project
stringclasses 765
values | commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| func
stringlengths 19
482k
| vul
int64 0
1
| CVE ID
stringlengths 13
16
| CWE ID
stringclasses 13
values | CWE Name
stringclasses 13
values | CWE Description
stringclasses 13
values | Potential Mitigation
stringclasses 11
values | __index_level_0__
int64 0
23.9k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ImageMagick | 8598a497e2d1f556a34458cf54b40ba40674734c | static MagickBooleanType IsPostscriptRendered(const char *path)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
struct stat
attributes;
if ((path == (const char *) NULL) || (*path == '\0'))
return(MagickFalse);
status=GetPathAttributes(path,&attributes);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && S_ISREG(attributes.st_mode) &&
(attributes.st_size > 0))
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,834 |
linux | 999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4 | mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, unsigned int flags)
{
int mask = NFS4_ANYONE_MODE;
if (flags & NFS4_ACL_OWNER)
mask |= NFS4_OWNER_MODE;
if (perm & ACL_READ)
mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE;
if (perm & ACL_WRITE)
mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE;
return mask;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,144 |
php-src | c4cca4c20e75359c9a13a1f9a36cb7b4e9601d29 | */
static void php_wddx_push_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **atts)
{
st_entry ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
if (!strcmp(name, EL_PACKET)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i=0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VERSION)) {
/* nothing for now */
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING)) {
ent.type = ST_STRING;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
ent.type = ST_BINARY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_CHAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_CHAR_CODE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
char tmp_buf[2];
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%c", (char)strtol(atts[i+1], NULL, 16));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER)) {
ent.type = ST_NUMBER;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VALUE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_BOOL;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1]));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
ent.type = ST_NULL;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
ZVAL_NULL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY)) {
ent.type = ST_ARRAY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT)) {
ent.type = ST_STRUCT;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
if (stack->varname) efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = estrdup(atts[i+1]);
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET)) {
int i;
ent.type = ST_RECORDSET;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], "fieldNames") && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
zval *tmp;
char *key;
char *p1, *p2, *endp;
i++;
endp = (char *)atts[i] + strlen(atts[i]);
p1 = (char *)atts[i];
while ((p2 = php_memnstr(p1, ",", sizeof(",")-1, endp)) != NULL) {
key = estrndup(p1, p2 - p1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, key, p2 - p1 + 1, tmp);
p1 = p2 + sizeof(",")-1;
efree(key);
}
if (p1 <= endp) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, p1, endp - p1 + 1, tmp);
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
int i;
st_entry ent;
ent.type = ST_FIELD;
ent.varname = NULL;
ent.data = NULL;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
st_entry *recordset;
zval **field;
if (wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&recordset) == SUCCESS &&
recordset->type == ST_RECORDSET &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(recordset->data), (char*)atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1])+1, (void**)&field) == SUCCESS) {
ent.data = *field;
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
ent.type = ST_DATETIME;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,547 |
aubio | b1559f4c9ce2b304d8d27ffdc7128b6795ca82e5 | uint_t aubio_tempo_set_tatum_signature (aubio_tempo_t *o, uint_t signature) {
if (signature < 1 || signature > 64) {
return AUBIO_FAIL;
} else {
o->tatum_signature = signature;
return AUBIO_OK;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,508 |
Chrome | 3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f | Response StorageHandler::UntrackIndexedDBForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
GetIndexedDBObserver()->TaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBObserver::UntrackOriginOnIDBThread,
base::Unretained(GetIndexedDBObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
| 1 | CVE-2018-6111 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 1,013 |
libming | 2be22fcf56a223dafe8de0e8a20fe20e8bbdb0b9 | decompileArithmeticOp(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn)
{
struct SWF_ACTIONPUSHPARAM *left, *right;
int op_l = OpCode(actions, n, maxn);
int op_r = OpCode(actions, n+1, maxn);
right=pop();
left=pop();
switch(OpCode(actions, n, maxn))
{
/*
case SWFACTION_GETMEMBER:
decompilePUSHPARAM(peek(),0);
break;
*/
case SWFACTION_INSTANCEOF:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left)," instanceof ",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left)," instanceof ",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_ADD:
case SWFACTION_ADD2:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"+",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"+",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_SUBTRACT:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"-",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"-",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_MULTIPLY:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"*",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"*",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_DIVIDE:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"/",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"/",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_MODULO:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"%",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"%",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_SHIFTLEFT:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"<<",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"<<",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),">>",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),">>",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT2:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),">>>",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),">>>",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_LOGICALAND:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"&&",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"&&",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_LOGICALOR:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"||",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"||",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_BITWISEAND:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"&",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"&",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_BITWISEOR:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"|",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"|",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_BITWISEXOR:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"^",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"^",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_EQUALS2: /* including negation */
case SWFACTION_EQUAL:
if( OpCode(actions, n+1, maxn) == SWFACTION_LOGICALNOT &&
OpCode(actions, n+2, maxn) != SWFACTION_IF)
{
op_r = OpCode(actions, n+1, maxn);
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"!=",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"!=",getString(right),0,")"));
return 1; /* due negation op */
}
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"==",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"==",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_LESS2:
if( OpCode(actions, n+1, maxn) == SWFACTION_LOGICALNOT &&
OpCode(actions, n+2, maxn) != SWFACTION_IF )
{
op_r = OpCode(actions, n+2, maxn);
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),">=",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),">=",getString(right),0,")"));
return 1; /* due negation op */
}
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"<",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"<",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_GREATER:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),">",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),">",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_LESSTHAN:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"<",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"<",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_STRINGEQ:
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"==",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"==",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
case SWFACTION_STRINGCOMPARE:
puts("STRINGCOMPARE");
break;
case SWFACTION_STRICTEQUALS:
#ifdef DECOMP_SWITCH
if (OpCode(actions, n, maxn) == SWFACTION_IF)
{
int code = actions[n+1].SWF_ACTIONIF.Actions[0].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode;
if(check_switch(code))
{
push(right); // keep left and right side separated
push(left); // because it seems we have found a switch(){} and
break; // let decompileIF() once more do all the dirty work
}
}
#endif
if( OpCode(actions, n+1, maxn) == SWFACTION_LOGICALNOT &&
OpCode(actions, n+2, maxn) != SWFACTION_IF )
{
op_r = OpCode(actions, n+2, maxn);
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"!==",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"!==",getString(right),0,")"));
return 1; /* due negation op */
} else {
if (precedence(op_l, op_r))
push(newVar3(getString(left),"===",getString(right)));
else
push(newVar_N("(",getString(left),"===",getString(right),0,")"));
break;
}
default:
printf("Unhandled Arithmetic/Logic OP %x\n",
OpCode(actions, n, maxn));
}
return 0;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,377 |
oniguruma | 3661ae526bc1cfe1b93ec31fc03c0fe72e1fe6c1 | onig_print_compiled_byte_code(FILE* f, Operation* p, Operation* start, OnigEncoding enc)
{
int i, n;
RelAddrType addr;
LengthType len;
MemNumType mem;
OnigCodePoint code;
ModeType mode;
UChar *q;
fprintf(f, "%s", op2name(p->opcode));
switch (p->opcode) {
case OP_EXACT1:
p_string(f, 1, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACT2:
p_string(f, 2, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACT3:
p_string(f, 3, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACT4:
p_string(f, 4, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACT5:
p_string(f, 5, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACTN:
len = p->exact_n.n;
p_string(f, len, p->exact_n.s); break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N1:
p_string(f, 2, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N2:
p_string(f, 4, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N3:
p_string(f, 3, p->exact.s); break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N:
len = p->exact_n.n;
p_len_string(f, len, 2, p->exact_n.s); break;
case OP_EXACTMB3N:
len = p->exact_n.n;
p_len_string(f, len, 3, p->exact_n.s); break;
case OP_EXACTMBN:
{
int mb_len;
mb_len = p->exact_len_n.len;
len = p->exact_len_n.n;
q = p->exact_len_n.s;
fprintf(f, ":%d:%d:", mb_len, len);
n = len * mb_len;
while (n-- > 0) { fputc(*q++, f); }
}
break;
case OP_EXACT1_IC:
len = enclen(enc, p->exact.s);
p_string(f, len, p->exact.s);
break;
case OP_EXACTN_IC:
len = p->exact_n.n;
p_len_string(f, len, 1, p->exact_n.s);
break;
case OP_CCLASS:
case OP_CCLASS_NOT:
n = bitset_on_num(p->cclass.bs);
fprintf(f, ":%d", n);
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MB:
case OP_CCLASS_MB_NOT:
{
OnigCodePoint ncode;
OnigCodePoint* codes;
codes = (OnigCodePoint* )p->cclass_mb.mb;
GET_CODE_POINT(ncode, codes);
codes++;
GET_CODE_POINT(code, codes);
fprintf(f, ":%u:%u", code, ncode);
}
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MIX:
case OP_CCLASS_MIX_NOT:
{
OnigCodePoint ncode;
OnigCodePoint* codes;
codes = (OnigCodePoint* )p->cclass_mix.mb;
n = bitset_on_num(p->cclass_mix.bs);
GET_CODE_POINT(ncode, codes);
codes++;
GET_CODE_POINT(code, codes);
fprintf(f, ":%d:%u:%u", n, code, ncode);
}
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR_PEEK_NEXT:
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR_PEEK_NEXT:
p_string(f, 1, &(p->anychar_star_peek_next.c));
break;
case OP_WORD_BOUNDARY:
case OP_NO_WORD_BOUNDARY:
case OP_WORD_BEGIN:
case OP_WORD_END:
mode = p->word_boundary.mode;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mode);
break;
case OP_BACKREF_N:
case OP_BACKREF_N_IC:
mem = p->backref_n.n1;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mem);
break;
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI_IC:
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI:
case OP_BACKREF_CHECK:
fputs(" ", f);
n = p->backref_general.num;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
mem = (n == 1) ? p->backref_general.n1 : p->backref_general.ns[i];
if (i > 0) fputs(", ", f);
fprintf(f, "%d", mem);
}
break;
case OP_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL:
case OP_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL_IC:
case OP_BACKREF_CHECK_WITH_LEVEL:
{
LengthType level;
level = p->backref_general.nest_level;
fprintf(f, ":%d", level);
fputs(" ", f);
n = p->backref_general.num;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
mem = (n == 1) ? p->backref_general.n1 : p->backref_general.ns[i];
if (i > 0) fputs(", ", f);
fprintf(f, "%d", mem);
}
}
break;
case OP_MEMORY_START:
case OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH:
mem = p->memory_start.num;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mem);
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH:
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC:
case OP_MEMORY_END:
case OP_MEMORY_END_REC:
mem = p->memory_end.num;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mem);
break;
case OP_JUMP:
addr = p->jump.addr;
fputc(':', f);
p_rel_addr(f, addr, p, start);
break;
case OP_PUSH:
case OP_PUSH_SUPER:
addr = p->push.addr;
fputc(':', f);
p_rel_addr(f, addr, p, start);
break;
#ifdef USE_OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT
case OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT1:
addr = p->push_or_jump_exact1.addr;
fputc(':', f);
p_rel_addr(f, addr, p, start);
p_string(f, 1, &(p->push_or_jump_exact1.c));
break;
#endif
case OP_PUSH_IF_PEEK_NEXT:
addr = p->push_if_peek_next.addr;
fputc(':', f);
p_rel_addr(f, addr, p, start);
p_string(f, 1, &(p->push_if_peek_next.c));
break;
case OP_REPEAT:
case OP_REPEAT_NG:
mem = p->repeat.id;
addr = p->repeat.addr;
fprintf(f, ":%d:", mem);
p_rel_addr(f, addr, p, start);
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_SG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG:
mem = p->repeat.id;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mem);
break;
case OP_EMPTY_CHECK_START:
mem = p->empty_check_start.mem;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mem);
break;
case OP_EMPTY_CHECK_END:
case OP_EMPTY_CHECK_END_MEMST:
case OP_EMPTY_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH:
mem = p->empty_check_end.mem;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mem);
break;
case OP_PREC_READ_NOT_START:
addr = p->prec_read_not_start.addr;
fputc(':', f);
p_rel_addr(f, addr, p, start);
break;
case OP_LOOK_BEHIND:
len = p->look_behind.len;
fprintf(f, ":%d", len);
break;
case OP_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT_START:
addr = p->look_behind_not_start.addr;
len = p->look_behind_not_start.len;
fprintf(f, ":%d:", len);
p_rel_addr(f, addr, p, start);
break;
case OP_CALL:
addr = p->call.addr;
fprintf(f, ":{/%d}", addr);
break;
case OP_PUSH_SAVE_VAL:
{
SaveType type;
type = p->push_save_val.type;
mem = p->push_save_val.id;
fprintf(f, ":%d:%d", type, mem);
}
break;
case OP_UPDATE_VAR:
{
UpdateVarType type;
type = p->update_var.type;
mem = p->update_var.id;
fprintf(f, ":%d:%d", type, mem);
}
break;
#ifdef USE_CALLOUT
case OP_CALLOUT_CONTENTS:
mem = p->callout_contents.num;
fprintf(f, ":%d", mem);
break;
case OP_CALLOUT_NAME:
{
int id;
id = p->callout_name.id;
mem = p->callout_name.num;
fprintf(f, ":%d:%d", id, mem);
}
break;
#endif
case OP_FINISH:
case OP_END:
case OP_ANYCHAR:
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML:
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR:
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR:
case OP_WORD:
case OP_WORD_ASCII:
case OP_NO_WORD:
case OP_NO_WORD_ASCII:
case OP_EXTENDED_GRAPHEME_CLUSTER_BOUNDARY:
case OP_NO_EXTENDED_GRAPHEME_CLUSTER_BOUNDARY:
case OP_BEGIN_BUF:
case OP_END_BUF:
case OP_BEGIN_LINE:
case OP_END_LINE:
case OP_SEMI_END_BUF:
case OP_BEGIN_POSITION:
case OP_BACKREF1:
case OP_BACKREF2:
case OP_FAIL:
case OP_POP_OUT:
case OP_PREC_READ_START:
case OP_PREC_READ_END:
case OP_PREC_READ_NOT_END:
case OP_ATOMIC_START:
case OP_ATOMIC_END:
case OP_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT_END:
case OP_RETURN:
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "onig_print_compiled_byte_code: undefined code %d\n", p->opcode);
break;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,327 |
linux-stable | 8ba8682107ee2ca3347354e018865d8e1967c5f4 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioprio_set, int, which, int, who, int, ioprio)
{
int class = IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(ioprio);
int data = IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(ioprio);
struct task_struct *p, *g;
struct user_struct *user;
struct pid *pgrp;
kuid_t uid;
int ret;
switch (class) {
case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* fall through, rt has prio field too */
case IOPRIO_CLASS_BE:
if (data >= IOPRIO_BE_NR || data < 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE:
break;
case IOPRIO_CLASS_NONE:
if (data)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = -ESRCH;
rcu_read_lock();
switch (which) {
case IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS:
if (!who)
p = current;
else
p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
if (p)
ret = set_task_ioprio(p, ioprio);
break;
case IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP:
if (!who)
pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
else
pgrp = find_vpid(who);
do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
ret = set_task_ioprio(p, ioprio);
if (ret)
break;
} while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
break;
case IOPRIO_WHO_USER:
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), who);
if (!uid_valid(uid))
break;
if (!who)
user = current_user();
else
user = find_user(uid);
if (!user)
break;
do_each_thread(g, p) {
if (!uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) ||
!task_pid_vnr(p))
continue;
ret = set_task_ioprio(p, ioprio);
if (ret)
goto free_uid;
} while_each_thread(g, p);
free_uid:
if (who)
free_uid(user);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,049 |
wireshark | 2c13e97d656c1c0ac4d76eb9d307664aae0e0cf7 | dissect_rpcap_error (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset)
{
proto_item *ti;
gint len;
len = tvb_captured_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
if (len <= 0)
return;
col_append_fstr (pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ": %s",
tvb_format_text_wsp (tvb, offset, len));
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_error, tvb, offset, len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_error,
"Error: %s", tvb_format_text_wsp (tvb, offset, len));
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,286 |
qemu | a9c380db3b8c6af19546a68145c8d1438a09c92b | static void ssi_sd_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
SSISlaveClass *k = SSI_SLAVE_CLASS(klass);
k->init = ssi_sd_init;
k->transfer = ssi_sd_transfer;
k->cs_polarity = SSI_CS_LOW;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,286 |
