian standoff points up an obvious design flaw in the alliance. When the big players at the table like the U.S. decide to sit out a bad hand, European alliance members who have more at stake but fewer military chits to lay down are unlikely to ante up. Turkey is by far one of the most politically isolated members of the NATO bloc. But if NATO’s assurances do not hold up, that is not a good look for a military alliance.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>2. Passivity <u>emboldens</u> Turkey - Article 5 draws in <u>Russia</u>---nuclear war. </h4><p><strong>Rondeaux ’20 </strong>[Candace; March 6; Senior Fellow and Professor of Practice at the Center on the Future of War at New America and Arizona State University, M.P.P. in Public Policy from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University; World Politics Review, “NATO is in Denial About the Risk of War Between Turkey and Russia,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28583/for-nato-turkey-russia-war-is-a-nightmare-scenario]</p><p>For most close observers, <u>it has long seemed only a <strong><mark>matter of time</strong> before</mark> the long</u>, bloody <u><strong>proxy <mark>war</strong></mark> between <strong><mark>Turkey</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>Russia</strong> for regional <strong>predominance</strong> in the <strong>Middle East</strong> would <strong>break out</strong> into full-scale</u></mark> direct <u>hostilities. That came closer</u> to happening <u>last week, when Russian</u>-backed <u><strong>Syrian forces</strong> attacked a Turkish</u> military <u>outpost</u> in Idlib province, leaving more than 30 Turkish soldiers dead. However, <u>few observers would have predicted the <strong>utter impotence</strong> of Turkey’s</u> ostensible <u>military partners in <strong>NATO</strong> in the face</u> of what is arguably <u>the <strong>gravest threat</strong> to the <strong>future of the alliance</strong> since</u> the <u>Russian annexation of Crimea</u> in 2014.</p><p><u>In retaliation for</u> last week’s <u>attack</u>, which some initial reports claimed was the work of Russian bombers, <u>Turkey</u> has <u>pounded Syrian forces with drone strikes and</u> taken out the Syrian army’s Russian-made <u>anti-aircraft batteries</u>. Earlier this week, <u>Russian warships in the <strong>Black Sea</u></strong> fleet <u>steamed across the Bosporus strait to boost</u> the <u>Russian <strong>navy’s presence</strong> in the eastern <strong>Mediterranean</u></strong>.</p><p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan flew to Moscow on Thursday for an emergency summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin to tamp down tensions. They announced yet another cease-fire in Idlib and joint patrols in a corridor along a strategic highway, but <u>the deal is likely to be <strong>temporary</strong> and <strong>tenuous</strong> at best</u>.</p><p><u>To increase his <strong>leverage</strong> prior to the trip, <mark>Erdogan sought</mark> <strong>support</strong> from <strong><mark>NATO</strong></mark>,</u> including the imposition of a no-fly zone in northwestern Syria. Following an emergency meeting last Friday, <u>the <mark>alliance expressed its “<strong>full solidarity</strong>” with Turkey</u></mark>, but announced no specific measures to assist it.</p><p><u>The question</u> now <u>is whether any of the</u> 26 European <u>members of the alliance <mark>realize how <strong>pivotal</strong></mark> Turkey’s <strong>clash with <mark>Russia</strong> is for</mark> the <strong>future of <mark>NATO</strong></mark> and <strong>security</strong> on the European continent</u>.</p><p><u>As <strong>proxy wars</strong> go, <mark>the</mark> <strong>ongoing <mark>conflict</strong></mark> between <strong>Turkey and Russia</strong> in the Middle East</u> has in many ways <u>hewed closely to script</u>. For nearly a decade, <u>the two</u> have <u><mark>danced <strong>on the</mark> edge</strong> of the <strong>escalatory <mark>precipice</strong>, deploying</mark> <strong>irregular <mark>forces</strong> along</mark> the narrow corridor of <mark>Syria’s</mark> <strong>northern <mark>border</u></strong></mark>. In December 2015, <u>Turkey downed</u> two <u>Russian fighter jets</u> it claimed had entered its airspace, <u>raising fears of <strong>direct conflict</u></strong>. But Erdogan and Putin were able to deescalate the situation, and they subsequently arrived at an understanding for operating discretely—and often at cross-purposes—in Syria, while avoiding any more direct confrontations.</p><p>More recently, in January, <u>Turkey and Russia’s battle for <strong>regional primacy</strong> took a <strong>sharper turn</strong>, as thousands of Turkish</u>-backed Syrian rebel <u>fighters began <strong>streaming into Libya</strong> to defend</u> the internationally recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli <u>against an</u> ever more <u>aggressive campaign</u> mounted by the forces of Gen. Khalifa Haftar with the support of Russian mercenaries.</p><p>Almost from the start of Syria’s civil war in 2011, <u>Erdogan began cultivating a mix of <strong>secular</strong> and <strong>Islamist</u></strong> armed <u>factions fighting to topple</u> President <u>Bashar al-Assad’s regime</u>. On the other side, Russia took incremental steps toward protecting Assad, first deploying Russian warplanes to provide air support, and then Russian private military contractors with the Wagner Group and other cutouts from Russian state enterprises to train up and fight alongside a hodgepodge of Syrian army forces and local militias.</p><p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in Syria burst into the spotlight after it suffered serious setbacks in skirmishes with U.S. forces in Deir Ezzor in 2018. By then, its fighters had been helping Haftar secure oil production facilities in eastern Libya for at least a year. Three years on, it now seems that <u><mark>the</mark> <strong>negative <mark>feedback loop</strong> between</mark> the two <strong>proxy <mark>wars</strong></mark> in Libya and Syria has <mark>become so intense</mark> that <strong>years</strong> of</u> relatively <u>stable <strong>crisis management</strong> between Moscow and Ankara may</u> finally <u>be at an end</u>.</p><p>The trouble is <u>there are</u> truly <u><mark>no <strong>obvious answers</strong> for solving the conundrum <strong>provoked</strong> by Putin’s and Erdogan’s</mark> <strong>adventurism</strong>, and that should scare <strong>every one</strong> of <strong>NATO’s members</u></strong>.</p><p>With <u>the U.S. effectively <strong>sidelined</strong> by</u> a combination of White House <u>incompetence</u> and election year jitters about wading deeper into the Middle East, <u>there is <strong>little evidence</u></strong> the most powerful member of <u>the North Atlantic alliance will be willing</u> or able <u>to <strong>influence Turkey</strong> to deescalate</u>. The European members, meanwhile, are up in arms over Erdogan’s bold and cynical effort to pressure NATO to come to its aid by opening its border with Greece to Syrian refugees, thereby threatening a repeat of the 2015 refugee crisis.</p><p><u>Since becoming a <strong>full member</strong> of the North Atlantic alliance</u> in 1952, Turkey has actively supported multiple NATO missions, most critically perhaps by investing millions of dollars in support of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan over the past 19 years. As a result, <u>Turkey was</u> until recently <u>viewed as a <strong>rock-solid ally</u></strong> in Washington and Brussels. <u>Its progressive <strong>descent</strong> into the </u>schizophrenic <u><strong>politics of autocracy</u></strong>, however, <u>has <strong>driven a wedge</strong> between Erdogan and</u> his American and <u>European allies. That has come back to <strong>haunt him</u></strong> now, <u>leaving him with <strong>few</u></strong> real <u><strong>friends</strong> inside</u> or outside <u>the NATO alliance.</p><p></u>On Wednesday, it appeared that Erdogan was also losing sway domestically, as fist fights broke out in Turkey’s parliament over his handling of the military crisis in Syria. <u>This latest <strong>political upheaval</strong> should give</u> Turkey’s <u>partners in NATO</u> real <u>pause</u>. If Erdogan’s government is unsuccessful in tamping down political fractures over the crisis in Syria, <u>how long before dissent turns into</u> even <u>greater <strong>internal instability</strong> in Turkey?</p><p></u>Under the circumstances, <u>Turkey’s European partners are faced with a <strong>choice</strong> between the <strong>lesser of two evils</u></strong>. Delivering more humanitarian aid and financial support via the European Union for Syrian refugees already in Turkey might seem like a costly and less than optimal solution to the burgeoning crisis. But at the very least, it would be a show of support for Erdogan, at a time when <u>there is a very <strong>real possibility</u></strong> that <u><mark>Turkey will <strong>purposely or inadvertently spark</strong> an <strong>open conflict</strong> with Russia</u>.</mark> If that happens, <u><mark>NATO would be forced to</mark> </u><strong>seriously consider</strong> whether an<u> <strong><mark>Article 5</mark> declaration</strong> of</u> mutual <u>defense would be an appropriate response</u>.</p><p>It would be nice to think that NATO’s charter still meant something to its members, and 19 years of mutual defense in Afghanistan following 9/11 certainly suggest that it does. But <u>the <strong>Turkish-Russian <mark>standoff</strong> points</u></mark> up <u><mark>a</mark>n obvious <strong>design <mark>flaw</strong></mark> in the alliance</u>. When the big players at the table like the U.S. decide to sit out a bad hand, European alliance members who have more at stake but fewer military chits to lay down are unlikely to ante up. Turkey is by far one of the most politically isolated members of the NATO bloc. But <u>if NATO’s assurances <strong>do not hold up</strong>, that is <strong>not a good look</strong> for a <strong>military alliance</strong>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Fairclough and Fairclough 18 — Norman Fairclough, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics in the Department of Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University (UK), holds an M.A. in English from University College London (UK), and Isabela Fairclough, Senior Lecturer in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Central Lancashire (UK), holds a Ph.D. in Applied Linguistics from the University of Lancaster (UK), 2018 (“A procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA,” Critical Discourse Studies, Volume 15, Issue 2, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 1-4) fulltext: Introduction Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a form of critical social analysis which focuses upon relations between discourse and other aspects of social life. Its critique is in part ethical. CDA is both normative critique and explanatory critique (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 33, pp. 59–69; Fairclough, 2015, pp. 10–13), and ethical critique is a part of normative critique. Not all normative critique is ethical critique. Normative critique includes critique of truth claims, in addition to critique of ‘truthfulness’ and ‘rightness’ (Habermas, 1984). Ethical critique is primarily critique of actions, but actions are conditioned and constrained by social practices, institutions and structures, so ethical critique needs to be extended to them. The analytical framework we outline below can incorporate this extension. The main concern of CDA is with political discourse, and its ethical critique is most often concerned with political values (justice, equality, liberty) as motives for action. CDA has a connection with politics, and an orientation towards it. Political activists can draw upon the critique of existing social realities that it provides, in formulating and advocating political policies and strategies. Moreover, as a way of engaging in critical social science, CDA has an emancipatory knowledge interest (Habermas, 1986), a concern with ‘wrongs’ in social life, which can and ought to be put right, including political ‘wrongs’ (injustice, unfairness, discrimination, domination). There is a sense in which CDA is advocative – it advocates (often implicitly) action, and change to put right certain ‘wrongs’ in social life – and partizan – it sides with people who suffer from such ‘wrongs’. But CDA is a social science [end page 1] method, aiming to ‘speak truth to power’, and that requires not being politically partizan or ‘party political’ in the same way that political activism is. Some work in CDA is politically partizan in this way, but our view is that it should not be. We want to argue in favour of a way of doing CDA that is not so much a form of advocacy of a particular pre-determined political standpoint, but a genuinely critical and open-minded endeavour. In taking this position, we are opting for an approach to ethical critique in CDA which gives primacy to procedural ethics, to what Habermas (1996) calls ‘discourse ethics’, and to a particular form of it which arises from our recent ‘argumentative’ approach to CDA (Fair- clough & Fairclough, 2012). This involves a procedure for critical questioning of proposals for actions which can integrate considerations coming from deontological, virtue and consequentialist ethical perspectives. A procedural approach provides an ethical commitment to impartiality in CDA, which is necessary to its status as critical social science method. The procedure is applied in the normative critique of argumentation, in explanatory critique of aspects of social practices and structures, and in critique of advocated changes in practices and structures aimed at addressing such problems. Our approach treats CDA as ‘dialectical reasoning’, moving from normative critique, through explanation and explanatory critique, towards transformative action (N. Fairclough, 2018). The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 30–34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that an adequate framework for ethical evaluation and critique must include the comparison and evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, deliberation can contribute to the quality of ethical critique by ensuring that a wide range of arguments are considered in making decisions, that all alternatives are taken into account and thoroughly criticized, and that people have to (at least) moderate their own partialities in evaluating a range of arguments collectively. To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have dis- cussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 96–97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. CDA and practical argumentation CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is oriented to action, including political discourse, but also managerial, organizational and other forms of discourse. The primary activity in such discourse is practical argumentation, argumentation over action, over what is to be done (e.g. what policies should be adopted). Practical argumentation should accordingly be the primary analytical focus in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). This does not exclude other familiar forms of analysis (such as analysing representations) but subsumes them. The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to create particular public attitudes and opinions, and thus legitimize or facilitate a particular course of action. [end page 2] Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a normal part of everyday practical argumentation: people find reasons in favour and against proposals for action, they consider alternatives, adopt them or discard them, and so on. A course of action worthy of being adopted is one that has withstood criticism. Agents may decide to discard proposals either because they are likely to be instrumentally inadequate in relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them ethically problematic, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? What are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? What are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)? CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a form of practical argumentation (Fairclough, 2013), open to the same critical questions that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work. Moreover, the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA does not come out of thin air, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough, 2003). We have argued that the primary focus of critical analysis in CDA should be practical argumentation and deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of what is to be done. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which (alternative) proposals are being tested. The framework for critical analysis of practical argumentation and deliberation which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an effective way of evaluating and critiquing discourse from an ethical point of view. One of its strengths is that it allows different approaches to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) to be combined within an ethical deliberative procedure for achieving impartiality. In a more recent version of this framework (I. Fairclough, 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to filter out those practical conclusions (and corresponding decisions) that would not pass the test of critical questioning. Two distinct argument schemes are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and means-goal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are tentatively supported by practical arguments from goals, and are tested in the light of their potential consequences, via practical arguments from consequence. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. Critical questioning seeks to expose potential negative consequences of proposals and thus [end page 3] evaluate them in terms of their acceptability or reasonableness: if the consequences are on balance unacceptable for those affected, then it would be more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action. Unacceptable consequences are critical objections which can conclusively rebut a proposal. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be chosen as the better proposal on non-arbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact). In our view, the most significant perspective in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a consequentialist one (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; I. Fairclough, 2016). The term ‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is likely to result in a situation that is illegal or unjust, then the proposal can be evaluated as unacceptable from both a consequentialist ethics and a deontological ethical position. Our framework can therefore accommodate deontological ethical issues within a broader consequentialist perspective. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u>Policy Framework Best</u> — vote aff if the plan should be enacted based on its <u>expected consequences</u>. Kritiks are <u>part</u> of this analysis, but K-first and K-only frameworks undermine <u>clash</u> and <u>argument analysis</u>. </h4><p><strong>Fairclough and Fairclough 18</strong> — <u>Norman Fairclough</u>, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics in the Department of Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University (UK), holds an M.A. in English from University College London (UK), and <u>Isabela Fairclough</u>, Senior Lecturer in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Central Lancashire (UK), holds a Ph.D. in Applied Linguistics from the University of Lancaster (UK), 2018 (“A procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA,” Critical Discourse Studies, Volume 15, Issue 2, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 1-4)</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Critical discourse analysis (<u><strong>CDA</u></strong>) <u><strong>is a form of critical social analysis which focuses upon relations between discourse and other aspects of social life</u></strong>. Its critique is in part ethical. <u><strong>CDA is both normative critique and explanatory critique</u></strong> (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 33, pp. 59–69; Fairclough, 2015, pp. 10–13), <u><strong>and ethical critique is a part of normative critique</u></strong>. Not all normative critique is ethical critique. Normative critique includes critique of truth claims, in addition to critique of ‘truthfulness’ and ‘rightness’ (Habermas, 1984). <u><strong>Ethical critique is primarily critique of actions, but actions are conditioned and constrained by social practices, institutions and structures, so ethical critique needs to be extended to them</u></strong>. The analytical framework we outline below can incorporate this extension.</p><p><u><strong>The main concern of CDA is with political discourse, and its ethical critique is most often concerned with political values</u></strong> (justice, equality, liberty) <u><strong>as motives for action. CDA has a connection with politics, and an orientation towards it. Political activists can draw upon the critique of existing social realities that it provides, in formulating and advocating political policies and strategies</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>as a way of engaging in critical social science, CDA has an emancipatory knowledge interest</u></strong> (Habermas, 1986), <u><strong>a concern with ‘wrongs’ in social life, which can and ought to be put right, including political ‘wrongs’</u></strong> (injustice, unfairness, discrimination, domination). There is a sense in which <u><strong>CDA is advocative – it advocates</u></strong> (often implicitly) <u><strong>action</u></strong>, <u><strong>and change to put right certain ‘wrongs’ in social life</u></strong> – and partizan – it sides with people who suffer from such ‘wrongs’. <u><strong>But CDA is a social science</u></strong> [end page 1] method, aiming to ‘speak truth to power’, and that requires not being politically partizan or ‘party political’ in the same way that political activism is. Some work in CDA is politically partizan in this way, but our view is that it should not be. We want to argue in favour of a way of doing CDA that is not so much a form of advocacy of a particular pre-determined political standpoint, but a genuinely critical and open-minded endeavour.</p><p>In taking this position, <u><strong>we are opting for an approach to <mark>ethical critique</mark> in CDA which <mark>gives primacy to procedural ethics</u></strong></mark>, to what Habermas (1996) calls ‘discourse ethics’, and to a particular form of it which arises from our recent ‘argumentative’ approach to CDA (Fair- clough & Fairclough, 2012). <u><strong><mark>This involves</mark> a procedure for <mark>critical questioning of proposals for actions which can integrate considerations</mark> coming <mark>from deontological, virtue and consequentialist</mark> ethical <mark>perspectives</u></strong></mark>. A procedural approach provides an ethical commitment to impartiality in CDA, which is necessary to its status as critical social science method. <u><strong><mark>The procedure is applied in the normative critique of argumentation, in explanatory critique of</mark> aspects of social <mark>practices and structures, and in critique of advocated changes</mark> in practices and structures <mark>aimed at addressing</mark> such <mark>problems</mark>. Our approach treats CDA as ‘dialectical reasoning’, moving from normative critique, through explanation and explanatory critique, towards transformative action</u></strong> (N. Fairclough, 2018).</p><p>The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 30–34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that <u><strong><mark>an adequate framework</mark> for ethical evaluation and critique <mark>must include the comparison and evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action in a process of deliberation</u></strong></mark>. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, <u><strong><mark>deliberation can contribute to the quality of ethical critique by ensuring</mark> that <mark>a wide range of arguments are considered</mark> in making decisions, <mark>that all alternatives are taken into account and</mark> thoroughly <mark>criticized, and that people have to</mark> (at least) <mark>moderate</mark> their own <mark>partialities in evaluating</mark> a range of <mark>arguments collectively</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have dis- cussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 96–97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics.</p><p>CDA and practical argumentation</p><p><u><strong>CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is oriented to action, including political discourse</u></strong>, but also managerial, organizational and other forms of discourse. <u><strong><mark>The primary activity</mark> in such discourse <mark>is practical argumentation</mark>, argumentation over action, <mark>over what is to be done (e.g. what policies should be adopted)</mark>. Practical argumentation should</u></strong> accordingly <u><strong>be the primary analytical focus in CDA</u></strong> (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). <u><strong><mark>This does not exclude other</mark> familiar <mark>forms of analysis (such as analysing representations) but subsumes them. The point of</mark> representing (or <mark>‘framing’</mark>) an issue in a particular way <mark>is to</mark> create particular public attitudes and opinions, and thus <mark>legitimize or facilitate a particular course of action</mark>. [end page 2]</p><p></u></strong>Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, <u><strong><mark>critique of discourse is</u></strong></mark> a normal part of all discourse. It is <u><strong><mark>a normal part of</mark> everyday <mark>practical argumentation: people find reasons in favour and against proposals</mark> for action, they <mark>consider alternatives, adopt</mark> them <mark>or discard them</mark>, and so on. <mark>A course of action worthy of being adopted</mark> is one that has <mark>withstood criticism. Agents may</mark> decide to <mark>discard proposals either because they are</mark> likely to be <mark>instrumentally inadequate</mark> in relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, <mark>or because they find them ethically problematic</mark>, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers</u></strong> (e.g. politicians) <u><strong>arguing from? What are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? What are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)?</p><p>CDA</u></strong> is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It <u><strong>can itself be viewed as a form of practical argumentation</u></strong> (Fairclough, 2013), <u><strong>open to the same critical questions that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA does not come out of thin air, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse</u></strong>. And <u><strong>CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality</u></strong>, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough, 2003).</p><p>We have argued that <u><strong>the primary focus of critical analysis in CDA should be practical argumentation and deliberation</u></strong> (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, <u><strong>which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of what is to be done. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which (alternative) proposals are being tested. The framework for critical analysis of practical argumentation and deliberation</u></strong> which we have developed since 2012 <u><strong>provides CDA with an effective way of evaluating and critiquing discourse from an ethical point of view. One of its strengths is that <mark>it allows different approaches to thinking about ethical questions</mark> (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) <mark>to be combined within an ethical deliberative procedure</mark> for achieving impartiality</u></strong>.</p><p>In a more recent version of this framework (I. Fairclough, 2016, 2018), <u><strong>deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to filter out those practical conclusions (and corresponding decisions) that would not pass the test of critical questioning. <mark>Two</mark> distinct argument <mark>schemes are involved</mark> in deliberative activity types<mark>: an argument from goals, circumstances and means-goal relations, and an argument from</mark> (negative or positive) <mark>consequences. Proposals are tentatively supported by practical arguments from goals</mark>, <mark>and</mark> are <mark>tested in the light of their potential consequences</mark>, via practical arguments from consequence. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. <mark>Critical questioning seeks to expose potential negative consequences</mark> of proposals and thus</u></strong> [end page 3] <u><strong>evaluate them in terms of their acceptability or reasonableness: if the consequences are on balance unacceptable for those affected, then it would be more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action. Unacceptable consequences are critical objections which can conclusively rebut a proposal. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be chosen as the better proposal on non-arbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact)</u></strong>.</p><p>In our view, <u><strong>the most significant perspective in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a consequentialist one</u></strong> (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; I. Fairclough, 2016). <u><strong>The term ‘consequence’ is</u></strong> however <u><strong>used</u></strong> here <u><strong>broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is likely to result in a situation that is illegal or unjust, then the proposal can be evaluated as unacceptable from both a consequentialist ethics and a deontological ethical position. <mark>Our framework can</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>accommodate deontological ethical issues within a broader consequentialist perspective</mark>. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective</u></strong>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Zuniga 20 – (Didier, To think and act ecologically: the environment, human animality, nature, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2020.1772605 2020)//gcd fulltext: What this means for our picture of interdependency is that just as disability studies and the ethics of care have demonstrated that we are corporeal beings who are embedded in networks of (human-human) reciprocity to which we owe our flourishing, we also need to integrate the ecological insight that such embodied location goes beyond human bodies and their built environments. However, our ecological awareness does start with our experience as bodily beings, since it is through our bodies that we encounter and navigate the world. This is why Corine Pelluchon argues that we cannot nurture and preserve the lands and waters that we inhabit – and hence, engage in practices of reconciliation with each other and the living earth – without first reconciling ourselves with our bodies (Pelluchon, 2018, p. 222). Echoes of Pope Francis’ emphasis on the importance of caring for our own bodies as a precondition to caring for the ecosystems and the living earth are audible here. It is because we have been conditioned to be oblivious to this aspect of our existence that we must reawaken our bodily experience and self-understanding in order to perceive the indissociable unity of our bodies and the rest of nature, which is the very condition of human animal life. Consequently, an integral ethics must aim at bringing about harmony and concord to our relationships to the world, to each other, and to ourselves. One central task of an ethics of interdependency, therefore, is to bring into being the cycles of conciliation and reciprocity that are needed if we are to achieve the sort of conviviality that ecosocial solidarity and peaceful coexistence entail. It is our responsibility to work towards the transformation of the patterns of exploitation, domination and dispossession that hegemonic relations of production have set forth. The sustainability of ecosocial diversity, which refers to the interdependence and inter-penetration of our social systems and ecological systems, rests entirely on relationships of cooperation and mutual aid (Tully, 2020a, 2020b). And I have been arguing that the practices of ecosocial reconciliation that aim at repairing our world begin with a deep decentering of our philosophical enquiries, one which integrates the disability studies and the care ethics insights that we ought to be attentive to the ways in which our social environments constrain us, but that also moves our analysis towards our interconnections with the nonhuman world. But in order to get there, an appropriate ecological ethics must foster the deployment of a language of qualitative evaluations, one which enables us to characterize our relationships to each other and to the environment contrastively.7 If we are to judge critically the dominant conceptions of the person, and of the ways in which we relate to other human and nonhuman animals and to the environment, then it is important that we are able to contrast these to more favourable alternatives. For this reason, I want to reassert the significance of grounding our views of these relations on the basis of qualitative distinctions between ways of living together and with the lands and waters of the earth. It is the duty of human animals that inhabit dominant and exploitative socioeconomic systems to learn from place-based practices of care for the lands and waters, practices that are deeply informed by what the lands and waters as a mode of ‘reciprocal relationship . . . ought to teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and our surroundings in a respectful, nondominating and nonexploitative way’ (Coulthard, 2014, p. 60. Emphasis in original). But this can only be achieved by pluralizing our respective understandings of the environment, human animality, and nature. As I noted in the beginning of this paper, the contribution of the scholarship on disability and care is twofold: it has provided incisive critiques of the ideals of independence, autonomy and self-sufficiency that are at the heart of liberal individualism, and it has brought into view our bodily vulnerability and interdependence. Both aspects have received insufficient attention, and their importance is still to be fully appreciated within political and philosophical enquiry. Throughout these pages, I have insisted that our existential conditions of interdependency and vulnerability, which we share with all other living beings on earth, ought to occupy a central place in our reflections on how to live together. My main aim here has been to show that an appropriate way of thinking and acting in the world needs to reject the conventional division between the realm of human affairs and that which pertains to ecology. I have argued that a prominent strand of disability studies and care ethics conceives of the environment in a unilateral way. Such scholarship is mainly concerned with how the built environments and the social structures that produce them severely restrict and exclude disabled people. And as I have mentioned, this line of research is crucial for illuminating how power is exercised over those of us who do not fit the imposed norms of able-bodiedness. But I do think that this work needs to be complemented by a consideration of the ways in which we affect, and are affected by, the natural world. This is why I have defended an integral ethics of interdependency, whose main goal is to help orient ourselves towards sustainable forms of living together, and whose scope is necessarily ecosocial – namely, that it includes human and nonhuman animals, streams, rivers, mountains, seasons, ecosystems, and the living earth as a whole. Moreover, I have tried to show that thinking and acting ecologically is vital to cultivating the kinds of networks of co-sustainability that are required for interrelated forms of life to flourish. In order to rework our current relations with the lands and waters of the earth, we need first of all to be conscious of the imaginary that generates unsustainable patterns of exploitation, as well as of the assumptions that inform and uphold it. To this end, I began by discussing the notion of anthropocentrism, and, more precisely, the particular conception of human animality that underwrites it. I argued that the imaginary that is holding us captive relies on a false – because gendered, raced and classed – picture of humanity. The result is a partial and one-sided view that posits a homogeneous human animal that is equally responsible for and equally affected by unsustainable social systems. And this is to blatantly ignore Western imperialism and colonialism – as well as the relations of production that allowed them to develop – which are at the root of the vicious and dominant social system that exploits and destroys both the ecosphere and marginalized social systems. Furthermore, this led me to examine the debate over the society/culture and nature distinction, which is characterized by the opposition between realist and constructivist accounts of nature. Even though I reject the view that construes realism and constructivism as mutually exclusive, I have nevertheless argued that it is inadequate to look at nature through the lenses of the predatory social systems that are responsible for ecological injustices in the first place. If we want to avoid political inertia, then it is important that we establish evaluative distinctions between ways of relating ourselves to the lands and waters of the earth. For this reason, I argued that a major aim of a relational ethics of interdependency is to foster our ecological awareness, which refers to the process of relearning to think and act in sustainable and caring ways with each other, nonhuman animals, ecosystems, and the earth as a whole. This is the condition of possibility not only for peaceful coexistence, but also for the cultivation of relationships of solidarity, reciprocity, and cooperation between interdependent forms of life.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Our alternative – we should create integrative ethics of interdependence beyond the human. Recognizing the unity of bodies and nature allows ecosocial subjectivity formation that challenges ableist ethics which make the flourishing of all life impossible. </h4><p><strong>Zuniga 20</strong> – (Didier, To think and act ecologically: the environment, human animality, nature, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2020.1772605 2020)//<u>gcd</p><p></u>What this means for our picture of interdependency is that just as disability studies and the ethics of care have demonstrated that <u><strong><mark>we are corporeal beings </mark>who</strong> are <mark>embedded in networks of (</mark>human-human) <mark>reciprocity</u></mark> <u>to which we owe our flourishing, we also need to integrate the ecological insight <mark>that</mark> such embodied location <mark>goes beyond human bodies</mark> <mark>and</mark> their <strong><mark>built environments</strong></mark>.</u> However, our ecological awareness does start with our experience as bodily beings, since it is through our bodies that we encounter and navigate the world. This is why Corine Pelluchon argues that <u><strong><mark>we cannot nurture</strong></mark> and preserve <strong><mark>the lands and waters that we inhabit</u></strong></mark> – and hence, engage in practices of reconciliation with each other and the living earth – <u><strong><mark>without first reconciling</mark> ourselves <mark>with</mark> our <mark>bodies</u></strong></mark> (Pelluchon, 2018, p. 222). Echoes of Pope Francis’ emphasis on the importance of caring for our own bodies as a precondition to caring for the ecosystems and the living earth are audible here. It is because we have been conditioned to be oblivious to this aspect of our existence that <u><strong><mark>we must</u></strong></mark> reawaken our bodily experience and self-understanding in order to <u><mark>perceive the indissociable unity of</mark> our <mark>bodies and</mark> the rest of <mark>nature</mark>, <mark>which is the very</mark> <mark>condition</mark> <mark>of human animal life.</mark> C</u>onsequently, an <u><strong><mark>integral ethics must</strong></mark> aim at <strong><mark>bring</strong></mark>ing about <mark>harmony and concord to</mark> our <strong><mark>relationships to</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>world</mark>, to each other, and to ourselves.</p><p></u></strong>One central task of an ethics of <u><strong><mark>interdependency</u></strong></mark>, therefore, <u>is to <strong><mark>bring into bein</strong></mark>g the cycles of conciliation and reciprocity that are needed if we are to achieve <strong><mark>the</strong></mark> sort of <strong><mark>conviviality</strong></mark> <mark>that</mark> <strong><mark>ecosocial solidarity</strong></mark> and peaceful coexistence <strong><mark>entail</strong></mark>. It</u> <u>is our responsibility <strong><mark>to work towards</strong></mark> the <mark>transformation of</mark> the patterns of <mark>exploitation, domination and dispossession that</mark> hegemonic <strong><mark>relations of production have set forth</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>sustainability of ecosocial diversity</u></strong></mark>, which refers to the interdependence and inter-penetration of our social systems and ecological systems, <u><strong><mark>rests entirely on</mark> relationships of <mark>cooperation and mutual aid</u></strong></mark> (Tully, 2020a, 2020b). And I have been arguing that the practices of ecosocial reconciliation that aim at repairing our world begin with a deep decentering of our philosophical enquiries, one which integrates the disability studies and the care ethics insights that we ought to be attentive to the ways in which our social environments constrain us, but that also moves our analysis towards our interconnections with the nonhuman world. But in order to get there, an appropriate ecological ethics must foster the deployment of a language of qualitative evaluations, one which enables us to characterize our relationships to each other and to the environment contrastively.7 <u><strong><mark>If we are to judge critically</strong></mark> <strong><mark>the</strong></mark> <mark>dominant conceptions of the person</mark>, and of the ways in which we relate to other human and nonhuman animals and to the environment, then <strong><mark>it is important that we are able to contrast</strong></mark> <strong><mark>these to</strong></mark> more <strong><mark>favourable alternatives</u></strong></mark>. For this reason, I want to reassert the significance of grounding our views of these relations on the basis of qualitative distinctions between ways of living together and with the lands and waters of the earth. <u><strong><mark>It is the duty of human animals</strong></mark> <strong><mark>that</strong></mark> <strong><mark>inhabit</strong></mark> <strong><mark>dominant</strong></mark> and exploitative <mark>socioeconomic systems to learn from</mark> place-based practices of <strong><mark>care for the lands and waters</strong></mark>, practices that are <strong><mark>deeply informed by</strong></mark> what the <strong><mark>lands and waters as</strong></mark> a mode of ‘<strong><mark>reciprocal relationship</mark> </u></strong>. . . ought to teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and our surroundings in a respectful, nondominating and nonexploitative way’ (Coulthard, 2014, p. 60. Emphasis in original). <u>But <mark>this can only be achieved by</mark> <strong><mark>pluralizing</strong></mark> our respective <strong><mark>understandings of</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>environment</strong></mark>, human <strong><mark>animality, and nature.</p><p></u></strong></mark>As I noted in the beginning of this paper, the contribution of the scholarship on <u><strong><mark>disability</u></strong></mark> and care is twofold: <u>it <mark>has provided incisive critiques</mark> <strong><mark>of</strong></mark> the ideals of <strong><mark>independence</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>autonomy and self-sufficiency</strong></mark> that are <strong><mark>at the heart of liberal individualism</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and</strong></mark> it has <strong><mark>brought into view</mark> </strong>our <strong><mark>bodily vulnerability</strong></mark> and interdependence</u>. Both aspects have received insufficient attention, and their importance is still to be fully appreciated within political and philosophical enquiry. Throughout these pages, I have insisted that our existential conditions of interdependency and vulnerability, which we share with all other living beings on earth, ought to occupy a central place in our reflections on how to live together. My main aim here has been to show that an appropriate way of thinking and acting in the world needs to reject the conventional division between the realm of human affairs and that which pertains to ecology. I have argued that a prominent strand of disability studies and care ethics conceives of the environment in a unilateral way. Such scholarship is mainly concerned with how the built environments and the social structures that produce them severely restrict and exclude disabled people. And as I have mentioned, this line of research is crucial for illuminating how power is exercised over those of us who do not fit the imposed norms of able-bodiedness. But I do think that this work needs to be complemented by a consideration of the ways in which we affect, and are affected by, the natural world. This is why I have defended <u><strong><mark>an integral ethics of interdependency</u></strong></mark>, whose main goal is to help <u><strong><mark>orient ourselves towards</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>sustainable</strong></mark> forms of living together, and whose scope is necessarily <strong><mark>ecosocial</strong></mark> – namely, that it includes human and nonhuman animals, streams, rivers, mountains, seasons, ecosystems, and <strong><mark>the living earth</strong></mark> as a whole.</p><p></u>Moreover, I have tried to show that <u><strong><mark>thinking</strong></mark> and acting <strong><mark>ecologically is vital to cultivating</strong></mark> the kinds of networks of <strong><mark>co-sustainability that</strong></mark> are <strong><mark>required for interrelated</strong></mark> forms of <strong><mark>life to flourish.</strong></mark> </u>In order to rework our current relations with the lands and waters of the earth, we need first of all to be conscious of the imaginary that generates unsustainable patterns of exploitation, as well as of the assumptions that inform and uphold it. To this end, I began by discussing the notion of anthropocentrism, and, more precisely, the particular conception of human animality that underwrites it. I argued that the imaginary that is holding us captive relies on a false – because gendered, raced and classed – picture of humanity. The result is a partial and one-sided view that posits a homogeneous human animal that is equally responsible for and equally affected by unsustainable social systems. And this is to blatantly ignore <u><strong><mark>Western imperialism and colonialism</u></strong></mark> – as well as the relations of production that allowed them to develop – <u>which <strong><mark>are at the root of</strong></mark> the vicious and <strong><mark>dominant social system that exploits</strong></mark> and destroys both the <strong><mark>ecosphere and marginalized</strong></mark> <mark>social systems</u></mark>. Furthermore, this led me to examine the debate over the society/culture and nature distinction, which is characterized by the opposition between realist and constructivist accounts of nature. Even though I reject the view that construes realism and constructivism as mutually exclusive, I have nevertheless argued that it is inadequate to look at nature through the lenses of the predatory social systems that are responsible for ecological injustices in the first place. If we want to avoid political inertia, then it is important that we establish evaluative distinctions between ways of relating ourselves to the lands and waters of the earth. For this reason, I argued that a major aim of a relational ethics of interdependency is to foster our <u><strong><mark>ecological awareness</strong></mark>, which refers to the process of relearning to think and act in sustainable and caring ways with each other, nonhuman animals, ecosystems, and the earth as a whole</u>. <u><strong>This <mark>is the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>condition of possibility</u></strong></mark> not only <u><strong><mark>for</u></strong></mark> peaceful coexistence, but also for the cultivation of <u><strong><mark>relationships</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of</strong></mark> <strong><mark>solidarity, reciprocity</strong></mark>, and <strong><mark>cooperation between interdependent</strong></mark> forms of <strong><mark>life</strong></mark>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Schwartz and Sunkara 17 - Joseph M. Schwartz is the national vice-chair of the Democratic Socialists of America, and professor of political science at Temple, Bhaskar Sunkara is the founding editor of Jacobin, “What Should Socialists Do?,” August 1, 2017, Jacobin, https://jacobinmag.com/2017/08/socialist-left-democratic-socialists-america-dsa fulltext: Fighting for “Non-Reformist Reforms” For socialists, theory and practice must be joined at the hip. Socialists work for reforms that weaken the power of capital and enhance the power of working people, with the aim of winning further demands — what André Gorz called “non-reformist reforms.” We want to move towards a complete break with the capitalist system. Socialists, unlike single-issue activists, know that democratic victories must be followed by more democratic victories, or they will be rolled back. Single-payer health care is a classic example of a “non-reformist” reform, one that would pry our health system free from capital’s iron grip and empower the working class by nationalizing the private health insurance industry. But socialists conceive of this struggle differently than single-issue advocates of Medicare for All. Socialists understand that single payer alone cannot deal with the cost spiral driven by for-profit hospital and pharmaceutical companies. If we do achieve a national (or state-level) single-payer system, the fight wouldn’t be over; socialists would then fight for nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry. A truly socialized health care system (as in Britain and Sweden) would nationalize hospitals and clinics staffed by well-paid, unionized health care workers. Socialists can and should be at the forefront of fights like this today. To do so, we must gain the skills needed to define who holds power in a given sector and how to organize those who have a stake in taking it away from them. But we can’t simply be the best activists in mass struggles. Single-issue groups too often attack a few particularly bad corporate actors without also arguing that a given crisis cannot be solved without curtailing capitalist power. Socialists not only have to be the most competent organizers in struggle, but they have to offer an analysis that reveals the systemic roots of a particular crisis and offer reforms that challenge the logic of capitalism. Building a Majority As socialists, our analysis of capitalism leads us to not just a moral and ethical critique of the system, but to seeing workers as the central agents of winning change. This isn’t a random fetishizing of workers — it’s based on their structural position in the economy. Workers have the ability to disrupt production and exchange, and they have an interest in banding together and articulating collective demands. This makes them the key agents of change under capitalism. This view can be caricatured as ignoring struggles for racial justice, immigrant rights, reproductive freedom, and more. But nothing could be further from the truth. The working class is majority women and disproportionately brown and black and immigrant; fighting for the working class means fighting on precisely these issues, as well as for the rights of children, the elderly, and all those who cannot participate in the paid labor market. Socialists must also fight on the ideological front. We must combat the dominant ideology of market individualism with a compelling vision of democracy and freedom, and show how only in a society characterized by democratic decision-making and universal political, civil, and social rights can individuals truly flourish. If socialist activists cannot articulate an attractive vision of socialist freedom, we will not be able to overcome popular suspicion that socialism would be a drab, pseudo-egalitarian, authoritarian society. Thus we must model in our own socialist organizations the democratic debate, peaceful conflict, and social solidarity that would characterize a socialist world. A democratic socialist organization that doesn’t have a rich and accessible internal educational life will not develop an activist core who can be public tribunes for socialism. Activists don’t stay committed to building a socialist organization unless they can articulate to themselves and others why even a reformed capitalism remains a flawed, undemocratic society. The Power of a Minority But socialists must also be front and center in struggles to win the short-term victories that empower people and lead them to demand more. Socialists today are a minority building and pushing forward a potential, progressive anti-corporate majority. We have no illusions that the dominant wing of the Democrats are our friends. Of course, most levels of government are now run by Republicans well to the right of them. But taking on neoliberal Democrats must be part of a strategy to defeat the far right. Take the Democrats, who are showing what woeful supposed leaders of “the resistance” they are every day. Contrary to the party leadership’s single-note insistence, the Russians did not steal the election for Trump; rather, a tepid Democratic candidate who ran on expertise and competence lost because her corporate ties precluded her articulation of a program that would aid the working class — a $15 minimum wage, Medicare for All, free public higher education. Clinton failed to gain enough working-class votes of all races to win the key states in the former industrial heartland; she ended up losing to the most disliked, buffoonish presidential candidate in history. If we remain enthralled to Democratic politics-as-usual, we’re going to continue being stuck with cretins like Donald Trump. Of course, progressive and socialist candidates who openly reject the neoliberal mainstream Democratic agenda may choose for pragmatic reasons to use the Democratic Party ballot line in partisan races. But whatever ballot line the movement chooses to use, we must always be working to increase the independent power of labor and the Left. Sanders provides an example: it’s hard to imagine him offering a radical opening to using the “s” word in American politics for his openly independent campaign if he had run on an independent line. Bernie also showed the strength of socialists using coalition politics to build a short-term progressive majority and to win people over to a social-democratic program and, sometimes, to socialism. Sanders gained the support of six major unions; if we had real social movement unionism in this country, he would have carried the banner of the entire organized working-class movement. Bernie’s weaker performance than Clinton among voters of color — though not among millennials of color — derived mostly from his being a less known commodity. But it also demonstrated that socialists need deeper social roots among older women and communities of color. That means developing the organizing strategies that will better implant us in the labor movement and working-class communities, as well as struggles for racial justice and gender and sexual emancipation. Socialists have the incumbent obligation to broaden out the post-Sanders, anti-corporate trend in US politics into a working-class “rainbow coalition.” We must also fight our government’s imperialist foreign policy and push to massively cut wasteful “defense” spending. We should be involved in multiracial coalitions, fighting for reforms like equitable public education and affordable housing. Democratic socialists can be the glue that brings together disparate social movement that share an interest in democratizing corporate power. We can see the class relations that pervade society and how they offer common avenues of struggle. But at 25,000 members, we can’t substitute ourselves for the broader currents needed to break the power of both far-right nativist Republicans and pro-corporate neoliberal Democrats. We have to work together with broader movements that may not be anti-capitalist but remain committed to reforms. These movements have the potential to win material improvements for workers’ lives. If we stay isolated from them, we will slide into sectarian irrelevance. Of course, socialists should endeavor to build their own organizational strength and to operate as an independent political force. We cannot mute our criticism against business unionist trends in the labor movement and the middle-class professional leadership of many advocacy groups. But in the here and now, we must also help win those victories that will empower workers to conceive of more radical democratic gains. Our members are disproportionately highly educated, young, male, and white. To win victories, we must pursue a strategy and orientation that makes us more representative of the working class.