project
stringclasses 765
values | commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| func
stringlengths 19
482k
| vul
int64 0
1
| CVE ID
stringlengths 13
16
| CWE ID
stringclasses 13
values | CWE Name
stringclasses 13
values | CWE Description
stringclasses 13
values | Potential Mitigation
stringclasses 11
values | __index_level_0__
int64 0
23.9k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
mbed-coap | 4647a68e364401e81dbd370728127d844f221d93 | static uint32_t sn_coap_parser_options_parse_uint(uint8_t **packet_data_pptr, uint8_t option_len)
{
uint32_t value = 0;
while (option_len--) {
value <<= 8;
value |= *(*packet_data_pptr)++;
}
return value;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,182 |
oniguruma | 850bd9b0d8186eb1637722b46b12656814ab4ad2 | callout_name_table_hash(st_callout_name_key* x)
{
UChar *p;
int val = 0;
p = x->s;
while (p < x->end) {
val = val * 997 + (int )*p++;
}
/* use intptr_t for escape warning in Windows */
return val + (val >> 5) + ((intptr_t )x->enc & 0xffff) + x->type;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,520 |
Chrome | d304b5ec1b16766ea2cb552a27dc14df848d6a0e | FFmpegVideoDecodeEngine::~FFmpegVideoDecodeEngine() {
if (codec_context_) {
av_free(codec_context_->extradata);
avcodec_close(codec_context_);
av_free(codec_context_);
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,143 |
linux | 606142af57dad981b78707234cfbd15f9f7b7125 | static int su3000_power_ctrl(struct dvb_usb_device *d, int i)
{
struct dw2102_state *state = (struct dw2102_state *)d->priv;
u8 obuf[] = {0xde, 0};
info("%s: %d, initialized %d", __func__, i, state->initialized);
if (i && !state->initialized) {
state->initialized = 1;
/* reset board */
return dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 2, NULL, 0, 0);
}
return 0;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-8062 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 7,932 |
Chrome | deaa07bec5d105ffc546d37eba3da4cba341fc03 | void LogoService::GetLogo(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
if (!template_url_service_) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url =
template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
if (!template_url) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const base::CommandLine* command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
GURL logo_url;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL)) {
logo_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL));
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
logo_url = template_url->logo_url();
#endif
}
GURL base_url;
GURL doodle_url;
const bool is_google = template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs(
template_url_service_->search_terms_data());
if (is_google) {
base_url =
GURL(template_url_service_->search_terms_data().GoogleBaseURLValue());
doodle_url = search_provider_logos::GetGoogleDoodleURL(base_url);
} else if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kThirdPartyDoodles)) {
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL)) {
doodle_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL));
} else {
std::string override_url = base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(
features::kThirdPartyDoodles,
features::kThirdPartyDoodlesOverrideUrlParam);
if (!override_url.empty()) {
doodle_url = GURL(override_url);
} else {
doodle_url = template_url->doodle_url();
}
}
base_url = doodle_url.GetOrigin();
}
if (!logo_url.is_valid() && !doodle_url.is_valid()) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const bool use_fixed_logo = !doodle_url.is_valid();
if (!logo_tracker_) {
std::unique_ptr<LogoCache> logo_cache = std::move(logo_cache_for_test_);
if (!logo_cache) {
logo_cache = std::make_unique<LogoCache>(cache_directory_);
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Clock> clock = std::move(clock_for_test_);
if (!clock) {
clock = std::make_unique<base::DefaultClock>();
}
logo_tracker_ = std::make_unique<LogoTracker>(
request_context_getter_,
std::make_unique<LogoDelegateImpl>(std::move(image_decoder_)),
std::move(logo_cache), std::move(clock));
}
if (use_fixed_logo) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
logo_url, base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::ParseFixedLogoResponse),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::UseFixedLogoUrl));
} else if (is_google) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleParseLogoResponseCallback(base_url),
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleAppendQueryparamsCallback(
use_gray_background_));
} else {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewParseLogoResponse,
base_url),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewAppendQueryparamsToLogoURL,
use_gray_background_));
}
logo_tracker_->GetLogo(std::move(callbacks));
}
| 1 | CVE-2015-1290 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 7,325 |
linux | 3a9b153c5591548612c3955c9600a98150c81875 | int mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
const struct host_cmd_ds_command *resp)
{
u8 *curr = (u8 *) &resp->params.get_wmm_status;
uint16_t resp_len = le16_to_cpu(resp->size), tlv_len;
int mask = IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK;
bool valid = true;
struct mwifiex_ie_types_data *tlv_hdr;
struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status *tlv_wmm_qstatus;
struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter *wmm_param_ie = NULL;
struct mwifiex_wmm_ac_status *ac_status;
mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, INFO,
"info: WMM: WMM_GET_STATUS cmdresp received: %d\n",
resp_len);
while ((resp_len >= sizeof(tlv_hdr->header)) && valid) {
tlv_hdr = (struct mwifiex_ie_types_data *) curr;
tlv_len = le16_to_cpu(tlv_hdr->header.len);
if (resp_len < tlv_len + sizeof(tlv_hdr->header))
break;
switch (le16_to_cpu(tlv_hdr->header.type)) {
case TLV_TYPE_WMMQSTATUS:
tlv_wmm_qstatus =
(struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status *)
tlv_hdr;
mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, CMD,
"info: CMD_RESP: WMM_GET_STATUS:\t"
"QSTATUS TLV: %d, %d, %d\n",
tlv_wmm_qstatus->queue_index,
tlv_wmm_qstatus->flow_required,
tlv_wmm_qstatus->disabled);
ac_status = &priv->wmm.ac_status[tlv_wmm_qstatus->
queue_index];
ac_status->disabled = tlv_wmm_qstatus->disabled;
ac_status->flow_required =
tlv_wmm_qstatus->flow_required;
ac_status->flow_created = tlv_wmm_qstatus->flow_created;
break;
case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:
/*
* Point the regular IEEE IE 2 bytes into the Marvell IE
* and setup the IEEE IE type and length byte fields
*/
wmm_param_ie =
(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter *) (curr +
2);
wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len = (u8) tlv_len;
wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.element_id =
WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, CMD,
"info: CMD_RESP: WMM_GET_STATUS:\t"
"WMM Parameter Set Count: %d\n",
wmm_param_ie->qos_info_bitmap & mask);
memcpy((u8 *) &priv->curr_bss_params.bss_descriptor.
wmm_ie, wmm_param_ie,
wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len + 2);
break;
default:
valid = false;
break;
}
curr += (tlv_len + sizeof(tlv_hdr->header));
resp_len -= (tlv_len + sizeof(tlv_hdr->header));
}
mwifiex_wmm_setup_queue_priorities(priv, wmm_param_ie);
mwifiex_wmm_setup_ac_downgrade(priv);
return 0;
} | 1 | CVE-2020-12654 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 1,300 |
Android | 92a7bf8c44a236607c146240f3c0adc1ae01fedf | void rfc_send_sabme(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, uint8_t dlci) {
uint8_t* p_data;
uint8_t cr = RFCOMM_CR(p_mcb->is_initiator, true);
BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(RFCOMM_CMD_BUF_SIZE);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
/* SABME frame, command, PF = 1, dlci */
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_EA | cr | (dlci << RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI);
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_SABME | RFCOMM_PF;
*p_data++ = RFCOMM_EA | 0;
*p_data =
RFCOMM_SABME_FCS((uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET, cr, dlci);
p_buf->len = 4;
rfc_check_send_cmd(p_mcb, p_buf);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,371 |
Chrome | eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27 | void DevToolsUIBindings::CallClientFunction(const std::string& function_name,
const base::Value* arg1,
const base::Value* arg2,
const base::Value* arg3) {
if (!web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
return;
std::string javascript = function_name + "(";
if (arg1) {
std::string json;
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg1, &json);
javascript.append(json);
if (arg2) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg2, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
if (arg3) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg3, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
}
}
}
javascript.append(");");
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->ExecuteJavaScript(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(javascript));
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-5011 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 1,346 |
Chrome | b8573aa643b03a59f4e2c99c72d3511a11cfb0b6 | void GestureSequence::AppendScrollGestureUpdate(const GesturePoint& point,
const gfx::Point& location,
Gestures* gestures) {
int dx = point.x_delta();
int dy = point.y_delta();
if (scroll_type_ == ST_HORIZONTAL)
dy = 0;
else if (scroll_type_ == ST_VERTICAL)
dx = 0;
gestures->push_back(linked_ptr<GestureEvent>(new GestureEvent(
ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE,
location.x(),
location.y(),
flags_,
base::Time::FromDoubleT(point.last_touch_time()),
dx, dy)));
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,213 |
linux | ced39002f5ea736b716ae233fb68b26d59783912 | __kprobes void *perf_trace_buf_prepare(int size, unsigned short type,
struct pt_regs *regs, int *rctxp)
{
struct trace_entry *entry;
unsigned long flags;
char *raw_data;
int pc;
BUILD_BUG_ON(PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE % sizeof(unsigned long));
pc = preempt_count();
*rctxp = perf_swevent_get_recursion_context();
if (*rctxp < 0)
return NULL;
raw_data = this_cpu_ptr(perf_trace_buf[*rctxp]);
/* zero the dead bytes from align to not leak stack to user */
memset(&raw_data[size - sizeof(u64)], 0, sizeof(u64));
entry = (struct trace_entry *)raw_data;
local_save_flags(flags);
tracing_generic_entry_update(entry, flags, pc);
entry->type = type;
return raw_data;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,584 |
contiki-ng | 12c824386ab60de757de5001974d73b32e19ad71 | snmp_api_add_resource(snmp_mib_resource_t *new_resource)
{
return snmp_mib_add(new_resource);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,563 |
git | 1a7fd1fb2998002da6e9ff2ee46e1bdd25ee8404 | static int fsck_gitmodules_fn(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct fsck_gitmodules_data *data = vdata;
const char *subsection, *key;
int subsection_len;
char *name;
if (parse_config_key(var, "submodule", &subsection, &subsection_len, &key) < 0 ||
!subsection)
return 0;
name = xmemdupz(subsection, subsection_len);
if (check_submodule_name(name) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_NAME,
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
if (!strcmp(key, "url") && value &&
looks_like_command_line_option(value))
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_URL,
"disallowed submodule url: %s",
value);
if (!strcmp(key, "path") && value &&
looks_like_command_line_option(value))
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_PATH,
"disallowed submodule path: %s",
value);
free(name);
return 0;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,489 |
libmysofa | d39a171e9c6a1c44dbdf43f9db6c3fbd887e38c1 | int btreeRead(struct READER *reader, struct BTREE *btree) {
char buf[4];
/* read signature */
if (fread(buf, 1, 4, reader->fhd) != 4 || strncmp(buf, "BTHD", 4)) {
log("cannot read signature of BTHD\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
} log("%08lX %.4s\n", (uint64_t )ftell(reader->fhd) - 4, buf);
if (fgetc(reader->fhd) != 0) {
log("object BTHD must have version 0\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
btree->type = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->node_size = (uint32_t)readValue(reader, 4);
btree->record_size = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
btree->depth = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
btree->split_percent = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->merge_percent = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->root_node_address = (uint64_t)readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
btree->number_of_records = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
if(btree->number_of_records>0x1000)
return MYSOFA_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT;
btree->total_number = (uint64_t)readValue(reader, reader->superblock.size_of_lengths);
/* fseek(reader->fhd, 4, SEEK_CUR); skip checksum */
if(btree->total_number > 0x10000000)
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
btree->records = malloc(sizeof(btree->records[0]) * btree->total_number);
if (!btree->records)
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
memset(btree->records, 0, sizeof(btree->records[0]) * btree->total_number);
/* read records */
if(fseek(reader->fhd, btree->root_node_address, SEEK_SET)<0)
return errno;
return readBTLF(reader, btree, btree->number_of_records, btree->records);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,567 |
ImageMagick | d63a3c5729df59f183e9e110d5d8385d17caaad0 | MagickExport MagickBooleanType IsOpaqueImage(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Determine if image is opaque.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelOpacity(p) != OpaqueOpacity)
break;
p++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(y < (ssize_t) image->rows ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,342 |
Chrome | 5405341d5cc268a0b2ff0678bd78ddda0892e7ea | RenderFrameImpl::RenderFrameImpl(CreateParams params)
: frame_(nullptr),
is_main_frame_(true),
unique_name_frame_adapter_(this),
unique_name_helper_(&unique_name_frame_adapter_),
in_frame_tree_(false),
render_view_(params.render_view),
routing_id_(params.routing_id),
proxy_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_power_saver_helper_(nullptr),
#endif
cookie_jar_(this),
selection_text_offset_(0),
selection_range_(gfx::Range::InvalidRange()),
handling_select_range_(false),
web_user_media_client_(nullptr),
push_messaging_client_(nullptr),
render_accessibility_(nullptr),
previews_state_(PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED),
effective_connection_type_(
blink::WebEffectiveConnectionType::kTypeUnknown),
is_pasting_(false),
suppress_further_dialogs_(false),
blame_context_(nullptr),
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
focused_pepper_plugin_(nullptr),
pepper_last_mouse_event_target_(nullptr),
#endif
autoplay_configuration_binding_(this),
frame_binding_(this),
host_zoom_binding_(this),
frame_bindings_control_binding_(this),
frame_navigation_control_binding_(this),
fullscreen_binding_(this),
navigation_client_impl_(nullptr),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
media_factory_(this,
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
base::Unretained(this))),
input_target_client_impl_(this),
devtools_frame_token_(params.devtools_frame_token),
weak_factory_(this) {
CHECK(params.interface_provider.is_bound());
remote_interfaces_.Bind(std::move(params.interface_provider));
blink_interface_registry_.reset(new BlinkInterfaceRegistryImpl(
registry_.GetWeakPtr(), associated_interfaces_.GetWeakPtr()));
media_factory_.SetupMojo();
std::pair<RoutingIDFrameMap::iterator, bool> result =
g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(routing_id_, this));
CHECK(result.second) << "Inserting a duplicate item.";
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
new GinJavaBridgeDispatcher(this);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_power_saver_helper_ = new PluginPowerSaverHelper(this);
#endif
manifest_manager_ = std::make_unique<ManifestManager>(this);
if (IsMainFrame()) {
new ManifestChangeNotifier(this);
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,707 |
tensorflow | a5b89cd68c02329d793356bda85d079e9e69b4e7 | Status StoreResourceDtypesAndShapes(const eager::Operation& remote_op,
const DataTypeVector& output_dtypes,
TensorHandle** retvals) {
if (remote_op.name() == "VarHandleOp") {
if (output_dtypes.size() != 1) {
return errors::Internal("VarHandleOp should only have one output.");
}
if (output_dtypes[0] != DT_RESOURCE) {
return errors::Internal(
"The output of VarHandleOp should be a DT_RESOURCE.");
}
AttrSlice attr_slice = AttrSlice(&remote_op.attrs());
const AttrValue* dtype;
TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(attr_slice.Find("dtype", &dtype));
const AttrValue* shape;
TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(attr_slice.Find("shape", &shape));
retvals[0]->SetResourceHandleDtypeAndShape(
{DtypeAndPartialTensorShape{dtype->type(), shape->shape()}});
}
return Status::OK();
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,051 |
acpica | 987a3b5cf7175916e2a4b6ea5b8e70f830dfe732 | AcpiDsCreateOperands (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *FirstArg)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arg;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arguments[ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS];
UINT32 ArgCount = 0;
UINT32 Index = WalkState->NumOperands;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (DsCreateOperands, FirstArg);
/* Get all arguments in the list */
Arg = FirstArg;
while (Arg)
{
if (Index >= ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_DATA);
}
Arguments[Index] = Arg;
WalkState->Operands [Index] = NULL;
/* Move on to next argument, if any */
Arg = Arg->Common.Next;
ArgCount++;
Index++;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"NumOperands %d, ArgCount %d, Index %d\n",
WalkState->NumOperands, ArgCount, Index));
/* Create the interpreter arguments, in reverse order */
Index--;
for (i = 0; i < ArgCount; i++)
{
Arg = Arguments[Index];
WalkState->OperandIndex = (UINT8) Index;
Status = AcpiDsCreateOperand (WalkState, Arg, Index);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"Created Arg #%u (%p) %u args total\n",
Index, Arg, ArgCount));
Index--;
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
Cleanup:
/*
* We must undo everything done above; meaning that we must
* pop everything off of the operand stack and delete those
* objects
*/
AcpiDsObjStackPopAndDelete (ArgCount, WalkState);
ACPI_EXCEPTION ((AE_INFO, Status, "While creating Arg %u", Index));
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-13693 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 4,038 |
linux | ea25f914dc164c8d56b36147ecc86bc65f83c469 | static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-17857 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 6,579 |
openssl | 259b664f950c2ba66fbf4b0fe5281327904ead21 | static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
BN_free(user_pwd->s);
BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-0798 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 6,696 |
util-linux | 89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc | static int parse_dev(blkid_cache cache, blkid_dev *dev, char **cp)
{
char *start, *tmp, *end, *name;
int ret;
if ((ret = parse_start(cp)) <= 0)
return ret;
start = tmp = strchr(*cp, '>');
if (!start) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("blkid: short line parsing dev: %s", *cp));
return -BLKID_ERR_CACHE;
}
start = skip_over_blank(start + 1);
end = skip_over_word(start);
DBG(READ, ul_debug("device should be %*s",
(int)(end - start), start));
if (**cp == '>')
*cp = end;
else
(*cp)++;
*tmp = '\0';
if (!(tmp = strrchr(end, '<')) || parse_end(&tmp) < 0) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("blkid: missing </device> ending: %s", end));
} else if (tmp)
*tmp = '\0';
if (end - start <= 1) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("blkid: empty device name: %s", *cp));
return -BLKID_ERR_CACHE;
}
name = strndup(start, end - start);
if (name == NULL)
return -BLKID_ERR_MEM;
DBG(READ, ul_debug("found dev %s", name));
if (!(*dev = blkid_get_dev(cache, name, BLKID_DEV_CREATE))) {
free(name);
return -BLKID_ERR_MEM;
}
free(name);
return 1;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,171 |
linux | beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 | void udp_set_csum(bool nocheck, struct sk_buff *skb,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, int len)
{
struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
if (nocheck)
uh->check = 0;
else if (skb_is_gso(skb))
uh->check = ~udp_v4_check(len, saddr, daddr, 0);
else if (skb_dst(skb) && skb_dst(skb)->dev &&
(skb_dst(skb)->dev->features & NETIF_F_V4_CSUM)) {
BUG_ON(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb->head;
skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check);
uh->check = ~udp_v4_check(len, saddr, daddr, 0);
} else {
__wsum csum;
BUG_ON(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL);
uh->check = 0;
csum = skb_checksum(skb, 0, len, 0);
uh->check = udp_v4_check(len, saddr, daddr, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,485 |
pgbouncer | 7ca3e5279d05fceb1e8a043c6f5b6f58dea3ed38 | static bool handle_client_startup(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
const char *passwd;
const uint8_t *key;
bool ok;
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
/* don't tolerate partial packets */
if (incomplete_pkt(pkt)) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client sent partial pkt in startup phase");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_welcome) {
if (finish_client_login(client)) {
/* the packet was already parsed */
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
switch (pkt->type) {
case PKT_SSLREQ:
slog_noise(client, "C: req SSL");
if (client->sbuf.tls) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "SSL req inside SSL");
return false;
}
if (cf_client_tls_sslmode != SSLMODE_DISABLED) {
slog_noise(client, "P: SSL ack");
if (!sbuf_answer(&client->sbuf, "S", 1)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to ack SSL");
return false;
}
if (!sbuf_tls_accept(&client->sbuf)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to accept SSL");
return false;
}
break;
}
/* reject SSL attempt */
slog_noise(client, "P: nak");
if (!sbuf_answer(&client->sbuf, "N", 1)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to nak SSL");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_STARTUP_V2:
disconnect_client(client, true, "Old V2 protocol not supported");
return false;
case PKT_STARTUP:
/* require SSL except on unix socket */
if (cf_client_tls_sslmode >= SSLMODE_REQUIRE && !client->sbuf.tls && !pga_is_unix(&client->remote_addr)) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "SSL required");
return false;
}
if (client->pool && !client->wait_for_user_conn && !client->wait_for_user) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client re-sent startup pkt");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_user) {
client->wait_for_user = false;
if (!finish_set_pool(client, false))
return false;
} else if (!decide_startup_pool(client, pkt)) {
return false;
}
break;
case 'p': /* PasswordMessage */
/* too early */
if (!client->auth_user) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client password pkt before startup packet");
return false;
}
ok = mbuf_get_string(&pkt->data, &passwd);
if (ok && check_client_passwd(client, passwd)) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Auth failed");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_CANCEL:
if (mbuf_avail_for_read(&pkt->data) == BACKENDKEY_LEN
&& mbuf_get_bytes(&pkt->data, BACKENDKEY_LEN, &key))
{
memcpy(client->cancel_key, key, BACKENDKEY_LEN);
accept_cancel_request(client);
} else {
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad cancel request");
}
return false;
default:
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad packet");
return false;
}
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
client->request_time = get_cached_time();
return true;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,263 |
linux | 050fad7c4534c13c8eb1d9c2ba66012e014773cb | BPF_CALL_5(bpf_l3_csum_replace, struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, offset,
u64, from, u64, to, u64, flags)
{
__sum16 *ptr;
if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_HDR_FIELD_MASK)))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff || offset & 1))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(bpf_try_make_writable(skb, offset + sizeof(*ptr))))
return -EFAULT;
ptr = (__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset);
switch (flags & BPF_F_HDR_FIELD_MASK) {
case 0:
if (unlikely(from != 0))
return -EINVAL;
csum_replace_by_diff(ptr, to);
break;
case 2:
csum_replace2(ptr, from, to);
break;
case 4:
csum_replace4(ptr, from, to);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,695 |
sqlite | 18f6ff9eb7db02356102283c28053b0a602f55d7 | static int fts3BestIndexMethod(sqlite3_vtab *pVTab, sqlite3_index_info *pInfo){
Fts3Table *p = (Fts3Table *)pVTab;
int i; /* Iterator variable */
int iCons = -1; /* Index of constraint to use */
int iLangidCons = -1; /* Index of langid=x constraint, if present */
int iDocidGe = -1; /* Index of docid>=x constraint, if present */
int iDocidLe = -1; /* Index of docid<=x constraint, if present */
int iIdx;