tk | ebd0fc80d62eeb7b8556522256f8d035e013eb65 | setup_rubytkkit(void)
{
init_static_tcltk_packages();
{
ID const_id;
const_id = rb_intern(RUBYTK_KITPATH_CONST_NAME);
if (rb_const_defined(rb_cObject, const_id)) {
volatile VALUE pathobj;
pathobj = rb_const_get(rb_cObject, const_id);
if (rb_obj_is_kind_of(pathobj, rb_cString)) {
#ifdef HAVE_RUBY_ENCODING_H
pathobj = rb_str_export_to_enc(pathobj, rb_utf8_encoding());
#endif
set_rubytk_kitpath(RSTRING_PTR(pathobj));
}
}
}
#ifdef CREATE_RUBYTK_KIT
if (rubytk_kitpath == NULL) {
#ifdef __WIN32__
/* rbtk_win32_SetHINSTANCE("tcltklib.so"); */
{
volatile VALUE basename;
basename = rb_funcall(rb_cFile, rb_intern("basename"), 1,
rb_str_new2(rb_sourcefile()));
rbtk_win32_SetHINSTANCE(RSTRING_PTR(basename));
}
#endif
set_rubytk_kitpath(rb_sourcefile());
}
#endif
if (rubytk_kitpath == NULL) {
set_rubytk_kitpath(Tcl_GetNameOfExecutable());
}
TclSetPreInitScript(rubytkkit_preInitCmd);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,774 |
libtpms | ea62fd9679f8c6fc5e79471b33cfbd8227bfed72 | ObjectGetProperties(
TPM_HANDLE handle
)
{
return HandleToObject(handle)->attributes;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,512 |
postgres | 29725b3db67ad3f09da1a7fb6690737d2f8d6c0a | leading_pad(int zpad, int *signvalue, int *padlen, PrintfTarget *target)
{
if (*padlen > 0 && zpad)
{
if (*signvalue)
{
dopr_outch(*signvalue, target);
--(*padlen);
*signvalue = 0;
}
while (*padlen > 0)
{
dopr_outch(zpad, target);
--(*padlen);
}
}
while (*padlen > (*signvalue != 0))
{
dopr_outch(' ', target);
--(*padlen);
}
if (*signvalue)
{
dopr_outch(*signvalue, target);
if (*padlen > 0)
--(*padlen);
else if (*padlen < 0)
++(*padlen);
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,821 |
php-src | 6a7cc8ff85827fa9ac715b3a83c2d9147f33cd43?w=1 | static inline int object_common2(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, long elements)
{
zval *retval_ptr = NULL;
zval fname;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (!process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU, Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval), elements, 1)) {
/* We've got partially constructed object on our hands here. Wipe it. */
if(Z_TYPE_PP(rval) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_hash_clean(Z_OBJPROP_PP(rval));
}
ZVAL_NULL(*rval);
return 0;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(rval) != IS_OBJECT) {
return 0;
}
if (Z_OBJCE_PP(rval) != PHP_IC_ENTRY &&
zend_hash_exists(&Z_OBJCE_PP(rval)->function_table, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup"))) {
INIT_PZVAL(&fname);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&fname, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup") - 1, 0);
BG(serialize_lock)++;
call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), rval, &fname, &retval_ptr, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
BG(serialize_lock)--;
}
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
if (EG(exception)) {
return 0;
}
return finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-7411 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 3,000 |
libidn | 5e3cb9c7b5bf0ce665b9d68f5ddf095af5c9ba60 | main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct gengetopt_args_info args_info;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linelen = 0;
char *p, *r;
uint32_t *q;
unsigned cmdn = 0;
int rc;
setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
set_program_name (argv[0]);
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain (PACKAGE);
if (cmdline_parser (argc, argv, &args_info) != 0)
return EXIT_FAILURE;
if (args_info.version_given)
{
version_etc (stdout, "idn", PACKAGE_NAME, VERSION,
"Simon Josefsson", (char *) NULL);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
if (args_info.help_given)
usage (EXIT_SUCCESS);
/* Backwards compatibility: -n has always been the documented short
form for --nfkc but, before v1.10, -k was the implemented short
form. We now accept both to avoid documentation changes. */
if (args_info.hidden_nfkc_given)
args_info.nfkc_given = 1;
if (!args_info.stringprep_given &&
!args_info.punycode_encode_given && !args_info.punycode_decode_given &&
!args_info.idna_to_ascii_given && !args_info.idna_to_unicode_given &&
!args_info.nfkc_given)
args_info.idna_to_ascii_given = 1;
if ((args_info.stringprep_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.punycode_encode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.punycode_decode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.idna_to_ascii_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.idna_to_unicode_given ? 1 : 0) +
(args_info.nfkc_given ? 1 : 0) != 1)
{
error (0, 0, _("only one of -s, -e, -d, -a, -u or -n can be specified"));
usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!args_info.quiet_given
&& args_info.inputs_num == 0
&& isatty (fileno (stdin)))
fprintf (stderr, "%s %s\n" GREETING, PACKAGE, VERSION);
if (args_info.debug_given)
fprintf (stderr, _("Charset `%s'.\n"), stringprep_locale_charset ());
if (!args_info.quiet_given
&& args_info.inputs_num == 0
&& isatty (fileno (stdin)))
fprintf (stderr, _("Type each input string on a line by itself, "
"terminated by a newline character.\n"));
do
{
if (cmdn < args_info.inputs_num)
line = strdup (args_info.inputs[cmdn++]);
else if (getline (&line, &linelen, stdin) == -1)
{
if (feof (stdin))
break;
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("input error"));
}
if (strlen (line) > 0)
if (line[strlen (line) - 1] == '\n')
line[strlen (line) - 1] = '\0';
if (args_info.stringprep_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
rc = stringprep_profile (p, &r,
args_info.profile_given ?
args_info.profile_arg : "Nameprep", 0);
free (p);
if (rc != STRINGPREP_OK)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("stringprep_profile: %s"),
stringprep_strerror (rc));
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (r, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (r);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.punycode_encode_given)
{
char encbuf[BUFSIZ];
size_t len, len2;
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, &len);
free (p);
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
len2 = BUFSIZ - 1;
rc = punycode_encode (len, q, NULL, &len2, encbuf);
free (q);
if (rc != PUNYCODE_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("punycode_encode: %s"),
punycode_strerror (rc));
encbuf[len2] = '\0';
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (encbuf);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.punycode_decode_given)
{
size_t len;
len = BUFSIZ;
q = (uint32_t *) malloc (len * sizeof (q[0]));
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, ENOMEM, N_("malloc"));
rc = punycode_decode (strlen (line), line, &len, q, NULL);
if (rc != PUNYCODE_SUCCESS)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("punycode_decode: %s"),
punycode_strerror (rc));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
q[len] = 0;
r = stringprep_ucs4_to_utf8 (q, -1, NULL, NULL);
free (q);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.idna_to_ascii_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
free (p);
if (!q)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
rc = idna_to_ascii_4z (q, &p,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
free (q);
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_ascii_4z: %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
#ifdef WITH_TLD
if (args_info.tld_flag && !args_info.no_tld_flag)
{
size_t errpos;
rc = idna_to_unicode_8z4z (p, &q,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_unicode_8z4z (TLD): %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "tld[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
rc = tld_check_4z (q, &errpos, NULL);
free (q);
if (rc == TLD_INVALID)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z (position %lu): %s"),
(unsigned long) errpos, tld_strerror (rc));
if (rc != TLD_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z: %s"),
tld_strerror (rc));
}
#endif
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; p[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, p[i]);
}
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.idna_to_unicode_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UCS-4 to UTF-8"));
}
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
free (q);
rc = idna_to_unicode_8z4z (p, &q,
(args_info.allow_unassigned_given ?
IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED : 0) |
(args_info.usestd3asciirules_given ?
IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES : 0));
free (p);
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("idna_to_unicode_8z4z: %s"),
idna_strerror (rc));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
}
#ifdef WITH_TLD
if (args_info.tld_flag)
{
size_t errpos;
rc = tld_check_4z (q, &errpos, NULL);
if (rc == TLD_INVALID)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("tld_check_4z (position %lu): %s"),
(unsigned long) errpos, tld_strerror (rc));
}
if (rc != TLD_SUCCESS)
{
free (q);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("tld_check_4z: %s"),
tld_strerror (rc));
}
}
#endif
r = stringprep_ucs4_to_utf8 (q, -1, NULL, NULL);
free (q);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
if (args_info.nfkc_given)
{
p = stringprep_locale_to_utf8 (line);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from %s to UTF-8"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (p, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (p);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "input[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
free (q);
}
r = stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (p, -1);
free (p);
if (!r)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not do NFKC normalization"));
if (args_info.debug_given)
{
size_t i;
q = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (r, -1, NULL);
if (!q)
{
free (r);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("could not convert from UTF-8 to UCS-4"));
}
for (i = 0; q[i]; i++)
fprintf (stderr, "output[%lu] = U+%04x\n",
(unsigned long) i, q[i]);
free (q);
}
p = stringprep_utf8_to_locale (r);
free (r);
if (!p)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("could not convert from UTF-8 to %s"),
stringprep_locale_charset ());
fprintf (stdout, "%s\n", p);
free (p);
}
fflush (stdout);
}
while (!feof (stdin) && !ferror (stdin) && (args_info.inputs_num == 0 ||
cmdn < args_info.inputs_num));
free (line);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,963 |
poppler | fada09a2ccc11a3a1d308e810f1336d8df6011fd | PDFDoc *PDFDoc::ErrorPDFDoc(int errorCode, const GooString *fileNameA)
{
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc();
doc->errCode = errorCode;
doc->fileName = fileNameA;
return doc;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,786 |
Android | 295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-2476 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 1,698 |
Chrome | 69b4b9ef7455753b12c3efe4eec71647e6fb1da1 | net::BackoffEntry* DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::GetBackoffEntry() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return &backoff_entry_;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,897 |
Chrome | f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe | bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateBlendFuncFactors(
const char* function_name,
GLenum src,
GLenum dst) {
if (((src == GL_CONSTANT_COLOR || src == GL_ONE_MINUS_CONSTANT_COLOR) &&
(dst == GL_CONSTANT_ALPHA || dst == GL_ONE_MINUS_CONSTANT_ALPHA)) ||
((dst == GL_CONSTANT_COLOR || dst == GL_ONE_MINUS_CONSTANT_COLOR) &&
(src == GL_CONSTANT_ALPHA || src == GL_ONE_MINUS_CONSTANT_ALPHA))) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"incompatible src and dst");
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,561 |
qemu | c1b886c45dc70f247300f549dce9833f3fa2def5 | uint32_t vga_ioport_read(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
int val, index;
if (vga_ioport_invalid(s, addr)) {
val = 0xff;
} else {
switch(addr) {
case VGA_ATT_W:
if (s->ar_flip_flop == 0) {
val = s->ar_index;
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_ATT_R:
index = s->ar_index & 0x1f;
if (index < VGA_ATT_C) {
val = s->ar[index];
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_MIS_W:
val = s->st00;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_I:
val = s->sr_index;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_D:
val = s->sr[s->sr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read SR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->sr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_PEL_IR:
val = s->dac_state;
break;
case VGA_PEL_IW:
val = s->dac_write_index;
break;
case VGA_PEL_D:
val = s->palette[s->dac_read_index * 3 + s->dac_sub_index];
if (++s->dac_sub_index == 3) {
s->dac_sub_index = 0;
s->dac_read_index++;
}
break;
case VGA_FTC_R:
val = s->fcr;
break;
case VGA_MIS_R:
val = s->msr;
break;
case VGA_GFX_I:
val = s->gr_index;
break;
case VGA_GFX_D:
val = s->gr[s->gr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read GR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->gr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_CRT_IM:
case VGA_CRT_IC:
val = s->cr_index;
break;
case VGA_CRT_DM:
case VGA_CRT_DC:
val = s->cr[s->cr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read CR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->cr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_IS1_RM:
case VGA_IS1_RC:
/* just toggle to fool polling */
val = s->st01 = s->retrace(s);
s->ar_flip_flop = 0;
break;
default:
val = 0x00;
break;
}
}
#if defined(DEBUG_VGA)
printf("VGA: read addr=0x%04x data=0x%02x\n", addr, val);
#endif
return val;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,965 |
Android | 5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426 | virtual void DecompressedFrameHook(const vpx_image_t &img,
const unsigned int frame_number) {
ASSERT_TRUE(md5_file_ != NULL);
char expected_md5[33];
char junk[128];
const int res = fscanf(md5_file_, "%s %s", expected_md5, junk);
ASSERT_NE(EOF, res) << "Read md5 data failed";
expected_md5[32] = '\0';
::libvpx_test::MD5 md5_res;
md5_res.Add(&img);
const char *const actual_md5 = md5_res.Get();
ASSERT_STREQ(expected_md5, actual_md5)
<< "Md5 checksums don't match: frame number = " << frame_number;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,599 |
php | 2cc4e69cc6d8dbc4b3568ad3dd583324a7c11d64 | PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(pgsql)
{
char buf[256];
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "PostgreSQL Support", "enabled");
#if HAVE_PG_CONFIG_H
php_info_print_table_row(2, "PostgreSQL(libpq) Version", PG_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "PostgreSQL(libpq) ", PG_VERSION_STR);
#ifdef HAVE_PGSQL_WITH_MULTIBYTE_SUPPORT
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte character support", "enabled");
#else
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte character support", "disabled");
#endif
#ifdef USE_SSL
php_info_print_table_row(2, "SSL support", "enabled");
#else
php_info_print_table_row(2, "SSL support", "disabled");
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_PG_CONFIG_H */
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ld", PGG(num_persistent));
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Active Persistent Links", buf);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ld", PGG(num_links));
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Active Links", buf);
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,122 |
Chrome | ce891a86763d3540e2612be26938a6163310efe0 | void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderThreadStarted() {
chrome_observer_.reset(new ChromeRenderProcessObserver());
extension_dispatcher_.reset(new ExtensionDispatcher());
histogram_snapshots_.reset(new RendererHistogramSnapshots());
net_predictor_.reset(new RendererNetPredictor());
spellcheck_.reset(new SpellCheck());
visited_link_slave_.reset(new VisitedLinkSlave());
phishing_classifier_.reset(safe_browsing::PhishingClassifierFilter::Create());
RenderThread* thread = RenderThread::current();
thread->AddFilter(new DevToolsAgentFilter());
thread->AddObserver(chrome_observer_.get());
thread->AddObserver(extension_dispatcher_.get());
thread->AddObserver(histogram_snapshots_.get());
thread->AddObserver(phishing_classifier_.get());
thread->AddObserver(spellcheck_.get());
thread->AddObserver(visited_link_slave_.get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::ExternalExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::LoadTimesExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::SearchBoxExtension::Get());
v8::Extension* search_extension = extensions_v8::SearchExtension::Get();
if (search_extension)
thread->RegisterExtension(search_extension);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
thread->RegisterExtension(DomAutomationV8Extension::Get());
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableIPCFuzzing)) {
thread->channel()->set_outgoing_message_filter(LoadExternalIPCFuzzer());
}
WebString chrome_ui_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeUIScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(chrome_ui_scheme);
WebString extension_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsSecure(extension_scheme);
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-2798 | CWE-264 | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | Not Found in CWE Page | 6,196 |
Chrome | 32a9879fc01c24f9216bb2975200ab8a4afac80c | void ForeignSessionHelper::DeleteForeignSession(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& session_tag) {
OpenTabsUIDelegate* open_tabs = GetOpenTabsUIDelegate(profile_);
if (open_tabs)
open_tabs->DeleteForeignSession(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, session_tag));
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,858 |
Chrome | b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201 | EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Vector<unsigned long> unsignedLongArray(jsUnsignedLongArrayToVector(exec, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->methodWithUnsignedLongArray(unsignedLongArray);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-2350 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 1,359 |
linux | 0031c41be5c529f8329e327b63cde92ba1284842 | bool radeon_atom_get_tv_timings(struct radeon_device *rdev, int index,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *tv_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *tv_info_v1_2;
ATOM_DTD_FORMAT *dtd_timings;
int data_index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, AnalogTV_Info);
u8 frev, crev;
u16 data_offset, misc;
if (!atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, data_index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset))
return false;
switch (crev) {
case 1:
tv_info = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING)
return false;
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Total);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Disp);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Total);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Disp);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usPixelClock) * 10;
if (index == 1) {
/* PAL timings appear to have wrong values for totals */
mode->crtc_htotal -= 1;
mode->crtc_vtotal -= 1;
}
break;
case 2:
tv_info_v1_2 = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2)
return false;
dtd_timings = &tv_info_v1_2->aModeTimings[index];
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = mode->crtc_hsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = mode->crtc_vsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usPixClk) * 10;
break;
}
return true;
}
| 1 | CVE-2010-5331 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 3,768 |
jasper | 988f8365f7d8ad8073b6786e433d34c553ecf568 | jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (numrows < 0 || numcols < 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-10249 | CWE-190 | Integer Overflow or Wraparound | The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number. | Phase: Requirements
Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.
Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences.
Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
Phase: Implementation
Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]
Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system. | 6,984 |
Chrome | 4504a474c069d07104237d0c03bfce7b29a42de6 | void HTMLMediaElement::PauseInternal() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "pauseInternal(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (network_state_ == kNetworkEmpty)
InvokeResourceSelectionAlgorithm();
can_autoplay_ = false;
if (!paused_) {
paused_ = true;
ScheduleTimeupdateEvent(false);
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::pause);
SetOfficialPlaybackPosition(CurrentPlaybackPosition());
ScheduleRejectPlayPromises(kAbortError);
}
UpdatePlayState();
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,922 |
linux | 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 | static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_socket(struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6->daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6->saddr = np->saddr;
fl6->flowlabel = np->flow_label;
IP6_ECN_flow_xmit(sk, fl6->flowlabel);
fl6->flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6->flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6->fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
if (!IS_ERR(dst))
__inet6_csk_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return dst;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-3841 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 3,908 |
linux | 9ad2de43f1aee7e7274a4e0d41465489299e344b | static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-6545 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 9,858 |
tensorflow | c99d98cd189839dcf51aee94e7437b54b31f8abd | NodeDef* Node::mutable_def() { return &props_->node_def; } | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,180 |
Android | c57fc3703ae2e0d41b1f6580c50015937f2d23c1 | WORD32 ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_none_available(WORD16 *pi2_coeff_block,
UWORD32 u4_sub_block_strd,
UWORD32 u4_isdc,
dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
UWORD8 *pu1_top_nnz,
UWORD8 *pu1_left_nnz,
UWORD8 u1_tran_form8x8,
UWORD8 u1_mb_field_decodingflag,
UWORD32 *pu4_csbp)
{
UWORD32 u4_num_coeff, u4_n, u4_subblock_coded;
UWORD32 u4_top0, u4_top1;
UWORD32 *pu4_dummy;
WORD32 (**pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff)(WORD16 *pi2_coeff_block,
UWORD32 u4_isdc,
WORD32 u4_n,
struct _DecStruct *ps_dec,
UWORD32 *pu4_dummy) =
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff;
UWORD32 u4_idx = 0;
UWORD8 *puc_temp;
WORD32 ret;
*pu4_csbp = 0;
puc_temp = ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan;
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 0 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[0];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[0];
}
}
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[0](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc, 0,
ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
u4_top0 = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 1 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_idx++;
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[1];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[1];
}
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_block += NUM_COEFFS_IN_4x4BLK;
}
u4_n = u4_num_coeff;
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[(u4_n > 7)](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc,
u4_n, ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
u4_top1 = pu1_left_nnz[0] = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 2 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_idx += (u4_sub_block_strd - 1);
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[2];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[2];
}
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_block += ((u4_sub_block_strd - 1) * NUM_COEFFS_IN_4x4BLK);
}
u4_n = u4_top0;
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[(u4_n > 7)](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc,
u4_n, ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
pu1_top_nnz[0] = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 3 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_idx++;
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[3];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[3];
}
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_block += NUM_COEFFS_IN_4x4BLK;
}
u4_n = (u4_top1 + u4_num_coeff + 1) >> 1;
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[(u4_n > 7)](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc,
u4_n, ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
pu1_top_nnz[1] = pu1_left_nnz[1] = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = puc_temp;
return OK;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,909 |
qemu | f6091d86ba9ea05f4e111b9b42ee0005c37a6779 | virgl_cmd_ctx_detach_resource(VuGpu *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_ctx_resource det_res;
VUGPU_FILL_CMD(det_res);
virgl_renderer_ctx_detach_resource(det_res.hdr.ctx_id, det_res.resource_id);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,711 |
libvncserver | 57433015f856cc12753378254ce4f1c78f5d9c7b | static void CopyRectangleFromRectangle(rfbClient* client, int src_x, int src_y, int w, int h, int dest_x, int dest_y) {
int i,j;
if (client->frameBuffer == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!CheckRect(client, src_x, src_y, w, h)) {
rfbClientLog("Source rect out of bounds: %dx%d at (%d, %d)\n", src_x, src_y, w, h);
return;
}
if (!CheckRect(client, dest_x, dest_y, w, h)) {
rfbClientLog("Dest rect out of bounds: %dx%d at (%d, %d)\n", dest_x, dest_y, w, h);
return;
}
#define COPY_RECT_FROM_RECT(BPP) \
{ \
uint##BPP##_t* _buffer=((uint##BPP##_t*)client->frameBuffer)+(src_y-dest_y)*client->width+src_x-dest_x; \
if (dest_y < src_y) { \
for(j = dest_y*client->width; j < (dest_y+h)*client->width; j += client->width) { \
if (dest_x < src_x) { \
for(i = dest_x; i < dest_x+w; i++) { \
((uint##BPP##_t*)client->frameBuffer)[j+i]=_buffer[j+i]; \
} \
} else { \
for(i = dest_x+w-1; i >= dest_x; i--) { \
((uint##BPP##_t*)client->frameBuffer)[j+i]=_buffer[j+i]; \
} \
} \
} \
} else { \
for(j = (dest_y+h-1)*client->width; j >= dest_y*client->width; j-=client->width) { \
if (dest_x < src_x) { \
for(i = dest_x; i < dest_x+w; i++) { \
((uint##BPP##_t*)client->frameBuffer)[j+i]=_buffer[j+i]; \
} \
} else { \
for(i = dest_x+w-1; i >= dest_x; i--) { \
((uint##BPP##_t*)client->frameBuffer)[j+i]=_buffer[j+i]; \
} \
} \
} \
} \
}
switch(client->format.bitsPerPixel) {
case 8: COPY_RECT_FROM_RECT(8); break;
case 16: COPY_RECT_FROM_RECT(16); break;
case 32: COPY_RECT_FROM_RECT(32); break;
default:
rfbClientLog("Unsupported bitsPerPixel: %d\n",client->format.bitsPerPixel);
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,541 |
poppler | b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91 | int StreamPredictor::getChar() {
if (predIdx >= rowBytes) {
if (!getNextLine()) {
return EOF;
}
}
return predLine[predIdx++];
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,643 |
ImageMagick | 56d6e20de489113617cbbddaf41e92600a34db22 | ModuleExport size_t RegisterMSLImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_XML_DELEGATE)
xmlInitParser();
#endif
entry=SetMagickInfo("MSL");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_XML_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMSLImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMSLImage;
#endif
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->description=ConstantString("Magick Scripting Language");
entry->module=ConstantString("MSL");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,153 |
Chrome | c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7 | ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* ExtensionTtsController::GetPlatformImpl() {
if (!platform_impl_)
platform_impl_ = ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::GetInstance();
return platform_impl_;
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-2839 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 2,672 |
openssl | 32cc2479b473c49ce869e57fded7e9a77b695c0d | void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char* md_out,
size_t* md_out_size,
const unsigned char header[13],
const unsigned char *data,
size_t data_plus_mac_size,
size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
const unsigned char *mac_secret,
unsigned mac_secret_length,
char is_sslv3)
{
union { double align;
unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state;
void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
/* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
/* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
* the hash. */
unsigned md_length_size = 8;
char length_is_big_endian = 1;
/* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
* many possible overflows later in this function. */
OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
{
case NID_md5:
MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);
md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
md_size = 16;
sslv3_pad_length = 48;
length_is_big_endian = 0;
break;
case NID_sha1:
SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;
md_size = 20;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
case NID_sha224:
SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
md_size = 224/8;
break;
case NID_sha256:
SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
md_size = 32;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
case NID_sha384:
SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
md_size = 384/8;
md_block_size = 128;
md_length_size = 16;
break;
case NID_sha512:
SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
md_size = 64;
md_block_size = 128;
md_length_size = 16;
break;
#endif
default:
/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been
* called first to check that the hash function is
* supported. */
OPENSSL_assert(0);
if (md_out_size)
*md_out_size = -1;
return;
}
OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
header_length = 13;
if (is_sslv3)
{
header_length =
mac_secret_length +
sslv3_pad_length +
8 /* sequence number */ +
1 /* record type */ +
2 /* record length */;
}
/* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
* calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
* padding value.
*
* In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext
* varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that
* the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash
* termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we
* say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
*
* TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
* required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
* can vary based on the padding.
*
* Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
* cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
/* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
* bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
* (SSLv3) */
len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
/* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
* |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
/* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
/* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
* the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
* end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we
* can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
* be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
* they are plaintext. */
num_starting_blocks = 0;
/* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
* we start processing. */
k = 0;
/* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
* MACed. */
mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
/* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
* contains application data. */
c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
/* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
* value. */
index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
/* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
* length, in bits. */
index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
/* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
* block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of
* SSLv3. */
/* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need
* at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */
if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0))
{
num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
}
bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
if (!is_sslv3)
{
/* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and
* secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more
* than a single block. */
bits += 8*md_block_size;
memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
}
if (length_is_big_endian)
{
memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4);
length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits;
}
else
{
memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size);
length_bytes[md_length_size-5] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
length_bytes[md_length_size-6] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
length_bytes[md_length_size-7] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
length_bytes[md_length_size-8] = (unsigned char)bits;
}
if (k > 0)
{
if (is_sslv3)
{
/* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block.
* overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single
* block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes
* (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */
unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size;
md_transform(md_state.c, header);
memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang);
md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++)
md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang);
}
else
{
/* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13);
md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
}
}
memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
/* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
* it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
* bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
* constant time, to |mac_out|. */
for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++)
{
unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++)
{
unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
if (k < header_length)
b = header[k];
else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
b = data[k-header_length];
k++;
is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
/* If this is the block containing the end of the
* application data, and we are at the offset for the
* 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
/* If this the the block containing the end of the
* application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
* just write zero. */
b = b&~is_past_cp1;
/* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
* index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
* length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
* add an extra block of zeros. */
b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
/* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
* length. */
if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
{
/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
}
block[j] = b;
}
md_transform(md_state.c, block);
md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
/* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */);
if (is_sslv3)
{
/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
}
else
{
/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
}
EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
if (md_out_size)
*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,075 |
qemu | 1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f | void virtio_queue_set_align(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n, int align)
{
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
/* virtio-1 compliant devices cannot change the alignment */
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) {
error_report("tried to modify queue alignment for virtio-1 device");
return;
}
/* Check that the transport told us it was going to do this
* (so a buggy transport will immediately assert rather than
* silently failing to migrate this state)
*/
assert(k->has_variable_vring_alignment);
vdev->vq[n].vring.align = align;
virtio_queue_update_rings(vdev, n);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,521 |
libsoup | 0e7b2c1466434a992b6a387497432e1c97b6125c | soup_ntlm_parse_challenge (const char *challenge,
char **nonce,
char **default_domain,
gboolean *ntlmv2_session)
{
gsize clen;
NTLMString domain;
guchar *chall;
guint32 flags;
chall = g_base64_decode (challenge, &clen);
if (clen < NTLM_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN_STRING_OFFSET ||
clen < NTLM_CHALLENGE_NONCE_OFFSET + NTLM_CHALLENGE_NONCE_LENGTH) {
g_free (chall);
return FALSE;
}
memcpy (&flags, chall + NTLM_CHALLENGE_FLAGS_OFFSET, sizeof(flags));
flags = GUINT_FROM_LE (flags);
*ntlmv2_session = (flags & NTLM_FLAGS_NEGOTIATE_NTLMV2) ? TRUE : FALSE;
if (default_domain) {
memcpy (&domain, chall + NTLM_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN_STRING_OFFSET, sizeof (domain));
domain.length = GUINT16_FROM_LE (domain.length);
domain.offset = GUINT16_FROM_LE (domain.offset);
if (clen < domain.length + domain.offset) {
g_free (chall);
return FALSE;
}
*default_domain = g_convert ((char *)chall + domain.offset,
domain.length, "UTF-8", "UCS-2LE",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
if (nonce) {
*nonce = g_memdup (chall + NTLM_CHALLENGE_NONCE_OFFSET,
NTLM_CHALLENGE_NONCE_LENGTH);
}
g_free (chall);
return TRUE;
} | 1 | CVE-2019-17266 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 1,661 |
linux | 8f3fafc9c2f0ece10832c25f7ffcb07c97a32ad4 | static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_DRIVE_STATUS))
return -ENOSYS;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) ||
(arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE))
return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (((int)arg >= cdi->capacity))
return -EINVAL;
return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg);
}
| 1 | CVE-2018-16658 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 1,282 |
linux | 89189557b47b35683a27c80ee78aef18248eefb4 | static void drop_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header)
{
struct ctl_dir *parent = header->parent;
if (--header->nreg)
return;
if (parent) {
put_links(header);
start_unregistering(header);
}
if (!--header->count)
kfree_rcu(header, rcu);
if (parent)
drop_sysctl_table(&parent->header);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 23,492 |
Chrome | 9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c | explicit ShutdownWatchDogThread(const base::TimeDelta& duration)
: base::Watchdog(duration, "Shutdown watchdog thread", true) {
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,544 |
ompl | abb4fadcb4e4fe4c9cf41e5e7706143a66948eb7 | ompl::geometric::VFRRT::VFRRT(const base::SpaceInformationPtr &si, VectorField vf, double exploration,
double initial_lambda, unsigned int update_freq)
: RRT(si)
, vf_(std::move(vf))
, explorationSetting_(exploration)
, lambda_(initial_lambda)
, nth_step_(update_freq)
{
setName("VFRRT");
maxDistance_ = si->getStateValidityCheckingResolution();
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,280 |
Chrome | e3de7fc7dbb642ed034afa1c1fed70a748a60f35 | void OverscrollControllerAndroid::Disable() {
if (!enabled_)
return;
enabled_ = false;
if (!enabled_) {
if (refresh_effect_)
refresh_effect_->Reset();
if (glow_effect_)
glow_effect_->Reset();
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,575 |
Bento4 | 5eb8cf89d724ccb0b4ce5f24171ec7c11f0a7647 | AP4_HdlrAtom::AP4_HdlrAtom(AP4_UI32 size,
AP4_UI08 version,
AP4_UI32 flags,
AP4_ByteStream& stream) :
AP4_Atom(AP4_ATOM_TYPE_HDLR, size, version, flags)
{
AP4_UI32 predefined;
stream.ReadUI32(predefined);
stream.ReadUI32(m_HandlerType);
stream.ReadUI32(m_Reserved[0]);
stream.ReadUI32(m_Reserved[1]);
stream.ReadUI32(m_Reserved[2]);
// read the name unless it is empty
if (size < AP4_FULL_ATOM_HEADER_SIZE+20) return;
AP4_UI32 name_size = size-(AP4_FULL_ATOM_HEADER_SIZE+20);
char* name = new char[name_size+1];
if (name == NULL) return;
stream.Read(name, name_size);
name[name_size] = '\0'; // force a null termination
// handle a special case: the Quicktime files have a pascal
// string here, but ISO MP4 files have a C string.