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Aff is a non-reformist reform, a necessary step towards socialism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz and Sunkara 17 </strong>- Joseph M. Schwartz is the national vice-chair of the Democratic Socialists of America, and professor of political science at Temple, Bhaskar Sunkara is the founding editor of Jacobin, “What Should Socialists Do?,” August 1, 2017, Jacobin, https://jacobinmag.com/2017/08/socialist-left-democratic-socialists-america-dsa</p><p>Fighting for “Non-Reformist Reforms” For socialists, theory and practice must be joined at the hip. <u><strong><mark>Socialists</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>work for reforms that weaken</u></strong></mark> the power of <u><strong><mark>capital</u></strong></mark> and enhance the power of working people, <u><strong><mark>with the aim of winning further demands</u></strong></mark> — what André Gorz called “<u><strong><mark>non-reformist reforms</u></strong></mark>.” We want to move towards a complete break with the capitalist system. Socialists, unlike single-issue activists, know that democratic victories must be followed by more democratic victories, or they will be rolled back. <u><strong><mark>Single-payer</u></strong></mark> health care <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> a classic <u><strong><mark>example</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>of</u></strong></mark> a “<u><strong><mark>non-reformist” reform</u></strong></mark>, one that <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> pry our health system free from capital’s iron grip and <u><strong><mark>empower</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>working class</u></strong></mark> by nationalizing the private health insurance industry. But socialists conceive of this struggle differently than single-issue advocates of Medicare for All. Socialists understand that single payer alone cannot deal with the cost spiral driven by for-profit hospital and pharmaceutical companies. If we do achieve a national (or state-level) single-payer system, the fight wouldn’t be over; socialists would then fight for nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry. A truly socialized health care system (as in Britain and Sweden) would nationalize hospitals and clinics staffed by well-paid, unionized health care workers. Socialists can and should be at the forefront of fights like this today. To do so, we must gain the skills needed to define who holds power in a given sector and how to organize those who have a stake in taking it away from them. But we can’t simply be the best activists in mass struggles. Single-issue groups too often attack a few particularly bad corporate actors without also arguing that a given crisis cannot be solved without curtailing capitalist power. <u><strong><mark>Socialists</u></strong></mark> not only have to be the most competent organizers in struggle, but they have to <u><strong><mark>offer</u></strong></mark> an <u><strong><mark>analysis that reveals</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>systemic roots of a particular crisis and</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>offer reforms</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>that</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>challenge</u></strong></mark> the logic of <u><strong><mark>cap</u></strong></mark>italism. Building a Majority As socialists, our analysis of capitalism leads us to not just a moral and ethical critique of the system, but to seeing workers as the central agents of winning change. This isn’t a random fetishizing of workers — it’s based on their structural position in the economy. Workers have the ability to disrupt production and exchange, and they have an interest in banding together and articulating collective demands. This makes them the key agents of change under capitalism. This view can be caricatured as ignoring struggles for racial justice, immigrant rights, reproductive freedom, and more. But nothing could be further from the truth. The working class is majority women and disproportionately brown and black and immigrant; fighting for the working class means fighting on precisely these issues, as well as for the rights of children, the elderly, and all those who cannot participate in the paid labor market. Socialists must also fight on the ideological front. We must combat the dominant ideology of market individualism with a compelling vision of democracy and freedom, and show how only in a society characterized by democratic decision-making and universal political, civil, and social rights can individuals truly flourish. If socialist activists cannot articulate an attractive vision of socialist freedom, we will not be able to overcome popular suspicion that socialism would be a drab, pseudo-egalitarian, authoritarian society. Thus we must model in our own socialist organizations the democratic debate, peaceful conflict, and social solidarity that would characterize a socialist world. A democratic socialist organization that doesn’t have a rich and accessible internal educational life will not develop an activist core who can be public tribunes for socialism. Activists don’t stay committed to building a socialist organization unless they can articulate to themselves and others why even a reformed capitalism remains a flawed, undemocratic society. The Power of a Minority But socialists must also be front and center in struggles to win the <u><strong><mark>short-term victories</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>empower people and lead them to demand more</u></strong></mark>. Socialists today are a minority building and pushing forward a potential, progressive anti-corporate majority. We have no illusions that the dominant wing of the Democrats are our friends. Of course, most levels of government are now run by Republicans well to the right of them. But taking on neoliberal Democrats must be part of a strategy to defeat the far right. Take the Democrats, who are showing what woeful supposed leaders of “the resistance” they are every day. Contrary to the party leadership’s single-note insistence, the Russians did not steal the election for Trump; rather, a tepid Democratic candidate who ran on expertise and competence lost because her corporate ties precluded her articulation of a program that would aid the working class — a $15 minimum wage, Medicare for All, free public higher education. Clinton failed to gain enough working-class votes of all races to win the key states in the former industrial heartland; she ended up losing to the most disliked, buffoonish presidential candidate in history. If we remain enthralled to Democratic politics-as-usual, we’re going to continue being stuck with cretins like Donald Trump. Of course, progressive and socialist candidates who openly reject the neoliberal mainstream Democratic agenda may choose for pragmatic reasons to use the Democratic Party ballot line in partisan races. But whatever ballot line the movement chooses to use, <u><strong><mark>we must always be working to increase the independent power of labor and the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Left</u></strong></mark>. Sanders provides an example: it’s hard to imagine him offering a radical opening to using the “s” word in American politics for his openly independent campaign if he had run on an independent line. Bernie also showed the strength of <u><strong><mark>socialists</u></strong></mark> using <u><strong><mark>coalition politics to build a short-term progressive majority</u></strong></mark> and to win people over to a social-democratic program and, sometimes, to socialism. Sanders gained the support of six major unions; if we had real social movement unionism in this country, he would have carried the banner of the entire organized working-class movement. Bernie’s weaker performance than Clinton among voters of color — though not among millennials of color — derived mostly from his being a less known commodity. But it also demonstrated that socialists need deeper social roots among older women and communities of color. That means developing the organizing strategies that will better implant us in the labor movement and working-class communities, as well as struggles for racial justice and gender and sexual emancipation. Socialists have the incumbent obligation to broaden out the post-Sanders, anti-corporate trend in US politics into a working-class “rainbow coalition.” We must also fight our government’s imperialist foreign policy and push to massively cut wasteful “defense” spending. We should be involved in multiracial coalitions, fighting for reforms like equitable public education and affordable housing. Democratic <u><strong><mark>socialists</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>can</u></strong></mark> be the <u><strong><mark>glue</u></strong></mark> that brings <u><strong><mark>together disparate social movement</u></strong></mark> that share an interest in democratizing corporate power. We can see the class relations that pervade society and how they offer common avenues of struggle. But at 25,000 members, we can’t substitute ourselves for the broader currents needed to break the power of both far-right nativist Republicans and pro-corporate neoliberal Democrats. We have to work together with broader movements that may not be anti-capitalist but remain committed to reforms. These movements have the potential to win material improvements for workers’ lives. If we stay isolated from them, we will slide into sectarian irrelevance. Of course, socialists should endeavor to build their own organizational strength and to operate as an independent political force. We cannot mute our criticism against business unionist trends in the labor movement and the middle-class professional leadership of many advocacy groups. But in the here and now, <u><strong><mark>we must</u></strong></mark> also help win those victories that will <u><strong><mark>empower workers to conceive of more radical democratic gains</u></strong></mark>. Our members are disproportionately highly educated, young, male, and white. To win victories, we must pursue a strategy and orientation that makes us more representative of the working class.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Steven Erlanger 21. Citing Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Mark Fitzpatrick, an associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Nobuyasu Abe, a former commissioner of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission and former U.N. under secretary-general for disarmament, "Biden’s Top Challenge Abroad Is Something No One Wants to Talk About." 2-10-2021. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/world/europe/biden-nuclear-weapons-arms-control.html. fulltext: There is little arms control; modern technologies are unrestrained; and the players are more numerous and rapidly building up nuclear stockpiles. As important, Mr. Trump’s transactional, spasmodic, “America First” policies undermined allies’ confidence in American security guarantees. Many experts are now warning that Mr. Biden must once again make arms control a priority, even if the notion seems as dated as the wide-lapeled suits of the 1970s and ’80s, when complex treaties about “throw weights” and “multiple re-entry vehicles” dominated Cold War diplomacy. Not to do so, they say, risks the acceleration of a nuclear arms race, with new threats to American allies in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. But few want to discuss the perils, especially in Europe, where nuclear literacy is largely gone and the danger comes from shorter-range nuclear weapons uncovered by any arms control. To Nathalie Tocci, director of Italy’s Institute of International Affairs, the lack of a debate is shocking. “We barely discuss nuclear,” she said. “On the risk and threat side, there’s no sufficient understanding of how more dangerous it’s becoming.” The most immediate fix would be to restore American credibility, experts said, though even that may not be easy. The old assurance that the United States would respond with its own arsenal if allies were attacked was a strong barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. No more, perhaps. America’s partners in Europe and Asia feel vulnerable. They want reassurance that America’s security guarantees are valid, realistic and reliable, experts said. If not, some would consider going nuclear themselves, openly or secretly. What is compelling them are the new dangers of a world where North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenals are expanding; where China is doubling its nuclear-weapons stockpile and building sophisticated intermediate-range missiles; where Russia has modernized its nuclear arms and is developing hypersonic missiles; and where Iran is thought to be several months from producing enough fissile material to make a nuclear bomb. Just before the last nuclear arms-control treaty with Russia, New START, expired, Mr. Biden extended for another five years. But it does nothing to diminish the threat from more modern technologies, from tactical or medium-range nuclear missiles, or from other nuclear nations. All other nuclear arms control treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, have lapsed, and Mr. Trump pulled out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which put tight limits on Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium. “The combination of these challenges raises the nuclear security of our allies anew, as they ask whether they can continue to rely on the United States as they’ve always done,” said Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “Some allies wonder about the viability and credibility of the U.S. nuclear and security guarantee,” he said. Doubts about America’s security guarantees are not new, but they are bigger than ever. Charles de Gaulle, who as French president created his country’s independent nuclear deterrent in the 1960s, questioned American willingness to trade “New York for Paris,” and in 2018 Mr. Trump wondered if the United States should go to war to defend Montenegro, a NATO member state. Given the new reach and capability of North Korea, with missiles that could hit the United States, Mr. Daalder said, Asian allies are asking: “Will you sacrifice us for you? Will you save Seattle at the price of Seoul?” With no U.S. nuclear weapons there, reassuring Asia is very difficult. “The Biden nuclear agenda has not so far received the global attention it warrants, especially regarding Asia and China’s modernization,” said Kevin Rudd, the former prime minister of Australia who is president of the Asia Society. “There has to be sufficient belief in collective deterrence and the American nuclear umbrella to prevent allies from contemplating their own national nuclear breakouts,” he said. The problem of reassurance Mr. Biden faces is both military and political, said Mark Fitzpatrick, an associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. There is the growing threat from nuclear adversaries and less arms control, he said, and then there are the doubts about American willingness to act. America’s nuclear guarantee “has suffered the most from Trump’s transactional approach to alliances,” he said. “If I were an American ally [I would] have to think twice about how much I could rely on the U.S. guarantee, given that this American isolationism and unilateralism isn’t going away.” Mr. Daalder put together 16 former officials and analysts to write a report on these issues. Among its recommendations are suggestions to “rebalance the trans-Atlantic partnership” by encouraging Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense and security. Europeans should fund “real military capabilities” instead of administration and modernize NATO nuclear assets, the report says. Controversially, it recommends that France and Britain join in extending their nuclear deterrents to cover European allies. The report also urges Washington to resume serious security cooperation with Japan and South Korea and to create an Asian nuclear planning group, including Australia, to bring allies into American nuclear strategy for the region. If Europe is also vulnerable, anxiety is especially acute in Asia. “Both South Korea and Japan are under threat from this growing North Korean nuclear arsenal and missile capability,” said Byung-se Yun, a former South Korean foreign minister. “Both countries feel that the current level of extended deterrence is not sufficient to protect us. Nuclear reassurance has become the first and foremost issue for America in Asia.” Asians worry that Washington will make a deal with North Korea on intercontinental missiles but not shorter-range ones, which could start to decouple American and South Korean interests. In opinion polls, a consistent majority of South Koreans support acquiring nuclear weapons, and centrist and conservative political parties have called on Washington to station nuclear weapons in the country. Japan is also vulnerable but is allergic to debating nuclear strategy after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, said Nobuyasu Abe, a former commissioner of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission and former U.N. under secretary-general for disarmament. North Korea does not yet have a second-strike capacity, he said, but “we may be overconfident.” China, rapidly increasing its military budget and nuclear stockpile, is a different matter. “What’s happening to us is China,” Mr. Abe said. “It’s a big dragon but its tail is too short to be seen by Europeans.” The risk is Taiwan, he said, and how to defend it or deter China from attacking it. The American policy of “strategic ambiguity” is outdated, he said, “when Xi Jinping is so explicit on Taiwan.” The United States is 10,000 kilometers away, Mr. Abe said. “So persuade us that you can deter the Chinese. Are you ready to use nuclear weapons to deter China? Washington has never said yes.” An aggressive Russia presents similar problems for Europe and especially for Germany, with its own nuclear allergy, said Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference. The issue is so sensitive that “for the 16 years of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship we have not had a meaningful discussion about deterrence, what it means, do we need it, why, and the substance of NATO’s policy,” he said. The loss of public confidence in the United States after the Trump years, especially in Germany, is vivid in opinion polls by the European Council on Foreign Relations. But French ideas about European “strategic autonomy” are risky, Mr. Ischinger said. “NATO is so important to our security, we must avoid sending any signals that we’re considering alternatives.” Radoslaw Sikorski, a European legislator and former Polish foreign and defense minister, sees danger in Russia’s new weapons, especially without the intermediate-range forces treaty. “What’s surprising is that this has provoked no reaction in capitals that have come into range, like Berlin,” he said. “There’s nothing like the discussion and reaction produced by a similar move by the Soviets in the mid-1980s, when millions protested and governments were brought down.” As Mr. Fitzpatrick notes, “vulnerability doesn’t matter if you believe and trust in U.S. security guarantees, because the U.S. has over the horizon stuff that can hit targets in 30 minutes.” But that, he and others say, is an increasingly big “if.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Extended deterrence is <u>collapsing</u> now.</h4><p>Steven <strong>Erlanger 21</strong>. Citing Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Mark Fitzpatrick, an associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Nobuyasu Abe, a former commissioner of Japan’s Atomic <u><strong>Energy Commission and former U.N. under secretary-general for disarmament, "Biden’s Top Challenge Abroad Is Something No One Wants to Talk About." 2-10-2021. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/world/europe/biden-nuclear-weapons-arms-control.html.</p><p></u></strong>There is little arms control; modern technologies are unrestrained; and the players are more numerous and rapidly building up nuclear stockpiles. As important, Mr. <u><strong>Trump’s transactional</strong>, spasmodic, “America First” policies <strong>undermined allies’ confidence</strong> in <strong>American</strong> security <strong>guarantees</strong>. </u>Many experts are now warning that Mr. Biden must once again make arms control a priority, even if the notion seems as dated as the wide-lapeled suits of the 1970s and ’80s, when complex treaties about “throw weights” and “multiple re-entry vehicles” dominated Cold War diplomacy. Not to do so, they say, risks the acceleration of a nuclear arms race, with new threats to American allies in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. But few want to discuss the perils, especially in Europe, where nuclear literacy is largely gone and the danger comes from shorter-range nuclear weapons uncovered by any arms control. To Nathalie Tocci, director of Italy’s Institute of International Affairs, the lack of a debate is shocking. “We barely discuss nuclear,” she said. “On the risk and threat side, there’s no sufficient understanding of how more dangerous it’s becoming.” The most immediate fix would be <u><mark>to <strong>restore American credibility</u></strong></mark>, experts said, though even that <u><strong><mark>may not be easy</u></strong></mark>. <u>The old assurance that the United States would respond with its own arsenal if allies were attacked was a strong barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. No more, perhaps.</u> <u><strong><mark>America’s partners</strong> in</u></mark> Europe and <u><mark>Asia <strong>feel vulnerable</u></strong></mark>. <u>They want reassurance that America’s security guarantees are valid</u>, realistic <u>and reliable</u>, experts said. If not, some would consider going nuclear themselves, openly or secretly. <u>What is compelling them are</u> the <u>new dangers</u> of a world where <u><strong>North Korea’s nuclear</strong> and <strong>missile arsenals</u></strong> are expanding; where <u><strong>China</strong> is <strong>doubling</strong> its <strong>nuclear-weapons stockpile</strong> and <strong>building</u></strong> <u><strong>sophisticated</u></strong> intermediate-range <u><strong>missiles</u></strong>; where Russia has modernized its nuclear arms and is developing hypersonic missiles; and where Iran is thought to be several months from producing enough fissile material to make a nuclear bomb. Just before the last nuclear arms-control treaty with Russia, New START, expired, Mr. Biden extended for another five years. But it does nothing to diminish the threat from more modern technologies, from tactical or medium-range nuclear missiles, or from other nuclear nations. All other nuclear arms control treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, have lapsed, and Mr. Trump pulled out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which put tight limits on Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium. “The combination of these challenges raises the nuclear security of our <u>allies</u> anew, as they ask <u>whether they can continue to rely on the United States as they’ve always done</u>,” said Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “<u>Some allies wonder about the <strong>viability</strong> and <strong>credibility</strong> of the <strong>U.S. nuclear</strong> and <strong>security</strong> <strong>guarantee</u></strong>,” he said. <u><mark>Doubts about <strong>America’s security guarantees</u></strong></mark> <u>are not new, but they <strong><mark>are bigger than ever</u></strong></mark>. Charles de Gaulle, who as French president created his country’s independent nuclear deterrent in the 1960s, questioned American willingness to trade “New York for Paris,” and in 2018 Mr. Trump wondered if the United States should go to war to defend Montenegro, a NATO member state. Given the new reach and capability of North Korea, with missiles that could hit the United States, Mr. Daalder said, Asian allies are asking: “Will you sacrifice us for you? Will you save Seattle at the price of Seoul?” With no U.S. nuclear weapons there, reassuring Asia is very difficult. “The Biden nuclear agenda has not so far received the global attention it warrants, especially regarding Asia and China’s modernization,” said Kevin Rudd, the former prime minister of Australia who is president of the Asia Society. “<u><mark>There has to be</mark> <strong>sufficient <mark>belief</strong> in</mark> <strong>collective deterrence</strong> and <mark>the</mark> <strong>American nuclear <mark>umbrella</strong> to prevent <strong></mark>allies</strong> from <strong>contemplating their own</strong> national <strong><mark>nuclear breakouts</u></strong></mark>,” he said. <u>The problem of reassurance Mr. Biden faces is both <strong>military</strong> and <strong>political</u></strong>, said Mark Fitzpatrick, an associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. There is the growing threat from nuclear adversaries and less arms control, he said, and then <u><mark>there are</mark> the <strong><mark>doubts about</strong> <strong>American</mark> <mark>willingness to act</strong></mark>. America’s nuclear guarantee “has suffered the most from Trump’s transactional approach to alliances</u>,” he said. “<u>If I were an American ally [I would] have to <strong>think twice</strong> about how much I could <strong>rely on the U.S. guarantee</strong>, given that this <strong><mark>American isolationism</strong> </mark>and <strong>unilateralism <mark>isn’t going away.”</u></strong></mark> Mr. Daalder put together 16 former officials and analysts to write a report on these issues. Among its recommendations are suggestions to “rebalance the trans-Atlantic partnership” by encouraging Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense and security. Europeans should fund “real military capabilities” instead of administration and modernize NATO nuclear assets, the report says. Controversially, it recommends that France and Britain join in extending their nuclear deterrents to cover European allies. The report also urges Washington to resume serious security cooperation with Japan and South Korea and to create an Asian nuclear planning group, including Australia, to bring allies into American nuclear strategy for the region. If Europe is also vulnerable, <u><strong><mark>anxiety</strong> is <strong>especially</mark> <mark>acute in Asia</u></strong>.</mark> “Both South Korea and <u><strong><mark>Japan</strong> are <strong>under threat</strong> from</mark> this growing <strong><mark>North Korea</strong></mark>n nuclear arsenal and missile <strong>capability</u></strong>,” said Byung-se Yun, a former South Korean foreign minister. <u>“Both countries <mark>feel</mark> that <mark>the <strong>current level</strong> of <strong>extended deterrence</strong> is <strong>not sufficient</strong> to <strong>protect</mark> us</u></strong>. Nuclear reassurance has become the first and foremost issue for America in Asia.” Asians worry that Washington will make a deal with North Korea on intercontinental missiles but not shorter-range ones, which could start to decouple American and South Korean interests. In opinion polls, a consistent majority of South Koreans support acquiring nuclear weapons, and centrist and conservative political parties have called on Washington to station nuclear weapons in the country. <u><strong>Japan</strong> is also <strong>vulnerable</strong> but is <strong>allergic</strong> to <strong>debating nuclear strategy</strong> after Hiroshima and Nagasaki</u>, said Nobuyasu Abe, a former commissioner of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission and former U.N. under secretary-general for disarmament. North Korea does not yet have a second-strike capacity, he said, but “we may be overconfident.” <u>China, rapidly increasing its military budget and nuclear stockpile, is a different matter. “</u>What’s happening to us is China,” Mr. Abe said. “It’s a big dragon but its tail is too short to be seen by Europeans.” The risk is Taiwan, he said, and how to defend it or deter China from attacking it. The American policy of “strategic ambiguity” is outdated, he said, “when Xi Jinping is so explicit on Taiwan.” <u><mark>The <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <mark>is <strong>10,000 kilometers away</strong></mark>,</u> Mr. Abe said. “<u>So <strong>persuade us</strong> that <strong>you can deter the Chinese</strong>. <mark>Are you <strong>ready</strong> to <strong>use nuclear weapons</strong> to <strong>deter China?</strong> <strong>Washington has never said yes</strong></mark>.” </u>An aggressive Russia presents similar problems for Europe and especially for Germany, with its own nuclear allergy, said Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference. The issue is so sensitive that “for the 16 years of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship we have not had a meaningful discussion about deterrence, what it means, do we need it, why, and the substance of NATO’s policy,” he said. The loss of public confidence in the United States after the Trump years, especially in Germany, is vivid in opinion polls by the European Council on Foreign Relations. But French ideas about European “strategic autonomy” are risky, Mr. Ischinger said. “NATO is so important to our security, we must avoid sending any signals that we’re considering alternatives.” Radoslaw Sikorski, a European legislator and former Polish foreign and defense minister, sees danger in Russia’s new weapons, especially without the intermediate-range forces treaty. “What’s surprising is that this has provoked no reaction in capitals that have come into range, like Berlin,” he said. “There’s nothing like the discussion and reaction produced by a similar move by the Soviets in the mid-1980s, when millions protested and governments were brought down.” As Mr. Fitzpatrick notes, “<u><strong>vulnerability doesn’t matter</strong> <strong>if</strong> you believe and <strong>trust</strong> in <strong>U.S. security guarantees</u></strong>, because the U.S. has over the horizon stuff that can hit targets in 30 minutes.” <u>But that</u>, he and others say, <u>is <strong>an increasingly big “if.”</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Luibheid & Cantu ’05 (Eithne, Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from the University of California, Berkeley, works @ Arizona U, Lionel, professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz , who focused on queer theory , queer issues, and Latin American immigration, “Queer Migrations Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings,” 2005, Published by the University of Minnesota Press, //akash) fulltext: INA = Immigration and Nationality Act Yet as a number of scholars have argued, we should be deeply skeptical about placing the 1952 INA within a civil rights trajectory. The removal of the explicit language of racial prerequisites from the 1952 law did not mean that race suddenly became irrelevant to U.S. policies on immigration and naturalization. On the contrary, by mobilizing national origin as the basis of the quota system, the INA continued to have profoundly racist effects on immigration policy.28 Despite some legislators' claims, Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State 83 the 1952INA was "permeated with the doctrine of racial superiority."29 As Rachel Buff notes, "Although the law did eliminate restrictions against the naturalization of Asians as citizens, it implemented national-origins quotas that applied the 19205 'Nordic race theory' of immigration restriction. In accordance with Nordic race theory, this law gave preference to immigrants of northern European backgrounds."30 Even at the time of its passage, the racist implications of the INA were widely acknowledged. In a minority report, for instance, other members of the Judiciary Committee contested the claim that the new legislation did away with racial discrimination. They asserted that the "sources of our national strength rest squarely on the guiding idea of our form of government, the idea that every race and every creed among us is equally entitled to the protection of the American flag." The new legislation did not, they argued, uphold these goals, pointing out that quotas based on national origin constituted de facto "racial discrimination against Eurasians and colonial natives [of the West Indies], and national ancestry discriminations against Italians, Poles, and Greeks."31 In addition, President Truman vetoed the bill (a veto that was overturned) because he objected to the "unfair and discriminatory" system of national origins quotas.32 Likewise, an editorial in the New York Times strongly criticized the bill as "racist, restrictionist, and reactionary."33 The INA's removal of racial categories of exclusion, then, indicates not the end of racialized and racist immigration and naturalization policies, but rather a recognition that the explicit language of race was losing legitimacy in official constructions of American citizenship. How then might we account for the simultaneous disappearance of the overt language of race and appearance of "outlawed" sexual formations such as homosexuality and adultery in the 1952 INA? The exclusions based on homosexuality and adultery, I would argue, were profoundly entangled with the narrative that Congress was writing about the relationship between race and nation in the 1952 INA. There is nothing in the record to indicate a conscious linkage between the removal of the explicit language of race and the simultaneous articulation of exclusions based on prohibited sexual categories. Their very congruence, however, suggests an underlying logic that connects these two aspects of the law. One clue to how these concepts worked in tandem is suggested in the Senate report of 1950 that preceded passage of the act. In its discussion of the proposed changes, the Senate subcommittee noted that the 84 Siobhan B. Somerville original purpose of the "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" clause in 1917 was "to keep out 'tainted blood,' that is, 'persons who have medical traits which would harm the people of the United States if those traits were introduced into this country, or if those possessing those traits were added to those in this country who unfortunately are so afflicted.' "34 In constructing homosexuality as a matter of "tainted blood," the subcommittee tacitly reinforced an earlier discourse of eugenics; to exclude homosexuals was to invoke the logic of national purification.35 Although less overtly, adultery was also historically linked to a history of eugenics and models of national belonging in which citizenship was transferred through bloodlines. The term "adultery" refers, after all, to "pollution, contamination, a 'base admixture,' a wrong combination."36 To adulterate is "to render spurious or counterfeit; to falsify, corrupt, debase, esp. by the admixture of baser ingredients."37 If monogamous marriage was assumed to produce an unadulterated line of descent, adultery was imagined as the literal pollution of bloodlines through extramarital reproduction, thus scrambling the inheritance of property relationships and status. Further, as Ursula Vogel has pointed out, the legal history of adultery is thoroughly embedded within essentialist and asymmetrical understandings of gender. Because women's bodies were the site of literal reproduction as well as the transmission of family bloodlines, a wife's extramarital sex could potentially adulterate that lineage, while a husband's extramarital sex could not. In the original laws on adultery, "only a wife was capable of committing adultery.... The very same act on the part of her husband had no name in the language of the law, as long as he did not violate the marriage of another man."38 Although this double standard had long ago disappeared on the face of the law, I would argue that these underlying anxieties about property and pollution animated legislators who drafted the 1952INA. Just as the provisions regarding homosexuality apparently respond to eugenic concerns about "tainted blood," the explicit naming of adultery registers anxieties over paternity and the transmission of property. Thus, while Congress removed overt references to race in the requirements for American citizenship, it maintained a logic of blood purification by invoking the sexualized figures of the adulterer and the homosexual.39 When the explicit language of race disappeared, the underlying fantasy of national purification—an unadulterated Americanness—was articulated instead through the discourse of sexuality. Even though the law appeared "race- Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State 85 neutral" on its surface, the 1952 INA's new provisions on prohibited sexual categories, along with those on "national origins," reinforced rather than replaced the racist logic that had anchored U.S. immigration and naturalization policy from its earliest instantiation. The exclusions based on adultery and homosexuality in congressional legislation were relatively short-lived compared to the prohibitions against other sexualized figures, such as polygamists and prostitutes. By 1979, following the 1973 decision by the American Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders, the surgeon general announced that the Public Health Service would no longer issue the medical certificates needed for the INS to exclude aliens solely on the basis of homosexuality.40 Without the participation of the Public Health Service, the existing policy was difficult to enforce. The reference to homosexuality was finally removed in 1990, when Congress undertook another sweeping reform of all immigration legislation; at that time, it deleted any reference to "persons of psychopathic personality" from the law. (However, in the meantime, HIV had been added to the list of communicable diseases used to exclude potential immigrants, in effect relegitimating the exclusion of many gay men and immigrants of color from entry into the United States. That law remains on the books.) Similarly, in 1981, Congress removed any explicit mention of adultery from the list of disqualifications from "good moral character" in naturalization provisions (although even after its removal from the letter of the law, the exclusion of adulterers has been enforced by the INS under various other guises).41 In subsequent years, the underlying blood logic that had organized earlier exclusions has been articulated instead through the prevailing policy of "family reunification" in immigration and naturalization law, the explicit purpose of which is "to principally reunite nuclear families."42 This policy, a central feature of the 1965 immigration and naturalization reforms, is tied to the somewhat obvious ideological goals of privileging and reproducing a model of the nuclear family. The policy of family unification allowed the law to appear facially "color-blind" even as it was designed to achieve racialized effects, specifically maintaining the existing racial makeup of incoming immigrant groups. The racial dimensions of the family unification policy were not lost on those who designed and supported it, such as Representative Emmanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee at the time. In discussions leading to the 86 Siobhan B. Somerville passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, Celler reassured Congress that the immigrant pool would remain largely European: there will not be, comparatively, many Asians or Africans entering this country.... Since the people of Africa and Asia have very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate from those countries because they have no family ties in the U.S.43 This statement is astonishing and ironic for a number of reasons, one of which is its denial of the state's own history of actively destroying structures of kinship that might tie the United States to Africa through the technologies of slavery. Celler's predictions for the future, however, were also proved incorrect by the significant increases in the number of immigrants from Asia, South America, and the Caribbean basin in subsequent decades. The policy, however, did have profound effects in another way, placing heterosexual family structures even more squarely at the center of patterns of legal immigration and naturalization. Indeed, as James Smith and Barry Edmonston have argued, as a result of this "family reunification" policy, "compared with native-born [Americans] of the same age, new immigrants are more likely to be married and are less likely to be divorced, widowed, or separated"; "family ties clearly dominate [the reasons for immigration], accounting in 1995 for two-thirds of admissions."44 The more recent policy of "family reunification" in U.S. immigration and naturalization law has brought to the surface many of the ideological goals that were implicit in the 1952INA while simultaneously masking the continuing salience of race to U.S. immigration and naturalization policy. Although the legislators who designed the 1952 law did not explicitly link homosexuality and adultery as similar types of prohibited conduct and status, it is not difficult to see how these exclusions fit coherently into a national narrative about normative sexuality: both exclusions reinforce the state's investment in constructing potential citizens as monogamous, heterosexual, and married (or marriageable). The emphasis on monogamy and heterosexuality in immigration and naturalization law can be understood as part of a larger cultural and political emphasis on sexual discipline and the promotion of the nuclear family after World War II, an ideological vision that had economic consequences, since the nuclear family form played a necessary role in restructuring the postwar economy by expanding consumption of household goods and services.45 Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State 87 The 1952 INA and its legislative history tell a particular and powerful story about how models of normative sexuality were enlisted to maintain racist structures in the state's production of citizens during the Cold War era. Despite their relatively brief appearance in the legislative texts concerning immigration and naturalization, exclusions based on adultery and homosexuality served a specific purpose for lawmakers, providing an unspoken logic of blood purification in the absence of the explicit language of race. It is important, however, to clarify the kinds of claims that can be made based on these juridical texts: we cannot necessarily conclude that they were representative of understandings of race and sexuality in American culture more broadly. Further, these changes in federal law did not necessarily reflect the formation of sexual or racial subjectivity during this period, nor do they tell us anything about how these laws were negotiated, at times oppositionally, by those who enforced or were subjected to them. These texts do mark certain key shifts in official discourses about what constituted an embodied "American" citizenry and what language was available for representing it. Although the explicit language of race was losing legitimacy in the eye of the law as a means of excluding potential citizens, the language of sexual pathology and pollution became increasingly available for circumscribing the characteristics of the ideal citizen. The appearance of adultery and homosexuality in the legislative history of the 1952 INA seemed to express an anxious desire to maintain a model of nation bound to citizenship through blood, even, or especially, at a moment when the explicit use of race in the articulation of that model had lost legitimacy.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Law Focus Link – the aff’s focus on the TEXT of the law <u>mystifies</u> other formations of citizenship that <u>are social</u>, not <u>legal</u></strong>.</h4><p><strong>Luibheid & Cantu ’05 </strong>(Eithne, Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from the University of California, Berkeley, works @ Arizona U, Lionel, professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz , who focused on queer theory , queer issues, and Latin American immigration, “Queer Migrations Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings,” 2005, Published by the University of Minnesota Press, //akash)</p><p>INA = Immigration and Nationality Act Yet as a number of scholars have argued, we should be deeply skeptical about placing the 1952 INA within a civil rights trajectory. <u>The <mark>removal of</mark> the explicit <mark>language of racial prerequisites from</u></mark> the 1952 <u><strong><mark>law did not mean</mark> that <mark>race</mark> suddenly <mark>became irrelevant</mark> <mark>to</mark> U.S. <mark>policies on immigration</mark> and naturalization</u></strong>. On the contrary, <u><mark>by mobilizing national origin as the basis of the quota</mark> system, <mark>the INA <strong>continued</mark> to have profoundly <mark>racist effects on immigration policy</mark>.</u></strong>28 Despite some legislators' claims, Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State 83 <u>the</u> 1952<u><strong>INA was "permeated with the doctrine of racial superiority.</u></strong>"29 As Rachel Buff notes, "<u>Although <mark>the law</mark> <mark>did eliminate restrictions against</mark> </u>the <u>naturalization</u> <u>of <mark>Asians</mark> as citizens, <mark>it implemented</mark> national-origins <mark>quotas that</mark> applied the</u> 19205 <u><strong>'Nordic race theory' of immigration restriction. In accordance with Nordic race theory, this law <mark>gave preference to immigrants of</mark> northern <mark>European backgrounds</mark>."</u></strong>30 Even at the time of its passage, <u>the racist implications of the INA were widely acknowledged. In a minority report</u>, for instance, other members of <u>the Judiciary Committee contested the claim that the new legislation did away with racial discrimination.</u> They asserted that the "sources of our national strength rest squarely on the guiding idea of our form of government, the idea that every race and every creed among us is equally entitled to the protection of the American flag." The new legislation did not, they argued, uphold these goals, pointing out that quotas based on national origin constituted de facto "racial discrimination against Eurasians and colonial natives [of the West Indies], and national ancestry discriminations against Italians, Poles, and Greeks."31 In addition, President Truman vetoed the bill (a veto that was overturned) because he objected to the "unfair and discriminatory" system of national origins quotas.32 Likewise, an editorial in the New York Times strongly criticized the bill as "racist, restrictionist, and reactionary."33 <u><mark>The INA's removal of racial categories</mark> of exclusion</u>, then, <u><strong><mark>indicates not the end of</mark> racialized and <mark>racist immigration</mark> and naturalization <mark>policies, but</mark> rather <mark>a recognition that the</mark> <mark>explicit language of race was losing legitimacy</mark> <mark>in</mark> official <mark>constructions of</mark> American <mark>citizenship</mark>. </u></strong>How then might we account for the simultaneous disappearance of the overt language of race and appearance of "outlawed" sexual formations such as homosexuality and adultery in the 1952 INA? The exclusions based on homosexuality and adultery, I would argue, were profoundly entangled with the narrative that Congress was writing about the relationship between race and nation in the 1952 INA. There is nothing in the record to indicate a conscious linkage between the removal of the explicit language of race and the simultaneous articulation of exclusions based on prohibited sexual categories. Their very congruence, however, suggests an underlying logic that connects these two aspects of the law. One clue to how these concepts worked in tandem is suggested in the Senate report of 1950 that preceded passage of the act. In its discussion of the proposed changes, the Senate subcommittee noted that the 84 Siobhan B. Somerville original purpose of the "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" clause in 1917 was "to keep out 'tainted blood,' that is, 'persons who have medical traits which would harm the people of the United States if those traits were introduced into this country, or if those possessing those traits were added to those in this country who unfortunately are so afflicted.' "34 In constructing homosexuality as a matter of "tainted blood," the subcommittee tacitly reinforced an earlier discourse of eugenics; to exclude homosexuals was to invoke the logic of national purification.35 Although less overtly, adultery was also historically linked to a history of eugenics and models of national belonging in which citizenship was transferred through bloodlines. The term "adultery" refers, after all, to "pollution, contamination, a 'base admixture,' a wrong combination."36 To adulterate is "to render spurious or counterfeit; to falsify, corrupt, debase, esp. by the admixture of baser ingredients."37 If monogamous marriage was assumed to produce an unadulterated line of descent, adultery was imagined as the literal pollution of bloodlines through extramarital reproduction, thus scrambling the inheritance of property relationships and status. Further, as Ursula Vogel has pointed out, the legal history of adultery is thoroughly embedded within essentialist and asymmetrical understandings of gender. Because women's bodies were the site of literal reproduction as well as the transmission of family bloodlines, a wife's extramarital sex could potentially adulterate that lineage, while a husband's extramarital sex could not. In the original laws on adultery, "only a wife was capable of committing adultery.... The very same act on the part of her husband had no name in the language of the law, as long as he did not violate the marriage of another man."38 Although this double standard had long ago disappeared on the face of the law, I would argue that these underlying anxieties about property and pollution animated legislators who drafted the 1952INA. Just as the provisions regarding homosexuality apparently respond to eugenic concerns about "tainted blood," the explicit naming of adultery registers anxieties over paternity and the transmission of property. Thus, while Congress removed overt references to race in the requirements for American citizenship, it maintained a logic of blood purification by invoking the sexualized figures of the adulterer and the homosexual.39 When the explicit language of race disappeared, the underlying fantasy of national purification—an unadulterated Americanness—was articulated instead through the discourse of sexuality. Even though the law appeared "race- Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State 85 neutral" on its surface, the 1952 INA's new provisions on prohibited sexual categories, along with those on "national origins," reinforced rather than replaced the racist logic that had anchored U.S. immigration and naturalization policy from its earliest instantiation. The exclusions based on adultery and homosexuality in congressional legislation were relatively short-lived compared to the prohibitions against other sexualized figures, such as polygamists and prostitutes. By 1979, following the 1973 decision by the American Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders, the surgeon general announced that the Public Health Service would no longer issue the medical certificates needed for the INS to exclude aliens solely on the basis of homosexuality.40 Without the participation of the Public Health Service, the existing policy was difficult to enforce. The reference to homosexuality was finally removed in 1990, when Congress undertook another sweeping reform of all immigration legislation; at that time, it deleted any reference to "persons of psychopathic personality" from the law. (However, in the meantime, HIV had been added to the list of communicable diseases used to exclude potential immigrants, in effect relegitimating the exclusion of many gay men and immigrants of color from entry into the United States. That law remains on the books.) Similarly, in 1981, Congress removed any explicit mention of adultery from the list of disqualifications from "good moral character" in naturalization provisions (although even after its removal from the letter of the law, the exclusion of adulterers has been enforced by the INS under various other guises).41 In subsequent years, the underlying blood logic that had organized earlier exclusions has been articulated instead through the prevailing policy of "family reunification" in immigration and naturalization law, the explicit purpose of which is "to principally reunite nuclear families."42 This policy, a central feature of the 1965 immigration and naturalization reforms, is tied to the somewhat obvious ideological goals of privileging and reproducing a model of the nuclear family. The policy of family unification allowed the law to appear facially "color-blind" even as it was designed to achieve racialized effects, specifically maintaining the existing racial makeup of incoming immigrant groups. The racial dimensions of the family unification policy were not lost on those who designed and supported it, such as Representative Emmanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee at the time. In discussions leading to the 86 Siobhan B. Somerville passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, Celler reassured Congress that the immigrant pool would remain largely European: there will not be, comparatively, many Asians or Africans entering this country.... Since the people of Africa and Asia have very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate from those countries because they have no family ties in the U.S.43 This statement is astonishing and ironic for a number of reasons, one of which is its denial of the state's own history of actively destroying structures of kinship that might tie the United States to Africa through the technologies of slavery. Celler's predictions for the future, however, were also proved incorrect by the significant increases in the number of immigrants from Asia, South America, and the Caribbean basin in subsequent decades. The policy, however, did have profound effects in another way, placing heterosexual family structures even more squarely at the center of patterns of legal immigration and naturalization. Indeed, as James Smith and Barry Edmonston have argued, as a result of this "family reunification" policy, "compared with native-born [Americans] of the same age, new immigrants are more likely to be married and are less likely to be divorced, widowed, or separated"; "family ties clearly dominate [the reasons for immigration], accounting in 1995 for two-thirds of admissions."44 The more recent policy of "family reunification" in U.S. immigration and naturalization law has brought to the surface many of the ideological goals that were implicit in the 1952INA while simultaneously masking the continuing salience of race to U.S. immigration and naturalization policy. Although the legislators who designed the 1952 law did not explicitly link homosexuality and adultery as similar types of prohibited conduct and status, it is not difficult to see how these exclusions fit coherently into a national narrative about normative sexuality: both exclusions reinforce the state's investment in constructing potential citizens as monogamous, heterosexual, and married (or marriageable). The emphasis on monogamy and heterosexuality in immigration and naturalization law can be understood as part of a larger cultural and political emphasis on sexual discipline and the promotion of the nuclear family after World War II, an ideological vision that had economic consequences, since the nuclear family form played a necessary role in restructuring the postwar economy by expanding consumption of household goods and services.45 Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State 87 The 1952 INA and its legislative history tell a particular and powerful story about how models of normative sexuality were enlisted to maintain racist structures in the state's production of citizens during the Cold War era. Despite their relatively brief appearance in the legislative texts concerning immigration and naturalization, exclusions based on adultery and homosexuality served a specific purpose for lawmakers, providing an unspoken logic of blood purification in the absence of the explicit language of race. It is important, however, to clarify the kinds of claims that can be made based on these juridical texts: we cannot necessarily conclude that they were representative of understandings of race and sexuality in American culture more broadly. Further, these changes in federal law did not necessarily reflect the formation of sexual or racial subjectivity during this period, nor do they tell us anything about how these laws were negotiated, at times oppositionally, by those who enforced or were subjected to them. These texts do mark certain key shifts in official discourses about what constituted an embodied "American" citizenry and what language was available for representing it. Although the explicit language of race was losing legitimacy in the eye of the law as a means of excluding potential citizens, the language of sexual pathology and pollution became increasingly available for circumscribing the characteristics of the ideal citizen. The appearance of adultery and homosexuality in the legislative history of the 1952 INA seemed to express an anxious desire to maintain a model of nation bound to citizenship through blood, even, or especially, at a moment when the explicit use of race in the articulation of that model had lost legitimacy.