/* By default use a full table scan. This is an expensive option,
** so search through the constraints to see if a more efficient
** strategy is possible.
*/
pInfo->idxNum = FTS3_FULLSCAN_SEARCH;
pInfo->estimatedCost = 5000000;
for(i=0; i<pInfo->nConstraint; i++){
int bDocid; /* True if this constraint is on docid */
struct sqlite3_index_constraint *pCons = &pInfo->aConstraint[i];
if( pCons->usable==0 ){
if( pCons->op==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_MATCH ){
/* There exists an unusable MATCH constraint. This means that if
** the planner does elect to use the results of this call as part
** of the overall query plan the user will see an "unable to use
** function MATCH in the requested context" error. To discourage
** this, return a very high cost here. */
pInfo->idxNum = FTS3_FULLSCAN_SEARCH;
pInfo->estimatedCost = 1e50;
fts3SetEstimatedRows(pInfo, ((sqlite3_int64)1) << 50);
return SQLITE_OK;
}
continue;
}
bDocid = (pCons->iColumn<0 || pCons->iColumn==p->nColumn+1);
/* A direct lookup on the rowid or docid column. Assign a cost of 1.0. */
if( iCons<0 && pCons->op==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_EQ && bDocid ){
pInfo->idxNum = FTS3_DOCID_SEARCH;
pInfo->estimatedCost = 1.0;
iCons = i;
}
/* A MATCH constraint. Use a full-text search.
**
** If there is more than one MATCH constraint available, use the first
** one encountered. If there is both a MATCH constraint and a direct
** rowid/docid lookup, prefer the MATCH strategy. This is done even
** though the rowid/docid lookup is faster than a MATCH query, selecting
** it would lead to an "unable to use function MATCH in the requested
** context" error.
*/
if( pCons->op==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_MATCH
&& pCons->iColumn>=0 && pCons->iColumn<=p->nColumn
){
pInfo->idxNum = FTS3_FULLTEXT_SEARCH + pCons->iColumn;
pInfo->estimatedCost = 2.0;
iCons = i;
}
/* Equality constraint on the langid column */
if( pCons->op==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_EQ
&& pCons->iColumn==p->nColumn + 2
){
iLangidCons = i;
}
if( bDocid ){
switch( pCons->op ){
case SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_GE:
case SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_GT:
iDocidGe = i;
break;
case SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_LE:
case SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_LT:
iDocidLe = i;
break;
}
}
}
iIdx = 1;
if( iCons>=0 ){
pInfo->aConstraintUsage[iCons].argvIndex = iIdx++;
pInfo->aConstraintUsage[iCons].omit = 1;
}
if( iLangidCons>=0 ){
pInfo->idxNum |= FTS3_HAVE_LANGID;
pInfo->aConstraintUsage[iLangidCons].argvIndex = iIdx++;
}
if( iDocidGe>=0 ){
pInfo->idxNum |= FTS3_HAVE_DOCID_GE;
pInfo->aConstraintUsage[iDocidGe].argvIndex = iIdx++;
}
if( iDocidLe>=0 ){
pInfo->idxNum |= FTS3_HAVE_DOCID_LE;
pInfo->aConstraintUsage[iDocidLe].argvIndex = iIdx++;
}
/* Regardless of the strategy selected, FTS can deliver rows in rowid (or
** docid) order. Both ascending and descending are possible.
*/
if( pInfo->nOrderBy==1 ){
struct sqlite3_index_orderby *pOrder = &pInfo->aOrderBy[0];
if( pOrder->iColumn<0 || pOrder->iColumn==p->nColumn+1 ){
if( pOrder->desc ){
pInfo->idxStr = "DESC";
}else{
pInfo->idxStr = "ASC";
}
pInfo->orderByConsumed = 1;
}
}
assert( p->pSegments==0 );
return SQLITE_OK;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,096 |
tcpdump | 5d0d76e88ee2d3236d7e032589d6f1d4ec5f7b1e | isis_print_is_reach_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, u_int subt, u_int subl,
const char *ident)
{
u_int te_class,priority_level,gmpls_switch_cap;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer for several subTLVs */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
ident, tok2str(isis_ext_is_reach_subtlv_values, "unknown", subt),
subt, subl));
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, subl);
switch(subt) {
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_ADMIN_GROUP:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_LOCAL_REMOTE_ID:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_REMOTE_ID:
if (subl >= 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
if (subl == 8) /* rfc4205 */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_IPV4_INTF_ADDR:
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_IPV4_NEIGHBOR_ADDR:
if (subl >= sizeof(struct in_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_MAX_LINK_BW :
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_RESERVABLE_BW:
if (subl >= 4) {
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %.3f Mbps", bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_UNRESERVED_BW :
if (subl >= 32) {
for (te_class = 0; te_class < 8; te_class++) {
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s TE-Class %u: %.3f Mbps",
ident,
te_class,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
tptr+=4;
}
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_BW_CONSTRAINTS: /* fall through */
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_BW_CONSTRAINTS_OLD:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sBandwidth Constraints Model ID: %s (%u)",
ident,
tok2str(diffserv_te_bc_values, "unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
tptr++;
/* decode BCs until the subTLV ends */
for (te_class = 0; te_class < (subl-1)/4; te_class++) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Bandwidth constraint CT%u: %.3f Mbps",
ident,
te_class,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
tptr+=4;
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_TE_METRIC:
if (subl >= 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr)));
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_ATTRIBUTE:
if (subl == 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [ %s ] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(isis_subtlv_link_attribute_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_LINK_PROTECTION_TYPE:
if (subl >= 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s, Priority %u",
bittok2str(gmpls_link_prot_values, "none", *tptr),
*(tptr+1)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_METRIC:
if (subl >= 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", LM: %u", EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr)));
tptr=tptr+3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", P: %u", *(tptr)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", P-ID: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_EXT_IS_REACH_INTF_SW_CAP_DESCR:
if (subl >= 36) {
gmpls_switch_cap = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Interface Switching Capability:%s",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values, "Unknown", gmpls_switch_cap)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", LSP Encoding: %s",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values, "Unknown", *(tptr + 1))));
tptr+=4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Max LSP Bandwidth:", ident));
for (priority_level = 0; priority_level < 8; priority_level++) {
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s priority level %d: %.3f Mbps",
ident,
priority_level,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
tptr+=4;
}
subl-=36;
switch (gmpls_switch_cap) {
case GMPLS_PSC1:
case GMPLS_PSC2:
case GMPLS_PSC3:
case GMPLS_PSC4:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 6);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Min LSP Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps", ident, bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Interface MTU: %u", ident, EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
case GMPLS_TSC:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Min LSP Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps", ident, bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Indication %s", ident,
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_tsc_indication_values, "Unknown (%u)", *(tptr + 4))));
break;
default:
/* there is some optional stuff left to decode but this is as of yet
not specified so just lets hexdump what is left */
if(subl>0){
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", subl))
return(0);
}
}
}
break;
default:
if (!print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", subl))
return(0);
break;
}
return(1);
trunc:
return(0);
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-13055 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 6,090 |
php-src | 5c0455bf2c8cd3c25401407f158e820aa3b239e1 | static void timelib_skip_day_suffix(char **ptr)
{
if (isspace(**ptr)) {
return;
}
if (!strncasecmp(*ptr, "nd", 2) || !strncasecmp(*ptr, "rd", 2) ||!strncasecmp(*ptr, "st", 2) || !strncasecmp(*ptr, "th", 2)) {
*ptr += 2;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,952 |
samba | 7f51ec8c4ed9ba1f53d722e44fb6fb3cde933b72 | static int ldb_dn_escape_internal(char *dst, const char *src, int len)
{
const char *p, *s;
char *d;
size_t l;
p = s = src;
d = dst;
while (p - src < len) {
p += strcspn(p, ",=\n\r+<>#;\\\" ");
if (p - src == len) /* found no escapable chars */
break;
/* copy the part of the string before the stop */
memcpy(d, s, p - s);
d += (p - s); /* move to current position */
switch (*p) {
case ' ':
if (p == src || (p-src)==(len-1)) {
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = *p++;
}
break;
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = *p++;
}
break;
case '?':
/* these must be escaped using \c form */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
break;
default: {
/* any others get \XX form */
unsigned char v;
const char *hexbytes = "0123456789ABCDEF";
v = *(const unsigned char *)p;
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = hexbytes[v>>4];
*d++ = hexbytes[v&0xF];
p++;
break;
}
}
s = p; /* move forward */
}
| 1 | CVE-2015-5330 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 8,029 |
ImageMagick | 53c1dcd34bed85181b901bfce1a2322f85a59472 | static inline LayerInfo *DestroyLayerInfo(LayerInfo *layer_info,
const ssize_t number_layers)
{
ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i<number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image != (Image *) NULL)
layer_info[i].image=DestroyImage(layer_info[i].image);
if (layer_info[i].mask.image != (Image *) NULL)
layer_info[i].mask.image=DestroyImage(layer_info[i].mask.image);
}
return (LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,060 |
tensorflow | bb6a0383ed553c286f87ca88c207f6774d5c4a8f | TfLiteStatus Eval(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) {
const TfLiteTensor* params;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context, GetInputSafe(context, node, kParams, ¶ms));
const TfLiteTensor* indices;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context, GetInputSafe(context, node, kIndices, &indices));
TfLiteTensor* output;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context,
GetOutputSafe(context, node, kOutputTensor, &output));
// Prevent division by 0 in the helper
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, NumElements(params) > 0);
switch (indices->type) {
case kTfLiteInt32:
return EvalGatherNd<int32_t>(context, params, indices, output);
case kTfLiteInt64:
return EvalGatherNd<int64_t>(context, params, indices, output);
default:
context->ReportError(
context, "Indices of type '%s' are not supported by gather_nd.",
TfLiteTypeGetName(indices->type));
return kTfLiteError;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,462 |
lua | 6298903e35217ab69c279056f925fb72900ce0b7 | void luaD_hookcall (lua_State *L, CallInfo *ci) {
int hook = (ci->callstatus & CIST_TAIL) ? LUA_HOOKTAILCALL : LUA_HOOKCALL;
Proto *p;
if (!(L->hookmask & LUA_MASKCALL)) /* some other hook? */
return; /* don't call hook */
p = clLvalue(s2v(ci->func))->p;
L->top = ci->top; /* prepare top */
ci->u.l.savedpc++; /* hooks assume 'pc' is already incremented */
luaD_hook(L, hook, -1, 1, p->numparams);
ci->u.l.savedpc--; /* correct 'pc' */
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,856 |
php-src | 7b1898183032eeabc64a086ff040af991cebcd93 |
static HashTable *date_object_get_properties_period(zval *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
HashTable *props;
zval *zv;
php_period_obj *period_obj;
period_obj = zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
props = zend_std_get_properties(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (!period_obj->start || GC_G(gc_active)) {
return props;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zv);
if (period_obj->start) {
php_date_obj *date_obj;
object_init_ex(zv, date_ce_date);
date_obj = zend_object_store_get_object(zv TSRMLS_CC);
date_obj->time = timelib_time_clone(period_obj->start);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(zv);
}
zend_hash_update(props, "start", sizeof("start"), &zv, sizeof(zv), NULL);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zv);
if (period_obj->current) {
php_date_obj *date_obj;
object_init_ex(zv, date_ce_date);
date_obj = zend_object_store_get_object(zv TSRMLS_CC);
date_obj->time = timelib_time_clone(period_obj->current);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(zv);
}
zend_hash_update(props, "current", sizeof("current"), &zv, sizeof(zv), NULL);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zv);
if (period_obj->end) {
php_date_obj *date_obj;
object_init_ex(zv, date_ce_date);
date_obj = zend_object_store_get_object(zv TSRMLS_CC);
date_obj->time = timelib_time_clone(period_obj->end);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(zv);
}
zend_hash_update(props, "end", sizeof("end"), &zv, sizeof(zv), NULL);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zv);
if (period_obj->interval) {
php_interval_obj *interval_obj;
object_init_ex(zv, date_ce_interval);
interval_obj = zend_object_store_get_object(zv TSRMLS_CC);
interval_obj->diff = timelib_rel_time_clone(period_obj->interval);
interval_obj->initialized = 1;
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(zv);
}
zend_hash_update(props, "interval", sizeof("interval"), &zv, sizeof(zv), NULL);
/* converted to larger type (int->long); must check when unserializing */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zv);
ZVAL_LONG(zv, (long) period_obj->recurrences);
zend_hash_update(props, "recurrences", sizeof("recurrences"), &zv, sizeof(zv), NULL);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zv);
ZVAL_BOOL(zv, period_obj->include_start_date);
zend_hash_update(props, "include_start_date", sizeof("include_start_date"), &zv, sizeof(zv), NULL);
return props; | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,953 |
mbedtls | 97b5209bc01ab8b3b519fdb46cefc04739433124 | int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0, size;
size = ( bits / 8 ) + ( ( bits % 8 ) ? 1 : 0 );
// Calculate byte length
//
if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size + 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
len = size + 1;
(*p) -= size;
memcpy( *p, buf, size );
// Write unused bits
//
*--(*p) = (unsigned char) (size * 8 - bits);
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) );
return( (int) len );
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,136 |
Android | 04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d | const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(
const CuePoint* pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* pTP) const
{
if (pCP == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-1621 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 6,750 |
illumos-gate | d65686849024838243515b5c40ae2c479460b4b5 | devzvol_validate(struct sdev_node *dv)
{
dmu_objset_type_t do_type;
char *dsname;
char *nm = dv->sdev_name;
int rc;
sdcmn_err13(("validating ('%s' '%s')", dv->sdev_path, nm));
/*
* validate only READY nodes; if someone is sitting on the
* directory of a dataset that just got destroyed we could
* get a zombie node which we just skip.