// we try to detect a pascal encoding and correct it.
if (name[0] == name_size-1) {
m_HandlerName = name+1;
} else {
m_HandlerName = name;
}
delete[] name;
} | 1 | CVE-2017-14643 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 3,207 |
krb5 | e3b5a5e5267818c97750b266df50b6a3d4649604 | pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req * request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part * enc_tkt_reply,
krb5_pa_data * data,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond,
void *arg)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data authp_data = {0, 0, NULL}, krb5_authz = {0, 0, NULL};
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 *reqp9 = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack *auth_pack = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack_draft9 *auth_pack9 = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL;
krb5_checksum cksum = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
int valid_eku = 0, valid_san = 0;
krb5_data k5data;
int is_signed = 1;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n");
if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
if (moddata == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server);
if (plgctx == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(data->contents, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_as_req");
#endif
/* create a per-request context */
retval = pkinit_init_kdc_req_context(context, &reqctx);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
reqctx->pa_type = data->pa_type;
PADATA_TO_KRB5DATA(data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&k5data, &reqp);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp->signedAuthPack.data, reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, &is_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&k5data, &reqp9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp9->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data_draft9");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp9->signedAuthPack.data, reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, NULL);
break;
default:
pkiDebug("unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", data->pa_type);
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkcs7_signeddata_verify failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_signed) {
retval = verify_client_san(context, plgctx, reqctx, request->client,
&valid_san);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_san) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable SAN in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = verify_client_eku(context, plgctx, reqctx, &valid_eku);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_eku) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable EKU in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else { /* !is_signed */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, request->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal())) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Pkinit request not signed, but client "
"not anonymous."));
goto cleanup;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(authp_data.data, authp_data.length, "/tmp/kdc_auth_pack");
#endif
OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&authp_data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* check dh parameters */
if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (!is_signed) {
/*Anonymous pkinit requires DH*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Anonymous pkinit without DH public "
"value not supported."));
goto cleanup;
}
der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL,
0, der_req, &cksum);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
k5_bcmp(cksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
cksum.length) != 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to match the checksum\n");
#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n",
req_pkt->length);
print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ",
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.checksum_type,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
print_buffer(auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ",
cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length);
print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length);
#endif
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check if kdcPkId present and match KDC's subjectIdentifier */
if (reqp->kdcPkId.data != NULL) {
int valid_kdcPkId = 0;
retval = pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
(unsigned char *)reqp->kdcPkId.data,
reqp->kdcPkId.length, &valid_kdcPkId);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_kdcPkId)
pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert"
"RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
auth_pack = NULL;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(&k5data, &auth_pack9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack_draft9\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
auth_pack9 = NULL;
break;
}
/* remember to set the PREAUTH flag in the reply */
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
modreq = (krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq)reqctx;
reqctx = NULL;
cleanup:
if (retval && data->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata failed: creating e-data\n");
if (pkinit_create_edata(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx,
plgctx->idctx, plgctx->opts, retval, &e_data))
pkiDebug("pkinit_create_edata failed\n");
}
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&reqp);
free(cksum.contents);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&reqp9);
}
free(authp_data.data);
free(krb5_authz.data);
if (reqctx != NULL)
pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx);
free_krb5_auth_pack(&auth_pack);
free_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(context, &auth_pack9);
(*respond)(arg, retval, modreq, e_data, NULL);
}
| 1 | CVE-2015-2694 | CWE-264 | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | Not Found in CWE Page | 610 |
openssl | 8e20499629b6bcf868d0072c7011e590b5c2294d | static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
void *ptr)
{
EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *key = data(ctx);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
{
unsigned int i;
unsigned char hmac_key[64];
memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key));
if (arg > (int)sizeof(hmac_key)) {
MD5_Init(&key->head);
MD5_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg);
MD5_Final(hmac_key, &key->head);
} else {
memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg);
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */
MD5_Init(&key->head);
MD5_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */
MD5_Init(&key->tail);
MD5_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
return 1;
}
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
{
unsigned char *p = ptr;
unsigned int len;
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return -1;
len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
len -= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
p[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
p[arg - 1] = len;
}
key->payload_length = len;
key->md = key->head;
MD5_Update(&key->md, p, arg);
return MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
default:
return -1;
}
} | 1 | CVE-2017-3731 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 3,026 |
linux | 8dca4a41f1ad65043a78c2338d9725f859c8d2c3 | static void amd_irq_ack(struct irq_data *d)
{
/*
* based on HW design,there is no need to ack HW
* before handle current irq. But this routine is
* necessary for handle_edge_irq
*/
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,066 |
libarchive | 6e06b1c89dd0d16f74894eac4cfc1327a06ee4a0 | archive_read_open2(struct archive *a, void *client_data,
archive_open_callback *client_opener,
archive_read_callback *client_reader,
archive_skip_callback *client_skipper,
archive_close_callback *client_closer)
{
/* Old archive_read_open2() is just a thin shell around
* archive_read_open1. */
archive_read_set_callback_data(a, client_data);
archive_read_set_open_callback(a, client_opener);
archive_read_set_read_callback(a, client_reader);
archive_read_set_skip_callback(a, client_skipper);
archive_read_set_close_callback(a, client_closer);
return archive_read_open1(a);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,098 |
radare2 | a7ce29647fcb38386d7439696375e16e093d6acb | R_API RList *r_anal_var_all_list(RAnal *anal, RAnalFunction *fcn) {
// r_anal_var_list if there are not vars with that kind returns a list with
// zero element.. which is an unnecessary loss of cpu time
RList *list = r_list_new ();
if (!list) {
return NULL;
}
RList *reg_vars = r_anal_var_list (anal, fcn, R_ANAL_VAR_KIND_REG);
RList *bpv_vars = r_anal_var_list (anal, fcn, R_ANAL_VAR_KIND_BPV);
RList *spv_vars = r_anal_var_list (anal, fcn, R_ANAL_VAR_KIND_SPV);
r_list_join (list, reg_vars);
r_list_join (list, bpv_vars);
r_list_join (list, spv_vars);
r_list_free (reg_vars);
r_list_free (bpv_vars);
r_list_free (spv_vars);
return list;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,603 |
lxc | 81f466d05f2a89cb4f122ef7f593ff3f279b165c | static int attach_child_main(void* data)
{
struct attach_clone_payload* payload = (struct attach_clone_payload*)data;
int ipc_socket = payload->ipc_socket;
int procfd = payload->procfd;
lxc_attach_options_t* options = payload->options;
struct lxc_proc_context_info* init_ctx = payload->init_ctx;
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
long new_personality;
#endif
int ret;
int status;
int expected;
long flags;
int fd;
uid_t new_uid;
gid_t new_gid;
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it's ready
* for us to start initializing
*/
expected = 0;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive notification from initial process (0)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* A description of the purpose of this functionality is
* provided in the lxc-attach(1) manual page. We have to
* remount here and not in the parent process, otherwise
* /proc may not properly reflect the new pid namespace.
*/
if (!(options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_REMOUNT_PROC_SYS)) {
ret = lxc_attach_remount_sys_proc();
if (ret < 0) {
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* now perform additional attachments*/
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
if (options->personality < 0)
new_personality = init_ctx->personality;
else
new_personality = options->personality;
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_SET_PERSONALITY) {
ret = personality(new_personality);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("could not ensure correct architecture");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
#endif
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_DROP_CAPABILITIES) {
ret = lxc_attach_drop_privs(init_ctx);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not drop privileges");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* always set the environment (specify (LXC_ATTACH_KEEP_ENV, NULL, NULL) if you want this to be a no-op) */
ret = lxc_attach_set_environment(options->env_policy, options->extra_env_vars, options->extra_keep_env);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not set initial environment for attached process");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* set user / group id */
new_uid = 0;
new_gid = 0;
/* ignore errors, we will fall back to root in that case
* (/proc was not mounted etc.)
*/
if (options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)
lxc_attach_get_init_uidgid(&new_uid, &new_gid);
if (options->uid != (uid_t)-1)
new_uid = options->uid;
if (options->gid != (gid_t)-1)
new_gid = options->gid;
/* setup the control tty */
if (options->stdin_fd && isatty(options->stdin_fd)) {
if (setsid() < 0) {
SYSERROR("unable to setsid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
if (ioctl(options->stdin_fd, TIOCSCTTY, (char *)NULL) < 0) {
SYSERROR("unable to TIOCSTTY");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* try to set the uid/gid combination */
if ((new_gid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)) {
if (setgid(new_gid) || setgroups(0, NULL)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container gid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
if ((new_uid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER) && setuid(new_uid)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container uid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* tell initial process it may now put us into the cgroups */
status = 1;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret != sizeof(status)) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify initial process for initialization (1)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it has done
* everything for us when it comes to cgroups etc.
*/
expected = 2;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive final notification from initial process (2)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_socket);
if ((init_ctx->container && init_ctx->container->lxc_conf &&
init_ctx->container->lxc_conf->no_new_privs) ||
(options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
SYSERROR("PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS could not be set. "
"Process can use execve() gainable "
"privileges.");
rexit(-1);
}
INFO("PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is set. Process cannot use execve() "
"gainable privileges.");
}
/* set new apparmor profile/selinux context */
if ((options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM) && init_ctx->lsm_label) {
int on_exec;
on_exec = options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM_EXEC ? 1 : 0;
if (lsm_set_label_at(procfd, on_exec, init_ctx->lsm_label) < 0) {
rexit(-1);
}
}
if (init_ctx->container && init_ctx->container->lxc_conf &&
init_ctx->container->lxc_conf->seccomp &&
(lxc_seccomp_load(init_ctx->container->lxc_conf) != 0)) {
ERROR("Loading seccomp policy");
rexit(-1);
}
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
/* The following is done after the communication socket is
* shut down. That way, all errors that might (though
* unlikely) occur up until this point will have their messages
* printed to the original stderr (if logging is so configured)
* and not the fd the user supplied, if any.
*/
/* fd handling for stdin, stdout and stderr;
* ignore errors here, user may want to make sure
* the fds are closed, for example */
if (options->stdin_fd >= 0 && options->stdin_fd != 0)
dup2(options->stdin_fd, 0);
if (options->stdout_fd >= 0 && options->stdout_fd != 1)
dup2(options->stdout_fd, 1);
if (options->stderr_fd >= 0 && options->stderr_fd != 2)
dup2(options->stderr_fd, 2);
/* close the old fds */
if (options->stdin_fd > 2)
close(options->stdin_fd);
if (options->stdout_fd > 2)
close(options->stdout_fd);
if (options->stderr_fd > 2)
close(options->stderr_fd);
/* try to remove CLOEXEC flag from stdin/stdout/stderr,
* but also here, ignore errors */
for (fd = 0; fd <= 2; fd++) {
flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0)
continue;
if (flags & FD_CLOEXEC)
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags & ~FD_CLOEXEC) < 0)
SYSERROR("Unable to clear CLOEXEC from fd");
}
/* we don't need proc anymore */
close(procfd);
/* we're done, so we can now do whatever the user intended us to do */
rexit(payload->exec_function(payload->exec_payload));
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-8649 | CWE-264 | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | Not Found in CWE Page | 4,481 |
cantata | afc4f8315d3e96574925fb530a7004cc9e6ce3d3 | static inline bool mpOk(const QString &mp)
{
return !mp.isEmpty() && mp.startsWith("/home/"); // ) && mp.contains("cantata");
} | 1 | CVE-2018-12559 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 7,253 |
Chrome | 6c6888565ff1fde9ef21ef17c27ad4c8304643d2 | bool TopSitesImpl::GetTemporaryPageThumbnailScore(const GURL& url,
ThumbnailScore* score) {
for (const TempImage& temp_image : temp_images_) {
if (temp_image.first == url) {
*score = temp_image.second.thumbnail_score;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,135 |
samba | 52dd9f8f835bc23415ec51dcc344478497e208c3 | kdc_code kpasswd_process(struct kdc_server *kdc,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB *request,
DATA_BLOB *reply,
struct tsocket_address *remote_addr,
struct tsocket_address *local_addr,
int datagram)
{
uint16_t len;
uint16_t verno;
uint16_t ap_req_len;
uint16_t enc_data_len;
DATA_BLOB ap_req_blob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB ap_rep_blob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB enc_data_blob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB dec_data_blob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB kpasswd_dec_reply = data_blob_null;
const char *error_string = NULL;
krb5_error_code error_code = 0;
struct cli_credentials *server_credentials;
struct gensec_security *gensec_security;
#ifndef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
struct sockaddr_storage remote_ss;
#endif
struct sockaddr_storage local_ss;
ssize_t socklen;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
kdc_code rc = KDC_ERROR;
krb5_error_code code = 0;
NTSTATUS status;
int rv;
bool is_inet;
bool ok;
if (kdc->am_rodc) {
return KDC_PROXY_REQUEST;
}
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return KDC_ERROR;
}
is_inet = tsocket_address_is_inet(remote_addr, "ip");
if (!is_inet) {
DBG_WARNING("Invalid remote IP address");
goto done;
}
#ifndef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
/*
* FIXME: Heimdal fails to to do a krb5_rd_req() in gensec_krb5 if we
* set the remote address.
*/
/* remote_addr */
socklen = tsocket_address_bsd_sockaddr(remote_addr,
(struct sockaddr *)&remote_ss,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
if (socklen < 0) {
DBG_WARNING("Invalid remote IP address");
goto done;
}
#endif
/* local_addr */
socklen = tsocket_address_bsd_sockaddr(local_addr,
(struct sockaddr *)&local_ss,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
if (socklen < 0) {
DBG_WARNING("Invalid local IP address");
goto done;
}
if (request->length <= HEADER_LEN) {
DBG_WARNING("Request truncated\n");
goto done;
}
len = RSVAL(request->data, 0);
if (request->length != len) {
DBG_WARNING("Request length does not match\n");
goto done;
}
verno = RSVAL(request->data, 2);
if (verno != 1 && verno != RFC3244_VERSION) {
DBG_WARNING("Unsupported version: 0x%04x\n", verno);
}
ap_req_len = RSVAL(request->data, 4);
if ((ap_req_len >= len) || ((ap_req_len + HEADER_LEN) >= len)) {
DBG_WARNING("AP_REQ truncated\n");
goto done;
}
ap_req_blob = data_blob_const(&request->data[HEADER_LEN], ap_req_len);
enc_data_len = len - ap_req_len;
enc_data_blob = data_blob_const(&request->data[HEADER_LEN + ap_req_len],
enc_data_len);
server_credentials = cli_credentials_init(tmp_ctx);
if (server_credentials == NULL) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to initialize server credentials!\n");
goto done;
}
/*
* We want the credentials subsystem to use the krb5 context we already
* have, rather than a new context.
*
* On this context the KDB plugin has been loaded, so we can access
* dsdb.
*/
status = cli_credentials_set_krb5_context(server_credentials,
kdc->smb_krb5_context);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto done;
}
ok = cli_credentials_set_conf(server_credentials, kdc->task->lp_ctx);
if (!ok) {
goto done;
}
/*
* After calling cli_credentials_set_conf(), explicitly set the realm
* with CRED_SPECIFIED. We need to do this so the result of
* principal_from_credentials() called from the gensec layer is
* CRED_SPECIFIED rather than CRED_SMB_CONF, avoiding a fallback to
* match-by-key (very undesirable in this case).