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Walt ’22 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. June 2, 2022; "Will Teaching Aggressors a Lesson Deter Future Wars?"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/will-teaching-aggressors-a-lesson-deter-future-wars/; //CYang fulltext: Arguments of this sort have been a staple of hard-line (and especially neoconservative) discourse for decades. Like the domino theory, which refuses to die no matter how often it is disproved, such claims transform the outcome of a single conflict into a struggle for the fate of the entire planet. The choice we are said to face is stark. Down one path: a revitalized liberal order led by a unified alliance of powerful, peace-loving democracies, and a future where war is rare and prosperity reigns. Down the other path: a world of rising autocracy, eroding human rights, and more war. According to this view, Ukraine must win big, or all is lost. Framing the issue in this way stacks the deck in favor of always doing more and rejecting any sort of compromise, but is the choice as stark as hard-liners make out? Does defeating an aggressor really teach others to behave better? It would be a more benign world if this were the case, but a quick glance at the past century or so suggests otherwise. Start with World War I. Although all the major European powers played a role in the outbreak of war, Germany was the driving force during the July Crisis of 1914. Overly fearful of rising Russian power, German leaders used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and the confrontation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as the occasion for a preventive war for hegemony in Europe. The result was four horrific years of war, a total German defeat at the hands of the Allies, the end of the Hohenzollern monarchy and its Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman allies, and the imposition of a highly punitive peace treaty. The stark reality of Germany’s World War I defeat didn’t teach Adolf Hitler not to make his own bid for European hegemony 20 years later; indeed, the myth that Germany had been stabbed in the back and the harsh peace imposed at Versailles helped fuel the rise of Nazism and set the stage for another round of war. Nor did the carnage of the First World War teach Imperial Japan that trying to carve out its own empire in Asia was a bad idea. The chief aggressors were also soundly punished in World War II. Japan was firebombed repeatedly, and two of its cities were destroyed by atomic bombs; Germany was occupied and subsequently divided into two separate states; and Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini both ended up dead. A clearer demonstration that “aggression does not pay” would be hard to imagine, and a good case can be made that both Germany and Japan learned that lesson well. But this lesson didn’t stop Kim Il Sung from attacking South Korea in 1950 (with Joseph Stalin’s full support) or convince various leaders elsewhere in Asia or the Middle East that going to war was always unwise. Similarly, one might have thought the French and American experiences in Vietnam would offer a vivid and enduring reminder of the dangers of hubris and the limits of military power, not to mention the futility of trying to nation-build in a deeply divided society without a competent local partner. Yet the George W. Bush administration paid no heed to this lesson when it invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Mind you, it’s not just great powers that get taught harsh lessons after launching an aggressive war. Back in 1982, Argentina’s military junta decided that the British Falkland Islands (which they call the Malvinas) were theirs and decided to take the territory by force. Britain sank the flagship of the Argentine navy and successfully retook the islands, and popular protests in Argentina eventually swept the generals from power. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein eventually suffered a similar fate. His decision to attack revolutionary Iran in 1980 led to nearly eight years of war in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis lost their lives and Iraq’s economy cratered. Two years later, he decided to solve the economic problems the first war had created by seizing neighboring Kuwait, only to be ignominiously expelled by a U.S.-led coalition and placed under highly intrusive United Nations sanctions. Aggression didn’t pay in either case, but Saddam’s failures didn’t stop some other countries — including some prominent democracies — from starting new wars themselves. If painful defeats really sent clear warnings to others, the Soviet and American experiences in Afghanistan and the U.S. experience in Iraq after 2003 would have taught Putin and his associates that invading Ukraine was likely to trigger a powerful nationalist reaction and encourage outside powers to do what they could to thwart his aims. Surely he knew that the United States had helped defeat the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by supplying the mujahideen, just as Syria and Iran had each helped the Iraqi insurgents defeat the U.S. effort in Iraq. The lesson of these two conflicts seems all too obvious, but Putin seems to have convinced himself it didn’t apply to Ukraine. Not every aggressive war ends in defeat, of course, but there seems to be no shortage of cases where aggressors were badly beaten and more than a few where the people who started the war paid a large personal price for their folly. Yet the lesson that “aggression does not pay” is typically ignored or forgotten. Why? One reason is that the lessons of any given war aren’t always clear-cut, and reasonable people can draw different conclusions from a defeat. Was going to war a bad idea from the start, or was defeat due to poor implementation or just bad luck? The lessons from a failed war will also be discarded if policymakers believe that this time is different, and that new knowledge, new technology, a clever new strategy, or a uniquely favorable set of political circumstances will bring success this time around. One should never underestimate what elites can talk themselves into if they really want to go to war. Leaders may be intimately familiar with their own national histories, but they know and care less about what happened to other nations in similar circumstances. A second problem — one highlighted in the work of the late scholar Robert Jervis — is that humans tend to place more weight on their own experiences than on the experiences of others. Leaders in one country may be intimately familiar with their own national history (though they have probably absorbed a self-serving version of it), but they will know and care less about what happened to other nations in similar circumstances. And it’s easy to dismiss another country’s failure by claiming their cause was not as just, their resolve not as great, and their military not as competent as one’s own. Moreover, because decisions for war typically reflect a complex weighing of threats, opportunities, expected costs, and alternatives, what happened to another country in a wholly different conflict may not loom large in their calculations. Furthermore, leaders who start wars are often aware that there are risks involved, and they sometimes recognize that the odds of victory are slim. Even so, they will “roll the iron dice” if they believe the alternative is even worse. To take an obvious example, Japan’s leaders in 1941 understood that the United States was vastly stronger and that attacking Pearl Harbor was a huge gamble that would probably fail. Nonetheless, they believed the alternative was bowing to U.S. pressure and giving up their quest for great-power status and Asian dominance — an outcome they regarded as infinitely worse. The bottom line is that U.S. policymakers should not base their actions today on the belief that victory in Ukraine (or Yemen or Ethiopia or Libya) is going to tilt the arc of history decisively in the directions they favor. Nor will the outcome of today’s conflicts have much effect on how future leaders think about their own prospects when they are deciding whether to launch a war.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>8. Deterrence fails.</h4><p><strong>Walt ’22</strong> — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. June 2, 2022; "Will Teaching Aggressors a Lesson Deter Future Wars?"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/will-teaching-aggressors-a-lesson-deter-future-wars/; //CYang</p><p><u><mark>Arguments</u></mark> of this sort <u>have been a <mark>staple of <strong>hard-line</u></strong></mark> (and <u>especially <strong><mark>neocon</mark>servative</u></strong>) <u><mark>discourse</u></mark> <u>for decades</u>. Like the domino theory, which refuses to die no matter how often it is disproved, such <u>claims transform</u> the <u>outcome of a single conflict into</u> a <u>struggle for</u> the <u>fate of the <strong>entire planet</u></strong>. The choice we are said to face is stark. Down one path: a revitalized liberal order led by a unified alliance of powerful, peace-loving democracies, and a future where war is rare and prosperity reigns. Down the other path: a world of rising autocracy, eroding human rights, and more war. According to this view, Ukraine must win big, or all is lost.</p><p>Framing the issue in this way <u><mark>stacks the deck in favor of <strong>always doing more</strong></mark> and rejecting any</u> sort of <u>compromise</u>, but is the choice as stark as hard-liners make out? <u><mark>Does defeating an aggressor</u></mark> really <u><mark>teach others to <strong>behave</mark> better</u></strong>? It would be a more benign world if this were the case, but a quick glance at the <u>past <mark>century</u></mark> or so <u><mark>suggests <strong>otherwise</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Start with World War I. Although all the major European powers played a role in the outbreak of war, Germany was the driving force during the July Crisis of 1914. Overly fearful of rising Russian power, German leaders used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and the confrontation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as the occasion for a preventive war for hegemony in Europe. The result was four horrific years of war, a total German defeat at the hands of the Allies, the end of the Hohenzollern monarchy and its Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman allies, and the imposition of a highly punitive peace treaty.</p><p>The <u><strong>stark reality</strong> of Germany’s <strong><mark>W</strong></mark>orld <strong><mark>W</strong></mark>ar <strong><mark>I</strong></mark> defeat <mark>didn’t teach</u></mark> Adolf <u><mark>Hitler not to make his</mark> own <mark>bid for</mark> <strong>European <mark>heg</mark>emony</u></strong> 20 years later; indeed, the <u><mark>myth</u></mark> that <u><mark>Germany</mark> had been <mark>stabbed in the back</mark> and</u> the <u><strong>harsh peace</strong> imposed at Versailles</u> helped <u><mark>fuel</mark> the <mark>rise of <strong>Nazism</strong> and set the stage for</u></mark> another round of <u><mark>war</u></mark>. <u><mark>Nor</u></mark> did the carnage of the First World War <u>teach <strong>Imperial <mark>Japan</u></strong></mark> that <u>trying to carve out its</u> own <u>empire in Asia was a <strong>bad idea</u></strong>.</p><p>The chief aggressors were also soundly punished in World War II. Japan was firebombed repeatedly, and two of its cities were destroyed by atomic bombs; Germany was occupied and subsequently divided into two separate states; and Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini both ended up dead. A clearer demonstration that “aggression does not pay” would be hard to imagine, and a good case can be made that both Germany and Japan learned that lesson well. But this <u>lesson <mark>didn’t stop Kim</mark> Il Sung</u> from <u>attacking South Korea <mark>in 1950</u></mark> (<u>with</u> Joseph <u><strong><mark>Stalin’s</mark> full support</u></strong>) <u>or convince various leaders</u> elsewhere <u>in <mark>Asia or the Middle East</u></mark> that <u>going to <mark>war was</mark> <strong>always <mark>unwise</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Similarly, one might have thought the French and American experiences in <u><mark>Vietnam</u></mark> would <u>offer a vivid and <strong>enduring reminder</strong> of</u> the <u><mark>dangers of <strong>hubris</strong> and</u></mark> the <u><mark>limits of</mark> military <mark>power</u></mark>, not to mention the futility of trying to nation-build in a deeply divided society without a competent local partner. Yet the George W. Bush administration paid no heed to this lesson when it invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.</p><p>Mind you, it’s not just great powers that get taught harsh lessons after launching an aggressive war. Back in 1982, Argentina’s military junta decided that the British Falkland Islands (which they call the Malvinas) were theirs and decided to take the territory by force. Britain sank the flagship of the Argentine navy and successfully retook the islands, and popular protests in Argentina eventually swept the generals from power.</p><p>Iraq’s Saddam Hussein eventually suffered a similar fate. His decision to attack revolutionary Iran in 1980 led to nearly eight years of war in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis lost their lives and Iraq’s economy cratered. Two years later, he decided to solve the economic problems the first war had created by seizing neighboring Kuwait, only to be ignominiously expelled by a U.S.-led coalition and placed under highly intrusive United Nations sanctions. Aggression didn’t pay in either case, but Saddam’s failures didn’t stop some other countries — including some prominent democracies — from starting new wars themselves.</p><p><u><mark>If</mark> <strong>painful <mark>defeats</strong> really sent</mark> <strong>clear <mark>warnings</u></strong></mark> to others, the <u>Soviet and American experiences in <mark>Afghanistan</mark> and</u> the U.S. experience in <u><mark>Iraq</u></mark> after 2003 <u><mark>would have taught Putin</u></mark> and his associates that <u>invading <mark>Ukraine</mark> was <mark>likely to trigger</mark> a <strong><mark>powerful</mark> nationalist <mark>reaction</u></strong></mark> and encourage outside powers to do what they could to thwart his aims. Surely he knew that the United States had helped defeat the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by supplying the mujahideen, just as Syria and Iran had each helped the Iraqi insurgents defeat the U.S. effort in Iraq. The <u>lesson</u> of these two conflicts <u><mark>seems</mark> <strong>all too <mark>obvious</u></strong></mark>, <u>but <mark>Putin</u></mark> seems to have <u><mark>convinced himself it <strong>didn’t apply</strong></mark> to Ukraine</u>.</p><p>Not every aggressive war ends in defeat, of course, but there seems to be no shortage of cases where aggressors were badly beaten and more than a few where the people who started the war paid a large personal price for their folly. Yet the lesson that “<u><mark>aggression does not pay</u></mark>” <u><mark>is</u></mark> typically <u><strong><mark>ignored</strong> or <strong>forgotten</u></strong></mark>. Why?</p><p>One reason is that the lessons of any given war aren’t always clear-cut, and reasonable people can draw different conclusions from a defeat. Was going to war a bad idea from the start, or was defeat due to poor implementation or just bad luck? The lessons from a failed war will also be discarded if <u>policymakers <mark>believe that this time is <strong>different</u></strong></mark>, and that <u>new knowledge</u>, <u>new technology</u>, a <u>clever new strategy</u>, or a <u><strong>uniquely favorable</u></strong> set of <u>political circumstances</u> will bring success this time around. One should never underestimate what <u>elites</u> can <u><mark>talk themselves into</u></mark> if they really want to go to <u><mark>war</u></mark>.</p><p>Leaders may be intimately familiar with their own national histories, but they know and care less about what happened to other nations in similar circumstances.</p><p>A second problem — one highlighted in the work of the late scholar Robert Jervis — is that humans tend to place more weight on their own experiences than on the experiences of others. Leaders in one country may be intimately familiar with their own national history (though they have probably absorbed a self-serving version of it), but they will know and care less about what happened to other nations in similar circumstances.</p><p>And it’s <u>easy to dismiss</u> another country’s <u>failure by claiming</u> their <u>cause was not as just</u>, their <u>resolve not as great</u>, <u>and</u> their <u>military not as competent</u> as one’s own. Moreover, because decisions for war typically reflect a complex weighing of threats, opportunities, expected costs, and alternatives, what happened to another country in a wholly different conflict may not loom large in their calculations.</p><p>Furthermore, <u>leaders who start wars</u> are often <u>aware that there are <strong>risks involved</u></strong>, and they sometimes recognize that the odds of victory are slim. Even so, <u>they will</u> “<u><strong>roll the iron dice</u></strong>” if they believe the alternative is even worse. To take an obvious example, Japan’s leaders in 1941 understood that the United States was vastly stronger and that attacking <u><mark>Pearl Harbor</u></mark> was a huge gamble that would probably fail. Nonetheless, they believed the alternative was bowing to U.S. pressure and giving up their quest for great-power status and Asian dominance — an outcome they regarded as infinitely worse.</p><p>The bottom line is that <u>U.S. policymakers should <mark>not</mark> base</u> their <u>actions today on</u> the <u>belief that victory in <mark>Ukraine</u></mark> (or <u><mark>Yemen</u></mark> or <u><mark>Ethiopia</u></mark> or <u><mark>Libya</u></mark>) is <u><mark>going to tilt</u></mark> the <u><strong>arc of <mark>history</strong> decisively</u></mark> in the directions they favor. <u><mark>Nor will</u></mark> the <u>outcome of <mark>today’s</mark> conflicts <mark>have</u></mark> much <u><mark>effect on how future leaders</u></mark> think about their own prospects when they are <u><strong><mark>deciding</mark> whether</strong> <mark>to launch a war</u></mark>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Oriana Skylar Mastro 18. Assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. 11/01/2018. “Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China’s Military Help Secure North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons?” International Security, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 84–116. fulltext: In contrast to the above conventional wisdom, I argue that Chinese military involvement in a Korea contingency would benefit U.S. WMD-C3D objectives at almost every stage of the mission. For example, the United States’ plan is to first attempt to identify, isolate, and secure key sites, including nuclear research, production, storage, and delivery facilities; search and clear them of WMD; and do so possibly while sustaining major war operations.115 Studies show that the large number of WMD sites in North Korea would require massive combat forces to support the WMD-C3D mission, around 188,000 troops, though estimates vary greatly, depending on whether U.S. troops faced a hostile environment.116 With only 28,500 U.S. troops currently in South Korea, the U.S. military would have to fly in troops from the United States and Japan over several months. If resistance were light, the United States could drop airborne forces into the most worrisome sites, but it would take weeks for ground forces to flow in through the ports and across the border from South Korea.117 The mission would also take troops away from broader combat and stabilization operations for unspeciªed periods of time.118 Granted, under the United Nations Command, military personnel from South Korea and from the sending states would contribute greatly to the overall campaign. But given Nonproliferation Treaty limitations, South Korean troops could not take responsibility for the WMD-C3D mission. China, however, has both the authority to deal with nuclear materials (as a recognized nuclear state in the Treaty) and the necessary [troop numbers] manpower, and it could take on this mission while freeing up U.S. troops to focus on warfighting and stabilization efforts. Moreover, be cause Chinese forces have the geographic and logistical advantage, they would likely reach these facilities sooner. Nuclear weapons in the hands of China would mean that North Korea could not detonate them, thereby avoiding a nuclear war. China could also contribute to the goal of nonproliferation. In addition to shutting down the northern border to contain the ºow of people and dangerous material, the Chinese military could conduct surveillance; secure highpriority WMD targets; and sweep the country to secure, inspect, and identify North Korea’s nuclear weapons facilities.119 Lastly, after a nuclear site had been secured and its contents identiªed, the United States would want to dismantle the facility and render safe any weapons or nuclear material found there. Admittedly, this part of the mission would be difªcult to concede to China, as its dismantle-and-destroy capabilities are a key weakness. Chinese weaknesses in this area, however, may not detract from the overall success of the WMD-C3D mission, for two reasons. First, China may decide not to dismantle the weapons—it could take them to China for study and indeªnite storage. This option is not discussed in great detail in the United States, primarily because U.S. policy assumes that destruction will always take place within the possessing country.120 Second, Chinese scientists have indicated in interviews with the author a willingness to share the burden of dismantlement with international agencies such as the IAEA.121 In short, encouraging China to conduct the WMD-C3D mission, or facilitating its ability to do so, may be beneficial for the U.S./ROK war effort and regional security. Chinese control would lower the likelihood of nuclear use on the peninsula in the short term and, potentially, reduce the economic and military burden to the United States of conducting WMD-C3D in the long term. Additionally, U.S. acceptance of China’s WMD-C3D role would avoid unnecessary clashes between Chinese and U.S. troops that could escalate to fullblown war. Conclusion Given China’s increasing concerns about nuclear security, desire to control refugee flows into China, expanding and improved military capabilities, and geopolitical competition with the United States, China is likely to intervene directly and militarily if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula. Although China’s potential involvement has traditionally been seen as a threat to any U.S. mission under similar circumstances, I argue that the beneªts of the Chinese military’s involvement outweigh the costs. The primary objective in a conflict scenario is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea; China has the manpower and capabilities to identify and secure North Korean nuclear facilities effectively and more quickly than the United States. Moreover, in areas of the WMD-C3D mission where China is still potentially weak, such as nonproliferation and the dismantling of nuclear weapons, Beijing has shown a willingness to work with the IAEA and potentially even the United States to meet U.S. standards of success in these areas. Chinese involvement, however, comes at a geopolitical price in that Beijing will demand greater influence on the peninsula at the expense of the United States and its alliance with South Korea. This research generates a number of recommendations for U.S. policy.122 First, planning to conduct a unilateral U.S. WMD-C3D mission in North Korea may not be a viable option. Evidence suggests that if conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula, China would take control of some, if not all, of North Korea’s major nuclear facilities. China’s interests are no longer limited to securing its border to prevent an inºux of refugees.123 The United States may not get a vote in whether China is involved, and therefore needs to embrace the benefits of Chinese intervention and change its approach to mitigate the associated challenges. There are a number of initiatives the United States can take before any crisis to defuse the risks associated with potential Chinese involvement. A rush of U.S. and Chinese forces to North Korean nuclear sites would introduce a high risk of miscalculation and undermine escalation management. This research suggests there may be no need to rush; the benefits of Chinese control over DPRK nuclear facilities, in terms of a reduced likelihood of nuclear use, may outweigh the costs, at least operationally. This would only be the case, however, if the PLA did not overlook sites that the United States deemed important. To prevent the PLA from overlooking any sites, the United States might consider sharing intelligence with China about certain facilities and what the U.S. intelligence community predicts will be there. Currently, there are no established channels through which such intelligence could be shared, and figuring out how to do so while minimizing operational risk would take significant bureaucratic effort. Second, the United States might consider steps to address China’s lesser capability and interest in the dismantlement and destruction components of the WMD-C3D mission. For the United States, these final steps are so critical that China’s shortcomings in this area alone may be reason enough to rush to secure the facilities. To avoid that necessity, the United States might consider combined training or exercises to enhance Chinese dismantlement and destruction capabilities. Moreover, as China’s global role expands, enhanced WMD-C3D capabilities may encourage Beijing to contribute more actively to nuclear security missions elsewhere, such as in Syria or Iran. If the core issue is Beijing’s reluctance to include a dismantle-and-destroy component in its mission, Washington could communicate a willingness to provide ªnancial support or expertise under the umbrella of international institutions, which Chinese interlocutors have suggested might be welcome. Additionally, if China is unwilling to furnish the resources to secure its borders with North Korea and conduct maritime and aerial interdiction operations to prevent the movement out of North Korea of people and materials of concern to the degree desired by the United States, U.S. and South Korean combined forces could take on that aspect of the nonproliferation mission. Achieving the objectives described above would require massive amounts of U.S.-China coordination. For political reasons, Beijing may not want to participate—especially in the absence of conºict on the peninsula. In this case, the United States would need to consider the benefits of unilateral transparency and communication. Also, any discussion about DPRK disarmament should be done through a new, separate channel, so as to avoid the sensitivities associated with arms control talks between the United States and China. If China continues to be reluctant to coordinate planning efforts, the United States might consider contributing to China’s nuclear emergency training through less politically sensitive means, such as civilian training or technical exchanges.124 The United States and China have already made great strides in nuclear security cooperation. Bilateral discussions on nuclear security were held for the ªrst time on February 20, 2016, and both sides have agreed to continue these discussions on an annual basis. The two countries continue to engage in a number of technical areas, including the opening of the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in China, which serves as a regional training center on best practices in nuclear safety.125 Cooperation in WMD-C3D could also be structured so as not to require visits to each other’s nuclear laboratories and sites, which would be sensitive. Or the United States could shape some of the international exercises that China participates in and support China’s expanded involvement.126 The effort to counter nuclear smuggling offers another promising channel for cooperation; China and the United States have already indicated their willingness to participate in this effort.127 It is also possible that U.S. experts and ofªcials could observe China’s national-level nuclear emergency joint exercises, such as the Shendun exercises.128 A decade after its ªrst nuclear test, North Korea is still “the most volatile and dangerous threat” facing the United States and its treaty allies in Northeast Asia.129 Chinese military capabilities and their potential application in contingencies have greatly expanded since then, with China embracing new missions that seemed unthinkable just a few years ago.130 The way the United States manages its relations with China, both during and before a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, needs to evolve in tandem. Failure by the United States to embrace new thinking and new approaches could affect the prospects for peace on the peninsula, U.S.-China relations more broadly, and the future of global nonproliferation regimes. By testing and potentially transforming U.S.-China relations, any crisis on the peninsula will reverberate far beyond the two Koreas.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>AND, key to <u>collaborative WMD containment</u>. Chinese <u>involvement</u> is inevitable, BUT <u>coordination</u> is key to <u>success</u>. </h4><p>Oriana Skylar <strong>Mastro 18<u>. Assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. 11/01/2018. “Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China’s Military Help Secure North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons?” International Security, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 84–116.</p><p></u></strong>In contrast to the above conventional wisdom, I argue that <u><mark>Chinese</mark> military <mark>involvement in</mark> a <mark>Korea</mark> contingency <mark>would <strong>benefit</mark> U.S. <mark>WMD-C3D objectives</u></strong> <u>at</u></mark> almost <u><strong><mark>every stage</mark> of the mission</u></strong>. For example, <u>the United States’ plan is to first attempt to identify, isolate, and secure key sites, including nuclear research, production, storage, and delivery facilities; search and clear them of WMD; and do so possibly while sustaining major war operations</u>.115 <u><strong>Studies</u></strong> <u>show</u> that <u><mark>the</u></mark> <u><strong>large <mark>number of WMD sites</u></strong></mark> in North Korea <u>would <mark>require <strong>massive combat forces</u></strong></mark> to support the WMD-C3D mission, around 188,000 troops, though estimates vary greatly, <u>depending on whether U.S. troops faced a hostile environment.</u>116 <u>With only 28,500 U.S. troops currently in South Korea, the U.S. military would have to fly in troops from the United States and Japan over several <strong>months</u></strong>. If resistance were light, the United States could drop airborne forces into the most worrisome sites, but <u>it <mark>would take <strong>weeks</u></strong></mark> for ground forces <u>to flow in through the ports and across the border</u> from South Korea.117 <u>The mission would also take troops away from <strong>broader combat and stabilization</u></strong> operations for unspeciªed periods of time.118 Granted, <u>under the United Nations Command, military personnel from South Korea and from the sending states would contribute greatly to the overall campaign. <mark>But given <strong>N</strong></mark>on<strong><mark>p</strong></mark>roliferation <strong><mark>T</strong></mark>reaty <strong><mark>limit</strong></mark>ation<strong><mark>s</strong>, <strong>So</strong></mark>uth <strong><mark>Ko</strong></mark>rean <mark>troops <strong>could not take</mark> responsibility for <mark>the WMD</mark>-C3D mission</strong>. <mark>China, however, has both</mark> the <strong><mark>authority</u></strong></mark> <u>to deal with nuclear materials (as a recognized nuclear state</u> in the Treaty) <u><mark>and</mark> the <strong>necessary [<mark>troop numbers</mark>] manpower</strong>, and it could take on this mission while <strong><mark>freeing</u></strong></mark> up <u><strong><mark>U.S. troops to focus on warfighting</u></strong></mark> and stabilization efforts. Moreover, be cause Chinese forces have the geographic and logistical advantage, they would likely reach these facilities sooner. <u>Nuclear weapons in the hands of China would mean that North Korea <strong>could not detonate them</strong>, <mark>thereby <strong>avoiding</mark> a <mark>nuclear war</u></strong></mark>. <u>China could also contribute to the goal of <strong>nonproliferation</u></strong>. In addition to shutting down the northern border to contain the ºow of people and dangerous material, <u>the Chinese military could conduct surveillance; secure highpriority WMD targets; and sweep the country to secure, inspect, and identify North Korea’s nuclear weapons facilities</u>.119 Lastly, <u>after a nuclear site had been secured and its contents identiªed, the United States would want to dismantle the facility and render safe any weapons or nuclear material found there</u>. Admittedly, this part of the mission would be difªcult to concede to China, as its dismantle-and-destroy capabilities are a key weakness. Chinese weaknesses in this area, however, may not detract from the overall success of the WMD-C3D mission, for two reasons. First, China may decide not to dismantle the weapons—it could take them to China for study and indeªnite storage. This option is not discussed in great detail in the United States, primarily because U.S. policy assumes that destruction will always take place within the possessing country.120 Second, <u>Chinese <strong>scientists</u></strong> <u>have indicated in interviews</u> with the author <u>a willingness to share the burden of dismantlement with international agencies such as the <strong>IAEA</u></strong>.121 In short, <u><strong>encouraging</u></strong> <u>China to conduct the WMD-C3D mission</u>, or facilitating its ability to do so, <u>may be <strong>beneficial for the U.S./ROK war effort and regional security</u></strong>. <u>Chinese control would <strong>lower the likelihood of nuclear use</u></strong> on the peninsula in the short term <u>and</u>, potentially, <u>reduce the economic and military burden to the United States of conducting WMD-C3D in the long term. <mark>Additionally</mark>, U.S. <mark>acceptance</mark> of China’s WMD-C3D role <mark>would <strong>avoid unnecessary clashes between Chinese and U.S. troops that could escalate to fullblown war</mark>. </u></strong>Conclusion Given China’s increasing concerns about nuclear security, desire to control refugee flows into China, expanding and improved military capabilities, and geopolitical competition with the United States, China is likely to intervene directly and militarily if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula. Although China’s potential involvement has traditionally been seen as a threat to any U.S. mission under similar circumstances, I argue that the beneªts of the Chinese military’s involvement outweigh the costs. The primary objective in a conflict scenario is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea; China has the manpower and capabilities to identify and secure North Korean nuclear facilities effectively and more quickly than the United States. Moreover, in areas of the WMD-C3D mission where China is still potentially weak, such as nonproliferation and the dismantling of nuclear weapons, Beijing has shown a willingness to work with the IAEA and potentially even the United States to meet U.S. standards of success in these areas. Chinese involvement, however, comes at a geopolitical price in that Beijing will demand greater influence on the peninsula at the expense of the United States and its alliance with South Korea. This research generates a number of recommendations for U.S. policy.122 First, planning to conduct <u>a <strong>unilateral</u></strong> U.S. <u>WMD-C3D mission in North Korea <strong>may not be a viable option</u></strong>. Evidence suggests that <u>if conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula, China would take control of some, if not all, of North Korea’s major nuclear facilities</u>. China’s interests are no longer limited to securing its border to prevent an inºux of refugees.123 <u><mark>The <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <strong><mark>may not get a vote in whether China is involved</strong></mark>, and <mark>therefore needs to <strong>embrace</mark> the <mark>benefits</mark> of Chinese intervention</u></strong> and change its approach to mitigate the associated challenges. There are a number of initiatives the United States can take before any crisis to defuse the risks associated with potential Chinese involvement. <u><mark>A <strong>rush</u></strong></mark> <u>of U.S. and Chinese forces to North Korean nuclear sites would <mark>introduce</mark> a high risk of <strong><mark>miscalc</mark>ulation</strong> and undermine escalation management</u>. This research suggests there may be no need to rush; the benefits of Chinese control over DPRK nuclear facilities, in terms of a reduced likelihood of nuclear use, may outweigh the costs, at least operationally. This would only be the case, however, if the PLA did not overlook sites that the United States deemed important. To prevent the PLA from overlooking any sites, the United States might consider sharing intelligence with China about certain facilities and what the U.S. intelligence community predicts will be there. <u>Currently, there are no established channels through which</u> such <u><strong>intelligence</u></strong> <u>could be shared,</u> and figuring out how to do so while minimizing operational risk would take significant bureaucratic effort. Second, the United States might consider steps to address China’s lesser capability and interest in the dismantlement and destruction components of the WMD-C3D mission. For the United States, these final steps are so critical that China’s shortcomings in this area alone may be reason enough to rush to secure the facilities. To avoid that necessity, the United States might consider combined training or exercises to enhance Chinese dismantlement and destruction capabilities. Moreover, as China’s global role expands, enhanced WMD-C3D capabilities may encourage Beijing to contribute more actively to nuclear security missions elsewhere, such as in Syria or Iran. If the core issue is Beijing’s reluctance to include a dismantle-and-destroy component in its mission, Washington could communicate a willingness to provide ªnancial support or expertise under the umbrella of international institutions, which Chinese interlocutors have suggested might be welcome. Additionally, if China is unwilling to furnish the resources to secure its borders with North Korea and conduct maritime and aerial interdiction operations to prevent the movement out of North Korea of people and materials of concern to the degree desired by the United States, U.S. and South Korean combined forces could take on that aspect of the nonproliferation mission. <u><mark>Achieving</mark> the <mark>objectives</mark> described above <mark>would require <strong>massive</strong></mark> amounts of <strong><mark>U.S.-China coordination</u></strong></mark>. For political reasons, Beijing may not want to participate—especially in the absence of conºict on the peninsula. In this case, the United States <u>would <mark>need</u></mark> to consider the benefits of unilateral <u><strong><mark>transparency</u></strong></mark> and communication. Also, any discussion about DPRK disarmament should be done through a new, separate channel, so as to avoid the sensitivities associated with arms control talks between the United States and China. If China continues to be reluctant to coordinate planning efforts, the United States might consider contributing to China’s nuclear emergency training through less politically sensitive means, such as civilian training or technical exchanges.124 <u>The United States and China have already made great strides in nuclear security cooperation</u>. Bilateral discussions on nuclear security were held for the ªrst time on February 20, 2016, and both sides have agreed to continue these discussions on an annual basis. The two countries continue to engage in a number of technical areas, including the opening of the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in China, which serves as a regional training center on best practices in nuclear safety.125 Cooperation in WMD-C3D could also be structured so as not to require visits to each other’s nuclear laboratories and sites, which would be sensitive. Or the United States could shape some of the international exercises that China participates in and support China’s expanded involvement.126 The effort to counter nuclear smuggling offers another promising channel for cooperation; China and the United States have already indicated their willingness to participate in this effort.127 It is also possible that U.S. experts and ofªcials could observe China’s national-level nuclear emergency joint exercises, such as the Shendun exercises.128 A decade after its ªrst nuclear test, North Korea is still “the most volatile and dangerous threat” facing the United States and its treaty allies in Northeast Asia.129 Chinese military capabilities and their potential application in contingencies have greatly expanded since then, with China embracing new missions that seemed unthinkable just a few years ago.130 <u>The way the United States manages its relations with China, both during and before a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, needs to <strong>evolve</u></strong> in tandem. <u>Failure</u> by the United States <u>to embrace new thinking and new approaches could <strong>affect the prospects for peace on the peninsula</strong>, U.S.-China <strong>relations more broadly</u></strong>, <u>and the future </u>of global nonproliferation regimes. By testing and potentially transforming U.S.-China relations, any crisis on the peninsula will reverberate <u><strong>far beyond the two Koreas.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Lieber and Press 7 – Keir Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, July/August 2007, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200707/china-nukes fulltext: From a military perspective, this modernization has paid off: A U.S. nuclear first strike could quickly destroy China’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Whether launched in peacetime or during a crisis, a preemptive strike would likely leave China with no means of nuclear retaliation against American territory. And given the trends in both arsenals, China may live under the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for years to come. This assessment is based on unclassified information, standard targeting principles, and formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. (And we systematically chose conservative estimates for key unknowns, meaning that our analysis understates U.S. counterforce capabilities.) The simplest version of an American preemptive strike would have nuclear-armed submarines in the Pacific launch Trident II missiles at the Chinese ICBM field in Henan province. The Navy keeps at least two of these submarines on “hard alert” in the Pacific at all times, meaning they’re ready to fire within 15 minutes of a launch order. Since each submarine carries 24 nuclear-tipped missiles with an average of six warheads per missile, commanders have almost 300 warheads ready for immediate use. This is more than enough to assign multiple warheads to each of the 18 Chinese silos. Chinese leaders would have little or no warning of the attack. During the Cold War, U.S. submarines posed little danger to China’s silos, or to any other hardened targets. Each warhead on the Trident I missiles had little chance—roughly 12 percent—of success. Not only were those missiles inaccurate, their warheads had a relatively small yield. (Similarly, until the late 1980s, U.S. ICBMs lacked the accuracy to carry out a reliable disarming attack against China.) But the Navy’s new warheads and missiles are far more lethal. A Trident II missile is so accurate, and the newer W88 warhead so powerful, that if the warhead and missile function normally, the destruction of the silo is virtually assured (the likelihood is calculated as greater than 99 percent). In reality, American planners could not assume such near-perfect results. Some missiles or warheads could malfunction: One missile’s rockets might fail to ignite; another’s guidance system might be defective. So a realistic counterforce plan might assign four warheads to each silo. The U.S. would “cross-target” the missiles, meaning that the warheads on each missile would each go to different silos, so that a silo would be spared only if many missiles malfunctioned. Even assuming that 20 percent of missiles malfunctioned—the standard, conservative assumption typically used by nuclear analysts—there is a 97 percent chance that every Chinese DF-5 silo would be destroyed in a 4-on-1 attack. (By comparison, a similar attack using Cold War–era Trident I missiles would have produced less than a 1 percent chance of success. The leap in American counterforce capabilities since the end of the Cold War is staggering.) Beyond bolstering the ability to conduct a first strike, the improvements to U.S. counterforce weapons also allow war planners to design nuclear options that will make the weapons more “usable” during high-stakes crises. Nuclear planners face many choices when they consider striking a given target. First, they must choose a warhead yield. The American arsenal includes low-yield weapons such as the B-61 bomb, which can detonate with as little explosive force as 0.3 kilotons (one-fiftieth the power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima), and high-yield weapons such as the B-83 bomb, which can yield 1,200 kilotons (80 times the strength of the Hiroshima bomb). For a military planner, high-yield weapons are attractive because they’re very likely to destroy the target—even if the weapon misses by some distance. Low-yield warheads, on the other hand, can be more discriminating, if planners want to minimize civilian casualties. A second key decision for war planners is whether to set the weapon to detonate at ground level or in the air above the target. A groundburst creates enormous overpressure and ground shock, ideal for destroying a hardened target. But groundbursts also create a lot of radioactive fallout. Dirt and other matter is sucked up into the mushroom cloud, mixes with radioactive material, and, after being carried by the wind, falls to earth in the hours after the blast, spreading lethal radiation. Airbursts create smaller zones of extremely high overpressure, but they also generate very little fallout. If the detonation occurs above a threshold altitude (which depends on the weapon yield), virtually no heavy particles from the ground mix with the radioactive material in the fireball. The radioactive material rises into the high atmosphere and then falls to earth over the course of several weeks in a far less dangerous state and over a very wide area, greatly reducing the harm to civilians. In the past, a nuclear attack on China’s arsenal would have had horrific humanitarian consequences. The weapons were less accurate, so an effective strike would have required multiple high-yield warheads, detonating on the ground, against each target. The Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council modeled the consequences of such an attack—similar to the submarine attack described above—and published their findings in 2006. The results were sobering. Although China’s long-range missiles are deployed in a lightly populated region, lethal fallout from an attack would travel hundreds of miles and kill more than 3 million Chinese civilians. American leaders might have contemplated such a strike, but only in the most dire circumstances. But things are changing radically. Improved accuracy now allows war planners to target hardened sites with low-yield warheads and even airbursts. And the United States is pushing its breakthroughs in accuracy even further. For example, for many years America has used global-positioning systems in conjunction with onboard inertial-guidance systems to improve the accuracy of its conventionally armed (that is, nonnuclear) cruise missiles. Although an adversary may jam the GPS signal near likely targets, the cruise missiles use GPS along their flight route and then—if they lose the signal—use their backup inertial-guidance system for the final few kilometers. This approach has dramatically improved a cruise missile’s accuracy and could be applied to nuclear- armed cruise missiles as well. The United States is deploying jam- resistant GPS receivers on other weapons, experimenting with GPS on its nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and planning to deploy a new generation of GPS satellites—with higher-powered signals to complicate jamming. The payoff for equipping cruise missiles (or nuclear bombs) with GPS is clear when one estimates the civilian casualties from a lower-yield, airburst attack. We asked Matthew McKinzie, a scientific consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council and coauthor of the 2006 study, to rerun the analysis using low-yield detonations compatible with nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. arsenal. Using three warheads per target to increase the odds of destroying every silo, the model predicts fewer than 1,000 Chinese casualties from fallout. In some low-yield scenarios, fewer than 100 Chinese would be killed or injured from fallout. The model is better suited to predicting fallout casualties than to forecasting deaths from the blast and fire, but given the low population in the rural region where the silos are, Chinese fatalities would be fewer than 6,000 in even the most destructive scenario we modeled. And in the future, there may be reliable nonnuclear options for destroying Chinese silos. Freed from the burden of killing millions, a U.S. president staring at the threat of a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. forces, allies, or territory might be more inclined to choose preemptive action. Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Imbalance The most plausible flash point for a serious U.S.-China conflict is Taiwan. Suppose Taiwan declared independence. China has repeatedly warned that such a move would provoke an attack, probably a major air and naval campaign to shatter Taiwan’s defenses and leave the island vulnerable to conquest. If the United States decided to defend Taiwan, American forces would likely thwart China’s offensive, since aerial and naval warfare are strengths of the U.S. military. But looming defeat would place great pressure on China’s leaders. Losing the war might mean permanently losing Taiwan. This would undermine the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, which increasingly relies on the appeal of nationalism to justify its rule. A crippling defeat would also strain relations between political leaders in Beijing and the Chinese military. To stave off a regime-threatening disaster, the political leaders might decide to raise the stakes by placing part of the Chinese nuclear force on alert in hopes of coercing the United States into accepting a negotiated solution (for example, a return to Taiwan’s pre-declaration status). By putting its nuclear forces on alert, however, China’s leaders would compel a U.S. president to make a very difficult decision: to accede to blackmail (by agreeing to a cease-fire and pressuring the Taiwanese to renounce independence), to assume that the threat is a bluff (a dangerous proposition, given that each Chinese ICBM carries a city-busting 4,000-kiloton warhead), or to strike the Chinese missiles before they could be launched. How do America’s growing counterforce capabilities affect this scenario? First, American nuclear primacy may prevent such a war in the first place. China’s leaders understand that their military now has little hope of defeating U.S. air and naval forces. If they also recognize that their nuclear arsenal is vulnerable—and that placing it on alert might trigger a preemptive strike—the leaders may conclude that war is a no-win proposition. Second, if a war over Taiwan started anyway, U.S. nuclear primacy might help contain the fighting at the conventional level. Early in the crisis, Washington could quietly convey to Beijing that the United States would act decisively if China put its vulnerable nuclear arsenal on alert. Finally, if China threatened to launch nuclear attacks against America’s allies, its territory, or its forces in Asia, nuclear primacy would make a preemptive first strike more palatable to U.S. leaders. Any decision to attack China’s ICBM force, though, would be fraught with danger. A missile silo might have escaped detection. Furthermore, a strike on China’s 18 ICBMs would leave Beijing with roughly 60 shorter-range nuclear missiles with which to retaliate against U.S. forces and allies in the region. However, in the aftermath of a “clean” disarming strike—one that killed relatively few Chinese—American leaders could credibly warn that a Chinese nuclear response would trigger truly devastating consequences, meaning nuclear attacks against a broader target set, including military, government, and possibly even urban centers. In light of warnings from Chinese defense analysts and from within China’s military that it might use nuclear weapons to avoid losing Taiwan, an American president might feel compelled to strike first. In this terrible circumstance, he or she would reap the benefits of the past decade’s counterforce upgrades.