*/
if (dv->sdev_state != SDEV_READY) {
sdcmn_err13(("skipping '%s'", nm));
return (SDEV_VTOR_SKIP);
}
if ((strcmp(dv->sdev_path, ZVOL_DIR "/dsk") == 0) ||
(strcmp(dv->sdev_path, ZVOL_DIR "/rdsk") == 0))
return (SDEV_VTOR_VALID);
dsname = devzvol_make_dsname(dv->sdev_path, NULL);
if (dsname == NULL)
return (SDEV_VTOR_INVALID);
rc = devzvol_objset_check(dsname, &do_type);
sdcmn_err13((" '%s' rc %d", dsname, rc));
if (rc != 0) {
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_INVALID);
}
sdcmn_err13((" v_type %d do_type %d",
SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type, do_type));
if ((SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VLNK && do_type != DMU_OST_ZVOL) ||
((SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VBLK || SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VCHR) &&
do_type != DMU_OST_ZVOL) ||
(SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VDIR && do_type == DMU_OST_ZVOL)) {
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_STALE);
}
if (SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VLNK) {
char *ptr, *link;
long val = 0;
minor_t lminor, ominor;
rc = sdev_getlink(SDEVTOV(dv), &link);
ASSERT(rc == 0);
ptr = strrchr(link, ':') + 1;
rc = ddi_strtol(ptr, NULL, 10, &val);
kmem_free(link, strlen(link) + 1);
ASSERT(rc == 0 && val != 0);
lminor = (minor_t)val;
if (sdev_zvol_name2minor(dsname, &ominor) < 0 ||
ominor != lminor) {
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_STALE);
}
}
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_VALID);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,259 |
Little-CMS | 049d634ea6bf2a9bafbf9ddef18464be9caa567f | cmsPipeline* _cmsCreateGamutCheckPipeline(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsUInt32Number Intents[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number nGamutPCSposition,
cmsHPROFILE hGamut)
{
cmsHPROFILE hLab;
cmsPipeline* Gamut;
cmsStage* CLUT;
cmsUInt32Number dwFormat;
GAMUTCHAIN Chain;
int nChannels, nGridpoints;
cmsColorSpaceSignature ColorSpace;
cmsUInt32Number i;
cmsHPROFILE ProfileList[256];
cmsBool BPCList[256];
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationList[256];
cmsUInt32Number IntentList[256];
memset(&Chain, 0, sizeof(GAMUTCHAIN));
if (nGamutPCSposition <= 0 || nGamutPCSposition > 255) {
cmsSignalError(ContextID, cmsERROR_RANGE, "Wrong position of PCS. 1..255 expected, %d found.", nGamutPCSposition);
return NULL;
}
hLab = cmsCreateLab4ProfileTHR(ContextID, NULL);
if (hLab == NULL) return NULL;
// The figure of merit. On matrix-shaper profiles, should be almost zero as
// the conversion is pretty exact. On LUT based profiles, different resolutions
// of input and output CLUT may result in differences.
if (cmsIsMatrixShaper(hGamut)) {
Chain.Thereshold = 1.0;
}
else {
Chain.Thereshold = ERR_THERESHOLD;
}
// Create a copy of parameters
for (i=0; i < nGamutPCSposition; i++) {
ProfileList[i] = hProfiles[i];
BPCList[i] = BPC[i];
AdaptationList[i] = AdaptationStates[i];
IntentList[i] = Intents[i];
}
// Fill Lab identity
ProfileList[nGamutPCSposition] = hLab;
BPCList[nGamutPCSposition] = 0;
AdaptationList[nGamutPCSposition] = 1.0;
IntentList[nGamutPCSposition] = INTENT_RELATIVE_COLORIMETRIC;
ColorSpace = cmsGetColorSpace(hGamut);
nChannels = cmsChannelsOf(ColorSpace);
nGridpoints = _cmsReasonableGridpointsByColorspace(ColorSpace, cmsFLAGS_HIGHRESPRECALC);
dwFormat = (CHANNELS_SH(nChannels)|BYTES_SH(2));
// 16 bits to Lab double
Chain.hInput = cmsCreateExtendedTransform(ContextID,
nGamutPCSposition + 1,
ProfileList,
BPCList,
IntentList,
AdaptationList,
NULL, 0,
dwFormat, TYPE_Lab_DBL,
cmsFLAGS_NOCACHE);
// Does create the forward step. Lab double to device
dwFormat = (CHANNELS_SH(nChannels)|BYTES_SH(2));
Chain.hForward = cmsCreateTransformTHR(ContextID,
hLab, TYPE_Lab_DBL,
hGamut, dwFormat,
INTENT_RELATIVE_COLORIMETRIC,
cmsFLAGS_NOCACHE);
// Does create the backwards step
Chain.hReverse = cmsCreateTransformTHR(ContextID, hGamut, dwFormat,
hLab, TYPE_Lab_DBL,
INTENT_RELATIVE_COLORIMETRIC,
cmsFLAGS_NOCACHE);
// All ok?
if (Chain.hInput && Chain.hForward && Chain.hReverse) {
// Go on, try to compute gamut LUT from PCS. This consist on a single channel containing
// dE when doing a transform back and forth on the colorimetric intent.
Gamut = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 3, 1);
if (Gamut != NULL) {
CLUT = cmsStageAllocCLut16bit(ContextID, nGridpoints, nChannels, 1, NULL);
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Gamut, cmsAT_BEGIN, CLUT)) {
cmsPipelineFree(Gamut);
Gamut = NULL;
} else
cmsStageSampleCLut16bit(CLUT, GamutSampler, (void*) &Chain, 0);
}
}
else
Gamut = NULL; // Didn't work...
// Free all needed stuff.
if (Chain.hInput) cmsDeleteTransform(Chain.hInput);
if (Chain.hForward) cmsDeleteTransform(Chain.hForward);
if (Chain.hReverse) cmsDeleteTransform(Chain.hReverse);
if (hLab) cmsCloseProfile(hLab);
// And return computed hull
return Gamut;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,293 |
linux | 7b07f8eb75aa3097cdfd4f6eac3da49db787381d | static int ccid3_hc_rx_init(struct ccid *ccid, struct sock *sk)
{
struct ccid3_hc_rx_sock *hc = ccid_priv(ccid);
hc->rx_state = TFRC_RSTATE_NO_DATA;
tfrc_lh_init(&hc->rx_li_hist);
return tfrc_rx_hist_alloc(&hc->rx_hist);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,805 |
openssl | 97ab3c4b538840037812c8d9164d09a1f4bf11a1 | static int set_altname_email(X509 *crt, const char *name)
{
return set_altname(crt, GEN_EMAIL, name, 0);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,494 |
qemu | 204f01b30975923c64006f8067f0937b91eea68b | static int virtio_gpu_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, size_t size)
{
VirtIOGPU *g = opaque;
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
struct virtio_gpu_scanout *scanout;
uint32_t resource_id, pformat;
int i;
resource_id = qemu_get_be32(f);
while (resource_id != 0) {
res = g_new0(struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource, 1);
res->resource_id = resource_id;
res->width = qemu_get_be32(f);
res->height = qemu_get_be32(f);
res->format = qemu_get_be32(f);
res->iov_cnt = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* allocate */
pformat = get_pixman_format(res->format);
if (!pformat) {
return -EINVAL;
}
res->image = pixman_image_create_bits(pformat,
res->width, res->height,
NULL, 0);
if (!res->image) {
return -EINVAL;
}
res->addrs = g_new(uint64_t, res->iov_cnt);
res->iov = g_new(struct iovec, res->iov_cnt);
/* read data */
for (i = 0; i < res->iov_cnt; i++) {
res->addrs[i] = qemu_get_be64(f);
res->iov[i].iov_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, (void *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image),
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image) * res->height);
/* restore mapping */
for (i = 0; i < res->iov_cnt; i++) {
hwaddr len = res->iov[i].iov_len;
res->iov[i].iov_base =
cpu_physical_memory_map(res->addrs[i], &len, 1);
if (!res->iov[i].iov_base || len != res->iov[i].iov_len) {
return -EINVAL;
}
}
QTAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&g->reslist, res, next);
resource_id = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
/* load & apply scanout state */
vmstate_load_state(f, &vmstate_virtio_gpu_scanouts, g, 1);
for (i = 0; i < g->conf.max_outputs; i++) {
scanout = &g->scanout[i];
if (!scanout->resource_id) {
continue;
}
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, scanout->resource_id);
if (!res) {
return -EINVAL;
}
scanout->ds = qemu_create_displaysurface_pixman(res->image);
if (!scanout->ds) {
return -EINVAL;
}
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(scanout->con, scanout->ds);
dpy_gfx_update(scanout->con, 0, 0, scanout->width, scanout->height);
update_cursor(g, &scanout->cursor);
res->scanout_bitmask |= (1 << i);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,974 |
linux | fc27fe7e8deef2f37cba3f2be2d52b6ca5eb9d57 | static int snd_seq_device_dev_free(struct snd_device *device)
{
struct snd_seq_device *dev = device->device_data;
put_device(&dev->dev);
return 0;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-16528 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 7,460 |
linux | f2e5ddcc0d12f9c4c7b254358ad245c9dddce13b | static inline int cipso_v4_sock_getattr(struct sock *sk,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
return -ENOSYS;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,897 |
hhvm | 97ef580ec2cca9a54da6f9bd9fdd9a455f6d74ed | FastCGIServer::FastCGIServer(const std::string &address,
int port,
int workers,
bool useFileSocket)
: Server(address, port),
m_worker(&m_eventBaseManager),
m_dispatcher(workers, workers,
RuntimeOption::ServerThreadDropCacheTimeoutSeconds,
RuntimeOption::ServerThreadDropStack,
this,
RuntimeOption::ServerThreadJobLIFOSwitchThreshold,
RuntimeOption::ServerThreadJobMaxQueuingMilliSeconds,
RequestPriority::k_numPriorities) {
folly::SocketAddress sock_addr;
if (useFileSocket) {
sock_addr.setFromPath(address);
} else if (address.empty()) {
sock_addr.setFromLocalPort(port);
} else {
sock_addr.setFromHostPort(address, port);
}
m_socketConfig.bindAddress = sock_addr;
m_socketConfig.acceptBacklog = RuntimeOption::ServerBacklog;
std::chrono::seconds timeout;
if (RuntimeOption::ConnectionTimeoutSeconds >= 0) {
timeout = std::chrono::seconds(RuntimeOption::ConnectionTimeoutSeconds);
} else {
// default to 2 minutes
timeout = std::chrono::seconds(120);
}
m_socketConfig.connectionIdleTimeout = timeout;
} | 1 | CVE-2019-3569 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 5,108 |
Little-CMS | 06d4557477e7ab3330a24d69af4c67adcac9acdf | int PCS2ITU(register const cmsUInt16Number In[], register cmsUInt16Number Out[], register void* Cargo)
{
cmsCIELab Lab;
cmsLabEncoded2Float(&Lab, In);
cmsDesaturateLab(&Lab, 85, -85, 125, -75); // This function does the necessary gamut remapping
Lab2ITU(&Lab, Out);
return TRUE;
UTILS_UNUSED_PARAMETER(Cargo);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,677 |
linux | f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe | static inline int l2cap_config_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data)
{
struct l2cap_conf_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_conf_rsp *)data;
u16 scid, flags, result;
struct sock *sk;
scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid);
flags = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->flags);
result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result);
BT_DBG("scid 0x%4.4x flags 0x%2.2x result 0x%2.2x",
scid, flags, result);
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(&conn->chan_list, scid);
if (!sk)
return 0;
switch (result) {
case L2CAP_CONF_SUCCESS:
break;
case L2CAP_CONF_UNACCEPT:
if (++l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_retry < L2CAP_CONF_MAX_RETRIES) {
char req[128];
/* It does not make sense to adjust L2CAP parameters
* that are currently defined in the spec. We simply
* resend config request that we sent earlier. It is
* stupid, but it helps qualification testing which
* expects at least some response from us. */
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_get_ident(conn), L2CAP_CONF_REQ,
l2cap_build_conf_req(sk, req), req);
goto done;
}
default:
sk->sk_state = BT_DISCONN;
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
l2cap_sock_set_timer(sk, HZ * 5);
{
struct l2cap_disconn_req req;
req.dcid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid);
req.scid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_get_ident(conn),
L2CAP_DISCONN_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
}
goto done;
}
if (flags & 0x01)
goto done;
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_INPUT_DONE;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state & L2CAP_CONF_OUTPUT_DONE) {
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
}
done:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-1000251 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 5,717 |
sqlite | 522ebfa7cee96fb325a22ea3a2464a63485886a8 | static int lookupName(
Parse *pParse, /* The parsing context */
const char *zDb, /* Name of the database containing table, or NULL */
const char *zTab, /* Name of table containing column, or NULL */
const char *zCol, /* Name of the column. */
NameContext *pNC, /* The name context used to resolve the name */
Expr *pExpr /* Make this EXPR node point to the selected column */
){
int i, j; /* Loop counters */
int cnt = 0; /* Number of matching column names */
int cntTab = 0; /* Number of matching table names */
int nSubquery = 0; /* How many levels of subquery */
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db; /* The database connection */
struct SrcList_item *pItem; /* Use for looping over pSrcList items */
struct SrcList_item *pMatch = 0; /* The matching pSrcList item */
NameContext *pTopNC = pNC; /* First namecontext in the list */
Schema *pSchema = 0; /* Schema of the expression */
int eNewExprOp = TK_COLUMN; /* New value for pExpr->op on success */
Table *pTab = 0; /* Table hold the row */
Column *pCol; /* A column of pTab */
assert( pNC ); /* the name context cannot be NULL. */
assert( zCol ); /* The Z in X.Y.Z cannot be NULL */
assert( !ExprHasProperty(pExpr, EP_TokenOnly|EP_Reduced) );
/* Initialize the node to no-match */
pExpr->iTable = -1;
ExprSetVVAProperty(pExpr, EP_NoReduce);
/* Translate the schema name in zDb into a pointer to the corresponding
** schema. If not found, pSchema will remain NULL and nothing will match
** resulting in an appropriate error message toward the end of this routine
*/
if( zDb ){
testcase( pNC->ncFlags & NC_PartIdx );
testcase( pNC->ncFlags & NC_IsCheck );
if( (pNC->ncFlags & (NC_PartIdx|NC_IsCheck))!=0 ){
/* Silently ignore database qualifiers inside CHECK constraints and
** partial indices. Do not raise errors because that might break
** legacy and because it does not hurt anything to just ignore the
** database name. */
zDb = 0;
}else{
for(i=0; i<db->nDb; i++){
assert( db->aDb[i].zDbSName );
if( sqlite3StrICmp(db->aDb[i].zDbSName,zDb)==0 ){
pSchema = db->aDb[i].pSchema;
break;
}
}
}
}
/* Start at the inner-most context and move outward until a match is found */
assert( pNC && cnt==0 );
do{
ExprList *pEList;
SrcList *pSrcList = pNC->pSrcList;
if( pSrcList ){
for(i=0, pItem=pSrcList->a; i<pSrcList->nSrc; i++, pItem++){
pTab = pItem->pTab;
assert( pTab!=0 && pTab->zName!=0 );
assert( pTab->nCol>0 );
if( pItem->pSelect && (pItem->pSelect->selFlags & SF_NestedFrom)!=0 ){
int hit = 0;
pEList = pItem->pSelect->pEList;
for(j=0; j<pEList->nExpr; j++){
if( sqlite3MatchSpanName(pEList->a[j].zSpan, zCol, zTab, zDb) ){
cnt++;
cntTab = 2;
pMatch = pItem;
pExpr->iColumn = j;
hit = 1;
}
}
if( hit || zTab==0 ) continue;
}
if( zDb && pTab->pSchema!=pSchema ){
continue;
}
if( zTab ){
const char *zTabName = pItem->zAlias ? pItem->zAlias : pTab->zName;
assert( zTabName!=0 );
if( sqlite3StrICmp(zTabName, zTab)!=0 ){
continue;
}
if( IN_RENAME_OBJECT && pItem->zAlias ){
sqlite3RenameTokenRemap(pParse, 0, (void*)&pExpr->y.pTab);
}
}
if( 0==(cntTab++) ){
pMatch = pItem;