*/
ok = cli_credentials_set_realm(server_credentials,
lpcfg_realm(kdc->task->lp_ctx),
CRED_SPECIFIED);
if (!ok) {
goto done;
}
ok = cli_credentials_set_username(server_credentials,
"kadmin/changepw",
CRED_SPECIFIED);
if (!ok) {
goto done;
}
/* Check that the server principal is indeed CRED_SPECIFIED. */
{
char *principal = NULL;
enum credentials_obtained obtained;
principal = cli_credentials_get_principal_and_obtained(server_credentials,
tmp_ctx,
&obtained);
if (obtained < CRED_SPECIFIED) {
goto done;
}
TALLOC_FREE(principal);
}
rv = cli_credentials_set_keytab_name(server_credentials,
kdc->task->lp_ctx,
kdc->kpasswd_keytab_name,
CRED_SPECIFIED);
if (rv != 0) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to set credentials keytab name\n");
goto done;
}
status = samba_server_gensec_start(tmp_ctx,
kdc->task->event_ctx,
kdc->task->msg_ctx,
kdc->task->lp_ctx,
server_credentials,
"kpasswd",
&gensec_security);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto done;
}
status = gensec_set_local_address(gensec_security, local_addr);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto done;
}
#ifndef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
status = gensec_set_remote_address(gensec_security, remote_addr);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto done;
}
#endif
/* We want the GENSEC wrap calls to generate PRIV tokens */
gensec_want_feature(gensec_security, GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL);
/* Use the krb5 gesec mechanism so we can load DB modules */
status = gensec_start_mech_by_name(gensec_security, "krb5");
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto done;
}
/*
* Accept the AP-REQ and generate the AP-REP we need for the reply
*
* We only allow KRB5 and make sure the backend to is RPC/IPC free.
*
* See gensec_krb5_update_internal() as GENSEC_SERVER.
*
* It allows gensec_update() not to block.
*
* If that changes in future we need to use
* gensec_update_send/recv here!
*/
status = gensec_update(gensec_security, tmp_ctx,
ap_req_blob, &ap_rep_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) &&
!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
ap_rep_blob = data_blob_null;
error_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
error_string = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx,
"gensec_update failed - %s\n",
nt_errstr(status));
DBG_ERR("%s", error_string);
goto reply;
}
status = gensec_unwrap(gensec_security,
tmp_ctx,
&enc_data_blob,
&dec_data_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ap_rep_blob = data_blob_null;
error_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
error_string = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx,
"gensec_unwrap failed - %s\n",
nt_errstr(status));
DBG_ERR("%s", error_string);
goto reply;
}
code = kpasswd_handle_request(kdc,
tmp_ctx,
gensec_security,
verno,
&dec_data_blob,
&kpasswd_dec_reply,
&error_string);
if (code != 0) {
ap_rep_blob = data_blob_null;
error_code = code;
goto reply;
}
status = gensec_wrap(gensec_security,
tmp_ctx,
&kpasswd_dec_reply,
&enc_data_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ap_rep_blob = data_blob_null;
error_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
error_string = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx,
"gensec_wrap failed - %s\n",
nt_errstr(status));
DBG_ERR("%s", error_string);
goto reply;
}
reply:
if (error_code != 0) {
krb5_data k_enc_data;
krb5_data k_dec_data;
const char *principal_string;
krb5_principal server_principal;
if (error_string == NULL) {
DBG_ERR("Invalid error string! This should not happen\n");
goto done;
}
ok = kpasswd_make_error_reply(tmp_ctx,
error_code,
error_string,
&dec_data_blob);
if (!ok) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to create error reply\n");
goto done;
}
k_dec_data.length = dec_data_blob.length;
k_dec_data.data = (char *)dec_data_blob.data;
principal_string = cli_credentials_get_principal(server_credentials,
tmp_ctx);
if (principal_string == NULL) {
goto done;
}
code = smb_krb5_parse_name(kdc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
principal_string,
&server_principal);
if (code != 0) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to create principal: %s\n",
error_message(code));
goto done;
}
code = smb_krb5_mk_error(kdc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE + error_code,
NULL, /* e_text */
&k_dec_data,
NULL, /* client */
server_principal,
&k_enc_data);
krb5_free_principal(kdc->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
server_principal);
if (code != 0) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to create krb5 error reply: %s\n",
error_message(code));
goto done;
}
enc_data_blob = data_blob_talloc(tmp_ctx,
k_enc_data.data,
k_enc_data.length);
if (enc_data_blob.data == NULL) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to allocate memory for error reply\n");
goto done;
}
}
*reply = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx,
NULL,
HEADER_LEN + ap_rep_blob.length + enc_data_blob.length);
if (reply->data == NULL) {
goto done;
}
RSSVAL(reply->data, 0, reply->length);
RSSVAL(reply->data, 2, 1);
RSSVAL(reply->data, 4, ap_rep_blob.length);
memcpy(reply->data + HEADER_LEN,
ap_rep_blob.data,
ap_rep_blob.length);
memcpy(reply->data + HEADER_LEN + ap_rep_blob.length,
enc_data_blob.data,
enc_data_blob.length);
rc = KDC_OK;
done:
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return rc;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 23,815 |
linux | 5ae94c0d2f0bed41d6718be743985d61b7f5c47d | static int irda_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_irda *addr = (struct sockaddr_irda *) uaddr;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
int err;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
lock_sock(sk);
/* Don't allow connect for Ultra sockets */
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if ((sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (sk->sk_protocol == IRDAPROTO_ULTRA))
goto out;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED && sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
err = 0;
goto out; /* Connect completed during a ERESTARTSYS event */
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE && sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto out;
}
err = -EISCONN; /* No reconnect on a seqpacket socket */
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
err = -EINVAL;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_irda))
goto out;
/* Check if user supplied any destination device address */
if ((!addr->sir_addr) || (addr->sir_addr == DEV_ADDR_ANY)) {
/* Try to find one suitable */
err = irda_discover_daddr_and_lsap_sel(self, addr->sir_name);
if (err) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), auto-connect failed!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
} else {
/* Use the one provided by the user */
self->daddr = addr->sir_addr;
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), daddr = %08x\n", __func__, self->daddr);
/* If we don't have a valid service name, we assume the
* user want to connect on a specific LSAP. Prevent
* the use of invalid LSAPs (IrLMP 1.1 p10). Jean II */
if((addr->sir_name[0] != '\0') ||
(addr->sir_lsap_sel >= 0x70)) {
/* Query remote LM-IAS using service name */
err = irda_find_lsap_sel(self, addr->sir_name);
if (err) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), connect failed!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
} else {
/* Directly connect to the remote LSAP
* specified by the sir_lsap field.
* Please use with caution, in IrDA LSAPs are
* dynamic and there is no "well-known" LSAP. */
self->dtsap_sel = addr->sir_lsap_sel;
}
}
/* Check if we have opened a local TSAP */
if (!self->tsap)
irda_open_tsap(self, LSAP_ANY, addr->sir_name);
/* Move to connecting socket, start sending Connect Requests */
sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;
sk->sk_state = TCP_SYN_SENT;
/* Connect to remote device */
err = irttp_connect_request(self->tsap, self->dtsap_sel,
self->saddr, self->daddr, NULL,
self->max_sdu_size_rx, NULL);
if (err) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), connect failed!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* Now the loop */
err = -EINPROGRESS;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED && (flags & O_NONBLOCK))
goto out;
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (wait_event_interruptible(*(sk_sleep(sk)),
(sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT)))
goto out;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
if (sk->sk_prot->disconnect(sk, flags))
sock->state = SS_DISCONNECTING;
err = sock_error(sk);
if (!err)
err = -ECONNRESET;
goto out;
}
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
/* At this point, IrLMP has assigned our source address */
self->saddr = irttp_get_saddr(self->tsap);
err = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,800 |
linux | 93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939 | static struct ctl_dir *get_subdir(struct ctl_dir *dir,
const char *name, int namelen)
{
struct ctl_table_set *set = dir->header.set;
struct ctl_dir *subdir, *new = NULL;
int err;
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
subdir = find_subdir(dir, name, namelen);
if (!IS_ERR(subdir))
goto found;
if (PTR_ERR(subdir) != -ENOENT)
goto failed;
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
new = new_dir(set, name, namelen);
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
subdir = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!new)
goto failed;
/* Was the subdir added while we dropped the lock? */
subdir = find_subdir(dir, name, namelen);
if (!IS_ERR(subdir))
goto found;
if (PTR_ERR(subdir) != -ENOENT)
goto failed;
/* Nope. Use the our freshly made directory entry. */
err = insert_header(dir, &new->header);
subdir = ERR_PTR(err);
if (err)
goto failed;
subdir = new;
found:
subdir->header.nreg++;
failed:
if (IS_ERR(subdir)) {
pr_err("sysctl could not get directory: ");
sysctl_print_dir(dir);
pr_cont("/%*.*s %ld\n",
namelen, namelen, name, PTR_ERR(subdir));
}
drop_sysctl_table(&dir->header);
if (new)
drop_sysctl_table(&new->header);
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
return subdir;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,946 |
libarchive | 94821008d6eea81e315c5881cdf739202961040a | DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_multiarchive_solid_skip_all)
{
const char* reffiles[] = {
"test_read_format_rar5_multiarchive_solid.part01.rar",
"test_read_format_rar5_multiarchive_solid.part02.rar",
"test_read_format_rar5_multiarchive_solid.part03.rar",
"test_read_format_rar5_multiarchive_solid.part04.rar",
NULL
};
PROLOGUE_MULTI(reffiles);
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("cebula.txt", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test1.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test2.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test3.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test4.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test5.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test6.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("elf-Linux-ARMv7-ls", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertA(ARCHIVE_EOF == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
EPILOGUE();
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,656 |
qpdf | 701b518d5c56a1449825a3a37a716c58e05e1c3e | QPDF::resolve(int objid, int generation)
{
// Check object cache before checking xref table. This allows us
// to insert things into the object cache that don't actually
// exist in the file.
QPDFObjGen og(objid, generation);
if (this->resolving.count(og))
{
// This can happen if an object references itself directly or
// indirectly in some key that has to be resolved during
// object parsing, such as stream length.
QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDF recursion loop in resolve");
warn(QPDFExc(qpdf_e_damaged_pdf, this->file->getName(),
"", this->file->getLastOffset(),
"loop detected resolving object " +
QUtil::int_to_string(objid) + " " +
QUtil::int_to_string(generation)));
return new QPDF_Null;
}
ResolveRecorder rr(this, og);
if (! this->obj_cache.count(og))
{
if (! this->xref_table.count(og))
{
// PDF spec says unknown objects resolve to the null object.
return new QPDF_Null;
}
QPDFXRefEntry const& entry = this->xref_table[og];
switch (entry.getType())
{
case 1:
{
qpdf_offset_t offset = entry.getOffset();
// Object stored in cache by readObjectAtOffset
int aobjid;
int ageneration;
QPDFObjectHandle oh =
readObjectAtOffset(true, offset, "", objid, generation,
aobjid, ageneration);
}
break;
case 2:
resolveObjectsInStream(entry.getObjStreamNumber());
break;
default:
throw QPDFExc(qpdf_e_damaged_pdf, this->file->getName(), "", 0,
"object " +
QUtil::int_to_string(objid) + "/" +
QUtil::int_to_string(generation) +
" has unexpected xref entry type");
}
}
return this->obj_cache[og].object;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,089 |
Chrome | 41cc463ecc5f0ba708a2c8282a7e7208ca7daa57 | HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::CreateTarget(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params) {
std::string url;
std::string browser_context_id;
int width = browser_->options()->window_size.width();
int height = browser_->options()->window_size.height();
if (!params || !params->GetString("url", &url))
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "url");
bool enable_begin_frame_control = false;
params->GetString("browserContextId", &browser_context_id);
params->GetInteger("width", &width);
params->GetInteger("height", &height);
params->GetBoolean("enableBeginFrameControl", &enable_begin_frame_control);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (enable_begin_frame_control) {
return CreateErrorResponse(
command_id, kErrorServerError,
"BeginFrameControl is not supported on MacOS yet");
}
#endif
HeadlessBrowserContext* context =
browser_->GetBrowserContextForId(browser_context_id);
if (!browser_context_id.empty()) {
context = browser_->GetBrowserContextForId(browser_context_id);
if (!context)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "browserContextId");
} else {
context = browser_->GetDefaultBrowserContext();
if (!context) {
return CreateErrorResponse(command_id, kErrorServerError,
"You specified no |browserContextId|, but "
"there is no default browser context set on "
"HeadlessBrowser");
}
}
HeadlessWebContentsImpl* web_contents_impl = HeadlessWebContentsImpl::From(
context->CreateWebContentsBuilder()
.SetInitialURL(GURL(url))
.SetWindowSize(gfx::Size(width, height))
.SetEnableBeginFrameControl(enable_begin_frame_control)
.Build());
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> result(
target::CreateTargetResult::Builder()
.SetTargetId(web_contents_impl->GetDevToolsAgentHostId())
.Build()
->Serialize());
return CreateSuccessResponse(command_id, std::move(result));
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,967 |
Chrome | fd6a5115103b3e6a52ce15858c5ad4956df29300 | void AudioNode::DidAddOutput(unsigned number_of_outputs) {
connected_nodes_.push_back(nullptr);
DCHECK_EQ(number_of_outputs, connected_nodes_.size());
connected_params_.push_back(nullptr);
DCHECK_EQ(number_of_outputs, connected_params_.size());
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,831 |
ImageMagick | 8187d2d8fd010d2d6b1a3a8edd935beec404dddc | static inline Quantum GetPixelChannel(const Image *magick_restrict image,
const PixelChannel channel,const Quantum *magick_restrict pixel)
{
if (image->channel_map[channel].traits == UndefinedPixelTrait)
return((Quantum) 0);
return(pixel[image->channel_map[channel].offset]);
} | 1 | CVE-2019-13299 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 5,515 |
ntopng | 30610bda60cbfc058f90a1c0a17d0e8f4516221a | static void get_qsvar(const struct mg_request_info *request_info,
const char *name, char *dst, size_t dst_len) {
const char *qs = request_info->query_string;
mg_get_var(qs, strlen(qs == NULL ? "" : qs), name, dst, dst_len);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,443 |
openjpeg | baf0c1ad4572daa89caa3b12985bdd93530f0dd7 | static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_info_header(FILE* IN, OPJ_BITMAPINFOHEADER* header)
{
memset(header, 0, sizeof(*header));
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
header->biSize = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
switch (header->biSize) {
case 12U: /* BITMAPCOREHEADER */
case 40U: /* BITMAPINFOHEADER */
case 52U: /* BITMAPV2INFOHEADER */
case 56U: /* BITMAPV3INFOHEADER */
case 108U: /* BITMAPV4HEADER */
case 124U: /* BITMAPV5HEADER */
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Error, unknown BMP header size %d\n", header->biSize);
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
header->biWidth = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biWidth |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biHeight = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biHeight |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biPlanes = (OPJ_UINT16)getc(IN);
header->biPlanes |= (OPJ_UINT16)((OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8);
header->biBitCount = (OPJ_UINT16)getc(IN);
header->biBitCount |= (OPJ_UINT16)((OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8);
if (header->biBitCount == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error, invalid biBitCount %d\n", 0);
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (header->biSize >= 40U) {
header->biCompression = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biCompression |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biSizeImage = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biSizeImage |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biXpelsPerMeter = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biXpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biYpelsPerMeter = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biYpelsPerMeter |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biClrUsed = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biClrUsed |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biClrImportant = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biClrImportant |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 56U) {