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u>Current</u> first-strike posture means the U.S. would launch <u>damage limitation</u> strikes to preempt their nuclear launch if China began preparing to use first---means <u>zero Chinese nuclear weapons</u> hit American territory---kills <u>fewer than 6,000 people</u> in the <u>worst-case scenario</u>. But the plan <u>bans</u> those first-strikes. </h4><p><strong>Lieber and Press 7</strong> – Keir Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, July/August 2007, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200707/china-nukes</p><p>From a military perspective, this modernization has paid off: <u><mark>A U.S. nuclear first strike could</u> <u><strong>quickly destroy China’s</u></strong></mark> strategic <u><strong><mark>nuclear arsenal</u></strong></mark>. Whether launched in peacetime or during a crisis, <u><mark>a preemptive strike would</u></mark> likely <u><mark>leave China</u> <u><strong>with no means of nuclear retaliation</strong> against American territory</u></mark>. And given the trends in both arsenals, China may live under the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for years to come.</p><p>This assessment is based on unclassified information, standard targeting principles, and formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. (And we systematically chose conservative estimates for key unknowns, meaning that our analysis understates U.S. counterforce capabilities.) The simplest version of an American preemptive strike would have nuclear-armed submarines in the Pacific launch Trident II missiles at the Chinese ICBM field in Henan province. The Navy keeps at least two of these submarines on “hard alert” in the Pacific at all times, meaning they’re ready to fire within 15 minutes of a launch order. Since each submarine carries 24 nuclear-tipped missiles with an average of six warheads per missile, commanders have almost 300 warheads ready for immediate use. This is more than enough to assign multiple warheads to each of the 18 Chinese silos. Chinese leaders would have little or no warning of the attack.</p><p>During the Cold War, U.S. submarines posed little danger to China’s silos, or to any other hardened targets. Each warhead on the Trident I missiles had little chance—roughly 12 percent—of success. Not only were those missiles inaccurate, their warheads had a relatively small yield. (Similarly, until the late 1980s, U.S. ICBMs lacked the accuracy to carry out a reliable disarming attack against China.) But the Navy’s new warheads and missiles are far more lethal. A Trident II missile is so accurate, and the newer W88 warhead so powerful, that if the warhead and missile function normally, the destruction of the silo is virtually assured (the likelihood is calculated as greater than 99 percent).</p><p>In reality, American planners could not assume such near-perfect results. Some missiles or warheads could malfunction: One missile’s rockets might fail to ignite; another’s guidance system might be defective. So a realistic counterforce plan might assign four warheads to each silo. The U.S. would “cross-target” the missiles, meaning that the warheads on each missile would each go to different silos, so that a silo would be spared only if many missiles malfunctioned. Even assuming that 20 percent of missiles malfunctioned—the standard, conservative assumption typically used by nuclear analysts—there is a 97 percent chance that every Chinese DF-5 silo would be destroyed in a 4-on-1 attack. (By comparison, a similar attack using Cold War–era Trident I missiles would have produced less than a 1 percent chance of success. The leap in American counterforce capabilities since the end of the Cold War is staggering.)</p><p>Beyond bolstering the ability to conduct a first strike, the <u><mark>improvements to U.S. counterforce weapons</u></mark> also allow war planners to design nuclear options that will <u><mark>make the weapons more “usable” during</u></mark> high-stakes <u><mark>crises</u></mark>. Nuclear planners face many choices when they consider striking a given target. First, they must choose a warhead yield. The American arsenal includes low-yield weapons such as the B-61 bomb, which can detonate with as little explosive force as 0.3 kilotons (one-fiftieth the power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima), and high-yield weapons such as the B-83 bomb, which can yield 1,200 kilotons (80 times the strength of the Hiroshima bomb). For a military planner, high-yield weapons are attractive because they’re very likely to destroy the target—even if the weapon misses by some distance. <u><mark>Low-yield warheads</u></mark>, on the other hand, <u><mark>can be</u></mark> more <u><mark>discriminating</u></mark>, if planners want <u><mark>to minimize civilian casualties</u><strong></mark>.</p><p></strong>A second key decision for war planners is whether to set the weapon to detonate at ground level or in the air above the target. A groundburst creates enormous overpressure and ground shock, ideal for destroying a hardened target. But groundbursts also create a lot of radioactive fallout. Dirt and other matter is sucked up into the mushroom cloud, mixes with radioactive material, and, after being carried by the wind, falls to earth in the hours after the blast, spreading lethal radiation.</p><p><u><mark>Airbursts create smaller zones of</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>extremely high overpressure</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>but</u></mark> they also <u><strong><mark>generate very little fallout</u></strong></mark>. If the detonation occurs above a threshold altitude (which depends on the weapon yield), virtually no heavy particles from the ground mix with the radioactive material in the fireball. The <u><mark>radioactive material rises into the high atmosphere</u></mark> and then falls to earth over the course of several weeks in a far less dangerous state and over a very wide area, <u><mark>greatly reducing the harm</u></mark> to civilians.</p><p>In the past, a nuclear attack on China’s arsenal would have had horrific humanitarian consequences. The weapons were less accurate, so an effective strike would have required multiple high-yield warheads, detonating on the ground, against each target. The Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council modeled the consequences of such an attack—similar to the submarine attack described above—and published their findings in 2006. The results were sobering. Although China’s long-range missiles are deployed in a lightly populated region, lethal fallout from an attack would travel hundreds of miles and kill more than 3 million Chinese civilians. American leaders might have contemplated such a strike, but only in the most dire circumstances.</p><p>But things are changing radically. Improved accuracy now allows war planners to target hardened sites with low-yield warheads and even airbursts. And the United States is pushing its breakthroughs in accuracy even further. For example, for many years America has used global-positioning systems in conjunction with onboard inertial-guidance systems to improve the accuracy of its conventionally armed (that is, nonnuclear) cruise missiles. Although an adversary may jam the GPS signal near likely targets, the cruise missiles use GPS along their flight route and then—if they lose the signal—use their backup inertial-guidance system for the final few kilometers. This approach has dramatically improved a cruise missile’s accuracy and could be applied to nuclear- armed cruise missiles as well. The United States is deploying jam- resistant GPS receivers on other weapons, experimenting with GPS on its nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and planning to deploy a new generation of GPS satellites—with higher-powered signals to complicate jamming.</p><p>The payoff for equipping cruise missiles (or nuclear bombs) with GPS is clear when one estimates the civilian casualties from a lower-yield, airburst attack. We asked Matthew McKinzie, a scientific consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council and coauthor of the 2006 study, to rerun the analysis using low-yield detonations compatible with nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. arsenal. Using three warheads per target to increase the odds of destroying every silo, the model predicts fewer than 1,000 Chinese casualties from fallout. In some low-yield scenarios, fewer than 100 Chinese would be killed or injured from fallout. The model is better suited to predicting fallout casualties than to forecasting deaths from the blast and fire, but given the low population in the rural region where the silos are, <u><strong><mark>Chinese fatalities would be fewer than 6,000 in even the most destructive scenario</u></strong></mark> we modeled. And in the future, there may be reliable nonnuclear options for destroying Chinese silos. Freed from the burden of killing millions, a U.S. president staring at the threat of a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. forces, allies, or territory might be more inclined to choose preemptive action. </p><p>Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Imbalance</p><p><u><strong>The most plausible flash point</u></strong> for a serious U.S.-China conflict <u>is Taiwan</u>. Suppose Taiwan declared independence. China has repeatedly warned that such a move would provoke an attack, probably a major air and naval campaign to shatter Taiwan’s defenses and leave the island vulnerable to conquest. If the United States decided to defend Taiwan, American forces would likely thwart China’s offensive, since aerial and naval warfare are strengths of the U.S. military. But looming defeat would place great pressure on China’s leaders. <u>Losing the war might mean</u> permanently <u><strong>losing Taiwan</u></strong>. <u>This would</u><strong> <u></strong>undermine the</u> domestic legitimacy of the <u><strong>C</u></strong>hinese <u><strong>C</u></strong>ommunist <u><strong>P</u></strong>arty, which increasingly relies on the appeal of nationalism to justify its rule. A crippling defeat would also strain relations between political leaders in Beijing and the Chinese military. To stave off a regime-threatening disaster, the political <u><mark>leaders might</u><strong></mark> </strong>decide to <u><mark>raise the stakes by placing</u></mark> part of <u><mark>the</u></mark> Chinese <u><strong><mark>nuclear force on alert</u></strong></mark> in hopes of coercing the United States into accepting a negotiated solution (for example, a return to Taiwan’s pre-declaration status).</p><p><u><mark>By putting its</u></mark> nuclear <u><mark>forces on alert</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>China</u></mark>’s leaders <u><mark>would compel a</u></mark> U.S. <u><mark>president to</u></mark> make a very difficult decision: to accede to blackmail (by agreeing to a cease-fire and pressuring the Taiwanese to renounce independence), to assume that the threat is a bluff (a dangerous proposition, given that each Chinese ICBM carries a city-busting 4,000-kiloton warhead), or to <u><strong><mark>strike</mark> the <mark>Chinese missiles before they could be launched</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>How do America’s growing counterforce capabilities affect this scenario? First, American <u><mark>nuclear primacy may prevent such a war</u></mark> in the first place. China’s leaders understand that their military now has little hope of defeating U.S. air and naval forces. If they also recognize that their nuclear arsenal is vulnerable—and that placing it on alert might trigger a preemptive strike—the leaders may conclude that war is a no-win proposition.</p><p>Second, <u><strong><mark>if a war</u></strong></mark> over Taiwan <u><strong><mark>started anyway</u></strong></mark>, U.S. <u><mark>nuclear primacy might help<strong> contain the fighting at the conventional level.</u></strong></mark> Early in the crisis, <u><mark>Washington could</u></mark> quietly <u><mark>convey to Beijing</u></mark> that <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>would act decisively if China put its</u></mark> vulnerable <u><mark>nuclear arsenal on alert</u></mark>.</p><p>Finally, if China threatened to launch nuclear attacks against America’s allies, its territory, or its forces in Asia, nuclear <u><strong><mark>primacy would make a preemptive first strike more palatable to U.S. leaders</u></strong></mark>. Any decision to attack China’s ICBM force, though, would be fraught with danger. A missile silo might have escaped detection. Furthermore, a strike on China’s 18 ICBMs would leave Beijing with roughly 60 shorter-range nuclear missiles with which to retaliate against U.S. forces and allies in the region. However, in the aftermath of a “clean” disarming strike—one that killed relatively few Chinese—American leaders could credibly warn that a Chinese nuclear response would trigger truly devastating consequences, meaning nuclear attacks against a broader target set, including military, government, and possibly even urban centers. <u><mark>In light of warnings from Chinese defense analysts</u></mark> and from within China’s military <u><mark>that it might use nuclear weapons</mark> to avoid losing Taiwan</u>, <u><mark>a</u></mark>n American <u><strong><mark>president might feel compelled to strike first</u></strong></mark>. In this terrible circumstance, he or she would reap the benefits of the past decade’s counterforce upgrades.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Fire- has impact uniqueness too—they are looking to sell material now in illicit markets Probability first prevents action needed now to combat it fulltext: Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the postCold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrustwould spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social mediaPrevention, preparedness, response Given the severity of the impacts, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials Figure 3. Estimated global economic impact of a nuclear terrorism attack. The detonation of even one small nuclear bomb by a terrorist group would have multiple far-reaching, terrible effects, going far beyond a target city’s boundaries. In addition to the tens of thousands of dead and injured, and the total destruction of the city’s infrastructure, there would likely also be a years-long global economic depression, with 30 million more people reduced to extreme poverty. © NPSGlobal BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 3 can guarantee its full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling for proliferation purposes. Nor is it realistic to conceive of full compensation to others in the international community, if a catastrophic event happens because of any country’s acts or omissions. Therefore, we consider that prevention is the only acceptable way forward to preserve global stability. Consequently, it is essential for countries to make every effort to prevent nuclear terrorists from fulfilling their goals. It is true that the “primitivism” of currently active terrorist organizations gives a certain space to do what is necessary to enhance the current nuclear security effort concerning prevention and response. However, the perception of the “low likeliness” of a nuclear terrorist attack neutralizes the required sense of urgency in decision-making. Being in fact a “high-risk” scenario, it is imperative that governments consider this reality when setting priorities and making decisions about nuclear security. In practical terms, the essential measures that all countries should take include securing all their nuclear materials and facilities (both civilian and non-civilian) to an agreed minimum acceptable level, eliminating highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, and becoming accountable for their nuclear security practices toward the international community. This means that there is a need to strengthen supervision over nuclear materials and weapons, which in turn calls for ratifying and complying with the provisions in the key treaties that regulate prevention of terrorism and nuclear materials, and to implement global measures within the scope of the United Nations Security Council. It is imperative that all countries establish strategies to comply with these nuclear security commitments and participate in international partnerships aimed at strengthening the global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. More supervision, in its turn, means implementing reliable border control systems and training personnel at all levels involved in handling and securing nuclear materials and facilities. A sound prevention strategy is crucial, but it is also essential to have adequate mechanisms and capabilities in place to manage the crisis, if it occurs. These capabilities of preparedness and response should include, at an international level, the negotiation and approval of innovative crisis management protocols or guidelines, worked out jointly within the United Nations Security Council. They should also include improved international control over measures taken by states that could affect human rights and individual guarantees, and the creation of crisis management mechanisms in formal multilateral institutions (community banks, interstate cooperation blocks) to lessen the impact of a crisis and secure aid flows. At a national level, all countries should adopt measures aimed at establishing mechanisms for prompt decisionmaking – which may include the creation of crisis management teams. These mechanisms should be accompanied by the creation of contingency funds to mitigate any economic effects; the definition of protocols to use in responding in the public and private sectors; the setting of economic priorities to secure sustained fast access to basic goods such as water, food, fuel, medicine; and the design of crisis management mechanisms to secure the continuity of payment systems. These measures require the enforcing of national policies and contingency plans to respond to possible attacks, based on best practices, but avoiding causing panic in society.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Risk of terror outweighs—triggers every other impact scenario—mass poverty and death, global prolif, extinction, etc.Arguello and Buis 18, Irma, and Emiliano J. Buis Arguello is an international security expert and chair of the Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation, MA in Defense/Security studies from Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Argentina. Buis prof of Public Intl Law/Humanitarian Law @ University of Buenos Aires School of Law, LLM in national defense from Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Argentina. "The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?.<strong>" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74.2 (2018): 114-119. SJCP//JG</h4><p>Fire- has impact uniqueness too—they are looking to sell material now in illicit markets</p><p><u>Probability first prevents action needed now to combat it </p><p>Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario</u></strong>. And <u><strong>while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the <mark>threat o</mark>f nuclear <mark>terrorism is here and increasing</u></strong></mark>. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other <u><strong>terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. </u></strong>According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: <u><strong>Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling</u></strong>. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the postCold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. <u><strong>We found that <mark>there would be multiple harmful effects</mark> that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. <mark>Total physical destruction of</mark> the city’s <mark>infrastructure</mark>, due to the blast (shock wave) <mark>and</mark> thermal <mark>radiation</mark>, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. <mark>From</mark> the <mark>environmental</mark> point of <mark>view</mark>, such an <mark>area would be unusable</mark> for years.</u></strong> In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the <u><strong>consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. <mark>Global</mark> and national <mark>security</mark>, <mark>economy</mark> and finance, international <mark>governance</mark> and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals <mark>would all be put under</mark> severe <mark>trial</u></strong></mark>. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. <u><strong>Global security and regional/national <mark>defense schemes would be</mark> strongly <mark>affected</mark>. An <mark>increase in global</mark> <mark>distrust</mark>would spark rising <mark>tensions among countries</mark> and blocs, that could even <mark>lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states</mark> (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified).</u></strong> The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, <u><strong>the economic impacts would also include a <mark>shortage of</mark> high-technology <mark>products such as medicine</mark>s, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an <mark>increase of unemployment and poverty</mark> in all countries.</u></strong> Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least <u><strong><mark>30 million more people</mark> would be <mark>living in extreme poverty</u></strong></mark>, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. <u><strong>In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments</u></strong>. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, <u><strong>the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to <mark>impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order</mark> – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights.</u></strong> There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social mediaPrevention, preparedness, response <u><strong>Given the severity of the impacts, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials Figure 3. Estimated global economic impact of a nuclear terrorism attack. The detonation of even one small nuclear bomb by a terrorist group would have multiple far-reaching, terrible effects, going far beyond a target city’s boundaries.</u></strong> In addition to the tens of thousands of dead and injured, and the total destruction of the city’s infrastructure, there would likely also be a years-long global economic depression, with 30 million more people reduced to extreme poverty. © NPSGlobal BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 3 can guarantee its full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling for proliferation purposes. Nor is it realistic to conceive of full compensation to others in the international community, if a catastrophic event happens because of any country’s acts or omissions. <u><strong>Therefore, we consider that <mark>prevention is the only acceptable way</mark> forward <mark>to preserve</mark> global <mark>stability</mark>. Consequently, it is <mark>essential for countries to make every effort</mark> to prevent nuclear terrorists from fulfilling their goals</u></strong>. It is true that the “primitivism” of currently active terrorist organizations gives a certain space to do what is necessary to enhance the current nuclear security effort concerning prevention and response. However, <u><strong>the <mark>perception of</mark> the “<mark>low likeliness</mark>” of a nuclear terrorist attack <mark>neutralizes the required sense of urgency</mark> in decision-making. <mark>Being</mark> in fact a “<mark>high-risk</mark>” scenario, <mark>it is imperative</mark> that <mark>governments consider this</mark> reality when setting priorities and making decisions about nuclear security.</u></strong> In practical terms, the essential measures that all countries should take include securing all their nuclear materials and facilities (both civilian and non-civilian) to an agreed minimum acceptable level, eliminating highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, and becoming accountable for their nuclear security practices toward the international community. This means that there is a need to strengthen supervision over nuclear materials and weapons, which in turn calls for ratifying and complying with the provisions in the key treaties that regulate prevention of terrorism and nuclear materials, and to implement global measures within the scope of the United Nations Security Council<u><strong>. It is imperative that all countries establish strategies to comply with these nuclear security commitments and participate in international partnerships aimed at strengthening the global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism</u></strong>. More supervision, in its turn, means implementing reliable border control systems and training personnel at all levels involved in handling and securing nuclear materials and facilities. A sound prevention strategy is crucial, but it is also essential to have adequate mechanisms and capabilities in place to manage the crisis, if it occurs. These capabilities of preparedness and response should include, at an international level, the negotiation and approval of innovative crisis management protocols or guidelines, worked out jointly within the United Nations Security Council. They should also include improved international control over measures taken by states that could affect human rights and individual guarantees, and the creation of crisis management mechanisms in formal multilateral institutions (community banks, interstate cooperation blocks) to lessen the impact of a crisis and secure aid flows. At a national level, all countries should adopt measures aimed at establishing mechanisms for prompt decisionmaking – which may include the creation of crisis management teams. These mechanisms should be accompanied by the creation of contingency funds to mitigate any economic effects; the definition of protocols to use in responding in the public and private sectors; the setting of economic priorities to secure sustained fast access to basic goods such as water, food, fuel, medicine; and the design of crisis management mechanisms to secure the continuity of payment systems. <u><strong>These measures require the enforcing of national policies and contingency plans to respond to possible attacks, based on best practices, but avoiding causing panic in society.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kessler et al. 18 [Donald J. Kessler retired from NASA in 1996 as NASA’s Senior Scientist for Orbital Debris Research. He has more than 40 years of experience in scientific research associated with orbital debris, meteoroids, and interplanetary dust. Since retiring, Kessler has continued to consult with NASA and other organizations. In 2000, he received the AIAA Losey Atmospheric Sciences Award, in 2008, received the IAASS Jerome Lederer Space Safety Pioneer Award, and in 2010 the AAS Dirk Brouwer Award for his career in astrodynamics. Kessler has published more than 100 technical papers on meteoroids and orbital debris and has been a contributing author or editor of 10 major reports.] ("Kessler Syndrome: What Happens When Satellites Collide", medium.com, 11/2/18, https://medium.com/@asher.isbrucker/kessler-syndrome-what-happens-when-satellites-collide-1b571ca3c47e.) ES 19 fulltext: Donald Kessler: The worst case scenario is that you end up creating enough debris that it’s not cost-effective to depend on space. Now, that may take a long time, but because it’s a non-reversible process, once you’ve reached a certain threshold where you’re generating debris from these collisions faster than it can be cleaned out, it’ll just continually get worse unless you can do something drastic. Holger Krag: If we continue operating the way we do today, we will have a disaster in 50 years, in 100 years. It compares quite nicely to the CO2 issue, and the climate on ground, so it’s not our generation suffering from all the CO2 released into the atmosphere, it is future generations, but it is our generation that has to take the action. And the space debris problem is quite similar. DK: My name’s Don Kessler, I worked for NASA till 1996 as the senior researcher for orbital debris. I started the program back in 1979, and the program is still very active today. In the 1960s my main job was to define the interplanetary meteoroid environment. At the time, the only space debris NASA had to be concerned about were meteoroids, many of which are generated from collisions in the asteroid belt. These asteroid collisions are a cascading phenomenon, meaning every collision creates more ammunition for future collisions. It’s a positive feedback loop. Don was studying this phenomenon when he started to consider an interesting question: DK: When will the same phenomenon start happening in the Earth’s orbit? When will this same kind of cascading occur with satellites? And it was just a matter of curiosity as to what that number may be, and actually when I did the calculations, I was really shocked at the answer that it would happen so soon. Don published a paper in 1978 proposing this scenario, predicting that we’d start to see satellite collisions in Earth orbit by the year 2000. Just like in the asteroid belt, these satellite collisions would trigger a domino effect: creating a whole bunch of debris which causes more collisions, creating more debris, and so on. His main point: once the process starts, it’ll be nearly impossible to stop. This self-perpetuating phenomenon, this domino effect, became known as Kessler Syndrome. The first accidental collision occurred in 1996, when a French satellite was struck by a piece of a rocket thruster that had exploded ten years earlier, severing its stabilization boom and, for the first time, demonstrating how entangled the orbital environment has become. HK: In 2009 a collision happened that was by far more dramatic. The event he’s referring to was the first collision between two intact satellites: the Russian satellite Kosmos and an American Iridium. And that was the first catastrophic accidental collision that got everybody’s attention because not only did they realize how much debris is generated when something like that occurs but that we are now entering this phase of what we’re calling the Kessler Syndrome. Just two years earlier the Chinese military conducted a controversial anti-satellite test, intercepting one of their own defunct weather satellites with a kinetic kill vehicle — a non-explosive missile which relies on sheer speed of impact to destroy its target. It blew the satellite to smithereens and created just a huge mess, it was really bad. DK: And unfortunately it was something they should have known not to do. Yeah, that’s because the US did the same thing back in 1985 — the first anti-satellite test, with more or less the same results. DK: We at NASA tried to delay that or stop that because, we said it’s going to create enough debris that we’ll have to add more shielding to the space station which was planned to be launched a few years later. And nobody believed it would make that much debris, but it did. All of these collisions, accidental or otherwise, make a big mess of junk zipping around the Earth called space debris. It accounts for 95% of the objects in Low Earth Orbit, and comes in all shapes and sizes. It’s technically defined as any nonfunctional object in orbit, so there’s big stuff like rocket thrusters and defunct satellites, but the vast majority are little bits and pieces called fragmentation debris. Many of these fragments come from explosions caused by residual fuel and other explosive energy sources self-igniting under the extreme conditions of space. These explosions happen more often than you might think, and as catastrophic and messy as these explosions are, collisions are even worse due to the incredible amount of kinetic energy involved. At the velocities objects travel in Lower Earth Orbit (speeds known as hypervelocity) even an object as tiny as a screw can deliver an incapacitating strike to a satellite. In fact, NASA has repeatedly had to replace shuttle windows due to hypervelocity impacts by flecks of paint. HK: These are velocities, we have no example nor anything that compares to that on ground. So the energy involved in these collisions is extremely high. A 1 cm object that size like a cherry hitting a satellite with 10 km/s, the energy released by this corresponds roughly to an exploding grenade. You can imagine what the satellite looks like after that. DK: Yes, let me know show you something. This is something that was shot in the lab, it’s a projectile about the size of a BB, and it makes a crater into, this is solid aluminum, and this was only going about 5 km/s, about half the speed of what you would expect in space. Most of this is happening in Low Earth Orbit, the 2000 km strip of space above our heads where we’ve packed the vast majority of our satellites, including the International Space Station and the Hubble Space Telescope. The most crowded section is between 500 and 1000 km up. It’s the densest region, it’s the Highway 401 of space. DK: And that’s what’s creating the problem because we’ve crowded so much stuff in that small region. And the probability of collision goes as the square of the spatial density. So you double the number of satellites, you get four times as many collisions. Now, the space station usually flies around 300 km but the debris that’s generated at that higher altitude is being thrown down and drifting down to the lower altitudes. HK: If you look at the space station surface you will find craters everywhere, impact craters caused by debris everywhere. Whenever you bring hardware down and inspect it on ground you find craters of all sizes. What do we do with this? How do you protect the life of the astronauts? The only thing you can do is shielding. And to protect against a hypervelocity impact you need a special type of lightweight shielding, called Whipple shielding. DK: Let me show you something else. The same particle that caused this kind of damage [image below, left] only caused this kind of damage [image below, right] on a surface with a very minor amount of shielding on it. And that’s, it’s almost a liquid splattered onto that. Most spacecraft utilize this type of shielding, which can withstand impacts from objects up to about one centimeter. Objects larger than a softball are catalogued and tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network. Tracking is imprecise, but allows spacecraft to dodge some of the debris that comes too close. This only works for objects larger than 10 cm or so. Anything smaller can’t be reliably tracked. For that reason, the most concerning objects are those between 1 and 10 cm; too large for shielding to withstand and too small to be tracked. These objects could incapacitate any spacecraft in their path, or worse. And with every future explosion and collision there will be more and more of these invisible projectiles going around. The problem gets worse when you consider how long objects can remain in orbit. Depending on altitude, debris in Low Earth Orbit may remain there for years, decades, or centuries before their orbit naturally decays enough to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. For example, look no further than ENVISAT; a defunct 8-tonne satellite operated by the European Space Agency until it lost contact in 2012, becoming a massive piece of space junk in the densest region of Earth orbit. ENVISAT will remain in orbit for 200 years if not removed. Experts hope to avoid an encore of ENVISAT and to mitigate Kessler Syndrome through the international adoption of two clean space policies. The first will prevent explosions by requiring so-called passivation of onboard energy sources. HK: Meaning, residual fuel must be either depleted, burned, released through a valve, whatever. That’s number one: no more explosions. DK: And the other is what we call a 25 year rule. Once you put something in orbit, after you finish using it you have 25 years to get it out. Either by moving up to a designated “graveyard orbit” where it will pose minimal risk to active spacecraft or more ideally, lowering its altitude so it will burn up in the atmosphere sooner. These policies aren’t difficult to follow and are beginning to be adopted internationally. HK: When we do these two things that would already make space flight pretty safe for the future. It would mean, if we do this systematically, the risk in the future would be almost the same as it is today. The mitigation measures they help to dampen the effect of the Kessler Syndrome, we are not talking about stopping it, we are talking about maintaining it on an acceptable level, the growth. But it will grow, even if we implement these two measures strictly. If we want to even prevent this growth, then we need to do active removal. DK: We’ve already concluded that it’s going to take something like removing 500 intact objects over the next 100 years in order to stabilize the Low Earth Orbit environment again. That works out to five objects per year for the next century, which at least seems achievable, right? The challenge though is that there’s no easy way to remove space debris. HK: We need to approach the object that are not under control anymore, and attach to them, dock with them, rendezvous them, capture them somehow, and then get rid of them in a controlled way. You can imagine this is not so easy. Experts are working on ways to remove debris, and there are several promising ideas in early development. There are reusable concepts like tethers and space tugs which can grab multiple objects per launch, which saves money. There are ground- or space-based lasers which can deorbit objects by kind of shooting them down, but these face political challenges. There are actually active satellites in space right now, the University of Surrey is controlling a spacecraft called RemoveDEBRIS which will use a harpoon to grab on to debris, that’s promising. And there’s another single-use option like ESA’s e.Deorbit, currently planned to retrieve and deorbit ENVISAT in 2023. Many of these ideas aren’t scalable, though, that’s the problem, they’re expensive and complicated, and missions like these are almost completely unprecedented. The pressure is on, though, because Kessler Syndrome isn’t waiting, and the consequences for space infrastructure are dire. HK: Today only half of the satellites actually disappear from space within the 25 years that are recommended as the maximum on orbit time. We still have five explosions every year. If we continue and not improve the way we do spaceflight, then in a few decades some regions of space might not be useable anymore for spaceflight, or it might be much too risky to go there. And that might mean that we either lose services from space that we rely on today, or they get more expensive. AI: Do you think something like Kessler Syndrome is inevitable? Are you optimistic that this can be managed properly, or do you think this is an inevitable issue for a spacefaring society? HK: I think it can be managed, it can be managed. I do believe it’s time for young people to take charge and there’s a lot of work to be done, and there’s enough people involved today that I’m confident that it’s going to be done. Much like other environmental and generational problems, Kessler Syndrome is invisible to us. When you look up at the night sky, you don’t see collisions and explosions and fragments of debris. If you’re lucky and the conditions are right, you might see one white speck drifting across the sky, a tiny testament to humankind’s highest collective ambitions. But that speck is at risk, along with all it represents, if we don’t address this invisible problem — because Kessler Syndrome isn’t waiting.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Satellite collisions trigger a domino effect of cascading debris destroying satellites, the brink is now – tracking and shielding fail, <u>active removal is necessary</h4><p></u><strong>Kessler et al. 18 <u>[Donald J. Kessler retired from NASA in 1996 as NASA’s Senior Scientist for Orbital Debris Research. He has more than 40 years of experience in scientific research associated with orbital debris, meteoroids, and interplanetary dust. Since retiring, Kessler has continued to consult with NASA and other organizations. In 2000, he received the AIAA Losey Atmospheric Sciences Award, in 2008, received the IAASS Jerome Lederer Space Safety Pioneer Award, and in 2010 the AAS Dirk Brouwer Award for his career in astrodynamics. Kessler has published more than 100 technical papers on meteoroids and orbital debris and has been a contributing author or editor of 10 major reports.] ("Kessler Syndrome: What Happens When Satellites Collide", medium.com, 11/2/18, https://medium.com/@asher.isbrucker/kessler-syndrome-what-happens-when-satellites-collide-1b571ca3c47e.) ES 19</p><p></u></strong>Donald Kessler: The worst case scenario is that you end up creating enough debris that it’s not cost-effective to depend on space. Now, that may take a long time, but because it’s a non-reversible process, <u><strong>once you’ve reached a certain threshold where you’re generating debris from</u></strong> these <u><strong>collisions faster than it can be cleaned</u></strong> out, <u><strong>it’ll</u></strong> just <u><strong>continually get worse unless you can do something drastic</u></strong>. Holger Krag: <u><strong>If we continue operating the way we do today, we will have a disaster</u></strong> in 50 years, in 100 years. It compares quite nicely to the CO2 issue, and the climate on ground, so it’s not our generation suffering from all the CO2 released into the atmosphere, it is future generations, but it is our generation that has to take the action. And the space debris problem is quite similar. DK: My name’s Don Kessler, I worked for NASA till 1996 as the senior researcher for orbital debris. I started the program back in 1979, and the program is still very active today. In the 1960s my main job was to define the interplanetary meteoroid environment. At the time, the only space debris NASA had to be concerned about were meteoroids, many of which are generated from collisions in the asteroid belt. These asteroid collisions are a cascading phenomenon, meaning <u><strong>every collision creates more ammunition for future collisions. It’s a positive feedback loop</u></strong>. Don was studying this phenomenon when he started to consider an interesting question: DK: When will the same phenomenon start happening in the Earth’s orbit? When will this same kind of cascading occur with satellites? And it was just a matter of curiosity as to what that number may be, and actually when I did the calculations, I was really shocked at the answer that it would happen so soon. Don published a paper in 1978 proposing this scenario, predicting that we’d start to see satellite collisions in Earth orbit by the year 2000. Just like in the asteroid belt, these <u><strong><mark>satellite collisions</mark> would <mark>trigger a domino effect: creating</mark> a whole bunch of <mark>debris which causes more collisions</mark>, creating more debris</u></strong>, <u><strong>and so on</u></strong>. His main point: <u><strong><mark>once the process starts, it’ll be</mark> nearly <mark>impossible to stop.</mark> This self-perpetuating phenomenon, this domino effect, became known as Kessler Syndrome. The first accidental collision occurred in 1996</u></strong>, when <u><strong>a French satellite was struck by a piece of a rocket thruster that had exploded ten years earlier, severing its stabilization boom and</u></strong>, for the first time, <u><strong>demonstrating how entangled the orbital environment has become</u></strong>. HK: <u><strong>In 2009 a collision happened that was by far more dramatic</u></strong>. The event he’s referring to <u><strong>was the first collision between two intact satellites: the Russian satellite Kosmos and an American Iridium</u></strong>. And that was <u><strong>the first catastrophic accidental collision that got everybody’s attention because not only did they realize how <mark>much debris is generated</mark> when something like that occurs but that <mark>we are </mark>now <mark>entering</mark> this phase of what we’re calling <mark>the Kessler Syndrome</mark>.</u></strong> Just <u><strong>two years earlier the <mark>Chinese military </mark>conducted a controversial <mark>a</mark>nti-<mark>sat</mark>ellite <mark>test</mark>, intercepting one of their own defunct weather satellites with a kinetic kill vehicle</u></strong> — a non-explosive missile which relies on sheer speed of impact to destroy its target. <u><strong>It</u></strong> <u><strong>blew the satellite to smithereens and <mark>created</u></strong></mark> just <u><strong><mark>a huge mess</u></strong></mark>, it was really bad. DK: And unfortunately it was something they should have known not to do. Yeah, that’s because the US did the same thing back in 1985 — the first anti-satellite test, with more or less the same results. DK: We at NASA tried to delay that or stop that because, we said it’s going to create enough debris that we’ll have to add more shielding to the space station which was planned to be launched a few years later. And nobody believed it would make that much debris, but it did. <u><strong>All of these collisions, accidental or otherwise, make a big mess of junk zipping around the Earth called <mark>space debris</mark>. It <mark>accounts for 95% of the objects in L</mark>ow <mark>E</mark>arth <mark>O</mark>rbit, and comes in all shapes and sizes. It’s technically defined as any nonfunctional object in orbit, so there’s big stuff like rocket thrusters and defunct satellites, but the vast majority are little bits and pieces called fragmentation debris</u></strong>. Many of these fragments come from explosions caused by residual fuel and other explosive energy sources self-igniting under the extreme conditions of space. These explosions happen more often than you might think, and as catastrophic and messy as these explosions are, <u><strong>collisions are even worse due to the incredible amount of kinetic energy involved. At the velocities objects travel in Lower Earth Orbit</u></strong> (speeds known as hypervelocity) <u><strong>even <mark>an object as tiny as a screw can deliver an incapacitating strike to a satellite</u></strong>.</mark> In fact, NASA has repeatedly had to replace shuttle windows due to hypervelocity impacts by flecks of paint. HK: These are velocities, we have no example nor anything that compares to that on ground. So <u><strong>the energy involved in these collisions is extremely high. A 1 cm object</u></strong> that size like a cherry hitting a satellite with 10 km/s, the energy released by this <u><strong>corresponds roughly to an exploding grenade</u></strong>. You can imagine what the satellite looks like after that. DK: Yes, let me know show you something. This is something that was shot in the lab, it’s a projectile about the size of a BB, and it makes a crater into, this is solid aluminum, and this was only going about 5 km/s, about half the speed of what you would expect in space. <u><strong>Most of this is happening in Low Earth Orbit</u></strong>, the 2000 km strip of space above our heads <u><strong>where we’ve packed the vast majority of our satellites</u></strong>, including the International Space Station and the Hubble Space Telescope. The most crowded section is between 500 and 1000 km up. It’s the densest region, it’s the Highway 401 of space. DK: And that’s what’s creating the problem because <u><strong>we’ve crowded so much stuff in that small region. And the probability of collision goes as the square of the spatial density. So you double the number of satellites, you get four times as many collisions</u></strong>. Now, the space station usually flies around 300 km but the debris that’s generated at that higher altitude is being thrown down and drifting down to the lower altitudes. HK: If you look at the space station surface you will find craters everywhere, impact craters caused by debris everywhere. Whenever you bring hardware down and inspect it on ground you find craters of all sizes. What do we do with this? How do you protect the life of the astronauts? The only thing you can do is shielding. And to protect against a hypervelocity impact you need a special type of lightweight shielding, called Whipple shielding. DK: Let me show you something else. The same particle that caused this kind of damage [image below, left] only caused this kind of damage [image below, right] on a surface with a very minor amount of shielding on it. And that’s, it’s almost a liquid splattered onto that. Most spacecraft utilize this type of shielding, which can withstand impacts from objects up to about one centimeter. Objects larger than a softball are catalogued and tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network. <u><strong>Tracking is imprecise</u></strong>, but allows spacecraft to dodge some of the debris that comes too close. <u><strong>This only works for objects larger than 10 cm or so. Anything smaller can’t be reliably tracked</u></strong>. For that reason, <u><strong><mark>the most concerning objects are</mark> those between 1 and 10 cm; <mark>too large for shielding</mark> to withstand <mark>and too small to be tracked. These objects</mark> could <mark>incapacitate </mark>any <mark>spacecraft</mark> in their path, or worse. And with every future explosion and collision there will be more and more of these invisible projectiles going around</u></strong>. The problem gets worse when you consider how long objects can remain in orbit. <u><strong>Depending on altitude, <mark>debris</mark> in Low Earth Orbit may <mark>remain</mark> there <mark>for</mark> years, decades, or <mark>centuries</mark> before their orbit naturally decays enough to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere</u></strong>. For example, look no further than ENVISAT; a defunct 8-tonne satellite operated by the European Space Agency until it lost contact in 2012, becoming a massive piece of space junk in the densest region of Earth orbit. ENVISAT will remain in orbit for 200 years if not removed. Experts hope to avoid an encore of ENVISAT and to mitigate Kessler Syndrome through the international adoption of two clean space policies. The first will prevent explosions by requiring so-called passivation of onboard energy sources. HK: Meaning, residual fuel must be either depleted, burned, released through a valve, whatever. That’s number one: no more explosions. DK: And the other is what we call a 25 year rule. Once you put something in orbit, after you finish using it you have 25 years to get it out. Either by moving up to a designated “graveyard orbit” where it will pose minimal risk to active spacecraft or more ideally, lowering its altitude so it will burn up in the atmosphere sooner. These policies aren’t difficult to follow and are beginning to be adopted internationally. HK: When we do these two things that would already make space flight pretty safe for the future. It would mean, if we do this systematically, the risk in the future would be almost the same as it is today. The mitigation measures they help to dampen the effect of the Kessler Syndrome, we are not talking about stopping it, we are talking about maintaining it on an acceptable level, the growth. But it will grow, even if we implement these two measures strictly. If we want to even prevent this growth, then <u><strong><mark>we need </mark>to do <mark>active removal</u></strong></mark>. DK: We’ve already concluded that it’s going to take something like removing 500 intact objects over the next 100 years in order to stabilize the Low Earth Orbit environment again. That works out to five objects per year for the next century, which at least seems achievable, right? The challenge though is that there’s no easy way to remove space debris. HK: We need to approach the object that are not under control anymore, and attach to them, dock with them, rendezvous them, capture them somehow, and then get rid of them in a controlled way. You can imagine this is not so easy. <u><strong>Experts are working on ways to remove debris, and <mark>there are several promising ideas </mark>in early development. There are reusable concepts <mark>like tethers and</mark> space <mark>tugs</mark> which can grab multiple objects per launch, which saves money. There are ground- or space-based <mark>lasers</mark> which can deorbit objects by kind of shooting them down</u></strong>, but these face political challenges. There are actually active satellites in space right now, the University of Surrey is controlling a spacecraft called RemoveDEBRIS which will use a harpoon to grab on to debris, that’s promising. And there’s another single-use option like ESA’s e.Deorbit, currently planned to retrieve and deorbit ENVISAT in 2023. Many of these ideas aren’t scalable, though, that’s the problem, they’re expensive and complicated, and missions like these are almost completely unprecedented. The pressure is on, though, because Kessler Syndrome isn’t waiting, and the consequences for space infrastructure are dire. HK: Today only half of the satellites actually disappear from space within the 25 years that are recommended as the maximum on orbit time. We still have five explosions every year. If we continue and not improve the way we do spaceflight, then in a few decades some regions of space might not be useable anymore for spaceflight, or it might be much too risky to go there. And that might mean that we either lose services from space that we rely on today, or they get more expensive. AI: Do you think something like <u><strong><mark>Kessler</mark> Syndrome</u></strong> is inevitable? Are you optimistic that this can be managed properly, or do you think this is an inevitable issue for a spacefaring society? HK: I think it <u><strong><mark>can be managed</u></strong></mark>, it can be managed. I do believe it’s time for young people to take charge and there’s a lot of work to be done, and there’s enough people involved today that I’m confident that it’s going to be done. Much like other environmental and generational problems, Kessler Syndrome is invisible to us. When you look up at the night sky, you don’t see collisions and explosions and fragments of debris. If you’re lucky and the conditions are right, you might see one white speck drifting across the sky, a tiny testament to humankind’s highest collective ambitions. But that speck is at risk, along with all it represents, if we don’t address this invisible problem — because <u><strong>Kessler Syndrome isn’t waiting.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Boudreau, 17 (Thomas Boudreau, Ph.D., Salisbury University, 2017, accessed on 8-15-2021, Environmental and Earth Law Journal (EELJ): Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 , Article 2., "The Earth's Atmosphere As A Global Trust: Establishing Proportionate State Responsibility To Maintain, Restore And Sustain The Global Atmosphere", https://lawpublications.barry.edu/ejejj/vol7/iss1/2/, HBisevac) fulltext: In this regard, it is extremely relevant and interesting to note that the Justinian idea of a public trust and the doctrine of Jus Publicum is being cited in a pioneering and inevitably contested series of current cases in the United States and elsewhere. 62For instance, in very recent and contemporary times, there is a unique and relevant case in the United States Federal Court right now--in 2017--concerning the public trust doctrine. Quoting from the plaintiff's "Our Children's Trust" website (as an advocate in the case): "On November 10, 2016 Judge Ann Aiken issued an opinion and order denying the U.S. government and fossil fuel industry's motions to dismiss a constitutional climate change lawsuit filed by 21 youth. The decision means that the youth, age 9 to 20 and from all over the U.S., now have standing because their rights are at stake, and now their case is headed to trial. The youth had filed their constitutional climate lawsuit against the federal government in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon in 2015. Also acting as a plaintiff is world-renowned climate scientist Dr. James E. Hansen, serving as guardian for future generations and his granddaughter. Their complaint asserts that, through the government's [sic] affirmative actions in causing climate change, it has violated the youngest generation's constitutional rights to life, liberty, and [60] property, as well as failed to protect essential public trust resources." 63 This Oregon case, when decided at the District level, will undoubtedly be appealed. Even so, this pioneering case in the Federal Court right now indicated that, at the very least, the public trust doctrine is alive and well-- though still contested--in current Federal United States Courts. 