}
for(j=0, pCol=pTab->aCol; j<pTab->nCol; j++, pCol++){
if( sqlite3StrICmp(pCol->zName, zCol)==0 ){
/* If there has been exactly one prior match and this match
** is for the right-hand table of a NATURAL JOIN or is in a
** USING clause, then skip this match.
*/
if( cnt==1 ){
if( pItem->fg.jointype & JT_NATURAL ) continue;
if( nameInUsingClause(pItem->pUsing, zCol) ) continue;
}
cnt++;
pMatch = pItem;
/* Substitute the rowid (column -1) for the INTEGER PRIMARY KEY */
pExpr->iColumn = j==pTab->iPKey ? -1 : (i16)j;
break;
}
}
}
if( pMatch ){
pExpr->iTable = pMatch->iCursor;
pExpr->y.pTab = pMatch->pTab;
/* RIGHT JOIN not (yet) supported */
assert( (pMatch->fg.jointype & JT_RIGHT)==0 );
if( (pMatch->fg.jointype & JT_LEFT)!=0 ){
ExprSetProperty(pExpr, EP_CanBeNull);
}
pSchema = pExpr->y.pTab->pSchema;
}
} /* if( pSrcList ) */
#if !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER) || !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_UPSERT)
/* If we have not already resolved the name, then maybe
** it is a new.* or old.* trigger argument reference. Or
** maybe it is an excluded.* from an upsert.
*/
if( zDb==0 && zTab!=0 && cntTab==0 ){
pTab = 0;
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER
if( pParse->pTriggerTab!=0 ){
int op = pParse->eTriggerOp;
assert( op==TK_DELETE || op==TK_UPDATE || op==TK_INSERT );
if( op!=TK_DELETE && sqlite3StrICmp("new",zTab) == 0 ){
pExpr->iTable = 1;
pTab = pParse->pTriggerTab;
}else if( op!=TK_INSERT && sqlite3StrICmp("old",zTab)==0 ){
pExpr->iTable = 0;
pTab = pParse->pTriggerTab;
}
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_UPSERT
if( (pNC->ncFlags & NC_UUpsert)!=0 ){
Upsert *pUpsert = pNC->uNC.pUpsert;
if( pUpsert && sqlite3StrICmp("excluded",zTab)==0 ){
pTab = pUpsert->pUpsertSrc->a[0].pTab;
pExpr->iTable = 2;
}
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_UPSERT */
if( pTab ){
int iCol;
pSchema = pTab->pSchema;
cntTab++;
for(iCol=0, pCol=pTab->aCol; iCol<pTab->nCol; iCol++, pCol++){
if( sqlite3StrICmp(pCol->zName, zCol)==0 ){
if( iCol==pTab->iPKey ){
iCol = -1;
}
break;
}
}
if( iCol>=pTab->nCol && sqlite3IsRowid(zCol) && VisibleRowid(pTab) ){
/* IMP: R-51414-32910 */
iCol = -1;
}
if( iCol<pTab->nCol ){
cnt++;
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_UPSERT
if( pExpr->iTable==2 ){
testcase( iCol==(-1) );
if( IN_RENAME_OBJECT ){
pExpr->iColumn = iCol;
pExpr->y.pTab = pTab;
eNewExprOp = TK_COLUMN;
}else{
pExpr->iTable = pNC->uNC.pUpsert->regData + iCol;
eNewExprOp = TK_REGISTER;
ExprSetProperty(pExpr, EP_Alias);
}
}else
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_UPSERT */
{
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER
if( iCol<0 ){
pExpr->affExpr = SQLITE_AFF_INTEGER;
}else if( pExpr->iTable==0 ){
testcase( iCol==31 );
testcase( iCol==32 );
pParse->oldmask |= (iCol>=32 ? 0xffffffff : (((u32)1)<<iCol));
}else{
testcase( iCol==31 );
testcase( iCol==32 );
pParse->newmask |= (iCol>=32 ? 0xffffffff : (((u32)1)<<iCol));
}
pExpr->y.pTab = pTab;
pExpr->iColumn = (i16)iCol;
eNewExprOp = TK_TRIGGER;
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER */
}
}
}
}
#endif /* !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER) || !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_UPSERT) */
/*
** Perhaps the name is a reference to the ROWID
*/
if( cnt==0
&& cntTab==1
&& pMatch
&& (pNC->ncFlags & (NC_IdxExpr|NC_GenCol))==0
&& sqlite3IsRowid(zCol)
&& VisibleRowid(pMatch->pTab)
){
cnt = 1;
pExpr->iColumn = -1;
pExpr->affExpr = SQLITE_AFF_INTEGER;
}
/*
** If the input is of the form Z (not Y.Z or X.Y.Z) then the name Z
** might refer to an result-set alias. This happens, for example, when
** we are resolving names in the WHERE clause of the following command:
**
** SELECT a+b AS x FROM table WHERE x<10;
**
** In cases like this, replace pExpr with a copy of the expression that
** forms the result set entry ("a+b" in the example) and return immediately.
** Note that the expression in the result set should have already been
** resolved by the time the WHERE clause is resolved.
**
** The ability to use an output result-set column in the WHERE, GROUP BY,
** or HAVING clauses, or as part of a larger expression in the ORDER BY
** clause is not standard SQL. This is a (goofy) SQLite extension, that
** is supported for backwards compatibility only. Hence, we issue a warning
** on sqlite3_log() whenever the capability is used.
*/
if( (pNC->ncFlags & NC_UEList)!=0
&& cnt==0
&& zTab==0
){
pEList = pNC->uNC.pEList;
assert( pEList!=0 );
for(j=0; j<pEList->nExpr; j++){
char *zAs = pEList->a[j].zName;
if( zAs!=0 && sqlite3StrICmp(zAs, zCol)==0 ){
Expr *pOrig;
assert( pExpr->pLeft==0 && pExpr->pRight==0 );
assert( pExpr->x.pList==0 );
assert( pExpr->x.pSelect==0 );
pOrig = pEList->a[j].pExpr;
if( (pNC->ncFlags&NC_AllowAgg)==0 && ExprHasProperty(pOrig, EP_Agg) ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "misuse of aliased aggregate %s", zAs);
return WRC_Abort;
}
if( (pNC->ncFlags&NC_AllowWin)==0 && ExprHasProperty(pOrig, EP_Win) ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "misuse of aliased window function %s",zAs);
return WRC_Abort;
}
if( sqlite3ExprVectorSize(pOrig)!=1 ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "row value misused");
return WRC_Abort;
}
resolveAlias(pParse, pEList, j, pExpr, "", nSubquery);
cnt = 1;
pMatch = 0;
assert( zTab==0 && zDb==0 );
if( IN_RENAME_OBJECT ){
sqlite3RenameTokenRemap(pParse, 0, (void*)pExpr);
}
goto lookupname_end;
}
}
}
/* Advance to the next name context. The loop will exit when either
** we have a match (cnt>0) or when we run out of name contexts.
*/
if( cnt ) break;
pNC = pNC->pNext;
nSubquery++;
}while( pNC );
/*
** If X and Y are NULL (in other words if only the column name Z is
** supplied) and the value of Z is enclosed in double-quotes, then
** Z is a string literal if it doesn't match any column names. In that
** case, we need to return right away and not make any changes to
** pExpr.
**
** Because no reference was made to outer contexts, the pNC->nRef
** fields are not changed in any context.
*/
if( cnt==0 && zTab==0 ){
assert( pExpr->op==TK_ID );
if( ExprHasProperty(pExpr,EP_DblQuoted)
&& areDoubleQuotedStringsEnabled(db, pTopNC)
){
/* If a double-quoted identifier does not match any known column name,
** then treat it as a string.
**
** This hack was added in the early days of SQLite in a misguided attempt
** to be compatible with MySQL 3.x, which used double-quotes for strings.
** I now sorely regret putting in this hack. The effect of this hack is
** that misspelled identifier names are silently converted into strings
** rather than causing an error, to the frustration of countless
** programmers. To all those frustrated programmers, my apologies.
**
** Someday, I hope to get rid of this hack. Unfortunately there is
** a huge amount of legacy SQL that uses it. So for now, we just
** issue a warning.
*/
sqlite3_log(SQLITE_WARNING,
"double-quoted string literal: \"%w\"", zCol);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_NORMALIZE
sqlite3VdbeAddDblquoteStr(db, pParse->pVdbe, zCol);
#endif
pExpr->op = TK_STRING;
pExpr->y.pTab = 0;
return WRC_Prune;
}
if( sqlite3ExprIdToTrueFalse(pExpr) ){
return WRC_Prune;
}
}
/*
** cnt==0 means there was not match. cnt>1 means there were two or
** more matches. Either way, we have an error.
*/
if( cnt!=1 ){
const char *zErr;
zErr = cnt==0 ? "no such column" : "ambiguous column name";
if( zDb ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "%s: %s.%s.%s", zErr, zDb, zTab, zCol);
}else if( zTab ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "%s: %s.%s", zErr, zTab, zCol);
}else{
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "%s: %s", zErr, zCol);
}
pParse->checkSchema = 1;
pTopNC->nErr++;
}
/* If a column from a table in pSrcList is referenced, then record
** this fact in the pSrcList.a[].colUsed bitmask. Column 0 causes
** bit 0 to be set. Column 1 sets bit 1. And so forth.
**
** The colUsed mask is an optimization used to help determine if an
** index is a covering index. The correct answer is still obtained
** if the mask contains extra bits. But omitting bits from the mask
** might result in an incorrect answer.
**
** The high-order bit of the mask is a "we-use-them-all" bit.
** If the column number is greater than the number of bits in the bitmask
** then set the high-order bit of the bitmask. Also set the high-order
** bit if the column is a generated column, as that adds dependencies
** that are difficult to track, so we assume that all columns are used.
*/
if( pExpr->iColumn>=0 && pMatch!=0 ){
int n = pExpr->iColumn;
testcase( n==BMS-1 );
if( n>=BMS ){
n = BMS-1;
}
assert( pExpr->y.pTab!=0 );
assert( pMatch->iCursor==pExpr->iTable );
if( pExpr->y.pTab->tabFlags & TF_HasGenerated ){
Column *pCol = pExpr->y.pTab->aCol + pExpr->iColumn;
if( pCol->colFlags & COLFLAG_GENERATED ) n = BMS-1;
}
pMatch->colUsed |= ((Bitmask)1)<<n;
}
/* Clean up and return
*/
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, pExpr->pLeft);
pExpr->pLeft = 0;
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, pExpr->pRight);
pExpr->pRight = 0;
pExpr->op = eNewExprOp;
ExprSetProperty(pExpr, EP_Leaf);
lookupname_end:
if( cnt==1 ){
assert( pNC!=0 );
if( !ExprHasProperty(pExpr, EP_Alias) ){
sqlite3AuthRead(pParse, pExpr, pSchema, pNC->pSrcList);
}
/* Increment the nRef value on all name contexts from TopNC up to
** the point where the name matched. */
for(;;){
assert( pTopNC!=0 );
pTopNC->nRef++;
if( pTopNC==pNC ) break;
pTopNC = pTopNC->pNext;
}
return WRC_Prune;
} else {
return WRC_Abort;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 23,771 |
libvncserver | 53073c8d7e232151ea2ecd8a1243124121e10e2d | rfbSetClientColourMap(rfbClientPtr cl, int firstColour, int nColours)
{
if (cl->screen->serverFormat.trueColour || !cl->readyForSetColourMapEntries) {
return TRUE;
}
if (nColours == 0) {
nColours = cl->screen->colourMap.count;
}
if (cl->format.trueColour) {
LOCK(cl->updateMutex);
(*rfbInitColourMapSingleTableFns
[BPP2OFFSET(cl->format.bitsPerPixel)]) (&cl->translateLookupTable,
&cl->screen->serverFormat, &cl->format,&cl->screen->colourMap);
sraRgnDestroy(cl->modifiedRegion);
cl->modifiedRegion =
sraRgnCreateRect(0,0,cl->screen->width,cl->screen->height);
UNLOCK(cl->updateMutex);
return TRUE;
}
return rfbSendSetColourMapEntries(cl, firstColour, nColours);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,385 |
Chrome | a261ea1c56ef16fc0fc4af1e440feb302d577716 | void FileReaderLoader::OnDataPipeReadable(MojoResult result) {
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK) {
if (!received_all_data_)
Failed(FileError::kNotReadableErr);
return;
}
while (true) {
uint32_t num_bytes;
const void* buffer;
MojoResult result = consumer_handle_->BeginReadData(
&buffer, &num_bytes, MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_NONE);
if (result == MOJO_RESULT_SHOULD_WAIT) {
if (!IsSyncLoad())
return;
result = mojo::Wait(consumer_handle_.get(), MOJO_HANDLE_SIGNAL_READABLE);
if (result == MOJO_RESULT_OK)
continue;
}
if (result == MOJO_RESULT_FAILED_PRECONDITION) {
if (!received_all_data_)
Failed(FileError::kNotReadableErr);
return;
}
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK) {
Failed(FileError::kNotReadableErr);
return;
}
OnReceivedData(static_cast<const char*>(buffer), num_bytes);
consumer_handle_->EndReadData(num_bytes);
if (BytesLoaded() >= total_bytes_) {
received_all_data_ = true;
if (received_on_complete_)
OnFinishLoading();
return;
}
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,800 |
qpdf | 8249a26d69f72b9cda584c14cc3f12769985e481 | QPDFWriter::enqueueObject(QPDFObjectHandle object)
{
if (object.isIndirect())
{
if (object.getOwningQPDF() != &(this->pdf))
{
QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDFWriter foreign object");
throw std::logic_error(
"QPDFObjectHandle from different QPDF found while writing."
" Use QPDF::copyForeignObject to add objects from"
" another file.");
}
QPDFObjGen og = object.getObjGen();
if (obj_renumber.count(og) == 0)
{
if (this->object_to_object_stream.count(og))
{
// This is in an object stream. Don't process it
// here. Instead, enqueue the object stream. Object
// streams always have generation 0.
int stream_id = this->object_to_object_stream[og];
enqueueObject(this->pdf.getObjectByID(stream_id, 0));
}
else
{
object_queue.push_back(object);
obj_renumber[og] = next_objid++;
if ((og.getGen() == 0) &&
this->object_stream_to_objects.count(og.getObj()))
{
// For linearized files, uncompressed objects go
// at end, and we take care of assigning numbers
// to them elsewhere.