header->biRedMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biRedMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biGreenMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biGreenMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biBlueMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biBlueMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biAlphaMask = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biAlphaMask |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 108U) {
header->biColorSpaceType = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biColorSpaceType |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
if (fread(&(header->biColorSpaceEP), 1U, sizeof(header->biColorSpaceEP),
IN) != sizeof(header->biColorSpaceEP)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error, can't read BMP header\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
header->biRedGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biRedGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biGreenGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biGreenGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biBlueGamma = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biBlueGamma |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
if (header->biSize >= 124U) {
header->biIntent = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIntent |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biIccProfileData = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIccProfileData |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biIccProfileSize = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biIccProfileSize |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
header->biReserved = (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN);
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 8;
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 16;
header->biReserved |= (OPJ_UINT32)getc(IN) << 24;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,672 |
libmspack | 8759da8db6ec9e866cb8eb143313f397f925bb4f | static unsigned char *read_sys_file(struct mschm_decompressor_p *self,
struct mschmd_file *file)
{
struct mspack_system *sys = self->system;
unsigned char *data = NULL;
int len;
if (!file || !file->section || (file->section->id != 0)) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
return NULL;
}
len = (int) file->length;
if (!(data = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t) len))) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
return NULL;
}
if (sys->seek(self->d->infh, file->section->chm->sec0.offset
+ file->offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
{
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
sys->free(data);
return NULL;
}
if (sys->read(self->d->infh, data, len) != len) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_READ;
sys->free(data);
return NULL;
}
return data;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,848 |
linux-2.6 | 59839dfff5eabca01cc4e20b45797a60a80af8cb | static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state *ps)
{
int r = 0;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state, ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state));
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, 0, ps->channels[0].count);
return r;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,380 |
jansson | 64ce0ad3731ebd77e02897b07920eadd0e2cc318 | static int lex_scan(lex_t *lex, json_error_t *error)
{
int c;
strbuffer_clear(&lex->saved_text);
if(lex->token == TOKEN_STRING)
lex_free_string(lex);
do
c = lex_get(lex, error);
while(c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\n' || c == '\r');
if(c == STREAM_STATE_EOF) {
lex->token = TOKEN_EOF;
goto out;
}
if(c == STREAM_STATE_ERROR) {
lex->token = TOKEN_INVALID;
goto out;
}
lex_save(lex, c);
if(c == '{' || c == '}' || c == '[' || c == ']' || c == ':' || c == ',')
lex->token = c;
else if(c == '"')
lex_scan_string(lex, error);
else if(l_isdigit(c) || c == '-') {
if(lex_scan_number(lex, c, error))
goto out;
}
else if(l_isalpha(c)) {
/* eat up the whole identifier for clearer error messages */
const char *saved_text;
do
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
while(l_isalpha(c));
lex_unget_unsave(lex, c);
saved_text = strbuffer_value(&lex->saved_text);
if(strcmp(saved_text, "true") == 0)
lex->token = TOKEN_TRUE;
else if(strcmp(saved_text, "false") == 0)
lex->token = TOKEN_FALSE;
else if(strcmp(saved_text, "null") == 0)
lex->token = TOKEN_NULL;
else
lex->token = TOKEN_INVALID;
}
else {
/* save the rest of the input UTF-8 sequence to get an error
message of valid UTF-8 */
lex_save_cached(lex);
lex->token = TOKEN_INVALID;
}
out:
return lex->token;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,351 |
libjpeg-turbo | c30b1e72dac76343ef9029833d1561de07d29bad | static int fullTest(unsigned char *srcBuf, int w, int h, int subsamp,
int jpegQual, char *fileName)
{
char tempStr[1024], tempStr2[80];
FILE *file = NULL;
tjhandle handle = NULL;
unsigned char **jpegBuf = NULL, *yuvBuf = NULL, *tmpBuf = NULL, *srcPtr,
*srcPtr2;
double start, elapsed, elapsedEncode;
int totalJpegSize = 0, row, col, i, tilew = w, tileh = h, retval = 0;
int iter;
unsigned long *jpegSize = NULL, yuvSize = 0;
int ps = tjPixelSize[pf];
int ntilesw = 1, ntilesh = 1, pitch = w * ps;
const char *pfStr = pixFormatStr[pf];
if ((unsigned long long)pitch * (unsigned long long)h >
(unsigned long long)((size_t)-1))
THROW("allocating temporary image buffer", "Image is too large");
if ((tmpBuf = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t)pitch * h)) == NULL)
THROW_UNIX("allocating temporary image buffer");
if (!quiet)
printf(">>>>> %s (%s) <--> JPEG %s Q%d <<<<<\n", pfStr,
(flags & TJFLAG_BOTTOMUP) ? "Bottom-up" : "Top-down",
subNameLong[subsamp], jpegQual);
for (tilew = doTile ? 8 : w, tileh = doTile ? 8 : h; ;
tilew *= 2, tileh *= 2) {
if (tilew > w) tilew = w;
if (tileh > h) tileh = h;
ntilesw = (w + tilew - 1) / tilew;
ntilesh = (h + tileh - 1) / tileh;
if ((jpegBuf = (unsigned char **)malloc(sizeof(unsigned char *) *
ntilesw * ntilesh)) == NULL)
THROW_UNIX("allocating JPEG tile array");
memset(jpegBuf, 0, sizeof(unsigned char *) * ntilesw * ntilesh);
if ((jpegSize = (unsigned long *)malloc(sizeof(unsigned long) *
ntilesw * ntilesh)) == NULL)
THROW_UNIX("allocating JPEG size array");
memset(jpegSize, 0, sizeof(unsigned long) * ntilesw * ntilesh);
if ((flags & TJFLAG_NOREALLOC) != 0)
for (i = 0; i < ntilesw * ntilesh; i++) {
if (tjBufSize(tilew, tileh, subsamp) > (unsigned long)INT_MAX)
THROW("getting buffer size", "Image is too large");
if ((jpegBuf[i] = (unsigned char *)
tjAlloc(tjBufSize(tilew, tileh, subsamp))) == NULL)
THROW_UNIX("allocating JPEG tiles");
}
/* Compression test */
if (quiet == 1)
printf("%-4s (%s) %-5s %-3d ", pfStr,
(flags & TJFLAG_BOTTOMUP) ? "BU" : "TD", subNameLong[subsamp],
jpegQual);
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
memcpy(&tmpBuf[pitch * i], &srcBuf[w * ps * i], w * ps);
if ((handle = tjInitCompress()) == NULL)
THROW_TJ("executing tjInitCompress()");
if (doYUV) {
yuvSize = tjBufSizeYUV2(tilew, yuvPad, tileh, subsamp);
if (yuvSize == (unsigned long)-1)
THROW_TJ("allocating YUV buffer");
if ((yuvBuf = (unsigned char *)malloc(yuvSize)) == NULL)
THROW_UNIX("allocating YUV buffer");
memset(yuvBuf, 127, yuvSize);
}
/* Benchmark */
iter = -1;
elapsed = elapsedEncode = 0.;
while (1) {
int tile = 0;
totalJpegSize = 0;
start = getTime();
for (row = 0, srcPtr = srcBuf; row < ntilesh;
row++, srcPtr += pitch * tileh) {
for (col = 0, srcPtr2 = srcPtr; col < ntilesw;
col++, tile++, srcPtr2 += ps * tilew) {
int width = min(tilew, w - col * tilew);
int height = min(tileh, h - row * tileh);
if (doYUV) {
double startEncode = getTime();
if (tjEncodeYUV3(handle, srcPtr2, width, pitch, height, pf, yuvBuf,
yuvPad, subsamp, flags) == -1)
THROW_TJ("executing tjEncodeYUV3()");
if (iter >= 0) elapsedEncode += getTime() - startEncode;
if (tjCompressFromYUV(handle, yuvBuf, width, yuvPad, height,
subsamp, &jpegBuf[tile], &jpegSize[tile],
jpegQual, flags) == -1)
THROW_TJ("executing tjCompressFromYUV()");
} else {
if (tjCompress2(handle, srcPtr2, width, pitch, height, pf,
&jpegBuf[tile], &jpegSize[tile], subsamp, jpegQual,
flags) == -1)
THROW_TJ("executing tjCompress2()");
}
totalJpegSize += jpegSize[tile];
}
}
elapsed += getTime() - start;
if (iter >= 0) {
iter++;
if (elapsed >= benchTime) break;
} else if (elapsed >= warmup) {
iter = 0;
elapsed = elapsedEncode = 0.;
}
}
if (doYUV) elapsed -= elapsedEncode;
if (tjDestroy(handle) == -1) THROW_TJ("executing tjDestroy()");
handle = NULL;
if (quiet == 1) printf("%-5d %-5d ", tilew, tileh);
if (quiet) {
if (doYUV)
printf("%-6s%s",
sigfig((double)(w * h) / 1000000. *
(double)iter / elapsedEncode, 4, tempStr, 1024),
quiet == 2 ? "\n" : " ");
printf("%-6s%s",
sigfig((double)(w * h) / 1000000. * (double)iter / elapsed, 4,
tempStr, 1024),
quiet == 2 ? "\n" : " ");
printf("%-6s%s",
sigfig((double)(w * h * ps) / (double)totalJpegSize, 4, tempStr2,
80),
quiet == 2 ? "\n" : " ");
} else {
printf("\n%s size: %d x %d\n", doTile ? "Tile" : "Image", tilew, tileh);
if (doYUV) {
printf("Encode YUV --> Frame rate: %f fps\n",
(double)iter / elapsedEncode);
printf(" Output image size: %lu bytes\n", yuvSize);
printf(" Compression ratio: %f:1\n",
(double)(w * h * ps) / (double)yuvSize);
printf(" Throughput: %f Megapixels/sec\n",
(double)(w * h) / 1000000. * (double)iter / elapsedEncode);
printf(" Output bit stream: %f Megabits/sec\n",
(double)yuvSize * 8. / 1000000. * (double)iter / elapsedEncode);
}
printf("%s --> Frame rate: %f fps\n",
doYUV ? "Comp from YUV" : "Compress ",
(double)iter / elapsed);
printf(" Output image size: %d bytes\n",
totalJpegSize);
printf(" Compression ratio: %f:1\n",
(double)(w * h * ps) / (double)totalJpegSize);
printf(" Throughput: %f Megapixels/sec\n",
(double)(w * h) / 1000000. * (double)iter / elapsed);
printf(" Output bit stream: %f Megabits/sec\n",
(double)totalJpegSize * 8. / 1000000. * (double)iter / elapsed);
}
if (tilew == w && tileh == h && doWrite) {
snprintf(tempStr, 1024, "%s_%s_Q%d.jpg", fileName, subName[subsamp],
jpegQual);
if ((file = fopen(tempStr, "wb")) == NULL)
THROW_UNIX("opening reference image");
if (fwrite(jpegBuf[0], jpegSize[0], 1, file) != 1)
THROW_UNIX("writing reference image");
fclose(file); file = NULL;
if (!quiet) printf("Reference image written to %s\n", tempStr);
}
/* Decompression test */
if (!compOnly) {
if (decomp(srcBuf, jpegBuf, jpegSize, tmpBuf, w, h, subsamp, jpegQual,
fileName, tilew, tileh) == -1)
goto bailout;
} else if (quiet == 1) printf("N/A\n");
for (i = 0; i < ntilesw * ntilesh; i++) {
if (jpegBuf[i]) tjFree(jpegBuf[i]);
jpegBuf[i] = NULL;
}
free(jpegBuf); jpegBuf = NULL;
free(jpegSize); jpegSize = NULL;
if (doYUV) {
free(yuvBuf); yuvBuf = NULL;
}
if (tilew == w && tileh == h) break;
}
bailout:
if (file) { fclose(file); file = NULL; }
if (jpegBuf) {
for (i = 0; i < ntilesw * ntilesh; i++) {
if (jpegBuf[i]) tjFree(jpegBuf[i]);
jpegBuf[i] = NULL;
}
free(jpegBuf); jpegBuf = NULL;
}
if (yuvBuf) { free(yuvBuf); yuvBuf = NULL; }
if (jpegSize) { free(jpegSize); jpegSize = NULL; }
if (tmpBuf) { free(tmpBuf); tmpBuf = NULL; }
if (handle) { tjDestroy(handle); handle = NULL; }
return retval;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,060 |
linux | 635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e | static void sctp_generate_timeout_event(struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_event_timeout_t timeout_type)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
int error = 0;
bh_lock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(asoc->base.sk)) {
pr_debug("%s: sock is busy: timer %d\n", __func__,
timeout_type);
/* Try again later. */
if (!mod_timer(&asoc->timers[timeout_type], jiffies + (HZ/20)))
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Is this association really dead and just waiting around for
* the timer to let go of the reference?
*/
if (asoc->base.dead)
goto out_unlock;
/* Run through the state machine. */
error = sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_TIMEOUT,
SCTP_ST_TIMEOUT(timeout_type),
asoc->state, asoc->ep, asoc,
(void *)timeout_type, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (error)
asoc->base.sk->sk_err = -error;
out_unlock:
bh_unlock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
| 1 | CVE-2015-8767 | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. | Phase: Architecture and Design
In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
Phase: Implementation
When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
Phase: Implementation
Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
Phase: Implementation
Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
Phase: Implementation
Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
Phase: Implementation
Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
Phase: Implementation
Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
Phases: Architecture and Design; Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations | 821 |
Chrome | 7cde8513c12a6e8ec5d1d1eb1cfd078d9adad3ef | base::string16 PageInfoUI::PermissionTypeToUIString(ContentSettingsType type) {
for (const PermissionsUIInfo& info : GetContentSettingsUIInfo()) {
if (info.type == type)
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(info.string_id);
}
NOTREACHED();
return base::string16();
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,496 |
php | c351b47ce85a3a147cfa801fa9f0149ab4160834 | static void pcre_handle_exec_error(int pcre_code TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int preg_code = 0;
switch (pcre_code) {
case PCRE_ERROR_MATCHLIMIT:
preg_code = PHP_PCRE_BACKTRACK_LIMIT_ERROR;
break;
case PCRE_ERROR_RECURSIONLIMIT:
preg_code = PHP_PCRE_RECURSION_LIMIT_ERROR;
break;
case PCRE_ERROR_BADUTF8:
preg_code = PHP_PCRE_BAD_UTF8_ERROR;
break;
case PCRE_ERROR_BADUTF8_OFFSET:
preg_code = PHP_PCRE_BAD_UTF8_OFFSET_ERROR;
break;
default:
preg_code = PHP_PCRE_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
}
PCRE_G(error_code) = preg_code;
}
/* }}} */
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,513 |
Chrome | ff4330a2ca6bf69d24f9f9fb6f12dc81387b205a | explicit ScopedTargetContentsOwner(browser::NavigateParams* params)
: params_(params) {
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,779 |
Chrome | b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7 | WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-5156 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 179 |
qemu | 8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b | void bdrv_add_close_notifier(BlockDriverState *bs, Notifier *notify)
{
notifier_list_add(&bs->close_notifiers, notify);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,832 |
oniguruma | 6eb4aca6a7f2f60f473580576d86686ed6a6ebec | st_insert_callout_name_table(hash_table_type* table,
OnigEncoding enc, int type,
UChar* str_key, UChar* end_key,
hash_data_type value)
{
st_callout_name_key* key;
int result;
key = (st_callout_name_key* )xmalloc(sizeof(st_callout_name_key));
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(key);
/* key->s: don't duplicate, because str_key is duped in callout_name_entry() */
key->enc = enc;
key->type = type;
key->s = str_key;
key->end = end_key;
result = onig_st_insert(table, (st_data_t )key, value);
if (result) {
xfree(key);
}
return result;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,549 |
libdwarf-code | 8151575a6ace77d005ca5bb5d71c1bfdba3f7069 | dwarf_get_cu_die_offset_given_cu_header_offset_b(Dwarf_Debug dbg,
Dwarf_Off in_cu_header_offset,
Dwarf_Bool is_info,
Dwarf_Off * out_cu_die_offset,
Dwarf_Error * error)
{
Dwarf_Off headerlen = 0;
int cres = 0;
if (!dbg || dbg->de_magic != DBG_IS_VALID) {
_dwarf_error_string(NULL, error, DW_DLE_DBG_NULL,
"DW_DLE_DBG_NULL: "
"calling dwarf_get_cu_die_offset_given"
"cu_header_offset_b Dwarf_Debug is"
"either null or it is"
"a stale Dwarf_Debug pointer");
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
cres = _dwarf_length_of_cu_header(dbg,
in_cu_header_offset,is_info, &headerlen,error);
if (cres != DW_DLV_OK) {
return cres;
}
*out_cu_die_offset = in_cu_header_offset + headerlen;
return DW_DLV_OK;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,175 |
tensorflow | a74768f8e4efbda4def9f16ee7e13cf3922ac5f7 | static void SpatialMaxPoolWithArgMaxHelper(
OpKernelContext* context, Tensor* output, Tensor* output_arg_max,
Tensor* input_backprop, const Tensor& tensor_in, const Tensor& out_backprop,
const PoolParameters& params, const bool include_batch_in_index) {
if (input_backprop != nullptr) {
OP_REQUIRES(
context, include_batch_in_index,
errors::Internal(
"SpatialMaxPoolWithArgMaxHelper requires include_batch_in_index "
"to be True when input_backprop != nullptr"));
OP_REQUIRES(
context, (std::is_same<Targmax, int64>::value),
errors::Internal("SpatialMaxPoolWithArgMaxHelper requires Targmax "
"to be int64 when input_backprop != nullptr"));
}
typedef Eigen::Map<const Eigen::Matrix<T, Eigen::Dynamic, Eigen::Dynamic>>
ConstEigenMatrixMap;
typedef Eigen::Map<Eigen::Matrix<T, Eigen::Dynamic, Eigen::Dynamic>>
EigenMatrixMap;
typedef Eigen::Map<Eigen::Matrix<Targmax, Eigen::Dynamic, Eigen::Dynamic>>
EigenIndexMatrixMap;
ConstEigenMatrixMap in_mat(
tensor_in.flat<T>().data(), params.depth,
params.tensor_in_cols * params.tensor_in_rows * params.tensor_in_batch);
EigenMatrixMap out_mat(
output->flat<T>().data(), params.depth,
params.out_width * params.out_height * params.tensor_in_batch);
EigenIndexMatrixMap out_arg_max_mat(
output_arg_max->flat<Targmax>().data(), params.depth,
params.out_width * params.out_height * params.tensor_in_batch);
const DeviceBase::CpuWorkerThreads& worker_threads =
*(context->device()->tensorflow_cpu_worker_threads());
// The following code basically does the following:
// 1. Flattens the input and output tensors into two dimensional arrays.