64 Yet, the key point for our purposes is not necessarily the subsequent or contested nature of the public trusts doctrine in domestic jurisdictions. Rather, the key element in this analysis is that the doctrine exists in legal theory and practice across a variety of jurisdictions and has done so since ancient time. 65As such, it is an extant legal doctrine with an enduring legal pedigree in domestic jurisdictions from classical to current times that thus deserves inclusion as a key normative principle in Earth Jurisprudence as well. 66 IV. JUS PUBLICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE GLOBAL COMMONS The doctrine of Justinian's Jus Publican and public trusts is also extremely relevant in international law, especially in terms of already inspiring or regulating--to a greater or lesser extent-- three of the four global commons: the oceans, outer space and perhaps even Antarctica. 67For instance, the Doctrine of a Public Trust has also been used since the time of Grotius in international law to justify in theory and recognized through ensuing state practice the public nature and the ensuing freedom [61] of the seas. 68Yet, Grotius did not write in a historical or legal void. In his classic work, Mare Liberum, 69Grotius was profoundly influenced, in turn, by Roman commentators, jurists and even poets in declaring that the seas beyond territorial limits or control belong to everyone. 70 The oceans have had, and continue to have, a contested status in international law; yet Grotius' compelling arguments concerning the Freedom of the Seas has resonated down through the ages. In fact, the ideas found in Grotius's Mare Liberum can be found much later paraphrased in Ambassador's Pardo's articulation of the "Common Heritage of Humanity (Mankind)" concept that led to the initiation of the new Law of Sea negotiations. 71 In turn, the Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) ratified in 1982 which states in its Preamble that one of its purposes is to: "develop the principles embodied in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national [62] jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind...." 72 Thus, UNCLOS III furthers, in part, the ancient and enduring doctrine of Jus Publicum, and establishes common or public resources and areas owned by all consisting of the areas of the oceans beyond the territorial seas and the areas of the seabed and ocean floor, which are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; as originally conceived, mining of these areas are to be in parallel with private interests. UNCLOS III also states that the seas' resources, are the "common heritage of mankind" (Hereafter referred to as "Humanity"). Yet, after fully participating in the UNCLOS III negotiations, the United States under the new Regan administration in the early 1980s refused to sign the treaty UNCLOS. So, the United States continues to be outside of the treaty regime and doesn't has permanent seat on the International Seabed authority (ISA) where it would have the right of a veto of any pending action. 73So the legal status UNCLOS III is certainly contested, especially within the United States, though the ratification of the Convention has the full support of the mining interests and all for service branches of the Defense Department. 74Furthermore, there are some inconsistencies and even contractions as well between UNCLOS III and the doctrine of Jus Publicum, especially between its enclosure of more seas under national jurisdiction, as embodied in its concept and [63] application of Exclusive Economic zones (EEZ) and the traditional freedom of the seas which is still recognized. 75 The idea of the "Common Heritage of Mankind," is deservedly credited to Ambassador Pardo of Malta when he first spoke before the United Nations in 1967 about the need for a new law of the sea treaty. 76Before the Ambassador's speech, there were previous international treaties negotiated since the end of the World War II that dealt with the freedom of the seas and the oceans. 77Not surprisingly, such has been written in legal circles since Ambassador's speech about the "common heritage" concept and how it may overlap or differ from the Justinian doctrine, especially in the context of the global commons. 78This debate is too complex to fully resolve or even address here; so for the purposes of our present discussion, I will consider these two concepts as largely overlapping though different. For instance, the Jus Publicum doctrine clearly intended-- when created in Justinian Institutes --to includes the recognition and inclusion of a public domain owned by, and available, to all, i.e. the legal meaning of "public," as well as to any public property, place or thing.. So, public ownership is clearly not compatible with private ownership of the same place, property or thing, though [64] exceptions have been considered in more recent times. 79These exceptions have mostly dealt with the possible private right to use public spaces or places, while the ownership is keep by the "public." 80Furthermore, at the same time, the "Public Trust" doctrine of Justinian has legally evolved to clearly require active fiduciary duties in the domestic jurisdictions of states as well to "properties," land, designated places, parks, duties or rights as well. 81UNCLOS seems to incorporate both of these factors--the existence of the public domain as well as fiduciary duties to preserve, at least the regime for future generations and thus could be possibly and plausibly construed as a trust in a court of law. However, private mining rights are recognized by the Convention as well so this is certainly not a "pure" public trust, and nor should it be. 82From the beginning, UNCLOS was conceived as a [65] potential, and now actual, partnership between public and private interests, as well as developing and developed states. 83 The Treaty on Outer Space seeks to regulate another global commons, declaring in Article I that: "The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, and shall be the province [territory] of all mankind." 84The treaty goes on to outlaw the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space and to encourage international cooperation in the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies. 85<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Applying the doctrine to federal waters and territorial seas embeds it into international law — solves multiple converging crisis in space, seas and Antarctica</h4><p><strong>Boudreau, 17</strong> (Thomas Boudreau, Ph.D., Salisbury University, 2017, accessed on 8-15-2021, Environmental and Earth Law Journal (EELJ): Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 , Article 2., "The Earth's Atmosphere As A Global Trust: Establishing Proportionate State Responsibility To Maintain, Restore And Sustain The Global Atmosphere", https://lawpublications.barry.edu/ejejj/vol7/iss1/2/, HBisevac)</p><p><u>In this regard, it is extremely relevant and interesting to note that the Justinian<strong> <mark>idea</mark> <mark>of</mark> a <mark>public trust</mark> and the doctrine of Jus Publicum</strong> is being <strong><mark>cited in a pioneering</strong></mark> and inevitably contested <mark>series of</mark> current <mark>cases</mark> in the United States and elsewhere</u>. 62For instance, in very recent and contemporary times, there is a unique and relevant case in the United States Federal Court right now--in 2017--concerning the public trust doctrine. Quoting from the plaintiff's "Our Children's Trust" website (as an advocate in the case): "On November 10, 2016 Judge Ann Aiken issued an opinion and order denying the U.S. government and fossil fuel industry's motions to dismiss a constitutional climate change lawsuit filed by 21 youth. The decision means that the youth, age 9 to 20 and from all over the U.S., now have standing because their rights are at stake, and now their case is headed to trial. The youth had filed their constitutional climate lawsuit against the federal government in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon in 2015. Also acting as a plaintiff is world-renowned climate scientist Dr. James E. Hansen, serving as guardian for future generations and his granddaughter. Their complaint asserts that, through the government's [sic] affirmative actions in causing climate change, it has violated the youngest generation's constitutional rights to life, liberty, and [60] property, as well as failed to protect essential public trust resources." 63 This Oregon case, when decided at the District level, will undoubtedly be appealed. Even so, <u>this pioneering case in the Federal Court right now indicated that, at the very least, the <mark>p</mark>ublic <mark>t</mark>rust <mark>d</mark>octrine is <strong><mark>alive and well</strong></mark>-- though still <strong>contested</strong>--in current Federal United States Courts.</u> 64 Yet, the key point for our purposes is not necessarily the subsequent or contested nature of the public trusts doctrine in domestic jurisdictions. Rather, <u>the key element</u> in this analysis <u>is that the <strong><mark>doctrine exists</strong></mark> in legal theory and practice <mark>across</mark> a <strong><mark>variety of jurisdictions</u></strong></mark> and has done so since ancient time. 65As such<u>, it is an extant <mark>legal doctrine with</mark> an <strong><mark>enduring</mark> legal <mark>pedigree</mark> </strong>in domestic jurisdictions</u> from classical to current times <u><mark>that</mark> thus <mark>deserves <strong>inclusion</strong></mark> as a key normative principle <strong><mark>in </mark>Earth <mark>Jurisprudence</strong></mark> as well</u>. 66</p><p>IV. JUS PUBLICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE GLOBAL COMMONS</p><p>The doctrine of Justinian's Jus Publican and <u>public <mark>trusts</mark> is</u> also <u><strong><mark>extremely relevant</strong> in i</mark>nternational <mark>law</u></mark>, especially <u>in terms of already inspiring or regulating</u>--to a greater or lesser extent-- <u>three of the four global commons: <strong>the <mark>oceans</mark>, <mark>outer space and</u></strong></mark> perhaps even <u><strong><mark>Antarctica</u></strong></mark>. 67For instance, the Doctrine of a <u><mark>P</mark>ublic <mark>T</mark>rust has also been <mark>used</u></mark> since the time of <u>Grotius in international law <mark>to justify</mark> in theory <mark>and recognized</mark> <mark>through ensuing state practice</mark> the public nature and the ensuing freedom </u>[61] <u>of the seas</u>. 68Yet, Grotius did not write in a historical or legal void. In his classic work, Mare Liberum, 69Grotius was profoundly influenced, in turn, by Roman commentators, jurists and even poets in declaring that the seas beyond territorial limits or control belong to everyone. 70 <u>The oceans have had, and continue to have, a contested status in international law</u>; yet Grotius' compelling arguments concerning the Freedom of the Seas has resonated down through the ages. In fact, <u>the ideas found in Grotius's Mare Liberum can be found much later paraphrased in</u> Ambassador's <u>Pardo's</u> articulation of the <u>"Common Heritage of Humanity (Mankind)"</u> concept <u>that led to the initiation of the new Law of Sea negotiations</u>. 71 <u>In turn, the Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) ratified</u> in 1982 which states in its Preamble that one of its purposes is to: "develop the principles embodied in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national [62] jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind...." 72 Thus, UNCLOS III furthers, in part, the ancient and enduring doctrine of Jus Publicum, and establishes common or public resources and areas owned by all consisting of the areas of the oceans beyond the territorial seas and the areas of the seabed and ocean floor, which are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; as originally conceived, mining of these areas are to be in parallel with private interests. UNCLOS III also states that the seas' resources, are the "common heritage of mankind" (Hereafter referred to as "Humanity"). Yet, after fully participating in the UNCLOS III negotiations, the United States under the new Regan administration in the early 1980s refused to sign the treaty UNCLOS. So, the United States continues to be outside of the treaty regime and doesn't has permanent seat on the International Seabed authority (ISA) where it would have the right of a veto of any pending action. 73So the legal status UNCLOS III is certainly contested, especially within the United States, though the ratification of the Convention has the full support of the mining interests and all for service branches of the Defense Department. 74Furthermore, there are some inconsistencies and even contractions as well between UNCLOS III and the doctrine of Jus Publicum, especially between its enclosure of more seas under national jurisdiction, as embodied in its concept and [63] application of Exclusive Economic zones (EEZ) and the traditional freedom of the seas which is still recognized. 75 The idea of the "Common Heritage of Mankind," is deservedly credited to Ambassador Pardo of Malta when he first spoke before the United Nations in 1967 about the need for a new law of the sea treaty. 76Before the Ambassador's speech, there were <u><mark>previous</mark> international <mark>treaties</mark> negotiated since the end of the World War II that dealt with the freedom of the seas and the oceans</u>. 77Not surprisingly, such has been written in legal circles since Ambassador's speech about the "common heritage" concept and how <u>it <mark>may ov</mark>erlap</u> or differ <u>from the Justinian doctrine, especially in the context of the global commons</u>. 78This debate is too complex to fully resolve or even address here; so for the purposes of our present discussion, I will consider these two concepts as largely overlapping though different. For instance, <u>the Jus Publicum doctrine clearly intended</u>-- when created in Justinian Institutes --to<u> <mark>includes</mark> the <mark>recognition</mark> and inclusion <mark>of a public domain</mark> owned by, and <strong><mark>available</mark>, <mark>to all</strong></mark>, i.e. the legal meaning of "public," as well as to any public property, place or thing.. So, public ownership is clearly not compatible with private ownership of the same place, property or thing, though</u> [64] exceptions have been considered in more recent times. 79These exceptions have mostly dealt with the possible private right to use public spaces or places, while the ownership is keep by the "public." 80Furthermore, at the same time, the "<u>Public Trust</u>" doctrine of Justinian <u>has legally evolved to clearly <strong>require active fiduciary duties</strong> in the domestic jurisdictions</u> of states <u>as well to "properties," land, designated places, parks, duties or rights as well</u>. 81UNCLOS seems to incorporate both of these factors--<u>the existence of the public domain as well as fiduciary duties to <strong>preserve</u></strong>, at least <u>the regime <strong>for future generations</u></strong> and thus could be possibly and plausibly construed as a trust in a court of law. However, private mining rights are recognized by the Convention as well so this is certainly not a "pure" public trust, and nor should it be. 82From the beginning, UNCLOS was conceived as a [65] potential, and now actual, partnership between public and private interests, as well as developing and developed states. 83 The Treaty on Outer Space seeks to <u>regulate another global commons</u>, declaring in Article I that: "<u>The <mark>exploration</mark> <mark>and use of outer space</mark>, including the moon and other celestial bodies, <mark>shall be carried out fo</mark>r the <mark>benefit</mark> and in the interests <mark>of <strong>all countries</strong></mark>, and shall be the province </u>[territory]<u> of all mankind.</u>" 84The treaty goes on to <u><strong><mark>outlaw</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>placement</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>we</mark>apons of <mark>m</mark>ass <mark>d</mark>estruction</strong> in space and <mark>to encourage international coop</mark>eration <mark>in</mark> the <strong><mark>exploration</strong></mark> <mark>of</mark> the moon and other <mark>celestial bodies</mark>.</u> 85</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Parento ‘12 Professor Emily Whelan Parento is as Associate Professor and the Gordon D. Schaber Health Law Scholar at McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific. Her primary scholarly focus is the intersection of domestic health law and policy with the human rights framework for the right to health and health equity. The author holds a JD and LLM, from The Georgetown University Law Center and a BBA, from the University of Notre Dame. Earlier in her career she served as a federal judicial clerk and practiced litigation at Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York and California. From the article: “Health Equity, Healthy People 2020, and Coercive Legal Mechanisms as Necessary for the Achievement of Both” - 58 Loyola Law Review 655 - Fall, 2012 - #CutWithRJ – Modified for potentially offensive language – This Loyola Law Review article was re-published at Racism.org – http://www.racism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1424:racisthealthcare&catid=88&Itemid=274&showall=1&limitstart= fulltext: Although health equity was not a part of seventeenth-century political discourse, Montesquieu accurately captured the conflict that surrounds the concept today. In theory, people are born with equal potential for healthy lives, yet the minute their lives begin, a confluence of factors render some people immensely more likely than others to have the capability to lead healthy lives. These disparities in individuals' capabilities to achieve good health raise important social justice questions--What obligation does society have to take measures to reduce health disparities based on race or ethnicity, socioeconomic status (SES), gender, sexual orientation, education, disability, and other factors, particularly where behavioral risk factors are a contributing factor to disease? Stated differently, how much “choice” do individuals truly possess regarding their health, and what can and should government do to address the societal influences that negatively impact health status? Routinely, society looks at an individual health outcome and ascribes the result to modifiable lifestyle choices, good or bad, with the implicit assumption that people who are healthy deserve praise for their responsible choices and those who are not deserve at least partial blame for failing to act in ways that would improve their health. However, this personal responsibility framework fails at a population level. It is well-documented that there is a socioeconomic gradient to health, in which individuals are likely to be healthier as their socioeconomic status increases. But no serious scholar ascribes population level socioeconomic health disparities to the superior willpower of the wealthy in making healthy lifestyle choices. Similarly, there is a persistent racial and ethnic component to health that is not explained by other factors, pursuant to which certain racial and ethnic groups are more likely to have worse health outcomes than others. But no one argues that African-Americans have worse health outcomes on average than whites because African-Americans are not as motivated as whites to protect their health. There is no basis for making such population-wide generalities about motivation regarding health behavior. Yet in the face of these widespread and presumptively inequitable disparities, the law has done little. This paper argues that coercive legal mechanisms are an essential element of eliminating health disparities and achieving health equity. Moreover, the paper argues that Healthy People 2020 (HP 2020), which is the nation's “master blueprint for health” and explicitly seeks to achieve health equity, has not fully incorporated the principles of health equity in the formulation of its objectives and indicators because HP 2020 fails to recognize the varying distributive effects of policies that could achieve population health targets. To truly incorporate the principles of health equity, HP 2020 should advocate for those demonstrably effective coercive legal mechanisms that would both achieve its population health objectives and reduce health disparities. The federal government has monitored health disparities in one form or another since at least 1985 and has advocated for the elimination of health disparities since at least 2000, with the release of the Healthy People 2010 goals. However, decisive action on the reduction of disparities has been lacking, and, on average, disparities have not improved over at least the past fifteen years. Although health equity is a mainstay of health law and policy discourse, the concept has not had a significant role in mainstream political discussions. As it is commonly understood, health equity exists when “all people have an equal opportunity to develop and maintain their health, through fair and just access to resources for health.” There are strong philosophical and social justice reasons that support government action to reduce disparities--among them are human rights principles of equality underlying the right to health; Nussbaum's theory of health as an essential human capability necessary to fully function in life; Amartya Sen's theory of the capability for health as an instrumental human freedom; and principles of equality and nondiscrimination among people based on characteristics such as SES, race or ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, disability, rural/urban geography, and other characteristics historically linked to discriminatory treatment. The question, then, is, What means are both necessary and effective for reducing health disparities and achieving health equity? It is here that distributive consequences of policies become important, leading to the conclusion that coercive legal mechanisms such as direct regulation and taxation are essential to a serious strategy to reduce disparities. While coercive legal mechanisms are not suited to solve every problem and must always be balanced against concern for personal liberties and principles of autonomy, there are many instances in which coercive legal mechanisms are demonstrably the most effective way of reducing health disparities and improving population health. Unfortunately, when discussing these mechanisms, advocates are often cowed by advocates of “personal choice” into watering down interventions to the point that the likely result is--even with an improvement in population health--no change or a worsening in health disparities. This approach is problematic from a health equity standpoint, given that health equity by its nature requires the elimination of health disparities associated with social disadvantage. The U.S. government has made the achievement of health equity and the elimination of health disparities a national priority in HP 2020, recognizing the importance of working toward the realization of health equity. Every ten years since 1979, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issues new “Healthy People” nationwide health goals for the forthcoming decade, the most recent of which are HP 2020. The essential aim of the Healthy People project (the Project) is to establish national health priorities by setting targets for improvement of health across a broad spectrum of topics, ranging from access to health services to environmental health to more discrete diseases such as cancer and heart disease and, for the first time in HP 2020, including the social determinants of health. In some instances, HP 2020 advocates the adoption of specific coercive legal mechanisms that would both further a population health goal and reduce disparities--for example, passage of smoke-free legislation would both reduce overall population exposure to secondhand smoke and more strongly affect disadvantaged groups (who have higher rates of smoking and are more likely to work in places where smoking is permitted), thereby resulting in a reduction in the disparity in rates of exposure to secondhand smoke. This advocacy is laudable. However, in most instances, HP 2020 chooses to set broad, population-based targets for health measures without expressing a preference between means of achieving those targets, as in the case of access to health insurance coverage, where HP 2020 sets a target of 100% coverage without acknowledging the obvious--that there is no evidence that anything other than a coercive legal mechanism is a realistic way to achieve that goal. The determination of which coercive legal mechanisms HP 2020 supports appears to be made not on the ground of epidemiological evidence of a policy's effectiveness; rather, HP 2020 seems to be willing to advocate for direct regulation only in areas that are relatively politically uncontroversial, such as helmet laws and certain tobacco control measures. This paper argues that a true internalization of the principles of health equity requires that HP 2020 acknowledge the predictably different distributive consequences of various policy interventions and urge the adoption of those coercive legal mechanisms that are demonstrably effective in reducing health disparities. Without such a framework under which to operate, the likely result is that, even if overall population health improves, health disparities will widen between the most vulnerable population groups and the already advantaged, or remain essentially stagnant, as they did under HP 2010. More broadly, this paper argues that health equity demands the use of coercive legal mechanisms in certain circumstances given the existence of current disparities and the evidence of effectiveness of direct regulation as compared to its alternatives. This is true for a number of reasons, including that purely voluntary policy initiatives often result in little impact on the most vulnerable populations (e.g., in the case of trans fat initiatives, discussed infra Part III.B.3), and because market-based initiatives have failed to adequately account for the health needs of certain population groups (as in the case of access to health services, discussed infra Part III.B.1). Only with a candid assessment and acceptance of the critical role that coercive legal mechanisms play in furthering population health can progress be made toward the achievement of the HP 2020 goals and ultimately, health equity. Part II of this paper discusses health equity in the U.S. and how HP 2020 incorporates health equity into its goals. Part III discusses the importance of law in public health and health equity and uses specific HP 2020 goals and objectives as examples of the essential role of coercive legal mechanisms in achieving those goals while also furthering health equity. Part IV proposes certain additional legal mechanisms that could inform selection of strategies for achieving the HP 2020 goals and health equity, including the use of a “health in all policies” approach to government, the use of health impact assessments in policymaking, and the use of various indices to measure the effects of various policies and assess progress toward disparities reduction.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>We do not defend the law in all instances – but in the contingent realm of health provision, government policy is much better than the de facto Alt of an untouched market.</h4><p>Parento ‘12</p><p><u></strong>Professor Emily Whelan Parento is as Associate Professor and the Gordon D. Schaber Health Law Scholar at McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific. Her primary scholarly focus is the intersection of domestic health law and policy with the human rights framework for the right to health and health equity. The author holds a JD and LLM, from The Georgetown University Law Center and a BBA, from the University of Notre Dame. Earlier in her career she served as a federal judicial clerk and practiced litigation at Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York and California. From the article: “Health Equity, Healthy People 2020, and Coercive Legal Mechanisms as Necessary for the Achievement of Both” - 58 Loyola Law Review 655 - Fall, 2012 - #CutWithRJ – Modified for potentially offensive language – This Loyola Law Review article was re-published at Racism.org – http://www.racism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1424:racisthealthcare&catid=88&Itemid=274&showall=1&limitstart=</p><p></u>Although health equity was not a part of seventeenth-century political discourse, Montesquieu accurately captured the conflict that surrounds the concept today. <u>In theory, people are born with equal potential for health</u>y lives, <u>yet the minute their lives begin</u>, <u>a confluence of factors render some</u> people <u>immensely more likely than others to have the capability</u> to lead healthy lives. <u>These <mark>disparities in</u></mark> individuals' <u><mark>capabilities to achieve good health</u></mark> <u><mark>raise important </mark>social justice <mark>questions</u></mark>--<u>What obligation does society have to take measures to reduce health disparities based on race</u> or ethnicity, <u>socioeconomic status</u> (SES), <u>gender</u>, <u>sexual orientation</u>, education, <u>disability, and other factors</u>, particularly where behavioral risk factors are a contributing factor to disease? <u>Stated differently</u>, <u><strong><mark>how much “choice” do individuals truly possess regarding </mark>their <mark>health</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and what</u></mark> can and <u><mark>should government do to address</u></mark> the societal <u><mark>influences that negatively impact health </mark>status<mark>?</p><p></u></mark>Routinely, society looks at an individual health outcome and ascribes <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> result to modifiable lifestyle choices, good or bad, with the implicit assumption that people who are healthy deserve praise for their responsible choices and those who are not deserve at least partial blame for failing to act in ways that would improve their health. However, this <u><strong><mark>personal</mark> </u></strong>responsibility <u><strong><mark>framework</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>fails at a population level</u></strong></mark>. It is well-documented that there is a socioeconomic gradient to health, in which individuals are likely to be healthier as their socioeconomic status increases. But no serious scholar ascribes population level socioeconomic health disparities to the superior willpower of the wealthy in making healthy lifestyle choices. Similarly, there is a persistent racial and ethnic component to health that is not explained by other factors, pursuant to which certain racial and ethnic groups are more likely to have worse health outcomes than others. But no one argues that African-Americans have worse health outcomes on average than whites because African-Americans are not as motivated as whites to protect their health. There is no basis for making such population-wide generalities about motivation regarding health behavior. Yet in the face of these widespread and presumptively inequitable disparities, the law has done little. <u>This paper argues that </u>coercive <u>legal mechanisms are <strong>an essential element</u></strong> <u>of eliminating health disparities and achieving health equity.</u> Moreover, the paper argues that Healthy People 2020 (HP 2020), which is <u>the nation</u>'s “master blueprint for health” and explicitly seeks to achieve health equity, has not fully incorporated the principles of health equity in the formulation of its objectives and indicators because HP 2020 <u>fails to recognize the</u> varying <u>distributive effects</u> of<u> policies</u> that <u>could achieve</u> population health targets<u>.</u> To truly incorporate the <u>principles</u> of health equity, HP 2020 <u>should advocate for</u> <u>those <strong>demonstrably effective</strong> </u>coercive<u> <strong>legal mechanisms</u></strong> <u>that</u> would both achieve its population health objectives and <u>reduce health disparities.</p><p></u>The federal government has monitored health disparities in one form or another since at least 1985 and has advocated for the elimination of health disparities since at least 2000, with the release of the Healthy People 2010 goals. However, decisive action on the reduction of disparities has been lacking, and, on average, disparities have not improved over at least the past fifteen years. Although health equity is a mainstay of health law and policy discourse, the concept has not had a significant role in mainstream political discussions. As it is commonly understood, health equity exists when “all people have an equal opportunity to develop and maintain their health, through fair and just access to resources for health.” <u><mark>There are strong</u></mark> philosophical and social justice<u> <mark>reasons that support <strong>government action</strong> </mark>to reduce disparities</u>--among them are human rights principles of equality underlying the right to health; Nussbaum's theory of health as an essential human capability necessary to fully function in life; Amartya Sen's theory of the capability for health as an instrumental human freedom; and principles of equality and nondiscrimination <u>among people based on characteristics such as SES, race </u>or ethnicity, <u>gender, sexual orientation, religion, disability</u>, <u>rural/urban geography, and other characteristics</u> <u>historically linked to discriminatory treatment.</p><p>The question</u>, <u>then</u>, <u>is</u>, <u><mark>What means are <strong>both necessary</strong></mark> <mark>and <strong>effective</u></strong> <u></mark>for reducing health disparities</u> and achieving health equity<u>?</u> It is here that distributive consequences of policies become important, leading to the conclusion that coercive legal mechanisms such as direct regulation and taxation are essential to a serious strategy to reduce disparities. <u><strong><mark>While</u></strong></mark> coercive <u><strong><mark>legal mechanisms are not suited to solve every problem</u></strong></mark> and must always be balanced against concern for personal liberties and principles of autonomy<u><strong><mark>, </u></strong></mark>there are many instances in which coercive <u><strong><mark>legal mechanisms are demonstrably the most effective way of reducing health disparities</u></strong></mark> <u>and improving population health</u>. Unfortunately, when discussing these mechanisms, advocates are often cowed by advocates of “personal choice” into watering down interventions to the point that the likely result is--even with an improvement in population health--no change or a worsening in health disparities. This approach is problematic from a health equity standpoint, given that health equity by its nature requires the elimination of health disparities associated with social disadvantage.</p><p>The U.S. government has made the achievement of health equity and the elimination of health disparities a national priority in HP 2020, recognizing the importance of working toward the realization of health equity. Every ten years since 1979, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issues new “Healthy People” nationwide health goals for the forthcoming decade, the most recent of which are HP 2020. The essential aim of the Healthy People project (the Project) is to establish national health priorities by setting targets for improvement of health across a broad spectrum of topics, ranging from access to health services to environmental health to more discrete diseases such as cancer and heart disease and, for the first time in HP 2020, including the social determinants of health. In some instances, HP 2020 advocates the adoption of specific coercive legal mechanisms that would both further a population health goal and reduce disparities--for example, passage of smoke-free legislation would both reduce overall population exposure to secondhand smoke and more strongly affect disadvantaged groups (who have higher rates of smoking and are more likely to work in places where smoking is permitted), thereby resulting in a reduction in the disparity in rates of exposure to secondhand smoke. This advocacy is laudable. However, in most instances, HP 2020 chooses to set broad, population-based targets for health measures without expressing a preference between means of achieving those targets, as in the case of access to health insurance coverage, where HP 2020 sets a target of 100% coverage without acknowledging the obvious--that there is no evidence that anything other than a coercive legal mechanism is a realistic way to achieve that goal.</p><p>The determination of which coercive legal mechanisms HP 2020 supports appears to be made not on the ground of epidemiological evidence of a policy's effectiveness; rather, HP 2020 seems to be willing to advocate for direct regulation only in areas that are relatively politically uncontroversial, such as helmet laws and certain tobacco control measures. This paper argues that a <u><strong>true</u></strong> internalization of the principles of <u><strong><mark>health equity</u></strong> <u><strong>requires</u></strong></mark> that HP 2020 acknowledge the predictably different distributive consequences of various policy interventions and urge the <u><strong><mark>adoption of</u></strong></mark> those coercive <u><strong><mark>legal mechanisms </mark>that are</u></strong> <u><strong>demonstrably effective</u></strong> <u><strong>in reducing health disparities</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Without such a framework</u></strong></mark> under which to operate, <u><strong><mark>the </mark>likely <mark>result is that</u></strong>,</mark> even if overall population health improves, <u><strong>health <mark>disparities will widen</mark> </strong>between the most vulnerable population groups and the already advantaged</u>, <u>or remain essentially stagnant</u>, as they did under HP 2010.</p><p>More broadly, this paper argues that health equity demands the use of coercive legal mechanisms in certain circumstances given the existence of current disparities and the evidence of effectiveness of direct regulation as compared to its alternatives. This is true for a number of reasons, including that purely <u><mark>voluntary</mark> </u>policy<u> <mark>initiatives</u></mark> often <u><mark>result in little impact on</mark> the most <mark>vulnerable populations</u></mark> (e.g., in the case of trans fat initiatives, discussed infra Part III.B.3), <u><mark>and</u></mark> because <u><mark>market</mark>-based <mark>initiatives</u></mark> have <u><mark>fai</mark>l</u>ed <u>to adequately account for the health needs of certain population groups</u> (as in the case of access to health services, discussed infra Part III.B.1). <u><strong><mark>Only</mark> </u></strong>with<u><strong> a candid </strong>assessment and<strong> <mark>acceptance of the critical role</mark> <mark>that</u></strong></mark> coercive <u><strong><mark>legal mechanisms play</mark> </u></strong>in furthering population health <u><strong><mark>can </u></strong>p</mark>rogress be made toward the <u><strong><mark>achieve</u></strong></mark>ment of the HP 2020 goals and ultimately, <u><strong><mark>health equity</u></strong></mark>. Part II of this paper discusses health equity in the U.S. and how HP 2020 incorporates health equity into its goals. Part III discusses the importance of law in public health and health equity and uses specific HP 2020 goals and objectives as examples of the essential role of coercive legal mechanisms in achieving those goals while also furthering health equity. Part IV proposes certain additional legal mechanisms that could inform selection of strategies for achieving the HP 2020 goals and health equity, including the use of a “health in all policies” approach to government, the use of health impact assessments in policymaking, and the use of various indices to measure the effects of various policies and assess progress toward disparities reduction.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Barnes 18 (Robert – reporter covering the U.S. Supreme Court for The Washington Post, “‘If it wasn’t the Roberts court already, it is the Roberts court now’,” 6/28/18, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/if-it-wasnt-the-roberts-court-already-it-is-the-roberts-court-now/2018/06/28/089a6742-7ad1-11e8-80be-6d32e182a3bc_story.html?utm_term=.578396e8a468) fulltext: With the retirement of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the likelihood that President Trump will choose a more conservative replacement, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. is poised to play a pivotal role on the court he has headed for 13 years. Roberts has been content to play the long game, moving the court to the right with incremental steps. But now, with more conservative colleagues on one side and liberals on the other, Roberts will have the ability to supply the deciding fifth vote and dictate the terms of the deal. “With four presumably reliable conservative votes, he’ll be in a unique position to decide where, how far, and how fast, the court goes,” said Gregory G. Garre, who was a solicitor general under President George W. Bush. “This will put the chief in more of a swing justice role, and make him one of the most powerful chief justices in recent history.” Roberts has joked in the past that it is a historical accident that the chief justice gets only one vote, just like the eight other members. So like the others, he, too, was often in need of Kennedy’s vote. What Justice Kennedy's retirement means for the Supreme Court Kennedy’s exit “puts him in an extraordinarily privileged position of power,” said Daniel Epps, a Washington University law professor who monitors the Supreme Court for his podcast, First Mondays. “If it wasn’t the Roberts court already, it is the Roberts court now, and it will be for a generation.” With Roberts as the median justice, one of the most conservative Supreme Courts in history will almost surely move further to the right. And if the chief justice’s past is prologue, that could mean more restrictions on abortion rights, affirmative action contained or ended, gay rights more closely scrutinized, and states freer to alter voting laws and redistricting without judicial oversight. It is a long-sought goal for conservatives, for whom Kennedy often was an obstacle. Liberals have taken an apocalyptic view of a Supreme Court without Kennedy. By the time the court reconvenes in October, five justices will be conservatives nominated by Republican presidents. Two of the court’s four liberals will be octogenarians, and reinforcements are not on the way. Kennedy usually sided with conservatives. But recent victories for the liberals on same-sex marriage, abortion accessibility and affirmative action were possible only because he joined them. Roberts was on the other side, often with an adamant, stinging rebuke. When Kennedy wrote the 2015 decision that found a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, Roberts said in his dissent that gay couples and their supporters should “by all means celebrate today’s decision.” But he added: “Do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.” “The lesson of 2018 seems to be it can always get worse,” said Elizabeth B. Wydra, president of the liberal Constitutional Accountability Center. “And it did.” A court in which Kennedy is replaced by another Trump choice “is also likely to encourage conservative legal activists to shoot for the stars — look for cases seeking to overrule Roe v. Wade, reverse or undermine LGBTQ rights, including marriage equality, and erode the progress toward racial justice that the civil rights movement has fought tirelessly to have recognized by an often recalcitrant court,” she said. Such bold action is not usually Roberts’s style, and the Supreme Court is institutionally averse to overturning precedents, a legal principle called stare decisis. Roberts’s preferred path, his defenders and detractors say, involves limiting the court’s precedents rather than reversing them. So he fulfilled his opposition to parts of the Voting Rights Act by striking a section at its heart, rather than the entire law. He infuriated the right — Trump during the campaign called him “an absolute disaster” — by finding a narrow way to uphold the Obama-era Affordable Care Act [ACA], while also eliminating a crucial element of it. “Given that the chief also seems uniquely sensitive to public perception of the court, and concerns about the court overstepping its role, this will be a fascinating dynamic to follow for years to come,” Garre said. In fact, he said, the court this term gave the public a taste of what a post-Kennedy court might look like. Kennedy for once did not join liberals to form a 5-to-4 majority. His consistency led to decisions determined by the court’s conservatives, including: ● upholding President Trump’s ban on travelers from certain Muslim-majority countries ● overturning a 41-year-old precedent to prohibit public-sector employee unions from collecting fees from nonmembers ● approving a Texas redistricting plan that a lower court had found discriminated against blacks and Hispanics ● finding that the law does not provide a bond hearing for those detained and facing deportation, even after months or years in detention ● ruling that pregnancy centers cannot be required to tell patients about the availability of state-offered services, including abortion. [Supreme Court upholds Trump travel ban] Kevin Russell, a lawyer who frequently practices at the Supreme Court, said some of the court’s decisions this term called into question the court’s desired reputation for evenhandedness. “One of the themes of the term was that what’s good for the goose is not necessarily good for the gander,” he said. His examples: “Abortion providers can be required to tell patients about adoption options, but crisis pregnancy centers cannot be required to tell their clients about abortion options. The First Amendment provides no protection when public sector workers complain about their pay individually, but protects an individual worker from having to share in the cost of a union trying to bargain about wages collectively.” And the court ruled for a Colorado baker who did not want to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple because it said a commission member made remarks hostile to the baker’s Christianity. But it “basically ignores President Trump’s tweets in upholding the travel ban,” Russell said. “The court gives reasons for all these asymmetries, which may or may not be persuasive to people,” he said. “But the unfortunate fact is that in each instance, the differential treatment occurred in politically charged cases and uniformly favored conservative causes. That will not help the court’s credibility as a nonpartisan institution.” Leah Litman, a liberal law professor at the University of California at Irvine, said the justices need not overturn the same-sex marriage decision to undermine it. “They could recognize a right for religious objectors not to marry LGB individuals; not to serve them; not to provide them health care; not to allow them to adopt,” she wrote. A decision about whether a business owner may refuse wedding services to a same-sex couple because it would violate his religious beliefs is one the justices left open this term for another time. Michael McConnell, a former Republican-nominated federal judge and head of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, said predictions about the new court are difficult. He noted that this term especially revealed a split among the court’s liberals — Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor further to the left, Stephen G. Breyer and Elena Kagan closer to the middle. “If Justice Kennedy is replaced with an interesting, relatively non-doctrinaire conservative (like the best names on Trump’s list) this could augur a more fluid court with a more substantive middle and fewer 5-4 splits,” he wrote in an email. He also noted that the justices, as a group and as individuals, value independence. “Every action seems to have a countervailing reaction,” McConnell said. “It would not surprise me to see a few of the conservative justices breaking more frequently with the liberal side. “The court as an institution does not like to see itself as the instrument of an ideological movement.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Roberts balances ideological decisions – fears of <u>legitimacy</u> produce <u>countervailing action</h4><p></u><strong>Barnes</strong> <strong>18</strong> (Robert – reporter covering the U.S. Supreme Court for The Washington Post, “‘If it wasn’t the Roberts court already, it is the Roberts court now’,” 6/28/18, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/if-it-wasnt-the-roberts-court-already-it-is-the-roberts-court-now/2018/06/28/089a6742-7ad1-11e8-80be-6d32e182a3bc_story.html?utm_term=.578396e8a468<u>)</p><p>With the retirement of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the likelihood that President Trump will choose a more conservative replacement, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. is poised to play a pivotal role on the court he has headed for 13 years.</u> <u>Roberts has been content to play the long game, moving the court to the right with incremental steps. But now, with more conservative colleagues on one side and liberals on the other, <strong>Roberts will have the ability to supply the deciding fifth vote and dictate the terms of the deal. </strong>“With four presumably reliable conservative votes, he’ll be in a unique position to decide where, how far, and how fast, the court goes,”</u> said Gregory G. Garre, who was a solicitor general under President George W. Bush. <u>“This will put the chief in more of a swing justice role, and make him one of the most powerful chief justices in recent history.” </u>Roberts has joked in the past that it is a historical accident that the chief justice gets only one vote, just like the eight other members. So like the others, he, too, was often in need of Kennedy’s vote. What Justice Kennedy's retirement means for the Supreme Court Kennedy’s exit “puts him in an extraordinarily privileged position of power,” said Daniel Epps, a Washington University law professor who monitors the Supreme Court for his podcast, First Mondays. “If it wasn’t the Roberts court already, it is the Roberts court now, and it will be for a generation.” With Roberts as the median justice, one of the most conservative Supreme Courts in history will almost surely move further to the right. And if the chief justice’s past is prologue, that could mean more restrictions on abortion rights, affirmative action contained or ended, gay rights more closely scrutinized, and states freer to alter voting laws and redistricting without judicial oversight. It is a long-sought goal for conservatives, for whom Kennedy often was an obstacle. Liberals have taken an apocalyptic view of a Supreme Court without Kennedy. By the time the court reconvenes in October, five justices will be conservatives nominated by Republican presidents. Two of the court’s four liberals will be octogenarians, and reinforcements are not on the way. Kennedy usually sided with conservatives. But recent victories for the liberals on same-sex marriage, abortion accessibility and affirmative action were possible only because he joined them. Roberts was on the other side, often with an adamant, stinging rebuke. When Kennedy wrote the 2015 decision that found a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, Roberts said in his dissent that gay couples and their supporters should “by all means celebrate today’s decision.” But he added: “Do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.” “The lesson of 2018 seems to be it can always get worse,” said Elizabeth B. Wydra, president of the liberal Constitutional Accountability Center. “And it did.” A court in which Kennedy is replaced by another Trump choice “is also likely to encourage conservative legal activists to shoot for the stars — look for cases seeking to overrule Roe v. Wade, reverse or undermine LGBTQ rights, including marriage equality, and erode the progress toward racial justice that the civil rights movement has fought tirelessly to have recognized by an often recalcitrant court,” she said. Such bold action is not usually Roberts’s style, and the Supreme Court is institutionally averse to overturning precedents, a legal principle called stare decisis. <u>Roberts</u>’s preferred path, his defenders and detractors say, involves limiting the court’s precedents rather than reversing them. So <u>he fulfilled his opposition to parts of the Voting Rights Act by striking a section at its heart, rather than the entire law. He infuriated the right</u> — Trump during the campaign called him “an absolute disaster” — <u>by finding a narrow way to uphold the Obama-era Affordable Care Act [ACA], while also eliminating a crucial element of it. “Given that the chief also seems <strong>uniquely sensitive to public perception of the court, and concerns about the court overstepping its role</strong>, this will be a fascinating dynamic to follow for years to come,”</u> Garre said. In fact, he said, the court this term gave the public a taste of what a post-Kennedy court might look like. Kennedy for once did not join liberals to form a 5-to-4 majority. His consistency led to decisions determined by the court’s conservatives, including: ● upholding President Trump’s ban on travelers from certain Muslim-majority countries ● overturning a 41-year-old precedent to prohibit public-sector employee unions from collecting fees from nonmembers ● approving a Texas redistricting plan that a lower court had found discriminated against blacks and Hispanics ● finding that the law does not provide a bond hearing for those detained and facing deportation, even after months or years in detention ● ruling that pregnancy centers cannot be required to tell patients about the availability of state-offered services, including abortion. [Supreme Court upholds Trump travel ban] Kevin Russell, a lawyer who frequently practices at the Supreme Court, said some of the court’s decisions this term called into question the court’s desired reputation for evenhandedness. “One of the themes of the term was that what’s good for the goose is not necessarily good for the gander,” he said. His examples: “Abortion providers can be required to tell patients about adoption options, but crisis pregnancy centers cannot be required to tell their clients about abortion options. The First Amendment provides no protection when public sector workers complain about their pay individually, but protects an individual worker from having to share in the cost of a union trying to bargain about wages collectively.” And the court ruled for a Colorado baker who did not want to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple because it said a commission member made remarks hostile to the baker’s Christianity. But it “basically ignores President Trump’s tweets in upholding the travel ban,” Russell said. “The court gives reasons for all these asymmetries, which may or may not be persuasive to people,” he said. “But the unfortunate fact is that in each instance, the differential treatment occurred in politically charged cases and uniformly favored conservative causes. That will not help the court’s credibility as a nonpartisan institution.” Leah Litman, a liberal law professor at the University of California at Irvine, said the justices need not overturn the same-sex marriage decision to undermine it. “They could recognize a right for religious objectors not to marry LGB individuals; not to serve them; not to provide them health care; not to allow them to adopt,” she wrote. A decision about whether a business owner may refuse wedding services to a same-sex couple because it would violate his religious beliefs is one the justices left open this term for another time. Michael McConnell, a former Republican-nominated federal judge and head of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, said predictions about the new court are difficult. He noted that this term especially revealed a split among the court’s liberals — Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor further to the left, Stephen G. Breyer and Elena Kagan closer to the middle. “If Justice Kennedy is replaced with an interesting, relatively non-doctrinaire conservative (like the best names on Trump’s list) this could augur a more fluid court with a more substantive middle and fewer 5-4 splits,” he wrote in an email. He also noted that the <u>justices</u>, as a group and as individuals, <u>value independence. <strong>“Every action seems to have a countervailing reaction,”</u></strong> McConnell said. “It would not surprise me to see a few of the conservative justices breaking more frequently with the liberal side. “<u>The court as an institution does not like to see itself as the instrument of an ideological movement.”