if (! this->linearized)
{
assignCompressedObjectNumbers(og);
}
}
else if ((! this->direct_stream_lengths) && object.isStream())
{
// reserve next object ID for length
++next_objid;
}
}
}
}
else if (object.isArray())
{
int n = object.getArrayNItems();
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i)
{
if (! this->linearized)
{
enqueueObject(object.getArrayItem(i));
}
}
}
else if (object.isDictionary())
{
std::set<std::string> keys = object.getKeys();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator iter = keys.begin();
iter != keys.end(); ++iter)
{
if (! this->linearized)
{
enqueueObject(object.getKey(*iter));
}
}
}
else
{
// ignore
}
} | 1 | CVE-2017-18183 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 8,435 |
linux | 0b79459b482e85cb7426aa7da683a9f2c97aeae1 | static void update_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 eoi_exit_bitmap[4];
memset(eoi_exit_bitmap, 0, 32);
kvm_ioapic_calculate_eoi_exitmap(vcpu, eoi_exit_bitmap);
kvm_x86_ops->load_eoi_exitmap(vcpu, eoi_exit_bitmap);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,872 |
tensorflow | e6cf28c72ba2eb949ca950d834dd6d66bb01cfae | ALWAYS_INLINE void ScalarMulAdd3Way(const float a1, const float a2,
const float a3, const float** inp1,
const float** inp2, const float** inp3,
float** out) {
**out += a1 * **inp1 + a2 * **inp2 + a3 * **inp3;
++*out;
++*inp1;
++*inp2;
++*inp3;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,070 |
bsdiff4 | 49a4cee2feef7deaf9d89e5e793a8824930284d7 | static void qsufsort(off_t *I, off_t *V, unsigned char *old, off_t oldsize)
{
off_t buckets[256], i, h, len;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
buckets[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < oldsize; i++)
buckets[old[i]]++;
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++)
buckets[i] += buckets[i - 1];
for (i = 255; i > 0; i--)
buckets[i] = buckets[i - 1];
buckets[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < oldsize; i++)
I[++buckets[old[i]]] = i;
I[0] = oldsize;
for (i = 0; i < oldsize; i++)
V[i] = buckets[old[i]];
V[oldsize] = 0;
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++)
if (buckets[i] == buckets[i - 1] + 1)
I[buckets[i]] = -1;
I[0] = -1;
for (h = 1; I[0] != -(oldsize + 1); h += h) {
len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < oldsize + 1;) {
if (I[i] < 0) {
len -= I[i];
i -= I[i];
} else {
if (len)
I[i - len] = -len;
len = V[I[i]] + 1 - i;
split(I, V, i, len, h);
i += len;
len=0;
}
}
if (len)
I[i - len] = -len;
}
for (i = 0; i < oldsize + 1; i++)
I[V[i]] = i;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,887 |
claws | d390fa07f5548f3173dd9cc13b233db5ce934c82 | static gint conv_euctojis(gchar *outbuf, gint outlen, const gchar *inbuf)
{
const guchar *in = inbuf;
guchar *out = outbuf;
JISState state = JIS_ASCII;
while (*in != '\0') {
if (IS_ASCII(*in)) {
K_OUT();
*out++ = *in++;
} else if (iseuckanji(*in)) {
if (iseuckanji(*(in + 1))) {
K_IN();
*out++ = *in++ & 0x7f;
*out++ = *in++ & 0x7f;
} else {
K_OUT();
*out++ = SUBST_CHAR;
in++;
if (*in != '\0' && !IS_ASCII(*in)) {
*out++ = SUBST_CHAR;
in++;
}
}
} else if (iseuchwkana1(*in)) {
if (iseuchwkana2(*(in + 1))) {
if (prefs_common.allow_jisx0201_kana) {
HW_IN();
in++;
*out++ = *in++ & 0x7f;
} else {
guchar jis_ch[2];
gint len;
if (iseuchwkana1(*(in + 2)) &&
iseuchwkana2(*(in + 3)))
len = conv_jis_hantozen
(jis_ch,
*(in + 1), *(in + 3));
else
len = conv_jis_hantozen
(jis_ch,
*(in + 1), '\0');
if (len == 0)
in += 2;
else {
K_IN();
in += len * 2;
*out++ = jis_ch[0];
*out++ = jis_ch[1];
}
}
} else {
K_OUT();
in++;
if (*in != '\0' && !IS_ASCII(*in)) {
*out++ = SUBST_CHAR;
in++;
}
}
} else if (iseucaux(*in)) {
in++;
if (iseuckanji(*in) && iseuckanji(*(in + 1))) {
AUX_IN();
*out++ = *in++ & 0x7f;
*out++ = *in++ & 0x7f;
} else {
K_OUT();
if (*in != '\0' && !IS_ASCII(*in)) {
*out++ = SUBST_CHAR;
in++;
if (*in != '\0' && !IS_ASCII(*in)) {
*out++ = SUBST_CHAR;
in++;
}
}
}
} else {
K_OUT();
*out++ = SUBST_CHAR;
in++;
}
}
K_OUT();
*out = '\0';
return 0;
} | 1 | CVE-2015-8614 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 3,579 |
openjpeg | 8ee335227bbcaf1614124046aa25e53d67b11ec3 | opj_image_t* bmptoimage(const char *filename, opj_cparameters_t *parameters)
{
opj_image_cmptparm_t cmptparm[4]; /* maximum of 4 components */
OPJ_UINT8 lut_R[256], lut_G[256], lut_B[256];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT[3];
opj_image_t * image = NULL;
FILE *IN;
OPJ_BITMAPFILEHEADER File_h;
OPJ_BITMAPINFOHEADER Info_h;
OPJ_UINT32 i, palette_len, numcmpts = 1U;
OPJ_BOOL l_result = OPJ_FALSE;
OPJ_UINT8* pData = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 stride;
pLUT[0] = lut_R;
pLUT[1] = lut_G;
pLUT[2] = lut_B;
IN = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (!IN) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s for reading !!\n", filename);
return NULL;
}
if (!bmp_read_file_header(IN, &File_h)) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
if (!bmp_read_info_header(IN, &Info_h)) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
/* Load palette */
if (Info_h.biBitCount <= 8U) {
memset(&lut_R[0], 0, sizeof(lut_R));
memset(&lut_G[0], 0, sizeof(lut_G));
memset(&lut_B[0], 0, sizeof(lut_B));
palette_len = Info_h.biClrUsed;
if ((palette_len == 0U) && (Info_h.biBitCount <= 8U)) {
palette_len = (1U << Info_h.biBitCount);
}
if (palette_len > 256U) {
palette_len = 256U;
}
if (palette_len > 0U) {
OPJ_UINT8 has_color = 0U;
for (i = 0U; i < palette_len; i++) {
lut_B[i] = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
lut_G[i] = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
lut_R[i] = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
(void)getc(IN); /* padding */
has_color |= (lut_B[i] ^ lut_G[i]) | (lut_G[i] ^ lut_R[i]);
}
if (has_color) {
numcmpts = 3U;
}
}
} else {
numcmpts = 3U;
if ((Info_h.biCompression == 3) && (Info_h.biAlphaMask != 0U)) {
numcmpts++;
}
}
if (Info_h.biWidth == 0 || Info_h.biHeight == 0) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
if (Info_h.biBitCount > (((OPJ_UINT32) - 1) - 31) / Info_h.biWidth) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
stride = ((Info_h.biWidth * Info_h.biBitCount + 31U) / 32U) *
4U; /* rows are aligned on 32bits */
if (Info_h.biBitCount == 4 &&
Info_h.biCompression == 2) { /* RLE 4 gets decoded as 8 bits data for now... */
if (8 > (((OPJ_UINT32) - 1) - 31) / Info_h.biWidth) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
stride = ((Info_h.biWidth * 8U + 31U) / 32U) * 4U;
}
if (stride > ((OPJ_UINT32) - 1) / sizeof(OPJ_UINT8) / Info_h.biHeight) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
pData = (OPJ_UINT8 *) calloc(1, sizeof(OPJ_UINT8) * stride * Info_h.biHeight);
if (pData == NULL) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
/* Place the cursor at the beginning of the image information */
fseek(IN, 0, SEEK_SET);
fseek(IN, (long)File_h.bfOffBits, SEEK_SET);
switch (Info_h.biCompression) {
case 0:
case 3:
/* read raw data */
l_result = bmp_read_raw_data(IN, pData, stride, Info_h.biWidth,
Info_h.biHeight);
break;
case 1:
/* read rle8 data */
l_result = bmp_read_rle8_data(IN, pData, stride, Info_h.biWidth,
Info_h.biHeight);
break;
case 2:
/* read rle4 data */
l_result = bmp_read_rle4_data(IN, pData, stride, Info_h.biWidth,
Info_h.biHeight);
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported BMP compression\n");
l_result = OPJ_FALSE;
break;
}
if (!l_result) {
free(pData);
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
/* create the image */
memset(&cmptparm[0], 0, sizeof(cmptparm));
for (i = 0; i < 4U; i++) {
cmptparm[i].prec = 8;
cmptparm[i].bpp = 8;
cmptparm[i].sgnd = 0;
cmptparm[i].dx = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->subsampling_dx;
cmptparm[i].dy = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->subsampling_dy;
cmptparm[i].w = Info_h.biWidth;
cmptparm[i].h = Info_h.biHeight;
}
image = opj_image_create(numcmpts, &cmptparm[0],
(numcmpts == 1U) ? OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY : OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB);
if (!image) {
fclose(IN);
free(pData);
return NULL;
}
if (numcmpts == 4U) {
image->comps[3].alpha = 1;
}
/* set image offset and reference grid */
image->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->image_offset_x0;
image->y0 = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->image_offset_y0;
image->x1 = image->x0 + (Info_h.biWidth - 1U) * (OPJ_UINT32)
parameters->subsampling_dx + 1U;
image->y1 = image->y0 + (Info_h.biHeight - 1U) * (OPJ_UINT32)
parameters->subsampling_dy + 1U;
/* Read the data */
if (Info_h.biBitCount == 24 && Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /*RGB */
bmp24toimage(pData, stride, image);
} else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 8 &&
Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /* RGB 8bpp Indexed */
bmp8toimage(pData, stride, image, pLUT);
} else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 8 && Info_h.biCompression == 1) { /*RLE8*/
bmp8toimage(pData, stride, image, pLUT);
} else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 4 && Info_h.biCompression == 2) { /*RLE4*/
bmp8toimage(pData, stride, image,
pLUT); /* RLE 4 gets decoded as 8 bits data for now */
} else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 32 && Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /* RGBX */
bmpmask32toimage(pData, stride, image, 0x00FF0000U, 0x0000FF00U, 0x000000FFU,
0x00000000U);
} else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 32 && Info_h.biCompression == 3) { /* bitmask */
if ((Info_h.biRedMask == 0U) && (Info_h.biGreenMask == 0U) &&
(Info_h.biBlueMask == 0U)) {
Info_h.biRedMask = 0x00FF0000U;
Info_h.biGreenMask = 0x0000FF00U;
Info_h.biBlueMask = 0x000000FFU;
}
bmpmask32toimage(pData, stride, image, Info_h.biRedMask, Info_h.biGreenMask,
Info_h.biBlueMask, Info_h.biAlphaMask);
} else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 16 && Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /* RGBX */
bmpmask16toimage(pData, stride, image, 0x7C00U, 0x03E0U, 0x001FU, 0x0000U);
} else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 16 && Info_h.biCompression == 3) { /* bitmask */
if ((Info_h.biRedMask == 0U) && (Info_h.biGreenMask == 0U) &&
(Info_h.biBlueMask == 0U)) {
Info_h.biRedMask = 0xF800U;
Info_h.biGreenMask = 0x07E0U;
Info_h.biBlueMask = 0x001FU;
}
bmpmask16toimage(pData, stride, image, Info_h.biRedMask, Info_h.biGreenMask,
Info_h.biBlueMask, Info_h.biAlphaMask);
} else {
opj_image_destroy(image);
image = NULL;
fprintf(stderr,
"Other system than 24 bits/pixels or 8 bits (no RLE coding) is not yet implemented [%d]\n",
Info_h.biBitCount);
}
free(pData);
fclose(IN);
return image;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,713 |
openjpeg | 2cd30c2b06ce332dede81cccad8b334cde997281 | static unsigned short get_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
{
unsigned short val = *(const unsigned short *)data;
#ifdef OPJ_BIG_ENDIAN
val = ((val & 0xffU) << 8) | (val >> 8);
#endif
return val;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-14040 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 8,849 |
FreeRDP | 17c363a5162fd4dc77b1df54e48d7bd9bf6b3be7 | static void zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, const BYTE* src, size_t count)
{
UINT32 front;
if (count <= 0)
return;
if (count > zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
{
const size_t residue = count - zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
count = zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
src += residue;
zgfx->HistoryIndex = (zgfx->HistoryIndex + residue) % zgfx->HistoryBufferSize;
}
if (zgfx->HistoryIndex + count <= zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
{
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex]), src, count);
if ((zgfx->HistoryIndex += count) == zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
}
else
{
front = zgfx->HistoryBufferSize - zgfx->HistoryIndex;
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex]), src, front);
CopyMemory(zgfx->HistoryBuffer, &src[front], count - front);
zgfx->HistoryIndex = count - front;
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,353 |
libming | da9d86eab55cbf608d5c916b8b690f5b76bca462 | getString(struct SWF_ACTIONPUSHPARAM *act)
{
char *t;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("*getString* type=%d\n",act->Type);
#endif
switch( act->Type )
{
case PUSH_STRING:
if (!act->p.String) /* Not a NULL string */
{
SWF_warn("WARNING: Call to getString with NULL string.\n");
break;
}
t=malloc(strlen(act->p.String)+3); /* 2 "'"s and a NULL */
strcpy(t,"'");
strcat(t,act->p.String);
strcat(t,"'");
return t;
case PUSH_NULL: /* NULL */
return "null";
case PUSH_UNDEF: /* Undefined */
return "undefined";
case PUSH_REGISTER: /* REGISTER */
if( regs[act->p.RegisterNumber] &&
regs[act->p.RegisterNumber]->Type != 4 &&
regs[act->p.RegisterNumber]->Type != 7 )
{
return getName(regs[act->p.RegisterNumber]);
}
else
{
t=malloc(5); /* Rddd */
sprintf(t,"R%d", act->p.RegisterNumber );
return t;
}
case PUSH_BOOLEAN: /* BOOLEAN */
if( act->p.Boolean )
return "true";
else
return "false";
case PUSH_DOUBLE: /* DOUBLE */
{
char length_finder[1];
int needed_length = snprintf(length_finder, 1, "%g", act->p.Double) + 1;
if (needed_length <= 0)
{
SWF_warn("WARNING: could not evaluate size of buffer (memory issue ?).\n");
break;
}
t = malloc(needed_length);
sprintf(t, "%g", act->p.Double );
return t;
}
case PUSH_INT: /* INTEGER */
t=malloc(10); /* 32-bit decimal */
sprintf(t,"%ld", act->p.Integer );
return t;
case PUSH_CONSTANT: /* CONSTANT8 */
if (act->p.Constant8 > poolcounter)
{
SWF_warn("WARNING: retrieving constants not present in the pool.\n");
break;
}
t=malloc(strlenext(pool[act->p.Constant8])+3); /* 2 "'"s and a NULL */
strcpy(t,"'");
strcatext(t,pool[act->p.Constant8]);
strcat(t,"'");
return t;
case PUSH_CONSTANT16: /* CONSTANT16 */
if (act->p.Constant16 > poolcounter)
{
SWF_warn("WARNING: retrieving constants not present in the pool.\n");
break;
}
t=malloc(strlenext(pool[act->p.Constant16])+3); /* 2 '\"'s and a NULL */
strcpy(t,"'");
strcatext(t,pool[act->p.Constant16]);
strcat(t,"'");
return t;
case 12:
case 11: /* INCREMENTED or DECREMENTED VARIABLE */
case PUSH_VARIABLE: /* VARIABLE */
return act->p.String;
default:
fprintf (stderr," Can't get string for type: %d\n", act->Type);
break;
}
t = malloc(sizeof(char));
strcpyext(t,"");
return t;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,074 |
Chrome | 3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a | void webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight(WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase, unsigned height)
{
if (!webkitWebViewBase->priv->inspectorView)
return;
if (webkitWebViewBase->priv->inspectorViewHeight == height)
return;
webkitWebViewBase->priv->inspectorViewHeight = height;
gtk_widget_queue_resize_no_redraw(GTK_WIDGET(webkitWebViewBase));
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-3099 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 967 |
sound | 19bce474c45be69a284ecee660aa12d8f1e88f18 | static int __check_input_term(struct mixer_build *state, int id,
struct usb_audio_term *term)
{
int protocol = state->mixer->protocol;
int err;
void *p1;
unsigned char *hdr;
memset(term, 0, sizeof(*term));
for (;;) {
/* a loop in the terminal chain? */
if (test_and_set_bit(id, state->termbitmap))
return -EINVAL;
p1 = find_audio_control_unit(state, id);
if (!p1)
break;
hdr = p1;
term->id = id;
if (protocol == UAC_VERSION_1 || protocol == UAC_VERSION_2) {
switch (hdr[2]) {
case UAC_INPUT_TERMINAL:
if (protocol == UAC_VERSION_1) {
struct uac_input_terminal_descriptor *d = p1;
term->type = le16_to_cpu(d->wTerminalType);
term->channels = d->bNrChannels;
term->chconfig = le16_to_cpu(d->wChannelConfig);
term->name = d->iTerminal;
} else { /* UAC_VERSION_2 */
struct uac2_input_terminal_descriptor *d = p1;
/* call recursively to verify that the
* referenced clock entity is valid */
err = __check_input_term(state, d->bCSourceID, term);
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* save input term properties after recursion,
* to ensure they are not overriden by the
* recursion calls */
term->id = id;
term->type = le16_to_cpu(d->wTerminalType);
term->channels = d->bNrChannels;
term->chconfig = le32_to_cpu(d->bmChannelConfig);
term->name = d->iTerminal;
}
return 0;
case UAC_FEATURE_UNIT: {
/* the header is the same for v1 and v2 */
struct uac_feature_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
id = d->bSourceID;
break; /* continue to parse */
}
case UAC_MIXER_UNIT: {
struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
term->type = UAC3_MIXER_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
term->channels = uac_mixer_unit_bNrChannels(d);
term->chconfig = uac_mixer_unit_wChannelConfig(d, protocol);
term->name = uac_mixer_unit_iMixer(d);
return 0;
}
case UAC_SELECTOR_UNIT:
case UAC2_CLOCK_SELECTOR: {
struct uac_selector_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
/* call recursively to retrieve the channel info */
err = __check_input_term(state, d->baSourceID[0], term);
if (err < 0)
return err;
term->type = UAC3_SELECTOR_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
term->id = id;
term->name = uac_selector_unit_iSelector(d);
return 0;
}
case UAC1_PROCESSING_UNIT:
/* UAC2_EFFECT_UNIT */
if (protocol == UAC_VERSION_1)
term->type = UAC3_PROCESSING_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
else /* UAC_VERSION_2 */
term->type = UAC3_EFFECT_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
/* fall through */
case UAC1_EXTENSION_UNIT:
/* UAC2_PROCESSING_UNIT_V2 */
if (protocol == UAC_VERSION_1 && !term->type)
term->type = UAC3_EXTENSION_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
else if (protocol == UAC_VERSION_2 && !term->type)
term->type = UAC3_PROCESSING_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
/* fall through */
case UAC2_EXTENSION_UNIT_V2: {
struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
if (protocol == UAC_VERSION_2 &&
hdr[2] == UAC2_EFFECT_UNIT) {
/* UAC2/UAC1 unit IDs overlap here in an
* uncompatible way. Ignore this unit for now.