// tensor_in_as_matrix:
// depth by (tensor_in_cols * tensor_in_rows * tensor_in_batch)
// output_as_matrix:
// depth by (out_width * out_height * tensor_in_batch)
//
// 2. Walks through the set of columns in the flattened tensor_in_as_matrix,
// and updates the corresponding column(s) in output_as_matrix with the
// max value.
auto shard = [¶ms, &in_mat, &out_mat, &out_arg_max_mat, &input_backprop,
&output_arg_max, &out_backprop,
include_batch_in_index](int64 start, int64 limit) {
const int32 depth = params.depth;
const int32 in_rows = params.tensor_in_rows;
const int32 in_cols = params.tensor_in_cols;
const int32 pad_top = params.pad_top;
const int32 pad_left = params.pad_left;
const int32 window_rows = params.window_rows;
const int32 window_cols = params.window_cols;
const int32 row_stride = params.row_stride;
const int32 col_stride = params.col_stride;
const int32 out_height = params.out_height;
const int32 out_width = params.out_width;
{
// Initializes the output tensor with MIN<T>.
const int32 output_image_size = out_height * out_width * depth;
EigenMatrixMap out_shard(out_mat.data() + start * output_image_size, 1,
(limit - start) * output_image_size);
out_shard.setConstant(Eigen::NumTraits<T>::lowest());
EigenIndexMatrixMap out_arg_max_shard(
out_arg_max_mat.data() + start * output_image_size, 1,
(limit - start) * output_image_size);
out_arg_max_shard.setConstant(kInvalidMaxPoolingIndex);
}
for (int64 b = start; b < limit; ++b) {
for (int h = 0; h < in_rows; ++h) {
for (int w = 0; w < in_cols; ++w) {
// (h_start, h_end) * (w_start, w_end) is the range that the input
// vector projects to.
const int hpad = h + pad_top;
const int wpad = w + pad_left;
const int h_start =
(hpad < window_rows) ? 0 : (hpad - window_rows) / row_stride + 1;
const int h_end = std::min(hpad / row_stride + 1, out_height);
const int w_start =
(wpad < window_cols) ? 0 : (wpad - window_cols) / col_stride + 1;
const int w_end = std::min(wpad / col_stride + 1, out_width);
// compute elementwise max
const int64 in_index = (b * in_rows + h) * in_cols + w;
for (int ph = h_start; ph < h_end; ++ph) {
const int64 out_index_base = (b * out_height + ph) * out_width;
for (int pw = w_start; pw < w_end; ++pw) {
const int64 out_index = out_index_base + pw;
/// NOTES(zhengxq): not using the eigen matrix operation for
/// now.
for (int d = 0; d < depth; ++d) {
const T& input_ref = in_mat.coeffRef(d, in_index);
T& output_ref = out_mat.coeffRef(d, out_index);
Targmax& out_arg_max_ref =
out_arg_max_mat.coeffRef(d, out_index);
if (output_ref < input_ref ||
out_arg_max_ref == kInvalidMaxPoolingIndex) {
output_ref = input_ref;
if (include_batch_in_index) {
out_arg_max_ref = in_index * depth + d;
} else {
out_arg_max_ref = (h * in_cols + w) * depth + d;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
if (input_backprop != nullptr) {
auto input_backprop_flat = input_backprop->flat<T>();
auto out_arg_max_flat = output_arg_max->flat<int64>();
auto out_backprop_flat = out_backprop.flat<T>();
// Initialize output to 0.
const int64 in_size = in_rows * in_cols * depth;
const int64 in_start = start * in_size;
const int64 in_end = limit * in_size;
EigenMatrixMap in_shard(input_backprop_flat.data() + in_start, 1,
in_end - in_start);
in_shard.setConstant(T(0));
// Backpropagate.
const int out_size = out_height * out_width * depth;
const int out_start = start * out_size;
const int out_end = limit * out_size;
for (int index = out_start; index < out_end; ++index) {
int input_backprop_index = out_arg_max_flat(index);
// Although this check is in the inner loop, it is worth its value
// so we don't end up with memory corruptions. Our benchmark shows that
// the performance impact is quite small
// CHECK(input_backprop_index >= in_start && input_backprop_index <
// in_end)
FastBoundsCheck(input_backprop_index - in_start, in_end - in_start);
input_backprop_flat(input_backprop_index) += out_backprop_flat(index);
}
}
};
const int64 shard_cost = params.tensor_in_rows * params.tensor_in_cols *
params.depth * params.window_rows *
params.window_cols;
Shard(worker_threads.num_threads, worker_threads.workers,
params.tensor_in_batch, shard_cost, shard);
} | 1 | CVE-2021-29579 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 5,856 |
FFmpeg | b0a8b40294ea212c1938348ff112ef1b9bf16bb3 | static int b44_uncompress(EXRContext *s, const uint8_t *src, int compressed_size,
int uncompressed_size, EXRThreadData *td) {
const int8_t *sr = src;
int stay_to_uncompress = compressed_size;
int nb_b44_block_w, nb_b44_block_h;
int index_tl_x, index_tl_y, index_out, index_tmp;
uint16_t tmp_buffer[16]; /* B44 use 4x4 half float pixel */
int c, iY, iX, y, x;
int target_channel_offset = 0;
/* calc B44 block count */
nb_b44_block_w = td->xsize / 4;
if ((td->xsize % 4) != 0)
nb_b44_block_w++;
nb_b44_block_h = td->ysize / 4;
if ((td->ysize % 4) != 0)
nb_b44_block_h++;
for (c = 0; c < s->nb_channels; c++) {
if (s->channels[c].pixel_type == EXR_HALF) {/* B44 only compress half float data */
for (iY = 0; iY < nb_b44_block_h; iY++) {
for (iX = 0; iX < nb_b44_block_w; iX++) {/* For each B44 block */
if (stay_to_uncompress < 3) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Not enough data for B44A block: %d", stay_to_uncompress);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (src[compressed_size - stay_to_uncompress + 2] == 0xfc) { /* B44A block */
unpack_3(sr, tmp_buffer);
sr += 3;
stay_to_uncompress -= 3;
} else {/* B44 Block */
if (stay_to_uncompress < 14) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Not enough data for B44 block: %d", stay_to_uncompress);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
unpack_14(sr, tmp_buffer);
sr += 14;
stay_to_uncompress -= 14;
}
/* copy data to uncompress buffer (B44 block can exceed target resolution)*/
index_tl_x = iX * 4;
index_tl_y = iY * 4;
for (y = index_tl_y; y < FFMIN(index_tl_y + 4, td->ysize); y++) {
for (x = index_tl_x; x < FFMIN(index_tl_x + 4, td->xsize); x++) {
index_out = target_channel_offset * td->xsize + y * td->channel_line_size + 2 * x;
index_tmp = (y-index_tl_y) * 4 + (x-index_tl_x);
td->uncompressed_data[index_out] = tmp_buffer[index_tmp] & 0xff;
td->uncompressed_data[index_out + 1] = tmp_buffer[index_tmp] >> 8;
}
}
}
}
target_channel_offset += 2;
} else {/* Float or UINT 32 channel */
if (stay_to_uncompress < td->ysize * td->xsize * 4) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Not enough data for uncompress channel: %d", stay_to_uncompress);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (y = 0; y < td->ysize; y++) {
index_out = target_channel_offset * td->xsize + y * td->channel_line_size;
memcpy(&td->uncompressed_data[index_out], sr, td->xsize * 4);
sr += td->xsize * 4;
}
target_channel_offset += 4;
stay_to_uncompress -= td->ysize * td->xsize * 4;
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,152 |
gdk-pixbuf | f8569bb13e2aa1584dde61ca545144750f7a7c98 | gif_init (GifContext *context)
{
unsigned char buf[16];
char version[4];
if (!gif_read (context, buf, 6)) {
/* Unable to read magic number,
* gif_read() should have set error
*/
return -1;
}
if (strncmp ((char *) buf, "GIF", 3) != 0) {
/* Not a GIF file */
g_set_error_literal (context->error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_CORRUPT_IMAGE,
_("File does not appear to be a GIF file"));
return -2;
}
strncpy (version, (char *) buf + 3, 3);
version[3] = '\0';
if ((strcmp (version, "87a") != 0) && (strcmp (version, "89a") != 0)) {
/* bad version number, not '87a' or '89a' */
g_set_error (context->error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_CORRUPT_IMAGE,
_("Version %s of the GIF file format is not supported"),
version);
return -2;
}
/* read the screen descriptor */
if (!gif_read (context, buf, 7)) {
/* Failed to read screen descriptor, error set */
return -1;
}
context->width = LM_to_uint (buf[0], buf[1]);
context->height = LM_to_uint (buf[2], buf[3]);
/* The 4th byte is
* high bit: whether to use the background index
* next 3: color resolution
* next: whether colormap is sorted by priority of allocation
* last 3: size of colormap
*/
context->global_bit_pixel = 2 << (buf[4] & 0x07);
context->global_color_resolution = (((buf[4] & 0x70) >> 3) + 1);
context->has_global_cmap = (buf[4] & 0x80) != 0;
context->background_index = buf[5];
context->aspect_ratio = buf[6];
/* Use background of transparent black as default, though if
* one isn't set explicitly no one should ever use it.
*/
context->animation->bg_red = 0;
context->animation->bg_green = 0;
context->animation->bg_blue = 0;
context->animation->width = context->width;
context->animation->height = context->height;
if (context->has_global_cmap) {
gif_set_get_colormap (context);
} else {
context->state = GIF_GET_NEXT_STEP;
}
#ifdef DUMP_IMAGE_DETAILS
g_print (">Image width: %d height: %d global_cmap: %d background: %d\n",
context->width, context->height, context->has_global_cmap, context->background_index);
#endif
return 0;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,380 |
tcpdump | 061e7371a944588f231cb1b66d6fb070b646e376 | ikev1_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
#define USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1 1
const struct ikev1_pl_id *p;
struct ikev1_pl_id id;
static const char *idtypestr[] = {
"IPv4", "IPv4net", "IPv6", "IPv6net",
};
static const char *ipsecidtypestr[] = {
NULL, "IPv4", "FQDN", "user FQDN", "IPv4net", "IPv6",
"IPv6net", "IPv4range", "IPv6range", "ASN1 DN", "ASN1 GN",
"keyid",
};
int len;
const u_char *data;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_ID)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_id *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&id, ext, sizeof(id));
if (sizeof(*p) < item_len) {
data = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
len = item_len - sizeof(*p);
} else {
data = NULL;
len = 0;
}
#if 0 /*debug*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," [phase=%d doi=%d proto=%d]", phase, doi, proto));
#endif
switch (phase) {
#ifndef USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1
case 1:
#endif
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo," idtype=%s", STR_OR_ID(id.d.id_type, idtypestr)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi_data=%u",
(uint32_t)(ntohl(id.d.doi_data) & 0xffffff)));
break;
#ifdef USE_IPSECDOI_IN_PHASE1
case 1:
#endif
case 2:
{
const struct ipsecdoi_id *doi_p;
struct ipsecdoi_id doi_id;
const char *p_name;
doi_p = (const struct ipsecdoi_id *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*doi_p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&doi_id, ext, sizeof(doi_id));
ND_PRINT((ndo," idtype=%s", STR_OR_ID(doi_id.type, ipsecidtypestr)));
/* A protocol ID of 0 DOES NOT mean IPPROTO_IP! */
if (!ndo->ndo_nflag && doi_id.proto_id && (p_name = netdb_protoname(doi_id.proto_id)) != NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo," protoid=%s", p_name));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," protoid=%u", doi_id.proto_id));
ND_PRINT((ndo," port=%d", ntohs(doi_id.port)));
if (!len)
break;
if (data == NULL)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*data, len);
switch (doi_id.type) {
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
if (len < 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 4]", len));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s", len, ipaddr_string(ndo, data)));
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_FQDN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_USER_FQDN:
{
int i;
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d ", len));
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
safeputchar(ndo, data[i]);
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
{
const u_char *mask;
if (len < 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 8]", len));
else {
mask = data + sizeof(struct in_addr);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s/%u.%u.%u.%u", len,
ipaddr_string(ndo, data),
mask[0], mask[1], mask[2], mask[3]));
}
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
if (len < 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 16]", len));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s", len, ip6addr_string(ndo, data)));
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
{
const u_char *mask;
if (len < 20)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 20]", len));
else {
mask = (const u_char *)(data + sizeof(struct in6_addr));
/*XXX*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s/0x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", len,
ip6addr_string(ndo, data),
mask[0], mask[1], mask[2], mask[3],
mask[4], mask[5], mask[6], mask[7],
mask[8], mask[9], mask[10], mask[11],
mask[12], mask[13], mask[14], mask[15]));
}
len = 0;
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
if (len < 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 8]", len));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s-%s", len,
ipaddr_string(ndo, data),
ipaddr_string(ndo, data + sizeof(struct in_addr))));
}
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
if (len < 32)
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d [bad: < 32]", len));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d %s-%s", len,
ip6addr_string(ndo, data),
ip6addr_string(ndo, data + sizeof(struct in6_addr))));
}
len = 0;
break;
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
case IPSECDOI_ID_KEY_ID:
break;
}
break;
}
}
if (data && len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", len));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)data, len))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_ID)));
return NULL;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-13689 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 6,543 |
server | 5ba77222e9fe7af8ff403816b5338b18b342053c | free_tmp_table(THD *thd, TABLE *entry)
{
MEM_ROOT own_root= entry->mem_root;
const char *save_proc_info;
DBUG_ENTER("free_tmp_table");
DBUG_PRINT("enter",("table: %s alias: %s",entry->s->table_name.str,
entry->alias.c_ptr()));
save_proc_info=thd->proc_info;
THD_STAGE_INFO(thd, stage_removing_tmp_table);
if (entry->file && entry->is_created())
{
entry->file->ha_index_or_rnd_end();
if (entry->db_stat)
entry->file->ha_drop_table(entry->s->path.str);
else
entry->file->ha_delete_table(entry->s->path.str);
delete entry->file;
}
/* free blobs */
for (Field **ptr=entry->field ; *ptr ; ptr++)
(*ptr)->free();
if (entry->temp_pool_slot != MY_BIT_NONE)
bitmap_lock_clear_bit(&temp_pool, entry->temp_pool_slot);
plugin_unlock(0, entry->s->db_plugin);
entry->alias.free();
free_root(&own_root, MYF(0)); /* the table is allocated in its own root */
thd_proc_info(thd, save_proc_info);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,409 |
linux | 338f977f4eb441e69bb9a46eaa0ac715c931a67f | ieee80211_tx_h_dynamic_ps(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = tx->local;
struct ieee80211_if_managed *ifmgd;
/* driver doesn't support power save */
if (!(local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_PS))
return TX_CONTINUE;
/* hardware does dynamic power save */
if (local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_DYNAMIC_PS)
return TX_CONTINUE;
/* dynamic power save disabled */
if (local->hw.conf.dynamic_ps_timeout <= 0)
return TX_CONTINUE;
/* we are scanning, don't enable power save */
if (local->scanning)
return TX_CONTINUE;
if (!local->ps_sdata)
return TX_CONTINUE;
/* No point if we're going to suspend */
if (local->quiescing)
return TX_CONTINUE;
/* dynamic ps is supported only in managed mode */
if (tx->sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION)
return TX_CONTINUE;
ifmgd = &tx->sdata->u.mgd;
/*
* Don't wakeup from power save if u-apsd is enabled, voip ac has
* u-apsd enabled and the frame is in voip class. This effectively
* means that even if all access categories have u-apsd enabled, in
* practise u-apsd is only used with the voip ac. This is a
* workaround for the case when received voip class packets do not
* have correct qos tag for some reason, due the network or the
* peer application.