</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Spencer, Keith A. [senior editor at Salon]“Against Mars-a-Lago: Why SpaceX's Mars Colonization Plan Should Terrify You.” Salon, Salon.com, Oct. 8 2017, https://www.salon.com/2017/10/08/against-mars-a-lago-why-spacexs-mars-colonization-plan-should-terrify-you/. fulltext: When CEO Elon Musk announced last month that his aerospace company SpaceX would be sending cargo missions to Mars by 2022 — the first step in his tourism-driven colonization plan — a small cheer went up among space and science enthusiasts. Writing in the New York Post, Stephen Carter called Musk’s vision “inspiring,” a salve for politically contentious times. “Our species has turned its vision inward; our image of human possibility has grown cramped and pessimistic,” Carter wrote: "We dream less of reaching the stars than of winning the next election; less of maturing as a species than of shunning those who are different; less of the blessings of an advanced technological tomorrow than of an apocalyptic future marked by a desperate struggle to survive. Maybe a focus on the possibility of reaching our nearest planetary neighbor will help change all that." The Post editorial reflected a growing media consensus that humankind’s ultimate destiny is the colonization of the solar system — yet on a private basis. American government leaders generally agree with this vision. Obama egged on the privatization of NASA by legislating a policy shift to private commercial spaceflight, awarding government contracts to private companies like SpaceX to shuttle supplies to the International Space Station. “Governments can develop new technology and do some of the exciting early exploration but in the long run it's the private sector that finds ways to make profit, finds ways to expand humanity,” said Dr. S. Pete Worden, the director of the NASA Ames Research lab, in 2012. And in a Wall Street Journal op-ed this week, Vice President Mike Pence wrote of his ambitions to bring American-style capitalism to the stars: “In the years to come, American industry must be the first to maintain a constant commercial human presence in low-Earth orbit, to expand the sphere of the economy beyond this blue marble,” Pence wrote. One wonders if these luminaries know their history. There has be no instance in which a private corporation became a colonizing power that did not end badly for everyone besides the shareholders. The East India Company is perhaps the finest portent of Musk’s Martian ambitions. In 1765, the East India Company forced the Mughal emperor to sign a legal agreement that would essentially permit their company to become the de facto rulers of Bengal. The East India Company then collected taxes and used its private army, which was over 200,000 strong by the early 19th century, to repress those who got in the way of its profit margins. “It was not the British government that seized India at the end of the 18th century, but a dangerously unregulated private company headquartered in one small office, five windows wide, in London, and managed in India by an unstable sociopath,” writes William Dalrymple in the Guardian. “It almost certainly remains the supreme act of corporate violence in world history.” The East India Company came to colonize much of the Indian subcontinent. In the modern era, an era in which the right of corporations to do what they want, unencumbered, has become a sacrosanct right in the eyes of many politicians, the lessons of the East India Company seem to have been all but forgotten. As Dalrymple writes: Democracy as we know it was considered an advance over feudalism because of the power that it gave the commoners to share in collective governance. To privately colonize a nation, much less a planet, means ceding governance and control back to corporations whose interest is not ours, and indeed, is always at odds with workers and residents — particularly in a resource-limited environment like a spaceship or the red planet. Even if, as Musk suggests, a private foundation is put in charge of running the show on Mars, their interests will inherently be at odds with the workers and employees involved. After all, a private foundation is not a democracy; and as major philanthropic organizations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation illustrate, often do the bidding of their rich donors, and take an important role in ripening industries and regions for exploitation by Western corporations. Yet Mars’ colonization is a bit different than Bengal, namely in that it is not merely underdeveloped; it is undeveloped. How do you start an entirely new economy on a virgin world with no industry? After all, Martian resource extraction and trade with Earth is not feasible; the cost of transporting material across the solar system is astronomical, and there are no obvious minerals on Mars that we don’t already have in abundance on Earth. The only basis for colonization of Mars that Musk can conceive of is one based on tourism: the rich pay an amount — Musk quotes the ticket price at $200,000 if he can get 1 million tourists to pay that — that entitles them to a round-trip ticket. And while they’re on Mars and traveling to it, they luxuriate: Musk has assured that the trip would be “fun.” This is what makes Musk’s Mars vision so different than, say, the Apollo missions or the International Space Station. This isn’t really exploration for humanity’s sake — there’s not that much science assumed here, as there was in the Moon missions. Musk wants to build the ultimate luxury package, exclusively for the richest among us. Musk isn’t trying to build something akin to Matt Damon’s spartan research base in "The Martian." He wants to build Mars-a-Lago. And an economy based on tourism, particularly high-end tourism, needs employees — even if a high degree of automation is assumed. And as I’ve written about before, that means a lot of labor at the lowest cost possible. Imagine signing away years of your life to be a housekeeper in the Mars-a-Lago hotel, with your communications, water, food, energy usage, even oxygen tightly managed by your employer, and no government to file a grievance to if your employer cuts your wages, harasses you, cuts off your oxygen. Where would Mars-a-Lago's employees turn if their rights were impinged upon? Oh wait, this planet is run privately? You have no rights. Musk's vision for Mars colonization is inherently authoritarian. The potential for the existence of the employees of the Martian tourism industry to slip into something resembling indentured servitude, even slavery, cannot be underestimated. We have government regulations for a reason on Earth — to protect us from the fresh horror Musk hopes to export to Mars. If he's considered these questions, he doesn't seem to care; for Musk, the devil's in the technological and financial details. The social and political are pretty uninteresting to him. This is unsurprising; accounts from those who have worked closely with him hint that he, like many CEOs, may be a sociopath. Even as a space enthusiast, I cannot get excited about the private colonization of Mars. You shouldn’t be either. This is not a giant leap for mankind; this is the next great leap in plutocracy. The mere notion that global wealth is so unevenly distributed that a small but sufficient sum of rich people could afford this trip is unsettling, indicative of the era of astonishing economic inequality in which we suffer. Thomas Frank, writing in Harpers, once wrote of a popular t-shirt he sighted while picnicking in a small West Virginia coal town: “Mine it union or keep it in the ground.” The idea, of course, is that the corporations interested in resource extraction do not care whatsoever about their workers’ health, safety, or well-being; the union had their interests at heart, and was able to negotiate for safety, job security, and so on. I’d like to see a similar t-shirt or bumper sticker emerge among scientists and space enthusiasts: “Explore Mars democratically, or keep it in the sky.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>If only wealthy elites can tap the vast resources of outer space, we lock in a permanent and unconscionable inequality. Private space colonization amounts to authoritarian corporate control of future settlements. Spencer ‘17</h4><p>Spencer, Keith A. [senior editor at Salon]“Against Mars-a-Lago: Why SpaceX's Mars Colonization Plan Should Terrify You.” Salon, Salon.com, Oct. 8 2017, https://www.salon.com/2017/10/08/against-mars-a-lago-why-spacexs-mars-colonization-plan-should-terrify-you/. </p><p>When CEO Elon Musk announced last month that his aerospace company SpaceX would be sending cargo missions to Mars by 2022 — the first step in his tourism-driven colonization plan — a small cheer went up among space and science enthusiasts. Writing in the New York Post, Stephen Carter called Musk’s vision “inspiring,” a salve for politically contentious times. “Our species has turned its vision inward; our image of human possibility has grown cramped and pessimistic,” Carter wrote: "We dream less of reaching the stars than of winning the next election; less of maturing as a species than of shunning those who are different; less of the blessings of an advanced technological tomorrow than of an apocalyptic future marked by a desperate struggle to survive. Maybe a focus on the possibility of reaching our nearest planetary neighbor will help change all that<u>." The Post editorial reflected a growing media consensus that humankind’s ultimate destiny is the colonization of the solar system — yet on a private basis. American government leaders generally agree with this vision. Obama egged on the privatization of NASA</u> by legislating a policy shift to private commercial spaceflight, <u>awarding government contracts to private companies like SpaceX</u> to shuttle supplies to the International Space Station. “Governments can develop new technology and do some of the exciting early exploration but in the long run it's the private sector that finds ways to make profit, finds ways to expand humanity,” said Dr. S. Pete Worden, the director of the NASA Ames Research lab, in 2012. And in a Wall Street Journal op-ed this week, Vice President Mike <u>Pence wrote of his ambitions to bring American-style capitalism to the stars: “In the years to come, American industry must be the first to maintain a constant commercial human presence in low-Earth orbit,</u> to expand the sphere of the economy beyond this blue marble,” Pence wrote. One wonders if these luminaries know their history. <u><strong>There has be <mark>no instance in which a private corporation became a colonizing power that did not end badly for everyone besides the shareholders</u></strong></mark>. The East India Company is perhaps the finest portent of Musk’s Martian ambitions. In 1765, the East India Company forced the Mughal emperor to sign a legal agreement that would essentially permit their company to become the de facto rulers of Bengal. The East India Company then collected taxes and used its private army, which was over 200,000 strong by the early 19th century, to repress those who got in the way of its profit margins. “It was not the British government that seized India at the end of the 18th century, but a dangerously unregulated private company headquartered in one small office, five windows wide, in London, and managed in India by an unstable sociopath,” writes William Dalrymple in the Guardian. “It almost certainly remains the supreme act of corporate violence in world history.” <u>The East India Company came to colonize much of the Indian subcontinent. In the modern era, an era in which the right of corporations to do what they want, unencumbered, has become a sacrosanct right in the eyes of many politicians, the lessons of the East India Company seem to have been all but forgotten</u>. As Dalrymple writes: Democracy as we know it was considered an advance over feudalism because of the power that it gave the commoners to share in collective governance<u>. <mark>To privately colonize a</mark> nation, much less a <mark>planet</mark>, <mark>means ceding governance and control</mark> back <mark>to corporations whose interest </mark>is not ours, and indeed, <strong><mark>is always at odds with workers and residents</mark> </strong>— <mark>particularly in a resource-limited environment</mark> like a spaceship or the red planet</u>. Even if, as Musk suggests, a private foundation is put in charge of running the show on Mars, their interests will inherently be at odds with the workers and employees involved. After all, a private foundation is not a democracy; and as major philanthropic organizations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation illustrate, often do the bidding of their rich donors, and take an important role in ripening industries and regions for exploitation by Western corporations. Yet Mars’ colonization is a bit different than Bengal, namely in that it is not merely underdeveloped; it is undeveloped. How do you start an entirely new economy on a virgin world with no industry? After all, Martian resource extraction and trade with Earth is not feasible; the cost of transporting material across the solar system is astronomical, and there are no obvious minerals on Mars that we don’t already have in abundance on Earth. The only basis for colonization of Mars that Musk can conceive of is one based on tourism: the rich pay an amount — Musk quotes the ticket price at $200,000 if he can get 1 million tourists to pay that — that entitles them to a round-trip ticket. And while they’re on Mars and traveling to it, they luxuriate: Musk has assured that the trip would be “fun.” This is what makes Musk’s Mars vision so different than, say, the Apollo missions or the International Space Station.<u> <mark>This isn’t</mark> </u>really<u> <mark>exploration for humanity’s sake</mark> — <mark>there’s not</mark> </u>that much<u> <mark>science </u></mark>assumed<u> <mark>here</mark>, as there was in the Moon missions. Musk wants to build the ultimate luxury package, exclusively for the richest among </u>us. Musk isn’t trying to build something akin to Matt Damon’s spartan research base in "The Martian." He wants to build Mars-a-Lago<u>. And <mark>an economy based on tourism</mark>, particularly high-end tourism, <mark>needs employees</mark> — even if a high degree of automation is assumed. And as I’ve written about before, <mark>that means a lot of labor at the lowest cost</mark> possible. </u>Imagine signing away years of your life<u> to be a housekeeper in the Mars-a-Lago hotel, with your communications, water, food, energy usage, even oxygen tightly managed by your employer, <mark>and no government to file a grievance to if your employer cuts your wages, harasses you, cuts off your oxygen</mark>.</u> Where would Mars-a-Lago's employees turn if their rights were impinged upon? Oh wait, <u><mark>this planet is</u></mark> run <u><mark>private</mark>ly</u>? You have no rights. <u>Musk's vision for <strong><mark>Mars colonization is inherently authoritarian</u></strong></mark>. The potential for the existence of the employees of the Martian tourism industry to slip into something resembling indentured servitude, even slavery, cannot be underestimated. We have government regulations for a reason on Earth — to protect us from the fresh horror Musk hopes to export to Mars. If he's considered these questions, he doesn't seem to care; for Musk, the devil's in the technological and financial details. The social and political are pretty uninteresting to him. This is unsurprising; accounts from those who have worked closely with him hint that he, like many CEOs, may be a sociopath. Even as a space enthusiast, I cannot get excited about the private colonization of Mars. You shouldn’t be either. This is not a giant leap for mankind; this is the next great leap in plutocracy. The mere notion that global wealth is so unevenly distributed that a small but sufficient sum of rich people could afford this trip is unsettling, indicative of the era of astonishing economic inequality in which we suffer. Thomas Frank, writing in Harpers, once wrote of<strong> a popular t-shirt he sighted while picnicking in a small West Virginia coal town: “Mine it union or keep it in the ground.” The idea, of course, is that the corporations interested in resource extraction do not care whatsoever about their workers’ health, safety, or well-being; the union had their interests at heart, and was able to negotiate for safety, job security, and so on. I’d like to see a similar t-shirt or bumper sticker emerge among scientists and space enthusiasts: “Explore Mars democratically, or keep it in the sky.”</p></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Lin 17. (Oon Yong; 4/23/2017; International Economics at SUNY Buffalo, under the supervision of Dr. Sandeep Bhakshar, PhD in economics; “Conflict and Trade,” http://geoeconomics.net/2017/09/13/conflict-and-trade/) fulltext: CONFLICT AND TRADE TODAY In the post-cold war era, actual conflicts are relatively few and far between especially between developed nations due to advances in military hardware [nuclear options]. Conflicts took on other forms such as economic warfare and proxy wars. Fortunately, advances in military technology were met with advances in international relations which led to the founding of intergovernmental organizations in the 20th-century. Trade in the modern context can be examined through globalization which serves as an all-encompassing word that represented progress, cultural exchange and increased trade. Development took off in the 1980s to 1990s, most notably from 1990 to 1996, capital inflows to developing countries increased by a massive 600% (Stiglitz, 2006). The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995, absorbing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], the organization enabled countries to have a combined platform to address international trade issues which developed and developing countries would both benefit in a world that was accelerating quickly in terms of trade. China’s control of rare earth mineral exports in the global market and the usefulness of the WTO is an example worth observing. China has an effective 97% control of the rare-earth elements market (Müller, Schweizer, & Seiler, 2016). It posed an issue as the Chinese government applied export quotas, causing global firms that use these minerals to be fearful of a supply issue due to the concentration of the source. Rare earth metals were useful in many applications and that contributed to the concern, United States firms used them for several product developments ranging from technological turbines to lab purposes such as for their magnetic properties. In 2014, an argument was brought up to the World Trade Organization [WTO] by the European Union, United States, and Japan in 2012 about the control of rare earth exports (World Trade Organization, 2015). The timing was nearly 11 years after the accession of China to the WTO, the panel concluded in 2014 that China’s export tariffs on rare earth exports were inconsistent with their WTO obligations. A study conducted by Müller et. al. (2016) begs to differ and found that U.S. firms could have adopted defensive actions such as stockpiling these materials and that export control effects were not overtly damaging after China has joined the World Trade Organization. But it remained apparent that the Chinese government did use its policies to benefit Chinese firms at the expense of non-domestic companies before they had joined the WTO. On 20 May 2015, China responded to the WTO’s request to conform to its panel’s recommendations and to fulfill its obligations to WTO law. China accepted the panel’s judgment, and the issue was resolved amicably. Bilateral agreements that increase cooperation through trade can also help reduce potential conflict. In 2010, a free trade agreement known as the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement was initiated between ROC Taiwan and PRC China, details of the agreement were finalized in June 2013. The deal’s results were twofold, firstly Taiwan benefited from the trade potential that China provided. Secondly, the agreement led to reduced pressure by PRC China on ROC Taiwan’s agenda of pursuing free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore (Kan & Morrison, 2013). The change in China’s political stance during that time allowed ROC Taiwan to ink deals in quick succession, initially [ANZTEC] with New Zealand on the 10th of July 2013, and subsequently with Singapore [ASTEP] on 7th November 2013. Bernard Cole of the National War College in Washington, DC shares that the possibility of ROC Taiwan and PRC China conflict has been reduced (Navarro, 2016) and the de-escalation can be partially attributed to the constant flow of trade between both countries. The most revolutionary organization for trade was the formation of the intergovernmental organization known as the European Union [EU]. The EU was founded after World War II [the deadliest war] to prevent future wars. The EU expressed the primary motivation for the formation, “The first steps were to foster economic cooperation: the idea being that countries that trade with one another become economically interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict.” (European Union, 2017, para 2). At its founding the EU had six member countries, today it has 28 member countries some of which are fully committed to its economic and monetary union. Furthermore, the EU is at the forefront of democratic thought and champions a broad range of issues such as human rights, internet privacy, and democracy. In support of the idea for the notion of trade and growth bringing peace to society, A Modern Peace? Schumpeter, the Decline of Conflict, and the Investment–War Trade-Off Professors Chatagnier and Castelli argues that To sustain growth (a basic requirement for every industrialized economy), governments and entrepreneurs must reinvest profits in innovation. Political leaders also benefit, as they can extract more revenue from a richer society. Within industrialized economies, war threatens this virtuous mechanism of investment, innovation, profits, and taxes, rendering it materially unprofitable. (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016) Their argument was based on the assumptions that industrialized economies which have grown to generate additional revenue for society, in general, tends not to prefer wars as it was contrary to the needs of an industrialized economy (Jentleson, 2007). Advocating that an extra dollar spent on military expenditures is one less dollar spent on economic growth for the society. They found that over the last fifty years from 2016, wars were not profitable and that industrialization does indeed reduce a nation’s incentive to enter conflicts due to the economic changes of industrialization. Additionally, the authors recognized that trade between industrialized societies potentially leads to peaceful attitudes (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016). Together, trade agreements [multilateral or unilateral] to economic/monetary unions attempt to push for more trade. Notably, the EU explicitly has an objective that is to reduce the presence of potential conflict through trade. We must note that trade, however, does not fully determine the direction of conflicts, it is but one among many other factors such as geopolitics, that can lead to conflict. Different levels of retaliation can constitute a conflict, however, as mentioned earlier, traditional wars are no longer viable for the countries of today. Rather than war, we tend to observe proxy wars fought over access to natural resources [oil pipes] in places such as Syria and Ukraine. Going Forward and Conclusion Progress in trade is fraught with challenges. Today, just a mere 22 years after the founding of the World Trade Organization [WTO] trade faces massive opposition; the latest WTO talks have completely stalled. Economists predict that additional benefits from more rounds might not bring substantial advantages, unlike past rounds due to the amount of reduction that have been pushed through previously, e.g. the Kennedy round. The adverse consequences of trade have also caused outstanding problems due to the ineffective reallocation of resources; an example would be the unequal distribution of income which has taken place in various nations. The increased trade came at a price. In the eyes of those that were negatively affected, open markets were anything but beneficial. Small businesses and workers of sunset industries grew wary and were skeptical of trade. In Globalization, War, and the Withering Away of the State Theodore Lowi (2011) shares that when a nation weakens due to various reasons which include financial markets, politicians are the first to know due to the nature of their job and they would try to compensate for the difference. In recent years, populist parties that peddle fear have gained popularity; fractured political environments gave rise to parties such as the National Front in France and AfD in Germany. These parties have been garnering an increasing number of votes that were impossible many years back, at the same time French President Francois Hollande’s voters were unhappy with his performance. In a late 2016 Elabe poll [French’s Gallup equivalent] 65% of individuals surveyed noted that Hollande was not properly defending the Republic’s values, nor was he forceful enough in the fight against terrorism [67%]. Most importantly, 86% of those polled said that they have no confidence in him on the recovery of the economy (ELABE, 2016). Populist parties of today are turning towards policies with a protectionist slant, and their objectives will only be temporarily blocked by past trade agreement commitments and obligations to the WTO. However, we should note that these obligations and mechanisms would only go as far as countries are willing to toe the line. A recent example would be the UK referendum, which its people have voted to set the country on the path to leave the EU in 2019. A commonly agreed upon reason for such a vote was that its citizens fear losing control of the nation to a supranational organization, and, losing the ability to control its borders due to refugee issues. The situation in Europe, like all other problems in the world, are subject to multiple influencing factors such as economic problems [post global financial crisis]. However, the relationship between conflict and trade should not be overlooked. Protectionist policies tend to reduce the interdependency that countries have of each other. As shown in the PRC China and ROC Taiwan case increased trade can help ease [at least temporarily] any risk of conflict. The same could apply to the relationship between rogue states and their trading partners, PRC China on DPRK Korea due to her role as a trade partner. The paper examined the relationship between trade and conflict through time. Trade is important as it allows for economic growth, industrialization, sharing of ideas, all of which contributes to conflict reduction. Exposure in the form of trade increases understanding and tolerance. Additionally, allows for the improved welfare of society by increasing the consumption possibilities for the nation. Countries are always graduating from the classification of Least Developed Countries, with Vanuatu and Angola expected to shed LDC status in 2020 and 2021. Historical examples have shown that trade can serve as a factor contributing to wars, it can also be a tool to fuel wars [WWII lend-lease program]. The founding of intergovernmental organizations such as the EU and WTO and unilateral agreements have helped increase trade and diminished chances of conflict. Most importantly increasing trade in the modern context tends to take the form of reducing tools and policies implemented by governments. The reduction and eventual remove of quotas, tariffs will eliminate the distortion of incentives in financial markets to the benefit of residents.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>50 years of <u>unequivocal data</u> prove <u>trade</u> and <u>globalization prevents conflict</u>.</h4><p><strong>Lin 17.</strong> (Oon Yong; 4/23/2017; International Economics at SUNY Buffalo, under the supervision of Dr. Sandeep Bhakshar, PhD in economics; “Conflict and Trade,” http://geoeconomics.net/2017/09/13/conflict-and-trade/)</p><p>CONFLICT AND TRADE TODAY</p><p><u>In the post-cold war era</u>, actual <u><mark>conflicts are</u></mark> relatively <u><strong><mark>few and far between</strong></mark> especially <mark>between developed nations</u></mark> due to advances in military hardware [nuclear options]. <u>Conflicts took</u> on other <u>forms such as <strong>economic warfare and proxy wars</u></strong>. Fortunately, <u><mark>advances in military tech</u></mark>nology <u><mark>were met with</mark> <strong>advances in international relations</strong> which led</u> to the founding of <u>intergovernmental organizations</u> in the 20th-century.</p><p><u>Trade</u> in the modern context <u>can be examined through <mark>globalization</u></mark> which serves as an all-encompassing word that represented progress, cultural exchange and increased trade. <u>Development took off in the 1980s to 1990s</u>, most notably <u>from 1990 to 1996, <strong><mark>capital inflows</strong></mark> to developing countries <strong><mark>increased</strong> by</u></mark> a massive <u><strong><mark>600%</u></strong></mark> (Stiglitz, 2006). <u>The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995</u>, absorbing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], the organization enabled countries to have a combined platform to address international trade issues which developed and developing <u><strong>countries would</u></strong> both <u><strong>benefit</strong> in a world that was <strong>accelerating quickly</strong> in terms of trade</u>.</p><p><u><mark>China’s control of r</mark>are <mark>e</mark>arth <mark>m</mark>ineral exports</u> in the global market <u><mark>and the</mark> <strong>usefulness of <mark>the WTO</strong> is</mark> an example <mark>worth observing</mark>. China has</u> an effective <u><strong>97% control</strong> of the rare-earth elements</u> market (Müller, Schweizer, & Seiler, 2016). It posed an issue as the Chinese government applied export quotas, <u>causing global firms that use these minerals to be fearful of a supply issue due to</u> the <u><strong>concentration of the source</u></strong>. Rare earth metals were useful in many applications and that contributed to the concern, United States firms used them for several product developments ranging from technological turbines to lab purposes such as for their magnetic properties.</p><p>In 2014, an argument was brought up to the World Trade Organization [WTO] by the European Union, United States, and Japan in 2012 about the control of rare earth exports (World Trade Organization, 2015). The timing was nearly 11 years after the accession of China to the WTO, the panel concluded in 2014 that China’s export tariffs on rare earth exports were inconsistent with their WTO obligations. A study conducted by Müller et. al. (2016) begs to differ and found that U.S. firms could have adopted defensive actions such as stockpiling these materials and that export control effects were not overtly damaging after China has joined the World Trade Organization. But it remained apparent that th<u>e Chinese government did use</u> its <u>policies to <strong>benefit Chinese firms</strong> at the <strong>expense of non-domestic companies</strong> before they</u> had <u>joined the WTO</u>.</p><p>On 20 May 2015, China responded to the WTO’s request to conform to its panel’s recommendations and to fulfill its obligations to WTO law. <u><mark>China accepted the</mark> panel’s <mark>judgment</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the issue was <strong>resolved amicably</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Bilateral agreements that <strong>increase cooperation through trade</strong></mark> can</u> also help <u><strong><mark>reduce</mark> potential <mark>conflict</strong></mark>. In 2010</u>, a free trade agreement known as <u>the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement was initiated between</u> ROC <u>Taiwan and</u> PRC <u>China</u>, details of the agreement were finalized in June 2013. The deal’s results were twofold, firstly Taiwan benefited from the trade potential that China provided. Secondly, <u>the agreement led to <strong>reduced pressure</strong> by</u> PRC <u>China on</u> ROC <u>Taiwan’s agenda of pursuing free trade agreements</u> with New Zealand and Singapore (Kan & Morrison, 2013). The change in China’s political stance during that time allowed ROC Taiwan to ink deals in quick succession, initially [ANZTEC] with New Zealand on the 10th of July 2013, and subsequently with Singapore [ASTEP] on 7th November 2013. Bernard <u>Cole of the National War College</u> in Washington, DC <u>shares that the <strong><mark>possibility of</u></strong></mark> ROC <u><strong><mark>Taiwan</mark> and</u></strong> PRC <u><strong><mark>China conflict has been reduced</u></strong></mark> (Navarro, 2016) and the <u><strong><mark>de-escalation</strong> can be</u></mark> partially <u><mark>attributed to</mark> the <strong><mark>constant</mark> flow of <mark>trade</u></strong></mark> between both countries.</p><p><u>The</u> most <u>revolutionary organization for trade was the</u> formation of the intergovernmental organization known as the <u>European Union</u> [EU]. The EU was founded after World War II [the deadliest war] to prevent future wars. <u><mark>The EU expressed the</mark> primary <mark>motivation</u></mark> for the formation, “The first steps were <u>to <strong><mark>foster</mark> economic <mark>cooperation</strong></mark>:</u> the idea being that <u><mark>countries that trade</mark> with one another <mark>become</mark> <strong>economically <mark>interdependent</strong> and</mark> so more <strong><mark>likely to avoid conflict</u></strong></mark>.” (European Union, 2017, para 2). At its founding the EU had six member countries, today it has 28 member countries some of which are fully committed to its economic and monetary union. Furthermore, <mark>th<u>e EU is at the <strong>forefront of </mark>democratic thought</strong> and champions</u> a broad range of issues such as <u><strong><mark>human rights</mark>, internet <mark>privacy, and</strong> <strong>democracy</strong></mark>.</p><p>In support of the idea for the notion of trade and growth bringing peace</u> to society, A Modern Peace? Schumpeter, the Decline of Conflict, and the Investment–War Trade-Off Professors <u>Chatagnier and Castelli argues that</p><p><mark>To sustain growth</u></mark> (<u>a <strong>basic requirement</strong> <strong>for every industrialized economy</u></strong>), <u><mark>governments</u></mark> and entrepreneurs <u>must <strong><mark>reinvest profits</mark> in innovation</u></strong>. <u>Political leaders</u> also <u>benefit</u>, as <u>they can extract more revenue from a richer society</u>. Within industrialized economies, war threatens this virtuous mechanism of investment, innovation, profits, and taxes, rendering it materially unprofitable. (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016)</p><p>Their argument was based on the assumptions that <u><mark>industrialized e</mark>conomies which have grown to generate additional revenue for society</u>, in general, <u><strong><mark>tend</mark>s <mark>not to prefer wars</u></strong></mark> as it was contrary to the needs of an industrialized economy (Jentleson, 2007). Advocating that <u><mark>an extra dollar</mark> spent <mark>on militar</mark>y expenditures <mark>is <strong>one less</u></strong></mark> dollar <u><strong>spent <mark>on economic growth</u></strong></mark> for the society. They found that <u><strong><mark>over the last fifty years</mark> from 2016</strong>, <mark>wars were not profitable</mark> and</u> that <u>industrialization does</u> indeed <u>reduce a nation’s incentive to enter conflicts due to </u>the <u>economic changes of industrialization</u>. Additionally, the authors recognized that <u><strong><mark>trade between industrialized societies</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><mark>leads to <strong>peaceful attitudes</u></strong></mark> (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016).</p><p>Together, <u>trade agreements</u> [multilateral or unilateral] <u>to economic/monetary unions</u> attempt to <u>push for more trade</u>. Notably, <u>the EU</u> explicitly <u>has an objective that is to reduce </u>the presence of <u>potential conflict through trade</u>. We must note that trade, however, does not fully determine the direction of conflicts, it is but one among many other factors such as geopolitics, that can lead to conflict. Different levels of retaliation can constitute a conflict, however, as mentioned earlier, traditional wars are no longer viable for the countries of today. Rather than war, we tend to observe proxy wars fought over access to natural resources [oil pipes] in places such as Syria and Ukraine.</p><p>Going Forward and Conclusion</p><p><u><strong><mark>Progress</mark> in trade <mark>is fraught with challenges</u></strong></mark>. Today, just a mere 22 years after the founding of the World Trade Organization [WTO] trade faces massive opposition; <u>the latest WTO talks have <strong>completely stalled</u></strong>. Economists predict that additional benefits from more rounds might not bring substantial advantages, unlike past rounds due to the amount of reduction that have been pushed through previously, e.g. the Kennedy round. <u>The <strong>adverse consequences</strong> of trade</u> have also <u>caused outstanding problems due to</u> the <u>ineffective reallocation of resources; an example would be</u> the <u><strong>unequal distribution of income</strong> </u>which has taken place in various nations.</p><p>The increased trade came at a price. In the eyes of those that were negatively affected, open markets were anything but beneficial. Small businesses and workers of sunset industries grew wary and were skeptical of trade. In Globalization, War, and the Withering Away of the State Theodore Lowi (2011) shares that when a nation weakens due to various reasons which include financial markets, politicians are the first to know due to the nature of their job and they would try to compensate for the difference. In recent years, populist parties that peddle fear have gained popularity; <u>fractured political environments gave rise to</u> parties such as <u>the National Front in France</u> and AfD in Germany. These parties have been garnering an increasing number of votes that were impossible many years back, at the same time French President Francois Hollande’s voters were unhappy with his performance. In a late 2016 Elabe poll [French’s Gallup equivalent] 65% of individuals surveyed noted that Hollande was not properly defending the Republic’s values, nor was he forceful enough in the fight against terrorism [67%]. Most importantly, 86% of those polled said that they have no confidence in him on the recovery of the economy (ELABE, 2016).</p><p><u>Populist parties</u> of today <u>are turning towards </u>policies with <u>a <strong><mark>protectionist</mark> slant,</u></strong> and <u>their <strong><mark>objectives will only be temporarily blocked</strong> by past trade</mark> agreement <mark>commitments and</mark> obligations to <mark>the WTO</u></mark>. However, we should note that these obligations and mechanisms would only go as far as countries are willing to toe the line. A recent example would be the UK referendum, which its people have voted to set the country on the path to leave the EU in 2019. A commonly agreed upon reason for such a vote was that its citizens fear losing control of the nation to a supranational organization, and, losing the ability to control its borders due to refugee issues.</p><p>The situation in Europe, like all other problems in the world, are subject to multiple influencing factors such as economic problems [post global financial crisis]. However, <u>the <strong>relationship between conflict and trade</strong> <strong>should not be overlooked.</strong> <mark>Protectionist policies</u></mark> tend to <u><mark>reduce</mark> the <strong><mark>interdependency</strong></mark> that countries have</u> of each other<u>. <mark>As shown in the PRC</u></mark> China <u><mark>and</u></mark> ROC <u><mark>Taiwan</mark> case increased <mark>trade can</u></mark> help <u><strong><mark>ease</mark> [at least temporarily</strong>] <strong><mark>any risk of conflict</strong>. The same could apply to</u></mark> the relationship between <u><strong><mark>rogue states and</mark> their <mark>trading partners</u></strong></mark>, PRC China on DPRK Korea due to her role as a trade partner.</p><p>The paper examined the relationship between trade and conflict through time. <u><mark>Trade</u></mark> is important as it <u><mark>allows</mark> for economic <mark>growth, industrialization, sharing of ideas, all of which <strong>contribute</u></strong></mark>s <u><strong><mark>to</strong> <strong>conflict reduction</strong>. Exposure</mark> in the form of trade <strong><mark>increases understanding</mark> and tolerance</u></strong>. Additionally, allows for the improved welfare of society by increasing the consumption possibilities for the nation. Countries are always graduating from the classification of Least Developed Countries, with Vanuatu and Angola expected to shed LDC status in 2020 and 2021.</p><p>Historical examples have shown that trade can serve as a factor contributing to wars, it can also be a tool to fuel wars [WWII lend-lease program]. The founding of intergovernmental organizations such as the EU and WTO and unilateral agreements have helped increase trade and diminished chances of conflict. Most importantly increasing trade in the modern context tends to take the form of reducing tools and policies implemented by governments. The <u>reduction and eventual remove of</u> quotas, <u>tariffs will eliminate</u> the <u>distortion of incentives in financial markets to the benefit of residents</u>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Golshan ’19 (Tara Golshan, Politics Reporter, Tara Golshan covers Congress, elections, and just about anything in politics that needs explaining. On her first day covering Congress she sat through the entire 18-hour Ways and Means Committee markup of the House's Obamacare repeal bill. Since, she's written comprehensive explainers about congressional budgets, spending fights, the immigration debate, health care and tax reform. She profiled Mark Meadows and keeps close tabs on the internal divisions within the Republican party, Vox, “Trump ignored Congress on war powers. Constitutional scholars want Democrats to take him to court”, https://www.vox.com/2019/5/27/18634590/nancy-pelosi-donald-trump-supreme-court-war-power, May 27, 2019) fulltext: A group of constitutional scholars and lawmakers want House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to take President Donald to the Supreme Court over the war in Yemen. Their case is straightforward: Trump is unilaterally involving the United States in war, and that’s unconstitutional. For four years, the United States has participated in a war in Yemen that was never authorized by Congress and that Congress expressly told Trump to withdraw from. Trump ignored the directive. Now, as the White House escalates tensions with Iran, there’s growing concern that unless legal action is taken, Congress will cede more war powers to Trump. In April, Congress passed a historic War Powers Resolution directing Trump to remove troops involved in “hostilities” in Yemen. Trump vetoed it, cementing American fingerprints on one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world: According to the most recent United Nations report, 80 percent of the Yemeni population — 24 million people — is in need of humanitarian assistance. The Senate failed to reach the 67-vote threshold needed to override the executive veto on the bill. Trump said the War Powers Resolution was an attempt to “weaken [his] constitutional authorities.” But the power to authorize a declaration of war, of course, sits with Congress, not the president. Constitutional scholars are now arguing a War Powers Resolution isn’t a normal bill. They say it is a fundamental constitutional question about the power to authorize war. And the stakes are high. “The president’s veto doesn’t end this conversation,” Bruce Ackerman, a constitutional law scholar with Yale University, told Vox. He’s one of a diverse group of legal experts who have sent Pelosi a letter urging her to take legal action. The United States got involved in Yemen four years ago when Saudi Arabia and its allies began a military campaign in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. The US is providing Saudis with intelligence, arms and ammunition, and, until late last year, fuel for their warplanes. The warplanes that bombed a school bus, killing at least 40 children last August, did so with an American-made bomb. The war has killed more than 50,000 people, according to one independent estimate, and has left tens of millions more in need of assistance. Trump is determined to keep course, and has shown he is committed to his alliance with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, even after it became clear the prince called for Saudi Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s killing. Since Trump’s veto, his administration has escalated tensions with Iran, spreading concern that Trump is itching to stoke another war. These concerns were exacerbated on Friday, when the administration sidestepped Congress again, unilaterally authorizing $8 billion in arms sales, including to Saudi Arabia and its allies, to counter Iran. “This is a moment of truth, both for the congressional war power and for the Supreme Court of the United States,” Ackerman said. “Does the Supreme Court of the United States — and its claim of originalism — is that supposed to be taken seriously?” The case for taking Trump to the Supreme Court, briefly explained Constitutionally, Congress has the power to declare war, and the president, as the commander in chief, has the power to direct the military after Congress’s authorization. Historically, America’s war-making has gone differently; presidents have consistently pushed the boundaries of their power. For example, for the past 18 years, presidents of both parties have used the same 2001 congressional war authorization, passed after 9/11, as justification for going to war across the Middle East, including Yemen. The Obama administration did not ask Congress for specific authorization before involving itself in Yemen. The Trump administration hasn’t either, bypassing the legislative branch as it negotiated billions of dollars in arms deals, and as it conducted military operations. Instead of seeking congressional approval for war, presidents have increasingly turned to their internal legal counsels to build a largely secret body of law to defend their war engagements, Mary Dudziak, a constitutional scholar with Emory University School of Law, said. “Especially since 9/11, Congress has let power accumulate in the executive branch,” Dudziak said. “And Congress does that by sitting back and not objecting, which is why Pelosi’s role is really important right now.” Now, Dudziak and others say Congress has an opportunity to fight back. Legal scholars are pointing to a 1950s Supreme Court case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, to make the case to Democratic leadership that Congress has the winning argument against Trump on war powers. In 1952, during the Korean War, a labor strike stalled steel production, cutting the availability of war materials for American troops. So President Harry Truman invoked his emergency powers to seize private steel mills to force steelworkers back, blatantly defying specific provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act — a largely anti-union labor law from 1947. Truman’s justification was that he could not wage a successful war without the proper materials, and therefore was allowed to act outside the law. The Supreme Court rejected Truman’s case, and, importantly, Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion established a clear three-tier framework for presidential powers. He wrote that a president’s powers are at maximum strength only with Congress’s authorization. When Congress shows indifference, presidential power is in a “twilight zone,” as both branches can claim authority over a given matter. Finally, a president’s power is “at its lowest ebb” when Congress has specifically disapproved of an action. US involvement in the war in Yemen firmly sits in this third category. Congress has passed a War Powers Resolution — a form of legislative action established in 1973 to prevent another Vietnam War — specifically directing Trump to withdraw from Yemen. In passing the resolution, Congress not only tried to claw back its constitutional powers from the president but also asserted that the executive had overstepped his bounds as commander in chief, going to war without Congress’s approval. “We have the leading fundamental precedent on this requiring the Supreme Court to scrutinize presidential war-making,” Ackerman said. “If Nancy Pelosi doesn’t go to court and urge the Supreme Court to intervene when Congress has for the first time invoked this [War Power Resolution], in the case where neither President Obama nor President Trump has gained the approval, it establishes a precedent that this war power shouldn’t be taken seriously.” Do Democrats want to get into this fight? Since Trump’s veto, lawmakers and activists have been waiting for their next move on Yemen. “We continue to consider all viable options to end this humanitarian crisis,” Pelosi’s spokesperson said. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), who shuttled the War Power Resolution through the House, with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) doing the same in the Senate, is hopeful: “It wasn’t a no,” he told Vox of leadership’s interest in taking Trump to court. That said, there still isn’t consensus that this is the best strategy going forward. Sanders told Vox he would be supportive of Pelosi taking legal action, but said his primary focus is on building enough support that the Senate can overturn Trump’s veto. Sanders often talks about Yemen, and the importance of Congress’s war powers (especially with respect to Trump’s escalations with Iran), on the national stage as one of the leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates. “I think essentially we have got to rally the American people to understand what a horrible humanitarian disaster this is, and we need the votes to override Trump’s veto — that is to me the major issue,” Sanders said. “The court case would go on and on. And we need immediate action.” Dudziak acknowledged the need for both legal action and a national campaign to gain Americans’ attention. “The only way for Congress to have any role in restraining president’s war power is for Congress to act,” she said. “The hardest thing to [doing] anything is profound apathy about our conflict on the part of the American people.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Congressional action on arm sales is key to <u>restrain</u> an <u>unchecked presidency</u>- Congress would win in Court and <u>establish precedent</u>.</h4><p><strong>Golshan ’19</strong> (Tara Golshan, Politics Reporter, Tara Golshan covers Congress, elections, and just about anything in politics that needs explaining. On her first day covering Congress she sat through the entire 18-hour Ways and Means Committee markup of the House's Obamacare repeal bill. Since, she's written comprehensive explainers about congressional budgets, spending fights, the immigration debate, health care and tax reform. She profiled Mark Meadows and keeps close tabs on the internal divisions within the Republican party, Vox, “Trump ignored Congress on war powers. Constitutional scholars want Democrats to take him to court”, https://www.vox.com/2019/5/27/18634590/nancy-pelosi-donald-trump-supreme-court-war-power<u>, May 27, 2019)</p><p>A group of constitutional scholars and lawmakers want House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to take President Donald to the Supreme Court over the war in Yemen. Their case is straightforward: <strong>Trump is unilaterally involving the United States</strong> in war, and <strong>that’s unconstitutional</strong>. For four years, the United States has participated in a war in Yemen that was never authorized by Congress and that <strong>Congress</strong> expressly <strong>told Trump to withdraw from</strong>. <strong>Trump ignored the directive</strong>. Now, as the White House escalates tensions with Iran, there’s growing concern that <strong>unless</strong> legal <strong>action is taken</strong>, <strong>Congress will cede more war powers to Trump</strong>. </u>In April, Congress passed a historic War Powers Resolution directing Trump to remove troops involved in “hostilities” in Yemen. Trump vetoed it, cementing American fingerprints on one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world: According to the most recent United Nations report, 80 percent of the Yemeni population — 24 million people — is in need of humanitarian assistance. The Senate failed to reach the 67-vote threshold needed to override the executive veto on the bill. <u>Trump said the War Powers Resolution was an attempt to “weaken [his] constitutional authorities.” But <strong>the</strong> power to <strong>authorize a declaration of war</strong>, of course, <strong>sits with Congress</strong>, <strong>not the president</strong>. Constitutional scholars are now arguing a War Powers Resolution isn’t a normal bill. They say it is a fundamental constitutional question about the power to authorize war. And the stakes are high. </u>“The president’s veto doesn’t end this conversation,” Bruce Ackerman, a constitutional law scholar with Yale University, told Vox. He’s one of a diverse group of legal experts who have sent Pelosi a letter urging her to take legal action. The United States got involved in Yemen four years ago when Saudi Arabia and its allies began a military campaign in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. The US is providing Saudis with intelligence, arms and ammunition, and, until late last year, fuel for their warplanes. The warplanes that bombed a school bus, killing at least 40 children last August, did so with an American-made bomb. The war has killed more than 50,000 people, according to one independent estimate, and has left tens of millions more in need of assistance. Trump is determined to keep course, and has shown he is committed to his alliance with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, even after it became clear the prince called for Saudi Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s killing. Since Trump’s veto, his administration has escalated tensions with Iran, spreading concern that Trump is itching to stoke another war. These concerns were exacerbated on Friday, when the administration sidestepped Congress again, unilaterally authorizing $8 billion in arms sales, including to Saudi Arabia and its allies, to counter Iran. <u>“<strong>This is a moment of truth, </strong>both <strong>for the congressional war power</strong> and for the Supreme Court of the United States,” Ackerman said. “Does the Supreme Court of the United States — and its claim of originalism — is that supposed to be taken seriously?” </u>The case for taking Trump to the Supreme Court, briefly explained Constitutionally, Congress has the power to declare war, and the president, as the commander in chief, has the power to direct the military after Congress’s authorization. Historically, America’s war-making has gone differently; presidents have consistently pushed the boundaries of their power. For example, for the past 18 years, presidents of both parties have used the same 2001 congressional war authorization, passed after 9/11, as justification for going to war across the Middle East, including Yemen. The Obama administration did not ask Congress for specific authorization before involving itself in Yemen. The Trump administration hasn’t either, bypassing the legislative branch as it negotiated billions of dollars in arms deals, and as it conducted military operations. Instead of seeking congressional approval for war, presidents have increasingly turned to their internal legal counsels to build a largely secret body of law to defend their war engagements, Mary Dudziak, a constitutional scholar with Emory University School of Law, said. <u>“Especially <strong>since 9/11</strong>, <strong>Congress has let power accumulate</strong> in the <strong>executive</strong> branch,” Dudziak said. “And <strong>Congress does that by sitting back</strong> and <strong>not objecting</strong>, which is why Pelosi’s role is really important right now.” Now, Dudziak and others say Congress has an opportunity to fight back. <strong>Legal scholars</strong> are <strong>point</strong>ing <strong>to</strong> a 1950s Supreme Court case, <strong>Youngstown Sheet</strong> & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, to make the case to Democratic leadership that <strong>Congress has the winning argument against Trump on war powers.