*/
return 0;
}
if (d->bNrInPins) {
id = d->baSourceID[0];
break; /* continue to parse */
}
if (!term->type)
term->type = UAC3_EXTENSION_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
term->channels = uac_processing_unit_bNrChannels(d);
term->chconfig = uac_processing_unit_wChannelConfig(d, protocol);
term->name = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(d, protocol);
return 0;
}
case UAC2_CLOCK_SOURCE: {
struct uac_clock_source_descriptor *d = p1;
term->type = UAC3_CLOCK_SOURCE << 16; /* virtual type */
term->id = id;
term->name = d->iClockSource;
return 0;
}
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
} else { /* UAC_VERSION_3 */
switch (hdr[2]) {
case UAC_INPUT_TERMINAL: {
struct uac3_input_terminal_descriptor *d = p1;
/* call recursively to verify that the
* referenced clock entity is valid */
err = __check_input_term(state, d->bCSourceID, term);
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* save input term properties after recursion,
* to ensure they are not overriden by the
* recursion calls */
term->id = id;
term->type = le16_to_cpu(d->wTerminalType);
err = get_cluster_channels_v3(state, le16_to_cpu(d->wClusterDescrID));
if (err < 0)
return err;
term->channels = err;
/* REVISIT: UAC3 IT doesn't have channels cfg */
term->chconfig = 0;
term->name = le16_to_cpu(d->wTerminalDescrStr);
return 0;
}
case UAC3_FEATURE_UNIT: {
struct uac3_feature_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
id = d->bSourceID;
break; /* continue to parse */
}
case UAC3_CLOCK_SOURCE: {
struct uac3_clock_source_descriptor *d = p1;
term->type = UAC3_CLOCK_SOURCE << 16; /* virtual type */
term->id = id;
term->name = le16_to_cpu(d->wClockSourceStr);
return 0;
}
case UAC3_MIXER_UNIT: {
struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
err = uac_mixer_unit_get_channels(state, d);
if (err <= 0)
return err;
term->channels = err;
term->type = UAC3_MIXER_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
return 0;
}
case UAC3_SELECTOR_UNIT:
case UAC3_CLOCK_SELECTOR: {
struct uac_selector_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
/* call recursively to retrieve the channel info */
err = __check_input_term(state, d->baSourceID[0], term);
if (err < 0)
return err;
term->type = UAC3_SELECTOR_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
term->id = id;
term->name = 0; /* TODO: UAC3 Class-specific strings */
return 0;
}
case UAC3_PROCESSING_UNIT: {
struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *d = p1;
if (!d->bNrInPins)
return -EINVAL;
/* call recursively to retrieve the channel info */
err = __check_input_term(state, d->baSourceID[0], term);
if (err < 0)
return err;
term->type = UAC3_PROCESSING_UNIT << 16; /* virtual type */
term->id = id;
term->name = 0; /* TODO: UAC3 Class-specific strings */
return 0;
}
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
}
}
return -ENODEV;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 23,912 |
ImageMagick | d5559407ce29f4371e5df9c1cbde65455fe5854c | static Image *ReadINLINEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register size_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*inline_image;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (LocaleNCompare(image_info->filename,"data:",5) == 0)
{
char
*filename;
Image
*data_image;
filename=AcquireString("data:");
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
data_image=ReadInlineImage(image_info,filename,exception);
filename=DestroyString(filename);
return(data_image);
}
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
quantum=MagickMin((size_t) GetBlobSize(image),MagickMaxBufferExtent);
if (quantum == 0)
quantum=MagickMaxBufferExtent;
inline_image=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(quantum,
sizeof(*inline_image));
count=0;
for (i=0; inline_image != (unsigned char *) NULL; i+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,quantum,inline_image+i);
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
if (~((size_t) i) < (quantum+1))
{
inline_image=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(inline_image);
break;
}
inline_image=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(inline_image,i+count+
quantum+1,sizeof(*inline_image));
}
if (inline_image == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
inline_image[i+count]='\0';
image=DestroyImageList(image);
image=ReadInlineImage(image_info,(char *) inline_image,exception);
inline_image=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(inline_image);
return(image);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,929 |
Chrome | b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201 | static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg, intArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-2350 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 3,583 |
Chrome | 94fef6e2a56ef5b3ed0dc0fd94e6ad52267067fb | void TaskService::PostBoundDelayedTask(RunnerId runner_id,
base::OnceClosure task,
base::TimeDelta delay) {
InstanceId instance_id;
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (bound_instance_id_ == kInvalidInstanceId)
return;
instance_id = bound_instance_id_;
}
GetTaskRunner(runner_id)->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&TaskService::RunTask, base::Unretained(this), instance_id,
runner_id, std::move(task)),
delay);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,456 |
gnupg | 07116a314f4dcd4d96990bbd74db95a03a9f650a | dump_decoder_state (DECODER_STATE ds)
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < ds->idx; i++)
{
fprintf (stderr," ds stack[%d] (", i);
if (ds->stack[i].node)
_ksba_asn_node_dump (ds->stack[i].node, stderr);
else
fprintf (stderr, "Null");
fprintf (stderr,") %s%d (%d)%s\n",
ds->stack[i].ndef_length? "ndef ":"",
ds->stack[i].length,
ds->stack[i].nread,
ds->stack[i].in_seq_of? " in_seq_of":"");
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,032 |
linux | 363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76 | int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
smp_rmb();
return key->reject_error;
}
return key_validate(key);
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-15951 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 8,199 |
gnutls | 5140422e0d7319a8e2fe07f02cbcafc4d6538732 | int cdk_pk_get_nbits(cdk_pubkey_t pk)
{
if (!pk || !pk->mpi[0])
return 0;
return _gnutls_mpi_get_nbits(pk->mpi[0]);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,744 |
linux | f0ec1aaf54caddd21c259aea8b2ecfbde4ee4fb9 | void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
{
/* convert pages-jiffies to Mbyte-usec */
stats->coremem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_rss_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
stats->virtmem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_vm_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
if (p->mm) {
/* adjust to KB unit */
stats->hiwater_rss = p->mm->hiwater_rss * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
stats->hiwater_vm = p->mm->hiwater_vm * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
}
stats->read_char = p->rchar;
stats->write_char = p->wchar;
stats->read_syscalls = p->syscr;
stats->write_syscalls = p->syscw;
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-3510 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 7,067 |
libsndfile | 708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074 | header_put_le_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
} ;
} /* header_put_le_8byte */
| 1 | CVE-2017-7586 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 9,031 |
linux | e7af6307a8a54f0b873960b32b6a644f2d0fbd97 | void snd_timer_notify(struct snd_timer *timer, int event, struct timespec *tstamp)
{
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long resolution = 0;
struct snd_timer_instance *ti, *ts;
if (timer->card && timer->card->shutdown)
return;
if (! (timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE))
return;
if (snd_BUG_ON(event < SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTART ||
event > SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MRESUME))
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
if (event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTART ||
event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MCONTINUE ||
event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MRESUME)
resolution = snd_timer_hw_resolution(timer);
list_for_each_entry(ti, &timer->active_list_head, active_list) {
if (ti->ccallback)
ti->ccallback(ti, event, tstamp, resolution);
list_for_each_entry(ts, &ti->slave_active_head, active_list)
if (ts->ccallback)
ts->ccallback(ts, event, tstamp, resolution);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,679 |
FFmpeg | 2b46ebdbff1d8dec7a3d8ea280a612b91a582869 | static int parse_video_info(AVIOContext *pb, AVStream *st)
{
uint16_t size_asf; // ASF-specific Format Data size
uint32_t size_bmp; // BMP_HEADER-specific Format Data size
unsigned int tag;
st->codecpar->width = avio_rl32(pb);
st->codecpar->height = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 1); // skip reserved flags
size_asf = avio_rl16(pb);
tag = ff_get_bmp_header(pb, st, &size_bmp);
st->codecpar->codec_tag = tag;
st->codecpar->codec_id = ff_codec_get_id(ff_codec_bmp_tags, tag);
size_bmp = FFMAX(size_asf, size_bmp);
if (size_bmp > BMP_HEADER_SIZE) {
int ret;
st->codecpar->extradata_size = size_bmp - BMP_HEADER_SIZE;
if (!(st->codecpar->extradata = av_malloc(st->codecpar->extradata_size +
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE))) {
st->codecpar->extradata_size = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
memset(st->codecpar->extradata + st->codecpar->extradata_size , 0,
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if ((ret = avio_read(pb, st->codecpar->extradata,
st->codecpar->extradata_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| 1 | CVE-2018-1999011 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 8,632 |
openssh-portable | ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad | kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,648 |
Chrome | 2511466dd15750f2ab0e5cecc30010f0a3f7949c | void FocusFirstNameField() {
LOG(WARNING) << "Clicking on the tab.";
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(ui_test_utils::ClickOnView(browser(),
VIEW_ID_TAB_CONTAINER));
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::IsViewFocused(browser(),
VIEW_ID_TAB_CONTAINER));
LOG(WARNING) << "Focusing the first name field.";
bool result = false;
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::ExecuteJavaScriptAndExtractBool(
render_view_host(), L"",
L"if (document.readyState === 'complete')"
L" document.getElementById('firstname').focus();"
L"else"
L" domAutomationController.send(false);",
&result));
ASSERT_TRUE(result);
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-2876 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 9,751 |
w3m | e2c7ecec6f9b730ad3c9bf8c8df9212970f183d7 | formUpdateBuffer(Anchor *a, Buffer *buf, FormItemList *form)
{
Buffer save;
char *p;
int spos, epos, rows, c_rows, pos, col = 0;
Line *l;
copyBuffer(&save, buf);
gotoLine(buf, a->start.line);
switch (form->type) {
case FORM_TEXTAREA:
case FORM_INPUT_TEXT:
case FORM_INPUT_FILE:
case FORM_INPUT_PASSWORD:
case FORM_INPUT_CHECKBOX:
case FORM_INPUT_RADIO:
#ifdef MENU_SELECT
case FORM_SELECT:
#endif /* MENU_SELECT */
spos = a->start.pos;
epos = a->end.pos;
break;
default:
spos = a->start.pos + 1;
epos = a->end.pos - 1;
}
switch (form->type) {
case FORM_INPUT_CHECKBOX:
case FORM_INPUT_RADIO:
if (buf->currentLine == NULL ||
spos >= buf->currentLine->len || spos < 0)
break;
if (form->checked)
buf->currentLine->lineBuf[spos] = '*';
else
buf->currentLine->lineBuf[spos] = ' ';
break;
case FORM_INPUT_TEXT:
case FORM_INPUT_FILE:
case FORM_INPUT_PASSWORD:
case FORM_TEXTAREA:
#ifdef MENU_SELECT
case FORM_SELECT:
if (form->type == FORM_SELECT) {
p = form->label->ptr;
updateSelectOption(form, form->select_option);
}
else
#endif /* MENU_SELECT */
{
if (!form->value)
break;
p = form->value->ptr;
}
l = buf->currentLine;
if (!l)
break;
if (form->type == FORM_TEXTAREA) {
int n = a->y - buf->currentLine->linenumber;
if (n > 0)
for (; l && n; l = l->prev, n--) ;
else if (n < 0)
for (; l && n; l = l->prev, n++) ;
if (!l)
break;
}
rows = form->rows ? form->rows : 1;
col = COLPOS(l, a->start.pos);
for (c_rows = 0; c_rows < rows; c_rows++, l = l->next) {
if (rows > 1) {
pos = columnPos(l, col);
a = retrieveAnchor(buf->formitem, l->linenumber, pos);
if (a == NULL)
break;
spos = a->start.pos;
epos = a->end.pos;
}
if (a->start.line != a->end.line || spos > epos || epos >= l->len || spos < 0 || epos < 0)
break;
pos = form_update_line(l, &p, spos, epos, COLPOS(l, epos) - col,
rows > 1,
form->type == FORM_INPUT_PASSWORD);
if (pos != epos) {
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->href, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->name, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->img, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
shiftAnchorPosition(buf->formitem, buf->hmarklist,
a->start.line, spos, pos - epos);
}
}
break;
}
copyBuffer(buf, &save);
arrangeLine(buf);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,105 |
linux | 1957a85b0032a81e6482ca4aab883643b8dae06e | u64 __init efi_mem_desc_end(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
u64 size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
u64 end = md->phys_addr + size;
return end;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,309 |
tcpdump | 211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66 | static int dccp_cksum(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct ip *ip,
const struct dccp_hdr *dh, u_int len)
{
return nextproto4_cksum(ndo, ip, (const uint8_t *)(const void *)dh, len,
dccp_csum_coverage(dh, len), IPPROTO_DCCP);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,800 |
linux | c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 | static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
const u32 __user *tmp = (const u32 __user *)buf;
u32 data[2];
u32 reg = *ppos;
int cpu = iminor(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
int err = 0;
ssize_t bytes = 0;
if (count % 8)
return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
for (; count; count -= 8) {
if (copy_from_user(&data, tmp, 8)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
err = wrmsr_safe_on_cpu(cpu, reg, data[0], data[1]);
if (err)
break;
tmp += 2;
bytes += 8;
}
return bytes ? bytes : err;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,104 |
DBD-mysql | 7c164a0c86cec6ee95df1d141e67b0e85dfdefd2 | MYSQL *mysql_dr_connect(
SV* dbh,
MYSQL* sock,
char* mysql_socket,
char* host,
char* port,
char* user,
char* password,
char* dbname,
imp_dbh_t *imp_dbh)
{
int portNr;
unsigned int client_flag;
MYSQL* result;
dTHX;
D_imp_xxh(dbh);
/* per Monty, already in client.c in API */
/* but still not exist in libmysqld.c */
#if defined(DBD_MYSQL_EMBEDDED)
if (host && !*host) host = NULL;
#endif
portNr= (port && *port) ? atoi(port) : 0;
/* already in client.c in API */
/* if (user && !*user) user = NULL; */
/* if (password && !*password) password = NULL; */
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: host = |%s|, port = %d," \
" uid = %s, pwd = %s\n",
host ? host : "NULL", portNr,
user ? user : "NULL",
password ? password : "NULL");
{
#if defined(DBD_MYSQL_EMBEDDED)
if (imp_dbh)
{
D_imp_drh_from_dbh;
SV* sv = DBIc_IMP_DATA(imp_dbh);
if (sv && SvROK(sv))
{
SV** svp;
STRLEN lna;
char * options;
int server_args_cnt= 0;
int server_groups_cnt= 0;
int rc= 0;
char ** server_args = NULL;
char ** server_groups = NULL;
HV* hv = (HV*) SvRV(sv);
if (SvTYPE(hv) != SVt_PVHV)
return NULL;
if (!imp_drh->embedded.state)
{
/* Init embedded server */
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_embedded_groups", 21, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
options = SvPV(*svp, lna);
imp_drh->embedded.groups=newSVsv(*svp);
if ((server_groups_cnt=count_embedded_options(options)))
{
/* number of server_groups always server_groups+1 */
server_groups=fill_out_embedded_options(options, 0,
(int)lna, ++server_groups_cnt);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
{
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"Groups names passed to embedded server:\n");
print_embedded_options(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh), server_groups, server_groups_cnt);
}
}
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_embedded_options", 22, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
options = SvPV(*svp, lna);
imp_drh->embedded.args=newSVsv(*svp);
if ((server_args_cnt=count_embedded_options(options)))
{
/* number of server_options always server_options+1 */
server_args=fill_out_embedded_options(options, 1, (int)lna, ++server_args_cnt);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
{
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh), "Server options passed to embedded server:\n");
print_embedded_options(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh), server_args, server_args_cnt);
}
}
}
if (mysql_server_init(server_args_cnt, server_args, server_groups))
{
do_warn(dbh, AS_ERR_EMBEDDED, "Embedded server was not started. \
Could not initialize environment.");
return NULL;
}
imp_drh->embedded.state=1;
if (server_args_cnt)
free_embedded_options(server_args, server_args_cnt);
if (server_groups_cnt)
free_embedded_options(server_groups, server_groups_cnt);
}
else
{
/*
* Check if embedded parameters passed to connect() differ from
* first ones
*/
if ( ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_embedded_groups", 21, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp)))
rc =+ abs(sv_cmp(*svp, imp_drh->embedded.groups));
if ( ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_embedded_options", 22, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp)) )
rc =+ abs(sv_cmp(*svp, imp_drh->embedded.args));
if (rc)
{
do_warn(dbh, AS_ERR_EMBEDDED,
"Embedded server was already started. You cannot pass init\
parameters to embedded server once");
return NULL;
}
}
}
}
#endif
#ifdef MYSQL_NO_CLIENT_FOUND_ROWS
client_flag = 0;
#else
client_flag = CLIENT_FOUND_ROWS;
#endif
mysql_init(sock);
if (imp_dbh)
{
SV* sv = DBIc_IMP_DATA(imp_dbh);
DBIc_set(imp_dbh, DBIcf_AutoCommit, TRUE);
if (sv && SvROK(sv))
{
HV* hv = (HV*) SvRV(sv);
SV** svp;
STRLEN lna;
/* thanks to Peter John Edwards for mysql_init_command */
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_init_command", 18, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
char* df = SvPV(*svp, lna);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Setting" \
" init command (%s).\n", df);
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_INIT_COMMAND, df);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_compression", 17, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Enabling" \
" compression.\n");
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_OPT_COMPRESS, NULL);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_connect_timeout", 21, FALSE))
&& *svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
int to = SvIV(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Setting" \
" connect timeout (%d).\n",to);
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT,
(const char *)&to);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_write_timeout", 19, FALSE))
&& *svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
int to = SvIV(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Setting" \
" write timeout (%d).\n",to);
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_OPT_WRITE_TIMEOUT,
(const char *)&to);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_read_timeout", 18, FALSE))
&& *svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
int to = SvIV(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Setting" \
" read timeout (%d).\n",to);
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_OPT_READ_TIMEOUT,
(const char *)&to);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_skip_secure_auth", 22, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
my_bool secauth = 0;
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Skipping" \
" secure auth\n");
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_SECURE_AUTH, &secauth);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_read_default_file", 23, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
char* df = SvPV(*svp, lna);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Reading" \
" default file %s.\n", df);
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_READ_DEFAULT_FILE, df);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_read_default_group", 24,
FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp)) {
char* gr = SvPV(*svp, lna);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Using" \
" default group %s.\n", gr);
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_READ_DEFAULT_GROUP, gr);
}
#if (MYSQL_VERSION_ID >= 50606)
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_conn_attrs", 16, FALSE)) && *svp) {
HV* attrs = (HV*) SvRV(*svp);
HE* entry = NULL;
I32 num_entries = hv_iterinit(attrs);
while (num_entries && (entry = hv_iternext(attrs))) {
I32 retlen = 0;
char *attr_name = hv_iterkey(entry, &retlen);
SV *sv_attr_val = hv_iterval(attrs, entry);
char *attr_val = SvPV(sv_attr_val, lna);
mysql_options4(sock, MYSQL_OPT_CONNECT_ATTR_ADD, attr_name, attr_val);
}
}
#endif
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_client_found_rows", 23, FALSE)) && *svp)
{
if (SvTRUE(*svp))
client_flag |= CLIENT_FOUND_ROWS;
else
client_flag &= ~CLIENT_FOUND_ROWS;
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_use_result", 16, FALSE)) && *svp)
{
imp_dbh->use_mysql_use_result = SvTRUE(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->use_mysql_use_result: %d\n",
imp_dbh->use_mysql_use_result);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_bind_type_guessing", 24, TRUE)) && *svp)
{
imp_dbh->bind_type_guessing= SvTRUE(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->bind_type_guessing: %d\n",
imp_dbh->bind_type_guessing);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_bind_comment_placeholders", 31, FALSE)) && *svp)
{
imp_dbh->bind_comment_placeholders = SvTRUE(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->bind_comment_placeholders: %d\n",
imp_dbh->bind_comment_placeholders);
}
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_no_autocommit_cmd", 23, FALSE)) && *svp)
{
imp_dbh->no_autocommit_cmd= SvTRUE(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->no_autocommit_cmd: %d\n",
imp_dbh->no_autocommit_cmd);
}
#if FABRIC_SUPPORT
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_use_fabric", 16, FALSE)) &&
*svp && SvTRUE(*svp))
{
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->use_fabric: Enabling use of" \
" MySQL Fabric.\n");
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_OPT_USE_FABRIC, NULL);
}
#endif
#if defined(CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS)
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_multi_statements", 22, FALSE)) && *svp)
{
if (SvTRUE(*svp))
client_flag |= CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS;
else
client_flag &= ~CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS;
}
#endif
#if MYSQL_VERSION_ID >=SERVER_PREPARE_VERSION
/* took out client_flag |= CLIENT_PROTOCOL_41; */
/* because libmysql.c already sets this no matter what */
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_server_prepare", 20, FALSE))
&& *svp)
{
if (SvTRUE(*svp))
{
client_flag |= CLIENT_PROTOCOL_41;
imp_dbh->use_server_side_prepare = TRUE;
}
else
{
client_flag &= ~CLIENT_PROTOCOL_41;
imp_dbh->use_server_side_prepare = FALSE;
}
}
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->use_server_side_prepare: %d\n",
imp_dbh->use_server_side_prepare);
#endif
/* HELMUT */
#if defined(sv_utf8_decode) && MYSQL_VERSION_ID >=SERVER_PREPARE_VERSION
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_enable_utf8mb4", 20, FALSE)) && *svp && SvTRUE(*svp)) {
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_SET_CHARSET_NAME, "utf8mb4");
}
else if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_enable_utf8", 17, FALSE)) && *svp) {
/* Do not touch imp_dbh->enable_utf8 as we are called earlier
* than it is set and mysql_options() must be before:
* mysql_real_connect()
*/
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_SET_CHARSET_NAME,
(SvTRUE(*svp) ? "utf8" : "latin1"));
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"mysql_options: MYSQL_SET_CHARSET_NAME=%s\n",
(SvTRUE(*svp) ? "utf8" : "latin1"));
}
#endif
#if defined(DBD_MYSQL_WITH_SSL) && !defined(DBD_MYSQL_EMBEDDED) && \
(defined(CLIENT_SSL) || (MYSQL_VERSION_ID >= 40000))
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_ssl", 9, FALSE)) && *svp)
{
if (SvTRUE(*svp))
{
char *client_key = NULL;
char *client_cert = NULL;
char *ca_file = NULL;
char *ca_path = NULL;
char *cipher = NULL;
STRLEN lna;
#if MYSQL_VERSION_ID >= SSL_VERIFY_VERSION
/*
New code to utilise MySQLs new feature that verifies that the
server's hostname that the client connects to matches that of
the certificate
*/
my_bool ssl_verify_true = 0;
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_ssl_verify_server_cert", 28, FALSE)) && *svp)
ssl_verify_true = SvTRUE(*svp);
#endif
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_ssl_client_key", 20, FALSE)) && *svp)
client_key = SvPV(*svp, lna);
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_ssl_client_cert", 21, FALSE)) &&
*svp)
client_cert = SvPV(*svp, lna);
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_ssl_ca_file", 17, FALSE)) &&
*svp)
ca_file = SvPV(*svp, lna);
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_ssl_ca_path", 17, FALSE)) &&
*svp)
ca_path = SvPV(*svp, lna);
if ((svp = hv_fetch(hv, "mysql_ssl_cipher", 16, FALSE)) &&
*svp)
cipher = SvPV(*svp, lna);
mysql_ssl_set(sock, client_key, client_cert, ca_file,
ca_path, cipher);
#if MYSQL_VERSION_ID >= SSL_VERIFY_VERSION
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_OPT_SSL_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT, &ssl_verify_true);
#endif
client_flag |= CLIENT_SSL;
}
}
#endif
#if (MYSQL_VERSION_ID >= 32349)
/*
* MySQL 3.23.49 disables LOAD DATA LOCAL by default. Use
* mysql_local_infile=1 in the DSN to enable it.