*
* Note: ifmgd->uapsd_queues access is racy here. If the value is
* changed via debugfs, user needs to reassociate manually to have
* everything in sync.
*/
if ((ifmgd->flags & IEEE80211_STA_UAPSD_ENABLED) &&
(ifmgd->uapsd_queues & IEEE80211_WMM_IE_STA_QOSINFO_AC_VO) &&
skb_get_queue_mapping(tx->skb) == IEEE80211_AC_VO)
return TX_CONTINUE;
if (local->hw.conf.flags & IEEE80211_CONF_PS) {
ieee80211_stop_queues_by_reason(&local->hw,
IEEE80211_MAX_QUEUE_MAP,
IEEE80211_QUEUE_STOP_REASON_PS);
ifmgd->flags &= ~IEEE80211_STA_NULLFUNC_ACKED;
ieee80211_queue_work(&local->hw,
&local->dynamic_ps_disable_work);
}
/* Don't restart the timer if we're not disassociated */
if (!ifmgd->associated)
return TX_CONTINUE;
mod_timer(&local->dynamic_ps_timer, jiffies +
msecs_to_jiffies(local->hw.conf.dynamic_ps_timeout));
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,680 |
Chrome | 01e4ee2fda0a5e57a8d0c8cb829022eb84fdff12 | PassRefPtr<StylePropertySet> CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::copy() const
{
return copyPropertiesInSet(computedProperties, numComputedProperties);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,972 |
php | 188c196d4da60bdde9190d2fc532650d17f7af2d | xmlNodePtr get_node_ex(xmlNodePtr node, char *name, char *ns)
{
while (node!=NULL) {
if (node_is_equal_ex(node, name, ns)) {
return node;
}
node = node->next;
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,568 |
gpac | dae9900580a8888969481cd72035408091edb11b | GF_Err gf_isom_write_compressed_box(GF_ISOFile *mov, GF_Box *root_box, u32 repl_type, GF_BitStream *bs, u32 *box_csize)
{
#ifdef GPAC_DISABLE_ZLIB
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#else
GF_Err e;
GF_BitStream *comp_bs = gf_bs_new(NULL, 0, GF_BITSTREAM_WRITE);
e = gf_isom_box_write(root_box, comp_bs);
if (!e) {
u8 *box_data;
u32 box_size, comp_size;
if (box_csize)
*box_csize = (u32) root_box->size;
gf_bs_get_content(comp_bs, &box_data, &box_size);
gf_gz_compress_payload_ex(&box_data, box_size, &comp_size, 8, GF_TRUE, NULL);
if (mov->force_compress || (comp_size + COMP_BOX_COST_BYTES < box_size)) {
if (bs) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, comp_size+8);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, repl_type);
gf_bs_write_data(bs, box_data, comp_size);
}
if (box_csize)
*box_csize = comp_size + COMP_BOX_COST_BYTES;
} else if (bs) {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, box_data, box_size);
}
gf_free(box_data);
}
gf_bs_del(comp_bs);
return e;
#endif /*GPAC_DISABLE_ZLIB*/
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,509 |
Chrome | b9866ebc631655c593a2ac60a3c7cf7d217ccf5d | void AudioOutputController::EnqueueData(const uint8* data, uint32 size) {
AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
pending_request_ = false;
if (size) {
buffer_.Append(data, size);
SubmitOnMoreData_Locked();
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,833 |
ceph | ba0790a01ba5252db1ebc299db6e12cd758d0ff9 | int RGWCopyObj_ObjStore_S3::get_params()
{
if_mod = s->info.env->get("HTTP_X_AMZ_COPY_IF_MODIFIED_SINCE");
if_unmod = s->info.env->get("HTTP_X_AMZ_COPY_IF_UNMODIFIED_SINCE");
if_match = s->info.env->get("HTTP_X_AMZ_COPY_IF_MATCH");
if_nomatch = s->info.env->get("HTTP_X_AMZ_COPY_IF_NONE_MATCH");
src_tenant_name = s->src_tenant_name;
src_bucket_name = s->src_bucket_name;
src_object = s->src_object;
dest_tenant_name = s->bucket.tenant;
dest_bucket_name = s->bucket.name;
dest_object = s->object.name;
if (s->system_request) {
source_zone = s->info.args.get(RGW_SYS_PARAM_PREFIX "source-zone");
s->info.args.get_bool(RGW_SYS_PARAM_PREFIX "copy-if-newer", ©_if_newer, false);
if (!source_zone.empty()) {
client_id = s->info.args.get(RGW_SYS_PARAM_PREFIX "client-id");
op_id = s->info.args.get(RGW_SYS_PARAM_PREFIX "op-id");
if (client_id.empty() || op_id.empty()) {
ldout(s->cct, 0) <<
RGW_SYS_PARAM_PREFIX "client-id or "
RGW_SYS_PARAM_PREFIX "op-id were not provided, "
"required for intra-region copy"
<< dendl;
return -EINVAL;
}
}
}
copy_source = s->info.env->get("HTTP_X_AMZ_COPY_SOURCE");
auto tmp_md_d = s->info.env->get("HTTP_X_AMZ_METADATA_DIRECTIVE");
if (tmp_md_d) {
if (strcasecmp(tmp_md_d, "COPY") == 0) {
attrs_mod = RGWRados::ATTRSMOD_NONE;
} else if (strcasecmp(tmp_md_d, "REPLACE") == 0) {
attrs_mod = RGWRados::ATTRSMOD_REPLACE;
} else if (!source_zone.empty()) {
attrs_mod = RGWRados::ATTRSMOD_NONE; // default for intra-zone_group copy
} else {
s->err.message = "Unknown metadata directive.";
ldout(s->cct, 0) << s->err.message << dendl;
return -EINVAL;
}
md_directive = tmp_md_d;
}
if (source_zone.empty() &&
(dest_tenant_name.compare(src_tenant_name) == 0) &&
(dest_bucket_name.compare(src_bucket_name) == 0) &&
(dest_object.compare(src_object.name) == 0) &&
src_object.instance.empty() &&
(attrs_mod != RGWRados::ATTRSMOD_REPLACE)) {
/* can only copy object into itself if replacing attrs */
s->err.message = "This copy request is illegal because it is trying to copy "
"an object to itself without changing the object's metadata, "
"storage class, website redirect location or encryption attributes.";
ldout(s->cct, 0) << s->err.message << dendl;
return -ERR_INVALID_REQUEST;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,273 |
PDFGen | ee58aff6918b8bbc3be29b9e3089485ea46ff956 | static const uint16_t *find_font_widths(const char *font_name)
{
if (strcmp(font_name, "Helvetica") == 0)
return helvetica_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Helvetica-Bold") == 0)
return helvetica_bold_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Helvetica-BoldOblique") == 0)
return helvetica_bold_oblique_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Helvetica-Oblique") == 0)
return helvetica_oblique_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Courier") == 0 ||
strcmp(font_name, "Courier-Bold") == 0 ||
strcmp(font_name, "Courier-BoldOblique") == 0 ||
strcmp(font_name, "Courier-Oblique") == 0)
return courier_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Times-Roman") == 0)
return times_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Times-Bold") == 0)
return times_bold_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Times-Italic") == 0)
return times_italic_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Times-BoldItalic") == 0)
return times_bold_italic_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "Symbol") == 0)
return symbol_widths;
if (strcmp(font_name, "ZapfDingbats") == 0)
return zapfdingbats_widths;
return NULL;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,996 |
Chrome | 04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8 | void SetupMockGroup() {
std::unique_ptr<net::HttpResponseInfo> info(MakeMockResponseInfo());
const int kMockInfoSize = GetResponseInfoSize(info.get());
scoped_refptr<AppCacheGroup> group(
new AppCacheGroup(service_->storage(), kManifestUrl, kMockGroupId));
scoped_refptr<AppCache> cache(
new AppCache(service_->storage(), kMockCacheId));
cache->AddEntry(
kManifestUrl,
AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST, kMockResponseId,
kMockInfoSize + kMockBodySize));
cache->set_complete(true);
group->AddCache(cache.get());
mock_storage()->AddStoredGroup(group.get());
mock_storage()->AddStoredCache(cache.get());
}
| 1 | CVE-2019-5837 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 3,160 |
libtiff | 3ca657a8793dd011bf869695d72ad31c779c3cc1 | horAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
assert((cc%(4*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] += wp[0]; wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-9535 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 7,577 |
Android | 04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d | const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return 0;
if (idx >= m_entry_count)
return 0;
return m_entries + idx;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-1621 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 5,673 |
Chrome | 3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b | bool LauncherView::IsShowingMenu() const {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
return (overflow_menu_runner_.get() &&
overflow_menu_runner_->IsRunning()) ||
(launcher_menu_runner_.get() &&
launcher_menu_runner_->IsRunning());
#endif
return false;
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-2895 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 4,045 |
Chrome | 1dab554a7e795dac34313e2f7dbe4325628d12d4 | SessionRestoreImpl(Profile* profile,
Browser* browser,
bool synchronous,
bool clobber_existing_tab,
bool always_create_tabbed_browser,
const std::vector<GURL>& urls_to_open)
: profile_(profile),
browser_(browser),
synchronous_(synchronous),
clobber_existing_tab_(clobber_existing_tab),
always_create_tabbed_browser_(always_create_tabbed_browser),
urls_to_open_(urls_to_open),
restore_started_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
browser_shown_(false) {
if (profiles_getting_restored == NULL)
profiles_getting_restored = new std::set<const Profile*>();
CHECK(profiles_getting_restored->find(profile) ==
profiles_getting_restored->end());
profiles_getting_restored->insert(profile);
g_browser_process->AddRefModule();
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-3088 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 1,994 |
Pillow | 5bdf54b5a76b54fb00bd05f2d733e0a4173eefc9 | ImagingPcdDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state, UINT8* buf, int bytes)
{
int x;
int chunk;
UINT8* out;
UINT8* ptr;
ptr = buf;
chunk = 3 * state->xsize;
for (;;) {
/* We need data for two full lines before we can do anything */
if (bytes < chunk)
return ptr - buf;
/* Unpack first line */
out = state->buffer;
for (x = 0; x < state->xsize; x++) {
out[0] = ptr[x];
out[1] = ptr[(x+4*state->xsize)/2];
out[2] = ptr[(x+5*state->xsize)/2];
out += 3;
}
state->shuffle((UINT8*) im->image[state->y],
state->buffer, state->xsize);
if (++state->y >= state->ysize)
return -1; /* This can hardly happen */
/* Unpack second line */
out = state->buffer;
for (x = 0; x < state->xsize; x++) {
out[0] = ptr[x+state->xsize];
out[1] = ptr[(x+4*state->xsize)/2];
out[2] = ptr[(x+5*state->xsize)/2];
out += 3;
}
state->shuffle((UINT8*) im->image[state->y],
state->buffer, state->xsize);
if (++state->y >= state->ysize)
return -1;
ptr += chunk;
bytes -= chunk;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,730 |
linux | 0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f | static inline void rpc_set_waitqueue_owner(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, pid_t pid)
{
queue->owner = pid;
queue->nr = RPC_BATCH_COUNT;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,923 |
linux | 1a51410abe7d0ee4b1d112780f46df87d3621043 | static void fill_stats(struct task_struct *tsk, struct taskstats *stats)
{
memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats));
/*
* Each accounting subsystem adds calls to its functions to
* fill in relevant parts of struct taskstsats as follows
*
* per-task-foo(stats, tsk);
*/
delayacct_add_tsk(stats, tsk);
/* fill in basic acct fields */
stats->version = TASKSTATS_VERSION;
stats->nvcsw = tsk->nvcsw;
stats->nivcsw = tsk->nivcsw;
bacct_add_tsk(stats, tsk);
/* fill in extended acct fields */
xacct_add_tsk(stats, tsk);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,179 |
linux | 84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c | packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int ret;
if (level != SOL_PACKET)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
switch (optname) {
case PACKET_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case PACKET_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
{
struct packet_mreq_max mreq;
int len = optlen;
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
if (len < sizeof(struct packet_mreq))
return -EINVAL;
if (len > sizeof(mreq))
len = sizeof(mreq);
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < (mreq.mr_alen + offsetof(struct packet_mreq, mr_address)))
return -EINVAL;
if (optname == PACKET_ADD_MEMBERSHIP)
ret = packet_mc_add(sk, &mreq);
else
ret = packet_mc_drop(sk, &mreq);
return ret;
}
case PACKET_RX_RING:
case PACKET_TX_RING:
{
union tpacket_req_u req_u;
int len;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
case TPACKET_V2:
len = sizeof(req_u.req);
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
default:
len = sizeof(req_u.req3);
break;
}
if (optlen < len)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&req_u.req, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
return packet_set_ring(sk, &req_u, 0,
optname == PACKET_TX_RING);
}
case PACKET_COPY_THRESH:
{
int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
pkt_sk(sk)->copy_thresh = val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_VERSION:
{
int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
switch (val) {
case TPACKET_V1:
case TPACKET_V2:
case TPACKET_V3:
po->tp_version = val;
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
case PACKET_RESERVE:
{
unsigned int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->tp_reserve = val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_LOSS:
{
unsigned int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->tp_loss = !!val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_AUXDATA:
{
int val;
if (optlen < sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->auxdata = !!val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_ORIGDEV:
{
int val;
if (optlen < sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->origdev = !!val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_VNET_HDR:
{
int val;
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -EINVAL;
if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
return -EBUSY;
if (optlen < sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->has_vnet_hdr = !!val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_TIMESTAMP:
{
int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->tp_tstamp = val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_FANOUT:
{
int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
return fanout_add(sk, val & 0xffff, val >> 16);
}
case PACKET_FANOUT_DATA:
{
if (!po->fanout)
return -EINVAL;
return fanout_set_data(po, optval, optlen);
}
case PACKET_TX_HAS_OFF:
{
unsigned int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->tp_tx_has_off = !!val;
return 0;
}
case PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS:
{
int val;
if (optlen != sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val)))
return -EFAULT;
po->xmit = val ? packet_direct_xmit : dev_queue_xmit;
return 0;
}
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-8655 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 2,134 |
file | 27a14bc7ba285a0a5ebfdb55e54001aa11932b08 | mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
uint8_t type;
switch (type = cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + file_pstring_length_size(m);
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
if (len >= sizeof(p->s))
len = sizeof(p->s) - 1;
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
if (type == FILE_BELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
if (type == FILE_BEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
if (type == FILE_LELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
if (type == FILE_LEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
if (type == FILE_MELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2014-3478 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 1,371 |
libav | 0ac8ff618c5e6d878c547a8877e714ed728950ce | static double bessel(double x)
{
double v = 1;
double lastv = 0;
double t = 1;
int i;
x = x * x / 4;
for (i = 1; v != lastv; i++) {
lastv = v;
t *= x / (i * i);
v += t;
}
return v;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,233 |
php | 0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f | ZEND_METHOD(CURLFile, __wakeup)
{
zend_update_property_string(curl_CURLFile_class, getThis(), "name", sizeof("name")-1, "" TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception(NULL, "Unserialization of CURLFile instances is not allowed", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-9137 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 3,936 |
Subsets and Splits