</strong> </u>In 1952, during the Korean War, a labor strike stalled steel production, cutting the availability of war materials for American troops. So President Harry Truman invoked his emergency powers to seize private steel mills to force steelworkers back, blatantly defying specific provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act — a largely anti-union labor law from 1947. Truman’s justification was that he could not wage a successful war without the proper materials, and therefore was allowed to act outside the law. The Supreme Court rejected Truman’s case, and, importantly, Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion established a clear three-tier framework for presidential powers. He wrote that a president’s powers are at maximum strength only with Congress’s authorization. When Congress shows indifference, presidential power is in a “twilight zone,” as both branches can claim authority over a given matter. Finally, a president’s power is “at its lowest ebb” when Congress has specifically disapproved of an action. <u>US involvement in the war in Yemen firmly sits in this third category. Congress has passed a War Powers Resolution — a form of legislative action established in 1973 to prevent another Vietnam War — specifically directing Trump to withdraw from Yemen. In passing the resolution, Congress not only <strong>tried to claw back its constitutional powers</strong> from the president but also <strong>asserted that the executive had overstepped his bounds</strong> as commander in chief, going to war without Congress’s approval. “We have the <strong>leading fundamental precedent</strong> on this requiring the Supreme Court to scrutinize presidential war-making,”</u> Ackerman said. “<u>If Nancy Pelosi doesn’t go to court and urge the Supreme Court to intervene when Congress has for the first time invoked this [War Power Resolution], in the case where neither President Obama nor President Trump has gained the approval, <strong>it establishes a precedent that this war power shouldn’t be taken seriously.”</strong> </u>Do Democrats want to get into this fight? Since Trump’s veto, lawmakers and activists have been waiting for their next move on Yemen. “We continue to consider all viable options to end this humanitarian crisis,” Pelosi’s spokesperson said. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), who shuttled the War Power Resolution through the House, with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) doing the same in the Senate, is hopeful: “It wasn’t a no,” he told Vox of leadership’s interest in taking Trump to court. That said, there still isn’t consensus that this is the best strategy going forward. Sanders told Vox he would be supportive of Pelosi taking legal action, but said his primary focus is on building enough support that the Senate can overturn Trump’s veto. Sanders often talks about Yemen, and the importance of Congress’s war powers (especially with respect to Trump’s escalations with Iran), on the national stage as one of the leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates. “I think essentially we have got to rally the American people to understand what a horrible humanitarian disaster this is, and we need the votes to override Trump’s veto — that is to me the major issue,” Sanders said. “The court case would go on and on. And we need immediate action.” Dudziak acknowledged the need for both legal action and a national campaign to gain Americans’ attention. <u><strong>“The only way for Congress to have any role in restraining president’s war power is for Congress to act</strong>,” she said. “The hardest thing to [doing] anything is profound apathy about our conflict on the part of the American people.”</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Linden ’12 fulltext: (Harry van der, Butler University, “On the Violence of Systemic Violence: A Critique of Slavoj Zizek”, 1-1-2012, http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=facsch_papers&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dstructural%2520violence%2520coady%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D6%26ved%3D0CEUQFjAF%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.butler.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1249%2526context%253Dfacsch_papers%26ei%3D445nUNPLGon49QTQpoHIBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNHAtwi4GF88kWuuxN3ymbIA8Y3Ggw#search=%22structural%20violence%20coady%22) The “force” at the endpoint of the process of subjective violence, however, stays in place whether the violence is technologically mediated or not, and this force leads to a much more narrow range of harms inflicted by subjective violence than is caused by systemic violence. The harms of subjective violence are death, bodily harms, and acute psychological malfunctioning caused by “force,” while social injustice or systemic violence leads to such a wide variety of harms as social and political exclusion, inadequate intellectual development due to insufficient educational opportunities, harsh working conditions, subsistent wages, lack of free time and recreational opportunities, inadequate housing or no housing at all, lack of basic medical care, hunger, and inadequate access to clean water. We have noted that the degree of permitted counter-violence should vary with the seriousness of the violent threat and the culpability of the perpetrator, and that from this perspective much counter-violence in our society is disproportionate or excessive. Some of the harms of systemic violence (e.g., restricted educational opportunities) are such that revolutionary violence as counter-violence would be disproportionate, especially since revolutionary violence may easily escalate and inevitably include seriously harming people with limited moral responsibility. Other harms caused by poor institutions, though, such as serious illness, starvation, or a much-reduced lifespan, are such that they meet the bar set by proportionality. What should be taken into account in making such proportionality judgments is that subjective violence tends to have a different psychological impact on its victims than systemic violence, even when their respective harms are otherwise equally bad or even similar in kind. Only subjective violence tends to come suddenly to its victims, often leaving them in fear, shock, paralysis, and helplessness. What adds to their trauma is the very realization that another human being is intent on physically harming or killing them, disrupting the everyday trust in minimal human decency and cooperation. So, for example, even a preventable industrial accident that occurs due to infrequent safety inspections as an instance of systemic violence will have a different psychological impact on a mining community than a brutal attack by the mine owner’s private army against a peaceful protest of his workers in support of greater mine safety. Much systemic violence can be integrated into everyday life, but the same is much more difficult to do with regard to most subjective violence. It is this very fact that makes oppressive political violence so often effective in the short run. But, again, the differences here between subjective and systemic violence are less pronounced when subjective violence becomes impersonally or “bureaucratically” executed, as, for example, in penal violence (what happens during an execution provides a good illustration) and strategic bombing (assuming that the bombing campaigns remain limited in scope and frequency). This brings me to the most crucial distinction – for my purpose here – between systemic and subjective violence: the range of options available to the victims in addressing the former are much greater than for the latter. Once the clubs come down or the bullets fly in political protest, the choice is to flee and capitulate, fight back, or hope that nonviolent sacrifice will cease the violence. Similarly, once a war of aggression is under way the basic choice is to fight back or surrender and then hope that a massacre will not follow. Surrender does not preclude nonviolent resistance to the aggressor, but it means at least that the aggressor has been initially successful in imposing his political will. In cases of political violence, the intention of the perpetrator is typically to impose his political will, restricting the options of the victims by making resistance to this will very costly. Personal violence might not have such coercive intent, but similar limited action options are in place. Basically, once an individual attacks you personally, the choice is to fight back or hope that the cheek is not hit too hard when it is turned. In my view, fighting back, or counter-violence, is a prima facie right, but to make its actual execution morally right presumes that other moral standards are satisfied, such as proportionality in the case of individual counter-violence and jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards (or approximations thereof) in the case of collective violence. The mere fact of systemic violence, to the contrary, does not warrant counter-violence; for social injustice can be effectively addressed in many different ways, including through institutional reforms from within, nonviolent protests, boycotts, collective strikes, lobbying, and electoral action. Even when social injustice can only be addressed through revolutionary change, counter-violence is not prima-facie warranted because it might be disproportionate. More importantly, it might not be necessary because it has become abundantly clear during the past few decades that nonviolence strategies can be remarkably successful in overthrowing oppressive regimes and the recent emergence of the global public sphere will only increase the chance of success of future endeavors. However, once the struggle for social justice is met by widespread violence inflicted, or supported, by the state, revolutionary counter-violence is prima facie morally right. Broadly speaking, the ethics of self-defense retains its moral force in light of the fact that nonviolence has not proven to be effective against agents who have no qualms unleashing subjective violence. No doubt, these are all difficult moral issues that should be carefully discussed and placed within their historical context. But all too often this does not happen in Žižek’s work, especially in Violence, and what we find instead is the claim that systemic violence rightfully begets subjective violence because it projects violence. This claim has only a ring of plausibility when we neglect that the two types of violence in this equation create very different ranges of options for remedial action. A more critical use of the concept of violence would not enable him to offer such a broad and facile justification of revolutionary violence. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not claiming that the notion of systemic violence necessarily leads to a broad and superficial justification of revolutionary violence. Galtung, for example, does not make such an inference. However, one must then ask why the inference is not appropriate since it is commonly accepted that counter-violence against wrongful violence is justified. This means that one must show how systemic violence differs from subjective violence so that counter-violence is generally only prima facie just with regard to the latter. I 18 suspect that once such differences are articulated (as I have tried to do in this paper) the notion of systemic violence loses much of its credibility. At any rate, the proponent of the notion of systemic violence should at least caution or clarify that our typical emotive and moral responses to subjective violence might not apply to systemic violence. The proponent also should outline some convincing limits on extending the core concept of violence because without such limits, as will become clear in the next section, we might end up with more conceptual and practical confusion and questionable support of revolutionary violence.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Subjective violence is much worse—it’s irreversible and causes massive psychological harm</h4><p><strong>Linden ’12 </p><p><u></strong>(Harry van der, Butler University, “On the Violence of Systemic Violence: A Critique of Slavoj Zizek”, 1-1-2012, http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=facsch_papers&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dstructural%2520violence%2520coady%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D6%26ved%3D0CEUQFjAF%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.butler.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1249%2526context%253Dfacsch_papers%26ei%3D445nUNPLGon49QTQpoHIBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNHAtwi4GF88kWuuxN3ymbIA8Y3Ggw#search=%22structural%20violence%20coady%22)</p><p></u>The “force” at the endpoint of the process of subjective violence, however, stays in place whether the violence is technologically mediated or not, and this force leads to a much more narrow range of harms inflicted by subjective violence than is caused by systemic violence. The harms of subjective violence are death, bodily harms, and acute psychological malfunctioning caused by “force,” while social injustice or systemic violence leads to such a wide variety of harms as social and political exclusion, inadequate intellectual development due to insufficient educational opportunities, harsh working conditions, subsistent wages, lack of free time and recreational opportunities, inadequate housing or no housing at all, lack of basic medical care, hunger, and inadequate access to clean water. We have noted that the degree of permitted counter-violence should vary with the seriousness of the violent threat and the culpability of the perpetrator, and that from this perspective much counter-violence in our society is disproportionate or excessive. Some of the harms of systemic violence (e.g., restricted educational opportunities) are such that revolutionary violence as counter-violence would be disproportionate, especially since revolutionary violence may easily escalate and inevitably include seriously harming people with limited moral responsibility<u>. Other harms caused by poor institutions, though, such as serious illness, starvation, or a much-reduced lifespan, are such that they meet the bar set by proportionality. What should be taken into account in making such proportionality judgments is that <strong><mark>subjective violence tends to have a different psychological impact </mark>on its victims <mark>than systemic violence, </mark>even when their respective harms are otherwise equally bad or even similar in kind</strong>. Only <mark>subjective violence tends to come suddenly </mark>to its victims, often leaving them in fear, shock, paralysis, and helplessness. What adds to their trauma is <mark>the </mark>very <mark>realization that another human </mark>being <mark>is intent on </mark>physically harming or <mark>killing </mark>them<mark>, disrupt</mark>ing<mark> the everyday trust in minimal human decency</mark> and cooperation. So</u>, for example, even a preventable industrial accident that occurs due to infrequent safety inspections as an instance of systemic violence will have a different psychological impact on a mining community than a brutal attack by the mine owner’s private army against a peaceful protest of his workers in support of greater mine safety. Much systemic violence can be integrated into everyday life, but the same is much more difficult to do with regard to most subjective violence. It is this very fact that makes oppressive political violence so often effective in the short run. But, again, the differences here between subjective and systemic violence are less pronounced when subjective violence becomes impersonally or “bureaucratically” executed, as, for example, in penal violence (what happens during an execution provides a good illustration) and strategic bombing (assuming that the bombing campaigns remain limited in scope and frequency). <u>This brings me to the most crucial distinction – for my purpose here – between systemic and subjective violence: the range of options available to the victims in addressing the former are much greater than for the latter. <strong>Once the</strong> clubs come down or the <strong>bullets</strong> fly in political protest, the choice is to flee and capitulate, fight back, or hope that nonviolent sacrifice will cease the violence. Similarly, <strong>once a war of aggression is under way the basic choice is to fight back or surrender and then hope that a massacre will not follow</strong>. Surrender does not preclude nonviolent resistance to the aggressor, but it means at least that the aggressor has been initially successful in imposing his political will. In cases of political violence, the intention of the perpetrator is typically to impose his political will, restricting the options of the victims by making resistance to this will very costly. Personal violence might not have such coercive intent, but similar limited action options are in place. Basically, once an individual attacks you personally, the choice is to fight back or hope that the cheek is not hit too hard when it is turned. In my view, fighting back, or counter-violence, is a prima facie right, but to make its actual execution morally right presumes that other moral standards are satisfied, such as proportionality in the case of individual counter-violence and jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards (or approximations thereof) in the case of collective violence. </u>The mere fact of systemic violence, to the contrary, does not warrant counter-violence; for <u><mark>social injustice can be effectively addressed in many different ways</u></mark>, including through institutional reforms from within, nonviolent protests, boycotts, collective strikes, lobbying, and electoral action. Even when social injustice can only be addressed through revolutionary change, counter-violence is not prima-facie warranted because it might be disproportionate. More importantly, it might not be necessary because it has become abundantly clear during the past few decades that nonviolence strategies can be remarkably successful in overthrowing oppressive regimes and the recent emergence of the global public sphere will only increase the chance of success of future endeavors. However, once the struggle for social justice is met by widespread violence inflicted, or supported, by the state, revolutionary counter-violence is prima facie morally right. Broadly speaking, <u><strong>the ethics of self-defense retains its moral force</u></strong> in light of the fact that <u><mark>nonviolence has not proven to be effective against agents who have no qualms unleashing subjective violence.</mark> No </u>doubt, these are all difficult moral issues that should be carefully discussed and placed within their historical context. But all too often this does not happen in Žižek’s work, especially in Violence, and what we find instead is the claim that systemic violence rightfully begets subjective violence because it projects violence. This claim has only a ring of plausibility when we neglect that the two types of violence in this equation create very different ranges of options for remedial action. A more critical use of the concept of violence would not enable him to offer such a broad and facile justification of revolutionary violence. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not claiming that the notion of systemic violence necessarily leads to a broad and superficial justification of revolutionary violence. Galtung, for example, does not make such an inference. However, one must then ask why the inference is not appropriate since it is commonly accepted that counter-violence against wrongful violence is justified. This means that one must show how systemic violence differs from subjective violence so that counter-violence is generally only prima facie just with regard to the latter.<u> I 18 suspect that <strong><mark>once such differences are articulated</strong></mark> (as I have tried to do in this paper) <strong><mark>the notion of systemic violence loses much of its credibility</strong></mark>. At any rate, the proponent of the notion of systemic violence should at least caution or clarify that our typical emotive and moral responses to subjective violence might not apply to systemic violence. The proponent also should outline some convincing limits on extending the core concept of violence because without such limits, as will become clear in the next section, we might end up with more conceptual and practical confusion and questionable support of revolutionary violence. </p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Sexton 8 (Jared Sexton, Director of African American Studies at UC Irvine, 2008, “Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism”, pages 111-114) fulltext: FYI: Randall Kennedy is “one of the first black scholars in this generation to pen a sustained argument advocating what he terms ‘a cosmopolitan ethos that welcomes the prospect of genuine, loving interracial intimacy’ ” (page 107-108) In response to the last question, we examine several comments from Kennedy’s opening chapter, “In the Age of Slavery.” As noted, Kennedy is at pains to counter the claims of a certain black feminist history regarding the “extremity of power” exercised by the slaveholder and “the absolute submission required of the slave” (Hartman, quoted in Kennedy 2003, 532fn11). He is, in other words, attempting to demonstrate, or at least to speculate upon, the limits of the slave system’s power of domination. Beyond this limit—whose locus proves frustratingly obscure—the agency of the slave herself was, we are told, able to affect significantly the conditions of captivity to alternate ends. Kennedy, in other words, proffers a narrative in which evidence of agency (evidence, that is, confirming an assumption of agency), however circumscribed or practically ineffective, is taken as a sign of resistance. More properly, this is a narrative of resistant affection, an insistence that the dehumanizing social order of racial slavery was unable to achieve its ultimate goal—“the absolute submission of the slave”—because it could not overcome the irresistible force of affection between men and women, “regardless of color.” When all is said and done, a human is still a human, as it were, and the family romance of normative heterosexuality persists “even within” hierarchies that preclude for the captive all of the recognizable (social, political, economic, cultural, legal) trappings of “human being” in the modern sense. Here is Kennedy: The slave system failed, however, to perfect the domination that [ Judge Thomas] Ruffin envisioned. It failed to bind the slaves so tightly as to deprive them of all room to maneuver. It failed to wring from them all prohibited yearnings. Slavery was, to be sure, a horribly oppressive system that severely restricted the ambit within which its victims could make decisions. But slavery did not extinguish altogether the possibility of choice. (43) We might ask, what is the minimum ambit of decision making? What sort of system, if not slavery, would bind one so tightly as to deprive one of all “room to maneuver”? Need a system of domination be “perfect” in order for it to be legally binding or socially effective or politically determinant? Need the captive body be deprived of all room to maneuver for the situation to be considered one of extremity? Need the yearnings of slaves be wrung entirely from them for their prohibition to be considered a constitutive element of life? At what point does the quantitative measure of the slave’s bondage become difference of a qualitative sort? What precisely is the “choice” available under slavery, and is it one worthy of belaboring, one whose sphere of influence is to be considered newsworthy? To put a finer point on it, why is the categorical discrepancy refused between the free and the enslaved, or more specifically, between the slave and the slaveholder? Is such refusal not tantamount to denying the very existence of slavery as a system that produced slaves rather than free people whose freedom was simply “severely restricted” or whose power was simply “severely limited” or who simply faced “difficult situations”? Kennedy continues: Bondage severely limited the power—including the sexual power—of slaves. But it did not wholly erase their capacity to attract and shape affectionate, erotic attachments of all sorts, including interracial ones. In a hard-to-quantify but substantial number of cases, feelings of affection and attachment between white male masters and their black female slaves somehow survived slavery’s deadening influence. The great difficulty, in any particular instance, lies in determining whether sex between a male master and a female slave was an expression of sexual autonomy or an act of unwanted sex. The truth is that most often we cannot know for sure, since there exists little direct testimony from those involved, especially the enslaved women. (44) The inability to quantify the “number of cases” or, indeed, to “know for sure” anything about them does not prevent the author from considering them nonetheless “substantial,” and the paucity of direct testimony,6 “especially [from] the enslaved women,” does not stop the author from extrapolating wildly about said “feelings of affection and attachment” between them and their “white male masters.” In fact, it is the void in its place—the great historic silence—that enables both the reiteration of longstanding alibis for white male sexual violence—what Hartman (1997) discusses skillfully as the “ruses of seduction”—and the projection of this newfangled, though no less menacing, story about a maverick interracial intimacy that, almost undetectably, undermines the injunctions of white supremacy, serving not only as a sign of agency for enslaved women but a moment of their resistance as well. Their “sexual power” is expressed as the “capacity to attract”—and “somehow” to manipulate—the erotic attachments of white male slaveholders. There is here an unsubtle shift in terms: agency is not in itself subversive; indeed, the entire slave system derives, in large part, from the agency of the enslaved (its capture, manipulation, redeployment, etc.) (Chandler 2000). Agency may be resistant or complicit or both, and it may or may not have practical effects in the world; all of this can only be determined contextually. Much more troubling than Kennedy’s imprecision here, however, is his entirely uncritical suggestion about the “sexual power” of slaves. Is not one of the principal conceits of power to suggest that though the dominant may monopolize power political, economic, and social, the dominated nonetheless enjoy a wily aptitude for “getting their way” by other means, namely, the ars erotica of seduction? Is not one of the most pernicious elements of the proslavery discourse that the “attractiveness” of enslaved black women presents a threat of corruption to civilized white manhood and/or an internal guarantee against the excesses of state-sanctioned violence reserved for white slaveholders? The same quality that served as temptation was also, or alternately, taken to be that which would forestall the descent of slaveholding into unrestrained brutality, an essential rationalization for the upholding of white (male) impunity toward blacks, whether enslaved or nominally “free” (Hartman 1997).7 Finally, was not the suggestion that enslaved black men might have the power to seduce white women (whether free or, in earlier periods, indentured) one of the prime alibis for the construction of regulatory or prohibitory statutes around interracial marriage and sexual relations from the seventeenth century onward (Bardaglio 1999)? In each case, the focus on the “sexual power” of slaves was undoubtedly a displacement of the organized violence consistently required of captivity and, further, a dissimulation of the institutionalized sexual power of slaveholders in particular (whose authority not only foreclosed the possibility of prosecution and militated against the extralegal reprisals but also contributed immeasurably to their “capacity to attract and shape affectionate, erotic attachments of all kinds.” The asymmetry here approaches the incommensurable—how, after all, would a slave go on to “court” a master? How would such an exercise in self-objectification, supplementing structural availability with an affirmation of “willingness,” rightly be called power?). This is no less the case simply because for Kennedy the “sexual power” of slaves is something to honor or celebrate rather than to fear.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The cultivation of agency does nothing—it is not subversive—it is complicit—the 1AC only displaces the organized violence of captivity</h4><p><u><strong>Sexton 8</u></strong> (Jared Sexton, Director of African American Studies at UC Irvine, 2008, “Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism”, pages 111-114)</p><p>FYI: Randall Kennedy is “one of the first black scholars in this generation to pen a sustained argument advocating what he terms ‘a cosmopolitan ethos that welcomes the prospect of genuine, loving interracial intimacy’ ” (page 107-108)</p><p>In response to the last question, we examine several comments from Kennedy’s opening chapter, “In the Age of Slavery.” As noted, <u><strong><mark>Kennedy</mark> is at <mark>pains to counter the claims of a</mark> </u></strong>certain <u><strong><mark>black feminist history regarding the</u></strong></mark> “extremity of power” exercised by the slaveholder and “<u><strong>the <mark>absolute submission required of the slave</u></strong></mark>” (Hartman, quoted in Kennedy 2003, 532fn11). <u><strong>He is</u></strong>, in other words, <u><strong>attempting to demonstrate</u></strong>, or at least to speculate upon, <u><strong>the limits of the slave system’s power of domination. Beyond this limit—whose locus proves frustratingly obscure—<mark>the agency of the slave herself was, we are told, able to affect significantly the conditions of captivity</mark> to alternate ends. <mark>Kennedy</u></strong></mark>, in other words, <u><strong><mark>proffers a narrative in which</u></strong></mark> evidence of agency (evidence, that is, confirming <u><strong><mark>an assumption of agency</u></strong></mark>), <u><strong>however circumscribed or practically ineffective, <mark>is taken as a sign of resistance</u></strong></mark>. More properly, <u><strong><mark>this is a narrative of resistant affection, an insistence that</mark> the dehumanizing social order of racial <mark>slavery was unable to achieve its ultimate goal—“the absolute submission of the slave”—because it could not overcome the irresistible force of affection between men and women, “regardless of color.”</u></strong> </mark>When all is said and done<u><strong><mark>, a human is still a human</u></strong>, </mark>as it were, <u><strong><mark>and the</mark> family <mark>romance</mark> of normative heterosexuality <mark>persists “even within” hierarchies that preclude for the captive all of the recognizable</u></strong></mark> (social, political, economic, cultural, legal) <u><strong><mark>trappings of “human being” in the modern sense. Here is Kennedy: The slave system failed</u></strong></mark>, however, to perfect the domination that [ Judge Thomas] Ruffin envisioned. It failed <u><strong><mark>to bind the slaves so tightly as to deprive them of all room to maneuver</u></strong></mark>. It failed to wring from them all prohibited yearnings. Slavery was, to be sure, a horribly oppressive system that severely restricted the ambit within which its victims could make decisions. But slavery did not extinguish altogether the possibility of choice. (43) <u><strong><mark>We might ask, what is the minimum ambit of decision making</u></strong></mark>? <u><strong><mark>What sort of system, if not slavery, would bind one so tightly as to deprive one of all “room to maneuver</u></strong></mark>”? <u><strong><mark>Need a system</mark> of domination <mark>be “perfect”</mark> in order <mark>for it to be</mark> legally binding or socially <mark>effective or politically determinant</u></strong></mark>? <u><strong>Need the captive body be deprived of all room to maneuver for the situation to be considered one of extremity</u></strong>? <u><strong>Need the yearnings of slaves be wrung entirely from them for their prohibition to be considered a constitutive element of life</u></strong>? <u><strong>At what point does the quantitative measure of the slave’s bondage become difference of a qualitative sort</u></strong>? <u><strong><mark>What precisely is the “choice” available under slavery, and is it one worthy of belaboring, one whose sphere of influence is to be considered newsworthy</u></strong></mark>? To put a finer point on it, why is <u><strong><mark>the categorical discrepancy refused between</u></strong></mark> the free and the enslaved, or more specifically, between <u><strong><mark>the slave and the slaveholder</u></strong></mark>?<u><strong> <mark>Is</u></strong></mark> such refusal not <u><strong><mark>tantamount to denying the very existence of slavery as a system that produced slaves rather than free people whose freedom was simply “severely restricted”</mark> or whose power was simply “severely limited” <mark>or who simply faced “difficult situations</u></strong></mark>”? Kennedy continues: Bondage severely limited the power—including the sexual power—of slaves. But it did not wholly erase their capacity to attract and shape affectionate, erotic attachments of all sorts, including interracial ones. In a hard-to-quantify but substantial number of cases, feelings of affection and attachment between white male masters and their black female slaves somehow survived slavery’s deadening influence. The great difficulty, in any particular instance, lies in determining whether sex between a male master and a female slave was an expression of sexual autonomy or an act of unwanted sex. The truth is that most often we cannot know for sure, since there exists little direct testimony from those involved, especially the enslaved women. (44) <u><strong><mark>The inability to</mark> quantify </u></strong>the “number of cases” or, indeed, <u><strong>to <mark>“know for sure” anything about them</u></strong></mark> does not prevent the author from considering them nonetheless “substantial,” <u><strong><mark>and the paucity of direct testimony</mark>,6 “especially [<mark>from</mark>] the <mark>enslaved women,” does not stop the author from extrapolating wildly</u></strong></mark> about said “feelings of affection and attachment” between them and their “white male masters.” In fact, it is the void in its place—the great historic silence—<u><strong><mark>that enables</mark> both the reiteration of longstanding alibis for white male sexual violence</u></strong>—what Hartman (1997) discusses skillfully as the “ruses of seduction”—<u><strong>and <mark>the projection of this</mark> newfangled, though no less <mark>menacing</mark>, <mark>story about</mark> a maverick interracial <mark>intimacy that</mark>, almost undetectably, <mark>undermines the injunctions of white supremacy, serving not only as a sign of agency for enslaved women but a moment of their resistance as well</mark>. Their “sexual power” is expressed as the “capacity to attract”—and “somehow” to manipulate—the erotic attachments of white male slaveholders. There is here an unsubtle shift in terms</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>agency is not in itself subversive</u></strong></mark>; indeed, the entire slave system derives, in large part, from the agency of the enslaved (its capture, manipulation, redeployment, etc.) (Chandler 2000). <u><strong><mark>Agency may be resistant or complicit or both</mark>, and it may or may not have practical effects in the world; <mark>all of this can only be determined contextually.</mark> Much more troubling</u></strong> than Kennedy’s imprecision here, however, <u><strong>is</u></strong> his entirely <u><strong>uncritical suggestion about the “sexual power” of slaves. <mark>Is not one of the principal conceits of power to suggest that though the dominant may monopolize power</u></strong></mark> political, economic, and social, <u><strong><mark>the dominated nonetheless enjoy</mark> a wily aptitude for <mark>“getting their way” by other means, namely</u></strong></mark>, the ars erotica of <u><strong><mark>seduction</u></strong></mark>? <u><strong>Is not one of the most pernicious elements of the proslavery discourse that the “attractiveness” of enslaved black women presents a threat of corruption to civilized white manhood and</u></strong>/or <u><strong>an internal guarantee against the excesses of state-sanctioned violence reserved for white slaveholders</u></strong>? <u><strong>The same quality that served as temptation was also</u></strong>, or alternately, taken to be that which would forestall the descent of slaveholding into unrestrained brutality, <u><strong>an essential rationalization for the upholding of white (male) impunity toward blacks, whether enslaved or nominally “free”</u></strong> (Hartman 1997).7 Finally, <u><strong>was not the suggestion that enslaved black men might have the power to seduce white women</u></strong> (whether free or, in earlier periods, indentured) <u><strong>one of the prime alibis for the construction of regulatory or prohibitory statutes around interracial marriage and sexual relations from the seventeenth century onward</u></strong> (Bardaglio 1999)? <u><strong><mark>In each case, the focus on the “sexual power” of slaves was undoubtedly a displacement of the organized violence consistently required of captivity and</mark>, further, <mark>a dissimulation of the institutionalized sexual power of slaveholders in particular</u></strong></mark> (whose authority not only foreclosed the possibility of prosecution and militated against the extralegal reprisals but also contributed immeasurably to their “capacity to attract and shape affectionate, erotic attachments of all kinds.” <u><strong><mark>The asymmetry here approaches the incommensurable—how, after all, would a slave</mark> go on to <mark>“court” a master? How would such an exercise in self-objectification, supplementing structural availability with an affirmation of “willingness,” rightly be called power?).</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>This is no less the case simply because for Kennedy</u></strong> <u><strong>the “sexual power” of slaves is something to honor or celebrate rather than to fear</u></strong>.</p></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Spindel, 19 - Jennifer Spindel is an assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center (“THE CASE FOR SUSPENDING AMERICAN ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA” War on the Rocks, 5/14, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/ fulltext: Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t have an effect. A U.S. arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a clear signal of American disproval of Saudi actions in Yemen, and would be an equally important signal to Washington’s allies, who are left wondering if the United States is ambivalent or uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe. By continuing to provide weapons, President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales. Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world [Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction, and serve an important communication role in international politics. Arms Embargos Are Signals and Can Build Coalitions Policymakers and scholars agree that arms embargoes are not effective “sticks” in international politics. Rarely do states cave when faced with punishment in the form of an embargo. But even if an arms embargo isn’t a direct tool of coercion, an embargo would be an important political signal. There are at least two reasons for the United States to seriously consider an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia. First, arms sales are signals that cut through the noise of the international system. Cutting off arms transfers is a common way that states express their dissatisfaction with others and try to influence behavior. As Lawrence Freedman observed in 1978, “refusing to sell arms is a major political act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence of the would-be recipient.” Yet this crucial point seems to have been lost in the current policy debate about whether or not the United States should continue selling arms to Saudi Arabia. My research shows that stopping arms transfers or denying requests is an effective way to signal dissatisfaction and causes the would-be recipient to re-think their behavior. Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with Israel in the 1960s. The United States sold Israel Hawk surface-to-surface missiles in 1962, M-48 Patton tanks in 1964 and 1965, and A-4E Skyhawk bombers in 1966. Israeli leaders understood that these transfers signaled a close U.S.-Israeli relationship. As diplomat Abba Eban wrote, the arms transfers were “a development of tremendous political value.” Even against this backdrop of close ties and significant arms sales, Israeli leaders were extremely sensitive to arms transfer denials. In April and May 1967, the United States denied Israeli requests for armored personnel carriers and fighter jets. Approving the transfers would have signaled support, and likely emboldened Israel, as tensions were growing in the region. Israeli leaders believed these transfer denials overruled prior signals and demonstrated that the United States was not willing to be a close political ally for Israel. Eban described Israel as “isolated,” and the head of Israel’s intelligence service said that the arms transfer denials made it clear that “in Israel, there existed certain misperceptions [about the United States].” If arms transfer denials could have such a significant effect on Israeli thinking — keeping in mind that there was a close and significant political relationship between the US and Israel — imagine what a transfer denial would mean for U.S.-Saudi relations. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia would have to re-think its impression that it has political support and approval from the United States. We can, and should, ask whether or not withdrawal of U.S. support would affect Saudi behavior, but it’s important that this question not get overlooked in the current debate. Because arms transfers (and denials) are powerful signals, they can have an effect even before a transfer is actually completed. This suggests that even the announcement of an embargo against Saudi Arabia could have an effect. Take, for example, Taiwan’s recent request for a fleet of new fighter jets. As reports mounted that Trump had given “tacit approval” to a deal for F-16 jets, China’s protests increased. The United States has not sold advanced fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992, partially out of fear of angering China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province. Even if the deal for F-16s is formally approved, Taiwan is unlikely to see the jets until at least 2021, and the balance of power between China and Taiwan would not change. As one researcher observed, the sale would be a “huge shock” for Beijing, “But it would be more of a political shock than a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.” Yet China’s immediate, negative reaction to even the announcement of a potential deal shows how powerful arms transfer signals can be. If this same logic is applied to an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, an arms embargo would signal that Saudi Arabia does not have the support of the United States. This signal would be an important first step in changing Saudi behavior because it would override other statements and actions the United States has sent that indicate support. And Trump has given Saudi Arabia a number of positive signals: He called Saudi Arabia a “great ally” and dismissed reports that that the Saudi government was involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has expressed interested in selling nuclear power plants and technology to Saudi Arabia. And he has repeatedly claimed that he has made a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia (he hasn’t). With these clear signals of support, why should Saudi Arabia alter its behavior based on resolutions that come out of the House or Senate, which are likely to be vetoed by Trump, anyway? An arms embargo would be a clear and unambiguous signal that the United States disproves of Saudi actions in Yemen. The second reason for supporting an embargo concerns U.S. allies and the logistical difficulties of making an embargo have an effect. One of the reasons embargoes have little material impact is because they require cooperation among weapons exporting states. A ban on sales from one country will have little effect if the target of the embargo can seek arms elsewhere. Germany, instituted an arms ban against Riyadh in November 2018, and German leaders have pressured other European states to stop selling arms to the Saudis. Germany understands the importance of the embargo as a political signal: as a representative of the German Green Party explained, “The re-start of arms exports to Saudi Arabia would be a fatal foreign policy signal and would contribute to the continued destabilization of the Middle East.” But the German embargo has had minimal effect because Saudi Arabia can get arms elsewhere. According to the 2019 Military Balance, most of Saudi Arabia’s equipment is American or French in origin, such as the M1A2 Abrams and AMX-30 tanks, Apache and Dauphin helicopters, and F-15C/D fighter jets. Saudi Arabia has some equipment manufactured wholly or in part in Germany, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Tornado ground attack craft, but these weapons are a small portion of its complete arsenal. A U.S. embargo would send an important signal to the allies who also supply Saudi Arabia, allowing them to explain participation in the embargo to their own domestic constituencies. This is especially important for countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, that need to export arms to keep their own production lines running. While the research shows that sustaining an arms embargo is often the most difficult step, embargoes can restrain sending states’ arms exports. Even if a U.S. embargo won’t have a direct effect on Saudi Arabia on its own, an embargo is important for building coalitions for a more expansive embargo that could affect Saudi behavior. The Difficulty of Stopping Atrocities Beyond signaling, we know U.S. arms sales often end up in the wrong hands, and have been used in Yemen. The Saudi-led war in Yemen has led to starvation conditions, caused thousands of civilian casualties, and has led to the displacement of millions of people. The United Nations estimates that 80 percent of Yemen’s population – 24 million people – require some form of humanitarian or protection assistance, and that the severity of the situation is increasing. Would an arms embargo create meaningful change in Yemen? An initial effect of an embargo is that Saudi Arabia would have to work harder to access war materiel. As Jonathan Caverley noted, more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s arms delivered in the past five years came from the United States. Even if this percentage decreases over time, it will be costly for Saudi Arabia to transition to a primarily Russian- or Chinese-supplied military. Though Saudi Arabia might be willing to pay this cost, it would still have to pay, and take the time to transition to its new weapons systems. This would represent a brief break in hostilities that could facilitate the delivery of aid and assistance in Yemen. The United States could, in theory, impose stricter end-user controls on Saudi Arabia. This would have the advantage of keeping Saudi Arabia within the world of U.S. weapons systems, and might prevent it from diversifying its suppliers, which would ultimately weaken any leverage the United States might have. Longer-term, it would not be to America’s advantage if Saudi Arabia takes a lesson from Turkey, and starts courting Russia as a new arms supplier. It is difficult to enforce end-user controls, since, once a weapon is transferred, the recipient can use it however it wishes. It might also be the case that Saudi Arabia would object to stricter end-user controls, and would seek new suppliers as a result. An arms embargo will not be a panacea. But not doing something sets a problematic precedent, and allows the difficulty of coordinating an arms embargo outweigh the potential benefits of one. An embargo is unlikely to have an immediate effect on Saudi behavior, because an embargo would be a political signal, rather than a blunt instrument of coercion. It will take time for a multilateral embargo to emerge and be put into place, and the United States should work with its allies to help support their ability to participate in the embargo. Not acting, however, would continue to implicitly endorse Saudi behavior, and would make it more difficult for U.S. allies to believe that future threats of an embargo are credible.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The plan forces Saudi Arabia to <u>rethink</u> its behavior – it won’t collapse the alliance but it sends a <u>signal of disapproval</u> that <u>outweighs other Trump actions</u> and <u>convinces allies to join</u>. Failure to start with Saudi Arabia eliminates any US credibility in leveraging arms sales with allies</h4><p><strong>Spindel, 19 -</strong> Jennifer Spindel is an assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center (“THE CASE FOR SUSPENDING AMERICAN ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA” War on the Rocks, 5/14, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/</p><p>Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t have an effect. <u><mark>A U.S. arms </mark>embargo against Saudi Arabia <mark>would be a <strong>clear signal</strong> of American disproval </mark>of Saudi actions in Yemen</u>, <u><mark>and would be an </mark>equally <mark>important <strong>signal to</mark> Washington’s <mark>allies</mark>,</u></strong> who are left wondering if the United States is ambivalent or uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe. <u>By continuing to provide weapons,</u> President Donald <u>Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies.</u> This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from <u>Congressional representatives show they are aware of <strong>the powerful signals sent by <mark>arms sales.</u></strong></mark> Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “<u><strong><mark>show</mark>s<mark> the world</u></strong></mark> [<u><mark>Trump] is determined to keep aiding </mark>a <mark>Saudi</mark>-backed <mark>war</u></mark> that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: <u>Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction, and serve an important communication role in international politics</u>. Arms Embargos Are Signals and Can Build Coalitions Policymakers and scholars agree that arms embargoes are not effective “sticks” in international politics. Rarely do states cave when faced with punishment in the form of an embargo. But even if an arms embargo isn’t a direct tool of coercion, an embargo would be an important political signal. There are at least two reasons for the United States to seriously consider an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia. First, <u><mark>arms sales are <strong>signals </mark>that cut through the noise</strong> of the international system.</u> <u>Cutting off arms transfers is a common way that states express their dissatisfaction with others and try to influence behavior.</u> As Lawrence Freedman observed in 1978, “<u><mark>refusing to sell arms</mark> is a major political act</u>. <u>It <mark>appears as a <strong>calculated insult</strong></mark>, <mark>reflecting on the</mark> stability, <strong><mark>trust</strong>, and</mark> credit-worthiness, or technical <strong><mark>competence </strong>of the</mark> would-be <mark>recipient.</mark>”</u> Yet this crucial point seems to have been lost in the current policy debate about whether or not the United States should continue selling arms to Saudi Arabia. My research shows that <u><mark>stopping arms transfers </mark>or denying requests is an effective way to signal dissatisfaction and <strong><mark>causes the </mark>would-be <mark>recipient to re-think their behavior</u></strong>.</mark> Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with Israel in the 1960s. The United States sold Israel Hawk surface-to-surface missiles in 1962, M-48 Patton tanks in 1964 and 1965, and A-4E Skyhawk bombers in 1966. Israeli leaders understood that these transfers signaled a close U.S.-Israeli relationship. As diplomat Abba Eban wrote, the arms transfers were “a development of tremendous political value.” Even against this backdrop of close ties and significant arms sales, Israeli leaders were extremely sensitive to arms transfer denials. In April and May 1967, the United States denied Israeli requests for armored personnel carriers and fighter jets. Approving the transfers would have signaled support, and likely emboldened Israel, as tensions were growing in the region. Israeli leaders believed these transfer denials overruled prior signals and demonstrated that the United States was not willing to be a close political ally for Israel. Eban described Israel as “isolated,” and the head of Israel’s intelligence service said that the arms transfer denials made it clear that “in Israel, there existed certain misperceptions [about the United States].” If arms transfer denials could have such a significant effect on Israeli thinking — keeping in mind that there was a close and significant political relationship between the US and Israel — imagine what a transfer denial would mean for U.S.-Saudi relations. Like Israel, <u>Saudi Arabia would have to re-think its impression that it has political support and approval from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. We can, and should, ask whether or not withdrawal of U.S. support would affect Saudi behavior, but it’s important that this question not get overlooked in the current debate. <u>Because<mark> arms</mark> transfers (and <mark>denials) </mark>are powerful signals, they can <mark>have an effect <strong>even before a transfer is </mark>actually <mark>completed</u></strong></mark>. This suggests that <u><strong>even the announcement</u></strong> <u>of an embargo against Saudi Arabia could have an effect</u>. Take, for example, Taiwan’s recent request for a fleet of new fighter jets. As reports mounted that Trump had given “tacit approval” to a deal for F-16 jets, China’s protests increased. The United States has not sold advanced fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992, partially out of fear of angering China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province. Even if the deal for F-16s is formally approved, Taiwan is unlikely to see the jets until at least 2021, and the balance of power between China and Taiwan would not change. As one researcher observed, the sale would be a “huge shock” for Beijing, “But it would be more of a political shock than a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.” Yet China’s immediate, negative reaction to even the announcement of a potential deal shows how powerful arms transfer signals can be. If this same logic is applied to an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, <u>an arms embargo would signal that Saudi Arabia does not have the support of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><mark>This signal would</mark> be an important first step in <strong><mark>chang</mark>ing<mark> Saudi behavior</strong> </mark>because <mark>it would <strong>override other statements and actions</strong> the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>has sent </mark>that indicate support</u>. <u>And Trump has given Saudi Arabia a number of positive signals</u>: He called Saudi Arabia a “great ally” and dismissed reports that that the Saudi government was involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has expressed interested in selling nuclear power plants and technology to Saudi Arabia. And <u>he has repeatedly claimed that he has made a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia (he hasn’t).