*/
if ((svp = hv_fetch( hv, "mysql_local_infile", 18, FALSE)) && *svp)
{
unsigned int flag = SvTRUE(*svp);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh),
"imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: Using" \
" local infile %u.\n", flag);
mysql_options(sock, MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE, (const char *) &flag);
}
#endif
}
}
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh), "imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: client_flags = %d\n",
client_flag);
#if MYSQL_VERSION_ID >= MULTIPLE_RESULT_SET_VERSION
client_flag|= CLIENT_MULTI_RESULTS;
#endif
result = mysql_real_connect(sock, host, user, password, dbname,
portNr, mysql_socket, client_flag);
if (DBIc_TRACE_LEVEL(imp_xxh) >= 2)
PerlIO_printf(DBIc_LOGPIO(imp_xxh), "imp_dbh->mysql_dr_connect: <-");
if (result)
{
#if MYSQL_VERSION_ID >=SERVER_PREPARE_VERSION
/* connection succeeded. */
/* imp_dbh == NULL when mysql_dr_connect() is called from mysql.xs
functions (_admin_internal(),_ListDBs()). */
if (!(result->client_flag & CLIENT_PROTOCOL_41) && imp_dbh)
imp_dbh->use_server_side_prepare = FALSE;
#endif
#if MYSQL_ASYNC
if(imp_dbh) {
imp_dbh->async_query_in_flight = NULL;
}
#endif
/*
we turn off Mysql's auto reconnect and handle re-connecting ourselves
so that we can keep track of when this happens.
*/
result->reconnect=0;
}
else {
/*
sock was allocated with mysql_init()
fixes: https://rt.cpan.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=86153
Safefree(sock);
rurban: No, we still need this handle later in mysql_dr_error().
RT #97625. It will be freed as imp_dbh->pmysql in dbd_db_destroy(),
which is called by the DESTROY handler.
*/
}
return result;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,512 |
git | de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60 | static struct commit *handle_commit(struct rev_info *revs,
struct object_array_entry *entry)
{
struct object *object = entry->item;
const char *name = entry->name;
const char *path = entry->path;
unsigned int mode = entry->mode;
unsigned long flags = object->flags;
/*
* Tag object? Look what it points to..
*/
while (object->type == OBJ_TAG) {
struct tag *tag = (struct tag *) object;
if (revs->tag_objects && !(flags & UNINTERESTING))
add_pending_object(revs, object, tag->tag);
if (!tag->tagged)
die("bad tag");
object = parse_object(tag->tagged->oid.hash);
if (!object) {
if (flags & UNINTERESTING)
return NULL;
die("bad object %s", oid_to_hex(&tag->tagged->oid));
}
object->flags |= flags;
/*
* We'll handle the tagged object by looping or dropping
* through to the non-tag handlers below. Do not
* propagate path data from the tag's pending entry.
*/
path = NULL;
mode = 0;
}
/*
* Commit object? Just return it, we'll do all the complex
* reachability crud.
*/
if (object->type == OBJ_COMMIT) {
struct commit *commit = (struct commit *)object;
if (parse_commit(commit) < 0)
die("unable to parse commit %s", name);
if (flags & UNINTERESTING) {
mark_parents_uninteresting(commit);
revs->limited = 1;
}
if (revs->show_source && !commit->util)
commit->util = xstrdup(name);
return commit;
}
/*
* Tree object? Either mark it uninteresting, or add it
* to the list of objects to look at later..
*/
if (object->type == OBJ_TREE) {
struct tree *tree = (struct tree *)object;
if (!revs->tree_objects)
return NULL;
if (flags & UNINTERESTING) {
mark_tree_contents_uninteresting(tree);
return NULL;
}
add_pending_object_with_path(revs, object, name, mode, path);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Blob object? You know the drill by now..
*/
if (object->type == OBJ_BLOB) {
if (!revs->blob_objects)
return NULL;
if (flags & UNINTERESTING)
return NULL;
add_pending_object_with_path(revs, object, name, mode, path);
return NULL;
}
die("%s is unknown object", name);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,127 |
radare2 | 1dd65336f0f0c351d6ea853efcf73cf9c0030862 | static void r_coresym_cache_element_symbol_fini(RCoreSymCacheElementSymbol *sym) {
if (sym) {
free (sym->name);
free (sym->mangled_name);
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,493 |
linux | 42cb14b110a5698ccf26ce59c4441722605a3743 | void migrate_page_copy(struct page *newpage, struct page *page)
{
int cpupid;
if (PageHuge(page) || PageTransHuge(page))
copy_huge_page(newpage, page);
else
copy_highpage(newpage, page);
if (PageError(page))
SetPageError(newpage);
if (PageReferenced(page))
SetPageReferenced(newpage);
if (PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(newpage);
if (TestClearPageActive(page)) {
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageUnevictable(page), page);
SetPageActive(newpage);
} else if (TestClearPageUnevictable(page))
SetPageUnevictable(newpage);
if (PageChecked(page))
SetPageChecked(newpage);
if (PageMappedToDisk(page))
SetPageMappedToDisk(newpage);
if (PageDirty(page)) {
clear_page_dirty_for_io(page);
/*
* Want to mark the page and the radix tree as dirty, and
* redo the accounting that clear_page_dirty_for_io undid,
* but we can't use set_page_dirty because that function
* is actually a signal that all of the page has become dirty.
* Whereas only part of our page may be dirty.
*/
if (PageSwapBacked(page))
SetPageDirty(newpage);
else
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(newpage);
}
if (page_is_young(page))
set_page_young(newpage);
if (page_is_idle(page))
set_page_idle(newpage);
/*
* Copy NUMA information to the new page, to prevent over-eager
* future migrations of this same page.
*/
cpupid = page_cpupid_xchg_last(page, -1);
page_cpupid_xchg_last(newpage, cpupid);
ksm_migrate_page(newpage, page);
/*
* Please do not reorder this without considering how mm/ksm.c's
* get_ksm_page() depends upon ksm_migrate_page() and PageSwapCache().
*/
if (PageSwapCache(page))
ClearPageSwapCache(page);
ClearPagePrivate(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
/*
* If any waiters have accumulated on the new page then
* wake them up.
*/
if (PageWriteback(newpage))
end_page_writeback(newpage);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-3070 | CWE-476 | NULL Pointer Dereference | The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL. | Phase: Implementation
If all pointers that could have been modified are checked for NULL before use, nearly all NULL pointer dereferences can be prevented.
Phase: Requirements
Select a programming language that is not susceptible to these issues.
Phase: Implementation
Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is non-null before acting upon it.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: Checking the return value of the function will typically be sufficient, however beware of race conditions (CWE-362) in a concurrent environment. This solution does not handle the use of improperly initialized variables (CWE-665).
Phase: Architecture and Design
Identify all variables and data stores that receive information from external sources, and apply input validation to make sure that they are only initialized to expected values.
Phase: Implementation
Explicitly initialize all variables and other data stores, either during declaration or just before the first usage. | 7,987 |
php-src | 8fa9d1ce28f3a894b104979df30d0b65e0f21107 | int gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(gdImagePtr im, gdInterpolationMethod id)
{
if (im == NULL || id < 0 || id > GD_METHOD_COUNT) {
return 0;
}
switch (id) {
case GD_DEFAULT:
id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
/* Optimized versions */
case GD_BILINEAR_FIXED:
case GD_BICUBIC_FIXED:
case GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR:
case GD_WEIGHTED4:
im->interpolation = NULL;
break;
/* generic versions*/
case GD_BELL:
im->interpolation = filter_bell;
break;
case GD_BESSEL:
im->interpolation = filter_bessel;
break;
case GD_BICUBIC:
im->interpolation = filter_bicubic;
break;
case GD_BLACKMAN:
im->interpolation = filter_blackman;
break;
case GD_BOX:
im->interpolation = filter_box;
break;
case GD_BSPLINE:
im->interpolation = filter_bspline;
break;
case GD_CATMULLROM:
im->interpolation = filter_catmullrom;
break;
case GD_GAUSSIAN:
im->interpolation = filter_gaussian;
break;
case GD_GENERALIZED_CUBIC:
im->interpolation = filter_generalized_cubic;
break;
case GD_HERMITE:
im->interpolation = filter_hermite;
break;
case GD_HAMMING:
im->interpolation = filter_hamming;
break;
case GD_HANNING:
im->interpolation = filter_hanning;
break;
case GD_MITCHELL:
im->interpolation = filter_mitchell;
break;
case GD_POWER:
im->interpolation = filter_power;
break;
case GD_QUADRATIC:
im->interpolation = filter_quadratic;
break;
case GD_SINC:
im->interpolation = filter_sinc;
break;
case GD_TRIANGLE:
im->interpolation = filter_triangle;
break;
default:
return 0;
break;
}
im->interpolation_id = id;
return 1;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,213 |
postgres | 31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a | poly_path(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
POLYGON *poly = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0);
PATH *path;
int size;
int i;
size = offsetof(PATH, p[0]) +sizeof(path->p[0]) * poly->npts;
path = (PATH *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(path, size);
path->npts = poly->npts;
path->closed = TRUE;
/* prevent instability in unused pad bytes */
path->dummy = 0;
for (i = 0; i < poly->npts; i++)
{
path->p[i].x = poly->p[i].x;
path->p[i].y = poly->p[i].y;
}
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(path);
}
| 1 | CVE-2014-2669 | CWE-189 | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | Not Found in CWE Page | 1,524 |
FFmpeg | 4c3e1956ee35fdcc5ffdb28782050164b4623c0b | static int lag_decode_zero_run_line(LagarithContext *l, uint8_t *dst,
const uint8_t *src, const uint8_t *src_end,
int width, int esc_count)
{
int i = 0;
int count;
uint8_t zero_run = 0;
const uint8_t *src_start = src;
uint8_t mask1 = -(esc_count < 2);
uint8_t mask2 = -(esc_count < 3);
uint8_t *end = dst + (width - 2);
output_zeros:
if (l->zeros_rem) {
count = FFMIN(l->zeros_rem, width - i);
if (end - dst < count) {
av_log(l->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many zeros remaining.\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
memset(dst, 0, count);
l->zeros_rem -= count;
dst += count;
}
while (dst < end) {
i = 0;
while (!zero_run && dst + i < end) {
i++;
if (src + i >= src_end)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
zero_run =
!(src[i] | (src[i + 1] & mask1) | (src[i + 2] & mask2));
}
if (zero_run) {
zero_run = 0;
i += esc_count;
memcpy(dst, src, i);
dst += i;
l->zeros_rem = lag_calc_zero_run(src[i]);
src += i + 1;
goto output_zeros;
} else {
memcpy(dst, src, i);
src += i;
dst += i;
}
}
return src_start - src;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,212 |
linux | 4c185ce06dca14f5cea192f5a2c981ef50663f2b | void exit_aio(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct kioctx_table *table = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->ioctx_table);
int i;
if (!table)
return;
for (i = 0; i < table->nr; ++i) {
struct kioctx *ctx = table->table[i];
struct completion requests_done =
COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(requests_done);
if (!ctx)
continue;
/*
* We don't need to bother with munmap() here - exit_mmap(mm)
* is coming and it'll unmap everything. And we simply can't,
* this is not necessarily our ->mm.
* Since kill_ioctx() uses non-zero ->mmap_size as indicator
* that it needs to unmap the area, just set it to 0.
*/
ctx->mmap_size = 0;
kill_ioctx(mm, ctx, &requests_done);
/* Wait until all IO for the context are done. */
wait_for_completion(&requests_done);
}
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->ioctx_table, NULL);
kfree(table);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,857 |
FFmpeg | 2fc108f60f98cd00813418a8754a46476b404a3c | int ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
unsigned startcode, v;
int ret;
int vol = 0;
/* search next start code */
align_get_bits(gb);
// If we have not switched to studio profile than we also did not switch bps
// that means something else (like a previous instance) outside set bps which
// would be inconsistant with the currect state, thus reset it
if (!s->studio_profile && s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample != 8)
s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = 0;
if (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("WV1F") && show_bits(gb, 24) == 0x575630) {
skip_bits(gb, 24);
if (get_bits(gb, 8) == 0xF0)
goto end;
}
startcode = 0xff;
for (;;) {
if (get_bits_count(gb) >= gb->size_in_bits) {
if (gb->size_in_bits == 8 &&
(ctx->divx_version >= 0 || ctx->xvid_build >= 0) || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("QMP4")) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "frame skip %d\n", gb->size_in_bits);
return FRAME_SKIPPED; // divx bug
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // end of stream
}
/* use the bits after the test */
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | v) & 0xffffffff;
if ((startcode & 0xFFFFFF00) != 0x100)
continue; // no startcode
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "startcode: %3X ", startcode);
if (startcode <= 0x11F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x12F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Layer Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x13F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x15F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FGS bp start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1AF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode == 0x1B0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq End");
else if (startcode == 0x1B2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "User Data");
else if (startcode == 0x1B3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Group of VOP start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B4)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Session Error");
else if (startcode == 0x1B5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B6)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B7)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "slice start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B8)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "extension start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B9)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fgs start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BA)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BB)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BC)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BD)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Still Texture Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Spatial Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture SNR Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Tile start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Shape Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "stuffing start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1C5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x1FF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "System start");
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " at %d\n", get_bits_count(gb));
}
if (startcode >= 0x120 && startcode <= 0x12F) {
if (vol) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring multiple VOL headers\n");
continue;
}
vol++;
if ((ret = decode_vol_header(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE) {
decode_user_data(ctx, gb);
} else if (startcode == GOP_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_gop_header(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOS_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_profile_level(s, gb);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO &&
(s->avctx->level > 0 && s->avctx->level < 9)) {
s->studio_profile = 1;
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 0);
}
} else if (startcode == VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE) {
if (s->studio_profile) {
if ((ret = decode_studiovisualobject(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else
mpeg4_decode_visual_object(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOP_STARTCODE) {
break;
}
align_get_bits(gb);
startcode = 0xff;
}
end:
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)
s->low_delay = 1;
s->avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (s->studio_profile) {
if (!s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing VOL header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return decode_studio_vop_header(ctx, gb);
} else
return decode_vop_header(ctx, gb);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,433 |
Chrome | 673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608 | void Initialized(mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_buffer,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket_handle,
bool initially_muted) {
ASSERT_TRUE(shared_buffer.is_valid());
ASSERT_TRUE(socket_handle.is_valid());
base::PlatformFile fd;
mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket_handle), &fd);
socket_ = std::make_unique<base::CancelableSyncSocket>(fd);
EXPECT_NE(socket_->handle(), base::CancelableSyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
size_t memory_length;
base::SharedMemoryHandle shmem_handle;
bool read_only;
EXPECT_EQ(
mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(shared_buffer), &shmem_handle,
&memory_length, &read_only),
MOJO_RESULT_OK);
EXPECT_TRUE(read_only);
buffer_ = std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(shmem_handle, read_only);
GotNotification(initially_muted);
}
| 1 | CVE-2018-6063 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 7,287 |
w3m | a6257663824c63abb3c62c4dd62455fe6f63d958 | if (status == R_ST_AMP) {
r2 = tagbuf->ptr;
t = getescapecmd(&r2);
if (*t != '\r' && *t != '\n')
len += get_strwidth(t) + get_strwidth(r2);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,110 |
linux | 5edabca9d4cff7f1f2b68f0bac55ef99d9798ba4 | static void dccp_enqueue_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__skb_pull(skb, dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_doff * 4);
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,468 |
launchpad | 29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac | static void Set(ContentMainDelegate* delegate, bool single_process) {
ContentClient* content_client = oxide::ContentClient::GetInstance();
content_client->browser_ = delegate->CreateContentBrowserClient();
if (single_process) {
content_client->renderer_ = delegate->CreateContentRendererClient();
content_client->utility_ = delegate->CreateContentUtilityClient();
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,471 |
busybox | 0402cb32df015d9372578e3db27db47b33d5c7b0 | int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char c;
int i = unpack_bz2_stream(0, 1);
if (i < 0)
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", bunzip_errors[-i]);
else if (read(STDIN_FILENO, &c, 1))
fprintf(stderr, "Trailing garbage ignored\n");
return -i;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,000 |
Chrome | 69ec52bd0b32622770a25952386596ccb4ad6434 | LayoutUnit NGFlexLayoutAlgorithm::MainAxisContentExtent(
LayoutUnit sum_hypothetical_main_size) {
if (Style().IsColumnFlexDirection()) {
return ComputeBlockSizeForFragment(
ConstraintSpace(), Style(),
sum_hypothetical_main_size + (borders_ + padding_).BlockSum()) -
border_scrollbar_padding_.BlockSum();
}
return content_box_size_.inline_size;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,493 |
openssl | 6e629b5be45face20b4ca71c4fcbfed78b864a2e | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
int purpose;
int allow_proxy_certs;
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent) {
allow_proxy_certs = 0;
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
} else {
allow_proxy_certs =
! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
/*
* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
* happy
*/
if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
allow_proxy_certs = 1;
purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
}
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
switch (must_be_ca) {
case -1:
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
break;
case 0:
if (ret != 0) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
break;
default:
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1))) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (ret == 0) {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1))) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
}
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
&& (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
/* Increment path length if not self issued */
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
plen++;
/*
* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
* must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
* the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
*/
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
/*
* RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
* is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
* the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
* should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
*
* Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
* with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
* and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
* increment proxy_path_length.
*/
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
} else
must_be_ca = 1;
}
ok = 1;
end:
return ok;
#endif
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,577 |
linux | 54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed | static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 eb;
eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
(1u << NM_VECTOR) | (1u << DB_VECTOR);
if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
(KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
eb = ~0;
if (enable_ept)
eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR); /* bypass_guest_pf = 0 */
if (vcpu->fpu_active)
eb &= ~(1u << NM_VECTOR);
/* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
* certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
* them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
* specified above if L1 did not want them.
*/
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
}
| 1 | CVE-2015-5307 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 9,586 |
Android | d834160d9759f1098df692b34e6eeb548f9e317b | OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::useBuffer(
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE **header,
OMX_U32 portIndex,
OMX_PTR appPrivate,
OMX_U32 size,
OMX_U8 *ptr) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
*header = new OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE;
(*header)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nRevision = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nStep = 0;
(*header)->pBuffer = ptr;
(*header)->nAllocLen = size;
(*header)->nFilledLen = 0;
(*header)->nOffset = 0;
(*header)->pAppPrivate = appPrivate;
(*header)->pPlatformPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pInputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pOutputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->hMarkTargetComponent = NULL;
(*header)->pMarkData = NULL;
(*header)->nTickCount = 0;
(*header)->nTimeStamp = 0;
(*header)->nFlags = 0;
(*header)->nOutputPortIndex = portIndex;
(*header)->nInputPortIndex = portIndex;
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
CHECK(mState == OMX_StateLoaded || port->mDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE);
CHECK_LT(port->mBuffers.size(), port->mDef.nBufferCountActual);
port->mBuffers.push();
BufferInfo *buffer =
&port->mBuffers.editItemAt(port->mBuffers.size() - 1);
buffer->mHeader = *header;
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mBuffers.size() == port->mDef.nBufferCountActual) {
port->mDef.bPopulated = OMX_TRUE;
checkTransitions();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-0817 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 3,462 |
tcpdump | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | l2tp_framing_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-13006 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 5,489 |
Chrome | c7a90019bf7054145b11d2577b851cf2779d3d79 | void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
if (print_web_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
WebFrame* pdf_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, &prepare)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize print page settings";
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(job_settings, false)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-3897 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 2,517 |
ngiflib | cf429e0a2fe26b5f01ce0c8e9b79432e94509b6e | int CheckGif(u8 * b) {
return (b[0]=='G')&&(b[1]=='I')&&(b[2]=='F')&&(b[3]=='8');
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,235 |
php | 1ddf72180a52d247db88ea42a3e35f824a8fbda1 | static php_stream *phar_make_dirstream(char *dir, HashTable *manifest TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *data;
int dirlen = strlen(dir);
phar_zstr key;
char *entry, *found, *save, *str_key;
uint keylen;
ulong unused;
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(data);
zend_hash_init(data, 64, zend_get_hash_value, NULL, 0);
if ((*dir == '/' && dirlen == 1 && (manifest->nNumOfElements == 0)) || (dirlen >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(dir, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1))) {
/* make empty root directory for empty phar */
/* make empty directory for .phar magic directory */
efree(dir);
return php_stream_alloc(&phar_dir_ops, data, NULL, "r");
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(manifest);
while (FAILURE != zend_hash_has_more_elements(manifest)) {
if (HASH_KEY_IS_STRING != zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(manifest, &key, &keylen, &unused, 0, NULL)) {
break;
}
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
if (keylen <= (uint)dirlen) {
if (keylen < (uint)dirlen || !strncmp(str_key, dir, dirlen)) {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
}
}
if (*dir == '/') {
/* root directory */
if (keylen >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(str_key, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
/* do not add any magic entries to this directory */
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
}
if (NULL != (found = (char *) memchr(str_key, '/', keylen))) {
/* the entry has a path separator and is a subdirectory */
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(found - str_key, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, str_key, found - str_key);
keylen = found - str_key;
entry[keylen] = '\0';
} else {
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(keylen, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, str_key, keylen);
entry[keylen] = '\0';
}
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
goto PHAR_ADD_ENTRY;
} else {
if (0 != memcmp(str_key, dir, dirlen)) {
/* entry in directory not found */
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
} else {
if (str_key[dirlen] != '/') {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
continue;
}
}
}
save = str_key;
save += dirlen + 1; /* seek to just past the path separator */
if (NULL != (found = (char *) memchr(save, '/', keylen - dirlen - 1))) {
/* is subdirectory */
save -= dirlen + 1;
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(found - save + dirlen, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, save + dirlen + 1, found - save - dirlen - 1);
keylen = found - save - dirlen - 1;
entry[keylen] = '\0';
} else {
/* is file */
save -= dirlen + 1;
entry = (char *) safe_emalloc(keylen - dirlen, 1, 1);
memcpy(entry, save + dirlen + 1, keylen - dirlen - 1);
entry[keylen - dirlen - 1] = '\0';
keylen = keylen - dirlen - 1;
}
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
PHAR_ADD_ENTRY:
if (keylen) {
phar_add_empty(data, entry, keylen);
}
efree(entry);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
break;
}
}
if (FAILURE != zend_hash_has_more_elements(data)) {
efree(dir);
if (zend_hash_sort(data, zend_qsort, phar_compare_dir_name, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
FREE_HASHTABLE(data);
return NULL;
}
return php_stream_alloc(&phar_dir_ops, data, NULL, "r");
} else {
efree(dir);
return php_stream_alloc(&phar_dir_ops, data, NULL, "r");
}
}
/* }}}*/
| 1 | CVE-2015-7804 | CWE-189 | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | Not Found in CWE Page | 8,918 |
linux | 6e8ab72a812396996035a37e5ca4b3b99b5d214b | int ext4_inline_data_fiemap(struct inode *inode,
struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
int *has_inline, __u64 start, __u64 len)
{
__u64 physical = 0;
__u64 inline_len;
__u32 flags = FIEMAP_EXTENT_DATA_INLINE | FIEMAP_EXTENT_NOT_ALIGNED |
FIEMAP_EXTENT_LAST;
int error = 0;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
*has_inline = 0;
goto out;
}
inline_len = min_t(size_t, ext4_get_inline_size(inode),
i_size_read(inode));
if (start >= inline_len)
goto out;
if (start + len < inline_len)
inline_len = start + len;
inline_len -= start;
error = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc);
if (error)
goto out;
physical = (__u64)iloc.bh->b_blocknr << inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
physical += (char *)ext4_raw_inode(&iloc) - iloc.bh->b_data;
physical += offsetof(struct ext4_inode, i_block);
if (physical)
error = fiemap_fill_next_extent(fieinfo, start, physical,
inline_len, flags);
brelse(iloc.bh);
out:
up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return (error < 0 ? error : 0);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,976 |
linux | 13054abbaa4f1fd4e6f3b4b63439ec033b4c8035 | static int hid_debug_events_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int err = 0;
struct hid_debug_list *list;
unsigned long flags;
if (!(list = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hid_debug_list), GFP_KERNEL))) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
err = kfifo_alloc(&list->hid_debug_fifo, HID_DEBUG_FIFOSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err) {
kfree(list);
goto out;
}
list->hdev = (struct hid_device *) inode->i_private;
file->private_data = list;
mutex_init(&list->read_mutex);
spin_lock_irqsave(&list->hdev->debug_list_lock, flags);
list_add_tail(&list->node, &list->hdev->debug_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->hdev->debug_list_lock, flags);
out:
return err;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,265 |
ImageMagick | 424d40ebfcde48bb872eba75179d3d73704fdf1f | static MagickBooleanType WritePDBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
const char
*comment;
int
bits;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PDBImage
pdb_image;
PDBInfo
pdb_info;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
literal,
packets,
packet_size,
repeat;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*runlength,
*scanline;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((image -> colors <= 2 ) ||
(GetImageType(image,&image->exception ) == BilevelType)) {
bits_per_pixel=1;
} else if (image->colors <= 4) {
bits_per_pixel=2;
} else if (image->colors <= 8) {
bits_per_pixel=3;
} else {
bits_per_pixel=4;
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pdb_info,0,sizeof(pdb_info));
(void) CopyMagickString(pdb_info.name,image_info->filename,
sizeof(pdb_info.name));
pdb_info.attributes=0;
pdb_info.version=0;
pdb_info.create_time=time(NULL);
pdb_info.modify_time=pdb_info.create_time;
pdb_info.archive_time=0;
pdb_info.modify_number=0;
pdb_info.application_info=0;
pdb_info.sort_info=0;
(void) CopyMagickMemory(pdb_info.type,"vIMG",4);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(pdb_info.id,"View",4);
pdb_info.seed=0;
pdb_info.next_record=0;
comment=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
pdb_info.number_records=(comment == (const char *) NULL ? 1 : 2);
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_info.name),(unsigned char *) pdb_info.name);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.attributes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.create_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.modify_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.archive_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.modify_number);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.application_info);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.sort_info);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.type);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.id);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.seed);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.next_record);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.number_records);
(void) CopyMagickString(pdb_image.name,pdb_info.name,sizeof(pdb_image.name));
pdb_image.version=1; /* RLE Compressed */
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0xff; break; /* monochrome */
case 2: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0x00; break; /* 2 bit gray */
default: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0x02; /* 4 bit gray */
}
pdb_image.reserved_1=0;
pdb_image.note=0;
pdb_image.x_last=0;
pdb_image.y_last=0;
pdb_image.reserved_2=0;
pdb_image.x_anchor=(unsigned short) 0xffff;
pdb_image.y_anchor=(unsigned short) 0xffff;
pdb_image.width=(short) image->columns;
if (image->columns % 16)
pdb_image.width=(short) (16*(image->columns/16+1));
pdb_image.height=(short) image->rows;
packets=((bits_per_pixel*image->columns+7)/8);
runlength=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(9UL*packets,
image->rows*sizeof(*runlength));
if (runlength == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
packet_size=(size_t) (image->depth > 8 ? 2: 1);
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Convert to GRAY raster scanline.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bits=8/(int) bits_per_pixel-1; /* start at most significant bits */
literal=0;
repeat=0;
q=runlength;
buffer[0]=0x00;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,scanline,&image->exception);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pdb_image.width; x++)
{
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
buffer[literal+repeat]|=(0xff-scanline[x*packet_size]) >>
(8-bits_per_pixel) << bits*bits_per_pixel;
bits--;
if (bits < 0)
{
if (((literal+repeat) > 0) &&
(buffer[literal+repeat] == buffer[literal+repeat-1]))
{
if (repeat == 0)
{
literal--;
repeat++;
}
repeat++;
if (0x7f < repeat)
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
literal=0;
repeat=0;
}
}
else
{
if (repeat >= 2)
literal+=repeat;
else
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
buffer[0]=buffer[literal+repeat];
literal=0;
}
literal++;
repeat=0;
if (0x7f < literal)
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,(literal < 0x80 ? literal : 0x80),0);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(buffer,buffer+literal+repeat,0x80);
literal-=0x80;
}
}
bits=8/(int) bits_per_pixel-1;
buffer[literal+repeat]=0x00;
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
/*
Write the Image record header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (TellBlob(image)+8*
pdb_info.number_records));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x40);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x6f);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x80);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
/*
Write the comment record header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (TellBlob(image)+8+58+q-
runlength));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x40);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x6f);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x80);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,1);
}
/*
Write the Image data.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(pdb_image.name),(unsigned char *)
pdb_image.name);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) pdb_image.version);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pdb_image.type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.reserved_1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.note);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.x_last);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.y_last);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.reserved_2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,pdb_image.x_anchor);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,pdb_image.y_anchor);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.width);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.height);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-runlength),runlength);
runlength=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,comment);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-7537 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 1,097 |
cpython | 6c004b40f9d51872d848981ef1a18bb08c2dfc42 | _PyBytes_Join(PyObject *sep, PyObject *x)
{
assert(sep != NULL && PyBytes_Check(sep));
assert(x != NULL);
return bytes_join(sep, x);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,416 |
Chrome | b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201 | JSValue JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Node* target = toNode(exec->argument(0));
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
JSObject* optionsObject = exec->argument(1).getObject();
if (!optionsObject) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return jsUndefined();
}
JSDictionary dictionary(exec, optionsObject);
MutationObserverOptions options = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < numBooleanOptions; ++i) {
bool option = false;
if (!dictionary.tryGetProperty(booleanOptions[i].name, option))
return jsUndefined();
if (option)
options |= booleanOptions[i].value;
}
HashSet<AtomicString> attributeFilter;
if (!dictionary.tryGetProperty("attributeFilter", attributeFilter))
return jsUndefined();
if (!attributeFilter.isEmpty())
options |= WebKitMutationObserver::AttributeFilter;
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
impl()->observe(target, options, attributeFilter, ec);
if (ec)
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return jsUndefined();
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-2350 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 3,573 |
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