</u> <u>With these clear signals of support, why should Saudi Arabia alter its behavior based on resolutions that come out of the House or Senate</u>, which are likely to be vetoed by Trump, anyway? <u><mark>An arms embargo would be a <strong>clear</mark> and unambiguous <mark>signal</u></strong></mark> that the United States disproves of Saudi actions in Yemen. The second reason for supporting an embargo concerns U.S. allies and the logistical difficulties of making an embargo have an effect. <u>One of the reasons embargoes have little material impact is because they require cooperation among weapons exporting states.</u> A ban on sales from one country will have little effect if the target of the embargo can seek arms elsewhere. Germany, instituted an arms ban against Riyadh in November 2018, and German leaders have pressured other European states to stop selling arms to the Saudis. Germany understands the importance of the embargo as a political signal: as a representative of the German Green Party explained, “The re-start of arms exports to Saudi Arabia would be a fatal foreign policy signal and would contribute to the continued destabilization of the Middle East.” But the German embargo has had minimal effect because Saudi Arabia can get arms elsewhere. According to the 2019 Military Balance, most of Saudi Arabia’s equipment is American or French in origin, such as the M1A2 Abrams and AMX-30 tanks, Apache and Dauphin helicopters, and F-15C/D fighter jets. Saudi Arabia has some equipment manufactured wholly or in part in Germany, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Tornado ground attack craft, but these weapons are a small portion of its complete arsenal. <u>A U.S. embargo would send an important signal <mark>to the allies who also supply Saudi </mark>Arabia<mark>, allowing them to explain participation</mark> in the embargo to their own domestic constituencies. This is especially important for countries <mark>like France, Germany, and the U</mark>nited <mark>K</mark>ingdom, that need to export arms to keep their own production lines running</u>. While the research shows that sustaining an arms embargo is often the most difficult step, <u>embargoes can restrain sending states’ arms exports. Even if a U.S. embargo won’t have a direct effect on Saudi Arabia on its own, <mark>an embargo is important for <strong>building coalitions for a more expansive embargo that could affect Saudi behavior</u></strong>.</mark> The Difficulty of Stopping Atrocities Beyond signaling, we know U.S. arms sales often end up in the wrong hands, and have been used in Yemen. The Saudi-led war in Yemen has led to starvation conditions, caused thousands of civilian casualties, and has led to the displacement of millions of people. The United Nations estimates that 80 percent of Yemen’s population – 24 million people – require some form of humanitarian or protection assistance, and that the severity of the situation is increasing. Would an arms embargo create meaningful change in Yemen? An initial effect of an embargo is that Saudi Arabia would have to work harder to access war materiel. As Jonathan Caverley noted, more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s arms delivered in the past five years came from the United States. Even if this percentage decreases over time, it will be costly for Saudi Arabia to transition to a primarily Russian- or Chinese-supplied military. Though Saudi Arabia might be willing to pay this cost, it would still have to pay, and take the time to transition to its new weapons systems. <u><mark>This would</u></mark> represent a brief <u><mark>break</u></mark> in <u><mark>hostilities that could <strong>facilitate the delivery of aid and assistance in Yemen</u></strong></mark>. The United States could, in theory, impose stricter end-user controls on Saudi Arabia. This would have the advantage of keeping Saudi Arabia within the world of U.S. weapons systems, and might prevent it from diversifying its suppliers, which would ultimately weaken any leverage the United States might have. Longer-term, it would not be to America’s advantage if Saudi Arabia takes a lesson from Turkey, and starts courting Russia as a new arms supplier. It is difficult to enforce end-user controls, since, once a weapon is transferred, the recipient can use it however it wishes. It might also be the case that Saudi Arabia would object to stricter end-user controls, and would seek new suppliers as a result. An arms embargo will not be a panacea. But not doing something sets a problematic precedent, and allows the difficulty of coordinating an arms embargo outweigh the potential benefits of one. An embargo is unlikely to have an immediate effect on Saudi behavior, because an embargo would be a political signal, rather than a blunt instrument of coercion. It will take time for a multilateral embargo to emerge and be put into place, and the United States should work with its allies to help support their ability to participate in the embargo. <u><mark>Not acting</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>would </mark>continue to implicitly endorse Saudi behavior, and would <mark>make it <strong>more difficult for U.S. allies to believe </mark>that <mark>future threats </mark>of an embargo are credible</u></strong>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Cribb, 17—principal of JCA, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, former Director, National Awareness, CSIRO (Julian, “The Poisoner,” Surviving the 21st Century Chapter 6, dml) fulltext: There are two essential points about the Earthwide chemical flood. First it is quite new. It began with the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, but expanded dramatically in the wake of the two world wars—where chemicals were extensively used in munitions—and has exploded in deadly earnest in the past 50 years, attaining a new crescendo in the early twenty-first century. It is something our ancestors never faced—and to which we, in consequence, lack any protective adaptations which might otherwise have evolved due to constant exposure to poisons. Second, the toxic flood is, for the most part, preventable. It is not compulsory—but is an unwanted by-product of economic growth. Though driven by powerful industries and interests, it still lies within the powers and rights of citizens, consumers and their governments to demand it be curtailed or ended and to encourage industry to safer, healthier products and production systems. The issue is whether, or not, a wise humanity would choose to continue poisoning our children, ourselves and our world. Regulatory Failure Despite the fact that around 2000 new chemicals are released onto world markets annually, most have not received proper health, safety or environmental screening—especially in terms of their impact on babies and small children. Regulation has so far failed to make any serious curtailment of this flood: only 21 out of 144,000 known chemicals have been banned internationally, and this has not eliminated their use. At such a rate of progress it will take us more than 50,000 years to identify and prohibit or restrict all the chemicals which do us harm. Even then, bans will only apply in a handful of well-regulated countries, and will not protect the Earth system nor humanity at large. Clearly, national regulation holds few answers to what is now an out-of-control global problem. Furthermore, the chemical industry is relocating from the developed world (where it is quite well regulated and observes its own ethical standards) and into developing countries, mainly in Asia, where it is largely beyond the reach of either ethics or the law. However, its toxic emissions return to citizens in well-regulated countries via wind, water, food, wildlife, consumer goods, industrial products and people. The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter how good your country’s regulations are: you and your family are still exposed to a growing global flood of toxins from which even a careful diet and sensible consumer choices cannot fully protect you. The wake-up call to the world about the risks of chemical contamination was issued by American biologist Rachel Carson when she published Silent Spring in 1962, in which she warned specifically about the impact of certain persistent pesticides used in agriculture. Since her book came out, the volume of pesticide use worldwide has increased 30-fold, to around four million tonnes a year in the mid-2010s. Since the modern chemical age began there has been a string of high-profile chemical disasters: Minamata, the Love Canal, Seveso, Bhopal, Flixborough, Oppau, Toulouse, Hinkley, Texas City, Jilin, Tianjin. Most of these display a familiar pattern of unproductive confrontation between angry citizens, industry and regulators, involving drawn-out legal battles that deliver justice to nobody. By their spectacular and local nature, such events serve to distract from the far larger, more insidious and ubiquitous, universal toxic flood. Chemists and chemical makers often claim that their products are ‘safe’ because individual exposure (e.g. in a given product, like a serve of food) is too low to result in a toxic dose, a theory first put forward by the mediaeval scholar Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. This ‘dose related’ argument is disingenuous, if not dishonest—as modern chemists well know—for the following reasons: Most chemicals target a receptor or receptors on certain of your body cells, to cause harm. There may be not one, but hundreds or even thousands of different chemicals all targeting the same receptor, so a particular substance may contribute an unknowable fraction to an overall toxic dose. That does not make it ‘safe’. Chemicals not known to be poisonous in small doses on their own can combine with other substances in water, air, food or your body to create a toxin. No manufacturer can truthfully assert this will not happen to their products. Chemical toxicity is a function of both dose and the length of time you are exposed to it. In the case of persistent chemicals and heavy metals, this exposure may occur over days, months, years, even a lifetime in some cases. Tiny doses may thus accumulate into toxic ones. Most chemical toxicity is still measured on the basis of an exposed adult male. Babies and children being smaller and using much more water, food and air for their bodyweight, are therefore more at risk of receiving a poisonous dose than are adults. Chemicals and minerals are valuable and extremely useful. They do great good, save many lives and much money. No-one is suggesting they should all be banned. But their value may be for nothing if the current uncontrolled, unmonitored, unregulated and unconscionable mass release and planetary saturation continues. Chemical Extinction Two billion years ago, excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the extermination of all life. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. This event was known as the ‘oxygen holocaust’, and is probably the nearest life on Earth has ever come to complete disaster before the present (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that it is possible for living creatures to pollute themselves into oblivion, if they don’t take care to avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment. It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder. While it is unlikely that human chemical emissions alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilisation, it is likely they will emerge as a serious contributing factor during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown. Credible ways in which man-made chemicals might imperil the human future include: Undermining the immune systems, physical and mental health of the population through growing exposure to toxins Reducing the intelligence of current and future generations through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, rendering humanity less able to solve its problems and adapt to major changes; and by increasing the level of violent crime and conflict in society, which is closely linked to lower IQ. Bringing down the economy through the massive healthcare costs of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure. By poisoning the ecosystem services—clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—on which humanity depends for its own survival and thereby contributing to potential global ecosystem breakdown By augmenting the global arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and hence the risk of their use by nations or uncontrollable fanatics.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Growth causes <u>chemical emissions</u> which cause extinction</h4><p><strong>Cribb, 17</strong>—principal of JCA, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, former Director, National Awareness, CSIRO (Julian, “The Poisoner,” Surviving the 21st Century Chapter 6, dml)</p><p>There are two essential points about <u><mark>the</mark> Earthwide <mark>chemical flood</u></mark>. First it <u>is <strong>quite new</u></strong>. <u>It</u> began with the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, but expanded dramatically in the wake of the two world wars—where chemicals were extensively used in munitions—and <u><mark>has exploded</mark> in deadly earnest in the past 50 years, attaining a <strong>new crescendo</strong> in the early twenty-first century</u>. It is something our ancestors never faced—and to which <u><mark>we</u></mark>, in consequence, <u><strong><mark>lack</mark> any <mark>protective adaptations</strong></mark> which might otherwise have evolved due to constant exposure to poisons</u>. Second, <u><mark>the toxic flood is</u></mark>, for the most part, <u><strong>preventable</strong>. It is not compulsory—but is <mark>a</mark>n <strong>unwanted <mark>by-product</strong> of <strong>economic growth</u></strong></mark>. Though driven by powerful industries and interests, it still lies within the powers and rights of citizens, consumers and their governments to demand it be curtailed or ended and to encourage industry to safer, healthier products and production systems. The issue is whether, or not, a wise humanity would choose to continue poisoning our children, ourselves and our world. Regulatory Failure Despite the fact that around 2000 new chemicals are released onto world markets annually, most have not received proper health, safety or environmental screening—especially in terms of their impact on babies and small children. <u><mark>Regulation has</u></mark> so far <u><strong><mark>failed</strong> to</mark> make <strong>any serious <mark>curtail</mark>ment</strong> of <mark>this</mark> flood: only 21 out of 144,000 known chemicals have been banned internationally, and this has not eliminated their use</u>. At such a rate of progress <u>it will take us <strong>more than 50,000 years</strong> to <strong>identify</strong> and <strong>prohibit</strong> or <strong>restrict</strong> all the chemicals which do us harm. Even then, <mark>bans</mark> will only apply in a handful of well-regulated countries, and <strong><mark>will not protect the Earth system</strong></mark> nor <strong>humanity at large</u></strong>. Clearly, national regulation holds few answers to what is now an out-of-control global problem. Furthermore, <u><mark>the</mark> chemical <mark>industry is <strong>relocating</strong></mark> from the developed world</u> (where it is quite well regulated and observes its own ethical standards) <u>and into developing countries</u>, mainly in Asia, <u>where it is largely beyond the reach of either ethics or the law</u>. However, <u>its toxic <mark>emissions return to citizens</mark> in well-regulated countries <mark>via <strong>wind</strong>, <strong>water</strong>, <strong>food</strong>, <strong>wildlife</strong></mark>, <strong>consumer goods</strong>, <strong>industrial <mark>products</strong> and <strong>people</strong></mark>.</u> The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter how good your country’s regulations are: you and your family are still exposed to a growing global flood of toxins from which even a careful diet and sensible consumer choices cannot fully protect you. The wake-up call to the world about the risks of chemical contamination was issued by American biologist Rachel Carson when she published Silent Spring in 1962, in which she warned specifically about the impact of certain persistent pesticides used in agriculture. Since her book came out, the volume of pesticide use worldwide has increased 30-fold, to around four million tonnes a year in the mid-2010s. Since the modern chemical age began there has been a string of high-profile chemical disasters: Minamata, the Love Canal, Seveso, Bhopal, Flixborough, Oppau, Toulouse, Hinkley, Texas City, Jilin, Tianjin. Most of these display a familiar pattern of unproductive confrontation between angry citizens, industry and regulators, involving drawn-out legal battles that deliver justice to nobody. By their spectacular and local nature, such events serve to distract from the far larger, more insidious and ubiquitous, universal toxic flood. Chemists and chemical makers often claim that their products are ‘safe’ because individual exposure (e.g. in a given product, like a serve of food) is too low to result in a toxic dose, a theory first put forward by the mediaeval scholar Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. This ‘dose related’ argument is disingenuous, if not dishonest—as modern chemists well know—for the following reasons: Most chemicals target a receptor or receptors on certain of your body cells, to cause harm. There may be not one, but hundreds or even thousands of different chemicals all targeting the same receptor, so a particular substance may contribute an unknowable fraction to an overall toxic dose. That does not make it ‘safe’. Chemicals not known to be poisonous in small doses on their own can combine with other substances in water, air, food or your body to create a toxin. No manufacturer can truthfully assert this will not happen to their products. Chemical toxicity is a function of both dose and the length of time you are exposed to it. In the case of persistent chemicals and heavy metals, this exposure may occur over days, months, years, even a lifetime in some cases. Tiny doses may thus accumulate into toxic ones. Most chemical toxicity is still measured on the basis of an exposed adult male. Babies and children being smaller and using much more water, food and air for their bodyweight, are therefore more at risk of receiving a poisonous dose than are adults. Chemicals and minerals are valuable and extremely useful. They do great good, save many lives and much money. No-one is suggesting they should all be banned. But their value may be for nothing if the current uncontrolled, unmonitored, unregulated and unconscionable mass release and planetary saturation continues. Chemical Extinction Two billion years ago, excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the extermination of all life. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. This event was known as <u>the ‘oxygen holocaust’</u>, and <u>is</u> probably <u>the nearest life on Earth has ever come to <strong>complete disaster</strong> before the present</u> (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that <u><mark>it is possible for</mark> living <mark>creatures to <strong>pollute themselves into oblivion</strong></mark>, if they don’t</u> take care to <u>avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment</u>. It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder. While it is unlikely that <u>human chemical emissions</u> alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilisation, it is likely they <u>will emerge as a serious contributing factor</u> during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown. Credible ways in which <u>man-made <mark>chemicals might <strong>imperil the human future</u></strong></mark> include: <u><strong><mark>Undermining</mark> the <mark>immune systems</strong></mark>, physical and mental health of the population</u> through growing exposure to toxins <u><strong><mark>Reducing</mark> the <mark>intelligence</strong></mark> of current and future generations</u> through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, <u><mark>rendering humanity <strong>less able</strong> to <strong>solve its problems</strong></mark> and <strong>adapt to major changes</strong>; and by increasing the level of <strong>violent crime</strong> and <strong>conflict</strong> in society</u>, which is closely linked to lower IQ. <u><strong>Bringing down the economy</strong> through</u> the <u><strong>massive healthcare costs</u></strong> of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure. By <u><strong><mark>poisoning</mark> the <mark>ecosystem services</u></strong></mark>—clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—<u><mark>on which humanity <strong>depends</mark> for its own survival</strong> and thereby contributing to potential <strong>global ecosystem breakdown</strong> </u>By <u><mark>augmenting the</mark> <strong>global <mark>arsenal of w</mark>eapons of <mark>m</mark>ass <mark>d</mark>estruction</strong> <mark>and</mark> hence <mark>the <strong>risk of their use</strong></mark> by <strong>nations</strong> or <strong>uncontrollable fanatics</u></strong>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Gunnarsson, et al, 16—Örebro University (Lena, with Angela Martinez Dy, Loughborough University London, and Michiel van Ingen, University of Westminster, “Critical Realism, Gender and Feminism: Exchanges, Challenges, Synergies,” Journal of Critical Realism, 15:5, 433-439, dml) fulltext: It should be noted, however, that not all of the contributors to this special issue are in fact committed to the adoption of a critical realist philosophical framework in this way. Gillman, Smirthwaite and Swahnberg, and Griffiths take something of an outsider’s or newcomer’s perspective with regard to critical realist philosophy. While these authors relate to critical realism as a framework of interest, none wholeheartedly subscribe to it. As editors of this special issue we were very pleased to receive such contributions, as respectful engagements and interested conversations between critical realists and proponents of perspectives that are more commonly adopted by feminist theorists and gender scholars have unfortunately continued to be few and far between. Sue Clegg, Dimitri Mader and Michiel van Ingen, however, clearly write much more from within the parameters of critical realist philosophy, using its meta-theoretical framework as a means of making interventions in important feminist debates. Although Clegg, in her piece on intersectionality, does engage in some (critical) conversation with popular poststructuralist versions of intersectional theorizing, for instance, the main purpose of her article is to use critical realism as a philosophical underlabourer in order to think through various issues currently arising in discussions about intersectional theory, particularly the relationship between structure and agency. Mader’s contribution also centres on the structure/agency problematic and, like Clegg, draws especially on Margaret Archer’s work. However, whereas Clegg explicitly intervenes in intersectionality theory, whose proponents foreground the multiplicity of different forms of positioning and are often suspicious of an exclusive focus on gender, Mader’s contribution implicitly challenges the ‘intersectional imperative’ (Wiegman 1999, 376) by focusing on the gendered power structure in abstraction from other power relations. There is therefore a crucial (if not explicit) philosophical link between Clegg’s and Mader’s contributions, insofar as the former, while being mainly concerned with intersectionality theory, also argues in favour of engaging in exactly the kind of non-intersectional, ‘separatist’ (Gunnarsson 2015, 10) theoretical projects that Mader’s article exemplifies with its in-depth focus on gendered dominance. Such feminist endeavours, which seek to trace the basic causal mechanisms of patriarchy, have been increasingly difficult to carry out in the contemporary theoretical climate, and this is in significant part due to both the aforementioned intersectional imperative and the more general poststructuralist taboo on structural forms of theorizing. Importantly, however, it is not intersectional forms of theorizing as such that are considered problematic by critical realist authors such as Clegg and Mader. The basic intersectional claim that social situations, identities and practices are conditioned by a range of intersecting power relations is arguably indisputable. Indeed, it is telling that authors and activists who persist in ignoring that this is the case are generally those who are subordinated only in terms of one, or no, social axis of power. However, while analyses of how different power relations and categorizations complexly intersect are pivotal, they do not allow us to do the equally important work of theorizing, in an in-depth and abstracted manner, the basic causal mechanisms that are exercised by the social/cultural structures that are ‘doing’ the intersecting at a concrete level (cf. Walby, Armstrong and Strid 2012; Martinez Dy, Martin and Marlow 2014; Gunnarsson 2015). As Clegg shows, however, the stratified ontology of critical realism provides helpful forms of support for theorists who wish to carry out analyses at different levels of abstraction. That is to say, it facilitates intersectional analysis where it is needed in order to understand the multi-layered fabric of social life, while not closing the door to ‘nonintersectional’ analyses that focus on how one specific categorical and structural dimension of this social life causally affects a situation of interest. What sets Mader’s contribution to theorizing gender-based domination apart from secondwave, single-issue feminist theory, however, is its engagement with contemporary debates, reflected in the explicit incorporation of the implications of his work for intersectional analyses. Intersectionality thus continues to be a topic of significance for the dev elopment of critical realist feminism. In her review of Vivian May’s book Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries (2015), for instance, Angela Martinez Dy contextualizes May’s discussion of the intersectional turn away from structural theory in the history of the philosophy of science and the feminist turn towards poststructuralism. She then points to various possibilities for a realist development of intersectional theory that affirms its key role in social analysis. For example, whereas May sees the critical realist imperative to retain the validity of categories like ‘woman’ (Gunnarsson 2011) as possibly promoting a problematic gender-first logic, Martinez Dy argues that a critical realist approach, informed by the body of knowledge on intersectionality reviewed in detail in May’s book, can be used to develop the meanings of the categories themselves to allow for much greater complexity and nuance. In her review of Susan Hekman’s book The Feminine Subject (2014), Alison Assiter similarly addresses what she sees as the problematic tendency of certain feminist and gender studies approaches to emphasize differences among women over and against those features that they have in common. Whereas poststructuralist scholars have sought to retain ‘women’ as a politically necessary category by means of ‘strategic’ essentialism (Spivak 1987) and the like, Assiter does not shy away from talking about a real ‘universal essence to women’, in the simple sense of ‘characteristics in virtue of which women are described as women’ (p. 549). While Assiter does not specify the precise role of biological as opposed to social/ cultural forms of determination in this respect, Martinez Dy points out that the stratified, emergentist critical realist view can account for the significance of biological factors, while avoiding determinism and reductionism. Her argument thereby engages in an implicit dialogue with Griffith’s contribution, which favours the adoption of a sceptical approach towards the work of critical realist authors (especially New 2005) who have sought to maintain clear distinctions between sex and gender as well as between the (two) sexes, as such distinctions are at odds with prominent queer perspectives that reject the postulation of stable foundations for gendered identities. As Griffith’s article illustrates, queer theorists tend to see the existence of both intersex and trans persons as evidence of the indeterminacy of biological sex. Critical realists, instead, have sought to retain the notion of a structuring biological foundation, interpreting the diversity of gender expressions not as something that undermines structuredness but as something that demonstrates that (relative) structuredness can co-exist with (relative) variety and irregularity (Hull 2006; Gunnarsson 2013, 2014). In conclusion, feminist theory has long acknowledged the importance of situated knowledges (or, in critical realist terms, epistemic relativism), and has called for the coming together of various different vantage points so that reality may be better understood. We hope that this special issue puts such ideas into practice, and that it illustrates how multiple philosophical perspectives, when placed into conversation with each other, can help us to achieve a synergetic end that is greater than the sum of its parts. Although there are some empirical aspects to the pieces that have been included, the contributions in this volume primarily have a theoretical thrust. This is intentional. One final aim of this special issue is for it to engage in a kind of theoretical ground-clearing that reconciles tensions, points out commonalities, and signposts promising paths, in an attempt to take us just a few steps further through the forest of conflicting feminist perspectives, both extant and emerging. We hope that the pieces that are included here encourage the use of critical realist philosophy, in dialogue with feminist and gender theory, so that new and stimulating forms of theoretical and empirical research may take place.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Gender isn’t the root cause—if it is, it proves the alt can’t resolve it alone </h4><p><strong>Gunnarsson, et al, 16</strong>—Örebro University (Lena, with Angela Martinez Dy, Loughborough University London, and Michiel van Ingen, University of Westminster, “Critical Realism, Gender and Feminism: Exchanges, Challenges, Synergies,” Journal of Critical Realism, 15:5, 433-439, dml)</p><p>It should be noted, however, that not all of the contributors to this special issue are in fact committed to the adoption of a critical realist philosophical framework in this way. Gillman, Smirthwaite and Swahnberg, and Griffiths take something of an outsider’s or newcomer’s perspective with regard to critical realist philosophy. While these authors relate to critical realism as a framework of interest, none wholeheartedly subscribe to it. As editors of this special issue we were very pleased to receive such contributions, as respectful engagements and interested conversations between critical realists and proponents of perspectives that are more commonly adopted by feminist theorists and gender scholars have unfortunately continued to be few and far between. Sue Clegg, Dimitri Mader and Michiel van Ingen, however, clearly write much more from within the parameters of critical realist philosophy, using its meta-theoretical framework as a means of making interventions in important feminist debates. Although Clegg, in her piece on intersectionality, does engage in some (critical) conversation with popular poststructuralist versions of intersectional theorizing, for instance, the main purpose of her article is to use critical realism as a philosophical underlabourer in order to think through various issues currently arising in discussions about intersectional theory, particularly the relationship between structure and agency. Mader’s contribution also centres on the structure/agency problematic and, like Clegg, draws especially on Margaret Archer’s work. However, whereas Clegg explicitly intervenes in <u>intersectionality</u> theory, whose <u><mark>proponents</mark> <strong>foreground the multiplicity</strong> of different forms of positioning and <mark>are</mark> often <strong><mark>suspicious of an exclusive focus</strong> on</u></mark> gender, Mader’s contribution implicitly challenges the ‘intersectional imperative’ (Wiegman 1999, 376) by focusing on <u>the <strong><mark>gendered power structure in abstraction from other power relations</u></strong></mark>. There is therefore a crucial (if not explicit) philosophical link between Clegg’s and Mader’s contributions, insofar as the former, while being mainly concerned with intersectionality theory, also argues in favour of engaging in exactly the kind of non-intersectional, ‘separatist’ (Gunnarsson 2015, 10) theoretical projects that Mader’s article exemplifies with its in-depth focus on gendered dominance. <u>Such <mark>feminist endeavours</mark>, which seek to trace the <strong>basic causal mechanisms of patriarchy</strong>, <mark>have been <strong>increasingly difficult to carry out</strong></mark> in the contemporary theoretical climate</u>, and this is in significant part due to both the aforementioned intersectional imperative and the more general poststructuralist taboo on structural forms of theorizing. Importantly, however, it is not intersectional forms of theorizing as such that are considered problematic by critical realist authors such as Clegg and Mader. <u>The basic</u> intersectional <u>claim that social situations</u>, identities and practices <u>are <strong>conditioned by a range of intersecting power relations</strong> is arguably <strong>indisputable</u></strong>. Indeed, it is telling that authors and activists who persist in ignoring that this is the case are generally those who are subordinated only in terms of one, or no, social axis of power. However, <u>while <mark>analyses</mark> of</u> how different <u>power relations and categorizations</u> complexly intersect <u>are pivotal, they <strong><mark>do not allow us</strong> to do the <strong>equally important work</strong> of theorizing, in an <strong>in-depth</strong> and <strong>abstracted manner</strong>, the <strong>basic causal mechanisms</strong></mark> that are exercised by the</u> social/cultural <u>structures that are ‘<strong>doing</strong>’ the intersecting <mark>at a <strong>concrete level</u></strong></mark> (cf. Walby, Armstrong and Strid 2012; Martinez Dy, Martin and Marlow 2014; Gunnarsson 2015). As Clegg shows, however, the stratified ontology of critical realism provides helpful forms of support for theorists who wish to carry out analyses at different levels of abstraction. That is to say, it facilitates intersectional analysis where it is needed in order to understand the multi-layered fabric of social life, while not closing the door to ‘nonintersectional’ analyses that focus on how one specific categorical and structural dimension of this social life causally affects a situation of interest. What sets Mader’s contribution to theorizing gender-based domination apart from secondwave, single-issue feminist theory, however, is its engagement with contemporary debates, reflected in the explicit incorporation of the implications of his work for intersectional analyses. Intersectionality thus continues to be a topic of significance for the dev</p><p>elopment of critical realist feminism. In her review of Vivian May’s book Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries (2015), for instance, Angela Martinez Dy contextualizes May’s discussion of the intersectional turn away from structural theory in the history of the philosophy of science and the feminist turn towards poststructuralism. She then points to various possibilities for a realist development of intersectional theory that affirms its key role in social analysis. For example, whereas May sees the critical realist imperative to retain the validity of categories like ‘woman’ (Gunnarsson 2011) as possibly promoting a problematic gender-first logic, Martinez Dy argues that a critical realist approach, informed by the body of knowledge on intersectionality reviewed in detail in May’s book, can be used to develop the meanings of the categories themselves to allow for much greater complexity and nuance. In her review of Susan Hekman’s book The Feminine Subject (2014), Alison Assiter similarly addresses what she sees as the problematic tendency of certain feminist and gender studies approaches to emphasize differences among women over and against those features that they have in common. Whereas poststructuralist scholars have sought to retain ‘women’ as a politically necessary category by means of ‘strategic’ essentialism (Spivak 1987) and the like, Assiter does not shy away from talking about a real ‘universal essence to women’, in the simple sense of ‘characteristics in virtue of which women are described as women’ (p. 549). While Assiter does not specify the precise role of biological as opposed to social/ cultural forms of determination in this respect, Martinez Dy points out that the stratified, emergentist critical realist view can account for the significance of biological factors, while avoiding determinism and reductionism. Her argument thereby engages in an implicit dialogue with Griffith’s contribution, which favours the adoption of a sceptical approach towards the work of critical realist authors (especially New 2005) who have sought to maintain clear distinctions between sex and gender as well as between the (two) sexes, as such distinctions are at odds with prominent queer perspectives that reject the postulation of stable foundations for gendered identities. As Griffith’s article illustrates, queer theorists tend to see the existence of both intersex and trans persons as evidence of the indeterminacy of biological sex. Critical realists, instead, have sought to retain the notion of a structuring biological foundation, interpreting the diversity of gender expressions not as something that undermines structuredness but as something that demonstrates that (relative) structuredness can co-exist with (relative) variety and irregularity (Hull 2006; Gunnarsson 2013, 2014). In conclusion, <u>feminist theory has long acknowledged the importance of</u> situated knowledges (or, in critical realist terms, <u><strong>epistemic relativism</u></strong>), <u>and has called for the <strong>coming together of various different vantage points</strong> so that reality may be <strong>better understood</u></strong>. We hope that this special issue puts such ideas into practice, and that it illustrates how <u><mark>multiple</mark> philosophical <mark>perspectives</mark>, when <strong>placed into conversation</strong> with each other, can <mark>help us to achieve a <strong>synergetic end</strong></mark> that is <strong><mark>greater than the sum of its parts</u></strong></mark>. Although there are some empirical aspects to the pieces that have been included, the contributions in this volume primarily have a theoretical thrust. This is intentional. One final aim of this special issue is for it to engage in a kind of <u><strong><mark>theoretical ground-clearing</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>reconciles tensions</strong></mark>, <strong>points out commonalities</strong>, and <strong>signposts promising paths</strong>, in an attempt <mark>to <strong>take us just a few steps further</strong></mark> through the forest of <strong>conflicting feminist perspectives</u></strong>, both extant and emerging. We hope that the pieces that are included here encourage the use of critical realist philosophy, in dialogue with feminist and gender theory, so that new and stimulating forms of theoretical and empirical research may take place.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Polzer and Power 16 (Jessica and Elaine, 2016, “Neoliberal Governance and Health,” McGill-Queen’s University Press) AG fulltext: Distinct from a conception of neoliberalism as political philosophy or economic theory, neoliberalism from the point of view of governmentality is understood as a particular mentality or rationality of rule – that is, as a way of rationalizing the means and ends of government. Although neoliberalism is not meant to be an ideal or universal type (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006),5 there are some general features of liberal political rationalities and their specifically neoliberal form that are helpful to elucidate before we elaborate on the neoliberal governance of health specifically. From the perspective of governmentality, liberalism is not seen as an underlying philosophy, but rather as a practice that is guided by the concern that the state always governs too much (Dean 2002, Foucault 1994a, Osborne 1996, Rose 1996). As a perpetually skeptical political rationality, liberalism builds criticism of government by the state into its very logic and reflexively addresses the question of why the state must govern at all in order to rationalize its own exercise and existence (Foucault 1994a). In this respect, liberalism justifies government not in terms of the state but in terms of society “which is in a complex relation of exteriority and interiority with respect to the state” (Foucault 1994a, 75).6 It is within the general framework of liberal political rationality that life (and health) became a central concern for politics, both at the level of the individual body and the species body (Foucault 1978; Lemke 2011). This biopolitics, according to Foucault (1994a), refers to “the endeavor, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race . . .” (73, emphasis added). As a specific configuration of power, biopower fosters life or disallows it to the point of death (makes live or lets die) in contrast to sovereign power, which focuses on life only insofar as it takes life or lets live (Foucault 1978; Lemke 2011). Comprised of both disciplinary technologies and technologies of security, biopower aims to increase the individual body’s capacity for economic productivity and political utility (e.g., through techniques of surveillance and examination) and regulate the population and its biological characteristics in order to protect it from internal threats (e.g., through monitoring of disease, birth rates) (Foucault 1978). While Foucault describes these as “two basic forms” of biopower, they are better understood as “two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations” (Foucault 1978, 139). As with discourses on sexuality (Foucault 1978), discourses on health, as expressions of biopower, proliferate in relation to concerns at both individual (micro) and population (macro) levels, thus constituting a politically useful hinge between the individual body and the body politic with a number of intermediary targets (e.g., family, community, groups designated as “at risk” for poor health outcomes). Neoliberal rationalities of rule are characterized by their active withdrawal from state- directed programs, while the market is afforded a key role as the economy is re-coded from being one area of human existence (the management of the household) to the model for judging all human action and behaviour. This application of economic styles of thinking to the “social domain” is evident in relation to both individual and collective bodies, as Thomas Lemke (2001) describes: “Neoliberalism is a political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-care.’ In this way, we can decipher the neo-liberal harmony in which not only the individual body, but also collective bodies and institutions (public administrations, universities, etc.), corporations and states have to be ‘lean,’ ‘fit,’ ‘flexible’ and ‘autonomous’: it is a technique of power” (203). Thus, the preoccupation of liberalism generally, and neoliberalism specifically, with the question of excess governance should not be interpreted as an argument for the need to govern less, but rather refers to the concern that it is the state that is doing too much of the governing (Dean 2002). In this sense, withdrawal of support for state-directed programs is indicative of a “prolongation of government” that involves power relations between the state and a complex assemblage of agencies and authorities in “civil society,” including non-profit organizations (Rose 1999). In the Canadian context, Suzan Ilcan (2009) describes neoliberalism as a privatization of responsibility that governs through “the entrepreneurship of autonomous actors, such as individuals, families, firms, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations” (213), mobilizing new citizen-subjects through initiatives that range from social welfare reform to public-private partnerships to free trade agreements. Related to this, another fundamental aspect of neoliberal rationalities of rule is that government and freedom are not viewed as opposed or mutually exclusive. Rather, a principal strategy of neoliberal practices of governance is to govern through freedom, where freedom is conceptualized as “choice, autonomy, self-responsibility, and the obligation to maximize one’s life as a kind of enterprise” (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006, 91). As we discuss further in the conclusion to this Introduction, this governance through freedom poses difficulties for critical analytic approaches that view freedom and social regulation as oppositional, because, when the “ethic of freedom [is] itself part of a particular formula for governing free societies” (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006, 91), freedom can no longer be used as the ground and ends of one’s critique. The neoliberal governance of health involves practices of both responsibilization and marginalization. On the one hand, neoliberal policies and practices privilege the production and circulation of discourse that frames health as an individual responsibility and moral obligation, thus creating new expectations in relation to the maintenance of one’s own health, the health of one’s family, and the health of the population. At the same time, neoliberal practices of governance exacerbate social and economic inequities, and differentially allocate risks for disease and opportunities for health and well-being along existing and new lines of privilege and oppression. By positioning the market as the optimal way to distribute resources that affect health and well-being, and by undermining and fragmenting the social safety net, neoliberal policies and practices perpetuate health inequities, rendering even more vulnerable the bodies and lives of those who are unable to meet their health needs in the market. In focusing on the power dynamics of both responsibilization and marginalization that are integral to neoliberal modes of governance, we move beyond the general tenets of neoliberalism – which emphasize the state’s role in supporting processes of privatization, deregulation, and cuts to social spending – to focus specifically on how neoliberal thought is “concretized into specific practices” (King 2010, 91), and in specific contexts, to shape discourses on health, as well as opportunities for health. While the need for “less state” is often used as a mantra to promote the interests of business, general tenets and simplistic definitions of neoliberalism as laissez-faire are insufficient for critical sociological investigation. Neoliberal modes of governance involve more than a retreat from state intervention, as new relationships are drawn between the state, the market, individuals, and their families. The neoliberal state does not simply roll back welfare state programs but also invests in health-related technologies, programs, and health care and public health arrangements that aim to produce new kinds of citizens (King 2010).<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Neoliberalism is not an economic system, but a biopolitical <u>rationality of rule</u> that generates a paradigm of <u>health as individual</u>.</h4><p><strong>Polzer and Power 16</strong> (Jessica and Elaine, 2016, “Neoliberal Governance and Health,” McGill-Queen’s University Press) AG</p><p><u><strong><mark>Distinct from a</mark> conception of neoliberalism as</u></strong> political philosophy or <u><strong><mark>economic theory</strong>, neoliberalism</mark> from the point of view of governmentality is understood as <mark>a <strong>particular mentality</mark> or rationality of rule</u></strong> – that is, as a way of rationalizing the means and ends of government. Although neoliberalism is not meant to be an ideal or universal type (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006),5 there are some general features of liberal political rationalities and their specifically neoliberal form that are helpful to elucidate before we elaborate on the neoliberal governance of health specifically. From the perspective of governmentality, <u>liberalism is</u> not seen as an underlying philosophy, but rather as <u>a practice that is guided by the concern that the state always governs too much</u> (Dean 2002, Foucault 1994a, Osborne 1996, Rose 1996). As a perpetually skeptical political rationality, liberalism builds criticism of government by the state into its very logic and reflexively addresses the question of why the state must govern at all in order to rationalize its own exercise and existence (Foucault 1994a). In this respect, liberalism justifies government not in terms of the state but in terms of society “which is in a complex relation of exteriority and interiority with respect to the state” (Foucault 1994a, 75).6 <u>It is within the general framework of liberal political rationality that life </u>(and health) <u>became a central concern for politics</u>, both at the level of the individual body and the species body (Foucault 1978; Lemke 2011). <u>This biopolitics</u>, according to Foucault (1994a), <u>refers to “the endeavor</u>, begun in the eighteenth century, <u>to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by</u> the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as <u>a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race</u> . . .” (73, emphasis added). As a specific configuration of power, <u>biopower</u> fosters life or disallows it to the point of death (<u>makes live or lets die</u>) in contrast to sovereign power, which focuses on life only insofar as it takes life or lets live (Foucault 1978; Lemke 2011). Comprised of both disciplinary technologies and technologies of security, biopower aims to increase the individual body’s capacity for economic productivity and political utility (e.g., through techniques of surveillance and examination) and regulate the population and its biological characteristics in order to protect it from internal threats (e.g., through monitoring of disease, birth rates) (Foucault 1978). While Foucault describes these as “two basic forms” of biopower, they are better understood as “two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations” (Foucault 1978, 139). As with discourses on sexuality (Foucault 1978), discourses on health, as expressions of biopower, proliferate in relation to concerns at both individual (micro) and population (macro) levels, thus constituting a politically useful hinge between the individual body and the body politic with a number of intermediary targets (e.g., family, community, groups designated as “at risk” for poor health outcomes). <u><mark>Neoliberal rationalities</mark> of rule <mark>are characterized by</mark> their <strong><mark>active withdrawal from state- directed programs</strong></mark>, while <strong><mark>the market is afforded a key role</strong> as the economy is</u></mark> re-coded from being one area of human existence (the management of the household) to <u><mark>the model for judging all human action</mark> and behaviour. </u>This application of economic styles of thinking to the “social domain” is evident in relation to both individual and collective bodies, as Thomas Lemke (2001) describes: <u>“Neoliberalism is <mark>a political rationality that tries to <strong>render the social domain economic</strong> and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’</mark> and ‘self-care.’</u> In this way, we can decipher the neo-liberal harmony in which not only the individual body, but also collective bodies and institutions (public administrations, universities, etc.), corporations and states have to be ‘lean,’ ‘fit,’ ‘flexible’ and ‘autonomous’: it is a technique of power” (203). Thus, <u>the preoccupation of</u> liberalism generally, and <u>neoliberalism</u> specifically, <u>with</u> the question of <u>excess governance should not be interpreted as an argument for the need to govern less, but rather refers to the concern that <strong>it is the state that is doing too much of the governing</u></strong> (Dean 2002). In this sense, <u>withdrawal of support for state-directed programs is indicative of a “prolongation of government” that involves power relations between the state and a complex assemblage of agencies and authorities in “civil society,” including non-profit organizations</u> (Rose 1999). In the Canadian context, Suzan Ilcan (2009) describes <u>neoliberalism as a privatization of responsibility</u> that governs through “the entrepreneurship of autonomous actors, such as individuals, families, firms, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations” (213), mobilizing new citizen-subjects through initiatives that range from social welfare reform to public-private partnerships to free trade agreements. Related to this, <u>another fundamental aspect of neoliberal rationalities of rule is that government and freedom are not viewed as opposed or mutually exclusive. Rather, a principal strategy of neoliberal practices of governance is to govern through freedom,</u> where freedom is conceptualized as “choice, autonomy, self-responsibility, and the obligation to maximize one’s life as a kind of enterprise” (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006, 91). As we discuss further in the conclusion to this Introduction, <u>this governance through freedom poses difficulties for critical analytic approaches that view freedom and social regulation as oppositional</u>, because, <u>when the “ethic of freedom [is] itself part of a particular formula for governing free societies”</u> (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006, 91), <u>freedom can no longer be used as the ground and ends of one’s critique</u>. <u><mark>The neoliberal governance of health involves</u></mark> practices of both <u><mark>responsibilization and marginalization</u></mark>. On the one hand, <u><mark>neoliberal policies</u></mark> and practices <u><mark>privilege</u></mark> the production and circulation of <u><mark>discourse that frames health as an individual responsibility</mark> and moral obligation</u>, thus creating new expectations in relation to the maintenance of one’s own health, the health of one’s family, and the health of the population. At the same time, <u>neoliberal practices of governance exacerbate social and economic inequities, and differentially allocate risks for disease</u> and opportunities for health and well-being <u>along existing and new lines of </u>privilege and<u> oppression. By positioning the market as the optimal way to distribute resources</u> that affect health and well-being, and by undermining and fragmenting the social safety net, neoliberal policies and practices perpetuate health inequities, rendering even more vulnerable the bodies and lives of those who are unable to meet their health needs in the market. In focusing on the power dynamics of both responsibilization and marginalization that are integral to neoliberal modes of governance, we move beyond the general tenets of neoliberalism – which emphasize the state’s role in supporting processes of privatization, deregulation, and cuts to social spending – to focus specifically on how <u><strong>neoliberal thought is “concretized into specific practices”</u></strong> (King 2010, 91), and in specific contexts, <u>to shape discourses on health</u>, as well as opportunities for health. <u>While the need for “less state” is often used as a mantra to promote the interests of business, general tenets and<strong> <mark>simplistic definitions of neoliberalism as laissez-faire are insufficient</strong></mark> for critical sociological investigation. <mark>Neoliberal</mark> modes of <mark>governance involve <strong>more than a retreat from state intervention</strong></mark>, as new relationships are drawn between the state, the market, individuals, and their families. The <mark>neoliberal state</mark> does not simply roll back welfare state programs but also <mark>invests in</mark> health-related technologies, programs, and <mark>health care</mark> and public health arrangements <mark>that <strong>aim to produce new kinds of citizens</strong></mark> (King 2010). </p></u><\|im_end\|>

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